A.C. No.
6281 September 26, 2011 On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda. 1
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890
square meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994,
complainant initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration
of the aforesaid property. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
Branch 275. During the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel
Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay
respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand
Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him,
as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case,
respondent demanded the additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the
preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position
in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property as additional
fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement.
Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have
agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of
his co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter
became furious and their relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition
for registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated June 5,
1998. On March 24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of
the letter addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City, which transmitted the
decree of registration and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
Certificate of Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same had
already been claimed by and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000,
complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's
duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and
authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20%
share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which, respondent
would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand,
for not having been agreed upon.
In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's
duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent
over the telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous demand and angrily told complainant
to comply, and threatened to have the OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse
claim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal
services was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not
returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite
repeated demands to effect the same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon respondent,
complainant invokes the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x
In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over to complainant the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's refusal, notwithstanding repeated
demands, to complete payment of his agreed professional fee consisting of 20% of the total
area of the property covered by the title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square meters,
or its equivalent market value at the rate of PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a
sum of PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter portion and that he was ready and
willing to turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should complainant pay him
completely the aforesaid professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the
amount earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the current value of the subject lot.
He alleged that the agreement was not reduced into writing, because the parties believed each
other based on their mutual trust. He denied that he demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00
for the preparation of a memorandum, since he considered the same unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the payment of the 20%
professional fees, respondent invoked the principle of "quantum meruit" to justify the amount
being demanded by him.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for unjustly withholding from complainant the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution
No. XVII-2005-173,5 dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
adopting the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the resolution of his motion
for reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for review 6 with this Court. The Court, in a
Resolution7 dated August 16, 2006, directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper
disposition, pursuant to this Court's resolution in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P.
Reyala.8
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17, 2005, with
modification that respondent is ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt of notice. Hence, the present petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed with
modification the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim for his
unpaid professional fees that would legally give him the right to retain the property of his client
until he receives what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power
over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure
the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur:
(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers;
and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.9 Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general
lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the
documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney's possession in the course
of his employment.10
In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the payment of
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that
their agreement was only for the payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the
complainant and the respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee
consisting of 20% of the total area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the
parties only shows that respondent will be paid the acceptance fee and the appearance fees,
which the respondent has duly received. Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's
fees that would entitle respondent to retain his client's property. Hence, respondent could not
validly withhold the title of his client absence a clear and justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by
respondent of the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an absolute
right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client
when due or upon demand.11
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to
deliver the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged
entitlement to additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule
16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall charge only fair and the personal record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of
reasonable fees." It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his country for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.
services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or
possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near
conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the
financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.

Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional

fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning
`as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in
the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client." 12 The principle of quantum
meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a
case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has
earned.13 In the present case, the parties had already entered into an agreement as to the
attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find
application because the respondent is already compensated by such agreement.

The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the one to secure
the owner's duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to immediately inform complainant
that the title was already in his possession. Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went to the RD of
Las Piñas City to get the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be surprised that the said
title had already been claimed by, and released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer
must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that
is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness.14 By keeping secret with the client his acquisition of the title,
respondent was not fair in his dealing with his client. Respondent could have easily informed
the complainant immediately of his receipt of the owner's duplicate of the OCT on March 29,
2000, in order to save his client the time and effort in going to the RD to get the title.

Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and imposing
unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary
sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors, adopting and approving with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be ordered to return
the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-
day period from notice given to respondent within which to return the title should be modified
and, instead, respondent should return the same immediately upon receipt of the Court's
decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the
complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision.
He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña, former head of the Records Department of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against
respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno. Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel
of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2 Register of Deeds of
Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She personally knew respondent
Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she
filed against her husband in 1974, and the aforementioned property was her share in their
property settlement. Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus,
as she was respondent's trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella
Kraus was always there whenever she visited respondent in connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she
(complainant) apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to
interested buyers, and that her property be offered as collateral. Respondent assured
complainant that she would work out the speedy processing and release of the loan.
Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent
her the sum of ₱27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was
released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent who would handle the
preparation of documents for the loan and follow-up the same, and complainant gave
respondent the authority for this purpose. From time to time, complainant inquired about the
application for the loan, but respondent always assured her that she was still preparing the
documents required by the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not bother to
check on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle speedily the
preparation of her application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her
apartment was already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed
on her property, which she later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who
bought her property from Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted respondent
about what she discovered, but respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After
verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale was
acknowledged.3 Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., through its Managing Partner, Estrella D.
Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd., and that she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before
respondent to acknowledge the sale. She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her
property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as
the instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign any deed
selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her
law office, and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients.
Respondent denied that she suggested that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank
to construct townhouses. She said that it was the complainant, on the contrary, who requested
her (respondent) to look for somebody who could help her raise the money she needed to
complete the amortization of her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS and was about
to be foreclosed. Respondent stated that she was the one who introduced complainant to the
Spouses Kraus when they were both in her office. In the course of their conversation,
complainant offered the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The
Spouses Kraus were interested, and got the telephone number of complainant. Thereafter,
complainant told respondent that she accompanied the Spouses Kraus to the site of her
property and the Office of the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the Spouses Kraus
called up respondent to tell her that they had reached an agreement with complainant, and
they requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale in favor of their company, Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to respondent's
office where complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven Thousand
Pesos (₱67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took hold
of the Deed of Sale, as the understanding was that the complainant would, in the meantime,
work for the release of the mortgage, and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title,
together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses Kraus who would then pay complainant the
balance of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told respondent that she would inform
respondent when the transaction was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded
in the Notarial Book. Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of what
transpired between complainant and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she was
never entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her property in Marikina (TCT No. N-
61244). Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property in favor of
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years
to verify what happened to her property only meant that she had actually sold the same, and
that she concocted her story when she saw the prospect of her property had she held on to it.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and
affirming the veracity of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be
scheduled by the Commission on Bar Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for
its initial hearing, and hearings were conducted from March 21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for
the reception of respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their
postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence,8 which was opposed by
complainant. The Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright
dismissal of the complaint, and directed respondent to present her evidence on October 24,
2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in
the name of complainant and the issuance of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.
However, the Register of Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing held on
July 29, 2003, respondent's counsel presented a certification 10 from Records Officer Ma.
Corazon Gaspar of the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a copy
of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita C. Peña in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
covering a parcel of land in Marikina, could not be located from the general file of the registry
and that the same may be considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On February 17,
2005, respondent was directed by the Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her
evidence and to submit her memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the
IBP on the ground that the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila,
Branch 36, which estafa case was anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had
been dismissed in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The
RTC held that the case for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C.
Paterno, respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, considering the absence of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof
that would show that Anita Peña's signature therein was forged and the transfer of the land
was made through fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and
preponderant evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Peña; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus
and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and
(c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP,
submitted his Report and Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed
upon her by complainant by executing a bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with
complainant's certificate of title, and that respondent also notarized the spurious deed of sale.
Commissioner Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that respondent actively
conspired with any party or actively participated in the forgery of the signature of complainant.
Nevertheless, Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence supports the
conclusion that her signature on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search
in the National Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Commissioner Sordan stated that the interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her
witness, Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the owner's duplicate certificate of title
was delivered to respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to respondent's
denial that complainant handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November
1986 at the GSIS, as Maura Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as Records
Processor at the GSIS, testified that she saw complainant give the said title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave
respondent her owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the
same as collateral in constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of
respondent for seven years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused
to return it.14 Yet, respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner. 15 Later,
complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her property in January 1994, eight
years after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that
after eight years, complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan application
nor visited her property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant explained
that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank required the submission of her title in order
to process her loan application.16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's
land to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No.
61244 with respect to the sale of the property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd. for ₱200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her
presence inside her office.19 However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if,
indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct examination,20 but on cross-examination, she
stated that she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale.21 Estrella
Kraus' affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing
by complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of
the said Deed. However, Commissioner Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he
affirmed that his participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere recording, but he
later affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. 23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's
testimony that she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's
deception. Respondent's notarization of the disputed deed of sale showed her active role to
perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed
to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party,
Anita Peña, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person
did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having
failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable
for violation of her oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), 24 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 125 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law
and her name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that
the notarial commission of respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be
perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464,
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C.
Paterno is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial commission if still existing is Revoked with
Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment as a Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the
sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed
of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. 26 Section 5,27 in relation to
Sections 128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the
continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of
evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. An
administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein,
based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. 33 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony
that she gave respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as
respondent would apply for a bank loan in complainant's behalf, using the subject property as
collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in
complainant's office at the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw
complainant give her title to respondent.35 Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she
executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was
notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in complainant's title, TCT No.
N-61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of the
complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her
allegation that her signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by
facilitating the sale of the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's
approval. However, complainant proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of November
1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall
keep a notarial register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature
of each instrument executed, among others, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall
keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in said records a
brief description of the substance thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy
of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of
the month next following or the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled,
to the proper clerk of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification, 41 dated February
22, 1994, stating that respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila
for the year 1986, and that respondent has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her
Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As
notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
not also be found in the National Archives per the certification 42 of the Archives Division Chief Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:
Teresita R. Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as
notary public to submit her notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause for revocation of her respect for law and for legal processes.
commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public
are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
public policy and impressed with public interest.44
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended
lessening confidence in the legal system.
for any deceit or dishonest act, thus:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party discredit of the legal profession.1âwphi1
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law,
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of Professional Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still
the certificate of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who existing, is perpetually REVOKED.
admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or signed,
the important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's signature on the Deed of Sale Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale could respondent's personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
not be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be located in the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
general files of the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be
considered lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from
Manila her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.
which was executed on November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan
opined that it appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale
to prevent complainant from getting hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting
verification from an expert to prove that her alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged.
The failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial
Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was
notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching implications and grave consequences, as
it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed the
deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her
testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of
records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny that she notarized the said
Deed of Sale.
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN
R. DE VERA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint 1 for the alleged betrayal of
trust, incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera
(Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy
of MariecrisUmaguing (Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing
(complainants), for the SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC.
CASE No. 07-1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the
SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1)
vote.3 Because of this, complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the
services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty.
De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance
fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of P30,000.00. 4 According to the
complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the
case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the
preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest.
Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark
Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was personally
prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed
to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To
remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and
Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and
Almera and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and
Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen,
respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty.
DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the
signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit, 9 declaring that
he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit
was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo
(Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified.
Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this
error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among
others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that
such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to
have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election
protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were
falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty.
De Vera did not appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain
December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer any explanation as to why he was
not able to attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation
regarding his non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was
hesitant in handling the particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge
Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the
defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision
for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the
complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge
Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and
competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the
complainants asked the former to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them
the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering that he only
appeared twice for the case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s
disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations
lodged against him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the
essential documents for election protest based on the statements of his
clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing of Lachica’s falsified
Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was Christina
Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense.
He added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the
aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw
the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could no longer
serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned
signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case. 18 To add, he pointed
out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants
executed a document entitled “Release Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him,
discharges him and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may
have against him, including the instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted
for report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP
Commissioner found the administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus
recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera
participated in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled
oppositely with respect to the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty.
De Vera deliberately omitted to comment on. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting
that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the affidavit, and her
vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing, and that Lalong-
Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was found to be credible
as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the
backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits
was done on November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the
election protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence,
his resort to the odious act of advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and
Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the affiants for and in their behalf in his
earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the election protest. 23 To
this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP
resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly
submitting a falsified document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed
against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution27 dated February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December
14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension from two (2) months to
one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held
administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly
substantiated by the records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period
of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts,
every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy.
These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical
burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full
expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon
admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but
also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to
the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.
Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of
law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.”
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete
agreement with the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP
Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a
falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the
November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the
Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa
Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that nothing appears on record to
seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that the IBP and its
officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during disciplinary
proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to first-
hand observe their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera
authorized the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the
absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion for
Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution dated December 14,
2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he
only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but
another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire
life,31 and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned
documents, much less of the participation in using the same. 32 Unfortunately for
Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere general denial which cannot
overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed participated in
the procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of
the claim of falsification.
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its
recommendation – is that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the
election protest case. The belated retraction of the questioned affidavits, through
the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit
significant consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought,
prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly
improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity
of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty
requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the
law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate
preparation34 or allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned
“Release Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed
to have discharged him from all causes of action that complainants may have
against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court its power to
sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified
document before a court.
As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte),
suspended the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing
a spurious document in court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court
finds it appropriate to impose the same here.
Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the
amount of P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other
legal expenses intrinsically related to his professional engagement, 41 for he had
actually admitted his receipt thereof in his Answer before the
IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation
in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is
granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the
Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as
members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including
adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the
privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the
Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is
found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6)
months from the practice of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a
stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished more
severely.
Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and
Amelia Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly received from
the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety
(90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing
directive will warrant the imposition of further administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10537 February 3, 2015
REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of
their clients. Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without
need for reminders. The privilege of the office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to
their client that they will manage the case as if it were their own. The relationship between an
attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot be disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the
lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked by an acquaintance. The
professional relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by
counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro bono.
Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal,
terminating the case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it
appear that the case was dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant’s
Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client.
This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section
12 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.
In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013. In its
delegated capacity to conduct fact finding for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo
had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.4 Consequently, the Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.5
In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he
engaged Atty. Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled
"Spouses Roque v. Ramirez."7 The case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.8
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral
from a friend of Ramirez’s sister.9 He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services
on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of
attorney’s fees.10 It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo ₱1,000.00
per court appearance.11
On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to
Ramirez.12 Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal
before the Court of Appeals.13
The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in
2008.14 On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s
Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared. 15
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief.
Atty. Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for
the brief.16
On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there
was still no word from the Court of Appeals.17
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. 18 She
told him that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation
with his alleged father, which was the basis of his claim.19 She also informed him that they
could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been
promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed. 20
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed
on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the
reglementary period.21
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility.22 By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued
that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense of ₱1,000.00 per
hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they
only had a 50% chance of winning the case.23 She denied ever having entered into an
agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the
controversy.
Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of
Ramirez had begged her to do so.24 She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her
for document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March
2009, he merely told her that he had been busy.25 Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of
the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because
her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her contacts. 26
Mandatory conference and findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.27 Only Ramirez appeared
despite Atty. Margallo having received notice.28 The mandatory conference was reset to July
22, 2010. Both parties then appeared and were directed to submit their position
papers.29 Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be
reprimanded for her actions and be given a stern warning that her next infraction of a similar
nature shall be dealt with more severely.30 This was based on his two key findings. First, Atty.
Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing an Appellant’s Brief to lapse by assuming
that Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means possible to
protect the interest of her client.31 Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as
counsel, resulting in the loss of Ramirez’s statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of
Appeals.32
In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with
a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013. 34 In the Resolution
dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirez’s Motion for Reconsideration
and increased the recommended penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2) years. 35
On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of
the Rules of Court.36 She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe
considering that she had been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client.
She also averred that this was the first time a Complaint was filed against her. 37 Ramirez
thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration previously filed with
the Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallo’s Petition for Review. 38 In
the Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirez’s Motion. Atty. Margallo
filed her Reply40 on October 6, 2014.
This court’s ruling
The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and
confidence."41 Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in
managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice,
but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by
either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal proficiency and
attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent
litigant.42
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
clearly provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify
his absence in a scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted
for resolution. This was aggravated by the lawyer’s failure to inform his client about the adverse
ruling of the Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the litigant from further pursuing an Appeal.
This court found that these actions amounted to gross negligence tantamount to breaching
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily,
a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free.
....
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or
the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.
While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per
se a violation.44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.
The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client
was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant
Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned
not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to
act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that
complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There
was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that
she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty.
Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which
is contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons,
she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their
authority or power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is
information assymetry between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts
and events that the agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal.
This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney client relationship. Lawyers
are expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their
relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is
not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the relevant legal
provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies
of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of
appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.
Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between
the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and
remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually
does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers
the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses.
In some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the
client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence.
Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that
it is her first infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we observed:
court to protect his legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant
Ramirez who relied on her alleged competence as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time
that we communicate that lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted to them. There
should be no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.46 Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. Its recommended
penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty of
two-year suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of
professionalism of our lawyers. This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties
imposed in order to address a current need in the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical standard for its members' conduct is laudable.
The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of candor is reprehensible.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is
ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. This decision is immediately
executory. SO ORDERED.

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable
for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a
period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found
guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F.
Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the
pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer
who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of
the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence,
the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly
suspends him for a period of six (6) months.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other
hand, respondent Atty. Margallo’s neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in
A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015 The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano
[Formerly CBD 09-2555] Turla,13 which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos
drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.15
ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,
vs. In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
x-----------------------x
ATTY. CARINGAL
A.C. No. 10584
[Formerly CBD 10-2827] ....

ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant, Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,]
vs. since she was about four years old.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
A : Yes, sir.
RESOLUTION
Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the
LEONEN, J.: plaintiff, isn’t it?

These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her
Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. cousins.

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter- ....
Complaint4 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action. 5
Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified
THE WITNESS
by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she
died in 1990.6
: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication7 executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the THE COURT
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:
: What’s the name of the mother?
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate
of said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her ATTY. CARINGAL
estate.9 (Emphasis in the original underscoring supplied)
: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano
Turla,10 filed a Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
temporary restraining order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.12
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir. Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly
notarized on or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book
Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla,
isn’t it? number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to
the document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the
A : Of course. defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal
heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any
Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness. descendant, ascendant or any other heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular
provision that you have drafted into this document . . . true or false?
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you
ATTY. REY SANTOS
requested to be marked as Exhibit B.

: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn
THE COURT
the legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was
only the wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and
: Exhibit? that has been the subject of my continuing objection from the very beginning.

