CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I REVIEWER

PHILIPPINE LAW SCHOOL

AY 2019-2020 (First Semester)

Atty. Ronald Ray K. San Juan

PART I – INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

I. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Marbury v. Ruling (Recording):

Madison, 1
Cranch (5 U.S.) The SC inserted a provision of jurisdiction to hear cases and to determine the
137, 2 L.Ed 60 legality/ the validity of an act w/c is the Judicial power.
(1803)
Judicial Power- the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversy
that involving rights w/c are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack/excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Art VIII, Sec 1)

Additional Doctrine: “that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”

Angara v. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT AS FINAL ARBITER

Electoral
Commission, 63 Ruling (Recording): Electoral tribunal did not act with grave abuse of
Phil. 139 (1936) discretion in taking cognizance of the election protest despite the resolution
provided by the national assembly. Electoral Tribunal acted within legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative (art VI, Sec4)

Judicial Supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and

appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no
one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
the source of all authority. This however is limited to actual cases and
controversies.

Avelino v. Facts:
Cuenco, G.R.
No. L-2821, 4 -Senate President position is at stake.
March 1949
-Quorum

Ruling (Recording): Political question doctrine - it involves the wisdom of

political department the SC for that matter should not interfere. Since this was
decided in 1949, SC did not take the case. Expanded certiorari power was not
yet created.

When a constitutional question arises from executive and legislative, only the
Court can decide as the guardian of the Constitution.
 1. There must be an actual Case or Controversy

Requisites of 2. Locus standi/ The question of constitutionality must be raised by the

Judicial Review proper party.

A. Citizen’s Standing Every Filipino citizen has legal standing to institute a

mandamus action to enforce a public right. One such public right is the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern under Article III,
section 7 of the Constitution, which is a self-executing provision.

B. Taxpayer’s Standing Taxpayer standing was first recognized by the

Supreme Court on 29 December 1960 in the seminal Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, where the Court adopted the American
“rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a
legislation appropriating local or state public funds.

C. Legislator’s Standing Legislators have been accorded standing to sue when

they “claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives. the act was done by an administrative agency, the President, a
Constitutional Convention, or any other instrumentality of the government.

D. voter’s standing upon the rationale that “a voter whose right of suffrage is
allegedly impaired…is entitled to judicial redress.”

E. Another such standard is that which confers “personality to sue in behalf

of the succeeding generations…based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced ecology.

3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity

4. It must be the very Lis mota of the case.

Tiojanco, Bryan Transcendental importance-Even though a petitioner failed to show a direct

Dennis G., injury they are allowed to sue.
Stilted Standards
of Standing, the
Transcendental
Importance
Doctrine, and
the Non-
Preclusion
Policy They
Prop, 86 PHIL.
L.J. 606 (2012)

Several petitions assailed the constitutionality of the declaration of a state of

national emergency by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. During the
pendency of the suits, the said declaration was lifted.
David v. Gloria A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
Macapagal- justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
Arroyo, G.R. No. adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical
171396, 3 May
2006 value or use.

-exceptions on moot and academic principle

1. if there’s a grave violation of the constitution

2. paramount public interest

3. needs to formulate a principle to guide the bench, bar, public.

4. capable of repetition but has evaded review.

Ruling (Recording):

It was moot and academic but the court took cognizance of the case because
of the exceptions above regardless of the PP1021 supervening event.

DOCTRINES:

Moot and academic- The one that ceases justifiable controversies by virtue of
supervening event.

Serrano v. The 3rd requisite of judicial review in assailing the constitutional question in
Gallant the earliest possible opportunity is only for the supreme court and lower
Maritime courts. Quasi-judicial
Services,
Inc., G.R. agencies are not included. Earliest possible opportunity entails the
No. interposition of the issue in the pleadings only before a competent court.
167614, 4
March Ruling (Recording):
2009
Only at CA level can determine the constitutionality of an act. LA and NLRC
are not courts but quasi-judicial bodies only. Therefore, it was raised at the
earliest opportunity.

Resident Marine - Legal standing

Mammals of the
Protected -stewards
Seascape Tanon
Strait v. Sec. - SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
Reyes, G.R. No. including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
180771, 21 April rights or obligations under environmental laws.
2015
Ruling (Recording):

- Concerned Citizens can represent inanimate objects and should be given

legal standing in actions before courts of law. It is not new in the field of
animal rights and environmental law.

- Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the
Resident Marine Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human
petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a representative
capacity.

- A representative as a party who is not bound to directly or actually benefit

or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified
 real party in interest.10 The representative is an outsider to the cause of action.
Second, the rule provides a list of who may be considered as
"representatives."

- You can retroactively apply the rules of procedure and not law. So long as
there’s no right that has been violated.

Oposa v. FACTS:
Factoran, G.R.
No. 101083, 30 -Timber license agreement
July 1993
-Class suit by 44 children represented by their parents.

-Suing on behalf of generation yet unborn

-intergenerational responsibility

Ruling (Recording):

Petitioners has standing because of intergenerational responsibility and their

right to a balance and healthful ecology. (Art II, Sec 15) (Self-executing
provision)

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundemental right .

Therefore, every citizen and generations yet unborn has legal standing to
protect the enviroment.

Arceta v. - BP no. 22 (bouncing check law)

Mangrobang,
G.R. No. Ruling (Recording):
152895, 15 June
2004 If the question raised was not the very lis mota of the case. It was a violation
of the law. There was no constitutional issue, the petitioner just wanted to
appeal the case.

- Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of

the act in question should have been immediately raised in the
proceedings in the competent courts. It does not mean immediately
elevating the matter to the Supreme Court.

Interpretation

Tiojanco & Ruling (Recording):

San Juan,
Importing 1. The Justices and framers of the constitution studied in the U.S.
Proportion
ality 2. American jurisprudence is more persuasive than other countries.
Through
Legislation Aids of construction:
: A
-Verba Legis (ordinary meaning, Looking at the text of the constitution.)
Philippine
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
Experiment
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. This
,
is where interpretation begins; when there is no ambiguity in the words of the
PROPORT
IONALITY law interpretation is not proper.
IN ASIA,
Cambridge -Ratio Legis est anima ( Intent of the framers by looking at the constitutional
University deliberation.) The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers
Press of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to
(pending be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
review) consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

-Ut magis valeat quam pereat (Interpret the law as a whole) Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.

Nitafan v. -exemption of income tax for judiciary

Commissione
r of Internal Ruling (Recording):
Revenue, 152
SCRA 284 Judiciary should not be exempted. The meaning of the text is not clear that’s
why it resorted to ratio legis.

The intent of the framer was to make the salary taxable.

Francisco, Jr. v. -impeachment cased with 2 impeachment complaints

Nagmamalas
akit ng mga -violated constitutional prohibition which is clear
Manananggo
l ng mga -Duty to determine if the boundary of each department.
Manggagawa
ng Pilipino, Ruling (Recording):
160261, 10
It was a violation of the constitution.
November
2003 Ordinary meaning of the law (verba legis)

- the court looked at the ordinary meaning of the word “initiate” which means
to start. In that case first impeachment complaint was already been initiated.

Unconstitutiona When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
lity; Effect former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights,

imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in
legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed.

Doctrine of operative fact: nullifies effects of unconstitutional law. It applies

as a matter of equity and fair play. It recognizes the effectivity of the law
prior to the declaration of its unconstitutionality.

Planters -tax P10 per bag

Products Inc.
v. Fertiphil PPI was not unduly burdened and thus, Operative fact is not applicable.
 Corporation, Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be
G.R. No. refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust
166006, 14 enrichment.
March 2008

Araullo v. - exception: Operative fact doctrine

Aquino III, G.R.
No. 209287, 1 -valid and applicable because there is a great effect on a third party
July 2014
-applies when it will give an undue burden to the person who have relied in
the invalid law.

-PDAP

-DOP nullifies void law but sustains effects

-equity and fair play

Ruling (Recording):

Operative facts was applicable because after DAP was declared

unconstitutional, some projects under DAP has already been implemented
and nullifying these will take the supposed beneficial effect it will carry to the
people. The doctrine of operative fact has nothing to do with the potential
liability of persons who acted pursuant to a then-constitutional statute, order,
or practice. They are presumed to have acted in good faith and the court
cannot load the dice, so to speak, by disabling possible defenses in potential
suits against so-called “authors, proponents and implementors.

II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

National Territory Article I- National territory: {comprises Philippine archipelago, with all islands
and waters embraced therein}, {all other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction,}{ all terrestrial, fluvial, aerial domains};{
including territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, other submarine
areas.} {Waters all around and connecting the islands}

Article XII, §2 – All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, other mineral oils, forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests,
timber, flora, fauna, other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated…The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control of the State.

Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens by cooperatives…

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth… and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively for Filipino citizens.
 The President may enter agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization… based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country…the State shall promote the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources.

Principles

Article II, §1 – Rule The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.

of Law
Democratic: Majority Rules

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.

Province of -extent of President’s powers in pursuing the peace process

North
Cotabato v. -MOA-AO contrary to law
GRP, G.R.
No. 183591, No law shall be passed allowing any part of the country to be separated.
14 October
2008 Ruling (Recording):

MOA- AD is a public concern because it involves sovereign and territorial

integrity of the state.

- Violation of the constitution, the present MOA-AD is not valid. It talks about
the creation of another state in all but name according to the Montevideo
convention- (a) a permanent population, (b) defined territory, (c) government,
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. Additionally, it is inimical
to national unity, to sequester a portion of territory with their own method of
governance and as such is against the constitution of the Philippines. Finally, it
is important to note that the view that it would provide towards the unity of the
Bangsamoro people is erroneous. It clearly distinguishes between the
Bangsamoro people and the other tribal people, all of whom may not necessarily
agree with the MOA-AD.

-The people’s right to self-determination should not be understood as unilateral

right of secession. Thus, with these arguments the court denies the petition.

Magallona v. -RA 9522- adjusting baselines, limited sovereignty, archipelagic waters.

Ermita, G.R. No.
187167, 6 August Ruling (Recording):
2011
Discuss only the extent of the Philippine Sovereignty.

- Important provision: Art II sec1

The UNCLOS ruling changes the reading of the coast and baseline. It starts by
changing the classification of the Philippines into an archipelago which means
 that the coast, from including the section of Palawan to Mindanao, is now seen
as only including the immediate waters around. While the numbers appear
larger (entire water territorial count from 440,994 to 586,210) it actually reduces
our territorial sea from 274,136 nautical miles to 32,106 in favor of adding more
EEZ. EEZs are defined as territory which isn’t necessarily our territory but
where we have exclusive rights to use.

Article II, §2 – The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
Incorporation generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
Clause and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations

Kuroda v. -prohibition of US lawyers not recognized by law

Jalandoni, G.R. No.
L-2662, 26 March Ruling (Recording): Even though Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague
1949 and Geneva Convention, the principle of the said 2 conventions are generally
accepted principle of the international law and under Art II sec2 of the
constitution, generally accepted principle is part of the law of the land.

Pharmaceutical & -MILK CODE-international law transformed from ICMB

Health Care
Association of the Incorporation- does not need a law to be applicable.
Philippines v.
Duque III, G.R. Transformation- needs an act of congress before it becomes operative.
No. 173034, 9
October 2007 The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant
to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it
to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

Article II, §3 – Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.
Civilian
Supremacy AFP= 1. protector of the people and the State. 2. goal: to secure the sovereignty
Clause of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

Integrated Bar of Use of AFP and PNP to patrol (Estrada)

the Philippines v.
Zamora, G.R. No. PNP is the leading team, Not the AFP.
141284, 15
August 2000 Ruling (Recording): It was not a violation of art II, sec 3.

The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is

appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident
 in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces
are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP.

Gudani v. Senga, EO 464- the violation of orders resulted in suppression of rights

G.R No. 170165,
15 August 2006 Invoked Commander-in-Chief powers

As members of AFP they must follow the order of the president.

Ruling (Recording): The President has full discretion in exercising his function
as commander in chief because this is essential to Civilian Supremacy.

The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP
to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose
duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties
imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature.
Civilian supremacy over the military also cancels the notion that the military
may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as
conducting warrantless searches and seizures.

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as

Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that "the
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines.” This clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief,
absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed
forces.

Article II, §4 – =to serve and protect the people.

Prime Duty of the
Government The Government may call upon the people to defend the State, and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal military or civil service.

Article II, §5 – The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
Enjoyment of and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
Democracy the people of the blessings of democracy.

Article II §6 – Separation of Church and State is INVIOLABLE

Separation of
Church & State Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz: No law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

A. Free Exercise Clause - The free exercise and enjoyment of religious

profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed.

Under the Free Exercise Clause, religious belief is absolutely protected,

religious speech and proselytizing are highly protected but subject to restraints
 applicable to non-religious speech, and unconventional religious practice
receives less protection; nevertheless conduct, even if it violates a law, could be
accorded protection.

B. Establishment Clause - No law shall be made respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

The purpose of the religion clauses - both in the restriction it imposes on the
power of the government to interfere with the free exercise of religion and the
limitation on the power of government to establish, aid, and support religion - is
the protection and promotion of religious liberty. The Free Exercise Clause
directly articulates the common objective of the two clauses and the
Establishment Clause specifically addresses a form of interference with
religious liberty. In other words, free exercise is the end, proscribing
establishment is a necessary means to this end to protect the rights of those who
might dissent from whatever religion is established.

Estrada v. Escritor, Benevolent neutrality

A.M. No. P-02-
1651, 4 August The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are
2003 anchored on a different reading of the "wall of separation." The strict
separationist view holds that Jefferson meant the "wall of separation" to protect
the state from the church. Thus, the Establishment Clause being meant to
protect the state from the church, the state's hostility towards religion allows no
interaction between the two. This approach erects an absolute barrier to formal
interdependence of religion and state.

A tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality is shows the
Court's tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society.

While the strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, it is strict in

holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes
duties or obligations.

Benevolent neutrality which gives room for accommodation is buttressed by a

different view of the "wall of separation" the wall is meant to protect the church
from the state. The Williams wall is, however, breached for the church is in the
state and so the remaining purpose of the wall is to safeguard religious liberty.
Williams' view would therefore allow for interaction between church and state,
but is strict with regard to state action which would threaten the integrity of
religious commitment.

3 Step Process: Compelling State Interest Test

First, has the government action created a burden on the free exercise of
religion?" The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but
without inquiring into the truth of the belief.

Second, the court asks: "is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify
this infringement of religious liberty?" In this step, the government has to
establish that its purposes are legitimate for the state and that they are
compelling.

Third, the court asks: "has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the
 least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?" The analysis requires
the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties.

-remanded for investigation

Ruling (Recording): Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality

approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause.

Estrada v. Escritor, -dismissed for lack of compelling interest

A.M. No. P-02-
1651, 22 June
2006

Re: Letter of Tony -Noon masses held at basement of QC Hall

Q. Valenciano,
Holding of - Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion
Religious
Rituals at the In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State
Hall of Justice adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the
Building in reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain
Quezon City, portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their
A.M. No. 10- religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does
4-19-SC, 7 not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit
March 2017 such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

State Policies

Article II, §7 – The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations to other
Independent states, the paramount consideration shall be:
Foreign Policy
~national sovereignty

~territorial integrity

~national interest

~right to self-determination

Bayan v. Executive The presence of U.S. military can be extended or be allowed thru treaty.
Secretary, G.R.
No. 138570, 10 Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
October 2000 in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, (a) it must
be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and,
 when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.

