Sarmiento vs Mison (156 SCRA 549) "The President shall have the power to make appointments
GR No. L-79974 Dec 17, 1987 during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
Subjects of Construction; The Constitution; How the
Constitution should be construed.
Statutory Construction; Constitution; Intent of the framers of
the constitution and of the people adopting it must be given
effect. —The fundamental principle of constitutional
construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to
which force is to be given is that which is embodied and
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. The
Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative department may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide.
Facts: Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground
that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Issue: Is the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the
BOC unconstitutional for no having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments?
Ruling: Yes. Petition was thus dismissed.
As earlier held by the Court, the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The
intention to which force is to be given is that which is
embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves.
The applicable constitutional provision was construed not in
accordance with how the executive or legislative department
may want them construed, but in accordance to what they say
and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
"The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
thosewhom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress."
It is readily apparent from above quoted provision that there
are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
The First group clearly needed consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The
Court then resolved to determine if the Second, Third and
Fourth Groups of Presidential Appointees needed
confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.
The Court cited the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that
only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the
first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
Then, they referred to the historical background as well as the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine
the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the
people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the
President, under the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups, require the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
However, political history showed that under the said
Constitution, the power of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments transformed that commission into a venue of
horse-trading and similar malpractices.
In the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian
pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive
amendments, placed absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two extremes in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the framers of the 1987 Constitution struck a
middle ground by requiring consent of the Commission on
Appointments for the first group and leaving to the President,
without such consent, appointment of other officers, i.e. those
in the 2nd and 3rd groups as well as the 4th group i.e., officers
of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
support this conclusion. Initially, the text of Section 16, Article
VII was almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart in the 1935
Constitution. On the discussion of this section by the framers,
a feeling was expressed to make the power of the Commission
on Appointments over presidential appointments more limited
than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution.
After deliberations, the framers thus arrived at the current
form of the applicable constitutional provision.
Amicus curiae Senator Neptali Gonzales contended that the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII which reads –
". . . He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint . .
x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the
President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned
in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall
appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the
same manner as he appoints officers
mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and
with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointment.
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible
meanings of the word "also" as used in the context of said
second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance
from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by
the President and appointment by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the
second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President.
And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences
proximate to each other underscores a difference in message
conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge
Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in
alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly
and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose
appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank,
compared to some officers whose appointments have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the
appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he
is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
The third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated
merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress
may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of various departments of the
government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal
import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the
1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy
cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments,
except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
On the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs, it is evident that the bureau heads are not one of
those within the first group which require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. While in the 1935 Constitution
the heads of bureaus were included in the first group, the 1987
Constitution deliberately excluded heads of bureaus from
appointments that need such consent (confirmation).
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to
appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, in
accordance with Sec. 601 of RA 1937 otherwise known as the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and PD 34,
amending the said Code.
Consequently, the Court ruled that the President of the
Philippines acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting
his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority
and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.