ATTY. CARINGAL THE COURT

: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial : But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned opened the floodgate to . . . questions on this document.
from you as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
THE WITNESS
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano
: Yes, sir. Turla, your Honor. That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said
documents, your Honor.
Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial.
THE COURT
A : Yes, sir.
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.
: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics
because it is not the issue in this case. ATTY. CARINGAL

.... : What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]

ATTY. CARINGAL ATTY. REY SANTOS

....
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and
impertinency and relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.
THE COURT
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent
with the ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?
THE WITNESS
: No, that is not true.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have
drafted a document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,]
ten or five years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu 17 she is entitled
[sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko
pababayaan yan". So, he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic]properties for himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty.
Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty.
Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.21 He also
alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims
of Mariano Turla.22
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead
Man’s Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before
the death of his deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information
acquired during his professional relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach
of trust . . . or of privileged communication[.]"24
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s
estate.26 In other words, he engaged in forum shopping.27
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit
states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be
false.29 Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece.30 As part of the family, Atty.
Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago,
he is fully aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn
Batac Santos was then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes
due. There is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a husband and wife team where the
lawyer makes the document while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the
payment of the taxes due the government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit
of Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant,
xxx, or any other heir entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . . [.] 32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit
that Rufina Turla had no other heir.33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for
his own benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that
were supposed to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental
income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the
Civil Code in his arguments.35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He explained that
the death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla
and that he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate. 38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and
was not representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead. 39 Further, "he
[was] representing Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s
estate."40 Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that there was no other
legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum
shopping because the various cases filed had different issues.42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by
his client as the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43 According to Atty.
Santos, payment of attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds could be considered as "expenses
of administration."44 Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal services was a matter which Atty.
Caringal had no standing to question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article
262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate
was registered.46
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death
certificate was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from
Mariano Turla’s estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated
that the evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed
law."50 Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved
different parties and prayed for different reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that
Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. 52 The Report and
Recommendation53 of the Commission on Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically
proscribes members of the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has
explained that "the proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable
however slight such adverse interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or
merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The
respondent has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand
admitted that he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that
he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s
daughter. To substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent
admitted that he relied on the birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that
she is not only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth
Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that Marilu
Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was deprived of the same
because of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is
his wife’s sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself
in a position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he
is the only heir of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 56 which was denied by the IBP Board
of Governors in the Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July
15, 2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from
the practice of law is proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution.
However, this court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law
from three (3) months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order
to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case. 59 In Hornilla v. Atty.
Salunat,60 this court explained what conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily
refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent
Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report
of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the
Civil Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted
as follows: "I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is
entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi
ko pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself." This very admission proves that the respondent
was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s
estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform
Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written
consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March
2009.65 It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent.
Still, respondent did not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he
previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent was sufficiently
proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent violated
Canon 10, Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds
that the respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of
Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to
the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the
bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing
to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath
but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers
are expected to be honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from being
honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s
request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10,
2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that
has the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987
Constitution: ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s "plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys"70 and discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court
and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and
guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority
to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to
the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite
apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also
an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.71 (Citations omitted)
This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:
RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.73 Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court.
Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.74
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person." However, this authority
is only to assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and
to recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.
We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest
and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing."76 (Citations omitted)
Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary
authority is granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court. 77 The
Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its
findings and recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions
rendered by this court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of
violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The findings of fact and recommendations of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and
ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO,
ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY.
RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED
RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009
filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V.
Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ),
Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela
(Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica),
and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of
which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and
Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases 2 where he was impleaded as
respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant.
The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties. 3
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and
his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain
Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same
law office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this
disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR,5 to wit:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their
association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements."
According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance
of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing,
and the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive
his own professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with
the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively.
Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They
averred that complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela
and not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed
by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of
complainant’s labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof.8 Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant’s labor cases
but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008, 9 and that complainant did not have any
monthly retainer contract.10 He likewise explained that he did not see the need to discuss
complainant’s labor cases with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple,11 and
that the latter did not confide any secret during the time the labor cases were pending that
would have been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the other
lawyers were not aware of the details of complainant’s labor cases nor did they know that he
was the handling counsel for complainant even after the said cases were closed and
terminated.12 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found
respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be
reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17,
2010.14 The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the
respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there
was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having been
retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified
theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. 15
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty
of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors
granted in its Resolution18 dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12,
2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents for violation of the rule
on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and (3)
suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel of
complainant’s labor cases.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client."
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.20
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of
a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste.21 In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that respondents represented
conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’
law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against
him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE
Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client,
and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical acceptance of the criminal case
arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to
keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring
that every engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As an
organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to
a corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference
to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in
this case, intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse
exposure, eroding in the balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired
trust and confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela
included, would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the firm to
decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming, herein
respondents, as the charged members of the law firm, ought to be administratively sanctioned.
Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should suffer the greater
penalty of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law
firm’s deficient organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had
been violated. As such, all of them are meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the
fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination
of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse
to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not
be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.22
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia,
Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred
Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore
REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip
Dabao is DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE
PEÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed
(complainant) against Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and
grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with
dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the
Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint
filed by respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by
complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate
to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed
by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.
Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a
copy of the free patent covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but
respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. Complainant claimed that
she could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She further
claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To support such
claim, complainant presented Certifications from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly
confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he
represented the occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family, who
previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of
donation respondent notarized.
Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client
in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor. Complainant narrated the
outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."
LA
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the
accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate
Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of
Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and received
salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.
In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the
charges against him. Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he
used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon Chairman, the
late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the
records in Civil Case No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to
complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not furnished, respondent
wondered why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.
Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the
case filed against the occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the
matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be addressed
to Judge Asis himself.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of
dismissal from the service, respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of
Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College
of Law, which is a government institution. However, respondent countered that he
was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this issue had
become moot. Respondent further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean
was only temporary, and he had not received any salary except honorarium.
Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there
were no objections, he proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant thereto.
He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the
administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for
judicial clemency filed before this Court.
Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a
Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20 February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the
Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these submissions basically reiterated
the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's
allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the IBP
The Ruling of the Court
In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in his Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described complainant's counsel
as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before Using foul language in pleadings
the wife of that married man died." According to the IBP Commissioner, such
offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and
that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court." complexion"10 and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x
before the wife of that married man died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent
With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to
Commissioner found that respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative
numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1)
for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint filed by We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is
complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While respondent is entitled and very much
respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper
free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and (3) for accepting the positions of stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
prohibition on reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
as a judge. convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from
practice of law for one year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers
IBP Commissioner's recommendation. The Resolution reads: language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137 For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of
Adm. Case No. 7594
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and Non-submission of certificate to file action
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation
misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice between the parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint
of law for one (1) year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no such certificate in the complaint filed
by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent
The Issue
submitted was the certificate to file action in the complaint filed by complainant's
brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for
Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x
x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118
was filed with the RTC on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which
respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-
1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October
2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the
complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to
respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was
brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was
issued prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that
he filed a certificate to file action when there was none, which act violated Canon
10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel
with a copy of the free patent title, we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.
Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which
means that a copy of the title exists. There is no showing that respondent
deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The
remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion
to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and her counsel
could examine the same.
Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a
question of fact demanding an examination of the parties' respective evidence.
Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this administrative case, absent
any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such
fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove that
respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT
No. 1730 does not exist in their official records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Conflict of interest
Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly
notarized a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by complainant's family
in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to
litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants in the lot owned by
complainant's family.
Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public
simply performs the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice,
namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings,
and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act
of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with
Judge Asis and conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to
respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any proof. Complainant
simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and
973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC.
Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete evidence proving her
grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover,
charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed
against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the
judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office
In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of
Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his
dismissal as a judge, one of which is the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified,
respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College
of Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.
Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary
was attached to his designation except for honorarium." Respondent also claims
that he furnished a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court." He further avers lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
that complainant in the administrative case against him (as a judge) posed no for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
objection to his petition for clemency. law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's
not distinguish between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.
designation was only temporary does not absolve him from liability. Further,
furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross
way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a government
misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2)
office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case years with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall
did not object to his petition for clemency.
be dealt with more severely.
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
respondent should have declined from accepting the designation and desisted from
Office of the Bar Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for their information
performing the functions of such positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied
and guidance.
the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the Court.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court
when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order," the
Court held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross
misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or
even disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he

