NOTES IN LEGAL ETHICS

THE LAWYER’S OATH: I, ________________________, of ___________________________, do

solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man’s cause for money or malice
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon
myself this obligation voluntarily without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God.

DEFINITION OF TERMS:

1. LEGAL PROFESSION – group of men and women pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service (note: three elements of Legal Profession - (a)
organization, (b) learning, and (c) spirit of public service).

2. LEGAL ETHICS – embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that should
govern the conduct of every Bar member; branch of moral science that treats of the
duties which a lawyer owes to the Court, his client, his Colleagues, and the Public; is
embodied in the Constitution, rules of Court, Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons
of Professional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral laws and special laws.

3. PRACTICE OF LAW – any activity in and out of court which requires the application of
laws, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience (Cayetano vs. Monsod,
G.R. No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991).

4. TITULO DE ABOGADO – not mere possession of academic degree of LLB but

membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of
law.

5. BAR and BENCH – Bar refers to the whole body of attorneys and counsellors;
collectively, the members of the legal profession. Bench denotes the whole body of
judges (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition).

6. LAWYER – general term for a person trained in law and authorized to advice or
represent others in legal matters; a person licensed to practice law (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 6th edition).

7. TRIAL LAWYER – one who personally handles cases in court, administrative agencies
or boards.

8. PRACTISING LAWYER – one who is engaged in the practice of law.

9. CLIENT – one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice or for purposes of
prosecuting or defending a suit in his behalf and usually for a fee.
10. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW – class of persons who are by license, officers of the court
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence.

11. COUNSEL DE OFFICIO – a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court who by

reason of experience and ability, may adequately defend the accused. He is normally
appointed to represent one who is indigent in a criminal case.

12. ATTORNEY AD HOC – one named or appointed by the court to defend an absentee
defendant in the suit in which the appointment is made.

13. ATTORNEY OF RECORD – one whose name must appear somewhere in permanent
records or files of the case, or on the pleading or some instrument filed in the case or on
the appearance docket.

14. OF COUNSEL – an associate attorney or employee of law offices.

15. AMICUS CURIAE – “friend of the court”. He is a person with strong interest in or views
on the subject matter of an action, but not a party to the action, may petition the court
for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a
rationale consistent with its own views. Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in
appeals concerning matters of a broad public interest like civil rights.

16. AMICI PAR EXCELLENCE – Bar associations which appear in court as friends to
expound in some matters of law for the information of the court.

17. BAR ASSOCIATION – is an association of members of the legal profession like the IBP
where membership is integrated and compulsory.

18. ADVOCATE – one who pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or court.

19. BARRATRY – offense of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits either at law or
otherwise except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty
to do so; the act of fomenting suit among individuals and offering legal services to one
of them for monetary motives.

20. AMBULANCE CHASING – figuratively, lawyer’s act of chasing the ambulance

chasing the victim of an accident for the purpose of talking to him or his relatives and
offering his legal services to file a case against the person who caused the accident; a
lawyer who haunts hospitals and visits the home of afflicted persistently offering his legal
services on contingent fee.

21. ATTORNEY’S FEES – reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal services
he has rendered to a client; indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by
the losing party to the prevailing party in litigation.

22. GENERAL RETAINER – fee/s intended to secure services for future legal problems.

23. SPECIAL RETAINER – fee/s paid for the engagement in a particular case.
24. CONTINGENT CONTRACT – an agreement whereby the fee, usually a fixed
percentage of what may be recovered, is made to depend on the success of the
action.

25. CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT – an agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay

expenses of proceedings to enforce the clients rights; is against public policy especially
where the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his won expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute.

26. RETAINING LIEN – attorney’s lien over the property of the client held by the lawyer to
apply to his claims upon due notice to the client.

27. CHARGING LIEN – a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments; a lawyer causes a statement of his
claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court that rendered judgment
or issuing execution with written notice to the client and adverse party (Rule 138, S3c.
37, Rules of Court).

28. GENERAL APPEARANCE – one that is done by a lawyer for any act except to
question the court’s jurisdiction.

29. SPECIAL APPEARANCE – one solely intended to question the court’s jurisdiction.

30. SUSPENSION – temporary withholding of a lawyer’s privilege to practice his

profession for a certain period or for an indefinite period of time.

31. DISBARMENT – the act of the Supreme Court in withdrawing from an attorney the
privilege to practice law.

32. REINSTATEMENT – restoration to a disbarred lawyer of the privilege to practice;

readmission to the membership in the Bar.

33. JUDICIAL ETHICS – branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper
conduct to be observed by all judges and magistrates in trying and deciding
controversies brought to them for adjudication which conduct must be demonstrative
of impartiality, integrity, competence, independence and freedom from improprieties.
The freedom from improprieties must be observed even in the judge’s private life.

34. COURT – a board or other tribunal which decides a litigation or contest.

35. JUDGE – a public officer who by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority.
A public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in accordance with
law.

36. DE JURE JUDGE – one who is exercising the office of judge as a matter of right; an
officer of a court who has been duly and legally elected or appointed.

37. DE FACTO JUDGE – an officer who is not lawfully invested with all of the powers and
duties conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of
right.
38. COURT STAFF – includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.

39. JUDGE’S FAMILY – includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, and any
other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree, or person who is a
companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.

REQUIREMENTS FOR BAR CANDIDATE: - (i) Philippine citizen; (ii) Philippine resident; (iii) at
least 21 years of age; (iv) must be of good moral character; (v) must not have been
charged of a crime involving moral turpitude; and (vi) must have met the required
educational requirements (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION INTO THE BAR: (1) must meet all academic requirements; (2)
pass the bar exam; (3) oath-taking before the Supreme Court, (4) signing of the
Attorney’s Roll and issuance of certificate of membership from Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court (must be in good standing).

DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF A LAWYER (Four-Fold Duty to the Court, to the Public, to the Bar
and to his Client): (a) maintain allegiance to the Republic and support the Constitution
and obey the laws; (b) observe and maintain respect due to courts and their officers;
(c) counsel or maintain such actions/proceedings only as appears to him to be just and
defenses as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law; (d) employ means
only consistent with truth and honor and never to mislead the judge; (e) maintain
inviolate the confidence and preserve the client’s secrets; (f) abstain from all offensive
personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party/witness unless required by the justice of the cause he is charged with; (g) not to
encourage suit/delay any man’s cause for corrupt motive; (h) not to reject the cause
of defenceless/oppressed for any personal consideration; (i) to present every defense
permitted by the law by all fair and honourable means, in the defense of a person
accused of a crime regardless of his personal opinion as to the accused’s guilt, so that
due process may be ensured (Rule 138, Sec. 20, Rules of Court).

PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW – General Rule: Any person admitted as a

member of the Bar in good and regular standing is entitled to practice of law.
Exceptions – (a) person representing himself or a friend in the MTC (Sec. 34, Rule 138,
Rules of Court); (b) in criminal proceedings in a municipal court in a locality where a
licensed member of the bar is not available (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules of Court); (c) person
representing himself in the RTC (Sec. 33, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (d) persons authorized
to represent the government in a case (Sec. 133, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (e)
complainant himself or union representatives in labor cases (Labor Code); (f) law
students who have completed 3rd year law and enrolled in a recognized law school’s
Supreme Court-approved legal education program to represent indigent clients,
provided that, such appearance if before the RTC should be accompanied at all times
by a supervising lawyer (Rule 138-A).

PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW – (a) Judges
and other officials or employees of Superior courts (Rule 138, Sec. 35, Rules of Court); (b)
Officials and employees of the Office of the Solicitor General; (c) Government
Prosecutors; (d) President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, their deputies and
assistants (Art. VII, Sec. 13, Constitution); (e) Members of Constitutional Commissions (Art.
IX-A, Sec. 2, Constitution); (f) Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. XI, Sec. 8[2]); (g)
Governors, city and municipal mayors (Ra. 7160, Sec. 90); and (h) those who by special
law are prohibited from engaging in the practice of law.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS WITH RESTRICTED RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW: (a) personal appearance
as counsel by Members of Congress before any court, electoral tribunal or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Constitution); (b) Sanggunian members
may practice their legal profession provided that they shall not (i) not appear in court in
any civil case where the local government or any governmental office, agency or
instrumentality is the adverse party; (ii) appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein
an national or local government officer/employee is accused of an offense committed
in relation to his office; (iii) collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which they are officials; and (iv) use
property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the government’s interest (RA7160); (c) a retired justice or
judge receiving pension from the government cannot act as counsel in any civil case in
which the government or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or in a
criminal case wherein an officer/employee of the government is accused of an offense
in relation to his office (RA 910, Sec. 1).

GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL: (a) client pursues an illegal or immoral course
of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; (b) client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of the canons and rules; (c) his inability to work with co-
counsel will not promote the best interest of the client; (d) the mental and physical
condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively; (e) client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply
with the retainer agreement; (f) lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office; and
(g) other similar cases (Rule 22.01, CPR).

INSTANCES WHEN COUNSEL CANNOT RECOVER FULL AMOUNT DESPITE WRITTEN

CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES – (1) when stipulated attorney’s fees are in excess of
what the law expressly provides; (2) when the attorney is guilty of fraud or bad faith
against the client; (3) when counsel’s services were worthless because of his
negligence; (4) when the contract of employment is illegal; (5) when counsel served
adverse interest, unless he acted with consent of both parties.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING ATTORNEY’S FEES (Rule 20.01, CPR) – (a) time spent and
extent and services rendered and required; (b) novelty and difficulty of question
involved; (c) importance of subject matter; (d) skill demanded of lawyer; (e) customary
charges for similar services and IBP schedule of fees; (f) probability of losing other
compensation; (g) amount involved in the controversy and benefits resulting from the
service; (h) contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) character of employment
whether occasional or established; (j) the lawyer’s professional standing.