Ruling (Recording):

Sec7 art II doesn’t preclude the state from entering a treaty/ agreement with
other country.

Saguisag v. Ochoa, EDCA does not need the concurrence of senate because it is just an executive
G.R. No. 212426, agreement. It is as binding as treaty.
12 January 2016
& 26 July 2016 Ruling (Recording):

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence

because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded. As culled from the
afore-quoted deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme
Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars, executive agreements merely
involve arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or
agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a treaty; (2) pursuant
to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or (3) in the exercise of the
President's independent powers under the Constitution.

There remain two very important features that

distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of
art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied

authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive

agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate
unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions.

Was not a violation of Sec 7 Art II

The power and duty to conduct foreign relations. The President also carries the
mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations.15 Since
every state has the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with other
sovereign states,16 it is but logical that every state must vest in an agent the
authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states.

The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences,

sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of
war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on
the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness, x x
x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most
confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular
officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world.

The President may generally enter into executive agreements subject to

limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a
treaty already concurred in by the Senate.

One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity

and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. 206
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding
through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by
Congress. The right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage.

The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of an executive
agreement or a treaty. No court can tell the President to desist from choosing
an executive agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement,
unless the case falls squarely within Article VIII, Section 25.

Treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements are all

constitutional manifestations of the conduct of foreign affairs with their distinct
legal characteristics.

a. Treaties are formal contracts between the Philippines and other

States-parties, which are in the nature of international
agreements, and also of municipal laws in the sense of their
binding nature.226

b. International agreements are similar instruments, the provisions

of which may require the ratification of a designated number of
parties thereto.

c. Executive agreements are generally intended to implement a

treaty already enforced or to determine the details of the
implementation thereof that do not affect the sovereignty of the
State.228

2. Treaties and international agreements that cannot be mere executive

agreements must, by constitutional decree, be concurred in by at least
two-thirds of the Senate.

3. However, an agreement - the subject of which is the entry of foreign

military troops, bases, or facilities - is particularly restricted. The
requirements are that it be in the form of a treaty concurred in by the
Senate; that when Congress so requires, it be ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose;
and that it be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Thus, executive agreements can continue to exist as a species of international

agreements. Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign
military forces if it merely involves detail adjustments.

1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent

requirements that must be fulfilled by the international agreement
allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in
the Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and (b)
it must be duly concurred in by the Senate.

2. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President
may choose the form of the agreement (i.e., either an executive
agreement or a treaty), provided that the agreement dealing with foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal agreement that
 first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines.

3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters,

limitations, and standards set by the law and/or treaty that the former
purports to implement; and must not unduly expand the international
obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in the law or
treaty.

4. The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as

well as with existing laws and treaties.

~consistent with its national interest

Article II, §8 – ~adopts a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons

Freedom from
Nuclear ~in its territory
Weapons

Article II, §9 – ~promote a just and dynamic social order

Just and
Dynamic ~that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation
Social Order
~free the people from poverty through policies that: 1.provide adequate social
services, 2. promote full employment, 3. a rising standard of living, 4. an
improved quality of life for all

Article II, §10 – Section 10: The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
Social Justice, c.f. development
Article XIII, §§1-
2 Art XIII Social Justice and Human Rights

[1]: Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, remove cultural inequities by diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.

The State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of
property and its increments.

[2]: The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

Article II, §11 – The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
Human Dignity, for human rights.
c.f. Article XIII,
§§17-19 XIII [17]: creation of the independent office Commission on Human Rights

[18] powers: 1. investigate on its own or on compliant by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights; 2. adopt operational
guidelines and rules of procedure in accordance with the Rules of Court; 3.
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines and Filipinos residing abroad; 4. Exercise
 visitatorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; 5. establish a
continuing program of education and research to enhance respect for human
rights; 6. recommend to Congreass measures to promote human rights and to
provide compensation to victims or their families; 7. monitor the Philippine
Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
8. grant immunity from prosecution any person whose testimony or possession
of documents/other evidence necessary to determine the truth in investigations;
9. request the assistance of any dept in the performance of its functions; 10.
appoint its officers and employees; 11. perform other functions and duties that
may be provided by law

[19] Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that
should fall within the authority of the Commission

Article II, §12 – State recognizes the sanctity of family life, shall protect and strengthen the
Sanctity of Family family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Life, c.f. Article
XV Mother and unborn = equal protection under the State

Right and duty of parents to rear youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall be supported by the Government

Art XV: The Family

[1] Filipino family is foundation of the nation

[2] marriage – inviolable social institution – is the foundation of the family and
is protected by the State

[3] State shall defend: 1. right of spouses to found a family according to their
own religious convictions; 2. right of children to assistance, care, protection; 3.
right of family to living wage and income; 4. right of family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies

Article II, §13 – ~vital role of Youth

Role of Youth
~State shall protect Youth and well-being

~State shall inculcate nationalism and patriotism, and encourage Youth

involvement

Article II, §14 – ~State recognizes the role of women in nation-building

Role of Women, c.f.
Article XIII, §14 ~State shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of men and women

Art XIII[14] State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such
facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

Saudia v. -gender discrimination

Rebesenci
o, G.R. -flight attendant forced to resign because she was pregnant
No.
 198587, ~lex loci intentionis -law intended by the parties
14
January Note: Modes settling law on contracts:
2015
1. lex loci contractus – place of making

2. lex loci solutionis – place of performance

3. lex loci intentionis – place of the parties

Ruling (Recording): Contract is null and void. It violates sec 14 Art II of the
constitution.

Saudia's policy is discriminatory. As argued by respondents, Saudia's policy

entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who become
pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that
pertains specifically to women. Saudia's policy excludes from and restricts
employment on the basis of no other consideration but sex.
We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical
limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated
with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to
view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that, it must entail
the termination of one's employment. It is clear to us that any individual,
regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of
functions. However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an
impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete
termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.

Article II, -State shall promote and protect the right to health of the people and instill
§15 – Right health consciousness among them.
to Health,
c.f. Article Art XIII Health
XIII, §§11-
13 [11] State shall adopt comprehensive approach to make essential goods and
services available to all the people. Priority: underprivileged sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. Free medical care to paupers.

[12] State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system.  manpower development, research, responsive to the country’s health
needs and problems.

[13] State shall establish a special agency for the disabled and their
rehabilitation and integration into the mainstream of society.

Article II, §16 – Self-executing provision

Balanced &
Healthful Ecology State protect and advance the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
~inherent right of the people

Oposa v. Factoran, Timber license agreement

G.R. No.
101083, 30 July
 1993

MMDA v. ~poor water quality of Manila Bay

Concerned
Residents of Ministerial vs. directory
Manila Bay,
G.R. No. Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial
171947, 18 duty. A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official
December 2008 discretion nor judgment." It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law."

Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand,

and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail
a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing
what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. It is not a task subject to the discretion of the petitioners because it
falls under their obligation.

Article II, §17 – State priorities:

Priority Sectors, c.f.
Article XIV, §14 1. education

2. science and technology

3. arts

4. national culture

5. sports

Cudia v. ~cadet was late by 2 mins to next class

Superinten
dent of ~issue: grave abuse of holding
PMA, G.R.
No. ~academic freedom invoked by institution, not by the student.
211362, 24
February 1. Who will be admitted
2015
2. Who will teach

3. What to teach

4. How to teach

Article II, §18 – State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. Shall protect rights and
Labor, c.f. welfare of workers.
Article II, §3
Hongkong Bank ~petition granted
Independent
Labor Union v. ~validity of external credit checks as a condition, Collective Bargaining
Hongkong and Agreement
Shanghai Banking
Corporation The Court held that the management of the bank may have the prerogative, but
Limited, G.R. No. it is not absolute. Collective Bargaining Agreement is a product of
218390, 28 constitutionally-granted right of employees to participate on matters affecting
February 2018 them as laborers.

It is held by the court that the enforcement of new rule by the bank violates the
rights of its employees because it invalidly modifies the CBA which must be
agreed upon by the employer and employees by their Union representatives.

Article II, §19 & 20 [19] State shall develop a self-reliant and independent economy effectively
– Self-reliant & controlled by Filipinos
Independent
National [20] State recognizes the role of the private sector; encourages private enterprise
Economy and provides incentives

c.f. Article
XII

Manila Prince ~bidding Manila Hotel

Hotel v. GSIS,
G.R. No. Filipino First Policy. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
122156, 3 the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
February 1997 Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national
goals and priorities.

Ruling (Recording):

Since MH is an art of national heritage and therefore part of our national

patrimony and economy then it should be controlled by Filipino. The term
qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least
60% of which is owned by Filipinos.

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not
only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It
also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should
develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also
the mental ability or faculty of our people.

Tanada v. Angara, ~WTO Agreement will not violate the Filipino first policy.
G.R. No. 118295,
2 May 1997 No, there’s no provision in the Constitution which prohibits our country from
participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and
from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized.
 While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair.

It was held that the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement does not
violate Sec. 19, Art. II, nor Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, because the said sections
should be read and understood in relation to Secs. 1 and 13, Art. XII, which
require the pursuit of a trade policy that “serves the general welfare and utilizes
all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity”. The provisions of Art. II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable rights, but guidelines for legislation.

Article II, §21 – State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
Rural
Development & Art XIII
Agrarian Reform,
c.f. Article XIII, [4] founded on the rights of farmers; shall provide incentives for landsharing

§§4- [5] State shall recognize rights of farmers, workers, cooperatives, landowners
10 and provide support services (marketing, production, research, financial)

[6] State shall apply principles of agrarian reform in the utilization of natural
resources, public domain, homestead rights of small settlers, rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral land

[7] State shall protect the rights and subsistence of fishermen; conserve
resources; protect our shores against foreign intrusion

[8] State shall provide incentives for landowners to invest proceeds of the
agrarian reform program to promote industrialization

Article II, §22 – State recognizes and protects the rights of indigenous cultural communities
Indigenous within the framework of national unity and development.
Cultural
Communities Regalian doctrine: everything is owned by the Government, except private
property and ancestral domain

(Native title)

Cruz v. Secretary RA 8371

of Environment
& Natural Regalian Doctrine. It is the doctrine which reserves to the State the full
Resources, 347 ownership of all natural resources or natural wealth that may be found in the
SCRA 128 bowels of the earth.

IPs- Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of

people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under
claim of ownership since time immemorial.
 Ancestral Domain- refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs. It shall
include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence
and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators

Ancestral lands refer to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,

families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual
or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as
a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings.

Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far
back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by
ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."

Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain.

They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs (Indigenous People) by native
title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal
grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.

The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land
on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and

at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Carino v. Insular Spanish government has not duly conferred a parcel of land to Carino but it is
Government, 212 contested by US Military to turn it into a US army facility. Carino however
U.S. 449 (1909) avers that his ancestors have had the land for more than 30 yrs.

Statute of limitations

Sec 54, Act 926, Public Land Act

The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands
occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369,
32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit
of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be
deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by
the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.

Article State shall encourage non-governmental community-based or sectoral

II, organizations that promote the welfare of the nation
§23
 –
Peop
le’s
Orga
nizat
ions,
c.f.
Arti
cle
XIII,
§§15
-16

Article II, §24 – State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-
Communication & building
Information

Article II, §25 – State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments
Local
Autonomy,
c.f. Article X

Article II, §26 & [26] State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
27– Public Service prohibit political dynasties

[27] State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption

Article II, §28 – Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
Full Public implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
Disclosure public interest.

(28: self-executing)

Legaspi v. Civil Disclosure of CSC eligibility of Health inspectors.

Service
Commission, Right to information is not absolute.
G.R. No. L-
72119, 29 May The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
1987 information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public
right.

The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in allowing the

examination of public records except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose
of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is
the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the
motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records.
Requisites for public disclosure of an information: (a) being of public concern
or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the
 operation of the constitutional guarantee.

PART II – CITIZENSHIP & SUFFRAGE

III. CITIZENSHIP

Article IV The citizens of the Philippines are;

1. citizens of the Phil. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

2. those whose fathers or mothers are citizen

3. those born before Jan 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority

4. those naturalized in accordance with law

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may

be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.

Republic Act No. May reacquire citizenship, provided the person is NOT 1. a person
8171 (1995) opposed to organized govt;

An act providing 2. defender or teacher of the necessity of violence;

for the
repatriation of 3. convicted of crime involving moral turpitude;
Filipino
women who 4. suffering from mental alienation or an incurable contagious disease.
have lost their
Philippine Oath-taking needed, then registration with the civil registry and Bureau of
citizenship by Immigration. Then alien certificate is cancelled, and certificate of
marriage to identification as a Filipino citizen is issued
aliens and of
natural-born
Filipinos
Republic Act No. [2] all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
9225 (2003) have lost their Philippine citizenship

An act making the [3] by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
citizenship of deemed to have reacquired by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine citizens Republic
who acquire foreign
citizenship [4] the unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted,
permanent. below 18, of those that reacquire Philippine citizenship shall be
deemed Philippine citizens
Citizenship
Retention and [5] reacquisition of civil and political rights and liabilities (including
Reacquistion Act of right to vote and run for office, practice profession with due license)
2003

Go v. Republic of Naturalization. Requires a credible witness.

the Philippines,
G.R. No. 202809, 2 Ruling (Recording):
July 2014
-Statement given was just a general statement. The petitioner fails to prove
the credibility of his witnesses. “CREDIBLE” implies that such person
must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be
honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and
that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the
worthiness of the petitioner.

Tecson v. Acknowledgment of FPJ as illegitimate

Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. Citizenship issue as to the qualifications of a Presidential candidate
161434, 3 March
2004 Primary basis of citizenship:

jus soli – soil or by place of birth

jus sanguinis – blood or by nationality of parent

1935: basis of citizenship -jui sanguinis, born of Filipino FATHERS

Adoption: baby needs to be Filipino to be under Philippine jurisdiction

Ruling (Recording): He was a natural born filipino citizen.

Bengzon III v. Repatriation will give back the status of citizenship as natural-born
HRET, G.R. No. citizen.
142840, 7 May
2001 NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS - those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.

NATURALIZED CITIZENS - those who have become Filipino citizens

through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.

Requisites: That the applicant has

(1) not left the Philippines;

(2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession;

(3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government

promulgated rules; or

(4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to
any Government announced policies.

Three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a

former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct
act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship. A former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications17and none of the
disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
economic necessity. Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in
the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means

that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Poe-Llamanzares v. Foundlings are Filipino citizen, unless there’s proof to the contrary.
Commission on
Elections, 8 March Foundlings are citizens under international law. "general principles of
2016 equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general
principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation."

A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino.