Francisco vs House of Representatives (415 SCRA 44)
GR No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ESPINOSA, GENO FRANCO
Subjects of Construction; The Constitution; How the
Constitution should be construed.
Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; Wherever possible, the
words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Statutory Construction; The words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers—
ratio legis est anima—the object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.
Statutory Construction; The Constitution is to be interpreted as
a whole—ut magis valeat quam pereat.
Statutory Construction; If the plain meaning of the word is not
found to be clear, resort to other aids is available; The proper
interpretation of a constitutional provision depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than the
framers’ understanding thereof.
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.”6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by abovementioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.”
Ruling: Yes, the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional.
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office,
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
**** TABLE ******
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De
Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of
our present Constitution, contending that the term initiate
does not mean to file; that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the
House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean to file because filing can,
as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not
have been violated as the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been
initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation
of the term initiate. Resort to statutory construction is,
therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the
Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually
became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the
meaning of initiate as to file, as proffered and explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the
Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the
oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5,
2003 at which he added that the act of initiating included the
act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any
doubt that indeed the word initiate as it twice appears in
Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.
Initiate of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means to perform
or facilitate the first action, which jibes with Justice Regalados
position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the
oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003
in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is
not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and an
end. The end is the transmittal of the articles
of impeachment to the Senate. The middle
consists of those deliberative moments
leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its
referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House
Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is deemed initiated when the
Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that
the Rule does not say impeachment
proceedings are initiated but rather
are deemed initiated. The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier,
but by legal fiction there is an attempt to
postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting
the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. From the
records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies
of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This
is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the
First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of
the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting
on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and
judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted
by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my
thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles
of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have
pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the
filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor
is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of
the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved
the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score,
probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging
these words because we have to be very technical about this. I
have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are
with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are
with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on
record.
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a
reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only
in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House
of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to
any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines
17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to initiate
impeachment proceedingsand the comma (,) and insert on
line 19 after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in impeachment and
replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH
THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as
far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with
it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words
Articles of Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the case
of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in
any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of
the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.[143] (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was
clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability
of Public Officers.
It is thus clear that the framers intended initiation to start with
the filing of the complaint.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas
clarified that the word initiate, appearing in the constitutional
provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is to initiate. The object in the first sentence is
impeachment case. The object in the second sentence is
impeachment proceeding. Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term cases must be distinguished from
the term proceedings. An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-
quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of
one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It
is in that sense that the House has exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
proceeding must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A
proceeding must be initiated. To initiate, which comes from
the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle,
and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House
and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives
or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of
the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject
the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4)
there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of
the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of
one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the
Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
the House initiates an impeachment case. It is at this point that
an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That
is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment case
before the Senate as impeachment court.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section. Clearly, its power to promulgate its
rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section. Hence, these rules
cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which
said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient
in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term initiate a
meaning different from filing.
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
 Chavez vs JBC (676 SCRA 579)
GR No. 202242 July 17, 2012
Subjects of Construction; The Constitution; How the
Constitution should be construed.
Statutory Construction; It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.
Statutory Construction; Noscitur a Sociis; Under the maxim
noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated.
Constitutional Law; Judicial and Bar Council; Doubtless, the
Framers of our Constitution intended to create a Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) as an innovative solution in response to the
public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment
of members of the Judiciary.
Same; Doctrine of Operative Facts; In the interest of fair play
under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
ABAD, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Statutory Construction; View that it is a basic principle in
statutory construction that the law must be given a reasonable
interpretation at all times.
Facts: The 1987 Constitution conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC). Its composition, term and functions are provided under
Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall
be appointed by the President for a term of
four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the
Members first appointed, the representative
of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four
years, the professor of law for three years,
the retired Justice for two years, and the
representative of the private sector for one
year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be
the Secretary ex officio of the Council and
shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall
receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual
budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal
function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court
may assign to it.
In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the
creation of the JBC, designated one representative to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order
to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive
body, the House of Representatives and the Senate would
send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words,
Congress had only one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th)
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.8 At present, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives
of the legislature.
Issue:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its
functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution
Ruling: Yes, it does run counter to the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution.
The composition of the JBC as stated in the first paragraph of
Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the
 Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The regular members are
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, professor
of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the
present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special
members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall
be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative
of Congress.”
The use of a singular letter “a” preceding “representative of
Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is
that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much
as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say.33 Verba legis non est recedendum―from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained;35 and second, because the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail. Moreover,
under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated. This is because a word
or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or
restricted by the latter.38 The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible.39 In short, every meaning to be given to
each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of
the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases and its
meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section
8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate
or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that,
in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed
to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible,
since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the
Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum,“from the
enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that
each category of members pertained to a single individual
only.”
Dissenting Opinion Abad, J.:
The majority heavily relies on the wordings of Section 8(1)
above. According to them, the framers of the 1987
Constitution used plain, unambiguous, and certain terms in
crafting that section and, therefore, it calls for no further
interpretation. The provision uses the indefinite article “a”
signifying “one” before the word “representative” which in
itself is in singular form. Consequently, says the majority,
Congress should have but just one representative in the JBC.
Section 8(1) uses the term “Congress” in its generic sense,
without any special and specific mention of the two houses
that compose it, namely the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
The majority also invokes the doctrine of noscitur a sociis
which states that a proper interpretation may be had by
considering the words that accompany the term or phrase in
question.2 By looking at the enumeration in Section 8(1) of
who the JBC members are, one can readily discern that every
category of membership in that body refers just to a single
individual.
There are three well-settled principles of constitutional
construction: first, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the
words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed; second,
where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima, meaning that
the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers; and third, ut magis
valeat quam pereat, meaning that the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole.3
There is no question that when the Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) deliberated on the provisions regarding the
composition of the JBC, the members of the commission
thought, as the original draft of those provisions indicates, that
the country would have a unicameral legislative body, like a
parliament. For this reason, they allocated the three “ex
officio” memberships in
the council to the Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative from the National Assembly, evidently to give
representation in the JBC to the three great branches of
government.
Subsequently, however, the ConCom decided, after a very
close vote of 23 against 22, to adopt a bicameral legislative
body, with a Senate and a House of Representatives.
Unfortunately, as Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
ConCom, admits, the committee charged with making
adjustments in the previously passed provisions covering the
JBC, failed to consider the impact of the changed character of
the legislature on the inclusion of “a representative of the
Congress” in the membership of the JBC.

Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the law

must be given a reasonable interpretation at all times.5 The
Court may, in some instances, consider the spirit and reason of
a statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, or injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose
of the law makers.6 Applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of the constitution may render its provisions
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or
an injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind
the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law
itself, resort should be made to the rule that the spirit of the
law controls its letter.

