CRR Yibal Khuf Rap Roject

Health Risk Assessment Report
for
Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA
06.07.2013
by
Fourie, Natashia
Printed: 24/04/2014 Printed copies of this docume nt should be treated as information of te mpor ary value and destroyed after use
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Table of Contents
0. Introduction to the HRA report ______________________________________________________________________ 3
1. HRA Scope __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3
2. HRA Team ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 5
3. Remedial Actions____________________________________________________________________________________ 6
4. Health Hazard Inventory and Detailed Risk Apprai sals _____________________________________________13
5. Generic Control s, Recovery Measure s and Remedial Actions _____________________________________57
6. Control statements for Low RAM Hazards _________________________________________________________58
Appendix 1: Definitions _______________________________________________________________________________59
Appendix 2: Ri sk Asse ssment Matrix _________________________________________________________________61
Appendix 3: Overview of Detailed Risk Apprai sals ___________________________________________________62
Appendix 4: Yibal Khuff FEED Combined HHI 23 May 2013 ___________________________________________64
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0. Introduction to the HRA report

IT
The Health Risk Assessment (HRA) report is created from oneHealt h , the global system used by Shell
Healt h to process and store health related information.
The report starts with a description of the scope of the HRA and the persons involved in sections 1 and 2.
The remedial actions from the HRA are pres ented in report section 3, and are sorted by priority. Section 4
provides information from the detailed appraisals. The focus here is on High and Medium RAM rated risks.
Section 5 provides an overview of generally applicable controls and recovery measures. Section 6 lists the
status of the Low RAM rated risks that were reviewed during the HRA. The report concludes with definitions
and a diagram of the RAM risk matrix in appendices 1 and 2. Appendix 3 contains an overview of the
detailed risk appraisals and their page numbers.
Blank cells in tables in the report indicate fields that are available for cont aining information, but are currently
IT
not populated in oneHealth .
1. HRA Scope
This is the Yibal Khuff (YK ) Project FEED HRA. This HRA does not cover the construction activities for the
facility. The purpose of the HRA is to identify high level potential health hazards associated with the YK
project and the controls necessary to manage health risks to ALARP once the project is in operational
phase. During FEED, there is an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of engineering controls in the
design, that when implemented, can reduce pers onal exposures to ALARP through the applic ation of the
hierarchy of controls. This report also identified areas that need to be re -assessed and these items are
captured as remedial action.
An HRA workshop was held in PDO FEED offices on the 16th and 23rd May 2013. With the input from the
attendees of this workshop, a high level health risk was prepared (attached to this HRA) which was used to
prepare this HRA.
The Yibal Khuff Sudair integrated project provides the opportunity to safely develop the Yibal Khuff/Sudair
reservoirs to realize synergy between the depletion of the Upper Khuff oil rim and its AG, and Khuff-5 and
Sudair NAG reservoirs. This development will add directly to PDO’s future oil production potential through
the development of an oil rim with S TOIIP of 127 mln m3, and through oil benefits that may be realised from
utilising the majority of the produced gas for power generation and EOR developments. The project is
strategic in nature, as the sweet export gas from gas -in-place volumes tot alling ~ 78 bln Sm3 will go t o
supporting Oman’s mid to long term gas supply requirements.
The major objectives of the YK Project are as follows :-
a. Production of sour oil & gas from the Upper Khuff Associated Gas (AG) reservoir and gas & condensat e
from the Lower Khuff and Sudair Non Associated Gas (NAG) reservoirs by means of an optimised integrated
depletion strategy.
b. Export of sweet gas to the Government Gas System to support Oman’s mid to long term gas demand and
PDO’s internal need for EOR projects and power generation.
c. Production of stabilised oil which is exported to the Main Oil Line (MOL) at Yibal A.
d. Produc ed water treatment and disposal by routing to the water injection and disposal system at Yibal A.
The facility will consist of on- and off plot facilities.
a. A description of the on-plot facilities are as follows:
 A new CPF location to the sout hwest of the Yibal field area.
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 2-phase inlet separator to receive and separat e liquid and gas.

 Acid Gas Removal Unit (AGRU) using Shell Sulfinol X where deep removal of H2S, CO2, RSH and
COS is accomplished.
 Gas dehydration and RSH removal (Mol sieve) unit for water and trac e RS H removal to meet 5
ppmv tot al S specifications.
 Gas conditioning (Hydrocarbon dew pointing) unit to meet cricondent herm specifications of export
gas.
 Gas export facilities comprising 1 x 100% single stage, fixed speed centrifugal machine.
 Nitrogen Removal Unit (NRU) to meet the nitrogen specification in the sales gas. Mercury removal is
installed upstream of the NRU.
 Export gas compression.
 Acid Gas Enrichment Unit (A GEU) using Shell ADIP-M to mak e the acid gas from AGRU suitable for
processing in the Sulphur Recovery Unit (S RU).
 Sulphur Recovery comprising 2 x 65% SRU, sulphur degassing and
 incinerator and CANSOLV SO2 scrubbing to meet sulphur rec overy efficiency and
 SO2 emissions regulation.
 Sulphur handling comprising liquid sulphur storage and sulphur blocking facility.
 Oil handling system comprising 3 -phase separation, flash gas compression, oil dehydration &
desalting, stabilization, storage and export.
 Water handling system comprising 2 x 100% sour water stripping, wat er storage and disposal
pumps.
 A 50 MW Power plant using a Frame 6B gas turbine and HRSG, utilising steam to supplement the
steam being generated from waste heat recovered in the sulphur recovery process. A back-
pressure Steam turbine generator using MP steam as the motive fluid.
 Steam generation and distribution for Mo and LP level wit h 2 MP auxiliary boilers.
 A closed chilled water cooling medium system with mechanical refrigeration unit using R-134a as
refrigerant.
 Water wells to supply raw water from the Yibal shallow aquifer to the CPF.
 A utility complex including raw water treatment facilities to produce demineralised and boiler feed
water, closed drain system, instrument and breathing air systems, fire water, and nitrogen
generation.
 A waste and produced water disposal pipeline tied into the water flood and disposal system to Yibal
A.
 Flare system (AP, LP, and Cry ogenic for NRU).
 Drain Systems.
 Provisions for future depletion compression, including plot space and process tie-ins.
 Waste handling and effluent treatment facility.
b) A description of the off-plot facilities are as follows:
 47 well sites, each comprising the wellhead, Instrumented Over -pressure P rotection System
(IOPPS), choke valve, chemical injection skids, hydraulics package, wellhead control panel, Fire and
Gas detection and CCTV.
 Each well site is tied back to one of three Remote Manifold Gathering Stations (RMS) through 6 inc h
GRE buried Flowlines.
 Three new Remote Manifold Gathering Stations (RMS); West RMS located 11 km to the North West
of the Yibal Khuff CPF, E ast RMS located 12.4 km to the North E ast of the Yibal Khuff CPF and the
South RMS locat ed 7.5 km to the North-East of the new CPF location.
 The West RMS will have 9 wells, the East RMS will have 17 wells and the South RMS will have 21
wells.
 Each RMS will comprise production and test manifolds, a Multiphase Flow Meter (MPFM), chemical
injection skids, maintenance flare with combined flare and drains drum, pig launchers, control and
safeguarding panel, Fire and Gas detection and CCTV.
 A single 11 km 14 inch buried carbon steel pipeline from the West RMS, a single 7.5 km 16 inc h
buried carbon steel pipeline from the South RMS, and dual 12.4 km 12 inch buried carbon pipelines
from the East RMS.
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 A single 9.7 km 16 inch buried CS Gas Export Pipeline from new YK -CPF to Yibal-GGP to be tied in
upstream of the existing 36 inch Government Gas Pipeline.
 A single 11 km 8 inch buried CS Oil Export Pipeline from new YK-CPF to Yibal-A station, with tie-ins
at the existing dehydration tanks and downstream of the existing 16 inch MOL.
 A single 10.4 km 8 inc h buried CS-PE lined Produc ed Water Export Pipeline from new YK-CPF to
Yibal-A station, with tie-in at the existing skim tanks.
2. HRA Team
Responsible for HRA: Fourie, Natashia
Input Provided By: Greg Hampson - HSE Advisor
Input also rec eived from:
 PDO-HSE-FEE D
 Safety Engineering
 Production Chemist
 PDO Occupational Health
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3. Remedial Actions
Priority Work Area Hazard, RAM Rating and Scenario Recommended Remedial Action
Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Heat Stress / Hot Temperature Differentials Process design/equipment standards - Provide confirmation
Medium of a BA portable system. Complete (Updated BA
Philosophy and Safety Equipment Specification – Jan 31,
2014 GJH). Include MCOH BA Quality Specification.
All staff working on process facilities and near Written procedure/safe work practice - P rovide verification
flare has the pot ential risk of exposure to heat of how air quality and temperature of BA air will be
when working out doors, typical temperature regulated. MCOH Feb 15, 2014.
ranges being 32-40 degrees Celsius. Working Written procedure/safe work practice - Define the range of
with BA (breathing apparatus ) and confined climatic conditions for “normal”, “restricted” and no work
space entry work presents an additional risk under BA sets. Provide rule-set for working under SCBA/BA
factor due to the increased met abolic rate due in high temperatures (work rest regimen) Use the OGP
to PPE load. protocol – MCOH Feb 15, 2014. Compliment with SP-1231.
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited
schedules - Define critical activities and conduct risk
assessment for use of BA sets. (1.) FTW protocol – MCOH
to provide, 2.) Review the S hell (Natashia), Harweel and
Kashagan procedures and provide guidance on
recommended good practice for YK and B IP – MCOH Feb
28, 2014.
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Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Hydrogen sulfide containing streams with H2S Process design/equipment standards - Provide ALARP
> 1000 ppm mole (600 mg/kg) or >100 ppm demonstration for flanges above ground vs pits.
vapour space (7783-06-4) Written procedure/safe work practice - Confirm a respirator
Medium fit testing procedure. V erify fit testing program for persons
with facial hair. (MCOH to provide new procedure
Procedure addressing Quantitative and Qualititative
Mechanic al/instrument maintenance operat ors requirements for fit testing by March 31, 2014 ).
are potentially exposed to Hydrogen Sulfide
during normal operations and during invasive
maintenance. Exposure scenario's exists in
process streams (bot h operations and
maintenance); well pad works, well testing
(new wells), remote manifolds; leaks from
process equipment; oil stabilizer on export line
(H2S scavenger); spend dessicant from the
MSU and sampling.
Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Legionella bacteria (waterborne) Written procedure/safe work practice - Determine water
Medium treatment/equipment maintenance philosophy to reduce bio -
filming and scale prevention. (Legionella monitoring
program planned in PDO in 2014).
All staff (on plot and off plot) has the potential Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that the
to be exposed to the following Legionella design of potential water sources prevents aerosols, dead
sources: showers/ aerolised water, wat er from legs and stagnant water. FEED HSE to review and confirm
fire water systems, potable water, any scenario any issues by Jan 31, 2014.
where ambient temperature wat er may Written procedure/safe work practice - Identify and
become airborne and inhaled. document water systems and equipment that are a potential
source of Legionella; assess water systems and equipment
for the risk of Legionella and define a monitoring and control
programme. 1.) FEED HSE to identify any risks. 2.)
MCOH to work with P T HSE to provide appropriate control
measures for the risks identified – April 30, 2014.
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Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Psychological Hazards and Stress Local Remedial Action - Implement entertainment and other
High facilities for long term shift staff in accommodations. P T-
OR&A – Closed - Entertainment facilities are provided at the
existing Yibal camp.
All staff (on and off plot ) have the potential to Written procedure/safe work practice - Confirm that PDO
experience isolation from family and friends, expectations for shift rotations and employee welfare
especially those on rotational duty; working on included in Contractor Agreements. PT – complete during
dead-lines, pressure owning to the nature of the Execute phas e.
the work environment is inherent. Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited
schedules - Confirm that a monitoring system is in place to
verify Contractor compliance to local Labour Law pertaining
to work cycle and annual leave. PT – complete during the
Execute phase.
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited
schedules - Confirm a fatigue risk management program is
available for implementation covering HSE critical jobs.
MCOH to confirm forward strategy for fatigue management
in PDO and advise by Jan 31, 2014.
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2 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Sulfur dioxide- SO2 (7446-09-5) Local Remedial Action - FEE D HSE to verify that the
Medium Cont rol Room is in a safe location for toxic SO2 enduranc e
in accordance with PDO SP 1190. Open – MCOH, FEE D
HSE and P T HSE and P T Op’s to meet to review and agree
Potential exposure for all site staff during on the criteria – January 16, 2014.
flaring of gas cont aining H2S; Pouring of Sulfur Process design/equipment standards - Verify that
blocks; Liquid sulfur; Sulfur fires and Jet/pool observation ports on run down lines are included in design
fires. Operations and Maint enance staff have philosophy. Confirmed.
an increased risk of potential exposure to Process design/equipment standards - State what the
sources mentioned here. ALARP effort is in the event where the degasser does not
work efficiently (leading to inc reased potential for S O2 and
HS2 emissions during pouring operations). Provide PDO
occupational exposure criteria and environmental air quality
criteria. FEED HSE to complete by January 31, 2014.
Process design/ equipment standards - Demonstrate ALA RP
for the absorber by-pass to meet environment and
occupational tolerability criteria through the CA NSOLV
design. Confirmed. See CANS OLV Stack technical note.
Process design/ equipment standards - Verify provision of
dilution gas when flaring acid gas to complete the
combustion process and improve dispersion standards.
Confirmed.
4 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Visible light (too much; too little) - wavelength Process design/equipment standards - Confirm design in
400 - 780 nm (non-ionizing radiation) accordance with HFE DEP’s and FEED Emergency
Low lightning guideline (GU/705). FEED HSE to Confirm by
90% Model.
Process design/equipment standards - HFE study to include
All staff are potentially expos ed to insufficient lessons learned from previously poorly designed Control
lighting and poor night time illumination of the Rooms in PDO facilities. FEED HSE to confirm by Jan 15,
plant and facilities. 2014.
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TB D Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Air pollution (environmental health hazard) Monitoring: other measurements - Verify whether ongoing
Low fugitive emissions monitoring programs will be implemented.
1.) MCOH t o advise whether the risk should be increased t o
“M” basis recent developments with exposure to diesel
Potentially impacted staff are on-plot and engine exhaust. Also advise on monitoring program
maintenance staff who work around flues with planned in PDO – January 31, 2014. 2.) FEED HSE to
incinerators; working on plat forms with poor update HRA with inputs from MCOH. 3.) P T HSE to con firm
ventilation. Other sources are process leak environmental monitoring requirements for the new facilities.
sources/ valves/flanges etc. 4.) P T HSE to confirm any requirements for Fugitive
Emissions monitoring and any design implications –
clarification of SP-1005 requirement. Update IA as
required.
TB D Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Amines [e.g., Ethylenediamine (1,2- Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - Include in
Diaminoethane), methylamine, diethylamine, chemical approval process (CAP). Develop and implement
mono-, di-, and tri-ethanolamine ] a SHOC card. MCOH – verify existence of SHOC card for
Medium amines. Develop as required – January 31, 2014.
Production operators and maintenance staff