Coquilla v. The term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been
COMELEC, G.R. naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines
No. 151914, 31 July and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the
2002 Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that
when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a
visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year
only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an
alien and as a non-resident.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as

referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"21but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence,22 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."23
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the
place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

Mercado v. Dual citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance

Manzano, 307
SCRA 630 DUAL CITIZENSHIP- result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states.9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. (involuntary)

DUAL ALLEGIANCE- refers to the situation in which a person

simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
(result of an individual's volition)

Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is

inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Labo v. COMELEC, Failure to dispose.
176 SCRA 1 (1989)
CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be lost. Among these are:

(1) naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) express renunciation of citizenship; and

(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws

of a foreign country

He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such

through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he
was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the
Affirmation of Allegiance. What we must consider is the fact that he
voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility
that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims,
does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the
Philippines.

Frivaldo v. Retroactivity of repatriation

COMELEC, 257
SCRA 727 (1996) Repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17, 1994. under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
"laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But
there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW
RIGHTS.

Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

Sobejana-Condon v. Failure to renounce foreign citizenship.

COMELEC, G.R.
No. 198742, 10 It must be sworn. The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos
August 2012 reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run
for elective posts in the Philippines.

The Exact tenor of the law is to Renounce allegiance UNDER OATH in

other countries. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores
one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith
 IV. SUFFRAGE

Article V

Republic Act No. List of overseas voters is approved and prepared by the Office for
9189 (Overseas Overseas Voting of the COMELEC
absentee voting by
qualified citizens -field registration
of the Philippines
abroad, -all citizens of the Philippines abroad who are not otherwise disqualified
appropriating by law, at least 18, may vote for P, VP, Senator, party-list, as well as in
funds therefor, national referenda and plebiscites
and for other
purposes), as
amended by R.A.
ARTICLE 5
No. 10590
(Overseas Voting Section 1 – The requisites for suffrage include:
Act of 2013) 1) Must be a Filipino citizen
2) Not disqualified by law
3) 18 or above years of age
4) Must have resided in the country for 1 year and in the locality
they wish to vote in for 6 months before the election

TAKE NOTE: that the next part states that THESE ARE THE ONLY
REQUIREMENTS FOR SUFFRAGE SANS PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS. The statement “no literacy, property, or other
substantive requirements should be taken as absolute and strictly read and
applied.

Gallego v. Vera, 73 Issue: whether Gallego was a proper resident of Abuyog Leyte. (Domicile by
Phil. 453 (1941) choice)

Held: Gallego was indeed a resident of Albuyog, Leyte as he there were

multiple evidences proving that he did not intend to change his domicile to
Bukidnon.

Domicile is acquired from where you were born and is permanent by nature.
You can choose to change your domicile. If you do so you need these
requisites: Domicile by choice:

1) Bodily presence in the new locality

2) An intention to remain there (animus manendi)
3) An intention to leave or abandon the old domicile (animus non
reverdendi)

Romualdez v. RTC, Issue: Did Romualdez lose his domicile when he and his family went to the
226 SCRA 408, US to seek asylum?
415 (1993)
Held: No, Romualdez did not lose his domicile upon leaving the Philippines

Taking into account the previous case’s requisites with domicile, we need to
understand how the three requisites come into play. This case discusses the
necessity of the “intent” to leave. It is important that their physical actions or
 overt actions truly reflect their desire to change domicile. In this case, it was
proven that Romualdez DID NOT intend to leave the Philippines and WAS
FORCED. Therefore, he did not pass the requisites for changing domicile.

AKBAYAN v. Issue: Should the extended registration period (additional 2 days) be

COMELEC, 355 allowed?
SCRA 318 (2001)
Held: No, the COMELEC will maintain the end of registration to be 120
days before election (as determined by COMELEC)

The right to suffrage is NOT ABSOLUTE. Everyone is free to vote provided

that they adhere to the laws and procedural requirements among others. It is
stated that the registration for voters should end 120 days before elections, it
must be followed. To further support the argument, SC provided the reason
for such ruling. They reported that the reason for such requirement is to
validate the list of voters and prevent flying voters from surfacing.

Ceniza v. Issue: Should Mandaue, Cebu and other cities be allowed to vote for
COMELEC, 95 provincial officials
SCRA 703 (1980)
Held: No, Mandaue, Cebu, and other highly urbanized cities are not allowed
to vote as they don’t have jurisdiction

A highly urbanized city is a city with a certain revenue or income per year
(don’t look at the case, as the quota has increased in time). It does not fall
under the jurisdiction of the province where it is. Geographical situation
does not make one a member of the province. This is further strengthened by
the mandate of the constitution that LGUs should be autonomous of each
other. Highly urbanized cities enjoy a wide degree of autonomy such as the
ability to tax in accordance to its needs and laws and immunity from
interference from the province it is geographically located in. Thus, citizens
from a highly urbanized city DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT to vote for
government officials. They are not affected by the provincial admin as stated
by the law that they can only vote for the officials in the city that they are in.
It is important to note that Mandaue is a component city BUT it has in its
charter the clause that it is NOT ALLOWED to vote for the provincial
officials.

There is also the issue of gerrymandering- term employed to describe an

apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair
advantage to the party in power. In laymen terms, it is putting in different
districts that would support a particular politician and cutting off those who
don’t. However, it was shown that no district was cut and assuming that
Mandaue was included, there was no way of saying that they would not vote
for the people currently in power there so this contention is invalid.

Gonzales v. Issue: Whether RA 4880 is constitutional or not

COMELEC, G.R.
No. L-40117, 22 Held: It is constitutional and the curtailing of the “right to free speech” for
February 1975 safety and public order is valid

This case is about the imposition of campaign periods (earlier than 150 days
preceding an election for nomination and earlier than 90 days for other
officials). It is argued that it is curtailing free speech. However, the clear and
 present danger test clearly states that there is unrest and danger with a
prolonged campaigning period, thus, the imposition.

However, Penera v COMELEC which had the same issue which was
premature campaigning functionally decriminalized premature campaigning,
stating that a candidate can only be liable for election offenses at the START
of election period.

Additional info: included in this article is the definition of a candidate:

Refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office,

regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of
candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate.
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to acts
designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a
person or persons to public office.

Macalintal v. Issue: Whether RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified

COMELEC, 405 Citizens is constitutional
SCRA 614 (2003)
Held: yes, it is constitutional

According Article 5 section 1- voters should be citizens of the Philippines

and should have resided for 1 year and 6 months on the locality they wish
to vote on. However, the second paragraph immediately following that
statement takes into account that the government should find a way for
overseas voters to practice their right to suffrage. This was proven along
with the ratio legis or the records of the commission. Absentee voters are
defined as those working overseas as well as THOSE MIGRATING
OVERSEAS provided that they didn’t change domiciles. This is why on
RA 9189 there is a waiver. This is the evidence that they have not yet
relinquished their domiciles in the Philippines. It is very important to take
note of this, as the waiver is an abbreviated version of the repatriation oath
under citizenship. Now, if they choose NOT to return to the Philippines
after 3 years, then they get struck out from the registry and lose the right to
vote.Constitutionality of sections in RA 8189

PART III – STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. Issue: Whether the statements by the accused are considered seditious to the
332 (1903) government

Held: No, the issuers aren’t seditious because they aren’t directed to the
government as an institution.

Administration was defined as the aggregate of those persons in whose

hands the reins of government are for the time being. The government on the
other hand is described as the aggregate of authorities or administration
which rule a society. Sedition can never be against a single person. It must
always be directed towards the government using the aforementioned
definition.
Co Cham v. Valdez, Issue: Should the court take cognizance of the case despite McArthur’s clear
75 Phil. 113 (1945) orders?

Held: Yes, because while the Japanese-sponsored government during the

time of the case was the de facto government of the Philippines it is still
covered by international laws such as those of the Hague Convention which
applies even without the due concurrence of the State.

The word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General Douglas

MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial
processes rather the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to
refer to the Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the
President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution
itself of said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and
regulations with which the world "processes" is associated.

Hague Conventions imposes upon a belligerent occupant the duty to

continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country
unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I’ordre et la
vie publice," that is, the public order and safety, and the entire social and
commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for the benefit of the
invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people, unless a legislative
action is done by the conqueror in order to negate the country’s political
powers. The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as
Japan was, does not, exempt him from complying with said precepts of the
Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the
courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. Thus the
Philippine courts did not become owned by Japanese courts.

de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state and is so

recognized by other states.

a de facto government is in actual possession of authority and control of the

state.

There are several kinds of de facto governments:

1. Government in a proper legal sense- government that gets possession and

control of, or usurps, by force or by voice of the majority the rightful and
legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter
2. Government of paramount force- military occupation enforcing their own
government. Must include these requisites: 1) that its existence is
maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful government. 2) while it
exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by
acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the
laws of the rightful country. (a third person appears and takes control.
(Philippines During Japanese Occupation)
3. Rebellion- established as an independent government by the inhabitants
of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state.

Republic v. Issue: Do you lose your constitutional rights (the right against illegal
Sandiganbayan, seizures) when there is no active government and no constitution that
G.R. No. 104768, 21 governs the land?
July 2003 –
Held: No, because the bill of rights exist in international law (Declaration of
Human Rights), the Covenant of Nations.

The EDSA revolution according to Justice Carpio, was done in defiance of

the 1973 constitution. This means that the government under Cory Aquino
was of the third kind, according to the previous case. Since the population is
in active defiance of the constitution, by technicality, there are no laws that
govern the land except those international treaties and agreements the
Philippines is bound to.

With regards to the right of revolting, There are two views upon it. Justice
Carpio places it as a constitutional right which follows a positivist theory-
wherein the constitution is the supreme law which must not be broken while
Justice Puno believes that it is an inherent right of the people to cast out their
governments when they believe that the government’s policies are against
their own (naturalist theory).

Immunity from suit The State may not be sued without its consent. (Article XVI, Section 3, 1987

Constitution). Generally the State cannot be sued unless the State waives
such rights, however such waiver also does not conform to the claimant the
right to claim liabilities unless the government also as well expressly
provides for it.

SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES. In the case of the foreign state

sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, “unduly vex the
peace of nations.” (Arigo v. Swift, G. R. No. 206510, 16

September 2014, 735 SCRA 102)

Republic v. Issue: Can the private person sue the government for property?
Feliciano, 148
SCRA 424 (1987) Held: No, there needs to be a congressional/ legislative act which waives the
government’s immunity from being sued first before a suit can prosper

Doctrine of non-suability of the State- The state cannot be held liable for
action in personam (these are actions that make the government as a private
person). A state may otherwise be sued for any action in rem (action
regarding rights).

When talking about the immunity of the state, it is important to construe it

CLEARLY and STRICTLY (Strictissimi juris). That is why there must be a
CLEAR legislative act which must first happen before the case could
prosper.

There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by
the respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. Such
possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie
evidence of possession. Using this possessory information, the respondent
could have applied for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the
 Public Land Act, which is an action in rem.

Meritt v. Issue: Assuming that the state can be sued (refer to above), is the state liable
Government of the for damages?
Phil. Island, 34 Phil.
311 (1916) Held: No, waiving the immunity to be sued does not place liability to the
government. There just exists a method for the case to be heard by the judge

With regards to liability- No claim arises against any government in favor of

an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise
of powers by its officers or agents.

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It

does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense.

There should be a distinction here. A state can only be held “liable” for acts
of its special agents (those with a commission- to do a specific task or
appointed by the government) and the chauffeur driving the ambulance is
not a special agent but merely an employee doing administrative tasks.

Arigo v. Swift, G.R. Issue: can the US be sued for the acts of its agent?
No. 206510, 16
September 2014 Held: No, because of the immunity from suit of the different states

Swift was the commander and was acting on its duties when he commited a
mistake which cost damages. He falls under an executive official in the
performance of his duty and is thus found to be immune from suit according
to our laws. HOWEVER, they are liable under UNCLOS- which the Ph and
US are both bound to follow.

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without the former’s consent or waiver
has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary
acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State
immunity extends only to acts jure imperii.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. The cloak of protection afforded
the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are
sued in their individual capacity. In this case, the US respondents were sued
in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on
the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties.

Jure imperii – in the performance of duty

 Jure gestionis – private acts

Inherent powers of the government- There are three of them and they are not
Inherent Powers of found in the constitution, hence, “inherent.” It has to be understood that such
the State: Police concepts co-exist with the state and without which the state cannot
Power, Taxation & effectively exist as it cannot exercise its duties and obligations to its citizens.
Eminent Domain The 3 inherent powers of the government are:

1. Police power- the most oppressive of the powers. Hinges on the curtail
of liberty for the common good/ betterment of society. "as the power of
promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property."
2. Taxation- constant. The goal of this power is to generate revenue for the
government. Legally considered as “lifeblood of the state/ government”
3. Eminent domain- the government can get private property following
these two requisites: 1) for public use or for public purpose and 2)
providing just compensation to the private person who lost the property

Rubi v. Provincial Issue: Police Power, May the Government place the Mangyans in a specified
Board, 39 Phil. 660 area for them without the Mangyan’s concurrence?
(1919)
Held: Yes, this being an action made under the State’s Police Power which
aims at " promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property." Particularly in this case, liberty.

"The police power of the State, is a power coextensive with self-protection,

and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to
be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. The
Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the
right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest.

"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty

regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the
general well-being. And this is what the Mangyans did not have – a proper
understanding of freedom for they understood freedom as doing as they
please. "Thus it is right for the Government to follow its policy to organize
them into political communities and to educate their children with the object
of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a
wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account
of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not
they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them." Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same
rightfully.

Agustin v. Edu, 88 Issue: Police Power, Is the LOI of President Marcos regarding the providing
SCRA 195 (1979) for an early seaming device for motor vehicles, unconstitutional on the
ground that it clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power?

Held: Police Power, being the remedy for the duty of the state to regulate
and promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property, is properly applied in the LOI as it aims at reducing the
 number of accidents due to vehicles that do not have early warning devices.

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of
respondents. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or
a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."

People v. Siton, 600 Issue: Police Power, Is the Anti-Vagrancy law unconstitutional for being
SCRA 476 vague as it is alleged to allow arbitrary imprisonment?

Held: The Anti-Vagrancy law is not unconstitutional

The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted
pursuant to the State's police power and justified by the Latin maxim "salus
populi est suprema lex, (the good of the people is the supreme law)" which
calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater
number, thus: Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police
power of the State. police power "as the power of promoting public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." This calls for
the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.

Public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs, were crafted
to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human
society. These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and
today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to improve the
citizens' quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.

Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order
laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but
for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the
public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor
or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to
engage in immoral conduct.

Mactan Cebu Issue: Can Cebu City lay property tax on two lots owned by the MCIA?
International
Airport Authority Held: MCIA being a government owned corporation and with the advent of
v. Marcos, G.R. the Local Government Code which repeals its (MCIA) previous Tax
No. 120082, 11 exemption
September 1996
Verily, taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and
property rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property
for the support of the government. Accordingly, tax statutes must be
construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer. But since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the
lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and
statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of
exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language
 in the law too plain to be mistaken. (Strictissimi Juris)

Petitioner’s claim that it is an instrumentality of the Government is based on

Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities.”