To insist that only one member of Congress from either the

Senate or the House of Representatives should sit at any time
in the JBC, is to ignore the fact that while these two houses of
Congress are involved in the common task of making laws, they
are separate and distinct.8 Senators are
elected by the people at large, while the Members of the
House of Representatives, by their respective districts or
sectors. They have detached administrative organizations and
deliberate on laws separately, indeed, often coming up with
dissimilar drafts of those laws. Clearly, neither the Senate nor
the House of Representatives can by itself claim to represent
the Congress.

Allowing a Senator and a Congressman to sit alternately at any

one time cannot be a solution since each of them would
actually be representing only his half of Congress when he
takes part in JBC deliberations. Allowing both, on the other
hand, to sit in those deliberations at the same time with half a
vote each is absurd since that would diminish their standing
and make them second class members of JBC, something that
the Constitution clearly does not contemplate. It is presumed
when drafting laws that the legislature does not intend to
produce undesirable consequences. Thus, when a literal
translation would result to such consequences, the same is to
be utterly rejected.
 Chavez vs JBC (696 SCRA 497)
GR No. 202242 April 16, 2013
Statutory Construction; Rule of Casus Omissus; According to
the rule of casus omissus “a case omitted is to be held as
intentionally omitted”; The Court cannot supply what it thinks
the legislature would have supplied had its attention been
called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation.
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in
the exercise of its primary function―to legislate. JBC was
created to support the executive power to appoint, and
Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function.

Facts: The respondents pray that the Court reconsider its
decision and dismiss the petition on
the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative
from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering
its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make
the proper adjustment when there was a shift from
unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that
two representatives from Congress would not subvert the
intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political
partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring
a seven-member composition would provide a solution should
there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House
of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived
at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members,
three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government―the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of
Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a
representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative
Department). The total is seven (7), not eight.

Issue: Whether or not the grounds to reconsider the decision

are sufficient to hold the composition of the JBC, with 8
members 2 of which are from Congress, constitutional.

Ruling: The Court dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration.

The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema

lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the
framework upon which government and society were to
operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional
provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that
the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the
Constitution must be taken to have
been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word
employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of

plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012
Decision, in opting to use the singular letter “a” to describe
“representative of Congress,” the Filipino people through the
Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1)
seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided,
as can be read in its other provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several

provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift
to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which
provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken
“by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.”20 Another is Section 8 thereof
which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to
be confirmed “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting separately.”21 Similarly, under Section
18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or
continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members.”22 In all these provisions,
the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly,
the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter
would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses. Thus, to
say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article
VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a
bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough.
 Macalintal v. PET
(G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010)
PRINCIPLE:
Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat.—Last, ut magis
valeat quam pereat—the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in the
landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991): It is a well-
established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that
all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate
the whole purpose of the Constitution and one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together. In other words, the court must
harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Macalintal questions the
constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is
"authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,"
he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate
tribunal". Petitioner avers that the designation of the
Members of the Court as Chairman and Members
thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the designation of
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in
the exercise thereof.
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise
of the court’s power to judge presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, as well as the rule-
making power adjunct thereto, is plenary. The court
reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply
constitutionalized what was statutory before the
1987 Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution
has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all
courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in
the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
The court had previously declared that the PET is not
simply an agency to which Members of the Court
were designated. The PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. The vehicle for
the exercise of this power, as intended by the
Constitution and specifically mentioned by the
Constitutional Commissioners during the
discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the
PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s,
should not constrict an absolute and constitutional
grant of judicial power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitution of the PET,
composed of the Members of this Court, is
unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII
and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING:
No. On its face, the contentious constitutional
provision does not specify the establishment of the
PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit,
otherwise. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
should be read with other related provisions of the
Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the
Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion,
the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to act as
sole judge of election contests involving our
country’s highest public officials, and its rule-
making authority in connection therewith, is not
 Aglipay v. Ruiz (64 Phil. 201, March 13, 1937) to the country. In evaluating the design made for the
stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead
of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the
PRINCIPLE: location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the
Writ not confined exclusively to courts or inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International
tribunals.—The statutory rule, therefore, in this Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not considering these, it is evident that there is no
confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the
them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
to prevent them from encroaching upon the The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts
are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of
actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez
[1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

FACTS:
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in
Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance
of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the
City of Manila. The said event was organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio
Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente
Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise
the matter to the President. The said stamps in
consideration were actually issued already and sold
though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented
by the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated the
Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress

RULING:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution
by issuing and selling the commemorative postage
stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No.
4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in
view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to
determine when the issuance of new postage stamps
would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of
course, the phrase “advantageous to the
Government” does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the
postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a
particular church or denomination. The stamps did
not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor were
money derived from the sale of the stamps given to
that church. The purpose of issuing of the stamps was
to actually take advantage of an international event
considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity
to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists
 Estrada v. Escritor
(A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)
PRINCIPLE:
The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment
Clause was meant to protect the state from the church,
and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no
interaction between the two.—The Strict Separationist
believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to
protect the state from the church, and the state’s
hostility towards religion allows no interaction between
the two. According to this Jeffersonian view, an absolute
barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state
needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not
receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state.
Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to
alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. Only
the complete separation of religion from politics would
eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions
and provide for a free choice among political views, thus
a strict “wall of separation” is necessary.
Governmental Neutrality Theory.—Under the
governmental neutrality theory, the establishment
clause requires government to be neutral on religious
matters. This theory was articulated by Mr. Justice Clark
in the case of Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963), where he stated that what the
Constitution requires is “wholesome neutrality,” i.e.,
laws and governmental programs must be directed to
secular ends and must have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. This test as stated by Mr.
Justice Clark embodies a theory of strict neutrality—thus,
the government may not use the religious factor as a
basis for classification with the purpose of advancing or
inhibiting religion: The place of religion in our society is
an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of
reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable
citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come
to recognize through bitter experience that it is not
within the power of government to invade that citadel,
whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to
advance or retard. In the relationship between man and
religion, the state is firmly committed to a position of
neutrality. (Italics supplied) However, the concept of
governmental neutrality can be interpreted in various
ways—to some, anything but total neutrality is
anathema; to others, “neutrality can only mean that
government policy must place religion at neither a
special advantage nor a special disadvantage.”
Accommodation Theory. —The accommodation theory
provides that any limitation derived from the
establishment clause on cannot be rigidly applied so as
to preclude all aid to religion and that in some situations
government must, and in other situations may,
accommodate its policies and laws in the furtherance of
religious freedom. The accommodation theory found its
first expression in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1951). The U.S. Supreme Court held in Zorach that a
state could authorize an arrangement whereby public
school children could be released one hour a week for
religious instruction off the school premises. Zorach did
not involve religiously motivated conduct that
constituted a violation of a criminal statute.
FACTS:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las
Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who
is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a
year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio
is still legally married to another woman. Complainant
Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate
respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it
will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent
claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by
her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval
of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for
such conjugal arrangement.
RULING:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is
exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put
it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights.
The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case
at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public
and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only
to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres
the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate
that the state has used the least intrusive means possible
so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state.
Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right
to freedom of religion.
Sps. Imbong vs. Ochoa [G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014.]
Principle: Preamble
Facts:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this court has
consistently armed this preferred status, well aware that it is
“designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good. Nothing has polarized the nation more in
recent years than the issues of population growth control,
abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their
perceived consequences freely circulate in various media.
From television debates, to sticker campaigns, from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by
members of the clergy — the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of
the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said
law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking
on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in intervention.
Issue: 1. Whether or not RA 10354 is constitutional?
Ruling:
The Church and The State At the outset, it cannot be denied
that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of
people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in
law and in practice, has allowed these various religious,
cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society
together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant
towards all — the religious people of different sects and the
non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally
believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to
whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our
fundamental law.
Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of the
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God "
manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that
the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so
far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.
Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to
society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions
such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious
officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier
so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church
and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable. Verily, the principle of separation of Church and
State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question
its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand,
the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they
are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should
ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-
cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense,
which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia , or any other
house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to
provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit
of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the
following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI,
Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
Section 29
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom
provides two guarantees: The Establishment Clause and The
Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause establishment clause "principally
prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring
any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it
prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause free
exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is
prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith. Explaining the concept
of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union wrote: The constitutional provisions not only
prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or
the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148,
1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form
of religion within limits of utmost amplitude but also assures
the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits
of utmost amplitude.
It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are
all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good.
Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may
be characterized as being only indirect (Sherbert v. Verner,374
U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970). But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law
which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S.420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed
to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal — to
promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices.
In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for
religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with
rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the
power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is
the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded
only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of
belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and
without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however
strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to
others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of
road to travel.
The second part however, is limited and subject to the
awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare”.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;
2. Section 23 (a) (1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3. Section 23 (a) (2) (i) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4. Section 23 (a) (2) (ii) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5. Section 23 (a) (3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6. Section 23 (b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;
7. Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8. Section 3.01 (a) and Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, which
added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
 Gamboa vs Finance Sec. however the constitution states that 60% of the total
(G.R. no. 176579, October 9, 2012) common shares must be Filipino owned for the
Filipinos to have control over PLDT.