are pot entially exposed to Amines during
maintenance, loading of new mat erial and
unloading of spent material in the CANSOLV
(novel), AGRU and A GEA (MDEA) units. Rich
amines are considered sour and can contain
H2S and SO2.
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TB D Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Freon (HCFC) Process design/equipment standards - Verify that the
Low cooling system that uses direct process cooling will be
protected with passive fire prot ection where required (during
the passive fire protection study). FEED HSE to verify –
Production Operators and Maintenanc e staffs reference study from RHI.
have a potential to exposure to Cont ainment / Isolation - Verify that the process for initial fill
Tetrafluoroethane (R134a) in the chilling and (first fill) will reduce frequency of connection between bottles
cooling system. Tet rafluoroethane is a and connection point. PT OR&A\CP – confirm ability to
colorless gas with a slight ethereal odor. procure R134A in bulk containers – End of FEED.
Vapors are heavier than air. Vapors can
replace the available oxygen. V apors may
cause dizziness or asphyxiation without
warning. Vapors from liquefied gas are initially
heavier than air and spread along ground.
Cont act with gas or liquefied gas may cause
burns, severe injury and/or frostbite. Fire may
produce irritating, corrosive and/or toxic gases.
TB D Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Hydrazine and compounds (302-01-2) Substitution - Identify a safer option for hy drazine.
Medium Hydrazine has been removed and replaced wit h
Diethylhydroxyl amine (DE HA).
Hydrazine and Ammonium Bisulphate is used

as oxygen scavengers. Production Operat ors
and Maintenanc e staff have the potential for
exposure in the following areas: IBC's (storage
area), waste water treatment plant and the
outlet of the sour water stripper.
TB D Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Hydrocarbons, VOC (total vapor) Monitoring: other measurements - Verify whether ongoing
Low fugitive emissions monitoring programs for hydrocarbons
will be implemented. Refer to air polution hazard.
Production and Maintenance staff has potential

exposure to hydrocarbons (in various
concentrations) throughout production
facilities.
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TB D Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Manual Handling - Lifting, Lowering Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that design
Medium include HFE DEP 30.00.60. 10. FEED HSE by 90% PDMS
Review.
Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that 3D
Operators, Maintenance and Technicians are model reviews are carried out for outdoor installations to
required to move materials, open and close identify and address ergonomic issues. Confirmed.
valves and manually manipulate controls. Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that ALARP
DEP (all of HSE critical tasks) are completed. FEE D HSE –
90% PDMS.
Local Remedial Action - Confirm that mechanical handling
exercise is initiated. FEE D Piping will produce a
Mechanic al Handling Report – 90% PDMS Review.
Process design/ equipment standards - Confirm that access
to valves and sampling points are included during HFE
screening – part of model review. Confirmed. Referenc e
FEED HFE Study reports.
Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that
modeling will be completed to verify adequate space for
lifting devices such as mobile cranes, lift-out pumps and
heavy items. 1.) FEED Piping to provide Mechanical
Handling report – 90% PDMS Review.
TB D Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Sulfur Process design/equipment standards - Verify that
Low observation ports on run down lines are included in design
(for liquid sulfur molten). Confirmed. 1.) Confirm
availability of a S HOC for sulfur.
Production Operators, Maintenance Staff and
Cont ractors (for sulfur handling) are pot entially
exposed to liquid molt en sulfur in the sulfur
recovery unit, sulfur handling area, leaks from
CPF (increased burns from molten sulfur) and
during over-pressure events in the liquid sulfur
storage tanks with loss of containment.
Cont ractors (sulfur handling) are pot entially
exposed to solid sulfur in the blocking plant
and CPF.
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TB D Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA General Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited
schedules - Site verification is required to finalize the
effectiveness of controls, recovery measures and final
exposure ratings mentioned in this HRA. 1.) PT-HSE -
Exposure ratings will be developed during the Execute
Phase when the task details become available.
Emergency / safety showers - S elect safety showers/eye
wash stations that have the capability to cool water during
summer period. 1.) P T-HSE to confirm requirements. 2.)
FEED HSE to develop safety equipment specific ation for
Safety Showers. (FEED HSE to confirm requirement for
eye wash stations at wells and RMS.)
New Actions (Jan 07, 2014 Rev iew):

1.) MCOH – Rev iew the CRR and provide the updated assessment in the HRA report for any changes – Jan 31, 2014.
2.) FEED HSE to schedule a meeting with PT HSE and PT Ops to review any update to the assessments and agree on the proposed controls fro m- Jan 31, 2014.
4. Health Hazard Inventory and Detailed Risk Appraisals

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA
Hazard Air pollution (environmental health hazard)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Respiratory tract irritation; aggravation of asthma

Effects RAM: 3B
Chronic Potential Health Respiratory irritation, increase in allergic symptoms and asthma
Effects RAM: 3A
Scenario Potentially impacted staff are on-plot and maintenance staff who work around
flues with incinerators; working on platforms with poor ventilation. Other sources
are process leak sources/ valves/flanges etc.
Route & Form of Inhalation
Exposure Gas
Frequency & Duration of Variable
Exposure 2 - 4 hours
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Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Status Assessment incomplete
ALARP Justification
Control s Effectivene ss
Recovery Measure s Effectivene ss
Remedial Actions Priority

Monitoring: other measurements - Verify whether ongoing fugitive emissions monitoring
programs will be implemented.
Page 15 of 74
Hazard Amines [e.g., Ethylenediamine (1,2-Diaminoethane), methylamine,

diethylamine, mono-, di-, and tri-ethanolamine ]
RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Moderate/severe irritant to skin, eye and respirat ory tract; absorbed through skin
Effects RAM: 3B
Chronic Potential Health Skin & respiratory sensitizer; repeated overex posure may produce liver, kidney
Effects damage
RAM: 3C
Scenario Production operators and maint enance staff are potentially exposed to Amines
during maintenance, loading of new materi al and unloading of spent material in
the CANS OLV (novel), AGRU and AGEA (MDEA) units. Rich amines are
considered sour and can contain H2S and SO2.
Route & Form of Dermal, Inhalation
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
PPE-Other - Fixed BA system for routine maintenance activities.

Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - Include in chemical approval process
(CAP). Develop and implement a SHOC card.
Page 16 of 74
Hazard Anti-foam agents (silicone based)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Effects will be substance specific and will require confirmation for chemical
Effects species
RAM: 1B
Chronic Potential Health None known
Effects RAM:
Scenario Maintenance operators have potential exposure scenarios during maintenance
tasks on the CANSOLV and AGRU units.
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Local Control - ALARP demonstration (controls) the same as for Corrosion and Scale
Inhibitors.
Page 17 of 74
Hazard Carbon monoxide- Gas (630-08-0)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Effects blood , resulting in carboxyhaemoglobinemia and cardiac disorders . Can
Effects be fatal.
RAM: 4B
Chronic Potential Health EU Risk Category 1 Teratogen, may cause harm to unborn child.
Effects RAM: 4B
Scenario All on-plot staffs have potential for exposure through gas turbine generat ors,
power boilers, regen gas heater, combustion sources, trenching and confined
space entry.
Exposure Gas
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Page 18 of 74
Hazard Catalyst - Alumina (activated)/Bauxite (Fresh and Spent)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Mechanic al irritation to eyes, skin, and respiratory tract
Effects RAM: 1B
Effects RAM:
Scenario Production Operators/Assistants and Maintenance staffs has potential for
exposure during work on the sulfur recovery units.
Exposure Dust / Particulate
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Page 19 of 74
Hazard Caustics (weak alkalis) pH < 11.5

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Irritant to skin and eyes. Respiratory irritant, may cause pulmonary edema
Effects RAM: 2C
Effects RAM:
Scenario Maintenance Operators have a potential ex posure scenario during work on
CANSOLV unit caustic polishing and SO2 abs orbent unit.
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Local Control - ALARP demonstration (controls) the same as for Corrosion and Scale
Inhibitors.
Page 20 of 74
Hazard Citric Acid (77-92-9)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Irritation of eyes, skin and respirat ory system
Effects RAM: 2B
Chronic Potential Health Possible tooth erosion
Effects RAM: 3A
Scenario Potential exposure exists for any person entering the water treatment plant
(DEMIN water) and IBC's (storage).
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Chemical warehouse designed to accommodate
separation of incompatible materials.
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - A chemical
compatibility study was undertaken.
Local Control - Reduced manual handling (large cont ainers vs. smaller containers).
Page 21 of 74
Hazard Corrosi on and Scale Inhibitors

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Corrosive to skin, eyes and res piratory tract. Can cause kidney failure, brain
Effects damage or blindness.
RAM: 3B
Chronic Potential Health Defatting of the skin, dermatitis. Effects on CNS.
Effects RAM: 2B
Scenario Maintenance staffs, Production Operators and Truck Drivers are potentially
exposed in the following work areas: Chemical storage (facilities), chemical
injection skids, injection pumps, offloading facilities, lines (marked), CPF, well
heads and RMS. Demulsifier (P T3265) - skid package (Upstream) and RMS.
Route & Form of Dermal
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Written procedure/safe work practice - Chemical approval procedure (CAP) in place with
chemical compatibility study.
Process design/equipment standards - Allocated chemical storage areas.
Cont ainment / Isolation - Storage areas are designed to be shaded, bunded and have an
appropriate slope towards rain.
Process design/equipment standards - Fittings/couplings designed for chemicals.
Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - PDO requires SHOC cards to be available
and displayed where product is stored.
Emergency / safety showers - Safety shower/eye wash stations in facility design where a
risk of splash/spill has been identified.
Page 22 of 74
Hazard Ethyl Mercaptan (odorant additive)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Nuisance odor, nausea

Effects RAM: 2B
Effects RAM:
Scenario Maintenance staff is potentially exposed during work on MSU (mol sieve 4year
frequency), and working on the gas compressor.
Exposure Gas
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Ventilation-General dilution - Maintenance activities in well naturally ventilat ed areas
under P TW.
Page 23 of 74
Hazard Food and water borne pathogens

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Food poisoning; hepatitis A, amoebic dysentery, giardiasis, typhoid, cholera
Effects RAM: 3C
Chronic Potential Health Carrier of disease without having symptoms
Effects RAM:
Scenario Food and/or drinking water is handled and provided to staff.
Route & Form of Ingestion
Exposure Other
Frequency & Duration of 3 x Daily
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification Site verification of cont rols and recovery measures required
Written procedure/safe work practice - A Catering Contractor will be selected based on
having a food safety management system (FSMS) aligned with HA CCP. The Catering
contract will include requirements for Good Hygiene P ractices and Hazard Analysis
Critical Control Point, as is the practice in PDO.
Audits and Inspections - FSMS audited internally and SME's to conduct external audits.
Process design/equipment standards - Dedicated food preparation and eating facilities as
part of catering approval process. Food handling facilities are planned, designed and
constructed meeting local and international best practices (aligned with PDO catering
requirements).
Vector control measures - Effective pest control and sanit ation programs.
Fitness to Work - Fitness to Work protocols implemented for food handlers meeting
country specific or Shell Health protocols (whichever is more stringent).
Page 24 of 74
Hazard Freon (HCFC)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Asphyxiant (for RAM see Simple Asphyxiant), frostbite, cardiac effects, forms
Effects Phosgene if ignited
RAM: 2B
Effects RAM:
Scenario Production Operators and Maint enance staffs have a potential to exposure to
Tetrafluoroethane (R134a) in the chilling and cooling system. Tetrafluoroethane
is a colorless gas with a slight ethereal odor. Vapors are heavier than air. Vapors
can replace the available oxygen. Vapors may cause dizziness or as phyxiation
without warning. Vapors from liquefied gas are initially heavier than air and
spread along ground. Contact with gas or liquefied gas may cause burns, severe
injury and/or frostbite. Fire may produce irritating, corrosive and/ or toxic gases.
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Closed loop system. The design allows for an
indirect chilling of the process with water to prevent potential for fire impacting onto the
refrigerant system. This reduc es the potential for hydrofluoric acid release.
Process design/equipment standards - Design accommodates recovery of refrigerant
during turn-around activities (no venting).

Process design/equipment standards - Verify that the cooling system that uses direct
process cooling will be prot ected with passive fire prot ection where required (during the
passive fire prot ection study).
Cont ainment / Isolation - Verify that the process for initial fill (first fill) will reduce frequency
of connection between bottles and connection point.
Page 25 of 74
Hazard HIV virus

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health HIV positive; Hepatitis B infection.

Effects RAM: 4B
Chronic Potential Health HIV infection, AIDS, secondary infections.
Effects RAM: 4B
Scenario Potentially exposed groups, i.e. staff (on and off plot), medical and first aiders
have exposure risk only when exposed to body fluids of HIV/Aids infected
person(s).
Route & Form of Penetration
Exposure Other
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Training and information on hazard - Periodic awareness provided as part of health
awareness campaigns, typically coinciding with World Aids Day activities.
Written procedure/safe work practice - Medical waste procedure in place (covered as
hazardous waste).
Local Control - HIV screening tests are a prerequisite for ent ry visa applications in Oman.
Page 26 of 74
Hazard Heat Stress / Hot Temperature Differentials

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Heat stroke leading to death (lesser symptoms: exhaustion, cramps, ras h,
Effects fatigue)
RAM: 4B
Chronic Potential Health Dermatitis
Effects RAM: 2C
Scenario All staff working on process facilities and near flare has the potential risk of
exposure to heat when working outdoors, typical temperature ranges being 32-
40 degrees Celsius. Working with BA (breathing apparat us) and confined space
entry work presents an additional risk factor due to the inc reased metabolic rate
due to PPE load.
Route & Form of
Exposure
Frequency & Duration of Daily
Exposure > 12 hours
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
Process design/equipment standards - Air temperature of BA air is regulated by
underground piping.
Process design/equipment standards - Design makes provision for separate resting areas
with AC and fresh, cool water supply (Sulfur Blocking area and FA R buildings).
Fitness to Work - Medical fitness to work standards has been established for users of BA
sets.
Training and information on hazard - Processes and procedures in place for effective
supervision.
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Provisions made
for shaded areas and cool drinking wat er. Offices with A C are available on plot, for
example the Central Control Room.