INSTANCES OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ON QUANTUM MERUIT (“as much as he deserves”) – (a)

no express contract for attorney’s fees; (b) court determines fees stipulated in the
contract to be unconscionable or unreasonable; (c) contract for attorney’s fees is void
due to purely formal matters or defects in the execution; (d) counsel’s inability, for
justifiable cause, to finish the case to its conclusion; (e) when lawyer and client
disregard the contract for attorney’s fees; (f) charging of fees beyond what is fixed by
law.

OBJECTIVES OF DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION – (a) Compel attorney to deal fairly and
honestly with his client; (b) remove from the profession, a person whose misconduct has
proved him UNFIT to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney; (c) punish lawyer although not so much as to safeguard the
administration of justice; (d) set as an example or warning for other members of the Bar;
(e) safeguard the administration of justice from incompetence and dishonesty of
lawyers; (f) protect the public.

NATURE OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS – being sui generis (class by itself), it has the
following characteristics: (a) neither civil or criminal; (b) double jeopardy cannot be
availed of in a disbarment proceeding against a lawyer as such a lawyer who is
convicted like for falsification cannot claim double jeopardy; (c) can be initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP and can be initiated without a complainant;
(d) can proceed regardless of the interest or lack thereof, if facts proven warrant; (e)
imprescriptible and as such the ordinary statues of limitations have no application to
disbarment proceedings however, unexplained delay in filing of an administrative case
creates suspicion over the motives of the complainant; (f) conducted confidentially
being confidential in nature until its final determination; (g) it is itself due process of law;
(h) whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that
may be enforced in another action like reconveyance or damages;

GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT (Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court) – (a) Deceit; (b)
Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (c) Grossly immoral conduct; (d)
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (e) Violation of the Oath of Office; (f)
Wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (g) Corrupt or Wilful
appearance as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

QUALIFICATIONS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES – (a) Justices of the Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court – natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 40 years of age, 15 years in the
practice of law [Section 7(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution]; (b) judges of lower courts
– natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 35 (for RTC) and 30 (for MTC) years of age, 10
years (for RTC) and 5 years (for MTC) in the practice of law [Section 7(2) of Article VIII of
the Constitution].

INSTANCES OF MANDATORY INHIBITION OF JUDGES – (a) judge’s actual bias/prejudice

concerning a party or personal knowledge of dispute evidentiary facts concerning
proceedings; (b) judge previously served as a lawyer or a material witness in the matter
in controversy; (c) judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in
the outcome of the matter in controversy; (d) judge served as executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of
the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a
material witness therein; (e) judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review; (f)
judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the 6th civil degree
or to counsel within the 4th civil degree; or (g) judge knows that his or her spouse or child
has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.

RE: APPLICATION FOR BAR ADMISSION (VICENTE CHING), BM#914, 10/1/1999 – Vicente
Ching passed the 1998 Bar Exam but was prohibited from taking his oath due to a
“citizenship” issue having been born on April 11, 1964 to a Chinese father and Filipino
mother. Despite, his oath of allegiance and affidavit of citizenship executed in 1999,
Supreme Court denied his motion to take the lawyer’s oath reasoning that, when he
was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution which required a
legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien father to follow the latter’s citizenship,
unless electing Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14years that lapsed from the time he
reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship is clearly beyond the contemplation of the requiring of electing “upon
reaching the age of majority”.

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE VS. EDWIN RANA, BM#1036, 6/10/2003 – Respondent, a 2000
Bar exam passer was precluded from signing the Attorney’s Roll because of a
complaint charging him of appearing as counsel for a local candidate before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers prior to his oath-taking in May 2001. In denying him
admission into the Bar, the Supreme Court held that, before one is admitted to the Bar,
he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. A
bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations. Respondent was engaged in law practice when he appeared before
the canvassing board without being a member of the Bar. It is the signing in the
Attorney’s Rolls that makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that Respondent passed
the bar exams is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become a
lawyer, Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still
had to be performed, namely, his lawyer’s oath to be administered by the Supreme
Court and his signature in the Attorney’s Roll.

ROMULO VILLA VS. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ET AL., BM#674, 6/14/2005 – Junel Ama, was
one of the members of Aquila Legis Fraternity implicated and charged for the death of
“Lenny” Villa. Despite passing the bar in 1992, Junel was not allowed to take his lawyer’s
oath. He later petitioned to be admitted to the Bar when his conviction for homicide
through conspiracy was set aside by the Court of Appeals finding him only liable for
physical injuries and sentencing him to 20-days imprisonment. Supreme Court admitted
him into the practice of law reasoning that the crime for which he was convicted was
only slight physical injuries, a light offense which cannot be considered a grave
violation of the moral sentiment of the community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility
or revenge – a crime certainly not involving moral turpitude.

SOLIMAN SANTOS, JR. VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, AC#4749, 1/20/2000 – Respondent
who last paid his IBP membership dues in 1992 subsequently failed to indicate his IBP
number in his pleadings and used at times the same IBP number for the years 1995, 1996
and 1997. Supreme Court rejected Respondent’s claim that he honestly thought that he
was exempted from payment of IBP dues being a senior citizen and being engaging in
limited law practice only as he was principally into farming. Rule 139-A, Section 9
requires every member of the IBP to pay annual dues. Non-payment of such dues may
warrant suspension or removal from the Attorney’s Roll pursuant to Section 10 of the
same rule. Respondent can engage in law practice only by paying his dues, and it
does not matter that his practice is “limited”. Further, exemption from taxation of senior
citizens does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues.

PETITION TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, Petitioner, BM#1678,

12/17/2007 – Petitioner, a Philippine Bar member migrated to Canada and became a
citizen thereof. Pursuant to RA9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003), Petitioner reacquired Filipino citizenship and petitioned the Supreme Court to
allow him to resume his law practice. In readmitting Petitioner, Supreme Court held that,
Philippine citizenship lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
later reacquired pursuant to RA 9225, is deemed never to have been lost. However,
although deemed never to have terminated his Bar membership, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues. Hence, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from
the Supreme Court authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) updating and payment in full
of the annual IBP membership; (b) payment of professional tax; (c) completion of at
least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; and (d) retaking of the
lawyer’s oath.

JULIETA B. NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, AC#3405, 6/29/1998 –

Respondent, while engaged as a teacher had an illicit relationship with his 17-year old
student with whom he later lived after abandoning his family. Supreme Court disbarred
Respondent reasoning that, good moral character is a continuing qualification required
of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of
moral integrity, the privilege to practice law may be withdrawn. Immoral conduct is
conduct so wilful, flagrant or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community. Such conduct, must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. VS. ATTY. RICHARD FUNK, AC#9094, 8/15/2012 –

Hocorma Foundation hired Respondent’s legal services in connection with, among
others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of several suits and over which same
property he later instituted a suit in behalf of Mabalacat Insttitute without the
foundation’s written consent. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the practice
of law reasoning that a lawyer owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the
highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound policy dictates that he be prohibited
from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney
may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute
that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyer’s part does not make it
inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client’s
doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it
not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their
relationship.

LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO VS. ATTY. RODOLFO GALING, AC#6174, 11/16/2011 – Respondent

accepted Complainant’s engagement and wrote in her behalf a demand letter to Ms.
Koa for dishonored checks. Subsequently, he filed a motion for consolidation and
appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa in the estafa and BP22 cases filed against her by
Complainant. The latter charged this as representation of conflicting interests. Supreme
Court suspended Respondent from law practice holding that, a lawyer-client
relationship can exist despite close friendship. This relationship was established the
moment Complainant sought Respondent’s legal advice regarding the dishonored
checks. Respondent confirmed this relationship by drafting the demand letter and
referring to Complainant therein as “my client”. The fact that the demand letter was
not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that Complainant hired another lawyer is
of no moment. Non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate Respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying
with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests (Canon 15) which
prohibition attaches from the establishment of attorney-client relationship extending
beyond its duration. This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste. In the course of the relationship, the lawyer learns facts connected with the
client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers
must not only keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also avoid appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.

SPS. VIRGILO & ANGELINA ARANDA VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL ELAYDA, AC#7907, 12/15/10 –
Respondent failed to notify Complainants who were here clients in a civil case of the
scheduled hearing which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Later,
Respondent took no steps, or at the very least, informed his clients of the adverse
decision rendered which became final and executory. Respondent claimed that he
did not have Complainants’ contact number or address and that the clients were the
ones remiss in making a follow up of their case’s status. Supreme Court suspended
Respondent from law practice citing amongst others, his duty of fidelity to his client’s
cause (Canon 17) and his duty to serve his client with competence (Canon 18), mindful
not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him (Rule 18.03). It is elementary procedure
for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to
have constant communication with each other. While communication is a shared
responsibility between counsel and client, it is counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients
of the status of their case and the court orders issued. He simply cannot wait for his
clients to make an inquiry about the development in their case. Close coordination
between counsel and client is necessary for them to adequate prepare for the case, as
well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.