Facts:
Petitioner Gamboa questioned the sale of shares
involving 12 million shares of the PLDT to First
Pacific. Which will increase the total shareholdings
of foreigners to 81.47%. Gamboa opposes, claiming
that it violates the Constitutional provision on
Filipinization of Public Utility stated in Sec 11,
Article XII of the Philippine Constitution.
The Preamble of the 1987 Constitution holds the
ideals that the Constitution wishes to achieve:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid
of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that
shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity, the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of
truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do
ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
Bearing emphasis on the issue on patrimony,
Consistent with these ideals, Section 19, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution declares as State Policy the
development of national economy “effectively
controlled” by Filipinos:
Section 19. The State shall develop a self- reliant
and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
Issue:
Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refer to common shares or to the
total outstanding capital stock?
Ruling:
Yes, the term “capital” refers to the total common
shares as provided in the Constitution.
Foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of
PLDT, which class of shares excercises the sole
right to vote in the election of directors, and thus
control PLDT; Filipinos own only 35.73% of
PLDT’s common shares, the minority of the voting
stock, thus, the Filipinos do not control PLDT; the
99.44% preferred shares owned by Filipinos have
no voting rights; preferred shares earn only 1/70 of
the dividends that common shares earn; preffered
shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital
stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%
First Pacific acquiring the 37% PLDT common
shares will total 81.47% owned by foreigners,
 NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., v
REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.
G.R. No. 195580
April 21, 2014
Principle: Role of the Preamble; Constitution prevails over a
statute; Grandfather Rule and Control Test; Casus omissus
(cases of omission)
Facts:
On December 2006, Redmont Corporation (REDMONT) took
interest in the mining and exploring of certain areas in the
Philippines. Upon inquiry with the DENR, Redmont learned
that the certain areas they took interest in are already covered
by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) and
Exploration Permits (EP) of Narra, Tesoro, and McArthrur
(petitioners).
Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor-in-interest Sara
Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an application for an MPSA
and Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines and Geo-Sciences
Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Subsequently,
SMMI was issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153 covering an area of over
1,782 hectares in Barangay Sumbiling, Municipality of
Bataraza, Province of Palawan and EPA-IVB-44 which includes
an area of 3,720 hectares in Barangay Malatagao, Bataraza,
Palawan. The MPSA and EP were then transferred to
Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and, on November 6,
2006, assigned to petitioner McArthur.
Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and
Development Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining &
Development Corporation (PLMDC) which previously filed an
application for an MPSA with the MGB, Region IV-B, DENR on
January 6, 1992. Through the said application, the DENR issued
MPSA-IV-1-12 covering an area of 3.277 hectares in barangays
Calategas and San Isidro, Municipality of Narra, Palawan.
Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred and/or assigned
its rights and interests over the MPSA application in favor of
Narra.
Another MPSA application of SMMI was filed with the DENR
Region IV-B, labeled as MPSA-AMA-IVB-154 (formerly EPA-IVB-
47) over 3,402 hectares in Barangays Malinao and Princesa
Urduja, Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan. SMMI
subsequently conveyed, transferred and assigned its rights and
interest over the said MPSA application to Tesoro.
On January 2007, Redmont filed before the Panel of
Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3) separate petitions for
the denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA designated as
AMA-IVB-153, AMA-IVB-154 and MPSA IV-1-12. Redmont
alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of the petitioners
are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a
100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that since
MBMI is a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the
driving force behind petitioners’ filing of the MPSAs over the
areas covered by applications since it knows that it can only
participate in mining activities through corporations which are
deemed Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that
petitioners’ capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they
were likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities
through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.
Issue: Whether or not the Grandfather rule shall apply
Ruling: Yes. The grandfather rule shall apply. It is elementary
in the statutory construction that the Constitution shall prevail
over a statute when there is conflict between the two. The
Grandfather rule is based on sec. 2, Art. XII: National Economy
and Patrimony, of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand,
the Control test is based on Sec. 3 of the Foreign Investment
Act (RA 7042, as amended by RA 8179).
In this case, the Grandfather Rule shall apply. Because the
Constitution prevails over a statute. Furthermore, in relation
to the topic, the preamble provides that “…in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a Government x x x (We,
the sovereign Filipino people) must promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony x x x”. Hence, the
court upheld that the Grandfather Rule shall prevail over the
Control test. The strict rule over the liberal rule to conserve
and develop our patrimony for the benefit of the Filipinos.
Additional Issue: Whether or not the petitioner corporations
are Philippine Corporation
Ruling: No. The Court held that the SEC Rules has provided the
manner of determining the nationality of a corporation
depending on the ownership of the capital stocks.
The court discussed the two tests in determining the
nationality of the corporation. The first test is the Control test
or also known as the liberal rule. It states that corporation
whose capital stocks are owned by Filipinos below 60% will be
considered as a Philippines nationality, and the remainder of
the shares will be considered as Foreign-owned. Under this
test, there will be no need to trace the ownership of the 60%
or more shares of the Filipino-owned shares since a
corporation is already considered a Philippine corporation.
The second test is the Grandfather Rule or also known as the
Strict Rule, it states that “…if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%,
only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage
shall be counted as of Philippine nationality.” Under this rule,
the combined totals must be traced to determine the total
percentage of Filipino ownership. Furthermore, the ultimate
Filipino ownership shares must first be traced.
The Grandfather rule shall apply when the 60-40 Filipino-
Foreign equity ownership is in doubt. In other words, when
the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the
Grandfather rule will not apply.
Dissent by LEONEN, J.,:
Justice Leonen opined that the Grandfather Rule has no
statutory basis and it should be the Control test that should
govern in determining Filipino equity. He further stated that
the Control Test is provided by a statute, and has been used in
recent jurisprudence. Furthermore, he stated that the Foreign
Investments Act is clear and unequivocal that the Control Test
shall be applied to determine the nationality of a corporation
in which another corporation owns stocks. Moreover, he
stated that the Constitution is silent on the preference of the
Constitution in the determination of the nationality of the
Corporation or also known as Casus omissus (case of
omission). It means to say that its omission is categorical, had
there been a preference, the Constitution could have very well
said it. However, the Grandfather rule may be used as a
supplement to the Control Test, that is, as a further check to
ensure the control and beneficial ownership of a corporation
is in fact lodged in Filipinos.
Tawang Multipurpose Cooperative v La Trinidad Water
District
G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011