submitted a certificate to file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in
fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil action of his client, Fortunato
Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his pleadings;
and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on reemployment in any
government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross
misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful
in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards
his client in which the former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and
skill sufficient for the engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney
fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during his
professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos
(respondent) with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of
P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having
performed the contemplated professional services. She avers that in March 2005,
she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment
of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the
respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the
appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial amount
of P90,000.00;1 that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the
developments in her case, but he told her that he would only start working on the
case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only learned then
that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation,
not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would
have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage; 2 that she
subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the
amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already started
working on the case;3 that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C.
Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount
corresponded to the legal services he had already performed; 4 that the respondent
did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable
legal services to her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts
prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him 6 in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the complainant
and her British fiancee sought his legal services to bring the petition for the
annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of her situation, the more
appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the psychological
incapacity of her husband; that she and her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00
for his legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with the fiancee paying
him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt;8 that for purposes of the
petition for legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of her
marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as
well as for her to submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for
legal separation; that he later on communicated with her and her fiancee upon
finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly respond to his communications;
that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the money that her
fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June
2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal
separation essentially requesting him not to file the petition because she had
meanwhile opted to bring the action for the annulment of her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but
states that he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand
lacked basis in law. It is noted that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated
May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15
August 2005 (Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have
been addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ,
who unskillfully relied on an unverified information furnished him, to the urinal
project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful
purpose.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a
mandatory conference on August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and her
counsel attended the conference. On his part, the respondent sent a letter dated
July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer.11 Due to his non-appearance,
the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the same day, but required the
complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days. She did not submit
the position paper in the end.
In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence
that he could have brought a petition for legal separation based on the
psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable because
he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation;
that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled
to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee,
the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered under the principle
of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the
amount of P30,000.00.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's
statement in the last part of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent
by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant should be treated as a scrap of
paper, or should have been addressed "to the urinal project of the MMDA where it
may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he opined that
such offensive and improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow
lawyer violated Rule 8.0113 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following:
(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of
P30,000.00 which he received for the purpose of preparing a petition for
legal separation. Undersigned believes that considering the degree of
professional services he has extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he
received on March 10, 2005 would be sufficient payment for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and
annulment of marriage, respondent should be sanctioned.
(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his
colleagues and for using offensive or improper language in his pleading,
which was filed right before the Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also
be sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid repetition of the said
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the
amount of P30,000.00 which the former received as payment for his services
because it is excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for failure to show his respect to his
fellow lawyer and for using offensive and improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008,14 the IBP
Board of Governors affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La
Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation of the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's
failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and improper
words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered
to Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant within thirty
(30) days from receipt of notice.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of
Governors denied through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014.17
Issues
The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the
respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether
or not he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-
177, but modify the recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return
the entire amount received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the
requisite professional competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment
of marriage for her. He required her to pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees,
exclusive of the filing fees and his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of that
amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the
complainant as his client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings
by IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between
the respondent and the complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an
attorney-client relationship. The respondent agreed to accept the case in the
amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon to be paid on (d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six
installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of appearance fee, years, even if pardoned;
filing fee and other legal documentation.
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it
intended for the filing of the annulment case or legal separation? (f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as (g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in
to what action he is going to file in court. The intention of the British national and or outside the Philippines;
the complainant was to get married. At that time and maybe up to now, the
complainant is still legally married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez. That (h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
considering that the two are intending to get married, we can safely assume that
the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of marriage (i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or
in order to free her from the marriage bond with her husband. It is only then,
granting that the petition will be granted, that the complainant will be free to marry (j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
the British subject. The legal separation is but a separation of husband and wife than one year.
from board and bed and the marriage bond still exists. Granting that the petition Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the
for legal separation will be granted, one is not free to marry another person.
complainant, is not one of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal
separation.
A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is not
well versed in the grounds for legal separation. He stated the following; Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the
never a ground for the purpose of filing a petition for legal separation.
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital
obligations developed or of their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose
of the Answer).
of filing a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC,
the grounds are as follows: That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a marriage
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
Sec. 2. Petition- incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only solemnization."
by the husband or the wife, as the case may be, within five years from the time of
the occurrence of any of the following causes: That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in
continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of advise that respondent
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish
between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of marriage.
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious But as the respondent stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the
or political affiliation; basic provisions of the law.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or
the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction
a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption
between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such
or inducement;
knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a
professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client
initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved.
The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services
was engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the complainant's
marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They
did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render
her incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that
he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as
attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore,
beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his
claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an
attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows
or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel
a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree
that every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his
client. As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and
serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for
such services.19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between
the client and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as
long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public
order.20 The underlying theory is that the retainer's agreement between them gives
to the client the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees. Once the
attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his
compensation is determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed. 21 In the
absence of the written agreement, the lawyer's compensation shall be based
on quantum meruit, which means "as much as he deserved."22 The determination
of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the
counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its
conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of
compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate
that it will be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all
compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable
compensation based on the obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney
does not receive more than what is reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
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Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to
be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is
not only for the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's
fees charged, but also for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the
legal profession.25cralawred
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later
revealed, it was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for
annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount
as attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to perform the
contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was improbable
that the agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having
supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for
annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or
his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount
he had already received.
The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received
P70,000.00 as acceptance fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant
rested on his claim of having already completed the first phase of the preparation
of the petition for legal separation after having held conferences with the
complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP Investigating Commission
De la Rama, Jr. opined that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the
P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered some legal services to the
complainant, specifically: (a) having the complainant undergo further interviews
towards establishing the ground for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the
grounds discussed during the interviews based on her statement in her own dialect
(Annexes 1 and 2) after he could not understand the written statement prepared
for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c) requiring her to submit her marriage
contract with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates of
live birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all
surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal
separation (Annex 8) in the later part of April, 2007.
The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the
respondent was too generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any
compensation because he did not really begin to perform the contemplated tasks
if, even based on his version, he would prepare the petition for legal separation
instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to
accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his
professional engagement does not discharge his professional responsibility and
ethical duty toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and
may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence,
he may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from the latter in
consideration of the professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum
meruit, if warranted.
Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his
misrepresentation of his professional competence, and he is further to be ordered
to return the entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full
payment.
2.
Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleague
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically
demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has
necessitated lawyers to use strong language in the advancement of the interest of
their clients.27 However, as members of a noble profession, lawyers are always
impressed with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to
represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that should not be
used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in his
pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his
duty as an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect
not only towards his clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his
colleagues in the Legal Profession.
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez
should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful
purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and
improper language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for
and improper. He explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the
demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper and should be
disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the offensiveness and
impropriety of his language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in
responding to the letter.
As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning
that a repetition of the offense will be severely punished.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated
September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors,
with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is
hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the
client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language
towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense
shall be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within
thirty (30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.
Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos as a member of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country. of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346. 12 In a
SO ORDERED. Decision13 dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On April
16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory. 14
A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009,
ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent. complainant filed this administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
RESOLUTION
In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: complainant, as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed the latter that there
were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the check. Respondent claimed that
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for disbarment by he merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose favor he
reason of dishonesty and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally benefit from the proceeds
Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent Atty. Orlando S. thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no means by
Paulma (respondent). which to pay for the amount of the check. 17 He also claimed that complainant
threatened him and used his unfunded check to the latter's personal advantage. 18
The Facts
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011, 19 referred this
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its
a check in the amount of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because of investigation, report, and recommendation.
respondent's standing as a respected member of the community and his being a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of The IBP's Report and Recommendation
Iloilo, complainant accepted the check without question.3
After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due of the IBP issued a Report and Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013,
to insufficient fluids. Respondent failed to make good the amount of the check recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting complainant to file a of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 224 against Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving
respondent,5 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo, moral turpitude.21
docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006
recommending the filing of the appropriate information against respondent before It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation
the Municipal Trial Court of Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC). 8 Subsequently, said of BP 22, involved moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the
information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604. 9 CPR when he committed the said offense. Stressing the importance of the lawyer's
oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime, respondent has shown
After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision 10 dated October 30, 2008 that he is "unfit to protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of
finding respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount good moral character"22 which justifies either his suspension or disbarment.23
of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay.
Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00 representing the Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice
amount of the check with interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per of Resolution24 adopting and approving with modification the IBP's Report and
annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint; (2) filing fees in the Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from the practice
amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus of law for a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the
appearance fees of P1,500.00 per hearing.11 CPR, as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral
turpitude.25cralawred
Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court
The Issue Before the Court Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes
administratively disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude. a ground for disciplinary action.30

The Court's Ruling In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude,
had been indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final.
The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
and modified by the IBP Board of Governors. CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary a period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,32 the same penalty was
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for two (2) years to respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions.
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34 respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, Or for corruptly or willfully for a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of his debts, respondent also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its
brokers, constitutes malpractice. proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was
suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same violation, the Court finds it appropriate
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and
to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.
promote respect for law x x x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's
As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a
oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the
privilege burdened with conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful
orderly administration of justice.26 As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his
of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. 36 Any transgression of
professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the
this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode
court.27cralawred
the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole.37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he must
In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22
suffer the necessary consequences.chanrobleslaw
in relation to an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He
legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished
is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the Office of
designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of
the Bar Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
x x x x

