DUKE UNIVERSITY

TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE OTHER:

A BAPTIST PERSPECTIVE

BY

AARON BROOKS

APRIL 27, 2012

 Introduction to Typologies

Before turning to the central argument of this paper, it will be helpful to say a word about

Christian typologies for the theology of religions in order to understand how they work in the

body of this essay. As discourse with and about the other, i.e. the person who stands outside of

Christianity, has advanced, new typologies for thinking about the other have developed

alongside that discourse, thereby giving Christians a shorthand method to describe the ways in

which Christian beliefs relate to the religious beliefs of the other. Of course, not all Christians

agree on which typologies should be used, but it will nevertheless be helpful to offer a prominent

example.

In his chapter, “A Reflection on Typologies,” within the volume entitled Christian

Approaches to Other Faiths, Peter Hedges examines a variety of typologies offered by various

theologians. Hedges settles on a subtle variant of the broadly accepted tripartite “exclusivism-

inclusivism-pluralism” typology offered by Alan Race in 1983. Hedges’ typology has four

categories: “exclusivisms,” “inclusivisms,” “pluralisms,” and “particularities.”1 If the reader is

not familiar with these terms, Hedges defines them in this way: “exclusivisms” refers to

theological systems that exclude all non-Christians from salvation;2 “inclusivisms” refers to

systems that include non-Christians in salvation, usually through some reference to the work of

Christ or the Holy Spirit;3 “pluralisms” refers to systems that assert that there are many paths that

lead to transcendent reality and salvation without the need for Christian means;4 and

“particularities” refers to systems that recognize the lack of meaning that “salvation” carries

1
Peter Hedges, “A Reflection on Typologies: Negotiating a Fast-Moving Discussion,” in Christian Approaches to
Other Faiths: SCM Reader, ed. Alan Race and Peter Hedges (London: SCM, 2009), 26-7.
2
Ibid., 17.
3
Ibid., 18.
4
Ibid., 18.
 Brooks 2

outside of a Christian context, and thus find any universal typology incoherent.5 Some will

recognize this last view as one which has emerged with postmodern philosophy. For now, we

note that even in the case of “particularities,” Hedges’ typology is primarily concerned with the

issue of salvation as it is understood in a Christian context. Hedges begins and ends his chapter

by emphasizing that this typology is not meant to be prescriptive or normative; rather, it is a

heuristic device helpful for categorizing various Christian approaches to the plurality of

religions. Indeed, Hedges encourages further exploration and experimentation with typologies. 6

Following Hedges’ exhortation, then, this essay begins with a suggestion for a new

typology. This typology retains, more or less, the categories of Hedges’ paradigm, while

combining it with the distinctions made by Paul Griffiths in Problems of Religious Diversity

between general truth claims, specific claims about salvation, and attitudes toward dialogue.7 As

noted earlier, Hedges’ paradigm focuses solely on the issue of salvation. So while the paradigm

is beneficial in that regard, it is insufficient for fully exploring ideas of truth and dialogue.

Griffiths, on the other hand, recognizes that claims about salvation are simply a subset of truth

claims in general. Thus, a broader typology might operate in three ways: it will take into

account how to think specifically about salvation while also offering a model for assessing

general truth claims of the other and attitudes toward dialogue with the other.

Using the framework offered by Griffiths and Hedges, then, I offer the following

typology: exclusivism/inclusivism/pluralism/particularity with respect to truth (and thus the

subset of salvation), and open/closed with respect to dialogue about the issues of truth and

salvation. The following diagram may prove useful:

5
Ibid., 28.
6
Ibid., 30.
7
For Griffiths’ philosophically rigorous discussion of these topics, see chapters 2 and 5 in Problems of Religious
Diversity (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001).
 Brooks 3

Truth

Salvation

Dialogue

Exclusivism Inclusivism Pluralism Particularity Open Closed

In regards to truth, “exclusivism” claims truth is only found in Christianity; “inclusivism” claims

truth is offered outside of Christianity as well; “pluralism” asserts that all religions are simply

different ways of talking about the same universal (experiential) truths; and “particularity”

asserts that truth may only be assessed when taking into account the whole of a tradition. In

regards to salvation, I rely on the definitions given by Hedges above. With respect to dialogue,

being “open” entails a willingness to learn, if possible, new truths from other religions; being

“closed” denies the possibility of learning new truths through dialogue.