DOLORES VDA. DE FAJARDO VS. ATTY. REXIE BUGARING, AC#5113, 10/7/2004 –

Complainant engaged Respondent to handle two cases affecting inherited land.
When asked about his fees, Respondent said, “huwag na ninyo alalahanin iyon, para
ko na kayong nanay o lola”. After the cases were settled, Complainant offered
Respondent P100k but he rejected. Years later, Complainant learned that her property
had been attached by Respondent after he filed a civil case for sum of money against
her. Supreme Court suspended Respondent reasoning that, the proper time to deal
with the issue of professional fees is upon commencement of the lawyer-client
relationship. Respondent should have determined and entered into an agreement
regarding his fees when he was first retained by Complainant. Such prudence would
have spared the Court this controversy over a lawyer’s compensation, a suit that should
be avoided except to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. While, a lawyer is entitled to
the court’s protection against any attempt on the client’s part to escape payment of
legitimate attorney’s fees, such protection however must not be sought at the expense
of truth. Complete candor or honesty is expected from lawyers, particularly when they
appear and plead before the courts for their own causes against former clients.

TORBEN B. OVERGAARD VS. ATTY. GODWIN VALDEZ, AC#7902, 9/20/2008 – After receipt
of about P900K to represent Complainant, a Dutch national, in several cases filed by
and against him, Respondent failed to give any update as to the case status, he also
failed to enter his appearance in some cases. Respondent also failed to inform
Complainant of the arraignment dates in the criminal cases against him and even
failed to mention that he was entitled to prepare counter-affidavits. Warrants for
Complainants arrests were subsequently issued for his non-attendance. Supreme Court
disbarred Respondent holding that, he had indubitably fallen below the exacting
standards demanded of Bar members. He did not only neglect his client’s case, he
abandoned his client and left him without any recourse but to hire another lawyer.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. A lawyer is bound to serve his client
with competence and diligence. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ VS. ATTY. MANUEL SAN JOSE, AC#3569, 2/23/2007 –
Respondent was paid to file an unlawful detainer suit. When he did not file the case,
Complainant demanded for the return of her documents. Due to non-compliance by
Respondent, the case prescribed. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. A lawyer
engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s
interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of law, the
interest of his client. An attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.

LUCILA S. BARBUCO VS. ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, AC#5092, 8/11/2004 –

Complainant hired Respondent to appeal her case to the Court of Appeals. Later, she
learned that her appeal had been dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief.
Respondent claimed that he timely filed the appeal only that he was late in filing the
required brief because he was physically incapacitated for several days due to a
vehicular incident. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court reasoned that,
Respondent’s conduct relative to the belated filing of the appellant’s brief falls below
the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their client’s
cause. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period constitutes inexcusable
negligence. That Respondent was suffered physical injuries from a vehicular accident
cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a
member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. He could have asked any of his
partners in the law office to file the brief or, at least, to seek extension of time to file such
pleading.

FERNANDO MARTIN PENA VS. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO, AC#7298, 6/25/2007 – His demand
for separation pay for his client in an illegal dismissal case having been rejected by the
Complainant, Respondent wrote threatening to file criminal cases for tax evasion and
falsification against Complainant. Respondent alleged that the disbarment complaint
against him should be dismissed for want of certification against forum-shopping.
Supreme Court held that, as to the necessity of a certification against forum shopping
to a disbarment complaint, the filing of multiple suits and conflicting decisions rarely
happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either taken
by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the IBP upon verified complaint of any
person, thus, if the complainant fails to attach a certification against forum shopping
the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be
ascertained with ease. Supreme Court reprimanded Respondent that, while a lawyer
shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law, his duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice – his client’s success is wholly subordinate and his
conduct must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The writing of
demand letters is standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction, but, the letter in this
case contains more than just a simple demand to pay containing as it did a threat to
file retaliatory charges against Complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s
claim.

ALEX ONG VS. ATTY. ELPIDIO UNTO, AC#2417, 2/6/2002 – For failing to heed his demand
letters seeking child support for his client, Respondent filed criminal cases against
Complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and Anti-
Dummy Law plus administrative cases before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the
Commission on Immigration and the Office of the Solicitor General. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent reasoning that, Canon 19 requires a lawyer to employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and not to present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain improper
advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent had not exercised the good faith
required of a lawyer in handling of his client’s legal affairs. He tried to coerce
Complainant to comply with his demand letter by threatening to file various charges
against the latter. After non-compliance, he made good his threat and filed a string of
criminal and administrative cases – this act is malicious as the cases filed did not have
any bearing or connection to his client’s cause.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. VS. ATTY. LEOVIGILDO MIJARES III, AC#8380, 11/20/09 –
Respondent was disbarred for failing to turn over certain papers which he supposedly
secured for Complainant after the latter had paid him P500k to Respondent as
facilitation and processing expenses for the titling of a certain property. Supreme Court
held that, “every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance his client’s
interest such that he must promptly account for whatever money or property his client
may have entrusted to him”. A lawyer’s conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross
violation of professional ethics.

NICANOR GONZALES VS. MIGUEL SABACAJAN 249 SCRA 276 – Respondent held
Complainants’ owner’s copies of land titles purportedly. Despite demand, Respondent
refused to surrender to Complainants said titles claiming that he was holding them in
behalf of a client to whom Complainants were supposedly indebted. In suspending
Respondent, the Supreme Court posited that, if complainant did have alleged
monetary obligations with his client, that did not warrant Respondent’s summarily
confiscating their titles since there was no showing in the records that the same were
given as collateral or any court order authorizing Respondent to take custody of said
title. A lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with laws and
principles of fairness.

ATTY. RICARDO SALOMON, JR. VS. ATTY. JOSELITO FRIAL, AC#7820, 9/12/2008 – Upon his
own undertaking, Respondent (who was counsel for the plaintiff in a civil case) took
possession of Complainant’s two vehicles which were attached. Complainant claimed
that, several times, one of the cars was used by unauthorized persons and the other car
was destroyed in a fire while parked in Respondent’s residence. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent. A writ of attachment issues to prevent defendant from
disposing of attached properties to secure satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered by the plaintiff. When attached objects are destroyed then the attached
properties would necessarily be of no value and attachment would be for naught. A
lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Thus, money
of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under
any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by him.

REYNARIA BARCENAS VS. ATTY. ANORLITO ALVERO, AC#8159, 4/23/10 – Respondent

received P300k from Complainant to be used to redeem the latter’s rights as tenant of
a ricefield. Respondent told Complainant that he would deposit the money in court
because the creditor refused to accept it. Later, Complainant found out that
Respondent was losing a lot in cockfights and no judicial deposit was made.
Complainant demanded for the return of his money but Respondent failed to comply.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. When a lawyer received money from the client
for a particular purpose, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for that purpose. If he does not use the money for the intended
purpose, he must promptly return the money to his client.

MELVIN D. SMALL VS. ATTY. JERRY BANARES, AC#7021, 2/21/2007 – Respondent received
money for acceptance and filing fees. Despite Complainant constant follow-up as to
the status of the cases, Respondent merely answered that he was still preparing the
documents. Months passed, Respondent failed to present any document prompting
Complainant to demand for a full refund. Respondent failed to comply. In suspending
Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, “every lawyer holds in trust moneys of his
client that may come into his possession. Further, he should account for all money
received from the client and deliver funds of the client upon demand. Respondent
received money and since he failed to render any legal service to Complainant, he
should have promptly accounted for and returned the money, but he failed to do so.

CLETO DOCENA VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, SR., AC#2387, 9/10/1998 –

Respondent asked for P10k to post a bond to stay the execution of a decision in a civil
case pending appeal. After favorable judgment in the appeal, Complainant went to
court to withdraw his bond only to discover that no such bond was posted, much less
required. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent. While the amount involved may be
small, the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier penalty. The Code mandates
that, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one’s good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. If it has to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.
By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, Respondent
reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable and most
contemptible.

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON VS. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, AC#6116, 8/1/2012 – After
failing to pay Complainant the agreed commission for a case referral, Respondent
wrote informing Complainant that the client would shoulder payment of the
commission because he agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees. Respondent was
suspended from law practice. The Supreme Court held that, practice of law is a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. Respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon
of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not
obtain in the case at bar.

MANUEL CAMACHO VS. ATTY LUIS PANGULAYAN, ET. AL., AC#4807, 3/22/2000 –
Complainant who represented expelled students in a civil case against the school
complained that the latter’s lawyer secured the dismissal of said complaint by
brokering a deal with the students allowing them readmission into the school without
Complainant’s presence or knowledge. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court
held that Canon 9 provides that, “a lawyer should not in any way communicate upon
the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with
his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that
may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake
to advise him as to the law”.

JOSE C. SABERON VS. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, AC#6567, 4/16/2008 – Respondent

as counsel for a bank filed various pleading using abusive and offensive language
hinting that Complainant was merely blackmailing/coercing his client for financial gain.
Supreme Court imposed a fine with a warning on Respondent. The Code mandates for
a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel and, in his professional
dealings, refrain from using language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
The adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in the pursuit of their duty to advance their clients’ interests. However,
while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ VS. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, AC#5737, 10/25/2004 – Complainant

was a 4th year law student who personally instituted and appeared in cases in his own
behalf. In one case, Respondent who was the opposing party’s counsel remarked,
“Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna”. The Supreme Court admonished
Respondent to be more circumspect in his performance of his duties as an officer of the
court. Respondent’s comment was intended to point out to the trial court that
Complainant was not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of Complainant’s
appearance as the judge in her order noted that Complainant was a lawyer. Such
single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant
Respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of
the moment in the course of an argument between them. Respondent was reminded
that Complainant is not precluded from personally litigating his cases pursuant to Sec.
34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA VS. ATTY. ANA LUZ CRISTAL-TENORIO, AC#6290, 7/14/2004. –
Charged with assisting in the illegal law practice of Felicisimo Tenorio who was not a Bar
member, Respondent admitted that Felicisimo is named as a senior partner because of
investments in her law office. While the disbarment case was pending, Complainant
withdrew her complaint claiming that it was all a mere misunderstanding. Supreme
Court suspended Respondent. An affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case does
not, in any way, exonerate Respondent. A suspension/disbarment case may proceed
regardless of Complainant’s interest/lack of interest – such proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance and are solely for the public
welfare, that is, to prevent courts of justice from the official ministrations of person unfit
to practice in them. If the evidence on record warrants, respondent may be
suspended/disbarred despite complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of charges.
Respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. The lawyer’s duty to
prevent, or at the very least not assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court.