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he
did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22,
and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest
and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support
the Constitution and obey the laws.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL
CENTER, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDWIN A.
PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case against the respondent attorney did not arise from any
attorney-client relationship gone wrong between the parties but from the
ejectment action in which the respondent attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully
defeated the local congregation of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc.,
Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other structures were the
objects of the action. After the defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties
agreed to settle among themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the notice of
appeal and agreeing to voluntarily vacate and remove their structures by August
31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00.
But, despite receiving the respondent's financial assistance, the defendants
reneged on their end of the agreement; hence, at the respondent's instance, the
trial court issued the writ of execution and the writ of demolition, by virtue of which
the structures of the defendants were ultimately demolished.
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A.
Pante (Pante), to bring the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on
his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in causing the demolition of the
structures without the demolition order from the court, violation of the Lawyer's
Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that he thereby
abused his legal knowledge.
Antecedents
Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church building on the land located
in JE 176 Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had
bought it from Larry Ogas;1 that on June 11, 2012, Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked
received the summons issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad,
Benguet requiring them to answer the complaint for unlawful detainer filed against
them by the respondent; that based on the allegations of the complaint (docketed
as Civil Case No. R-1256 entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino Omiles
and all persons staying with and/or acting on her behalf, including all Officers
and/or patrons of the Church of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines,
represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent claimed ownership of the
land where the church of the CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Benguet, and the deed of absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro
Loy;2 that the MTC later on decided the case by declaring the respondent to have
the better right of possession; and that the MTC further declared that the CSP-PLC
was a builder in good faith, without prejudice to the respondent exercising his
option to appropriate the building in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil Code.3
As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and obtained the writ of execution
from the MTC after the defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the
promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the premises by August 31, 2013 in
consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. The writ of
execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the writ of demolition on
December 19, 2013. Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla,
accompanied by the respondent and elements of the Philippine National Police,
implemented the writ of execution and writ of demolition on January 22 and
January 23, 2014 by demolishing the church building and the pastoral house of the
CSP-PLC.4
Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a demolition order from
the MTC; that the dismantled materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken
away by the respondent, who had taken advantage of his legal knowledge to cause
the premature demolition of the structures sans the demolition order; that such
taking away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and malicious
mischief; and that his act warranted his disbarment.
In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He counters that the
demolition was backed up by a court order;5 that after receiving the decision of the
MTC, the parties entered into a compromise agreement by virtue of which the CSP-
PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and surrender the
disputed premises in consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by him;6 that despite
his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the premises even within
the grace period given to them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the
judgment, and his motion was granted by the MTC;8 that the sheriffs report dated
November 21, 20139 stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply with the writ of
execution to remove or demolish its structures on the premises; that he
consequently sought from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC issued
the writ of demolition.10
The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs who implemented the writ
of demolition; that the sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the
conduct of the implementation was peaceful, and that Pante and the other
members of the church personally observed the conduct of the demolition; and
that the sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no defiance of the lawful
order of the court.11
The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in his appropriating the
dismantled materials to ensure compensation for the expenses incurred in the
demolition; and that the complaint for his disbarment should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as follows:
Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate
and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government service. Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals
and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with
the Supreme Court; Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and
Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment in the
Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP
or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the
IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter
No. 1960, May 1, 2000.)
Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of an attorney may be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP
itself upon the verified complaint of any person.
Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the
Court, the complaint is referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. The reference to the IBP is resorted to whenever the factual basis
for the charge may be contested or disputed, or may require the reception of the
evidence of the complainant and the respondent attorney. After the referral and
hearings, the IBP renders its findings and recommendations on the complaint,
subject to the review by the Court.12 Yet, the Court may dispense with the referral
to the IBP and resolve the charge without delay. This happens particularly when
the charge is patently frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only to
harass and spite the respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of
administrative complaints against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the
guardian of the legal profession with the ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys.
The disciplinary power of the Court is both a right and a duty. 13 Quite recently,
however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B14 to eliminate any ambiguity about the
authority of the Court to directly receive administrative complaints against
attorneys, thus:
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon
the filing of a verified complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall state clearly and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents
as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all
complaints for disbarment, suspension and discipline filed against incumbent
Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and judges
of lower courts, or against lawyers in the government service, whether or not they
are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and whether or not such
complaint deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions. If
the complaint is filed before the IBP. six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall
be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who
shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to
an investigator.
x x x x
B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings initiated by the Supreme
Court, or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court,
in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in
sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
 Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent
The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, of taking away the materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end
and recommendation, [bold emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions] to their dispute by the defendants, including the complainant and Pante, opting to
withdraw their notice of appeal and undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to
peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by August 31, 2013 in
Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against
exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent
attorneys are generally not dismissed outright but are instead referred for
investigation, report and recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of the paid the amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on
received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles, Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the
Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the Court or even a judge of a lower court.
representatives of the CSP-PLC on the same day.19 But the latter reneged on their
Such referral ensures that the parties' right to due process is respected as to
part of the agreement without returning the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who
matters that require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by the mere
evaluation of the documents attached to the pleadings.15 Consequently, whenever was left to exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the judgment against them. It is
notable that the judgment expressly directed him "to exercise his option pursuant
the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or other authorized office or
to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines within thirty
individual must conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint,
and this investigation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the improvements introduced
by the defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448 of the Civil Code granted
except for valid and compelling reasons because it serves the purpose of threshing
to him as the owner of the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as
out all the factual issues that no cursory evaluation of the pleadings can
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
determine.16
for in articles 546 and 548." His act of taking the materials of the demolished
structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating them in light
However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case
of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance was most
can be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the
referral to the IBP for the conduct of formal investigation would be redundant or likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.
unnecessary, such as when the protraction of the investigation equates to undue
The respondent has called attention to the letter of the Christian Spiritists in the
delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed at the outset should the Court
Philippines, Inc.,21 the mother organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the
find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit.17 Indeed, the Rules of
Court should not be read as preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such effect that it was disavowing knowledge of or participation in the disbarment
complaint, and that it was categorically declaring that the complaint had been filed
speedy relief is warranted.
by Pante only for his personal interest at the expense of the congregation. The
sentiments expressed in the letter manifested the inanity of the complaint, and the
It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the
respondent to the IBP for the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents ill motives behind Pante's filing of the complaint against the respondent. The proper
outcome for such a complaint is its immediate dismissal.
he submitted to substantiate his denial of professional wrongdoing are part of the
records of the trial court, and, as such, are sufficient to establish the unworthiness
of the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the demolition of the structures WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Daniel Dazon Mangallay for its utter lack of merit.
of the defendants in Civil Case No. R-1256.
SO ORDERED.
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on
December 19, 2013.18 In the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil
Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully discharged their functions. The presence of
the respondent during the execution proceedings was by no means irregular or
improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The complainant was
then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation, who did
not manifest any resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the
execution. After all, elements of the Philippine National Police were also present to
ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ of execution.
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015 Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of
the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation3 dated 14
ADAZA, Respondent. August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the
DECISION Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance
Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007,
respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
CARPIO, J.:
Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January
2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither
The Case applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April
2007 to 14 April 2010.
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for
his failure to comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk
Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850. of Court to furnish respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The
Court likewise required respondent to file his comment within ten days from notice.
The Antecedent Facts
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the he did not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that
attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He
for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for
and "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano
2012. Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the MCLE Office about was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law
the status of respondent's compliance and received the following Certification, Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent
dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the
Executive Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw judges and prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the law firm had
control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll
Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had
requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following compliance
been practicing law for about 50 years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x x
a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)
b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007) Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010) Court WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she
took over government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from but I refused the intended appointment because I did not like some members of
the MCLE requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE the Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009 meeting.1
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE canvassing of the results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING
Committee for evaluation, report and recommendation. CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), xxxx
 undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE
SANTIAGO in the national canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when requirements.
she ran for President against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was
former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS; In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and
Comment to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading recommendation.
generals like ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO
HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
validity of the 2010 national elections, still undecided up to this day; on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request
on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of his
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that according to
constitutionality and legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant
after the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant
the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic; must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise
in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws requirements necessary for the exemption.
as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the
senior member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the Committee on The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate
Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments; in all their pleadings filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent filed a motion
Omnibus Election Law; for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his "MCLE
Application for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that
prepared and orchestrated the debate in the complaint for impeachment against The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12
PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS; of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE
requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out of the
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also reported that under Section 12(d) of
before the Supreme Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply
REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts all over the country; with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to explain
his deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have provides that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall pay a
exemptions from the MCLE; non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE
x x x x6 Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent
to respondent on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013,
the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be filed against respondent in
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From
connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption
Marcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning,
number for the immediately preceding compliance period and that the pleadings
Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona
he filed be expunged from the records.
Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to

The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer.
The OBC stated that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements
jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be
stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the
Bar and guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be
directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure
to comply with the MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal
education "to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of
the practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14
April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007;
and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and
2012 which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements
for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.
2013, which the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013.
The denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a
letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with
Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second
Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not
follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with
his letter dated 7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on
his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the
MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply
with the requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated
in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for reconsideration
of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-
Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of
the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days from receipt of the
notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court,
respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the
country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-
14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the
University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
x x x x

The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the (5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
four compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE
Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First and A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will
Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given
Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or
exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall be written in
requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. capital letters as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for
exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS
from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A
Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE compliance. DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE. filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE
requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward
compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay
a non-compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of
the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP
Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is
still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court
has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with
the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for
exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly
wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that
his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider
the MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his motion for
reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on
28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that
he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period
required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without
even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to
continue practicing law while complying with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's
application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to
inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office only informed
respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received inquiries regarding the status
of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent indicated
"MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was not aware
of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption.
However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption,
it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial
of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time
to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated
"MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the
directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of
the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee
should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a
delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its
administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from
directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent
members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six
months. We agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is
also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice law until such
time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the
IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement,
under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper
to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from
the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied with the
requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on
matters that require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications
for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested parties within a
reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE
compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE
Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully
paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be
also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for their appropriate
actions.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibra
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3989-RTJ), August 26, In the morning of 16 October 2012, the Office of the Clerk of Court received a copy
2015 of the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino, which states that:
An (sic) oral motion of the counsel of the respondents, undersigned judge hereby
ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH, Complainant, v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE MA. ANGELA inhibit (sic) himself from further trying and ruling of this case to avoid any doubt
ACOMPAÑADO-ARROYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY, as to the impartiality of this court.3
CAMARINES SUR, Respondent. In the morning of 16 October 2012 also, the counsel for Spouses Muhlach filed with
MCTC, San Jose-Presentacion an Urgent Omnibus Motion: 1) to inhibit the Judge
DECISION Begino; and 2) to re-raffle and assign the case to another judge.