This discussion of typologies has been in preparation for the main argument of this essay.

The focus here is not to advance a new typology per se; rather, by forwarding a specific position

within the new typology, I will implicitly contend for the validity of the new typology as well.

In this essay, then, I will argue that within my own Baptist tradition, the most satisfactory

theology of religions will be particular-exclusive-open, that is, particular with respect to truth,

exclusive with regard to salvation, and open for dialogue. Instead of appealing to purportedly

universal criteria, I hope to heed Alasdair MacIntyre’s recognition that good arguments take

place within traditions, which themselves are nothing more than “historically extended, socially
 Brooks 4

embodied argument.”8 Consequently, since we all have to start somewhere,9 I will be reasoning

for a particular-exclusive-open model within a Baptist tradition, recognizing that those outside of

this tradition may not feel that my arguments are cogent. This essay will explore each of these

typological categories in turn.

“Particularity” with Respect to Truth

In the Preamble to the 1963 version of the “Baptist Faith and Message” – a statement of

doctrines recognized by my denomination, the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, as an accurate

exposition of its beliefs – the committee states: “Baptists are a people who profess a living faith

… A living faith must experience a growing understanding of truth and must be continually

interpreted and related to the needs of each new generation.”10 It is to this statement that I appeal

when assessing a Baptist response of “particularity” to the truth claims of other religions.

At this time, we live in a Postmodern era that has seen the rise and fall of the

Enlightenment ideal of autonomous, tradition-free reason. Indeed, for the past 60 or so years,

this generation has been coming to grips with the devastation caused by Western colonialism in

the name of “universal truth.” Within this context, perhaps the most influential and controversial

philosopher of the 20th century began his work on language and truth. Ludwig Wittgenstein,

whose Philosophical Investigations and “Lectures on Religious Belief” provided the fodder for

Postmoderns to begin thinking differently about truth, also enabled Postliberal Protestants to

conceive of religious truth claims in a new way. In light of these developments, the commitment

of the “Baptist Faith and Message” to a growing understanding of truth is apt. Thus, in order to

8
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1980), p. 207.
9
"If we consider what is involved in learning to know anything, we will see that knowing has to begin with an act of
faith.” Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions: Biblical, Historical & Contemporary
Perspectives (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP Academic, 2003), 251.
10
Committee on Baptist Faith and Message, “Comparison of 1925, 1963, and 2000 Baptist Faith and Message,”
Southern Baptist Convention, http://www.sbc.net/bfm/bfmcomparison.asp (accessed April 21, 2012).
 Brooks 5

trace out my position of “particularity” with respect to truth, I will rely heavenly on

Wittgensteinian, Postliberal thought.

In his “Lectures on Religious Beliefs,” Wittgenstein asks: “How should we compare

beliefs with each other? What would it mean to compare them?”11 Ultimately, Wittgenstein

argues that comparison of religious beliefs is different than other comparisons. For Wittgenstein,

denying a religious belief in something like the Last Judgment is not the same as denying

someone’s belief that they see a German airplane.12 In the first case, a religious belief such as

the Last Judgment shapes its adherents’ entire way of thinking, whereas the latter case requires

no such commitment. In other words, even to be able to talk of a Last Judgment requires a

language-game, or rule of talking, which non-believers in the Last Judgment do not have. In still

other words, religious belief is not proved by appeal to “ordinary” (empirical?) grounds, but by

appeal to the way that particular belief shapes one’s entire life.13

Thus, it is nonsensical to deny a religious claim in the same way that it is nonsensical to

affirm a religious claim if that claim has not played a role in shaping one’s entire way of

speaking. Wittgenstein states: “If Mr. Lewy is religious and says he believes in a Judgment

Day, I won’t even know whether to say I understand him or not. I’ve read the same things as

he’s read. In a most important sense, I know what he means.”14 In this way, Wittgenstein

acknowledges the possibility that with enough study of a particular religion, a non-believer might

be able to make a religious claim intelligible and meaningful. Yet, if that claim has not shaped

the non-believer’s life and way of discourse, then he must maintain a certain degree of doubt