Process design/equipment standards - Provide confirmation of a BA port able system.
Written procedure/safe work practice - Provide verification of how air quality and
temperature of BA air will be regulated.
Written procedure/safe work practice - Define the range of climatic conditions for “normal”,
“restricted” and no work under BA sets. Provide rule -set for working under SCBA/BA in
high temperatures (work rest regimen)
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Define critical
activities and conduct risk assessment for use of BA sets.
Page 27 of 74
Hazard Hepatitis Virus B, C and unspecified hepatitis virus

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Hepatitis B / C infection, flu-like symptoms

Effects RAM: 4B
Chronic Potential Health Liver failure, jaundice, weakness, liver cancer
Effects RAM: 4B
Scenario Potentially exposed groups, i.e. staff (on and off plot), medical and first aiders
have exposure risk only when exposed to body fluids of infected pers on(s).
Travelers/trans ferees from areas of low prevalence, travelling to areas of high
prevalence have an increas ed health risk.
Route & Form of Penetration
Exposure Other
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
Training and information on hazard - Periodic awareness provided as part of health
awareness campaigns, typically coinciding with World Aids Day activities.
Vaccination - Hep B vaccinations offered to medical staff, first aiders and business
travelers.
Page 28 of 74
Hazard Hydraulic and Heat Transfer Fluids

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Mildly irritation to skin, eyes, respiratory tract

Effects RAM: 2B
Chronic Potential Health Defatting of the skin, dermatitis
Effects RAM: 3B
Scenario Production Operators/Assistants and Maintenance staffs has potential for
exposure during work on chemical injection skids, lube skids compressors, well
pads and well safe guarding.
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Cont ainment / Isolation - Pumps for decanting, dedicated storage areas.
Page 29 of 74
Hazard Hydrazine and compounds (302-01-2)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Corrosive to skin, eyes and res piratory system. Can be fatal by inhalation or
Effects skin absorbtion. Can effect liver, kidney or CNS.
RAM: 4B
Chronic Potential Health Possibly carcinogenic to humans (IA RC 2B ), skin sensitizer, suspect mutagen,
Effects damage to liver,kidney and CNS.
RAM: 4B
Scenario Hydrazine and Ammonium Bisulphate is used as oxygen scavengers.
Production Operators and Maint enance staff have the potential for exposure in
the following areas: IBC's (storage area), waste water treatment plant and the
outlet of the sour water stripper.
Route & Form of Dermal, Inhalation, Splash
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Allocated chemical storage areas.

Substitution - Identify a safer option for hydrazine.
Page 30 of 74
Hazard Hydrocarbons, Light (<C5's), Hydrocarbon Ga s (EP), Liquefied Petroleum

Gase s (e.g. Propane)
RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Asphyxiant (for RAM see Simple Asphyxiant), headaches, giddiness, nausea,
Effects cold burns from liquefied gas
RAM: 2B
Effects RAM: 1A
Scenario Potential exposure to Methane exists for Production Operators working in
production facilities.
Exposure Gas
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Leak det ection & repair surveys - Potential leak sourc es identified in design proc ess.
Process design/equipment standards - Equipment and lines labeled in design process.
Ventilation-General dilution - Natural ventilation considered in design process, where
mechanic al ventilation is not practicable due to facility layout that prefers no enclosed
spaces.
Process design/equipment standards - Sampling points - close system design in
accordance with P R 1096.
Page 31 of 74
Hazard Hydrocarbons, VOC (total vapor)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Narc otic effect, CNS depression, irritant to eyes and respirat ory tract.
Effects RAM: 2B
Chronic Potential Health Effects on liver, kidney and CNS, peripheral neuropathy.
Effects RAM: 3B
Scenario Production and Maintenance staff has potential exposure to hydrocarbons (in
various concentrations) throughout production facilities.
Exposure Vapour
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Sampling points - close system design in
accordance with P R 1096.

Monitoring: other measurements - Verify whether ongoing fugitive emissions monitoring
programs for hydrocarbons will be implement ed.
Page 32 of 74
Hazard Hydrochloric Acid (7647-01-0)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Corrosive to skin and ey es. Respiratory irritant, may cause pulmonary edema
Effects RAM: 4B
Chronic Potential Health Impairment of lung function, tooth erosion
Effects RAM: 2B
Scenario RO Plant Operator(s) have potential expos ure scenarios when working
in/around the sour water stripper and RO plant for PH adjustment, IBC's storage.
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - A chemical
compatibility study was undertaken.
Page 33 of 74
Hazard Hydrogen sulfide containing streams with H2S > 1000 ppm mole (600
mg/kg) or >100 ppm vapour space (7783-06-4)
RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Chemical asphyxiant causing respiratory paralysis, irritant; unconsciousness,
Effects fatality
RAM: 4C
Chronic Potential Health Damage to nasal tissues.
Effects RAM: 2B
Scenario Mechanic al/instrument maintenanc e operators are potentially exposed to
Hydrogen Sulfide during normal operations and during invasive maintenance.
Exposure scenario's exists in process streams (both operations and
maintenance); well pad works, well testing (new wells), remote manifolds; leaks
from process equipment; oil stabilizer on export line (H2S scavenger); spend
dessicant from the MSU and sampling.
Exposure Gas
Exposure > 12 hours
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
Local Control - PDO occupational exposure criteria and environmental air quality criteria
established.
Process design/equipment standards - Fixed BA system for routine maintenance activities
in the sour system.
Process design/equipment standards - Design uses mechanical seals on pumps and dry
gas seals on sour gas compressors.
Leak det ection & repair surveys - Leak sources are minimized through leak pat h
reduction.
Monitoring: Other measurements - H2S detectors and warning system strategically
positioned throughout the facility for easy gas detection leaks (TLV 5ppm).
Process design/equipment standards - No atmosphere relief valve to atmosphere in sour
surface.
Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - Signs and labeling in accordance with
PDO SP 1284, SP 1166 and HFE DEP 30 00 60 21.
Process design/equipment standards - Instrument vents in sour service are to the LP flare
or to safe location.
Process design/equipment standards - Sampling points are designed to facilitate close
system sampling in accordance wit h PDO PR 1096.
Local Control - Purging proc edure using sweet gas prior to dumping spent dessicant from
the MSU.
Process design/equipment standards - Degassing unit removes H2S.
Emergency response procedures - Emergency escape provisions included in facility
design.
Process design/equipment standards - Provide ALARP demonstration for flanges above
ground vs pits.
Written procedure/safe work practice - Confirm a res pirat or fit testing procedure. Verify fit
testing program for persons wit h facial hair.
Page 34 of 74
Hazard Iron Sulfide

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Mechanic al irritation of eyes skin and respiratory tract from dust
Effects RAM: 1B
Chronic Potential Health Effects on lung function
Effects RAM: 2B
Scenario Potential exposure exists for Maintenance staff during routine maint enance as
iron sulfide may accumulate in plant. Secondary exposure scenario exists
during pigging.
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Extensive amount of CRA (corrosion resistant
alloy) in on-plot design and GRE (glass re-enforced epoxy) piping for the flow lines.
Page 35 of 74
Hazard Legionella bacteria (waterborne)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Pontiac fever (mildest form of infection); Legionairres ' disease - pneumonia
Effects (severest form of infection - may be fatal)
RAM: 4B
Effects RAM: 3B
Scenario All staff (on plot and off plot) has the potential to be exposed to the following
Legionella sourc es: showers/ aerolised water, water from fire water systems,
potable water, any scenario where ambient temperature water may become
airborne and inhaled.
Exposure Other
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
Written procedure/safe work practice - PDO Legionella management procedure is in
place, ready for implement ation. The procedure requires that water systems and
equipment that are a potential source of Legionella are identified, documented, assessed
and a monitoring and control program defined.
Remedial Action s Priority

Written procedure/safe work practice - Determine wat er treatment/equipment
maintenance philosophy to reduce bio-filming and scale prevention. MCOH – Complete.
Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that the design of potential water sources
prevents aerosols, dead legs and stagnant water. [HOLD – FEED HSE to review and
confirm any issues]
Written procedure/safe work practice - Identify and document water systems and
equipment that are a potential source of Legionella; assess water systems and equipment
for the risk of Legionella and define a monit oring and control programme. MCOH –
Monitoring program to commence in PDO during 2014.
Page 36 of 74
Hazard Man made or synthetic vitreous fibers

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Respiratory and skin irritation

Effects RAM: 2B
Effects RAM: 2B
Scenario Maintenance staff is potentially exposed to piping insulation and refractory
fibers.
Route & Form of Inhalation, Dermal
Exposure Other
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Written procedure/safe work practice - Asbestos containing materials are prohibited in
design and procurement process.
Page 37 of 74
Hazard Manual Handling - Lifting, Lowering

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Acute strain or sprain to muscles and joints

Effects RAM: 3C
Chronic Potential Health Chronic musculo-skeletal disorders
Effects RAM: 3D
Scenario Operators, Maintenance and Technicians are required to move materials, open
and close valves and manually manipulate controls.
Route & Form of
Exposure
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Design include HFE DEP 30 00 60 10. 3D model
reviews carried out for outdoor installations to identify and address ergonomic issues.
Access to valves and sampling points included during HFE screening (part of model
review).

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that design include HFE DEP
30.00. 60.10.
Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that 3D model reviews are carried out for
outdoor installations to identify and address ergonomic issues.
Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that ALA RP DEP (all of HSE critical tasks)
are completed.
Local Remedial Action - Confirm that mechanical handling exercise is initiated.
Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that access to valves and sampling points
are included during HFE screening – part of model review.
Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that modeling will be completed to verify
adequate space for lifting devices such as mobile cranes, lift-out pumps and heavy items.
Page 38 of 74
Hazard Mercury (7439-97-6)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Acute poisoning, neurological effects

Effects RAM: 3B
Chronic Potential Health Effects on kidneys and cent ral nervous system, emotional and pyschological
Effects disturbances, effects on reproduction.
RAM: 3C
Scenario Production Operators and Maint enance staffs has potential expos ure from
mercury sulfide solids in condensate, although considered to be a low risk. A
potential long-term accumulation risk in sludge exists.
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Written procedure/safe work practice - Approved Company procedure in place for
handling and disposal of Mercury (PR -1516).
Written procedure/safe work practice - Approved waste management strategy in place for
safe removal and dis posal, meeting as a minimum the local legislative requirements.
Removed mercury is not allowed to be stored in site.
Page 39 of 74
Hazard Natural Gas Condensate (C5-C10 hydrocarbons)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Irritation of the eyes and respiratory tract, CNS depression
Effects RAM: 2C
Chronic Potential Health Human carcinogen (IARC 1), damage to bone marrow and immune system,
Effects dermatitis.
RAM: 4B
Scenario Production operators and maint enance staffs (of crude and condensate handling
systems) are potentially exposed to these sources: All off-plot production
gathering facilities; inlet separation (Unit 30); condensate stabilization plant (Unit
33); LP separation (Unit 31); oil storage and pumping (Unit 34) and during
sampling and analysis.
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Good engineering design practice in accordance
with CP117, GU611, SP 1190 and SP 1078. Lab design completed in accordance with
DEP 34 17 10 31. The design of sampling equipment and sampling points to minimize
personal exposure risks.
Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - Equipment and lines labeled in
accordance with SP 1284, SP 1166 and DEP 30 00 60 21.
Ventilation-General dilution - Natural ventilation.
Page 40 of 74
Hazard Naturally Occurring Ionising radiation (NORM)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health No known effects