PEREZ, J.: In the afternoon of the same date, EJ Arroyo issued the assailed order which
rendered ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge Begino. It further directed
This resolves the complaint dated 6 November 2012 filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach Judge Begino to continue to hear and decide the case. EJ Arroyo noted that the
(complainant) charging Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompañado-Arroyo (EJ counsel for Spouses Muhlach's oral motion failed to state'the grounds to justify the
Arroyo), Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Jose City, Camarines Sur with gross inhibition of the judge. It likewise did not explain why doubts as to the impartiality
ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion. of the court could exist.4

ANTECEDENT FACTS
On 5 October 2012, Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and
Ferdinand Fernando Felix Monasterio filed a petition before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur praying for the
exclusion of Ariel and Charlene Mae G. Muhlach (Spouses Muhlach) from the list of
voters of Precinct No. 10A, Brgy. San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur. The case
was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 80.
On even date, Hon. Angel A. Tadeo, MCTC, San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur
voluntarily recused himself from hearing the case on the ground that petitioner
Edgar Malate is a cousin of his late mother-in-law and Francisco Perico-Dazon is
the son-in-law of the his former clerk of court, Florecito V. Patrocinio.1
Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing of the case and on 19 October 2012,
resolved, among others, the 16 October 2012 Urgent Motion to Inhibit filed by
counsel for the Spouses Muhlach. He ruled, thus:
The Court is not convinced of the merit being shown by [Spouses Muhlach] for the
Undersigned Judge (Judge for brevity) to inhibit from hearing and deciding this
case.
The movants miserably failed to show what judicial actuations made by the Judge
which may be perceived that he has already predetermined the facts and issues
involved in this case. If, the judicial actuations they are referring to is in connection
with the Order of the Judge denying their Motion to Dismiss, the same is not
sufficient for a Judge to inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case
considering that the denial was based on law.

Acting on such inhibition, EJ Arroyo scheduled the raffle of the case among judges x x x x
of the first level courts within her administrative jurisdiction to determine who
among them will be assigned to try and decide the case. All told, the [Spouses Muhlach[s] belief that the Judge and his sibling Agnes are
political allies of Mr. Fuentebella is unfounded, untrue and baseless.
The case was eventually raffled to Judge Ricky C. Begino (Judge Begino).
x x x x
In an Order2 dated 12 October 2012, Judge Begino set the case for hearing on 16
October 2012. WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion to Inhibit the Honorable Presiding Judge
Ricky C. Begino and to Re-Raffle and Assign Case to Another Presiding Judge is
On 15 October 2012, Spouses Muhlach filed a motion to dismiss Spec. Procs. No. hereby ordered DENIED. The undersigned Judge will continue to hear and decide
80. this case with the assurance to all parties concerned that he will take his role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.5
Dissatisfied, Spouses Muhlach filed on 23 October 2012 an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Orders dated 17 and 19 October 2012).
In a Decision6 dated 25 October 2012, Judge Begino granted the petition for
exclusion filed by Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and
Ferdinand Fernando Felix Monasterio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition to exclude ARIEL AQUINO
MUHLACH and CHARLENE MAE BONNIN MUHLACH from the list of voters of Precinct
No. 10A Barangay, San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur is hereby GRANTED. The
Election Registration Board is hereby ordered to EXCLUDE THE NAMES OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM THE LIST OF VOTERS OF PRECINCT NO. 10A
BARANGAY SAN JUAN, SAN JOSE, CAMARINES SUR and REMOVE THEIR
REGISTRATION RECORDS FROM THE CORRESPONDING BOOK OF
VOTERS and to ENTER THE ORDER OF EXCLUSION therein; and thereafter,
to PLACE THE RECORDS IN THE INACTIVE FILE, for lack of residency
requirement.7
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against EJ
Arroyo. He accused EJ Arroyo of having issued the Order dated 16 October 2012
with abuse of authority and with gross ignorance of law and procedure.
Complainant contended that EJ Arroyo had no authority to reverse Judge Begino's
order inhibiting himself as such power is vested solely in the Supreme Court.
In her comment,8 EJ Arroyo explained that immediately upon receipt of Judge
Begino's order of inhibition, she noticed that the order, on its face, was improper
or defective. She stressed that the procedure prescribed for the disqualification of
a judge must be substantially followed, citing the resolution of the Supreme Court
dated 31 August 1978 in A.M. No. 2128-JC.9 She averred that she was not ignorant
of Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998 when she issued the
questioned order. Under the cited circular, the duty of the executive judge is to
appoint another trial judge under his/her supervision to handle the inhibited case
or to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court. Considering that the inhibition order
issued by Judge Begino was "patently defective," she saw no point in referring the
same to the Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, for evaluation
"because in the first place, there was nothing for the latter to evaluate."
EJ Arroyo further explained that the subject case is a petition for exclusion of the
names of Spouses Muhlach from the list of voters which should be decided within
ten days from its filing as provided for under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8189. 10 In
view of the status of the Spouses Muhlach, EJ Arroyo claimed that no judge would
want to handle the case. Thus, when she received a copy of Judge Begino's order
of inhibition, she felt that it was her duty as executive judge to ensure that the
case is decided, as much as possible, within the period prescribed under the law.
She reasoned that if she were to approve Judge Begino's inhibition order which, on
its face, was defective, nothing would stop other judges from recusing themselves
from the case on flimsy grounds. She felt that it would result in an endless cycle
leaving the case unresolved.
EJ Arroyo surmised that the complaint was filed for the sole purpose of delaying
the resolution of Spec. Pro. No. 80. She alleged that after Judge Begino decided
the case in favor of the petitioners and ordered the exclusion of Spouses Muhlach
from the voters list, Spouses Muhlach appealed the decision to the RTC. It was
raffled to Branch 40 presided over by Judge Noel Paulite (Judge Paulite) who
eventually rendered a decision affirming the decision of Judge Begino. Spouses
Muhlach thereafter filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Paulite on 13 November
2012, after the instant complaint was filed on 7 November 2012. EJ Arroyo submits
that should Judge Paulite grant the motion for inhibition, a dilemma would arise
because the case would be assigned to Branch 58 where she is the presiding judge,
there being only two branches in RTC San Jose. She claimed that such scenario
would lead her to inhibit from the case because of the administrative complaint
filed against her. Consequently, the case will be referred to the nearest RTC and
raffled among the judges in that jurisdiction. She opined that other delaying tactics
may be employed, and soon, it would already be elections day without the case
having decided.11
Finally, she averred that she had been a judge for 11 years and this is the first
time that an administrative case has been filed against her.
We find the charges of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion bereft of merit.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is set forth in Section 1, Rule
137 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above. (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be
disqualified from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition
of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights,
which requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process, like To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can
a partial and biased judge.12 Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and be infallible in his
preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. judgment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We agree with EJ Arroyo that the inhibition of Judge Begino is lacking in some
elements. Judge Begino simply ruled that he is inhibiting from the case to avoid
any doubts as to the impartiality of the court. Although voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge,
such should still comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules, that is, it should be based on just or valid reasons. In the
subject order, the reason for the inhibition of the judge was not stated. Neither
could it be determined from the motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel since the
motion was done orally, in violation of Section 2 13 of the same rule.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative
complaint filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach against Executive Judge Ma. Angela
Acompafiado-Arroyo, Regional Trial Court, San Jose City, Camarines Sur for
ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was ineffective,
she was in a way, returning the case back to the presiding judge for the latter to
either cure the deficiency or take cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for the
motion. As EJ Arroyo explained, she was aware that she had no authority to revoke
or disapprove the order of inhibition, as such is vested only in the Supreme Court.
It was for that reason that she used the word "ineffective." Tersely put, EJ Arroyo
did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino. She correctly asked that
the Order be completed to comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges.

When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings, it was a manifestation and
admission on his part that he can hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality
expected from an impartial magistrate. His. subsequent ruling on the Urgent
Omnibus Motion filed by counsel for the Spouses Muhlach affirmed EJ Arroyo's
position that the earlier order issued on the basis of the oral motion was defective.
The assailed order of EJ Arroyo was issued in the proper exercise of her
administrative functions.

Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown
to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious.14 Here, it was clearly established that the only intention of EJ Arroyo
was to ensure that the case is decided expeditiously and within the period provided
under the law. There was no showing that she was moved by ill-will or malicious
intention to violate existing Court issuances. In fact, bad faith may be attributed
to the complainant for filing successive motions for inhibition.

While it was pronounced in relation to the performance by judges of their judicial