Principle of Constitutional Supremacy

Facts:
Tawang Multipurpose Cooperative (TMPC) was
organized to provide domestic water services in
Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. In the length of
its service, it decided to file with the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate
to operate and maintain a waterworks system in
Barangay Tawang.
However, La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a local
water utility authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial, and commercial purposes within the
municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet created under
Presidential Decree No. 198, opposed the application of
TMPC claiming that its franchise is exclusive pursuant to
section 47 of P.D. No. 198.
The NWRB approved TMPC’s application because it
found the TMPC legally and financially qualified to
operate and maintain a waterworks system and that
contrary to LTWD’s claim, exclusive franchises are
unconstitutional.
This was contested in the RTC which ruled that the
Constitution does not necessarily prohibit a franchise
that is exclusive on its face. Meaning, the grantee shall
be allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to
the exclusion of all others.

Issue:
Whether or Not section 47 of P.D. No. 198 is valid
thereby giving LTWD an exclusive franchise.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that plain words do not require
explanation. The 1935, 1972, and 1987 Constitutions are
clear; franchises for the operation of a public utility
cannot be exclusive in character.
It is the general rule that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to
apply the same to its clear language. Moreover, the court
also said that when there is conflict between the law and
the Constitution, the Constitution prevails because it is
the fundamental law of the land to which all laws must
conform. Therefore, the section 47 of the P.D. No. 198
that declared LTWD’s franchise to be exclusive is
unconstitutional.
AURELIO M. UMALI V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF
CABANATUAN G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014
PRINCIPLE:
Constitutional Supremacy. Hornbook doctrine states that
neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary
has the power to act beyond the Constitution’s mandate.
The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power
beyond what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra
vires.
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City
passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the
President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into
a highly urbanized city (HUC). The President then issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 418 affirming the request
but subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991”. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) also issued the assailed Minute
Resolution No. 12-0797 for the said plebiscite, stating
that only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City
should participate.
Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija,
filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in
conjunction with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
He argues that while the conversion in question does not
involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an
existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision
calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to vote
in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in
their rights and responsibilities. He also contended that
the phrase “qualified voters therein” in Section 453
should be interpreted to refer to those directly affected
by the conversion, not just in the component city,
enumerating adverse effects of the conversion affecting
the province as a whole.
However, Julius Cesar Vergara, respondent and city
mayor of Cabanatuan City, opposed. He argued that
Section 10, Article X does not apply to conversions and
that Section 453 allows only qualified voters of
Cabanatuan to vote in the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC ruled against Umali, maintaining that
Cabanatuan City is merely being converted thus only
affecting the city itself.
ISSUE:
Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire
province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City
can participate in the plebiscite?
RULING:
The entire province of Nueva Ecija should be included in
the plebiscite.
The rules of statutory construction dictate that a
particular provision should be interpreted with the other
relevant provisions in the law. The Court finds that
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is undeniably the
applicable provision on the conduct of plebiscites, as in
its title “Plebiscite Requirement”. It requires a majority
of votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Section 453 of the
LGC entitled “Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status” is
only to declare a city as highly urbanized. Thus, Section
10 prevails over Section 453 on the plebiscite
requirement.
The Hornbook doctrine states that neither the legislative,
the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act
beyond the Constitution’s mandate. The Constitution is
supreme; any exercise of power beyond what is
circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a
nullity. A law should be construed in harmony with and
not in violation of the Constitution. If there is doubt or
uncertainty, the interpretation which will avoid the
effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted.
The phrase “by the qualified voters therein” in Section
453 of the LGC should be construed in a manner that will
avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain
meaning of the phrase in relation to the HUC declaration
by the President, then Section 453 will clash with the
provision under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Thus, the Court treats the phrase to mean the qualified
voters not only in the city subject to conversion but also
those of the “political units directly affected” by the
conversion, harmonizing Section 453 of the LGC with
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, the entire
province of Nueva Ecija will be directly affected by
Cabanatuan City’s conversion.
Moreover, Section 453 merely authorized the President
to make a determination on whether or not the
requirements under Section 452 of the LGC are complied
with. In effect, Section 453 calls for a plebiscite for the
purpose of conversion once the requirements are met.
 DANILO E. PARAS vs. COMMISSION ON the people before the end of his term. And if the SK
ELECTIONS election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held
every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed
G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
within the purview of the phrase regular local
election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then
Principle of Constitutional Supremacy no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile
the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