FLORENCE MACARRUBO VS. ATTY. EDMUNDO MACARRUBO, AC#6148, 2/27/2004 –

Respondent married and fathered two children with Complainant by representing that
his previous marriage was void. Later, he abandoned Complainant and entered into a
third marriage with another woman. In his defense, Respondent presented the decree
of nullity of his marriage with Complainant and denied employing deception in
marrying her insisting that, despite her full knowledge of his prior marriage, Complainant
dragged him against his will to a sham wedding to protect her and her family’s
reputation due to her pregnancy. The Supreme Court disbarred Respondent reasoning
that, “while his marriage to Complainant has been annulled by final judgment, this did
not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety”. Having lived with Complainant
as husband and wife while his first marriage was subsisting made him liable for
concubinage – conduct inconsistent with the good moral character required for
continued right to practice law. Such conduct imports moral turpitude and is a public
assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.

WILSON CHAM VS. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, AC#7494, 6/27/2008 – Respondent leased
an apartment owned by Complainant’s company. Despite repeated demands, she
failed to settle her unpaid account and vacated the leased premises without notifying
Complainant. The Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice reasoning
that, “having incurred just debts, she had the moral and legal responsibility to settle
them when they became due”. Respondent’s abandonment of the leased premises to
avoid her obligations for rent and electric bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of
Canon1.

ISIDRA BARRIENTOS VS. ATTY. ELERIZZA LIBIRAN-METEORO, AC#6408, 8/31/2004 –

Respondent issued several checks in payment of a pre-existing debt. Due to their
dishonor, Complainant filed BP22. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court held
that the issuance of checks later dishonoured for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It
shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy
of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows
Respondent’s remorseless attitude, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to
the public interest and order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment
to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing
the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA VS. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, AC# 7136, 8/1/2007 –
Respondent, a married man cohabited with Irene, a married woman. In his defense,
Respondent posited that, his special friendship with Irene was low-profile and not
scandalous and that he did no damage to the institution of marriage as he was still civil
and in good terms with his own wife. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent holding that
Respondent did not deny his adulterous relationship with Irene, what he denied was
having flaunted such relationship maintain that it was “low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families”. Respondent’s denial is a negative
pregnant – a denial with admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. The Rules of Court employs the term “grossly immoral
conduct” as a ground for disbarment and not “under scandalous circumstances” as
used in Art. 334 (concubinage) of the Revised Penal Code. While the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative
sanction for illicit behaviour, it is not so with respect to the betrayals of the marital vow
of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law,
sexual relations outside marriage is deemed disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
ROSARIO MECARAL VS. ATTY. DANILO VASQUEZ, AC#8392, 6/29/10 – Complainant, who
was the secretary of Respondent, later became his lover and common-law wife.
Respondent brought Complainant to a religious cult which he headed up in the
mountains. There Respondent left her where she was tortured, brainwashed and
drugged and held in captivity until her mother and law officers rescued her. Supreme
Court disbarred Respondent holding that his acts of converting his secretary into a
mistress, contracting two marriages are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the
world can countenance. Further, Complainant’s subsequent detention and torture is
gross misconduct which only a beast may be able to do.

ALFREDO ROA VS. ATTY. JUAN MORENO, AC#8382, 4/21/10 – In selling a piece of land,
Respondent issued, instead of a deed of sale, a temporary receipt and a certificate of
land occupancy assuring Complainant that he could already use the lot. When he could
not register the certificate with the Register of Deeds, Complainant confronted
Respondent and learned that the latter was not the property owner and the land was in
fact subject of pending litigation. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. His credibility is
highly questionable – he even issued a bogus certificate of land occupancy to Complaint
whose only fault what that he did not know better. To the unlettered, said certificate could
have easily passed as document evidencing title. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 (not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct). Conduct, as used in the
Rule, is not confined to performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be
disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test
is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

RODRIGO MOLINA VS. ATTY. CEFERINO MAGAT, AC#1900, 6/13/2012 –Respondent was
counsel for an accused against whom Complainant filed a case for assault upon an
agent of a person in authority and breach of peace and resisting arrest. Respondent
move for quashal of said cases alleging double jeopardy as supposedly a similar case
for slight physical injuries had been filed against his client. The records revealed
however that no such case was filed by Molina. The latter claimed that the filing of the
motion to quash was in bad faith to mislead the court. Supreme Court suspended
Respondent from the practice of law finding that, there was deliberate intent on his
part to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on
the basis of double jeopardy. He should not make any false and untruthful statement in
his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that
was really filed in court, all he had to do was secure a certification from that court that,
indeed, a case was filed.

PARALUMAN AFURONG VS. ATTY. ANGEL AQUINO, AC#1571, 9/23/1999 – To stay the
execution of a decision obtained by Complainant in an ejectment case he filed
multiple petitions and even a motion to postpone a scheduled hearing supposedly due
to his appearance in another case when there was actually none. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent. It is an attorney’s duty to counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just and such defences only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law. Because the decision in the ejectment case had
reached finality and execution was being effected, Respondent should not have filed a
petition for certiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for it than to
delay execution of judgment. Respondent likewise committed a falsehood when he
stated in his motion for postponement that he had to attend another hearing. He
himself admitted that he only included such statement in order to give more “force” to
his motion. Such act violates a lawyer’s duty to avoid concealment of the truth from the
court. A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO VS. ATTY. JAMES FLORIDO, AC#5624, 1/20/2004 –

Respondent went to the Complainant who was his estranged wife to demand custody
of their children supposedly based upon a resolution of the Court of Appeals granting
him temporary custody. Per certification from the Court of Appeals, no such resolution
had been issued. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, “candor
and fairness are demanded of every lawyer”. The burden cast on the judiciary would
be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel.

ATTY. JOSABETH ALONSO VS. ATTY. IBARO RELAMIDA, JR., AC#8481, 8/3/10 – Respondent
was counsel for the complainant in a labor case for constructive dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter ruling that there was voluntary resignation, dismissed the labor case. This
decision was sustained by the Supreme Court and became final and executor.
Respondent filed a second complaint for illegal dismissal based on the same cause.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths
are neither mere words nor an empty formality. A lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s
cause but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Filing multiple
petitions constitutes abuse of court processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice punishable as contempt of
court.
HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS VS. ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, AC#6442, 10/21/2004 –
Respondent who was counsel for the protestee in an electoral protest before
Complainant filed a motion to withdraw as counsel citing heavy workload. After his
motion was granted, Respondent executed an affidavit saying that he really withdrew
from the case because Complainant pre-judged the case and even insinuated that
protestee would lose. This affidavit became the basis of protestee’s motion for inhibition
against Complainant. Supreme Court suspended Respondent holding that, “all
members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, ‘do no falsehood’
and ‘conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients’”. When
Respondent executed his affidavit retracting his reason for withdrawing as counsel, he
admitted under oath his misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his
oath as a lawyer and failed to abide by the Code. Candor towards the courts is a
cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. In fact, this obligation to the bench for
candor and honesty takes precedence. Thus, saying one thing in his motion and
another in his subsequent affidavit is a transgression of this imperative which
necessitates appropriate punishment.

LIBIT VS. ATTY. EDELSON OLIVA 237 SCRA 375 – Respondent was charged with falsifying
the sheriff’s return of summons in a civil case where he was counsel for the plaintiff. In
disbarring Respondent, the Supreme Court held that he committed acts of misconduct
which warranted the exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The practice of law
is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
and continue to possess the qualifications required by law. One of these requirements is
the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer’s first
duty is not to his client but to the courts as he is above all an officer of the court sworn
to assist the courts in rendering justice to all. For this reason, he is required to swear to do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing in any in court.

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN, JR. VS. ATTY. RIZALINO SIMBILLO, AC#5299, 8/19/2003 - Respondent
posted paid ads in two national newspapers advertising his services as an “annulment
expert at P48,000.00 within 4 to 6 months. He admitted to the ads but reasoned that
there was nothing wrong with such conduct. Supreme Court suspended Respondent.
The practice of law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture and law advocacy is not capital that necessarily yields profits. Gaining
of a livelihood should be secondary consideration as duty to public service and to
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers. Solicitation of
legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must
be compatible with the legal profession’s dignity. If made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to lawyers and to the Bar. Use of simple signs stating the
name/s of the lawyer’s, the office and residence address and fields of practice as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Calling cars are acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable.

PEDRO LINSANGAN VS. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, AC#6672, 9/4/09 – Respondent

solicited Complainant’s client by persistently texting and calling them to transfer legal
representation with promises of financial aid and expeditious collection of claims.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. Lawyers are reminded that the practice of law
is a profession and not a business. Lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares as the contrary would commercialize the legal
practice, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every Bar member is called.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutions malpractice
– a ground for disbarment.