functions, we find that in the matter of their administrative duties, it can likewise
be said that as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ], January 12, 12 out of the more than 500 members accompanying complainants on that day
2015 were allowed to enter.5 Worse, upon the motion of the Mayor, all the complainants
were escorted out of the courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who was scheduled
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, to give her testimony that day.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F.
BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. Complainants claimed that the questions propounded by respondent to their
TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, witnesses “were all geared towards establishing” that they should have no right to
AND MARIVEL B. ISON, Complaints, v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, oppose the Mayor’s plan, as “this will be good for all and the progress and
JR., BRANCH 45, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE OCCIDENTAL development of the municipality.”7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
MINDORO, Respondent.
After the hearing, respondent issued an open-court Order stating that “the Court
RESOLUTION is not inclined to extend for seventeen (17) days the said
TRO.”8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SERENO, C.J.:
At the next hearing held on 3 July 2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the
courtroom to take a call. He exited through the door used by the judge and the
This is an administrative Complaint1 for gross and serious violations of the Canons employees of the court.9 According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to
of the Code of Judicial Conduct & Judicial Ethics and Section 3(e) of Republic Act anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a
No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, surprise to everyone when respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had to
against Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), excuse himself for an important appointment.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the
Complainants Antonio Ascaño, Jr., Consolacion D. Dantes, Basilisa A. Obalo, Julieta TRO.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
D. Toledo, Joseph Z. Maac, Fidel S. Sarmiento, Sr., Dan T. Taunan, Amalia G.
Santos, Emiliano E. Lumboy, Tita F. Bernardo, Igmedio L. Noguera, Avelina Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent
Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and Marivel B. Ison (collectively, complainants) were “argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without
allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public market of basis or justification.”12 They further claimed that respondent judge asked
Occidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro complainants “confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit
(the Municipality), Jose T. Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly wanted answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their
to demolish the public market, so that the Municipality can use the space to erect adversary.”13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the new “San Jose Commercial Complex.”2 Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants
filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent Application for the Issuance of Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire community of San
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is
against the Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was docketed as Special identified with the causes, friends, and allies of the latter.14 They also alleged that
Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to respondent’s sala. all cases in the RTC before respondent involving Mayor Villarosa or his relatives,
political allies, supporters, and close friends were decided in favor of the Mayor or
Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity, on 27 June 2012. Hearings his relatives and supporters.15 Thus, complainants filed the instant complaint
for the determination of the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing the WPI charging respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of Judicial
against the Municipality were scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012. Mayor Villarosa Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
waived his right to present his evidence and submitted the case for
resolution.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited several cases in which he
issued an order/ruling against Mayor Villarosa and the latter’s supposed
While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the supporters.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
case, were all allowed inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing, 4 only
In a Resolution17 dated 25 November 2013, this Court referred the Complaint to 2. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying: “[B]asta na lang kayo
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manila (CA) “for raffle among the pirma pirma na gawa naman ng abogado
Justices thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation.” The case was niyo.”28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
raffled to CA Justice Pedro B. Corales on 24 February 2014. This Court received his
Report and Recommendation (Report)18 on 9 June 2014. 3. He asked Toledo: “You mentioned about that ‘walang pwesto na
nakikipwesto sa inyo,’ is that not a violation to your lease contract
We adopt the findings and recommendation of Justice Corales. that you are allowing somebody to occupy your portion so that they
can also engage in business? Is this not an additional earning on
Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias your part and you are violating your lease contract? Is that not
and partiality. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. 19 Clear and depriving the coffer of the Municipal Government?”29
convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality. 20 The
circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited
“manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence” in the The investigating justice found that the foregoing statements “definitely imperiled
discharge of his judicial functions, as required by Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, when the respect and deference”30 rightly due to respondent’s position.
he issued the Order lifting the TRO.
We agree.
This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can
be gleaned from the mere fact that he did not allow the “more than 500 members” As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and
who accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the courtroom. As unnecessary remarks to petitioners’ witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct
indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
improbable that this huge group could have been accommodated inside. 21 With Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,32 which
respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses while Julieta Toledo was giving her reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
testimony, this is sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.22chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
We now go to the claim of petitioners that respondent berated, scolded, confused lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
and admonished their witnesses without basis or justification. According to the require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
investigating justice, respondent failed to submit the transcript of notes for the 3 their influence, direction or control.
July 2012 hearing without plausible reason.23 As regards what transpired in the 2
July 2012 hearing, the investigating justice found that apart from raising his voice
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his
when addressing Toledo and making “abrasive and unnecessary statements to
court,33viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
her,”24 respondent also made the following “insulting, sometimes needlessly
lengthy statements”25 in open court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act
betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times
1. Respondent declared that he no longer wanted to go to the market, be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with
because he might be mistreated by utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his
petitioners.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.34

He told petitioners: “Mga taga-palengke na nagkakaso sa akin xxx

pero ‘di naman nila alam ang kanilang This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section
ginagawa.”27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which
read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 2
INTEGRITY SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.cralawred
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a
CANON 4
judge.
PROPRIETY
We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr.,40 this Court has already found
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
Respondent Judge Jacinto liable for his failure to supervise his personnel closely
their activities.
and for issuing orders relayed over the phone. Judge Jacinto was found guilty of
violating Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by failing to compel his Clerk of Court
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of to issue official receipts for all monies received by the latter. In the foregoing case,
impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance of impropriety. 35 This is respondent judge was fined in the sum of P11,000 and was warned that a repetition
because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
functions. A judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but
must also be above suspicion.36chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11(C), paragraph 1 of Rule 140 41 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, “unbecoming conduct” is classified as a light charge,
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000,
permission to leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as but not exceeding P10,000; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) admonition
the former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of with warning.42chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to
attend. Respondent does not deny this in his Comment.37 It was the Mayor’s Considering that this is respondent judge’s second infraction already, the Court
lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why the mayor finds that the penalties of a fine in the amount of P10,000 and admonition with
left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission. warning, as recommended by the investigating justice, are proper under the
circumstances.chanrobleslaw
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of
also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the unbecoming conduct and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
people's faith in the Judiciary.38 Members of the Judiciary should be beyond PESOS (P10,000) and REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a
reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as in their personal
behavior and everyday life.39chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust
in him as a judge. He gave petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality.
Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent must have directly
communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to
explain that the Mayor could no longer return to attend the hearing after leaving,
when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew that. Thus, respondent is also guilty
of violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 June 16, 2015 On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and
[Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC] physical inventory of cases at the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting presiding judge in both courts.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,
vs. xxx xxx xxx
JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.
Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong
RESOLUTION and Solano as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

Per Curiam:
On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as follows:
WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:
1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted
for decision and in failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.
He is FINED twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00), with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team
found an unremitted amount of ₱18,702.oo representing the court's collection from August 3,
2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise
by the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines account. Furthermore, 31 booklets of
accountable forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property Division, SC and OCA were not
accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collection of
₱348,993.60 from January 1990 to August 2003. However, only ₱186,330.98 was remitted by
Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of ₱162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund
(CCGF) collections from January 1996 to August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted
amount of ₱30,411. 70; and as of August 31, 2003 the Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage
of ₱1,864,304.27 which covered the collections from 1995 to August 2003.

2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled
misconduct. She is DISMISSED from the service. She is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE ₱2,057,378.59.
the amount of ₱1,817,378.59 representing the amount of shortages in her collections.
Her withheld salaries are to be applied to her accountabilities. The Office of
Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had been
Administrative Services, OCA is DIRECTED to compute Ms. Salimpade's leave credits
getting money from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of
and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA which
shall compute the money value of the same, the amount to be deducted from the fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her co-employees money which she took from her
collections.
shortages to be restituted.