11
L. Wittgenstein. Compiled from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees, and James Taylor. Edited by Cyril
Barrett, Lectures & Conversations On Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (New Haven: University of
California Press, 1966), 54.
12
Ibid., 53.
13
Ibid., 54.
14
Ibid., 58.
 Brooks 6

about how well the claim is understood. In his analysis of Wittgenstein, Postliberal theologian

William Placher sums up these thoughts succinctly: “The Wittgensteinian emphasis on the

importance of use and social context for understanding meaning implies rather persuasively that

we cannot understand, and therefore cannot judge, a single utterance in isolation.”15 On this

reading of Wittgenstein,16 then, it would seem that by the very nature of religious beliefs, it is

unwise to compare religious propositions in isolation. This moves us strongly toward a position

of “particularity” in regards to truth.

Working from a slightly different angle, Postliberal theologian George Lindbeck provides

a tripartite paradigm of his own for thinking about the ways religious language – namely,

“doctrine,” – is used. Relying on developments in sociology and anthropology, Lindbeck claims

that religious doctrines are typically thought of in three ways: as cognitive-propositions,

experiential-expressions, or cultural-linguistic rules of dialogue.17

In the case of cognitive-propositions, it seems easy to compare religions: a proposition is

free-standing and has a truth-value of “true” or “false,” so one simply compares the truth values

of propositions held by various religions. Consequently, a religion’s validity may be judged

based on how many true propositions it contains (if any at all). In my typology, “exclusivism”

and “inclusivism” rely on this view of religious doctrines. Exclusivists deny that religions

outside of Christianity contain any true propositions. For instance, theologian Daniel Strange,

who describe himself as an exclusivist (in the context of salvation), claims: “the exclusive truth

of Christianity means … on closer inspection of these other non-Christian worldviews and

15
William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology: a Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Louisville, Ky.:
Westminster John Knox Press, 1989), 61-2.
16
Wittgenstein’s thought is incredibly nuanced, and at times, difficult to follow. Consequently, there is not a
consensus about Wittgenstein’s thoughts on religion.
17
George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1984), 16-18.
 Brooks 7

according to their own presuppositions, we can show their instability and futility.”18 For him,

Christian truth-claims are superior enough to show the futility of all non-Christian worldviews.

In a somewhat similar vein, Karl Barth describes all religion as idolatry.19 On the other hand,

inclusivists believe that other religions may contain true propositions. For example, Paul

Griffiths recommends that inclusivism with respect to truth is the “right answer” to religious

diversity.20

The cognitive-propositional model of doctrines is widely held, and it is outside of the

scope of this essay to attempt to argue against it. Suffice it to say, I find it insufficient for

discussing the truth claims of other religions because of how I understand the nature of

propositions. A simple example may show in what way. Suppose an orthodox Christian is told

to assess the following religious propositions:

P1: God exists.

P2: God does not exist.

Without hesitation, she will answer “true” to P1 and “false” to P2. Prima facie, she will be in

agreement with theistic religions, and in disagreement with atheistic religions. Yet, by

answering in this way, she has assumed her own concept of God, i.e. she has used the language

of her own tradition to dictate her conclusion. What if the propositions were to be expanded?

P1: God, who is Allah, exists.

P2: God, who is Allah, does not exist.

In this case, her answers will be exactly opposite, though the basic idea – the existence of God –

remains the same! By adding a nominative clause in apposition to “God,” she is now in

disagreement with Muslims about P1 and P2, but in agreement with atheists! The simple point is

18
Daniel Strange, “Exclusivisms,” in Christian Approaches to Other Faiths: SCM Reader, ed. Alan Race and Peter
Hedges (London: SCM, 2009), 49.
19
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: Volume 1, Part 2 (New Haven: Hendrickson Pub, 2010), 314.
20
Griffiths, Problems, 64.
 Brooks 8

that comparison of propositions abstracted from their proper religious context is misleading at

best. At worst, as Wittgenstein suggests, they are unintelligible. Outside of the necessary

context, it is not easy to tell whether propositions contain all of the information needed to

accurately judge their truth-values. The missiologist Hendrik Kraemer makes the point

poetically: “Every religion is a living, indivisible unity. Every part of it … can never be

understood in its real function … without keeping constantly in mind the vast and living unity of

existential apprehension in which this part moves and has its being.”21

Lindbeck’s next model, the “experiential-expressivist” view of religions, understands

religious doctrines to be expressions of a common, religious, human experience. This model

functions in a way similar to that which I have termed “pluralism with respect to truth” above.