MANUEL VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. BEBE TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012 – Supreme Court
warned Respondent that, an agreement like the one supposedly forged between him
and Complainant for the latter to receive 10% of the former’s attorney’s fees for every
judicially-approved corporate rehabilitation plan prepared by the Complainant, is
violative of Rule 9.02. proscribing a lawyer from dividing or agreeing to divide fees for
legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law.

Respondent owned what purports to be a financial and legal consultancy company

which was in reality a vehicle for Respondent to procure professional employment,
specifically for corporate rehabilitation. A company letterhead proposing that should
the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, Respondent would render legal
services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank proves that Respondent
violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit. In suspending Respondent, Supreme Court held that, a lawyer is not
prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises
though when the business is of such nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer, or that can be used as a cloak for indirectly solicitation on
the lawyer’s behalf; or is of such a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be
regarded as practice of law.

ATTY. JULITO VITRIOLO, ET. AL. VS. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, AC#4984, 4/1/2003 – Respondent
who was the Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher
Education was charged with solicitation of money from various applicants for
correction of names pending before her office. In disbarring Respondent, the Supreme
Court ruled that, “generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a Bar member for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by the Court
as a Bar member. Respondent’s misconduct as a CHED lawyer is of such a character as
to affect her qualification as a Bar member. As a lawyer, she ought to have known that
it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration
for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

DAN JOEL V. LIM VS. ATTY. EDILBERTO BARCELONA, AC#5438, 3/10/2004 – Respondent
who was the chief of the NLRC-Public Assistance Center purportedly demanded money
from Complainants to in settlement of labor cases purportedly filed by their employees
and even threatened to close their businesses and put them in jail if they refused to
settle. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent reasoning that, if a lawyer’s misconduct in
the discharge of official duties as a government official is of such character as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a Bar
member on such ground. Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office.

WILFREDO M. CATU VS. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, A.C. No. 5738, 2/19/2008 –
Respondent, as barangay captain presided over the Lupon conciliatin proceedings
over a land dispute and later entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in
the subsequent ejectment case instituted involving the same parties. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent from law practice reasoning that, while Sec. 90 of the Local
Government Code subjected certain elective local officials to the proscription to
practice their profession, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and
members of the sangguniang baragay, however, he should have procured prior
permission or authorization from the the Secretary of DILG before he entered his
appearance as counsel pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 18 of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
Non-compliance therewith constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer to obey the
laws.

AURELIO M. SIERRA, VS. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, ET. AL., A.C. No. 7549, 8/29/2008 –
Complainant charged Respondent who were all city prosecutors with dereliction of
duty and gross ignorance of the law for not requiring the parties in certain criminal
cases instituted by Complainant to simultaneously appear during preliminary
investigation. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint holding that, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court does not require a confrontation between the parties. Preliminary investigation
is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits and supporting documents
through exchange of pleadings.

ANGEL BAUTISTA VS. ATTY. RAMON GONZALES 182 SCRA 151 – Respondent accepted a
civil case on contingency basis at 50% of the value of the litigated property. After
termination of the engagement, Respondent transferred to himself ½ of the property
subject of litigation. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. In executing a document
transferring ½ of the subject properties to himself, Respondent violated the law expressly
prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client’s property or interest involved in any
litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession (Art. 1491, CC). While a
lawyer may in good faith advance litigation expenses, the same should be the subject
of reimbursement. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expense
proceedings to enforce the client’s right is CHAMPERTOUS. Such an agreement is
against public policy, especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry
out the action at his own expenses of some bargain to have part of the thing in
litigation.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM LAW PRACTICE IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G.
MAQUERA, BM#793, 7/30/2004 – Atty. Maquera who was admitted to the Philipppine
Bar was later admitted to law practice in Guam. The Superior Court of Guam
suspended him from practicing in Guam due to misconduct for acquiring his client’s
property as payment for his legal services. The Guam court transmitted certified copies
of his suspension to the Philippine Supreme Court. May a Philippine Bar member be
suspended/disbarred for an infraction for which he has been suspended/disbarred from
law practice in a foreign country? Disbarment/suspension of a Philippine Bar member
by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension if the basis
of such action constitutes a ground for disbarment/suspension from law practice in the
Philippines. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency
shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment/suspension.

CRISTINO CALUB VS. ATTY. ABRAHAM SULLER, AC#1474, 1/28/2000 – A lawyer, under the
pretext of borrowing a blade, went to his neighbor’s house and raped her. Due to
reasonable doubt however he was acquitted. He argued that such acquittal should
warrant the dismissal of the disbarment case against him. In disbarring Atty. Suller, the
Supreme Court reasoned that acquittal due to prosecution’s failure to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is not determinative of the administrative case. The privilege
to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and equally important, morally.
MAXIMO DUMADAG VS. ATTY. ERNESTO LUMAYA, AC#2614, 6/29/2000 – Suspended
indefinitely from law practice, Respondent filed various pleadings including a petition to
lift his suspension seeking among others, clarification as to the exact term of his
suspension considering he was already 62 years of age and the lack of law practitioners
in their locality. Later he wrote the Chief Justice again imploring but also chiding the
Court for ‘slumbering’ on acting on his petition although still insisting his innocence.
Instead of lifting his suspension, the Supreme Court fixed his period of suspension at 10
years. The insolence of Respondent’s remonstrations that the Court was sleeping on its
job in acting on his case not only underscores his callous disregard of the myriad
administrative and judicial travails the Court has to contend with as the Court of Last
Resort, it also betrays his absolute lack of appreciation and disrespect for the efforts
and measures undertaken by the Court to cope with these concerns. Needless to state,
such presumptuousness is only too deserving of rebuke. Indefiniteness of Respondent’s
suspension, far from being cruel or degrading or inhuman has the effect of placing, as it
were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands –
that sanction has the effect of giving Respondent the chance to purge himself in his
own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct,
exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to
live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every Bar member
and officer of the courts.

LIGAYA MANIAGO VS. ATTY. LOURDES DE DIOS, AC#7472, 3/30/10 – Respondent who
had been suspended for 6 months from law practice was charged of violating the
order of her suspension by service as counsel for a Japanese national. In dismissing the
petition against Respondent, the Supreme Court noted that Respondent had already
served her prior 6-months suspension and had written a manifestation to the Court of
such fact. To be sure, the Supreme Court laid the following guidelines in relation to
resumption of practice following full service of suspension, to wit: (a) the suspended
lawyer must first present proof of his compliance by submitting certifications from the IBP
and Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from law practice during the period
of suspension; (b) thereafter, the Court, after evaluation and upon favorable
recommendation from the Office of the Bar Confidant, will issue a resolution lifting the
suspension order and allow him to resume his practice. It was only unfortunate that this
procedure was overlooked with regards to Respondent’s prior suspension.

CARLOS REYES VS. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, AC#5835, 8/10/10 – Suspended for an
aggregate period of 2 ½ years as a result of four administrative cases, Respondent
petitioned the Supreme Court for reinstatement as a member in good standing of the
Bar and to be allowed to practice law. Supreme Court granted Respondent’s
application for reinstatement effective upon his submission to the Court of a sworn
statement that: (a) he has completely served the four suspension orders imposed on
him successively; (b) he desisted from the law practice during the period of suspension;
(c) he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the court in
the previous administrative cases; (d) he has furnished copies of his sworn statement to
the IBP and the Executive Judge.
LEONARD RICHARDS VS. PATRICIO ASOY, AC#2655, 10/12/10 – In 1987, Respondent was
disbarred for grave professional misconduct and ordered to reimburse P16,000 to
Complainant. The latter wrote the Court several times to report non-payment by
Respondent. Respondent then sought readmission to the Bar in 1996, claiming that he
had consigned the money with the Court’s cashier. According to Respondent, his
belated compliance, that is, 9 years from the order to reimburse was due to his inability
to locate complainant. Supreme Court denied Respondent’s petition and the a later
petition in 2010 reasoning that, Respondent’s justification flimsy as it is, considering that
Complainant’s address was readily available with the Court what with the numerous
letters reporting Respondent’s non-compliance, glaringly speaks of his lack of candor,
of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities that do not endear him to the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling by
displaying a lack of candor towards the Court. By taking his sweet time to effect
reimbursement of the P16,000.00 – and through consignation with this Court at that - he
sent out a strong message that the legal processes and orders of this Court could be
treated with disdain or impunity.

FIDELA AND TERESITA BENGCO VS. ATTY. PABLO BERNARDO, AC#6368, 6/13/2012 –
Complainants charged that Respondent with a certain “Magat” enticed them to pay
money supposedly to expedite titling of their property without having performed the
task for which he was engaged. The Supreme Court found untenable Respondent’s
defense of prescription – that the complaint was filed two years after the supposed
deceit was committed. Administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse
of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.