The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not
interchangeable. "Republic of the Philippines" is broader and synonymous
with "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the
Administrative Code of 1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the
various arms through which political authority is made affective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial,
city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government." These "autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions" are the political subdivisions. On the other hand,
"National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the central
government, as distinguished from the different forms of local
governments." 29 The National Government then is composed of the three
great departments: the executive, the legislative and the judicial.

An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the

Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein;" while and "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of
the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if
not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and
controlled corporations."

Gerochi v. Issue: Police Power/Imminent Domain, Is the "Electric Power Industry

Department of Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge, and Rule 18
Energy, G.R. No. of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said
159796, 17 July imposition, unconstitutional as it imposes double taxation on the public?
2007
Held: The EPIRA and Universal Charge are Constitutional and are not
expressions of the State’s Taxation Power but Police Power.

Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes,

such as support of the government, administration of the law, or payment of
public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific
regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric
power industry.

The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its

range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its
abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which
imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it. It is based on the
principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need. On the other hand, police power is
the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. The conservative and pivotal
distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the
 charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make
the imposition a tax.

Eslaban, Jr. v. De Issue: Imminent Domain, In what instance should the compensation be paid;
Onorio, G.R. No. is it on the time of taking of property or at the time that the petitioner takes
146602, 28 June legal action?
2001
Held: Whichever comes first between the two has to be honored in terms of
paying the just compensation.

WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION

SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR
FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.

With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned

property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value
which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but
not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would
agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property
owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just
compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing
of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981,
because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent,
and it was respondent who filed the complaint. The owner of private
property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And
what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken.
This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e.,
"just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public,
which is to pay for it." Compensation is based on whatever comes first, the
taking of the property or the time when something is already built on the
property.

Telecommunications Issue: Imminent Domain, Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates
and Broadcast the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the
Attorneys of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting
Philippines v. stations without payment of just compensation
COMELEC, G.R.
No. 132922, 21 Held: Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by
April 1998 radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege
subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires."
 In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of
the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service. Art. XII, of the Constitution
authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." "It is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount."

Difference between Print and Broadcast Media

In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be

imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that, as already
noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation
of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media.
To require the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time
for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

V. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Article VI, §1 – Section 1: (1) Senate (2) House of Representatives

Legislative Power
Legislative power: vested in the people, through the representatives

Delegated- exception: LGU

Rule-making power is not a legislative function strictly, does not create

rights and obligations

Appointing Power

Government of the Facts: -extent reserved -people’s initiative

Philippine Islands v.
Springer, G.R. No. L- Issue: if the appointment of Springer was constitutional
26969, 1 April 1927
Ruling: No, because the power of appointments is vested in the
executive. Legislature cannot make a law and then take part in its
execution

The Legislative as having the authority to make, alter, and repeal laws

Organic act granting powers

L: create office and limit powers

E: appoint

The Power to appoint is executive in nature as the executive should be

clothed with enough power to control instrumentalities. Had it been
specified that the Legislature fills the offices it creates then it may
however it was not specified to do so.
 Legislative creates the offices, defines the power, limits the duration,
annexes compensation but does not designate its officer. Part of the
executive power is choosing the people with whom the President will
work with.

Office – public station, permanent in character, created by law whose

incident and duties were pprescribed by llaw.

Article VI, §§2-9 – Section 2-3:24 Senators

Membership
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines

2. At least 35 years old

3. resided in the Philippines for not less than 2 years preceding the
day of election

Section 4 – term shall be 6 years. Voluntary renunciation of the office

shall not be considered an interruption

Section 5 – HR 250 members (UNLESS otherwise provided by law),

from legislative districts and those shall be elected through party-list

Aldaba v. Issue: Did Malolos, Bulacan reach the required number to create another
Commission on legislative district?
Elections, G.R. No.
188078, 25 January Ruling: No,
2010 & 15 March
2010 1. NSCB gives the official projections

2. NSO Administrator

3. Intercensal population made in the middle of the year

~EO 135 (Ramos) – National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB)

coordinated statistical system; overall coordination of statistical
matters; production of local-level statistics; consolidation of data
produced by LGUs; provision of technical assistance.

Population must be actual. The certification must come from the

National Statistics Coordination Board and the NSO Administrator who
issues the demographic projections.

Issue: Can Makati, reaching 250,000 population, make another

legislative district?
Mariano v.
Commission on Ruling: Yes, provided a city reaches 250,000, they can create another
Elections, G.R. legislative district.
No. 118577, 7
March 1995 General Apportionment (results from the Constitutionally mandated
every-three-year census) v. Special Apportionment (don’t need to wait
for every census year to make another legislative district)
 If General Apportionment should be followed it would create an
inequitable situation where a new city/province will be denied legislative
representation over a period of time during sovereignty.

Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. Issue: is special apportionment legal?

No. L-114783, 8
December 1994 Yes, a special apportionment is as valid as general apportionment,
because the law does not specify a specific method

*Gerrymandering: apportionment of the districts to favor the person in

power.

RA 7675 An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a

Highly Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong. Before this
San Juan and Mandaluyong are 1 District.

Main subject of bill was converting Mandaluyong into a highly

urbanized city, creation of separate legislative district with San Juan is
ancillary to it, thus no plebiscite required for people of San Juan.

Section 5(2)- party-list shall constitute 20% of the representatives

including those under the party-list.

BANAT v. -the 20% is a ceiling, not mandatory.

Commission
on Elections, -major political parties? - are allowed through their sectoral wing
G.R. No.
179271, 21 1. Compute for Seats Available for Party List
April 2009 Formula: Seats of Legislative Districts ÷ .8 x .2
(ex: 220 legislative seats ÷ .8 x .2 = 55)
2. List all Party Lists from highest votes to lowest
3. distribute 1 seat each for those who got 2% and up
Formula: a Party List’s total votes ÷ Total votes for all Party Lists
(ex: BUHAY’s 1,169,234 ÷ 15,950,900 total party list votes = 7.33%,
automatic 1 seat)
4. Get remaining available seats
Formula: Subtract total Guaranteed seats in #3 from result of #1
(ex: 55 party list seats - 17 seats distributed as guaranteed = 38
remaining seats)
5. Get each party’s share in the remaining seats available for distribution
Formula: each Party List’s vote % X remaining seats as in #4
(ex: BUHAY’s 7.33% X 38 remaining seats = 2.79)
6. Add the whole integer only of #5 to guaranteed seat per Party List in
#3
(ex: BUHAY’s 1 guaranteed seat + 2 as whole integer in 2.79 = 3 total
distributed seats)
7. Cap to 3 if result of #6 is more than 3
8. Continue doing this from top to bottom until the total of all distributed
seats reach the Total Available Seats computed in #1

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. 52 party-list groups disqualified by COMELEC, which was focused on
Commission on the ‘marginalized’ descriptor.
Elections, G.R. No.
 203766, 2 April Party-list can be:
2013 1. national
2. regional
3. sectoral
a. marginalized
b. not marginalized, but Lack Well-Defined Constituency
(LWDC)
c. major political parties but through their SECTORAL
wing

*BUT Justice Panganiban: you cannot allow major political parties to

participate, because they have the machinery, and will keep winning,
which defeats the purpose of there being a party-list system.

*New parameter for the qualification of party-list rep.

Ang Ladlad - non-establishment clause: cannot use moral grounds for

LGBT Party v. disqualification/not accepting a national party
Commission on
Elections, G.R. -Ladlad followed all the requirements of being a party-list, therefore they
No. 190582, 8 should be allowed to be a party-list
April 2010
-there is no crime punishing being LGBT (cannot assume that there will
be a crime)

-they are a sectoral group because they qualify as a group that lacks a
well-defined constituency.

RA 7941 – AN The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
ACT interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
PROVIDING registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
FOR THE coalition on any of the following grounds:
ELECTION
OF PARTY- It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
LIST organized for religious purposes;
REPRESENTA
TIVES It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
THROUGH
THE PARTY- It is a foreign party or organization;
LIST SYSTEM,
It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
AND
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
APPROPRIATI
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
NG FUNDS
election purposes;
THEREFOR.
It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;

It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to

obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
 has registered.

Section 6

Member of the House of Representative

at least 25 years old on the day of election

registered voter in the district he/she shall be elected

resident of not less than one year

natural-born citizen

Section 7

tenure v term

tenure is how long you have been staying

term is how many years the elected member is supposed to serve

Section 9

if there is a vacancy, a special election can be called. the newly elected

official will serve the *remaining term only.

* is that term counted against the maximum term?-ask RSJ

Article VI, §§10-14 – Section 11

Privileges &
Immunities in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech (only
covers privileged speech) or debate in Congress or in any committee
thereof

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, publication of an open letter that are allegedly libelous

G.R. No. L-15905, 3
August 1966 issues:

1. privileged communication? NO. not a privileged speech, not part

pursuant to his official function
2. is it libelous? No, because it was not a clear or disparaging
allegation

Osmeña v. Pendatun, Osmeña lambasted President for alleged bribery during his privileged
G.R. No. L-17144, speech.
28 October 1960
Consti: parliamentary immunity is a fundamental privilege, its purpose to
enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
 public trust with firmness and success;

SC: The Consti says: Senate and HR members cannot be questioned in

any other case, but they can be questioned in Congress.

This case was filed before Congress. Congress itself punished the
congressman. This is within the jurisdiction of congress.

(RSJ tips:

1. to find out nuances, look at WHERE the case was filed

2. to ascertain the ratio, check the Constitution

Pobre v. Defensor- -MDS lambasted the JBC during her privileged speech in the Senate
Santiago, A.C. No.
7399, 25 August 2009 -this case was filed with the SC (disbarment)
-She could not be charged, because only the Senate can punish its
members.

-NOTE: parliamentary immunity is not afforded to the individual but to

the people represented for the common good

Adaza v. Pacana, G.R. Adaza is a governor of Misamis Oriental and won.

No. L-68159, 18
March 1985 Pacana was vice, and because there was no mayor, he became mayor

*section 13: no elected official can hold any other office in government.

if the mayor or governor runs, they are considered only on a leave of

absence. if they do not win, they can return to their original offices

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. Gordon was appointed Chair of the Philippine Red Cross
No. 175352, 15 July
2009 & 18 January Phil Red Cross was argued to be a public institution, but it was ruled to
2011 be sui generis, a special kind of government-related institution. Neither
public nor private thus he may hold the position he is given.

Article VI, §§15-16 – Section 15

Organization
period of convening of Congress

Section 16

election of Senate leader: requires the majority

quorum: half plus 1

majority and minority leader qualifications and election rules are not
specified by the Consti, but are decided upon the House
Santiago v. Guingona, First regular session of the 11th Congress
G.R. No. 134577, 18
November 1998 23 senators total

20-2 Sen Fernan won as Senate President

2 MDS and Kit Tatad; MDS says Tatad should be Minority Leader

Result: Tatad was elected minority leader

Ruling: majority and minority leader qualifications and election rules are
not specified by the Consti, but are decided upon the House, SC is out of
it.

(Note: those elected by the majority are

1. Senate President

2. President Pro Tempore

3. Secretary

4. Sergeant-at-Arms)

Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. -internal fight on who is the real Senate President
No. L-2821, 4 March
1949 -Avelino was trying to delay the proceedings

24 senators: minus 2 (one was sick, and one was abroad) so 22 senators
were present

Avelino walked out with 10 senators, including himself

the ruling was: the SC REFUSED to rule on who should be Senate

President, but they defined what a quorum is.

the session was legitimately continued, because there was a quorum. You
do not count the one that is absent who is out of the country. (those who
cannot be arrested)

Section 10: “A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and such
penalties as such House may provide”

Baguilat, Jr. v. Alvarez, Farinas and Suarez had an agreement that whoever has the next highest
G.R. No. 227757, 25 votes for majority leader, then that person will be the minority leader
July 2017
Baguilat contends that he was the second highest, he should have been
the minority leader.

In the prior House rules: those that abstain = part of the MINORITY
[Alvarez – 252
Baguilat – 8
 Suarez – 7
Abstain – 21 (chose Suarez)]
Note:

1. Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are not permanent and

can be revised at the discretion of members.

2. Consti: explicit on the election of the Speaker of the House, but

on other positions is silent. House rules are followed. These
house rules are beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

*RSJ mentioned a footnote here. Read the footnotes

Abas Kida v. Senate, 7 motions assailing the Court’s decision Oct 18, 2011 where the
G.R. No. 196271, 18 constitutionality of RA No 10153 was upheld—postponed regional
October 2011 elections in ARMM from Aug 2011 to Aug 2013 and recognized the
President’s power to appoint OICs to temporarily assume office upon the
expiration of the terms of the elected officials

 Consti: Section 8, Art X: term of office of elective local officials

Is 3 years. This is ABSOLUTE.

Congress cannot extend this.

SC: RA 10153 is an INTERIM MEASURE

 super majority: 2/3 required. this voting is unconstitutional,

because they will be creating an irrepealable law.

 The president certifies the bill, it those not need to be read on

separate days.

Section 16(4)

each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings

United States v. Pons, Pons was importing opium. He contended that the law punishing him
G.R. No. L-11530, was null and void, because it was passed on March 1, when Congress
12 August 1916 should have adjourned Feb 28.

The journals proved otherwise.

Journals are conclusive.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, enrolled bill doctrine

G.R. No. L-1123, 5
March 1947 when a law comes into the hands of the President for signing, it is
assumed that the law has undergone all the proper procedures in the
passing of that law in the House and the Senate. An enrolled bill takes
precedence over the house journal.

Enrolled Bill-one which has been duly introduced, finally passes by both
houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president
 and filed by the secretary.

Casco Philippine petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General

Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez, G.R. regarding urea formaldehyde
No. L-17931, 28
February 1963 Priorities: 1) enrolled bill trumps 2) house journals

The enrolled bill uses the term urea formaldehyde.

Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. *this came out in the Bar

No. L-23475, 30
April 1974 The SC resorted to the journal because the Senate President revoked his
signature/attestation

(an enrolled bill is the attestation of the Senate President and the
attestation of the Speaker of the House)

since there was no enrolled bill to speak of, the journals needed to be
consulted. (journals are subject to errors and misprint, so it is not the first
to be consulted)

***ask/confirm with RSJ about enrolled bill over journal

Arroyo v. de Venecia, petition for certiorari challenging the validity of RA No 8240, which
G.R. No. 127255, 14 amends provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code imposing sin
August 1997 taxes on the manufacturing of beer and cigarettes.

Ruling: in passing a bill, legislature does not need the yays and nays for
every single reading.

internal rules>> pertains to methods of passing a bill, the Court cannot

interfere.

Sec 17

Electoral Tribunal

Abbas v. Senate Membership is mandatory in SET and HRET.

Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. Electoral tribunal must be independent.
No. 83767, 27
October 1988 Legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in
the resolution of senatorial election contests.

The proposed mass disqualification would leave the tribunal no

alternative but to abandon duty that no other court/body can perform.

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be

staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and
'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
 Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this
proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of
an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in
which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented."

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers
of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an
election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom
would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when
once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at
stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the
Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal.

Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. security of tenure: once you are inside, you cannot be removed except
No. 97110, 26 (disability, death, resignation)
September 1991
proportional representation

It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress

is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be
hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors
which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it.