Facts: It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with
Barangay of Barangay Pula, Cabanatuan City. A the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section
petition for his recall was filed by the registered 74 (b) of the LGC, should not be in conflict with the
voters of the said barangay. Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of
the Constitution to enact local government code
The COMELEC resolved to approve the petition, which shall provide for a more responsive and
scheduled the signing of the petition and recall accountable local government structure instituted
election. However, the COMELEC deferred the through a system of decentralization with effective
recall election in view of petitioner’s opposition. mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x
They re-scheduled the recall election on January 13,
1996. Petitioner’s too literal interpretation of the law leads
to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance.
The petitioner argued that the scheduled January 13,
1996 recall election is now barred as the SK election The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines
was set on the 1st Monday of May 1996. Paras cited its construction; hence a statute must be read
Section 74(b) of RA No. 7160 (Local Government according to its spirit and intent.
Code), which states that no recall shall take place
within 1 year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or 1 year immediately
preceding a regular election. Petitioner also cited
Associated Labor Union vs. Letrondo-Montejo,
where the Court considered the SK election as
regular election, hence no recall election can be had
for barely four months separate the SK election from
recall election.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the recall election is barred as the SK
election was set on the 1st Monday of May 1996.
Ruling:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an
elective official to recall election once during his
term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with
paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject of a recall
election, that is, during the second year of his term of
office.
Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the
phrase regular local election to include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the novel
provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a
mode of removal of public officers by initiation of
 Ordillo vs Comelec
G.R. No. 93054
Date Promulgated: December 04, 1990
Principle: Constitutional Supremacy
Facts:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.” The
official Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of
the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889
votes in only the Ifugao Province and was
overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14,
1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the
Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or
ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the
province of Ifugao. The petitioner filed a petition
with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of
the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners
maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that
the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
Issue:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not
the province of Ifugao, being the only province
which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally
and validly constitute such Region.
Ruling:
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that
“region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions
into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become
part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other
units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this
case.
Central Bank Employees Association v. Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004
Principle: Relevant Constitutionality
Facts:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New
Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new
BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association,
Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.
The thrust of petitioners challenge is that
the abovementioned proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of
employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or
those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2)
the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and
below), or those not exempted from the coverage of
the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is a classic case of class legislation,
allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences, but solely on the SG of the
BSP personnels position
Issue: WON the continued operation and
implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme court held that the continued
operation and implementation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is
unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in
every instance, be determined by a mere comparison
of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts
and invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void
at another time because of altered circumstances.
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes
arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though
affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry
and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
WILSON P. GAMBOA vs. FINANCE
SECRETARY TEVES
(G.R. No. 176579, promulgated June
28, 2011)
Self-Executing v. Need for
Implementing Legislation
FACTS: This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of
Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC)
by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting
through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro
Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific
Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based
investment management and holding company and a
shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT).
The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that
it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about
6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned
by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacific’s
common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to
37 percent, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This,
according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign
ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than
40%.
ISSUE: Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refer to the total common shares only, or to the
total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and
non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?
RULING: [The Court partly granted the petition and held that
the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors of a public utility, or in the instant case, to the total
common shares of PLDT.]
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and
Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the
Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other
form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period
than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity
participation in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers
of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines.
The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in
the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to
common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares [of
PLDT].
Indisputably, construing the term “capital” in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and
non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our
telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a
clear abdication of the State’s constitutional duty to limit
control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an
interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional
provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino
citizens, such as the exploitation of natural resources as
well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and
advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign
control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to
Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and
of the national interest. The Court must perform its solemn
duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the
Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, “a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.”
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other
provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos
specific areas of investment, such as the development of
natural resources and ownership of land, educational
institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is
no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions of the Constitution.
To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as
not self-executing would mean that since the 1935
Constitution, or over the last 75 years, not one of the
constitutional provisions expressly reserving specific areas of
investments to corporations, at least 60 percent of the
“capital” of which is owned by Filipinos, was enforceable. In
short, the framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
miserably failed to effectively reserve to Filipinos specific areas
of investment, like the operation by corporations of public
utilities, the exploitation by corporations of mineral resources,
the ownership by corporations of real estate, and the
ownership of educational institutions. All the legislatures that
convened since 1935 also miserably failed to enact legislations
to implement these vital constitutional provisions that
determine who will effectively control the national economy,
Filipinos or foreigners. This Court cannot allow such an absurd
interpretation of the Constitution.
Considering that common shares have voting rights
which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares
which usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have
the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term
“capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right
to participate in the control or management of the corporation
is exercised through the right to vote in the election of
directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote
in the election of directors.
Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent
Filipino-owned “capital” required in the Constitution. Full
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required.
The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino
nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate.
Otherwise, the corporation is “considered as non-Philippine
national[s].”
 To construe broadly the term “capital” as the total
outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-
voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and
letter of the Constitution that the “State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.” A broad definition unjustifiably
disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which
necessarily equates to control of the public utility.
Only holders of common shares can vote in the
election of directors [of PLDT], meaning only common
shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders
of preferred shares, who have no voting rights in the election
of directors, do not have any control over PLDT. In fact, under
PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation, holders of common shares
have voting rights for all purposes, while holders of preferred
shares have no voting right for any purpose whatsoever.
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute,
that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of PLDT.
In fact, based on PLDT’s 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS),
which is a document required to be submitted annually to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold
120,046,690
common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only
66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold
64.27% of the total number of PLDT’s common shares, while
Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the
common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners
exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control
unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on
foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens x x x.”
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common
shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to
vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over
PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares,
constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not
exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44%
owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares
earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; (5)
preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares;
and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized
capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This
kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of
the Constitution.
Incidentally, the fact that PLDT common shares with
a par value of P5.00 have a current stock market value of
P2,328.00 per share, while PLDT preferred shares with a par
value of P10.00 per share have a current stock market value
ranging from only P10.92 to P11.06 per share, is a glaring
confirmation by the market that control and beneficial
ownership of PLDT rest with the common shares, not with the
preferred shares.