ELPIDIO TIONG VS. ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, AC#4428, 12/12/2011 –Complainant

confirmed that Respondent who was his lawyer was having an affair with his wife when
he overheard, through the extension phone, Respondent say “I Love You” to
Complainant’s wife. Later, and in the presence of their spouses, Respondent and
Complainant’s wife admitted their amorous affair and then and there, executed an
affidavit before a notary public attesting to their illicit and seeking their respective
spouses’ forgiveness. This affidavit signed by Complainant, Respondent and their
spouses provided that no criminal or legal action would be taken against the offending
parties. Despite such stipulation, Complainant sought for the disbarment of Respondent
who interposed the defense of pardon. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from
the practice of law holding that his act of having an affair with his client's wife
manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital
vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his
profession. Undeniably, this illicit relationship amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. A case for suspension or
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil
case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the
respondent’s acts as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his
fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the affidavit, which is akin to an
affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the proceedings.
GRACE M. ANACTA VS. ATTY. EDUARDO RESURRECCION, AC#9074, 8/14/2012 –
Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he had
already filed a petition for annulment of marriage on Complainant’s behalf after
receipt of P42,000.00. He went to the extent of presenting to Complainant a supposed
copy of the petition duly filed with the court. Later, Complainant found out from the
court that no such petition was filed. Finding Respondent guilty of deceit and gross
misconduct, the Supreme Court suspended him from law practice reasoning that, there
is no ironclad rule that disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or
gross misconduct. The Court is not mandated to automatically impose the extreme
penalty of disbarment where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

Anent the issue of whether Respondent should be directed to return the money he
received from Complainant, this case is the opportune time to harmonize the Court’s
ruling on this matter. When the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and
moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of
whether respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be
deemed within the Court’s disciplinary authority. In this case, it is clear that Respondent
violated his lawyer’s oath and code of conduct when he withheld the amount of
P42,000.00 despite his failure to render the necessary legal services and after
complainant demanded its return. He must be therefore directed to return the same.

RODOLFO ESPINOSA VS. ATTY. JULIETA OMANA, AC#9081, 10/12/2011 – Respondent

purported advised that Complainant and his wife could live separately and dissolve
their marriage, preparing for that purpose, a “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.
Respondent claimed that, it was not her but a part-time office staff who notarized the
document. In suspending Respondent from law practice and being a notary public, the
Supreme Court held that, extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void and a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly
what Omaña did in this case.In preparing and notarizing a void document, Respondent
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 (duty not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful). Respondent knew fully that the Kasunduan has no legal effect and is against
public policy. Even granting arguendo that, it was her part-time staff who notarized the
contract, it only showed Respondent’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary
public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any
member of his staff.

TAN TIONG BIO VS. ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES, AC#6634, 8/23/2007 – Respondent was
duly commissioned as a notary public for Quezon City but notarized a deed of sale in
Pasig City. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court reasoned that, while
seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, Respondent’s act of notarizing
documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial
commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. Respondent by
performing through the years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized
indulged in deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public, Respondent
violated Canon 7 directing every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession.

JESSICA UY VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL SAÑO, AC#6505, 9/11/2008 – For notarizing documents
despite expiration of his notarial commission, Supreme Court suspended Respondent
holding that, practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show they posses, and continue to possess, qualifications required by law for
conferment of such privilege. A lawyer’s act of notarizing without the requisite
commission therefor is reprehensible constituting as it does, not only malpractice but
also the crime of falsification of public documents. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest converting
a private document into a public document making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of authenticity. As such, only those who are qualified and authorized may
act as notaries public. Respondent’s reliance upon his aide’s representation that his
commission had been renewed shows disregard of the requirements for issuance of a
notarial commission.

DOLORES DELA CRUZ VS. ATTY. JOSE DIMAANO, JR., AC#7781, 9/12/2008 – Respondent
notarized a deed which allowed Navarro (Complainant’s sister) full ownership over the
estate of their deceased parents. Complainant’s signature on this deed was forged
and Complainant did not even appear before Respondent. Supreme Court gave no
credence to Respondent’s defense that he simply relied upon Navarro’s
representations because they had been long time neighbours and he believed she
would not lie to him. Supreme Court held that notaries public should refrain from affixing
their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the
same individuals who executed it and personally appeared before them to attest to
the truth of what are stated therein, otherwise, notaries public would not be able to
verify the genuineness of the signatures and whether the document is the party’s free
act or deed. Notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to
the instrument has acknowledged and presented the proper residence certificate.

LORENZO BRENNISEN VS. ATTY. RAMON CONTAWI, AC#7481, 4/24/2012 – Complainant,

being a US resident, entrusted the administration of his land along with its title to
Respondent. Via a spurious Special Power of Attorney, Respondent mortgaged and
subsequently sold the subject property to Roberto Ho. Supreme Court suspended
Respondent for violating Canon 1 for disposing his client’s property without his
knowledge or consent and partaking of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit.
Respondent’s contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then
financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and
implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature reflected thereon was
forged.

ATTY. FLORITA LINCO VS. ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL, AC#7241, 10/17/2011 – Respondent is
charged with dishonesty and violation of the Notarial Law for notarizing a deed of
donation allegedly executed by Complainant’s husband (Atty. Alfredo Linco) in favor
of his illegitimate minor child, despite Respondent’s knowledge that affiant died a day
prior to notarization. Respondent claimed affiant, whom he meet prior to his demise,
asked him to notarize the deed of donation which affiant signed in Respondent’s
presence. Since Respondent did not have his notarial register, he told affiant to bring
the deed to his office anytime for notarization. Hence, despite knowledge of death,
Respondent notarized the deed to accommodate a colleague. The Supreme Court
suspended Respondent from law practice and being a notary public finding that,
affiant’s previous personal appearance before Respondent does not justify the
notarization of the deed due to affiant’s absence on the day of notarization. The rule
requires Respondent not to notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him
to attest to its contents and truthfulness. Further, in the notarial acknowledgment,
Respondent attested to affiant’s personal appearance before him on the day of
notarization, yet, affiant clearly could not have appeared as he already died a day
before. Clearly, Respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

CORAZON NEVADA VS. ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, AC#7591, 3/20/2012 – Complainant is

the principal stockholder of a hotel where One in Jesus Christ Church holds its services.
Respondent and Complainant being both church members, became friends.
Respondent took advantage of their friendship by failing to deliver the P90,000 rental
deposit paid, after Respondent represented himself as hotel administrator and entered
into a lease contract with Jung Chul for office space in the hotel. Complainant also
entrusted to Respondent several jewelries intended for sale. Respondent however,
failed to return the proceeds of the sale or the unsold articles to Complainant. In
suspending Respondent from law practice and being a notary public, the Supreme
Court held that, he was guilty of misrepresentation, when he made it appear that he
was authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of Nevada when, in fact, he
was not. For failing to return or remitting proceeds of the sale, upon demand, he also
breached his duty to hold in trust property belonging to his client (Canon 16, Rule
16.03). Moreover, Respondent’s act of affixing his signature above the printed name
“Edwin Nevada”, without any qualification, veritably made him a party to the lease
contract. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of
the Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial Rules.

HON. JULIETA DECENA VS. JUDGE NILO MALANYAON, AM#RTJ-02-1669, 4/14/2004 –

During a municipal session wherein the revocation of two resolution granting authority
to permit a cockpit was being deliberate, Respondent whose nephew was one of such
cockpit operators, heckled and interruption the session by hurling accusatory remarks
and insults toward the municipal official. Respondent claimed that he was merely
present during the council session in his private capacity as a taxpayer. In imposing a
fine on Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, he should be reminded that his
judicial identity does not terminate at the end of the day when he takes off his judicial
robes. Even when garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains
the air of authority and moral ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala. A
judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. As such, he should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities, as well as behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
SALVADOR SISON VS. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., AM#RTJ-03-1771, 5/27/2004 –
Respondent ordered Complainant who was an MMDA traffic enforcer to appear in his
court and explain why he issued a traffic ticket to Respondent’s son even if the latter
had introduced himself to be a son of a judge. For failure to appear and explain,
Respondent cited Complainant in contempt, ordered him arrested and only
discharged him after admitting before Respondent that he made a mistake. Supreme
Court dismissed Respondent from the service. Initially, he appeared to be justified in
holding Complainant for contempt due to the latter’s refusal to comply with his order.
However, Complainant was not a party to any pending cases. What triggered the
contempt charge was the traffic incident involving Respondent’s son – this being a
personal matter involving his son, Respondent should have refrained from ordering
Complainant’s arrest and detention. A judge should so behave at all times to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

CARLOS DIONISIO VS. HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, AM#RTJ98-1400, 2/1/1999 –

Respondent posted an ad in the court bulletin board for “attractive waitresses and
personable waiters for the family-owned restaurant. He even interviewed some
applicants in his court. A news ad accepting such applicants even listed the address of
his court. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. His conduct constitutes involvement
in private business and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family
business. Judges must not allow themselves to be distracted from the performance of
their judicial tasks by other lawful enterprises.

ZENAIDA BESO VS. JUDGE JUAN DAGUMAN, AM#MTJ-99-1211, 1/28/2000 – Respondent

was a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita. He solemnized Complainant’s marriage in his
residence in Calbayog City. In imposing a fine on Respondent, the Supreme Court held
that, a person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also
live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature
of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.
Considering that Respondent’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Calbayog City.

SALVADOR RUIZ VS. JUDGE AGELIO BRINGAS, AM#MTJ-00-1266, 4/6/2000 – In a hearing

before Respondent, Complainant who was the fiscal got into a verbal exchange with
Respondent after Complainant requested time to submit his recommendation to an
accused’s guilty plea. Respondent directed that it be put on record that Complainant
does not know how to compute the proper penalty and that he even took the bar
three times. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. The duty to maintain respect for
the court’s dignity applies to members of the Bar and bench alike. A judge should be
courteous both in conduct and language especially to those appearing before him. He
can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients and
the public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing or tyrannical. He should refrain
from conduct that demeans his office and remember always that courtesy begets
courtesy.
RUFINO CASIMIRO VS. JUDGE OCTAVIO FERNANDEZ, AM#MTJ-04-1525, 1/29/2004 – After
the dismissal of the criminal case against Complainant, Respondent failed to return the
cash bond posted. Respondent only later issued a check to refund Complainant’s cash
bond. Per SC Circular No. 50-95, all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and
other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within 24 hours by the Clerk of Court
concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, in the name of
the court, with its Clerk of Court and the Executive Judge as authorized signatories.
While there is no direct and hard evidence that Respondent made personal use of the
cash bond, his wife’s issuance of her personal check to Complainant in the amount of
the cash bond, indicates so. By his actuations then, Respondent placed his honesty and
integrity under serious doubt. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
such in all activities.