For instance, pluralist John Hick argues that those religions which produce qualities like love and

morality are all valid ways of talking about an ultimate, transcendent reality. 22 Although

religious doctrines may seem to contradict one another, these contradictions are nothing like

insurmountable problems. Rather, they are different expressions of the same reality, and are

therefore “true” in that sense.

Lindbeck acknowledges the appeal of experiential-expressivism, yet he believes that a

cultural-linguistic model makes better sense of the way religious claims seem to function for

believers.23 Rather than viewing doctrines as simple propositions, he describes them as

“communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action.”24 Therefore, in the cultural-

linguistic context of religion, doctrines function more like a grammar for the faith than abstract

21
Hendrik Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World ( London: Edinburgh House Press, 1938),
135.
22
John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989).
23
Lindbeck, Doctrine, 34.
24
Ibid.,18.
 Brooks 9

propositions. Similarly, religions as a whole are viewed as interpretive schemes which are

embodied in narratives and rituals which “structure human experience and understanding of self

and world.”25 In other words, religions provide a language that does not simply give expression

to pre-existing experience, as in Hick’s language of “Ultimate Reality;” rather, religion becomes

a means of having experience and understanding the world. The religious “other” is not simply

thematizing in a different way an experience she purportedly shares with Christians – she is

having a different experience entirely.26 In the same way that a poet cannot help the reader to

experience beauty without an idiom in which to express his poetry, humans cannot have certain

types of religious experiences without a language, i.e. doctrines, to shape that experience.27

Thus, “to become religious involves becoming skilled in the language, the symbol system of a

given religion.”28 Furthermore, we may conclude that the richer and more varied our religious

language, the more differentiated our experience will be.29 For those who object that they have

had experiences that they cannot put into words, Lindbeck might argue that the ability to state

that you “cannot put an experience into words” is itself a linguistic interpretation of that

experience.30

So what does this mean for comparing truth claims? First, in a different way than I

argued above, it calls into question the idea that one may simply compare propositions outside of

the religious system in which they are found. Lindbeck says: “As actually lived, a religion may

be pictured as a gigantic proposition. It is a true proposition to the extent that … [it conforms

adherents] in some measure … to the ultimate reality and goodness that lies at the heart of

25
Ibid.,32.
26
Ibid., 40.
27
The example of the poet is my own, but the concept is Lindbeck’s. Ibid., 33-34.
28
Ibid., 34.
29
Ibid., 37.
30
Ibid., 36.
 Brooks 10

things.”31 Based on his cultural-linguistic model, Lindbeck is arguing that we must analyze

religions as a whole for their veridical status. Yet, one might argue that according to Lindbeck’s

model, it is not clear how one can determine the extent to which a religion conforms its adherents

to ultimate reality. Indeed, Lindbeck’s argument is weak at this point. For, as Wittgenstein

pointed out, it is doubtful that we can understand the other’s conformity to reality without

believing in the same things as the other. I will address this perceived weakness in Lindbeck’s

model below.

To summarize the argument to this point: I have made a case for “particularity” with

respect to truth by using Wittgenstein and Lindbeck to call into question the possibility of

comparing isolated propositions. Furthermore, Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic model for religious

doctrine was helpful in critiquing the possibility of “pluralism” with respect to truth. Thus, we

are left with the idea that one must analyze religious systems as an entire entity, i.e. one must

respect the “particularity” of each tradition. Yet, we have not established grounds for how this

analysis might take place. For this, I turn to baptist32 theologian James McClendon.