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, said it
was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the
tribunal. The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are
politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in

the HRET.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of

tenure. — Membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause.
A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for
"party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with
another political group.

Limkaichong v. Jurisdiction of COMELEC v jurisdiction of HRET

Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. Father of Limkaichong was allegedly naturalized, but in actuality, was
179120, 1 April not. Limkaichong was elected and was sworn into office, but it was
 2009 found that the father was not naturalized.

COMELEC resolution was that all pending cases should be proclaimed.

Ruling: the moment an official is proclaimed as a winner, taken his oath

and assumed office, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the case

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications,
and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not
divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.

Ongsiako-Reyes v. the candidacy was invalid, so the proclamation was invalid

COMELEC, G.R.
No. 207264, 22 almost the same facts as the previous case
October 2013; Brion
dissenting thus, in effect, there was no proclamation, so that the COMELEC still
had jurisdiction. COMELEC had a ruling against the candidacy, but the
ruling did not reach the Board of Canvassers

Dissenting opinion of Brion: Limkaichong should have been followed.

Section 18

Commission on Appointments

Senate President (ex-officio Chair)

12 Senators

12 members of the House of Representatives

who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the

political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein

Daza v. Singson, G.R. LIBERAL Party  LDP

No. 86344, 21
December 1989 Commission of Appointments

proportionality

as soon as there is a shift in allegiances, the membership of the

Commission of Appointments should change

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the

Constitution providing as follows: There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein.
 The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent
political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been
registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to
the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called
party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might be no different
from several other political groups that have died.

The petitioner’s contention that, even if registered, the party must still
pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable.

Note: Allied Majority was merely a temporary combination as the

Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and
permanently joined the new political group.

Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. Reorganization of political parties; people were removed, new people
No. 86649, 12 July came in, and new majority and new minority
1990
Coseteng: I should be in the minority; she was the lone representative of
her party

The House votes on who is part of the Commission of Appointments

according to proportionality. The representatives in the Commission
should consist of at least 8.4% of the total of the lower House

Ruling: Coseteng cannot be a member because she is the only member of

her party.

Proportional representation.

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's

KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority),
are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be
considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng)
represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence,
she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on
Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least
8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at
least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in

favor of the petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential
because they are not members of her party and they signed identical
indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-
Yap. There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House
members in the Commission on Appointments should have been
nominated and elected by their respective political parties.

Guingona v. gonzales. Political Coalition Membership Representatives

oct. 20 1992
LDP 15 7.5 members
NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
 12 seats in COA are not mandatory. Must follow the Proportional
representation. The Constitution does not contemplate that the
Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12)
senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives.
What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the
entire membership. The provision of Section 18 on proportional
representation does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the
Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation;
otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the
House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will
on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on
the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of
power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such
rule.

Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides for the

creation of a Commission on Appointments and the allocation of its
membership, as follows: There shall be a Commission of Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve
senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives, elected
by each house on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties or organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein.

Article VI, §§21-22 – Section 21-22

Legislative Inquiries
Senate inquiry—in aid of legislation, in accordance with its duly
published rules, rights should be respected

Arnault v. Nazareno, Arnault was thrown in contempt, because the Senate was inquiring into
G.R. No. L-3820, 18 the missing money of the government
July 1950
(the Senate holds the purse)

450k missing

probing Arnault as an expert witness

it was in aid of legislation because the money missing was the

government’s

Arnault was thrown into Bilibid Prison

Arnault invoked writ of habeas copus

Senate’s inherent power: Senate inquiry  means that the Senate has the
power to throw someone in prison for contempt

(There was a legislation passed.)

The rights of person’s appearing should be respected: Arnault was given

due process

Senate is a continuous body. There are always senators in office, unlike

 Congress, there is a period where the Congress is adjourned and there are
no Congress members: before the elections. Senate can hold Arnault
continuously, because the Senate is a continuous body.

The contempt power is inherent necessary for the Congress to investigate

and formulate laws for the people.

Balag v. Senate, G.R. En banc decision: petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
No. 234608, 3 July issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul
2018 (RSJ the Senate resolution citing petitioner Arvin Balag in contempt.
addendum)
This Senate inquiry follows the death of UST Law student, Horacio
Castillo, who died during alleged hazing rites of the Aegis Juris
Fraternity.

Balag was asked several times if he was the president of AJ fraternity,

and he refused to answer, invoking his right against self-incrimination.
He was cited to be in contempt.

Issue: Whether the respondent Senate Committees acted with

grave abuse of discretion in conducting the legislative inquiry
and citing petitioner in contempt.

Balag: these hearings (as stated in Senate Resolution 504 of the 17th
Congress) are not in aid of legislation, but in aid of prosecution (as it is
hereby resolved by the Senate to condemn in the strongest sense the
death of freshman law student Horacio Tomas Castillo III and direct the
appropriate Senate committees to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, to hold accountable those responsible for this senseless act.)

Senate committees: These hearings are for the evaluation of the ff 17th
Congress bills: 27, 199, 223, 1161, and 1591 (all bills seeking to replace
or amend RA 8049 the Act Regulating Hazing)

SC: at the time of ruling, Balag had been released, so a decision was
moot and academic. BUT the SC reviews the power to contempt of the
Senate during legislative inquiries:

1. Senate’s power of contempt is important, but must be balanced with

the rights of the individual.

2. Senate is a continuing body, BUT business of the Senate follows the

cycle of there being a new Congress after election.

3. The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent
power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation
should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under
which the said power is invoked. (overturning Arnault)

4. Termination of the Senate inquiry occurs when

4.1. upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee report; or

4.2. upon the expiration of 1 Congress.

Bengzon, Jr. v. no legislation, only investigation
Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, G.R. Enrile filed a resolution for an investigation if there’s a violation of the
No. 89914, 20 Anti-Graft Practices Act
November 1991
Bengzon did not attend the inquiry

Ruling: the inquiry should explicitly be in aid of legislation. There

should be a bill involved.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of

contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon Committee was to
find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly
Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved.

Standard There was a pending case involving SCB

Chartered
Bank v. there was a criminal case involving dubious foreign investments
Senate
Committee If the inquiry is in aid of legislation, it does not matter if there is a
on Banks, pending case before the court.
Financial
Institution The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a
s and court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct
Currencie of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
s, G.R. subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
No. instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise
167173, of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative
27 inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
December criminal or an administrative investigation.
2007
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to
punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the
branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish
contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not
to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign
character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the
power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the
attendance of witnesses.

In this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor

will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their
testimonies. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for
contempt, the respondent, as with the other Committees of the Senate or
of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even if there
is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing
 or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent can only
recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may
be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its
Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who
may appear liable.

Garcillano v. old and new Congress

House of
Representa they wanted to compel Garcillano to talk
tives
Committee senate inquiry: duly published rules? none. the current rules were not
s, G.R. No. established because the House had just changed constituency (after
179338, 23 elections, new Congress). The rules need to be published before the
December legislative inquiry.
2008
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the
rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules
cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language
of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs,
without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules
have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.

8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only
for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could

not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
 accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

Senate v. Ermita, Section 22 is Question hour – oversight function of the Senate. We made a
G.R. No. 169777, 20 law, let’s see how you are employing it. Different from senate inquiry
April 2006 (section 21), in that this is not in aid of legislation. The Senate was
checking on an anomaly.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of

Article VI of the Constitution which reads: The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however,

necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For
in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be
asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the
traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
given procedural setting.

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the

public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any
recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike

Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are
covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged
order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3,
the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on
the department heads' possession of any information which might be
covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis -
à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather,
the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question
hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative,
with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the
rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the

meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the
question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for
 the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation."

Validity of Sections 2 and 3

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials
of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all
senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of
offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff
of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are
"covered by the executive privilege."

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by

the President. Given the title of Section 2 - "Nature, Scope and Coverage of
Executive Privilege" ', it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis,
the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be
based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states
that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the
doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of
persons.

In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature,
scope and coverage of executive privilege, the reference to persons being
"covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of
saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the
judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section
2(a).

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure
to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to
Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President,
has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the
President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however,
even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an
implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive
branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege.
Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress

on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or
the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege.

Article VI, §§23 – Section 23 Emergencies

Emergencies
2/3 of both Houses, voting separately

Araneta v. Dinglasan, At the time that Congress reconvenes, the President loses the special
G.R. No. L-2044,
 16 August 1949 powers. They do not need to vote on it.

In this instance, the President was given powers because the Congress was
not in session.

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides: In time of war or

other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.

Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who
recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he
was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its
execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671
was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless
reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon
the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new
legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the
expiration of that period.

What then was the contemplated period? He said he issued the call for a
special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we
were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to
open on January 1, 1942." It can easily be discerned in this statement that
the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon
with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed
no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of
powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of
its authority. As we have indicated, the period that best comports with
constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the
law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for
its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to
function, a period ending with the convening of that body.

Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in

regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law.

Article VI, §§24-29 –

Appropriations

Tolentino v. It is not the law, but the revenue bill, which is required to originate
Secretary exclusively in the HOR.
of Finance,
G.R. No. To insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as HOuse
115455, 25 Bill would be to deny the Senate’s power to concur and propose
August amendments.
1994 & 30
October exclusive original jurisdiction from House of rep (it originates from them,
1995 but this does not preclude the Senate from tackling an issue even if the case
has not come to them)
 one bill-one subject rule

tax should be equitable

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at
large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill
in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by
the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. It was
only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that
the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the
Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission
by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630.

Second. Senate bill No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days
as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were
done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February
24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S.
No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualified the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.

Pascual v. “donated” land that was private property

Secretary
of Public no legislation
Works,
G.R. No. public funds should always be for public purposes
L-10405,
29 it was a private entity that would benefit, so that is wrong
Decembe
The legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a private purpose the
r 1960
principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this: "It is a general rule that the
legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but
a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not
the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public
or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the
use of public money."

"In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
 public purposes only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by taxation can
be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals."

"The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public

funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each
advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public."

The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval
and effectivity of said Act, made according to the petition, for the purpose
of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in
question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a
judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of said appropriation. Again, Article 1421 of our Civil
Code, like many other statutory enactments, is subject to exceptions.

Garcia v. Mata, G.R. Garcia was an active soldier who became inactive.
No. L-33713, 30 July
1975 “riders” in legislation are prohibited. parts of the bill that are not related to
the subject are void.

Appropriation Acts should contain only those related to appropriations.

The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600
appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year
1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental government
policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive
status of reserve officers in the AFP.

In the language of the respondents, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item

inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional
inhibition against "riders" to the GAA." It was indeed a new and completely
unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.

Paragraph in question violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified
and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that
was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not
germane to or properly connected with that subject.

In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the

subject and is properly connected therewith, the subject to be considered is
the one expressed in the title of the act, and every fair intendment and
reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the
legislative enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are
clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such
provisions are inoperative and without effect.

Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL

PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES as
unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers
no right and affords no protection.
Demetria v. Alba, President cannot transfer funds from the Exec department to just any
G.R. No. 71977, 27 another department. Respective offices only.
February 1987
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the
privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same
are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.

Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded
appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel
system as the ruling party may well expand public money not on the basis
of development priorities but on political and personal expediency." The
contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D.
1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the
limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with
the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope
of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This
is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law"

Belgica v.Ochoa, pork barrel: lump sum for discretionary appropriation, guidelines are vague,
G.R. No. 208566, projects funded will benefit a constituency; no accountability
19 November 2013
Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump–sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively
organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of
the fund’s utilization through various post–enactment measures and/or
practices.

Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump–sum,

discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of
its utilization.

“from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.”

Any post–enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny

and investigation. The Legislative Department only acts on the budget
twice; on its legislation and on the part of accountability. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the

budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to

the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Issues:

1. separation of power. The congress cannot join in the

implementation. As may be observed from its legal history, the
defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be
the authority of legislators to participate in the post–enactment
phases of project implementation. At its core, legislators – may it be
through project lists, prior consultations or program menus – have
been consistently accorded post–enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional
Pork Barrel allocations.

2. non-delegability of power: appropriation is given to the entire

Congress, and not just one congressman. Principle of non–
delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to
legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally–grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy
in times of war or other national emergency.

3. Accountability, the congress will not check itself. Congressional

Pork Barrel “gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the
smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget” which turns them
“from fiscalizers” into “financially–interested partners.” They also
claim that the system has an effect on re–election as “the PDAF
excels in self–perpetuation of elective officials.” Finally, they add
that the “PDAF impairs the power of impeachment” as such “funds
are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.

Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.

4. Line Veto Power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a

veto, is essentially a legislative act. The Constitution is a limitation
upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but
in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of
which he may defeat the will of the Legislature.

President’s item–power as “a salutary check upon the legislative

 body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of
factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public
good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body”;
phrased differently, it is meant to “increase the chances in favor of
the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design.”

For the President to exercise his item–veto power, it necessarily

follows that there exists a proper “item” which may be the object of
the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains
to “the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the
appropriation or of the bill.” An item of an appropriation bill
obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation
of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be
put into an appropriation bill.

5. Local Autonomy: Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA

7160,227 otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991”
(LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more
specifically explicated as follows: Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. –
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self–reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. In the cases at
bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes
against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.

Presidential Pork Barrel: "An appropriation made by law” under the

contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable
amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the
very definition of the word “appropriation,” which means “to allot, assign,
set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if written into
the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists.

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund

applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in
the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public
funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the
purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested.

The Malampaya Fund and the Social Emergency fund are within the
contemplation of the Constitution. Both are determinable and have a
specific purpose for which those two shall be spent for.

Araullo v. Aquino III, Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan. a. DAP was a program designed to
G.R. No. 209287, 1 promote economic growth: Policy is always a part of every budget and
July 2014 & 3 fiscal decision of any Administration. The national budget the Executive
February 2015 prepares and presents to Congress represents the Administration’s
"blueprint for public policy" and reflects the Government’s goals and
strategies.

Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be
implemented and funded, that is — (1) by declaring "savings" coming from
the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated
allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing
unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed
funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs. DAP
was not an appropriation measure; hence, no appropriation law was
required to adopt or to implement it.

‘"In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be
paid out of the Treasury,’ while appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act
of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum
to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.’"

Cross-boarder transfer is prohibited. The President shall, likewise, have the

authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive Department in the
General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another
department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant
to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 16 (5) of the Constitution.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the

privilege granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same
are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. The impact of the
phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize only transfers of funds
within their offices.

To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra,

refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with
respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect
to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the
Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.

Savings (should only come from finished projects if there is excess, or

abandoned projects) Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated
allotments under the DAP were not savings, and the use of such
appropriations contravened Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in

mind. The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse.
Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and the
amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that
the Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the
laws, is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the budget in
accordance with the provisions of the GAA. The third principle is that in
making the President’s power to augment operative under the GAA,
Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so
doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it delegates a
fraction of its power to the Executive.