ENGRACIO DIALO, JR. VS. JUDGE MARIANO MACIAS, AM#RTJ-04-1859, 7/13/2004 –

Complainant and a companion, who were both witness in the administrative case for
immorality filed against Respondent by his wife. On their way to Manila for the hearing
of the administrative case, they were arrested and detained by police reports based
upon Respondent’s report that they were would-be assassin. During the pendency of
the administrative case against Respondent for oppression, Complainant withdrew his
complaint. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Complainant’s withdrawal/disavowal of
the contents of his administrative complaint does not necessarily warrant its dismissal.
Administrative actions cannot depend on complainant’s will/pleasure who may, for his
own reasons, condone what may be detestable. Desistance cannot divest the Court of
its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against the respondent because
public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of
the judiciary. By respondent’s act of requesting for complainant’s and his companion’s
warrantless arrest, he violated complainant’s constitutional right, an act which partakes
of the nature of oppression, defined as an “act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction,
domination or excessive use of authority.”

ATTY. GLORIA LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU VS. JUDGE RAPHAEL B. YRASTORZA, A.M. No.

RTJ-03-1793, 2/5/2004 – When Complainant asked for a resetting, Respondent cut her
off saying, “Do not give me so many excuses x x x I don’t care who you are! x x x You
can file one thousand administrative cases against me. I don’t care”. In another case,
Respondent scolded Complainant for failure to file pre-trial brief. Subsequently, when
pre-trial was conducted and Complainant was absent due to another engagement,
Respondent ordered Complainant’s client to produce the original documents in five
minutes or the case would be dismissed. Supreme Court reprimanded Respondent.
Mere desistance on Complainant’s part does not warrant dismissal of an administrative
complaint against any member of the bench and the judiciary. Court’s interest in the
judiciary’s affairs is a paramount concern that knows no bounds. Upon assumption to
office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal and becomes the visible representation
of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. The tenor of Respondent’s statement can
easily instill in the minds of those who heard them that as a judge he is above the law.
Respondent’s unfounded act of insulting Complainant in open court and cutting her off
in mid-sentence while she was still explaining her side exhibited a manifest disregard of
his duty be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct
proceedings in court with fitting dignity and decorum.

HEINZ R. HECK VS. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, AM#RTJ-01-1657, 2/23/2004 – Prior to his
appointment as RTC judge, Respondent supposedly violated the notarial law by
notarizing documents in 1980 to 1984 without being commissioned as notary public.
May a retired judge disciplined for notarizing documents without the necessary
commission more than 20 years ago? Supreme Court fined Respondent. A judge may
be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. Possession of
good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law. Thus, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a
member of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission
therefor. Even then, though Respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still
considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm
of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

RODRIGO Q. TUGOT VS. JUDGE MAMERTO COLIFLORES, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1332, 2/16/2004
– Respondent dismissed an ejectment case wherein Complainant was one of the
plaintiffs. The latter appealed the dismissal but were advised to re-file their notice of
appeal because the records transmitted to the appellate court did not have a notice
of appeal. As it turned out, the notice of appeal was not lost but was simply misplaced
in Respondent’s office. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Courts exist to dispense and
promote justice. Realization of this solemn purpose depends to a great extent on the
intellectual, moral and personal qualities of the men and women who are called to
serve as judges. Misplacement of the notice of appeal indicates gross negligence.
Respondent should have been more prudent in determining the cause of its temporary
loss, which caused unnecessary inconvenience to Complainant, whose right to appeal
was affected. As administrative officers of the courts, judges should organize and
supervise court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as
well as the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. He
should adopt a system of records management, so that files are kept intact despite the
temporary absence of the person primarily responsible for their custody.
ELENA R. ALCARAZ VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1539, 4/14/2004 –
Having declared Complainant and her co-defendants in a civil collection suit in
default, Respondent proceeded with plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence and
thereafter, rendered judgment in plaintiff’s favour. rendered judgment in a civil case
Complainant alleged that she was not furnished various pleading and orders including
plaintiff’s motion to declare defendants in default and the order granting the same.
Supreme Court fined Respondent. Rule 9, Sec. (a) of the Rules on Civil Procedure
requires that “a party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings
but shall not take part in the trial”. So, even when a defendant is already declared in
default, he is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings. Respondent’s failure to
comply with the elementary dictates of procedural rules constitutes a violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code is explicit in its mandate that, “a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence”. Competence is the mark of
a good judge. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges
his own fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the
dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law.
SPS. RODOLFO & SYLVIA CABICO VS. JUDGE EVELYN DIMACULANGAN-QUERIJERO,
AM#RTJ-02-1735, 4/27/2007 – Respondent dismissed a criminal case for rape on ground
of full payment of civil liability and disinterest to prosecute, despite the manifestation in
court that Complainants who were the parents of the 17-year old victim would not settle
and their refusal to sign the affidavit of desistance. Supreme Court fined Respondent.
Respondent dismissed the criminal case after the accused had paid their individual civil
liability. This is in utter disregard and in gross ignorance of the law because payment of
civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability. When a law or rule is basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.
As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected
to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretations of our laws. Having
accepted the exalted position of a judge, Respondent owes the public and the court
she sits in proficiency in the law.

MARISSA MONDALA VS. JUDGE REBECCA MARIANO, AM#RTJ-06-2010, 1/25/2007 –

Respondent supposedly misrepresented in her report of pending cases that a decision
had already been rendered in a certain case when in fact, it was still with Complainant
(legal researcher) for research and drafting. Respondent claimed mere oversight and
not misrepresentation, i.e., at the time the monthly report was made, a decision had
actually been prepared. Supreme Court fined Respondent. A decision in a civil case is
rendered only upon the signing by the judge who penned the same and upon filing
with the clerk of court. A draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case
until the same is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation.
Under Sec. 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges ought to ensure
that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer. Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of
the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

GIDEON JUSON VS. JUDGE VICENTE MONDRAGON, AM#MTJ-07-1685, 10/3/2007 –

Respondent purportedly delayed for over three year in resolving Complainant’s motion
to intervene in a civil case for recovery of a land. Respondent admitted the delays
citing failing health due to a stroke and his load of supervising three courts at a time as
causes therefor. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Rules prescribing time within which
certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. Judicial office exacts nothing less than faithful
observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties. Section
15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower
courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are
submitted for decision or resolution. His failing health, as an excuse for the delay hardly
merits serious consideration. Even if he was stricken by an illness hampering his due
performance of his duties, it was incumbent upon him to inform this Court of his inability
to seasonably decide the cases assigned to him. As to his additional work in supervising
three courts at a time, such will not exonerate him. His failure to decide the case on
time cannot be ignored. Respondent should have know that if his caseload, additional
assignments or designations, health reasons or other facts prevented the timely
disposition of his pending cases, all he had to do was simply ask this Court for a
reasonable extension of time to dispose of his cases.

CONRADO LADIGON VS. JUDGE RIXON GARONG, AM#MTJ-08-1712, 8/20/2008 –

Respondent used his title as “judge” and his court’s official stationary in writing a letter-
complaint to the Chairman of the First United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA about
the surreptitious manner of the incorporation of the Banard Kelly Memorial United
Methodist Church, singling out Complainant to be part of the deception. Admitting that
he used his court’s letterhead and signed his letter using the word “judge”, Respondent
reasoned that he merely used an ordinary bond paper and typed thereon his court’s
station “to indicate the return or inside address”. Supreme Court admonished
Respondent. What is involved here is the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities”. Respondent’s transgression was
not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in
considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title. Use of
a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances
of the use – the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of “impropriety”
or “appearance of impropriety”. Respondent crossed the line of propriety when he
used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged violation of church rules
and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter addressed to a
foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of official
recognition or notice of the reported violation.

JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN VS. JUDGE SIBANAH USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 2-15-11 –

Complainant and her co-party litigants filed a motion to inhibit Respondent. During the
hearing for said motion, Respondent became emotional, forced Complainant to testify
without counsel, demanding a public apology, relentlessly interrogating her and finally
ordering her detained for direct contempt finding her in direct contempt until she
divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the court but not exceeding 30 days.
Supreme Court fined Respondent. No amount of rationalization can reconcile the limit
of the 10-day period of imprisonment for direct contempt set in Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court with the 30-day maximum period of imprisonment fixed by Respondent.
By virtue of his office, Respondent knows or should have known this so basic a rule. The
glaringly clarity of the rule tripped Respondent to commit a glaring error which was
made even more flagrant by the fact that Respondent was actually detained for 19
days. Failure to follow basic legal commands as prescribed by law and the rules is
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law.

OCA VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO LEONIDA, AM#RTJ-09-2198, 1/18/11 – Per judicial
audit and inventory conducted when Respondent availed of optional retirement, the
Office of the Court Administrator determined that Respondent failed to decide 102
criminal cases and 43 civil cases as well as to resolved motions in 10 civil cases.
Supreme Court fined Respondent. A judge’s failure to decide a case within the
reglementary period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with
utmost rigor for delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the
litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost
of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary
lowering its standards and bringing it to disrepute. The administration of justice demands
that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set
before them. As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with
efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but
likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence must be their
guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence
which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent.