James McClendon authored a three-volume systematic theology which was grounded in

the Postliberal concept of narrative theology. In it, he acknowledges the particularity of his own

Free Church tradition, and moves to center ethics, doctrine, and witness within the life of the

Free Church. In his volume entitled Witness, he assesses theology after Wittgenstein. In

stronger language than Lindbeck, who does acknowledge the propositional content in religions,33

McClendon states: “There is indeed 'cognitive content' in many religions … But religions are

best approached as active clusters of practices … that embody the profound life-shaping

31
Ibid., 51.
32
McClendon calls himself a little ‘b’ baptist as an attempt to represent the broader free church tradition.
33
Lindbeck, Doctrine, 68-69.
 Brooks 11

convictions of their communities.”34 In other words, he affirms that propositions are inherent to

religions. Yet, these propositions are not at the heart of religious life – embodied convictions

are. Elsewhere, McClendon says:

Some self-styled postmodernists claim that convictional communities are indeed closed

systems, so that no conviction set can be translated into the terms of another set of

convictions. It seems likely that what these folk rightly reject is the notion that a belief

system can harmlessly be superposed, wholesale, upon another, or that both systems

point to a deeper, more 'genuine' reality, and hence can be interchanged. Yet one does

not violate the integrity of a set of convictions when one comprehends and makes use

of one of its language games in one's own set.35

McClendon thus rejects the experiential-expressivist model in the same way as Lindbeck.

Religious systems cannot be translated into one another as if they name the same underlying

experience. Yet, for a Christian, and especially for a Baptist who claims the priesthood and

discernment of all believers, it is possible to adopt the other’s convictions when they are

understood as meaningful in the context of one’s own particular tradition.

Indeed, what Wittgenstein and Lindbeck have taught us is that the only way for a

Christian to understand the other is through the “particularity” of Christianity. It is impossible to

step onto some type of theologically-neutral, universal ground to objectively weigh and

understand the claims of the other. In order to truly understand the other, one must become

other by learning the language of and believing as the other. This claim does not mean that

propositions and doctrines, both in and outside of Christianity, are not important. Rather, this

34
James William McClendon, Jr., Systematic Theology Volume 3: Witness, Kindle Edition (Abingdon Press, 2000),
Kindle Locations 5537-5540.
35
Ibid., Kindle Locations 5743-5748.
 Brooks 12

claim implies that a Christian cannot be confident that they fully understand free-standing

propositions of the other, nor can Christians hope to “prove” their own propositions by some

type of universally-accepted approach.36 Therefore, the response to the purported weakness in

Lindbeck’s thought is this: Christians may assess the veridical status of other religions from

within Christianity, because, as MacIntrye says, such is the nature of reasoning within any

tradition, religious or otherwise. Furthermore, Christians trust that their views correspond more

accurately to a reality that is independent of human perception.37 So then, what hope does

dialogue bring? I will turn to this question below in “Open Dialogue.” But first, I hope to draw

out the implications of this position for the issue of salvation.

An “Exclusive” Salvation

Article IV of the 2000 “Baptist Faith and Message” states: “Salvation … is offered freely

to all who accept Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour … There is no salvation apart from personal

faith in Jesus Christ as Lord.”38 According to the typology offered in this essay, Baptists who

choose to work within the parameters offered by this statement must be classed as “exclusivists.”

This section will explore how this position relates to “particularity” with respect to truth.

It will first be helpful to return to Barth’s assertion that all religion, including

Christianity, is idolatry. For Barth, apart from the grace of God given through revelation, all

religious systems are destined to create idols, i.e. false Gods. Thus, the only way that a religion

can refer to God is if God gives that religion a language – a Word – that corresponds to the

divine reality. If salvation and damnation are parts of reality, and if God wants humanity to

36
Placher agrees, stating: “We cannot find an Archimedean point, a universal standard of rationality. On the other
hand, we are not utterly imprisoned within our own current horizons.” Unapologetic Theology, 112.
37
In philosophy, this view is called “epistemological realism” and a “correspondence theory of truth.” Lindbeck
explicitly makes room for both. Lindbeck, Doctrine, 68.
38
Baptist Faith and Message, “Comparison.”
 Brooks 13

know about these realities, then according to Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic model, God must

give humanity a language that shapes humanity’s experience of these realities. Of course, what

is meant by “God” and “idol” and “salvation” will also depend on that revealed language. So

then, insofar as the God-given language truly corresponds to reality, it would then be impossible

to experience that reality apart from the use of that language to shape the experience of the

language-user. In other words, a person must have the language of salvation and damnation

revealed to her in order to experience salvation or damnation. Lindbeck concisely describes this

position: “On this view, there is no damnation – just as there is no salvation – outside the

church. One must, in other words, learn the language of faith before one can know enough about

its message knowingly to reject it and thus be lost.”39 But if this is true, it would seem that we

are closer to “particularity” than “exclusivism” with respect to salvation. Thus, we must reason

further.