Effects RAM:
Chronic Potential Health Human carcinogen (IARC 1), Damage to reproductive system and blood cells.
Effects RAM: 4B
Scenario Operations and Maintenance staff have the potential for exposure to NORM
during opening of vessels or pigging lines, working on Xmas trees, flow lines and
test separators.
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Monitoring: Other measurements - If deposits are found, monitoring is required and
actions implemented as per Management of NORM procedure, SP-1170 (Management of
NORM).
Written procedure/safe work practice - Waste management strategy (Document number
KHF-00-000000-HX-5980-00001-0000) addresses disposal location of NORM
contaminated materials/equipment.
Written procedure/safe work practice - Sampling and disposal in accordance with SP-
1170.
Page 41 of 74
Hazard Noi se
RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Loud steady noise: temporary thres hold shift. Impact noise: rupture of eardrum;
Effects acoustic trauma.
RAM: 2C
Chronic Potential Health Noise induced hearing loss (permanent threshold shift); tinnitus (ringing in ears)
Effects RAM: 2D
Scenario All staff working on process facilities has the potential for exposure to plant noise
and equipment. Potential sources of noise in process facilities include noisy
plant (e. g. air coolers, heaters, flare etc) and noisy equipment (e.g. chemical
injection pumps, transfer pumps etc).
Route & Form of
Exposure
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
Process design/equipment standards - Predictive nois e modeling during FEED.
Process design/equipment standards - Equipment sourced for emissions lower than
85dB (A) - included in the equipment BID data sheets.
Noise silencer / Muffler / Damper - Silencers on air vents and deaerator and let down
valves.
Process design/equipment standards - Noise criteria (base of flare) DEP 80.45. 10.10
followed.
E vent -based: IH monitoring - Noise mapping during commission - Company hearing
conservation plan implemented for areas exceeding 85dB (A).
Page 42 of 74
Hazard Particulates (total, not classified)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Upper respiratory and eye irritation

Effects RAM: 1C
Effects RAM: 2C
Scenario Exposure to desert dust, shamal.
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Local Control - All work is stopped and staff is advised to seek shelter during a sand storm
- Work stoppages (MOPO). Dampening of road surfaces during excavation for dust
suppression<(>,<)> where reasonably practicable.
PPE-Eye and face protection - In addition to standard safety glasses, workers are also
issued with rubber-rimmed safety glasses to prevent foreign articles from
entering/damaging eyes.
PPE-Respirator - Staff is advis ed to cover their mout hs and noses to prevent inhalation of
desert dust (disposable dust masks or scarves).
Process design/equipment standards - Vehicles fitted with AC. Cranes, forklifts,
excavators etc have cabins fitted with AC.
Local Control - Dampening of road surfaces, during excavation etc where reasonably
practicable.
Page 43 of 74
Hazard Psychologi cal Hazards and Stress

RAM: High
Acute Potential Health Stress symptoms like headaches, high blood pressure, sleep disturbanc e,
Effects irritability
RAM: 2D
Chronic Potential Health Anxiety, depression, absenteeism
Effects RAM: 4D
Scenario All staff (on and off plot) have the potential to experience isolation from family
and friends, especially those on rot ational duty; working on dead-lines, pressure
owning to the nature of the work environment is inherent.
Route & Form of
Exposure
Frequency & Duration of
Exposure
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
Stress - generic organisational cont rols - Clear organisational structure with adequate
human resources.
Local Control - Good camp, welfare and sport facilities. No overcrowding in facilities or in
accommodations.
Training and information on hazard - Periodic health awareness (with focus on suicide
prevention) and general stress awareness provided at all work locations by PDO
Occupational Health team (e.g. during HSSE meetings).
Stress - generic recovery measures - Employee assistance program (call centre during
office hours).
Local Remedial Action - Implement ent ertainment and other facilities for long term shift
staff in accommodations.
Written procedure/safe work practice - Confirm that PDO ex pectations for shift rotations
and employee welfare included in Contractor Agreements.
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Confirm that a
monitoring system is in place to verify Contractor compliance to local Labour Law
pertaining to work cycle and annual leave.
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Confirm a fatigue
risk management program is available for implementation covering HSE critical jobs.
Page 44 of 74
Hazard RSI Ri sk from Computer/Di splay Screen Equipment

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Muscular discomfort; eyestrain; soreness to soft tissues (e.g. wrist)
Effects RAM: 1D
Chronic Potential Health Work-related upper limb dis orders, repetitive strain injury
Effects RAM: 3D
Scenario Poor workplace design can lead to repetitive movements and awkward static
postures, excessive stretching, bending and force exertion in office and
Operations staff who are us ers of V DU's, keyboards, mice and control panels.
Route & Form of
Exposure
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Ergonomic workplac e assessment - HFE screening for project and control room
completed by HFE professional (input from Shell Health) and res ults of analysis
implemented for FEED.
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Rotation
schedule considered.
Ergonomically designed furniture & workstations - PDO approved furniture.
RSI Case management - Return to work practice in consultation with PDO Occupational
Healt h team.
Page 45 of 74
Hazard Relative Humidity

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Heat stroke leading to death (lesser symptoms: exhaustion, cramps, ras h,
Effects fatigue)
RAM: 4B
Effects RAM: 2C
Scenario Exposure to relative humidity when working outdoors.
Route & Form of
Exposure
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification Requires site verification.
Process design/equipment standards - Design makes provision for separate resting areas
with AC and fresh, cool water supply (Sulfur Blocking area and FA R buildings).
Page 46 of 74
Hazard Simple Asphyxiants- Nitrogen Blanket, Inert Gase s, Oxygen Depletion, and
Gas Releases
RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Asphyxiation, to be addressed in HEMP or Safety Case

Effects RAM: 4C
Effects RAM:
Scenario Maintenance staff and Production Operators who are involved in gas tests,
purging, confined spaces etc have potential exposure to Nitrogen through these
sources: Nitrogen supply system for purging on plot vs. piping in vessels;
Nitrogen cylinders at well pads for purging piping; suction strainer change out for
pumps (maintenanc e); filter change -outs (e.g. amine, deslating maintenance etc);
equipment isolation (spectable blind) maintenance; vessel ent ry (maintenance);
nitrogen trucks for supply of large volumes during shut-downs and re-
instatements. All workers who use the cascade breat hing air system.
Exposure Gas
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Nitrogen purged through hard pipe system (near to
vessel) and vent ed to flare (also during commissioning).
Process design/equipment standards - Fixed connection points.
Process design/equipment standards - Safe guarding system for the breathing air supply
system. System designed to provide safe air for breat hing purposes (CSA Standard Z180
Compressed Breathing Air and Systems).
Page 47 of 74
Hazard Sodium hypochlorite (bleach)

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Severe eye irritant, corrosive to mucous membranes, choking, coughing,
Effects pulmonary edema
RAM: 3B
Effects RAM: 2B
Scenario Sodium hypochlorite planned to be used as a biocide. Production Operators and
Maintenance Staff (pump maintenance) have potential ex posure scenarios when
working on: water inlet and treatment systems, fire storage system (batch
treatment) and the IB C's (storage area).
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Biocides cleared
through CAP (Chemical approval process).
Local Control - Use of chlorine in addition to UV treatment (holding tanks).
Page 48 of 74
Hazard Sulfur
RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Irritating to the eyes and skin, can inflame the respiratory tract. May off gas H2S
Effects and SO2.
RAM: 2C
Chronic Potential Health Dermatitis and chronic bronchitis.
Effects RAM: 3B
Scenario Production Operators, Maintenance Staff and Contractors (for sulfur handling)
are potentially exposed to liquid molten sulfur in the sulfur recovery unit, sulfur
handling area, leaks from CPF (increased burns from molten sulfur) and during
over-pressure events in the liquid sulfur storage tanks with loss of containment.
Cont ractors (sulfur handling) are potentially exposed to solid sulfur in the
blocking plant and CPF.
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Cantilever system for sulfur pouring opposed to a
wheeled system.
Decontamination of equipment - Us e of nit rogen and fuel gas for clearing sulfur run-down
blockages.
Process design/equipment standards - External heating on the liquid sulfur molten tanks
opposed to internal heating coils.
Process design/equipment standards - Design incorporates pouring arms to divert/spread
sulfur in the sulfur blocking/CPF plants.
Process design/equipment standards - Layout separation between the sulfur blocks, CPF
and power plant (following 200m good practice rule). Wind direction taken into
consideration when deciding block location.

Process design/equipment standards - Verify that observation ports on run down lines are
included in design (for liquid sulfur molten).
Page 49 of 74
Hazard Sulfur Trioxide (7446-11-9)

RAM: Medium
Effects RAM: 4B
Chronic Potential Health Carcinogen IA RC 1, impairment of lung function, tooth erosion
Effects RAM: 4B
Scenario Maintenance staffs have potential for exposure to Sulfur Trioxide (in liquid and
gas phas e). Exposure scenario's exists in CANSOLV unit (pre-treatment) and
RO feed wat er system from the CANS OLV quenc h.
Exposure Gas
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Closed system - Closed system design.
Page 50 of 74
Hazard Sulfur dioxide- SO2 (7446-09-5)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Corrosive to eyes and lungs, fatality

Effects RAM: 4C
Chronic Potential Health Respiratory Sensitizer, Asthma
Effects RAM: 3C
Scenario Potential exposure for all site staff during flaring of gas containing H2S; Pouring
of Sulfur blocks; Liquid sulfur; Sulfur fires and Jet/pool fires. Operations and
Maintenance staff have an increased risk of potential exposure to sources
mentioned here.
Exposure Gas
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - Flare stack height designed to have acceptable
level of ground level concent ration in case of flaring. Stack height is based on safe
disposal of pollutants.
Local Control - Plant design allows a high level of automation to reduce personal level of
exposure (design philosophy). Examples of automation in design include aut omatic
skimming in the AGRU; using nitrogen and fuel gas for clearing sulfur run down
blockages; closed drain systems; CANSOLV unit and remot e activated fire water monitors
in the Sulfur block.
Process design/equipment standards - Plant layout has taken into consideration prevailing
wind directions from on plot areas.
Process design/equipment standards - Design facilitates environmental emissions limit of
35mg/m3 (point source emissions).