The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere
description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have
not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be
generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has
already been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and
disbursement authority. For us to consider unreleased appropriations as
savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would
seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such
appropriations had not even reached and been used by the agency
concerned vis-à-vis the PAPs for which Congress had allocated them.

operative fact: you cannot take back the money, to return the money will
cause undue burden on those who benefitted from the law.

c) The Philippine Budget Cycle:

c.1.Budget Preparation: The budget preparation phase is commenced

through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call is of
two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call, which is addressed to all
agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate
Budget Call, which is addressed to all government-owned and -controlled
corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).

c.2. Budget Legislation: The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period
commencing from the time Congress receives the President’s Budget,
which is inclusive of the NEP and the BESF, up to the President’s approval
of the GAA. This phase is also known as the Budget Authorization Phase,
and involves the significant participation of the Legislative through its
deliberations. Initially, the President’s Budget is assigned to the House of
Representatives’ Appropriations Committee on First Reading.

c.3. Budget Execution: With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next
step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is
primarily the function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the
following procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for
the release of funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release
Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement
authorities. Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program
(ARP) and a Cash Release Program (CRP).The ARP sets a limit for
allotments issued in general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the
monthly, quarterly and annual disbursement levels. Actual disbursement or
spending of government funds terminates the Budget Execution Phase and
is usually accomplished through the Modified Disbursement Scheme under
which disbursements chargeable against the National Treasury are coursed
through the government servicing banks.

c.4. Accountability: Accountability is a significant phase of the budget

cycle because it ensures that the government funds have been effectively
 and efficiently utilized to achieve the State’s socio-economic goals. It also
allows the DBM to assess the performance of agencies during the fiscal
year for the purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new
policies.

Line veto, the president should have the power to line veto. Denying to the
Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be
counterproductive. The Decision did find doubtful those projects that
appeared to have no appropriation cover under the relevant GAAs on the
basis that: (1) the DAP funded projects that originally did not contain any
appropriation for some of the expense categories (personnel, MOOE and
capital outlay); and (2) the appropriation code and the particulars appearing
in the SARO did not correspond with the program specified in the GAA.
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is
a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill. On this premise, it may be
concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be
able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide
for parameters of appropriation.

VI. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Executive Power- Executive power is the power of the Executive department in implementing the
law. It is important to note that the executive department is easily the most ambiguous of the
departments, such that all other powers not stated in the constitution is presumed to be under the
executive department (i.e. legislative appointments not stated in the constitution).

 The president is the chief executive AND THE EXECUTIVE itself and all the other heads of
the departments are merely alteregos or interalias of the president.

Article VII, §1–

Executive
Power

Marcos v. Facts: The Marcoses wanted to return home but President Aquino banned
Manglapus, G.R. them stating that they are inimical to the peace and stability of the
No. 88211, 27 government.
October 1989
Issue: Is it within President Aquino’s power to prevent people from
returning?

Ruling: Yes, the executive power has RESIDUAL/IMPLIED POWERS

which are the powers besides the enumeration of powers stated in the
constitution. it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
 Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. "The
executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific
terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by
direct expressions where limitation was needed. the constitutional concept
of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the
concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are
themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere
properly regarded as one of "executive" power, authority is implied unless
there or elsewhere expressly limited.”

Biraogo v. The Facts: PTC was a special body to investigate the corruption of previous
Philippine Truth rules/ governments.
Commission of
2010, G.R. No. Issue: Whether the president can create new offices.
192935, 7
December 2010 Ruling: Yes the power to investigate issues belong to primarily to the
president, thus he has the power to set up task force solely for that
purpose. Additionally, the president CAN set up groups called Ad Hoc
Investigation committees under the concept of REORGANIZATION
which in its purest form is the (1) restructuring the internal organizations
of the Office of the President (and any executive groups) by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof and transferring functions from
one to the other; (2) transferring any function under the office to any
department or agency or vice-versa; or (3) transferring any agency under
the office to any other department or agency.

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed

under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,” it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject
to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body
is one.

Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside

what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the
power of control is entirely different from the power to create public
offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to
faithfully execute the laws.

Neri v. Senate, G.R. Facts: This was the case following Neri’s refusal to answer certain
No. 180643, 25 March questions in a senate inquiry. These questions are whether the ZTE deal
2008 was followed up, whether it was prioritized or whether it was approved at
once (the deals were mostly related to the trade agreements of the
Philippines and Chine itself).

Issue: Can Neri be held in contempt?

 Ruling: The 3 questions are considered Presidential Communications
Privilege. These are communications, documents or other materials that
reflect presidential decision making and deliberations that the President
believes should remain confidential. In essence, this is the process of the
decision making of the president.

There are 3 elements to consider an information as privileged:

o Quintiseential and non-delegable power

o Authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
pres or the pres himself. This is also called operational
proximity.
o There must be adequate need to release the information

The other type is the Deliberative Process Privilege- advisory opinions,

recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. In essence,
this is the decision making of the executive official

AKBAYAN v. Aquino, Facts: AKBAYAN wants to show the contents of the JPEPA to the nation
G.R. No. 170516, 16
July 2008 Issue: Is it possible?

Ruling: No, because it is considered a diplomatic negotiating privilege.

Diplomatic relations are very complicated and thus it cannot be released
to the public for fear that the officials might be unable to do their jobs
properly if they are in public scrutiny.

They come within the coverage of executive privilege. At the time when
the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the
negotiations were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the
proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering the
status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently
covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions
and settled jurisprudence.

Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations: The privileged character

of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court
in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest."
"secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information."

Finally, releasing these snapshot views of the negotiations would be

comparable to releasing drafts of the treaty, particularly when the notes
state the tentative provisions and language agreed on. As drafts of
regulations typically are protected by the deliberative process privilege,
drafts of treaties should be accorded the same protection.
Article VII, 1. Natural born citizen
§§2-7 –
Qualifications 2. Registered voter
and Elections:
President & 3. Able to read and write.
Vice-
President 4. At least 40 years old

5. Resident for 10 years

Macalintal v. Issue: Macalintal is assailing the constitutionality of the PET

Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, Ruling: The PET is constitutional because the PET is the Supreme Court,
G.R. No. 191618, 23 just a different name. Additionally, the Supreme Court has the prerogative
November 2010 to decide how they will perform their tasks.

In effect, the conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create
two Supreme Courts and the answer of the Supreme Court was: "No, this
did not involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but precisely we are
giving new jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the
Constitution. Congress may allocate various jurisdictions."

Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest
between two presidential candidates or two vice-presidential candidates,
no one had jurisdiction over it. So, it became necessary to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize
what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of
powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial
power.

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the

establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory
before the 1987 Constitution. Consequently, we find it imperative to trace
the historical antecedents of the PET.

Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has
merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact
that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts
of first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate
courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations.

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court,

since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal
are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793,
does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment
vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the
imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
Pormento v. Estrada, Erap ran for the presidency for a second time but was assailed to violate
G.R. No. 191099, 21 the constitution for the one election ban. However, it was considered
August 2010 moot because Erap did not win.

Article VII, §§8-12 –

Vacancies &
Disabilities

Estrada v. Desierto, Facts: Erap states that he was on leave when Arroyo was the assumed
G.R. No. 146710, 2 president because there was NO ACTUAL LETTER that stated that he
March 2001 was resigning.

Issues: Whether Erap formally resigned or was on leave

Ruling: Resignation has two steps, namely:

1) Intent to resign- This is explained through the state of mind during the
event
2) Intent must be coupled with an act of relinquishment

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

Ayoko na" are words of resignation.

Gloria’s Presidency: They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the

cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They
stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people
power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she
has been recognized by foreign governments.

In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not

revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine
is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically
swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has
stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.

EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new

government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review,
but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine

whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of article VII." This contention is
the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:"

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the

President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.

Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit

within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not
in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and
without need of call.

(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into

law by respondent Arroyo as President.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses
of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming

he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity: Petitioner Estrada
makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been
convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he
must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency.
Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since,
the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted
 before he can be prosecuted.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner

as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are
criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle
of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.

Article VII, §§13 –

Conflicts of Interest

Civil Liberties Union v. Facts: Petitioner wanted to declare EO 284 giving the other cabinet
Executive Secretary, members maximum of 2 positions unconstitutional
G.R. No. 83896, 22
February 1991 Issues: Is the holding of two positions constitutional?

Ruling: Section 7 Article 9-B lays down the general rule applicable to
elective and appointive public officials (these are the officials that are ok
with posts given them) however, Article 7 section 13 is the strict limit on
certain officials. These include: (1) President, (2) Vice-President, (3) the
Members of the Cabinet, (4) and their deputies or assistants (USec and
ASec). Additionally, the family of the president to the fourth civil degree
cannot be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commission,
Office of Ombudsman, Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads
of bureaus and offices.

The only exemption is when a position is considered an ex-officio

position (a position tied to the office, which is part of the duties). The
term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position."
Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority
than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without
further warrant or appointment. Such office should not entitle the sitting
officer any emolument aside from the one he enjoys in his duly appointed
or elected office.

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of

the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to
receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. Commissioner Monsod
pointed out that there are instances when although not required by current
law, membership of certain high-ranking executive officials in other
offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said officials’ primary
functions.

The origin of this proposition is the history of the

Government under the Marcos Era.

Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the

President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more
powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed
to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable
to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.

This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the
broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would
have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent
and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents’
interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions
found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the
distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when
the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to
Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants
from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the
other, may hold any other office or position in the government during
their tenure. Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by
interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7,
par. (1) of Article IX-B providing the general rule and the other, i.e.,
Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same
manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be construed vis-a-vis
Section 13, Article VII.

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to

impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the
exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face,
the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily,
wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
 understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.

Funa v. Ermita, G.R. Facts: The undersecretary of the DOTC was appointed as the OIC of the
No. 184740, 11 Marina
February 2010
Issue: Is it unconstitutional

Ruling: Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter

prohibition of section 13. This does not matter if you are appointed or was
temporary, so long as you were designated into either position; you
automatically fall under such restrictions. Additionally, it was proved that
being the OIC of MARINA does not fall under the work of the DOTC
undersecretary and as such, it is not an ex-officio position.

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with

the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment
results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable
at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other
hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.

It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of
an acting and temporary capacity, the words "hold the office" were
employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and
designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and
functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or
multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of
the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words
which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7,
paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To "hold" an office means to "possess or
occupy" the same, or "to be in possession and administration," which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties
of the office.

Funa v. Agra, G.R. Facts: Agra was appointed as acting secretary of justice and was also
No. 191644, 19 designated as the acting solicitor general
February 2013
Issue: Is Agra prohibited from acting as both SG and secretary of justice

Ruling: Yes, Agra is prohibited as he falls under the stricter requirements.

Additionally the constitution does not discriminate between temporary
and permanent appointments. Thus, Agra should not be considered for the
second position.

There are only 2 exceptions to the holding of multiple offices:

1) When office was provided for by the Constitution

2) Posts occupied by executive officials under section 13 are
considered as Ex-Officio positions.
 To be sure, Agra’s concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice
and Acting Solicitor General did not come within the definition of an ex
officio capacity. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ is
mandated to "provide the government with a principal law agency which
shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm. On the other hand,
the Administrative Code of 1987 confers upon the Office of the Solicitor
General the following powers and functions, to wit: The Office of the
Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office
concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled
corporations.

The foregoing provisions of the applicable laws show that one position
was not derived from the other. Indeed, the powers and functions of the
OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor included by the
powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the
DOJ,40 is not a constituent unit of the latter,41 as, in fact,
the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and
autonomous. Moreover, the magnitude of the scope of work of the
Solicitor General, if added to the equally demanding tasks of the
Secretary of Justice, is obviously too much for any one official to bear.

Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions

of the two; Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the
relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant,
there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the
acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other.

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and
whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in
possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid
for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned.

Betoy v. Board of Facts: EPIRA was enacted which needed board members. As a measure,
Directors, G.R. No. the board members were taken from the executive secretaries of the other
156556, 4 October branches supporting the energy industry.
2011

Ruling: The positions as board members of the energy committee are

considered an Ex-Officio position and as such falls under the exceptions
of section 13.

The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of

importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is not
restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. The additional duties
must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's
 primary functions.

Designation of members of Cabinet to form the NPB does not violate the
prohibition contained in our Constitution as the privatization and
restructuring of the electric power industry involves the close
coordination and policy determination of various government agencies.
Section 2 of the EPIRA clearly shows that the policy toward privatization
would involve financial, budgetary and environmental concerns as well as
coordination with local government units.

Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon

the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the
position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the
officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an
employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and
approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.

Article VII, §§14-15 –

Temporary and
Midnight
Appointment

De Castro v. Judicial Facts: Chief Justice recently retired and then president appointed his
and Bar Council, successor when the appointment fell under the 2 mos appointment ban
G.R. No. 191002, 17 following the elections. Respondents however, were assailing that that
March 2010 under article 8 section 4, the next justice must be appointed within the
next 90 days and this takes precedence.

Issue: Whether the president can appoint a successor to the chief justice
within the 2 mos appointment ban

Ruling: Yes, because Article 7, section 15 applies only to the executive

officials, such as cabinet members and other secretaries and does not, in
fact, apply to the justices, judges, and other judiciary positions. (A
reasoning used was that the assailed section was found in the judiciary
rather than the executive department). Section 15 was used to stop
midnight appointments from the martial law but the framers intended to
make sure that the different functions of the government is not crippled.

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an
imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced[71] - should
not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President
the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme
Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by
the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President
to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special
 provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the
appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation
in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because
it was "couched in stronger negative language." Such interpretation even
turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional
Commission's deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

What midnight appointment is not: The filling up of vacancies in

important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance
of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be
permitted.

Midnight Appointment in the Constitution: The exception allows only

the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the
President during the period of the ban.

Article VII, §16 –

Appointment Clause

Sarmiento v. Mison, 4 groups to be appointed;

G.R. No. 79974, 17
December 1987 1. Heads of the executive department,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in
him in the constitution.

2. all other officers of the government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law

3. those whom he may be authorized by law to

appoint.

4. other officers lower in rank.

*only the first group requires confirmation from COA.

Matibag v. Benipayo, Ad interim appointments are permanent appointments. Ad

G.R. No. 149036, 2 interim appointments refer to appointments made by the
April 2002 president while the Congress is in recess and not appointments
that are transitory in nature or for the mean time.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes

effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
 disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution provides as follows: "The President shall have the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress."

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval

or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or
revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or
revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly
without basis.

"A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such

presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and
when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and
only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments
may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with
reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once.
The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his
function without loss of time. His title to such office is
complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment
is effective ‘until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’"

Article VII, §17–

Power of Control and
the Take Care Clause

Villena v. Secretary of The secretaries can suspend subordinates as an alter ego of the
Interior, G.R. No. L- president. As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the
46570, 21 April Interior to decree the suspension of the herein petitioner pending an
1939 administrative investigation of the charges against him. There is no
clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor
of a municipality who is under investigation.

Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law,

remove a municipal official, it would be a legal incongruity if he were
to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. After serious
reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the
government in this case on the board proposition, albeit not suggested,
that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted
and considering the departmental organization established and
continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our
Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
 situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Alter Ego: With reference to the Executive Department of the

government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily
visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of
Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begins with the enunciation of the principles that "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of
the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief
Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a
department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of
that department where the President is required by law to exercise
authority.

Gonzales III v. Office The president has NO power over deputy ombudsman because it will
of the President, violate the independence of ombudsman.
G.R. No. 196231, 4
September 2012 & Modern-day ombudsman, that is, someone who acts as a neutral
28 January 2014 representative of ordinary citizens against government abuses.29 This idea
of a people's protector was first institutionalized in the Philippines under
the 1973 Constitution with the creation of the Tanodbayan, which wielded
the twin powers of investigation and prosecution. The framers of the 1987
Constitution later envisioned a more effective ombudsman vested with
authority to "act in a quick, inexpensive and effective manner on
complaints against administrative officials", and to function purely with
the "prestige and persuasive powers of his office" in correcting
improprieties, inefficiencies and corruption in government freed from the
hampering effects of prosecutorial duties.

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a

Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint. Under the
doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove.48 As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the
President are also removable by him.49 Granting the President the
Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. What the Constitution
secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians." However these has
been effectively repealed by the subsequent decision.

Office of the Ombudsman is considered “a notch above other grievance-

handling investigative bodies.”39 It has powers, both constitutional and
statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing
 accountability of public officers.40

Independence” of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsman’s

independence. The extent of the independence enjoyed by these
constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted with two
significant considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or the
powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any allowable
interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks
and balances.

Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the

President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional. In more
concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to
discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials,
all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is
what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution
guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman
office seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily

true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the
performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to
place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as
independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
controls external to her Office. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) should be declared void.

Buklod ng Kawaning President can reorganize an office provided that it is

EIIB v. Zamora, done in good faith.
G.R. No. 142801, 10
July 2001 To "deactivate" means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by
discharging or reassigning personnel,13 while to "abolish" means to do
away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely.14 In essence,
abolition denotes an intention to do away with the
office wholly and permanently.15 Thus, while in abolition, the office
ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the office
continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative.

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office
is lodged with the legislature.16 This proceeds from the legal precept that
the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law.17 Thus,
except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be
abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.18 The
exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
 executive department are concerned, the President's power of control may
justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office,19 or certain
laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures.20

President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the

creation of offices in the department or agency concerned. This
provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under
the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines
the continuing authority to reorganize the national government,
which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies,
to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.

Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to
the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre,25 we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions."

Article VII, §18–

Commander in Chief
Powers

David v. Gloria Powers of the president;

Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396, 3 Calling out power
May 2006
To declare Martial Law

Suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus

While the Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a

discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion."

The standard laid down is not correctness, but

83
arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further
ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he
 fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court
cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings."

Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled

that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
"whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed
forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." Under the calling-out power, the President may summon
the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion
and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that
goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal
or ultra vires.

President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an

act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above.

Limits of the Power of the President: Generally, Congress is the

repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the

Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a

national policy declared by Congress.124

Lagman v. Medialdea, SC will only check the factual basis of ML before its proclamation. The
G.R. No. 231658, 4 congress can go deeper as to the accuracy of the factual basis of ML. The
July 2017 Court is only allowed to look whether or not there has been arbitrariness
in the usage of facts to support the declaration however the truthfulness of
such is lodged in the Congress.

The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege, of the
writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.

a) The judicial power to review versus the congressional power to revoke.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of
sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of

suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to
the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to
"undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On the
other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available
prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court
which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as
will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can
delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the

filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the
other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it
may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.

The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the

declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's
decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a
given situation.

Extraordinary powers of the President distinguished. Among the three

extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and
involves ordinary police action.114 The President may resort to this
extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is
fully discretionary to the President;"115 the only limitations being that he
acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not
constituting grave abuse of discretion.116

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only
when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it.
The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of
these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible
revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the
Supreme Court."118

"Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect) it

does not refer to a sequence) order, or arrangement by which the
Commander-in-Chief must adhere to. This so-called "graduation of
powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President
decides which power to choose.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the

President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that
the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a
mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it
calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the
President. The power to choose, initially, which among these
extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment
 call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are
broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats
that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.132

d) The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the Congress not to

interfere a priori in the decision-making process of the President. The
elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of
prior concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further
supports the conclusion that judicial review does not include the
calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers
will be availed of in a given situation.

The Court must similarly and necessarily refrain from calibrating the
President's decision of which among his extraordinary powers to avail
given a certain situation or condition. It cannot be overemphasized that
time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Padilla v. Congress, The congress is only required to convene jointly if they will revoke or
G.R. No. 231671, 25 suspend the declaration of ML.
July 2017
The duty of the Congress to vote jointly under Article VII, Section 18.
the issue of whether or not under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, it is mandatory for the Congress to automatically convene in
joint session in the event that the President proclaims a state of martial
law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
Philippines or any part thereof. The Court answers in the negative. The
Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session
except to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.

By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the

Congress is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal

and ordinary meaning, the provision grants the Congress the power to
revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the
Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The use of
the word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he Congress x x x may
revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is to be construed as
permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether
or not to revoke,71 but in order to revoke, the same provision sets the
requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress,
voting jointly, favor revocation.

It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint
session." While it may be conceded, subject to the discussions below, that
the phrase "voting jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the
joint voting will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence of
clear language in the Constitution,72 still, the requirement that "[t]he
 Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session," explicitly applies only to the
situation when the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus still lies with both
Houses of the Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members. There was no obligation on the part of the Congress
herein to convene in joint session as the provision on revocation under
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even come into
operation in light of the resolutions, separately adopted by the two Houses
of the Congress in accordance with their respective rules of procedure,
expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.

It must be stated that the Senate and the House of Representatives have
their own respective Rules, i.e., the Rules of the Senate and the Rules of
the House of Representatives. There is no general body of Rules
applicable to a joint session of Congress.

The usual procedure for having a joint session is for both Houses to
first adopt a Concurrent Resolution to hold a joint session. This is
achieved by either of two (2) ways: (1) both the Senate and the House
of Representatives simultaneously adopting the Concurrent
Resolution - an example would be when the two (2) Houses inform the
President that they are ready to receive his State of the Nation
Address or (2) For one (1) House to pass its own resolution and to
send it to the other House for the latter's concurrence.

Rodriguez v. Gloria Command responsibility. There must be;

Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 191805, 15 1. superior-subordinate relationship
November 2011
2. superior knew about the commission of the crime

3. Superior has failed to take necessary and reasonable

measures to prevent or punish the offenders.

Presidential immunity from suit. It bears stressing that since there is no

determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability
in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as
ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis: 69 It
does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing
the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way,
by action or omission.

Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that

should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
 disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level
of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.

Command responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders

for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict.”78

Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo. We rule in

the negative. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that
on the basis of the “Melo Commission” and the “Alston Report,”
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and
information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced
disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA.92 Without
even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez
contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the
perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing
enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not
automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each
and every count of forcible disappearance.93 Aside from Rodriguez’s
general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her
responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even
a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of
his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate,
punish or prevent it.

Article VII, §19– There is a need to properly distinguish between the pardon and amnesty.
Pardoning Power When you say Pardon, it is an act of grace of the President directed at a
person. You forgive the person, removing the criminal liability without
removing civil liability (unless otherwise EXPRESSEDLY stated).
Additionally, it can only be given, following a conviction.

Amnesty on the other hand, is the act of Congress, with the President, in
removing the crime in a certain crime. This means that the act is no
longer a crime, thus, there is no liability incurred in it. As such, there is
no need for any conviction. So long as the acts appear to fall under the
amnesty, it will be dismissed.

Monsato v. Factoran, Facts: Monsanto was already charged with a crime but received a pardon
G.R. No. 78239, 9 while her appeal was pending, wherein she alleges that because of that
February 1989 pardon, she should be returned to her previous work as a secretary of the
court. She alleges that there is an extinction of accessory penalties.

Issue: Whether pardon removes civil liabilities and disqualifications

Ruling: No, Pardon at its core is simple removal or of primary penalties.

It never includes accessory penalties. Accessory penalties are
disqualifications.
 Pardon acknowledges the commission of the crime.

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power

entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. . . . A pardon is
a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not
complete without acceptance. In her case, verdict has already been given
her and was simply in appeal, prior to the appeal a judgment has already
been passed, as such the pardon only affects the prior judgment.

A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though

pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished;
and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one
never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him
following his conviction.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends

for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to
make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

Facts: Estrada wants to run as the mayor of Manila after pardon by GMA.
The pardon explicitly stated that Erap’s civil personality and accessory
penalties are reinstated and removed.
Risos-Vidal v. Issue: Whether Erap’s pardon allows him to run for office
COMELEC, G.R.
No. 206666, 21 Ruling: Yes, you have to look at the wording of the pardon to see if there
January 2015 was an actual reinstitution of the civil personality. As stated before, it was
explicitly stated that GMA’s pardon reinstated Erap’s qualification to run
for office.

Additionally, the preamble is not part of the pardon “WHEREAS, Joseph

Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office.” The third preambular clause of the pardon did not
operate to make the pardon conditional. Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s
declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor
militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. This is
especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition
or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term “civil and
political rights” as being restored.

Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as

 it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word “whereas.”40

The congress cannot limit the pardoning power of the President. Only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming
from the COMELEC.

Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: Pardon; its effects.
– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored
by the terms of the pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory

penalties. – The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during
the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual
absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully

restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.

Barrioquinto v. Facts: Amnesty was given to those insurgents fighting for the country
Fernandez, G.R. No. during the war. The person was charged with murder among others while
L-1278, 21 January the case was still pending. The government states that since the persons
1949 were not convicted, they did not confess to the crime, as such, they cannot
be given amnesty. The court decided to refer it to the SC to properly
understand amnesty

Issue: Whether amnesty only counts those that are convicted or not

Ruling: No, amnesty is a blanket removal of the act as a crime. Thus, so

long as the facts of the case or the case appear to fall under amnesty, the
case will be dismissed as there was no crime committed. Amnesty does
not need a confession from the accused all that is needed is, the crime
committed is within the terms of the amnesty.

in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of

September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition
precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or
offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it
is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said
Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
 avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against
him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions
entitled to the benefits of the amnesty.

The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence

presented, either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense,
cannot be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is
regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of a law, not
only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never
committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot
or hero, cannot be punished as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice
cannot convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed
an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof,
so also and a fortiori they cannot convict a person considered by law not a
criminal, but a patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable services to
the nation in committing such an act.

Article VII, §20– There is an important clause: as provided by the law. Thus Congress may
Foreign Loans affect the loans itself. However, it is important to note that the method of
acquiring loans, of setting up and talking about it to other countries, these
are all executive responsibilities and actions.

Article VII, §21– Executive agreement need not to be concurred by senate.

Treaty Clause

VII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Article VIII, §§1- Judicial Review is different from Judicial Power. Judicial power is the blanket
2 – Judicial term of the SC to settle actual controversies, adjudicate and it has the function
Power & of the judicial review, which is the delineation and review of the borders
Review between the powers. This is to act as the check and balance of every
department’s post-martial law.

Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S.
346 (1911)
Francis
co v.
House
of
Represe
ntatives,
G.R.
No.
160261,
10
Novemb
er 2003

Kilosbayan
v. Morato,
G.R. No.
118910, 16
November
1995

Garcia v.
Board of
Investments,
G.R. No.
92024, 9
November 1990

Carpio Morales
v. Court of
Appeals, G.R.
No. 217126, 10
November 2015

Municipality of
Malabang v.
Benito, G.R.
No. L-28113,
28 March 1969
Article VIII,
§§4-5 –
Jurisdiction

Fortich v. Cases - decided

Corona,
G.R. No Matters – resolve (MR)
131457, 19
August 1999 Only cases that do not meet the 3 votes requirement will be decided En banc
not matters. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en
banc.4

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the

intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand,
and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are decided while matters,
which include motions, are resolved. Otherwise put, the word decided must
refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule
of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the
above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the
Constitution where these words appear.5

With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this
case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision
speaks only of case and not matter.

If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of
the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has
already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a
tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision
which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to
muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration.

Firestone If the En banc thinks that the case is necessary to be discussed by the En banc,
Ceramics v. they can do so.
Court of
Appeals, Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL
G.R. No. POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc
127022, 28 of November 18, 1993, which reads."Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89,
June 2000 dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:
All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership
 may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.

De Lima v. Facts: De Lima was tried in the RTC for the case of illegal drug sale and
Guerrero, possession. She assailed that as a senator, she should be tried by the SC
G.R. No.
229781; Issues:
Carpio &
Caguioa, 1) Hierarchy of Courts - The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy
dissenting on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are
also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave
time for the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
2) Prematurity - Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ
of certiorari annulling the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable
cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated February 24, 2017
committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center. Clearly
petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her release from
detention and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the
subject criminal case.
More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
under paragraph (b) of the prayer "until and unless the Motion to Quash is
resolved with finality," is an unmistakable admission that the RTC has
yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the existence of the RTC's
authority to rule on the said motion.

Ruling:

1) De Lima cannot go to the Supreme Court primarily because there is a

hierarchy of courts:
a) The trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation
of the evidence before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may invlude the validity of the
ordinance, statue, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
constitution.
b) Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that
reviews the determination of facts and law made by trial courts
c) Supreme court leads the judiciary by breaking new grounds or
further reiterating-in the light of new circumstances or in the light
of some confusion of bench or bar- existing precedents.

The Supreme Court may only try new cases if:

1. When genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed

immediately
2. When cases involve transcendental importance
3. When the case is novel
4. When the constitutional issues are better discussed by the SC
5. When time is of the essence
6. When the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ
7. When there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
 course of law
8. When the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice
9. When the order complained was a patent nullity
10. When the appeal was considered an inappropriate remedy
 It must be noted that De Lima’s case did not fall under any of these.
2) The SC cannot handle the case because there is yet to be a decision from
the lower courts. What De Lima is doing is forum shopping- choosing a
court that may best suit her needs, make her win a case. Even
granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of this
Court under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition nonetheless falls
short of the Constitutional requirements and of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In the absence of a final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to
Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no occasion
for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Article VIII, §6 –
Administrati
ve
Supervision

Caoibes v. Facts: 2 judges had a fight, respondent filed a complaint to the ombudsman
Ombudsman, and then to the court
G.R. No.
132177, 19 Issue: Who has the initial power to discipline members of the judiciary
July 2001
Ruling: The Supreme Court has the power to discipline and look to the cases
of the members of the judiciary. It is up to the court to determine if the case is
administrative in nature or otherwise and remand it to the necessary court
after. The ombudsman has no say in this.

The Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation, in Lieu of Comment,

correctly opined and we quote: ". . . the grant of the aforequoted powers to the
Office of the Ombudsman is not tantamount to giving it exclusive authority
thereon. In fact, Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770, which is relied upon by the
Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed order, provides that it has primary,
not exclusive, jurisdiction over graft and corruption cases and felonies
committed by public officers in relation to their office. Moreover, it was held
in Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993], that the Ombudsman’s
power under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 is not an exclusive authority but
rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who
were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge,
or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty
bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless
of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
 before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court.