Christians claim that God has revealed the true Word in the historical person of Jesus

Christ. Herbert McCabe, the Dominican ethicist, proclaims: “Jesus then, the communication of

the Father, is [humankind] come to its meaning …. We can compare the coming of Jesus to the

coming of a new language; and indeed, [the apostle] John does this: Jesus is the word, the

language of God which comes to be a language for man.”40 In other words, it is only through

Jesus, the Word of God, that humankind is able to fully experience the realities of salvation,

redemption, reconciliation, being human, etc. Indeed, we can only know about these realities as

God reveals them to us. But how can humankind hope to understand this Word two thousand

years after it was given?

39
Lindbeck, Doctrine., 59.
40
Herbert McCabe, Law, Love and Language. (London: Sheed & Ward, 1968), 127 and 129.
 Brooks 14

It is through the language and practices of the Church that God makes Christ known to

the world today: “The church makes the presence of Christ articulate as a language, as an

interpretation of the world, as a means of communication.”41 In order to know God and the new

language that God has provided in Christ, a person must participate in the community that knows

that language.42 Similarly, Stanley Hauerwas, in his essay “The Church as God’s New

Language,” claims that because Jesus came before the narrative,43 it is not simply language that

refers to God – it is the Church.44 That is, at Pentecost God formed a people, and through the

Holy Spirit, gave them a language to speak. If one were simply to refer to the story of Jesus

apart from the embodiment of that story through the Holy Spirit in the life of the church, it

“would be equivalent to considering the truth and falsity of sentences separate from their context

of utterance.”45 As McClendon argued before, religions are convictions embodied in practices.

So what does all of this talk of Jesus and the Church mean for salvation of the other? To

put it in the words of the pluralist Perry Schmidt-Leukel: “[If] the life and death of Jesus were

regarded as constitutive for human salvation, this would result either in an exclusivistic position

… or in an inclusivist position.”46 Schmidt-Leukel has rightly pointed out the seemingly

paradoxical implications of the argument thus far: By taking an approach of “particularity” with

respect to truth, we are led not to a position of “particularity” or “pluralism” with respect to

salvation, but to the conclusion that because God has made the Word of Jesus Christ constitutive

for salvation within the Christian community, the only options which that community has for

understanding salvation of the other are “exclusivism” or “inclusivism.”

41
Ibid., 142.
42
Ibid., 130.
43
Stanley Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press Books, 2001), 155.
44
Ibid., 158.
45
Ibid.
46
Perry Schmidt-Leukel, “Pluralisms,” in Christian Approaches to Other Faiths: SCM Reader, ed. Alan Race and
Peter Hedges (London: SCM, 2009), 95.
 Brooks 15

Nevertheless, as Paul Griffiths has argued in Problems of Religious Diversity, the

difference between these two options is not as clear as it might seem.47 I can rightly assert from

my particular position as a Baptist that salvation comes exclusively through faith in Jesus Christ,

i.e. the other must learn God’s “new language” in order to experience salvation. But does this

mean that religious others who do not learn the Christian narrative in this life cannot one day be

included (as inclusivists claim)? Does this mean that God is not at work in their faith-language

now? Are they destined for damnation? After all, Lindbeck claims that one must learn the

language of damnation in order to be damned. These questions are not easily answered, but they

must be examined using the narrative of the Christian faith. Indeed, they may only be answered

in the eschaton. For now, Baptists may hope that the loving God they serve will continue to

work, by the Holy Spirit, within the religious other. Indeed, faith that God is working in the

other will lead Baptists to dialogue.

An “Open” Dialogue

Article XVII of the 1963 “Baptist Faith and Message” acknowledges ““the right of free

and unhindered access to God on the part of all [people] and the right to form and propagate

opinions in the sphere of religion.”48 Article XI states that the impetus for dialogue is the desire

to fulfill the Great Commission, that is, to make disciples.49 These articles notwithstanding, it is

still unclear whether Baptists should be “open” to learning new truths through dialogue.