Local Remedial Action - FEED HSE to verify that the Control Room is in a safe loc ation 2
for toxic SO2 endurance in accordance with PDO SP 1190.
Process design/equipment standards - Verify that observation ports on run down lines are 2
included in design philosophy.
Process design/equipment standards - State what the ALARP effort is in the event where 2
the degasser does not work efficiently (leading to increased potential for SO2 and HS2
emissions during pouring operations). Provide PDO occupational ex posure criteria and
environmental air quality criteria.
Process design/equipment standards - Demonstrate ALARP for the absorber by-pass to 2
meet environment and occupational tolerability criteria through the CA NSOLV design.
Process design/equipment standards - Verify provision of dilution gas when flaring acid 2
gas to complete the combustion process and improve dispersion standards.
Page 51 of 74
Hazard Sulfuric Acid (7664-93-9)

RAM: Medium
Effects RAM: 4C
Chronic Potential Health Carcinogen IA RC 1, impairment of lung function, tooth erosion
Effects RAM: 4B
Scenario Plant Operators have potential exposure scenario's when working on the
CANSOLV Unit (pump system for injection to scrubber) - initial activation of
CANSOLV solvent; IBC (storage) and water treatment plan (DEMIN water).
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Chemical
compatibility study undertaken.
Emergency / safety showers - Safety shower/eye wash stations in facility design where
risk of exposure has been identified.
Page 52 of 74
Hazard Ultra violet light (UV) - wavelength 100 - 400 nm (non-ionizing radiation)
RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Arc eye; erythema, skin burn

Effects RAM: 2C
Chronic Potential Health Skin cancer (Human carcinogen IA RC 1)
Effects RAM: 4B
Scenario All staff (on plot and off plot) is exposed to direct sun in desert environment. In
addition, welding activities adds another sourc e of exposure for welders (for
example during gas welding).
Route & Form of
Exposure
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
PPE-Eye and face protection - Eye protection with UV filters issued to staff and
contractors.
PPE-Skin protection:gloves, clothing - Full length coveralls, gloves and hard hats
obligatory throughout work areas. PPE's issued in accordance with PDO Standard SP
1234).
Process design/equipment standards - Plant layout makes provision for sheltered areas to
provide relief from sun exposures.
Page 53 of 74
Hazard Visible light (too much; too little) - wavelength 400 - 780 nm (non-ionizing
radiation)
RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Eyestrain, headaches, decreas ed efficiency, increase in work errors.
Effects RAM: 1C
Effects RAM:
Scenario All staff are potentially exposed to insufficient lighting and poor night time
illumination of the plant and facilities.
Route & Form of
Exposure
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Status Yes
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - HFE screening completed to assess if a detailed
survey was required.
Local Control - CCTV to reduce operator frequency of walkabout.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm design in accordance with HFE DEP’s 4
and FEE D Emergency lightning guideline (GU/ 705).
Process design/equipment standards - HFE study to include lessons learned from 4
previously poorly designed Control Rooms in PDO fac ilities.
Page 54 of 74
Hazard Waxes and related products

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health Hot wax fumes irritate the eyes and respiratory tract; burns from molten wax
Effects RAM: 1B
Effects RAM:
Scenario Production Operators and Maint enance staff have potential exposure scenarios
when working in the chemical storage area and working on well heads.
Route & Form of Dermal, Splash
Exposure Liquid
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Allocated chemical storage areas.
Page 55 of 74
Hazard Work Environment - Indoor climate

RAM: Low
Acute Potential Health General discomfort, e.g. feeling too hot/too cold, stiff neck, dry throat/eyes,
Effects headaches
RAM: 1D
Effects RAM:
Scenario Office based and control room staff have potential exposure scenarios to indoor
air temperat ures that are too hot/cold, causing discomfort.
Route & Form of
Exposure
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Process design/equipment standards - HVAC system designed with adjustable
temperature controls. Design follows DEP 34.17.00.32 & DEP 30.00.60.15.
Page 56 of 74
Hazard X Rays wavelength < 10 nm (ionising radiation)

RAM: Medium
Acute Potential Health Cell damage e.g. skin burns, sickness, loss of hair - potentially fatal
Effects RAM: 3B
Chronic Potential Health Human carcinogen (IARC 1), Damage to reproductive system and blood cells.
Effects RAM: 4B
Scenario NDT Operators have potential exposure to sealed sources/NDT, as well as staff
providing in-field oversight.
Exposure Other
Exposure Limit
Exposure Rating &
Justi fication
ALARP Justification
Written procedure/safe work practice - Work executed in compliance with the extensive
safe work procedure that is in place - a condition of P TW system. Emergency respons e
plan has been approved by regulatory authority (Omani Ministry of Environment).
Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Exclusion zone.
Local Control - Use of a registered cont ractor. Wear of radiation badges.
Page 57 of 74
5. Generic Controls, Recovery Measures and Remedial Actions

Written procedure/safe work practice - PDO standard will be followed during procurement
of PPE (gloves, coveralls, face shield, goggles).
Local Control - PPE, competency and proc edures.
Cont ainment / Isolation - The facility layout is designed purposefully to prevent delivery
trucks from entering the facility. The chemical offloading bay is located outside of the
fence.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Site verification TB D
is required to finalize the effectiveness of controls, recovery measures and final exposure
ratings mentioned in this HRA.
Emergency / safety showers - Select safety showers/eye wash stations that have the TB D
capability to cool wat er during summer period.
Page 58 of 74
6. Control statements for Low RAM Hazards

Work Area Hazard Controlled through standard
procedure s and staff
competencies. There are no
indications for over-
exposure.
Page 59 of 74
Appendix 1: Definitions
Acute Health Effect
Healt h Effect that occurs immediat ely or a short time (seconds to hours) following exposure, such as heat
stroke, chemical burns and asphyxiation.
Agent
See Haz ard
ALARP - As Low As Rea sonably Practicable

The point at which the cost (in time, money and effort) of further Risk reduction is grossly disproportionate to
the Risk reduction achieved.
Barrier
A Risk Control or a Recovery Measure. Barriers provide the means of preventing an E vent or Incident, or of
mitigating the Consequences. A Barrier can be an item of equipment or a human int ervention, and can also
be a Control on an Escalation Facto r.
Chronic Health Effect

Healt h Effect that occurs gradually over a long period of time (mont hs or years), generally following repeated
and prolonged ex posure. In specific cases a short term exposure may result in a chronic health effect.
Consequence
An Effect on people, assets, the environment or reput ation as a result of a Hazard being released.
Control
A means of preventing an Incident. Controls can be engineering, proc edural or behavioural.
Critical Acti vity

An activity necessary for the development, implementation or maintenance of a Barrier established for
managing Hazards with RAM red Risks.
Effect
The Consequence of the releas e of a Hazard.
Escalation Factor
A situation, condition or circumstance that may lead to the partial or full failure of a Barrier.
Event
An Incident that occurs when a Hazard is released.
Exposure Limit
The airborne concent ration of chemical agents and levels of physical agents to which nearly all workers may
be repeatedly expos ed day after day without adverse Effect.
Exposure Rating
The chance of over-exposure to a healt h hazard when compared against agreed control standards. The
exposure rating is evaluated as Very Low, Low, Medium or High.
Hazard
An agent with the potential to cause harm to people, damage to Assets, or an Impact on the environment or
reputation.
Health Hazard
A factor of a physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic or psychological nature with the potential to cause
harm to the healt h of people.
Page 60 of 74
HRA - Health Ri sk Asse ssment

A process of identifying, evaluating, controlling and managing Health Risks, associated with work to prevent
acute and chronic health E ffects.
Incident
An unplanned E vent or chain of E vents that has, or could have, resulted in injury or illness or damage to
Assets, the environment or reputation.
Likelihood
The probability that a specified Consequence will happen.
OEL – Occupational Exposure Limit

The airborne concent ration of chemical agents and levels of physical agents to which nearly all workers may
be repeatedly expos ed day after day without adverse effect.
RAM - Ri sk Asse ssment Matrix

A tool used to assess the Consequences and Risks of Hazards to HSSE. The results are referred to as a
RAM Severity rating and a RAM Risk rating.
Recovery Measure
A Barrier that reduces the Consequences of the release of a Hazard as a result of an Incident. Rec overy
Measures can be engineering, proc edural or behavioural measures.
Remedial Action Plan

RAP - A Plan to implement corrective action items.
Ri sk
The combination of the Consequence of a specific Haz ard being released and the Likelihood of it happening.
Ri sk Asse ssment
The process of identifying the Cons equences of the Worst Case Credible Scenario arising from the release
of a Hazard, and estimating the Likelihood of that scenario.
Severity
A level of Consequence on the RAM on a scale of 0 to 5.
TBD
To be determined.
Page 61 of 74
Appendix 2: Risk Assessment Matrix
Page 62 of 74
Appendix 3: Overview of Detailed Risk Appraisals
Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 13

Air pollution (environmental health hazard) _________________________________ 13
Amines [e.g., Ethylenediamine (1,2-Diaminoethane), methylamine, diethylamine,
mono-, di-, and tri-ethanolamine ] _________________________________________ 15
Anti-foam agents (silicone based) _________________________________________ 16
Carbon monoxide- Gas (630-08-0) _________________________________________ 17
Catalyst - Alumina (activated)/Bauxite (Fresh and Spent) _____________________ 18
Caustics (weak alkalis) pH < 11.5 __________________________________________ 19
Citric Acid (77-92-9) ______________________________________________________ 20
Corrosi on and Scale Inhibitors ____________________________________________ 21
Ethyl Mercaptan (odorant additive)_________________________________________ 22
Food and water borne pathogens __________________________________________ 23
Freon (HCFC) ___________________________________________________________ 24
HIV virus________________________________________________________________ 25
Heat Stress / Hot Temperature Differentials _________________________________ 26
Hepatitis Virus B, C and unspecified hepatitis virus __________________________ 27
Hydraulic and Heat Transfer Fluids ________________________________________ 28
Hydrazine and compounds (302-01-2) ______________________________________ 29
Hydrocarbons, Light (<C5's), Hydrocarbon Ga s (EP), Liquefied Petroleum Gase s (e.g.
Propane)________________________________________________________________ 30
Hydrocarbons, VOC (total vapor) __________________________________________ 31
Hydrochloric Acid (7647-01-0) _____________________________________________ 32
Hydrogen sulfide containing streams with H2S > 1000 ppm mole (600 mg/kg) or >100
ppm vapour space (7783-06-4)_____________________________________________ 33
Iron Sulfide _____________________________________________________________ 34
Legionella bacteria (waterborne)___________________________________________ 35
Page 63 of 74
Man made or synthetic vitreous fibers______________________________________ 36