Article VIII, §7 – 1. Natural-born

Qualification
s 2. At least 40 years old

3. A judge of lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the

Philippines for 15 years or more

Article VIII,
§§8-9 –
Judicial and
Bar Council
(JBC)

Jardeleza v. Facts: Jardaleza was supposed to be part of the JBC group with regards to the
Sereno, G.R. opening for the position of the justice. There was opposition with regards to
No. 213181, his credentials and character, first, for his handling of an international case of
19 August the government and secondly, for allegations of extra marital affairs. He was
2014 invited to defend himself but was not given ample opportunity to prepare.
Thus, he was dropped from the list. He then assails that he was not given due
process.

Issue: Whether the JBC has the power to include and exclude people from
their list of nominees

Ruling: First, The Supreme Court has supervisory power on the JBC. This
means that the SC cannot order the JBC to include or exclude anyone but the
court may require the JBC to follow its own rules and proceedings.

Secondly, due process applies to JBC proceedings. Due Process is defined as

the right to be heard and the right to a fair trial. This is normally used in
criminal proceedings but it was found that this also applies to the JBC
proceedings.

The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with discretion,
however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due
process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. Notwithstanding being “a class of
its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.

Lastly, with regards to the qualifications, The first issue-relating to the way
Jardaleza handled the case, is not considered solid grounds to question his
character. However, his extramarital affairs and business moral practices in the
office are possible indicators of his character.

Does the “unanimity rule” apply in cases where the main point of contention is
the professional judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt
behavior? The Court answers these questions in the negative. While Chief
Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
 was not borne out of a mere variance of legal opinion but by an “act of
disloyalty” committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains
that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the “disagreement” in legal
strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers.

Do these issues fall within the purview of “questions on integrity” under

Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The claims of an illicit relationship and acts of
insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral character. Jurisprudence34 is
replete with cases where a lawyer’s deliberate participation in extra-marital
affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on one’s ethical and moral
principles.

Aguinaldo v. Facts: There was an opening for justices and the JBC was asked to fulfill the
Ochoa, G.R. vacancies as mandated. They gave a cluster to the President who decided to
No. 224302 choose completely different people from the cluster that was given.

Issue: Whether the clustering was constitutional

Ruling: Clustering is the act of the JBC wherein they put 3 or more candidates
per spot, ordering the seniority and the arrangements in a vague manner
wherein, when a candidate is not chosen for that spot, he is already removed
from the appointments. This preempts and affects the president from choosing
from a pool. The only requirement of the constitution is that per vacancy, the
JBC must furnish at least 3 candidates. It will be up to the president to order
the seniority and the list as he deems fit.
For an appointment to be valid, complete, and effective, four elements must
always concur, to wit: "(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of
authority, (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal, (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment, and (4) receipt of
the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications." The
Court expounded on the importance of the last element as follows:
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and
taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture
of the office.
It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a
collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the
seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by
controlling the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or
commission papers. By already designating the numerical order of the
vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order of preference
of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointment by
the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the
President's power of appointment.

Clustering impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as

restricts the chances for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1)
the President's option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven
nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed from one
cluster, then he is proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same
 cluster for the other vacancies.

Article VIII, §10

– Salary

Article VIII, §11

– Power to
Discipline

People v. Gacott, Facts: Gacott did not know of a presidential decree repealing an earlier law
G.R. No. which then led to incorrect application of the law. He was then sentenced by
116049, 13 the Supreme Court which involves an official record and suspension. He then
July 1995 is asking for clemency from the court

Issue: Whether the SC has the power to discipline its members

Ruling: Yes. The SC is the sole organ that can discipline its members
according to its rules.

At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly
shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause
which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that
disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise
thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all
administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole
Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein
and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other
hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case
must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Article VIII, §12

– Non-
Judicial
Functions

In re Manzano, Facts: Manzano was asking for a letter wherein he was given the right to take
A.M. No. an administrative position to support the delivery of government services in a
88-7-1861- region
RTC, 5
October Issue: Can Manzano take an administrative position
1998
Ruling: No, Manzano cannot hold an administrative position as clearly stated
in Article 8 Section 12, A judge is not allowed to be a part of any quasi-
judicial or administrative functions different from his judicial functions. A
judge’s duty is to judge.
 It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform
administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out
the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No.
856, it is provided that— Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City
Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of
justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of
the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial

Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in
violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Article VIII,
§§13-15 –
Decision-
making

VIII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Article IX

Funa v. COA Chairman, G.R. No. 192791,

24 April 2012

Funa v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.

191672, 25 November 2014

Medalla v. Sto. Tomas, 208 SCRA 351

Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

No. 230249, 24 April 2018

Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural

Office, G.R. No. 193462, 4 February 2014

Philippine Airlines v. COA, 245 SCRA 39

Petitioner-Organization v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 147036, 10 April 2012

Gamogamo v. PNOC Shipping and Transit

Corporation, 381 SCRA 742

Lumanta v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 79

IX. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Article X

Republic Act No. 11054 or the Bangsamoro

Organic Law

Disomangcop v. DPWH Secretary, G.R. No.

149848, 25 Novermber 2004

Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, 10

December 2013

Demaala v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.

199752, 17 February 2015

Rama v. Moises, G.R. No. 197146, 6

December 2016

Cong. Mandanas v. Executive Secretary,

G.R. No. 199808, 3 July 2018

X. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article XI

San Juan & IMPEACHMENT (means “accusation” or “charge”) – is a formal proceeding

Tiojanco, instituted by a public body (usually the legislature) for determining through a
Impeachment, trial whether a public official – usually although not necessarily high ranking,
Max Planck and who has a fixed term of office or protected tenure- must be either removed
Encyclopedia of from office or held accountable in other ways. (San Juan & Tiojanco, 2016)
Comparative
Constitutional Impeachable Officials:
Law, Oxford
Constitutional 1. President
Law (2016) 2. Vice-President
3. Members of the Supreme Court
4. Members of the Constitutional Commission (COMELEC, COA,
CSC)
5. Ombudsman

A vote of no confidence (or motion of no confidence), on the other hand, is

a legislative procedure to remove a person or persons in the government whom
the legislature deems unfit to continue in office. While impeachment targets
officials with protected tenures or terms of office, a vote of no confidence is
practiced mostly in parliamentary systems—where ministers are not protected
by fixed tenures and are subject to the pleasure of the parliament. A vote of no
confidence in presidential systems is generally symbolic, and cannot remove a
public official on its own (eg United States and Russia), since cabinet members
serve at the pleasure of the president (Berger 4). Impeachment, on the other
hand, is used mostly in presidential systems (Baumgartner and Kada 2).

The specific grounds for impeachment in various constitutions differ, but the
nature of the differing impeachable offences are similar. These offences can be
grouped into two types: determinate offences are those which constitute
violations of written laws, such as the constitution (eg Argentina, Philippines,
Germany, India, South Africa, Croatia, Romania) and criminal statutes (eg
Argentina and Poland), or wrongdoings that are well-defined in jurisprudence;
and corruption, which covers a wide range of unscrupulous activities such as
graft, plunder, and bribery, is almost always statutorily prohibited (corruption
and bribery). Treason, a ground widely found in numerous constitutions (eg
United States, Philippines, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and
Italy), is also included in this category.
How an impeachment process is carried out depends largely on which public
bodies are tasked to investigate and try an impeachable official. Based on the
actors involved, two models of impeachment can be distinguished:

Type I impeachment solely involves the legislature, from indictment stage to

trial, and is of two sub-types: those with unicameral legislature (Type I
unicameral) and those with bicameral ones (Type I bicameral) (Baumgartner and
Kada 142); Kada classified countries with Type I impeachment as ‘legislature-
dominant’ systems ( bicameralism). The United States’ model, where indictment
is conducted by the House of Representatives and the trial by the Senate, is a
Type I bicameral impeachment. Those with a Type I unicameral system, where a
unicameral legislative branch acts as both prosecutor and juror.

Type II impeachment, on the other hand, involves a constitutional body other

than the legislature—either the judiciary or a special ad-hoc body—or employs
other means such as plebiscite (eg Iceland) or referendum (eg Austria; direct
democracy). This model adds another veto point in order to prevent potential
legislative abuses.
 Regardless of which model a country follows, the whole impeachment process is
divisible into two stages: (1) impeachment proper (or indictment); and (2) trial.
Impeachment proper is that stage where one public institution, usually the
legislative, formally charges an official of an impeachable offence or offences.
Trial, usually conducted by another public body (except in Type I-unicameral),
determines the guilt or innocence of the respondent official, and imposes the
penalty, eg removal from office (removal of officials).

Because of the sui generis character of impeachment trials, technical rules of

evidence generally do not apply, and all evidence otherwise inadmissible in
ordinary cases may be admitted and considered (Black 18). The exception would
be when a country’s law provides that rules on criminal litigation apply to
impeachment cases. These voting thresholds, either in indictment or trial, not
only insulate public officials from needless harassment, but also give enough
sovereign weight to the actions of impeaching public bodies.

The standard of proof required to convict in impeachment cases is a delicate

matter, and is highly intertwined with questions of whether impeachment is a
legal or a political process and whether it is a criminal proceeding or not. While
Black thinks that ‘overwhelming preponderance of evidence’ is the ideal
evidentiary standard in impeachment (Black 17), the issue remains unsettled—
especially in cases where a public official is accused of a criminal offence
(where the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt). While it would be
convenient to think that the standard of proof depends upon the nature of the
charges (eg Hungary), the bulk of surveyed impeachment cases (where the
charges ranged from treason to mere misfiling of statements of assets and
liabilities) were driven largely by politics, and were thus highly dependent upon
the actors involved and not on the charges filed.

That impeachment is political, however, does not mean that it is necessarily

partisan. Even the simple wearing of black robes and togas, which are
distinctively judicial attires, symbolize the taking on of a new role as an
impartial jury. A country’s Chief Justice also usually presides over presidential
impeachment trials. In theory, because of the solemn oath taken by prosecutors
and jurors in an impeachment case they are expected to follow their conscience
devoid of any partisan tendency. In the impeachment trial of US Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Chase, a sufficient number of senators crossed well demarcated
party lines in voting for acquittal.

Fernando v. Ratio: Liability of public officers and other persons for audit disallowances shall
Honorable be determined on the basis of:
Commission on
Audit En Banc, (a) the nature of the disallowance;
G.R. No.
214910, 13 (b) the duties, responsibilities or obligations of the officers/persons concerned;
February 2018
(c) the extent of their participation or involvement in the disallowed transaction;
and

(d) the amount of losses or damages suffered by the government thereby.

Public officers who are custodians of government funds and/or

properties shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds and properties
are safely guarded against loss or damage.
Francisco, Jr. v. Ratio: the reckoning period for 1 year bar on filing a second impeachment is at
Nagmamalasakit the time when a complaint was filed and endorsed by a member of the house or
na mga representative and the referral to Committee on Justice. The term "initiate"
Manananggol ng means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
mga
Manggagawang Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
Pilipino, Inc., initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in
G.R. No. the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of
160261, 10 reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
November 2003 "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate.

However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a

"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to
begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists
of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a
Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a
Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing;
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable
public official is successfully impeached.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated

when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the
trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather,
the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.

Gutierrez v. The validity of the a) simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the b)
House of need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in
Representatives, Impeachment Proceedings of the House.
G.R. No.
193459, 15 Ratio:
February 2011
a) Initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon.
Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
 proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more
than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is
important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a
year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle.

b) Promulgation is to make known it is different from publication requirement.

Provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within
the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of impeachment.

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or

obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An
administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to
become known or obligatory.[44] While "promulgation" would seem
synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their usage.

In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has
invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as
promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means "the
delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication."[46]

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally

understood--that is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between
the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail
unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.[49]

Sabio v. Field Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
Investigation more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.
Office, Office of gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
the Ombudsman, intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
G.R. No. manifest in the former.
229882, 13
February 2018 Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which
shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or
intent to violate the truth.

An administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings. As

such, the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
or the acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case
does not necessarily preclude the administrative proceeding nor carry with it
relief from administrative liability.

"public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest
lives." with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions
ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.

Ifurung v. Carpio The framers of the Constitution reveal their intent to grant the Ombudsman and
Morales in her his deputies the same rank and salary as the Chair and members of the
capacity as Constitutional Commissions but not by the staggered term. The Office of the
Ombudsman, Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission and is not a collegial body. The
G.R. No. constitutional commissions observe the regular rotational plan which cannot
232131, 24 April apply to the Office of the Ombudsman.
2018
Ratio: the seven-year term of office of the first appointees for Ombudsman and
the deputies is not reckoned from 2 February 1987, but shall be reckoned from
their date of appointment.

Section 7. Term of Office. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including

the Special Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without
reappointment.

MR. ROMULO. Yes. If I may just comment: the Ombudsman in this

provision is a rank in itself really. That is how we look at it. But for
purposes of government classification and salary, we thought we have to
give him a recognizable or an existing rank as a point of reference more
than anything else.84

The discussion confirms that the intent of the framers of the Constitution in
qualifying that the salary and rank of the Ombudsman and the deputies shall be
the same as that of the chairman and the members of the constitutional
commissions, was for the purpose of having a government classification as to
salary and a point of reference as to rank.

Office of the Ratio: The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative
Ombudsman v. penalties against public officials or employees, in the exercise of its
Quimbo, G.R. administrative disciplinary authority. Pursuant to The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
No. 173277, 25 the Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties
February 2015 against errant public servants. The manifest intent of the lawmakers was to
bestow on the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord
with the constitutional deliberations.

The Ombudsman has the legal interest to intervene in the proceedings before the
CA.
The issue of whether or not the Ombudsman possesses the requisite legal
interest to intervene in the proceedings where its decision is at risk of being
inappropriately impaired has been laid to rest in Ombudsman v. De Chavez.17 In
the said case, the Court conclusively ruled that even if the Ombudsman was not
impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of its broad powers include
defending its decisions before the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court, 18the Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said
proceedings as its legal interest on the matter is beyond cavil. The Court
elucidated, thus:

The Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory

and prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations directed against them. Its function is critical
because public interest (in the accountability of public officers and employees)
is at stake.

PART IV – AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

Article XVII Amendment v Revision

Quantitative: mas madami sa revision

Qualitative: depends on the essence nung pinalitan. Pag greater weight, revision.

Sec 1 - Constitutional Assembly - 3/4 of Senate and House

COnstitutional Convention - made by 2/3 votes. Congress will just call for
Consti COnvention

Sec 2 - people’s initiative

Amendments : Sec 1 and 2

Revision - Sec 1 only

Del Rosario v.
COMELEC, 35
SCRA 367

Imbong v.
COMELEC, 35
SCRA 28

Lambino v.
COMELEC,

Occena v.
Commission,
104 SCRA 1

Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 21
SCRA 774

Tan v.
Macapagal, 43
SCRA 677

Sanidad v.
COMELEC, 73
SCRA 33

Tolentino v.
COMELEC, 41
SCRA 702
Javellana v.
Executive
Secretary, 50
SCRA 30