OCA VS. JUDGE BENJAMIN ESTRADA, AM#RTJ-09-2173, 1/18/11 – In the review of the
monthly report of cases from MTCC Malaybalay, Bukidnon, the OCA noted that
Respondent issued orders dismissing certain cases even when he was no longer the
judge of said court having been promoted to the RTC. Likewise the RTC Executive
Judge (Bacal) issued similar orders affecting certain MTCC cases. Both judges admitted
the acts claiming that they did not intend to violate the law, acting as they did out of
their desire to uphold the accused’s right to liberty in the cases they took cognizance
of. Both judges were fined by the Supreme Court. Their shared intention to uphold the
accused’s right to liberty cannot justify their action in excess of their authority in
violation of existing regulations. The vacuum in a first level court (MTC) due to the
absence of a presiding judge is not remedied by a take-over of the duties of the still-to-
be appointed or designated judge for that court, which is what they did. Instead of
allowing Respondent and herself to act on pending MTCC cases, the RTC Executive
Judge should have designated a municipal judge within her area of supervision to act
on the pending cases.

IMELDA MARCOS VS. JUDGE FERNANDO PAMINTUAN, AM#RTJ-07-2062, 1/18/11 – In 1996,

then Judge Reyes issued an order which later became final and executor releasing the
Golden Buddha status in custodial egis to the heirs of Rogelio Roxas. In implementing
said order, Respondent in his May 2006 Order added a statement to the effect that the
Golden Buddha in the court’s custody was a “fake or mere replica”. Having been
previously warned and punished for various infraction, Respondent was dismissed from
the service by the Supreme Court. While judges like any other citizen are entitled to
freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights,
they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. It is axiomatic
that when a judgment is final and executor, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It
may no longer be modified in ay respect either by the court which rendered it or even
by the Supreme Court. It is inexcusable for Respondent to have overlooked such basic
legal principle no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to
the public to be well-informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes
and procedural rules at all times. When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act
as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

ATTY. NORLINDA DESCALLAR VS. HON. REINERIO RAMAS, AM#RTJ-06-2015, 12/15/10 – For
omitting to reflect his absences in his May and June 2005 Certificates of Service,
Supreme Court FINED Respondent for dishonesty. Respondent admitted he reported for
work intermittently or did not report at all, after his Order that he had to temporarily stop
working due to the death threats he receiving in relation to a decision he made over
an electoral protest case. Indeed, there may be threats to his life as alleged in his order
but such threats do not justify cessation from performing judicial functions. Threats are
concomitant peril in public office especially in the judiciary, where magistrates decide
and determine sensitive issues that normally generate or provoke reprisals from losing
litigants. This is a consequence that a judge should be prepared of. Their exalted
position entails a great responsibility unyielding to one’s personal convenience.
Respondent is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code
of Judicial Conduct - a judge should perform official duties honestly, and with
impartiality and diligence (Canon 3), a judge be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence (Rule 3.01), and a judge to observe high standards of public
service and fidelity at all times (Rule 3.09). Respondent irrefragably failed to observe
these standards by making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service to cover
up his absences.

GAUDENCIO PANTILO III VS. JUDGE VICTOR CANOY, AM#RTJ-11-2262, 2/9/11 – Supreme
Court FINED Respondent for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and
appearance of impropriety for verbally ordering the release of the accused in a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide even when no information
was yet filed. Respondent also granted accused’s motion to release his impounded
vehicle despite said motion despite violation of the 3-day notice rule. In his defense,
Respondent invoked accused’s constitutional right to bail which supposedly did not
require that a person be charged in court before one could apply for it. While, It is
settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail, herein-
complaint focused on the manner of accused’s release from detention. In sum, there
was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector or
provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and
no written release order. While Respondent insisted that such may be considered as
“constructive bail,” there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest
of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the rights of another.

JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN VS. JUDGE SIBANAH USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 2-15-11 – In a

hearing on a motion for inhibition filed by Complainant relative to a suit pending before
Respondent, the latter forced Complainant to take the stand, then and there,
demanded a public apology and relentlessly interrogated her till Respondent issued an
order finding Complainant guilty of direct contempt and ordered her detention until
she divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the Court but not to exceed 30
days. Supreme Court FINED Respondent reasoning that, no amount of rationalization
can reconcile the limit of the 10-day period of imprisonment for direct contempt set in
Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court with the 30-day (maximum period of) imprisonment
that Respondent fixed in his order. By virtue of his office, Respondent knows or should
have known this so basic a rule. The glaring clarity of the rule tripped Respondent to
commit a glaring error, which was made even more flagrant by the fact that
Complainant was actually imprisoned for 19 days. Failure to follow basic legal
commands as prescribed by law and the rules is tantamount to gross ignorance of the
law. By accepting the exalted position of a judge, Respondent ought to have been
familiar with the legal norms and precepts as well as the procedural rules.
DANIEL SEVILLA VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO LINDO, AM#MTJ-08-1714, 2/9/11 – Complainant
charged that Respondent repeated reset the hearing of the BP22 case he filed so as to
force him to enter into a compromise agreement evident from Respondent’s comment
to him that, “Mr. Sevilla, ang hirap mo namang pakiusapan. Konting pera lang yan.
Bahala ka maghintay sa wala.” In imposing a FINE on Respondent, Supreme Court held
that, a trial judge who allows, or abets, or tolerates numerous unreasonable
postponements of the trial, whether out of inefficiency or indolence, or out of bias
towards a party, is administratively liable. Postponement of a hearing in a civil/criminal
case may at times be unavoidable, the Court however, disallows undue/unnecessary
postponements of court hearings, simply because they cause unreasonable delays in
the administration of justice and, thus, undermine the people’s faith in the Judiciary,
aside from aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants. Thus, the
Court has enjoined for postponements and resettings to be allowed only upon
meritorious grounds. The strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force
and greater reason to prosecutions involving violations of BP 22, the prompt resolution
of which has been ensured by their being now covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure – a rule precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the
speedy disposition of cases. Respondent flagrantly violated the letter and spirit of both
of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer
justice impartially and without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
which required him as a trial judge “to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted
to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.”

LYDELLE CONQUILLA VS. JUDGE LAURO BERNARDO, AM#MTJ-09-1737, 2/9/11 –

Respondent was charged with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and
ignorance of the law for conducting a preliminary investigation and finding probable
cause therein to charged Complainant with direct assault. Supreme Court SUSPENDED
Respondent, reasoning that, Respondent’s conduct of such preliminary investigation
directly contravenes A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (effective October 5, 2005), amending Rules
112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The latter removed the
conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts and making it
incumbent upon them to forward the records of the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for
preliminary investigation. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites (Canon
3) to the due performance of judicial office. Hence, when a law or rule is basic, judges
owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.
Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law
and jurisprudence.

ELADIO PERFECTO VS. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO ESIDERA, AM-RTJ-11-2270, 1/31/11 –

Respondent was charged with soliciting and receiving money from a fiscal and a
private practitioner supposedly to defray expenses for a religious celebration and
barangay fiesta. In her answer, Respondent brushed off the affidavit of Fiscal Ching
who witnessed the solicitation, claiming that the fiscal who was a former law student to
whom she gave a 3-grade because her ‘codigo’ was still inserted in the examination
booklet, is of “dubious personality” with a “narcissistic personality disorder”. FINED for
impropriety and conduct unbecoming, the Supreme Court held that, use of acerbic
words was uncalled for considering Respondent’s status. Further, her act of soliciting
(under the guise of a religious cause) betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge
but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice,
held in high esteem and respect by the local community, which must be preserved at
all times. It spawns the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or
pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz
into donating money through her charismatic group for religious purposes. A judge must
be like Caesar’s wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act
discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the judiciary must
exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private
individual. It is never trite to caution Respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both
speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is
always under constant observation.

FLORENDA TOBIAS VS. JUDGE MANUEL LIMSIACO, AM-MTJ-09-1734, 1-19-11 –

Complainant who charged Respondent with corruption for allegedly offering
“package deals” to litigants, claimed that the court stenographer informed her
sister that Respondent required P30,000 to provide counsel, prepare pleadings
and ensure a favorable decision in an ejectment case. Respondent did not
personally accept the initial payment of P10,000 but admitted to talking with
Complainant’s sister, recommending a lawyer and subsequently preparing a
motion for counsel to withdraw. Fined for gross misconduct, the Supreme Court
held that, although the alleged offer of package deals by Respondent to
litigants was unsubstantiated, it was improper for Respondent to talk to
prospective litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to handle cases.
The act of preparing the motion for counsel to withdraw is likewise improper and
unethical. The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and reflective of
the integrity of his office. Said acts of Respondent violate Sec. 1 of Canon 2
(Integrity), Sec. 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety)
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

ANTONINO MONTICALBO V. JUDGE CRESENTE MACARAYA, AM#RTJ-09-2197, 4/13/11 – In

admonishing Respondent for citing a non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of Appeals
with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 – in his
order, the Supreme Court held that, a search of available legal resources reveals that
no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court. Further, Supreme Court
docket numbers do not bear the initials, “CA G.R.” and, it cannot be considered a CA
case because the respondent was the “Court of Appeals.” This was counter to the
standard of competence and integrity expected of those occupying Respondent’s
judicial position. A judge must be “the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.” While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without
proof that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required
to observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
duties.
Compiled, digested and prepared by:

ATTY. ROMEO A. REYES, JR.