Manual Handling - Lifting, Lowering________________________________________ 37
Mercury (7439-97-6) ______________________________________________________ 38
Natural Gas Condensate (C5-C10 hydrocarbons) ____________________________ 39
Naturally Occurring Ionising radiation (NORM) ______________________________ 40
Noi se ___________________________________________________________________ 41
Particulates (total, not classified) __________________________________________ 42
Psychologi cal Hazards and Stress _________________________________________ 43
RSI Ri sk from Computer/Di splay Screen Equipment _________________________ 44
Relative Humidity ________________________________________________________ 45
Simple Asphyxiants- Nitrogen Blanket, Inert Gase s, Oxygen Depletion, and Gas
Releases________________________________________________________________ 46
Sodium hypochlorite (bleach) _____________________________________________ 47
Sulfur __________________________________________________________________ 48
Sulfur Trioxide (7446-11-9) ________________________________________________ 49
Sulfur dioxide- SO2 (7446-09-5) ____________________________________________ 50
Sulfuric Acid (7664-93-9)__________________________________________________ 51
Ultra violet light (UV) - wavelength 100 - 400 nm (non-ionizing radiation) _______ 52
Visible light (too much; too little) - wavelength 400 - 780 nm (non-ionizing radiation)53
Waxes and related products ______________________________________________ 54
Work Environment - Indoor climate ________________________________________ 55
X Rays wavelength < 10 nm (ionising radiation) _____________________________ 56
Page 64 of 74
Appendix 4: Yibal Khuff FEED Combined HHI 23 May 2013

CHEMICAL AGENT POTENTIAL EXPOSED SOURCE POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECT ALARP EFFORTS
GROUPS
Sulfur Dioxide  All operations and  Flaring of gas containing Acute: Corrosive to eyes and  Flare stack height designed to
(SO2) maintenance staff H2S lungs, fatality have acceptable level of ground
 Sulfur contractors  Pouring of Sulfur blocks Chronic: Respiratory level concentration in case of
 Liquid sulfur Sensitizer, Asthma flaring.
 Sulfur fires  Stack heights is based on safe
 Jet/pool fires disposal of pollutants.
 Plant layout has taken into
consideration prevailing wind
directions from on plot areas.
FEED HSE to verify the CR is in a
safe location for toxic SO2
endurance in accordance with
PDO SP 1190.
 High level of automation to
reduce personal level of
exposure (design philosophy)
e.g. automatic skimming,
automatic skimming in the
AGRU contactors and using
nitrogen and fuel gas for
clearing sulfur run down
blockages. Closed drain systems
CANSOLV unit, remote activated
fire water monitors in Sulfur
block.
 Verify that observation ports on
run down lines are included in
design.
Printed: 24/04/2014 Printed copies of this docume nt should be treatedasState what
information the
of te mporALARP
ary valueeffort is in after use
and destroyed
Page 65 of 74
the event where the degasser
does not work efficiently
(Leading to increased potential
for SO2 and H2S emissions
during pouring operations).
Provide PDO occupational
exposure criteria and
environmental air quality
criteria.
 Design facilitates environmental
emissions limit 35mg/m3 (point
source emissions).
 The CANSOLV design needs to
demonstrate ALARP for the
absorber by-pass to meet
environment and occupational
tolerability criteria.
 Verify provision of dilution gas
when flaring acid gas to
complete the combustion
process and improve dispersion
standards.
 PPE, procedures and
competence.
Hydrogen Sulfide  Mechanical/Instrument  Process streams Acute: Chemical asphyxiant  Flare ALARP as mentioned
maintenance operators (both operations and causing respiratory paralysis, above.
 Invasive maintenance maintenance) irritant; unconsciousness,  PDO occupational exposure
 Well pads fatality; criteria and environmental air
 Well testing (new wells) Chronic: Damage to nasal quality criteria.
 Remote manifolds tissues.  Fixed BA system for routine
 Leaks from process maintenance activities in the
equipment sour system.
 Oil stabilizer on export  Use of double mechanical seals
line (H2S scavenger) on pumps.
Printed: 24/04/2014  Spend dessicant from  Use of dry gas seals on sour gas
Printed copies of this docume nt should be treated as information of te mpor ary value and destroyed after use
Page 66 of 74
the MSU compressors.
 Sampling  Minimize leak sources through
leak path reduction.
 H2S detectors and warning
system strategically positioned
throughout facility for early gas
detection leaks (TLV 5ppm).
 No atmosphere relief valve to
atmosphere in sour surface.
 Signs and labeling in accordance
with PDO SP 12 84, SP 1166 and
HFE DEP 30 00 60 21.
 Instrument vents in sour service
are to the LP flare or to safe
location.
 Sampling points are designed to
facilitate close system sampling
in accordance with PDO PR
1096.
 Provide ALARP demonstration
for flanges above ground vs.
pits.
 Rule-set for working under
SCBA/BA in high temperatures
(work rest regimen).
 Confirm a respirator fit testing
procedure. Verify respirator fit
testing program for persons
with facial hair.
 Emergency escape provisions
included in facility design.
 Purging procedure using sweet
gas prior to dumping spent
dessicant from the MSU.
Printed: 24/04/2014 Printed copies of this docume nt should be treatedasDegassing
information of unit
te mporremoves H2S.
ary value and destroyed after use
Page 67 of 74

competence.
Liquid Sulfur  Production Operators &  Sulfur recovery unit Acute: Severe skin burns  Cantilver system for sulfur
Molten Maintenance staff  Sulfur handling area pouring opposed to wheeled
 Contractors - Sulfur  Leaks from CPF system.
handling (increased burns from  Verify that observation ports on
molten sulfur) run down lines are included in
 Over-pressure events in design.
liquid sulfur storage  Use of nitrogen and fuel gas for
tanks with loss of clearing sulfur run down
containment blockages.
 External heating on the tank as
opposed to internal heating coil.
 PPE, competency and
procedures.
Solid Sulfur Contractors - Sulfur handling  Blocking plant Acute: Mild irritant of mucous  Pouring arms to divert/spread
 CPF membranes; Sulfur dust is sulfur.
mild irritant of upper  Layout separation between the
respiratory system; H2S Sulfur blocks, CPF and power
residue may cause shortness plant (200m good practice).
of breath, breathing failure,  Wind direction taken into
coma and death; consideration when deciding
Chronic: Not known block location.
procedures.
Sulfur Trioxide  Production Operators  CANSOLV unit (pre- Acute: Corrosive to mucous  Closed system.
SO3 (In liquid and  Maintenance treatment) membranes; skin and  PPE, competency and
gas phase)  RO feed water system respiratory tract irritant; On procedures.
from the CANSOLV contact with water, converts
quench to Sulfuric acid with same
acute effects
Chronic: Carcinogenic
Methane Production Operators All production facilities Acute: Headaches, dizziness,  Potential leak sources identified
drowsiness, nausea; in design.
Printed: 24/04/2014 respiratory
Printed irritant.
copies of this Leaks
docume nt be treatedasEquipment
should may and
information of te lines
mpor ary labeled.
value and destroyed after use
Page 68 of 74
cause freeze burns  Natural ventilation (mechanical
ventilation not practicable due
to no enclosed spaces).
procedures.
Hydrocarbons (in Production operators and As above Acute: Simple Asphyxiants,  Verify whether ongoing fugitive
various maintenance staff headaches, giddiness, nausea, emissions monitoring programs
concentrations) cold burns from liquefied gas will be implemented
Chronic: None known  Sampling points – close system
design in accordance with PR
1096.
 PPE , competency and
procedures
Mercury Production operators and  Mercury sulfide solids in Acute: Acute poisoning,  Approved Company procedure
maintenance staff condensate although neurological effects in place for handling and
low risk Chronic: Effects on kidneys disposal of Mercury (PR-1516).
 Potential long-term and central nervous system,  Approved waste management
accumulation emotional and psychological strategy is in place for safe
(sludge)risk disturbances, effects on removal and disposal, meeting
reproduction. as minimum local legislative
requirements. Removed
mercury not stored on site.
 Suitable PPE identified in
JHA/under PTW activity
 Surveillance plans are
implemented to measure
mercury sulfide in condensate
once annually.
 Surveillance program in place to
measure mercury in export gas.
procedures.
Chemicals (such  Maintenance staff  Chemical Storage Acute: irritant/sensitizer to  Chemical approval procedure
as corrosion  Production Operators (facilities) eyes, skin, moderately irritant (CAP).
inhibitors,
Printed: 24/04/2014  Chemical injection skids Printed
to lungs;
copies dermal
of this docume nt should be treatedasAllocated
sensitizers information ofchemical storage
te mpor ary value and destroyed after use
Page 69 of 74
Methanol etc)  Truck drivers  Injection pumps Chronic: Effects will be areas.
 Offloading facilities substance specific and will  Chemical compatibility study.
 Lines (marked) require confirmation from  Safety shower/eye wash
 CPF MSDS stations in facility design where
 Well heads risk of exposure exists.
 RMS  Storage areas are shaded,
bunded and have appropriate
slope towards rain.
 Part of design is that no
chemical trucks will enter the
facility (offloading facility
outside of fence).
 Fittings/couplings designed for
chemicals.
procedures.
Amines  Production Operators  CANSOLV Unit (novel) Acute: Corrosive, irritating  Include in chemical approval
 Maintenance staff  AGRU (x) Chronic: Amines may react process (CAP). Develop and
(maintenance activities &  AGEU (MDEA) with nitrites and form implement a SHOC card.
loading new and unloading nitrosamines which are  Rich amines considered sour
spent material) carcinogenic. and can contain H2S and SO2.
 ALARP efforts for BA above.
procedures.
Wax inhibitors  Production Operators  Well heads  Chemical approval process
 Maintenance staff  Chemical storage area (CAP). SHOC card.
 As production chemical above.
procedures.
Oxygen scavenger  Production Operators  IBC’s (storage area)  As above
(Ammonium  Maintenance staff  Waste water treatment  Identify a safer option for
bisulphite) and plant hydrazine
hydrazine(?))  Outlet of sour water  PPE, competency and
stripper procedures.
Page 70 of 74
Biocides (Sodium  Production Operators  Water inlet and Acute: Corrosive and harmful  Biocides cleared through CAP.
hypochlorite)  Maintenance staff (pump treatment systems by skin, inhalation and  Use of chlorine in addition to UV
maintenance)  Fire water storage ingestion treatment (holding tanks).
system (batch  SHOC card.
treatment)  PPE, competency and
 IBC’s (storage area) procedures.
Demulsifier  Production Operators  Skid package: Upstream  ALARP demonstration same as
(PT3265)  Maintenance staff  RMS scale inhibitors.
procedures.
Tetrafluoroethane  Production Operators  Chilling & cooling Acute: Overexposure may  Closed loop system.
(R134a)  Maintenance staff system cause dizziness, loss of  An indirect chilling of the
concentration. At higher process with water to prevent
levels CNS depression, cardiac potential for fire impacting onto
arrhythmia; asphyxiation the refrigerating system
when vapors displace air (reducing potential for release
of hydrofluoric acid).
 Verify that the cooling system
that uses direct process cooling
will be protected with passive
fire protection where required
(during the passive fire
protection study)
 Design accommodates recovery
of refrigerant during turn
around activities (no venting).
 Verify that the process for initial
fill (first fill) will reduce
frequency of connection
between bottles and connection
point.
competence.
Iron Sulphide  Maintenance staff (also  Accumulate in plant Acute: Eye and respiratory  Extensive amount of CRA
Printed: 24/04/2014 during pigging) irritant
Printed copies of this docume nt should be treated as(corrosion
information of resistant alloy)
te mpor ary value in on after use
and destroyed
Page 71 of 74
plot design and GRE (glass re-
enforced epoxy) piping for the
flow lines.
procedures.
Solid activated  Maintenance staff  Sulfur recovery unit Acute: Powder is eye and  PPE, procedures and
alumina catalyst  Service contractors respiratory irritant competence.
Hydraulic Oils  Production Operators &  Chemical injection skids Acute: Mild irritant  Trolleys for lifting.
Assistance  Lube skids compressors Chronic: Prolonged skin  Pumps for decanting.
 Maintenance staff  Well pads contact may cause dermatitis  Dedicated storage areas.
 Wells safe guarding  PPE, procedures and
systems competence.
Acids: Sulfuric Production Operators  CANSOLV Unit (pump Acute: Corrosive, causes  Safety shower/eye wash
system for injection to burns to skin, eyes and stations in facility design where
scrubber)- initial respiratory system risk of exposure exists.
activation of CANSOLV Chronic: Carcinogenic  Chemical compatibility study.
solvent  Chemical warehouse designed
 IBC (storage) to accommodate separation of
 Water treatment plant incompatible chemicals.
(DEMIN water)  Reduced manual handling (large
containers vs. smaller
containers).
competence.
Acids: RO Plant Operator  Sour water stripper & Acute: Corrosive, causes  As above
Hydrochloric RO plant for PH burns to skin, eyes and
adjustment respiratory system
 IBC’s (storage)
Citric acid  Water treatment plant  As above