Nevertheless, I will argue that because Baptists are committed to a “growing understanding of

truth,” this truth will most likely come through dialogue with the other. Indeed, Baptists need

the other in order to better understand themselves.

47
Griffiths, Problems of Religious Diversity, 158-9.
48
Baptist Faith and Message, “Comparison.”
49
Ibid.
 Brooks 16

As noted in the discussion on truth claims, the Postliberal position of “particularity” with

respect to truth makes it impossible to appeal to so-called universal grounds to judge truth

claims. Yet, this does not mean that one must be “closed” to the possibility of discerning new

truths through dialogue. McClendon affirms this point: “cultural interaction can lead to new or

revised convictions that are justified (or justifiable) even though there is no universal science, no

imperial rationality, to tell the participants what they must think.”50 But is there another

“science” that Christians can use to revise their convictions through dialogue?

William Placher provides a helpful way to think about this question. He advocates

finding common beliefs – even if they are only shared on a superficial level – and moving from

there.51 In this way, dialogue will always proceed ad hoc, since it is impossible to systematically

engage the other when our common ground is always changing because of our changing

conversation partners. Moreover, Placher believes that with enough time, dialogue, and study,

Christians may even learn how doctrines and arguments function in the other’s religious

context.52 Of course, Christians must keep in mind Wittgenstein’s point that without believing

and dedicating one’s life to those doctrines, it is doubtful whether they will be understood at the

deepest level. Nevertheless, by entering into the language and rationale of the other, Christians

open themselves up to the possibility of learning new truths that can function within their own

Christian tradition.53

Finally, as Christians share their own beliefs – the gospel – with others, they must do so

with humility and respect. Lindbeck’s understanding of evangelism is helpful here: “The

50
McClendon, Witness, Kindle Locations 5718-5720.
51
Placher, Unapologetic Theology, 106.
52
Ibid., 108.
53
Thus, the inclusivist David Cheetham is right when he says: “It is extremely important when meeting people of
other faiths to allow them to be understood – to the fullest extent possible – on their own terms before attempting to
reflect on things from within a Christian perspective.”David Cheetham, “Inclusivisms,” in Christian Approaches to
Other Faiths: SCM Reader, ed. Alan Race and Peter Hedges (London: SCM, 2009), 78.
 Brooks 17

communication of the gospel is … the offer and the act of sharing one’s own beloved language –

the language that speaks of Jesus Christ – with all those who are interested, in the full awareness

that God does not call all to be part of the witnessing people.”54 Christians believe they possess

truths that have been given by God, but they also know that through the Holy Spirit, God is at

work in the other. Thus, Christians will be open to learning profound truths from the other

because they know that, like the wind, the Spirit blows where it wills. On this note, William

Placher offers three rules for dialogue:

1. Remember the particularity of your Christian tradition.

2. Seek out conversation partners who are deeply committed to the particularity of their

own religious traditions.

3. Be respectful of the particularity of other traditions. In other words, do not assume

that all non-Christian traditions are similar.55

If Christians can follow these three guidelines, they will have much to gain from “open”

dialogue with the other.

Conclusion

This essay has provided a small contribution toward a distinctly Baptist “theology of the

other.” In it, I proposed a new typology that takes into account three common problem-areas in

the theology of religions: truth claims, salvation, and attitudes toward dialogue. Rather than

trying to provide a universally-acceptable method for thinking about the other, I suggested that

Baptists in the Postliberal camp would find a “particular-exclusive-open” approach to other

religions most satisfying. Specifically, I argued that comparison of truth claims is a complicated

task that can distort the understanding of the other. Furthermore, Baptists cannot escape the fact

54
Lindbeck, Doctrine, 61.
55
Ibid., 147.
 Brooks 18

that this analysis cannot take place on completely neutral ground. Yet, this helps Baptists to

better understand that “exclusivism” in regards to salvation is a valid and respectful stance to

take towards the other. Finally, this stance motivates them to share their faith with the other,

while fully expecting the Holy Spirit to teach Christians new truths through dialogue with the

other. In this sense, Christians need the differences and challenges that the other provides.
 Brooks 19

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