3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from the
service. He is also ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the amount of
₱58,100.00
4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED ₱5,000, which should be
deducted from her retirement benefits.
The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal
charges against Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.
SO ORDERED.
As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as follows:
Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over ₱240,000.00 to Salimpade and
the latter issued a certification stating that the former had completely settled his monetary
accountability to the MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division,
Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit slip evidencing the turnover
of the ₱240,000.00.
The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report of
collections, as required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently, Salimpade's
salaries were withheld effective August 2003 to the present.
In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo
Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to
₱59,545.oo. However, the Official Receipts issued to cover said amounts were not accounted
for. The said cash amount was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank JDF Account No.
0591-0116-34.
A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage
of ₱106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank
accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage. Esconde explained to the audit team that
Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the collections. He stated that Judge Balut started
borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He
transferred to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to his dismay,
Judge Balut was designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice
of borrowing money from the collections of the court.
In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded
Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of accountabilities. The team
also found that the amount of ₱540.00, part of the JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to
August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time of audit. Said amount was remitted to the
Chief Accountant, Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs. Ramos opened an
account at the Rural Bank of Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court instead of
maintaining an account with Landbank. Said account was closed on September 11, 2003 and
an account was opened at Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A comparison of the court's
CCGF collections and remittances for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a
shortage of ₱510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred during his incumbency a cash shortage of ₱430.00
while Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱80.00 as of July 31, 2003. From August 2003 to
June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱430.00. She deposited the amount of
₱400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a shortage of 1!30.00. Withdrawals from the Fiduciary
Fund account on various dates, totalling ₱243,900.00 for the refund and return of cash bonds
to 20 litigants, were not supported by any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not
acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded. The Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from
April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted to ₱2,064,978.00. As of August 31, 2003, however,
the amount of ₱846,710.00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied
that the shortages incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as
the offender.
Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to
him money from the Fiduciary Fund collections.1âwphi1 In these instances, she requested
Judge Balut to affix his signature at the back portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash
recipient. However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt.
Ramos further stated that Judge Balut also collected the money through Salvador Briones,
Court Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also appeared at the back portion
of withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The total withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account
given to Judge Balut, as evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures of Judge Balut
and Briones, for the benefit of the former, as cash recipients, amounted to ₱193,500.00.
Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling ₱90,500.oo were also
given to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were notations such
as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge" written by Ramos.
On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with the
Fiduciary Fund collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to .₱207,774.42.
However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed, various amounts
totalling ₱802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP
Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of part of the shortage of ₱846, 710.00.
As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the other
hand, Esconde still had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of ₱58,100.oo
which, as of the time this case was submitted by the OCA for the Court's consideration, has
remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied)
In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay
a fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an
extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with
respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to
present his side on the matter.
Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum,2 sought
reconsideration of the Court's decision stating that although Judge Balut was not formally
required to comment on the findings of the audit team regarding the shortage in the court
collections, he was not denied due process of law. The OCA explained that Judge Balut was
able to present his side in his Letter3 to OCA, dated December 9, 2006. The OCA, thus, asked
for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be required to comment on
the findings of the financial audit.
In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to comment on
the audit report and, upon the recommendation5 of the OCA, referred the matter to the Court
of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.6
Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of the
charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the
participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. On his admission that he
borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no longer be
penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9, 2007 Resolution.
The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 7 The
standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant.8
A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The
three clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically
stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the court funds and executed certifications to
that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had been borrowing money from the
various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk of Court of
MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal slips9 where the back portions were
signed either by Judge Balut or his court interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the
cash withdrawn from the funds of the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations
of Ramos such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her
reminder that the money withdrawn were given to Judge Balut.
Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification10 stating that his cash accountability
as of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was ₱207,774.42 and there were certifications issued
by the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his accountabilities with the court funds.
The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he had
borrowed money from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its October 9,
2007 resolution is erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court categorically stated that Judge
Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and for failing to
resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.
Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct.11 Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times,
the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of morality,
decency and competence.12 He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability
lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.13
Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He
knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper
administration of court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role model of his staff and
other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and decency, both in his
official and personal conduct.
The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct,
punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first offense. 15 For said reason, the
respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has never tolerated and
will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public accountability, and diminish,
or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. 16
The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension. That,
however, would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of
Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo Esconde of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the service for the same offense. Clerk of
Court Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had already retired from the service. And
it would send a wrong message to the public that the Court has different standards - one for
the magistrates and another for the rank-and-file.
The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the consequences
of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves
administrative sanction and not even the full payment of his accountabilities will exempt him
from liability. "It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what counts is the
fact that these funds were used outside of official business."17
Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense
was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a span of several
years. In other words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not
once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different stations. In the case of In Re: Report on
the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal
City,18 it was written:
For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with
grave misconduct. Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds, the latter
recounted that on four occasions in 1994, he had borrowed ₱130,ooo to be able to purchase
a car and thereafter borrowed intermittently through the years, for reasons ranging from the
schooling needs of his children to the illness of his parents. That he intended to repay the
amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should never be used outside of official
business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan
from anyone except as may be allowed by law."
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible representation of
the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for others to follow."
Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed to
present himself as an example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no compunction
in violating the law, as well as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and
gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and would have warranted the
maximum penalty of dismissal. were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed from
the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court hereby
imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued earned
leave credits.
Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order
or decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt
of a copy of this resolution.This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be immediately
served on the respondent.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.
2015
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes
PAREDES, Respondent. accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for
the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, “People of the
DECISION Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,” docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then
pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
MENDOZA, J.:
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his
actuations.
For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio
Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to Comment of Judge Paredes
its January 14, 2013 Resolution,2 referring the complaint filed by Jill M.
Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations
Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of
investigation, report and recommendation. which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended
sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get
The Facts back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never
Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge
with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a
during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, negative experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges,
Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the
Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then marriage scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools
Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as where remedial law and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and
one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was
mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis
corrupt, and ignorant of the law. because these cases were known to the legal community and some were even
published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge
once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his advice.
included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge
Tormis, stating that he was a “court-noted addict.”4 She was absent from class at Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not
that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), complain about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative
informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to the attention of
decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted
in Tacloban City. saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and that
drug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that Francis
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled “Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge should be removed from the judiciary.
Tormis”5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six
(6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee
release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it
her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be appointed as court
employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court
a position in the judiciary. Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the parties presented
factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown
personally accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita investigation should be conducted by the CA.
Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond
was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court
allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on referred the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu
weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt receipt of the records.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of
Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by,
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the confidential
not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective
in the afternoon of March 21, 2011. memoranda of the parties.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge
cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of an administrative complaint Tormis’ cases in class where she was present was an open display of insensitivity,
because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties. impropriety and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive conduct,
which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of
Reply of the Complainant magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be
made administratively liable as the act was not made in the performance of his
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother official duties did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of
had nothing to do with the filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to what was just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but also in
leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere because she his everyday life.
could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates
brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed
administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in the marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case
the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, was still being investigated; that the administrative case relative to the marriage
the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive
was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that administrative cases Judge of the MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguio case; that
were confidential in nature. he could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before
accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his being
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the
Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a “drug addict.” Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him from committing the acts
complained of.
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in
In his Rejoinder, dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not
9
his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage scams scandalized the
premature to discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held
disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal publications, a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may
and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and
City. expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened in the present case;
that if he indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should have
filed a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than
addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4)
Judiciary.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Admonition with warning.

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual milieu
conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended
during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to that Judge Paredes be meted out with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning
project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. 18
obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.
The Court’s Ruling
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the
administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the
of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
penalty.
Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all
times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that “Judges, like any
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of
other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which
and independence of the judiciary.”16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
administratively liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the
that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial rights of others.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday activities.
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be
Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated
connected with the performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts
the subjudice rule when the latter discussed the marriage scams involving Judge complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge
Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being investigated. She cited, as basis
Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as “misconduct.” They
for Judge Paredes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus,
Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave
As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to
misconduct.
the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of any liability as the charge of grave
misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge
Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.
Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section
14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail bond.
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary CANON 3
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of
IMPARTIALITY
conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a
light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come
before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor
shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect
the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice.21 The rationale for the rule was spelled
out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that
the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis
in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In
fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2,
2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to
prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams,
where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of
the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge
Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes
for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were
carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case
of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity
given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely
discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There
was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub salt to the wound,” 25 as Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending
to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions,
was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes
instructs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 4 have been more circumspect in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to act
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should
do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in
expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-
tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and
courteous, both in conduct and in language.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety
required by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a
magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose
condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no
relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated
his intention to taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied
by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom
of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes
that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such
right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also
imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should
have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should
with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes
fell short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held
administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his
class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct
expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but
in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the
Code mandates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 2 receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure,
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office
but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith
in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be
seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the
court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be
emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of
his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his
private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated
from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial
integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge,
both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy
correctly found that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds
merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, of
the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:cFinally, the
Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes committed
grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to
the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely
following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC,
which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said
rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge
shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary
he cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond
in the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under
Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said
provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is
pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of
arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive
judges are authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are
necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to court
administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers
incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he was the only judge
available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for
cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court
where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC,
Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only
judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on
Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill
of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of
different dates is not backed up by sufficient evidence.28
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any
of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty
under the circumstances is admonition.ch
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of
Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for
conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.SO
ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014 3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ) respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority
and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, functions.
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas 4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record
City, Respondent. so that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

DECISION 5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss
the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
BRION, J.:
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial
We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1
filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation
(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense.
Branch 2, Batangas City. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the
Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation
with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No.
06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive
Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a
company then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of
SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse
of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty,
Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure
to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as shown by the following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver
over SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly
appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal
counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged
as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative
meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction
(i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where
she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she
wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would
prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP,
leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that
SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need
for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests
and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel,
Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for
permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules (the court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to
amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised
concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest
and personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he
alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details
as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed
with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement 4 dated March 18, 2008,
referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she
crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she
did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She
also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere
error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she
claimed that the administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still
available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences.
On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the
summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of
the Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is
all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to
call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested
that informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the
condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved
the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of
granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to
the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that
her denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her
part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to
favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly
appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza
as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant
raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the
rest of the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules
specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other
documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven
and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing
improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she
posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd.
She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary
standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive
ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she
submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala 9 should not be
applied to her case since the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting
"seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in
violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The CA’s Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted
a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010
Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly
meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the
respondent’s appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s
financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that
the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint
merely relied on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing
irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties,
including SCP’s creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in
approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary
bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective
of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with
what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls
below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done
recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum
requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts
to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.16
On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal
social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a
magistrate in the account) – even during these changing times when social networking
websites seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally
justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and
the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and
that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No.
100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional
incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and
recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable
Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison
be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas
City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of
impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be
dealt with more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the
charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action.
On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared
Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos
in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain
Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent
ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be
forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and
lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the
respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances
based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not
sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith,
or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively
liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise
of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these
are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that
are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal." 23 Errors committed by
him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies. 24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless.
The truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on
the complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially
of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to
the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. 25 There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. 26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances
cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too,
failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of
one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the
complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and
impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid,
and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence
and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. 27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence
of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."28
In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4
of the Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even
over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its
judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is
manifestly unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in
modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a
rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was
motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross
ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation
of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad
faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the
modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to
substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed32 and this
Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management
committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the
error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance
of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands.
In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or
disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of
the debtor-company’s assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of
minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation court should
hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their
submissions, on whether the appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a very
basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its
evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006
decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the
grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing
the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous
order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the
performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved and when
an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondent’s act of
promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing
and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe
the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we
find the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse
of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an
extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the
debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for
approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of
filing of the petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period
carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the
rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required.
Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year
from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure
an extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval
of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable
for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. 39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should
choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words,
a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge should
be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always
keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason.
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered
petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in
the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her
expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks,
as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are
displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe
judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the
decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a
judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so
by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or
any kind of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated
Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a
new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other. 45 While
judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry
with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is
expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent
in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge
from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section
6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen,
are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The
respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities,
whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections
1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance
of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-
shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must
bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part
of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the
judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the
posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by
acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore
to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public
consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge,
may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications,
particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless
and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and
thus must accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards
of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily
personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of
conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the
same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
 including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but
not exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the
following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable
for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper
to temper the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria
is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain
from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.