(DEMIN water)
 IBC’s (storage)
Nitrogen  Maintenance Staff  Nitrogen supply system Acute: Simple asphyxiant,  Nitrogen purged through hard
 Production Operators (gas for purging on plot vs frost burns pipe system (near to vessel) and
Page 72 of 74
tests, purging, confined piping in vessels vented to flare (also during
space)  Nitrogen cylinders at commissioning).
well pads for purging  Fixed connection points.
piping  Hardstands for N2 cylinders (off
 Suction strainer change plot HOLD).
out for pumps  PPE, procedures and
(maintenance) competence.
 Filter change outs (eg
amine, desalting etc)-
maintenance
 Equipment isolation
(spectacle blind)-
maintenance
 Vessel entry –
maintenance
 Nitrogen trucks for
supply of large volumes
during shut downs and
re-instatements
Carbon Monoxide All site staff  Gas turbine generators, Acute: Asphyxiants,  PPE, procedures and
power boilers, regen gas headaches, nausea, dizziness, competence.
heater, combustion confusion and hallucinations
sources Chronic: Teratogen
 Trenching, CS Entry
Fumes/fugitive  All site staff  Process leak Acute: Eye and respiratory  Confirm a fugitive emissions
emissions  Maintenance staff (working sources/valves/flanges/ irritation monitoring program in
around flues with etc accordance with SP 1005.
incinerators; working on  PPE, procedures and
platforms with poor competence.
ventilation)
Radon (from gas Maintenance staff  Low risk – not Acute:  PPE, procedures and
phase) considered a threat for Chronic: Cancer competence.
Concentration YK
levels very low;
Page 73 of 74
no accumulation
in process stream;
on depressurizing
of vessels
eliminated.
Particulates All  Work in desert Acute: Upper respiratory and  Vehicles fitted with AC.
(total, not  Shamal eye irritation  Cranes, forklifts, excavators etc
classified) Chronic: Potential effects on have cabins fitted with AC.
lung function  Work stoppages (MOPO).
 Provide disposable dust masks.
 Dampening of road surfaces,
during excavation etc where
reasonably practicable.
competence.
Mercaptan Maintenance  Work on MSU (changing Acute: Nuisance odor, nausea  Activity under PTW.
mol sieve 4 yr Chronic: None known  Adequate ventilation supplied.
frequency)  PPE, procedures and
 Working on competence.
regeneration gas
compressor
Condensate  Production Operators  All off plot production Acute: Narcotic vapour can  Good engineering design
 Maintenance staff (crude gathering facilities cause headaches, dizziness, practice in accordance with
and condensate handling  Inlet separation (Unit drowsiness, nausea, CP117 and GU611 and SP 1190
systems) 30) respiratory and skin irritant and SP 1078.
 Condensate Stabilization Chronic: Benzene is  Equipment and lines labeled
Plant (Unit 33) carcinogenic (leukemia, PDO SP 12 84, SP 1166 and HFE
 LP separation (Unit 31) nervous system damage) DEP 30 00 60 21.
 Oil storage and pumping  Natural ventilation.
(Unit 34)  Lab design as per DEP
 Sampling and analysis 34.17.10.31.
 Design of sampling equipment
and sampling points minimizes
personal exposure risks.
Page 74 of 74

competence.
Asphyxiants gases All workers using cascade Breathing air supply from Acute: Headaches, nausea,  Safe guarding system for the
from breathing system cascade system potential fatalities breathing air supply. See
air Chronic: Respiratory illness utilities SGM.
 System provides safe air for
breathing air purposes (CSA
Standard Z180 Compressed
Breathing Air and Systems).
Synthetic Fibres Maintenance  Piping insulation Acute: Irritant –skin and eyes  Asbestos containing materials
 Refractory fibres Chronic: Cat 2A carcinogen are prohibited in design and
procurement.
competence.
H2S Scavenger Operators  Sulfur degasser bypass Effects will be substance  ALARP demonstration - see
Maintenance line (unit 47) specific and will require production chemicals.
confirmation for chemical
species
Caustics Operators  CANSOLV unit caustic Acute: Corrosive to skin and  ALARP demonstration - see
Maintenance polishing and SO2 eyes. Respiratory irritant, may production chemicals.
Absorbent purification cause pulmonary edema.
unit Chronic: Corrosive effect on
skin and respiratory system.
Antifoams Operators  CANSOLV Effects will be substance  ALARP demonstration - see
Maintenance  AGRU specific and will require production chemicals.
confirmation for chemical
species

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Health Risk Assessment Report

0. Introduction to the HRA report ______________________________________________________________________ 3

1. HRA Scope __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3

2. HRA Team ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 5

4. Health Hazard Inventory and Detailed Risk Apprai sals _____________________________________________13

5. Generic Control s, Recovery Measure s and Remedial Actions _____________________________________57

6. Control statements for Low RAM Hazards _________________________________________________________58

Appendix 1: Definitions _______________________________________________________________________________59

Appendix 2: Ri sk Asse ssment Matrix _________________________________________________________________61

Appendix 3: Overview of Detailed Risk Apprai sals ___________________________________________________62

Appendix 4: Yibal Khuff FEED Combined HHI 23 May 2013 ___________________________________________64

0. Introduction to the HRA report

The major objectives of the YK Project are as follows :-

The facility will consist of on- and off plot facilities.

a. A description of the on-plot facilities are as follows:

 2-phase inlet separator to receive and separat e liquid and gas.

b) A description of the off-plot facilities are as follows:

Input also rec eived from:

 PDO Occupational Health

Production operators and maintenance staff

Hydrazine and Ammonium Bisulphate is used

Production and Maintenance staff has potential

New Actions (Jan 07, 2014 Rev iew):

4. Health Hazard Inventory and Detailed Risk Appraisals

Hazard Air pollution (environmental health hazard)

Acute Potential Health Respiratory tract irritation; aggravation of asthma

Recovery Measure s Effectivene ss

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Amines [e.g., Ethylenediamine (1,2-Diaminoethane), methylamine,

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Anti-foam agents (silicone based)

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Carbon monoxide- Gas (630-08-0)

Recovery Measure s Effectivene ss

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Catalyst - Alumina (activated)/Bauxite (Fresh and Spent)

Recovery Measure s Effectivene ss

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Caustics (weak alkalis) pH < 11.5

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Citric Acid (77-92-9)

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Corrosi on and Scale Inhibitors

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Ethyl Mercaptan (odorant additive)

Acute Potential Health Nuisance odor, nausea

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Food and water borne pathogens

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Freon (HCFC)

Remedial Actions Priority

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard HIV virus