As shown in PLDT’s 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC,

the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per share,
whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share.
In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of
common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70
of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the
preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own
only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse,
preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital
stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%.
This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not
with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common
shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60
percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a
public utility.

The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of

the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipinos
in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally
required for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public
utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares,
99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70
of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly
violates the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino
control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a public utility.

In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the

voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of
PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that “[n]o franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x
corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines,
 GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE of constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
REPRESENTATIVES provisions are treated as requiring legislation
G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011 instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
Principle: Presumption that all provisions of the the power to ignore and practically nullify the
Constitution are self-executing mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it
FACTS: On July 22, 2010, the Baraquel group filed has always been, that in case of doubt, the
an impeachment complaint against the ombudsman, Constitution should be considered self-executing
Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez. On August 3, 2010, rather than non-self-executing. Unless the contrary
another impeachment complaint was filed against is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Gutierrez by the Reyes Group. Both of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as
complaints were simultaneously referred to the a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion
Committee on Justice simultaneously. On September to determine when, or whether, they shall be
1, 2010, the House Committee on Justice found the effective. These provisions would be subordinated
two complaints, which both allege culpable violation to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
sufficient in substance and form. However, to pass the needed implementing statute.
petitioner contends that she was deprived of due
process since the Impeachment Rules was published
only on September 2, 2010 a day after public Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as
respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the contemplated by the framers of the
complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Constitution, merely aid or supplement
Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which the procedural aspects of
directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment. Being procedural in nature,
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of they may be given retroactive application to
this section. pending actions. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws
ISSUE: WON the publication of the Impeachment does not violate any right of a person who may
Rules is necessary in order for the Impeachment feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
provisions to take effect. constitutionally objectionable. The reason for
this is that, as a general rule, no vested right
RULING: No, publication is not necessary. may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
While promulgation would seem In the present case, petitioner fails to allege
synonymous to publication, there is a statutory any impairment of vested rights.
difference in their usage.
Promulgation must be used in the context in which it
is generally understood that is, to make known.
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict
promulgation to publication, the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It
is within the discretion of Congress to determine
on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules. Had
the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment
Rules published, it could have stated so as
categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries
From the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, then Commissioner, now retired
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section
3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill
the gaps in the impeachment process. This clearly
rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions
are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any
circumstance, operate to suspend the entire
impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional
Commission took pains in designing even its details.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act

is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the
 Tanada v. Angara
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997
Principle: While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in
favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity
and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments,
goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.
Facts:The Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with
the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two
letters to the Senate, of improving Philippine access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products.
The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new
opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs
and uncertainty associated with exporting, and the attraction
of more investments into the country.
Petitioners Senators Angara et. al. seeks to nullify an act of
the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, particularly Sec. 19, Article II and Secs. 10 and
12, Article XII.
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment
and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals
and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino
First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render
meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when
viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the
Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed agreements.
Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene
constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national
development and negate the preferential treatment accorded
to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods.
Issue:
1. Whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement.
2. Was the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution
violated by the so-called parity provisions and
national treatment clauses scattered in various parts
of the WTO Agreement?
Ruling:
1. Yes, there are enough balancing provisions in the
Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in
favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In
other words, the Constitution did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it
allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
that is unfair.
2. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and
independent national economy does not necessarily
rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion
nor mendicancy in the international community. As
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing
country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external
assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean
autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in
the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national
treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and
reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with the
best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have
shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hong Kong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez
faire.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
Statutory Construction; Self-executing provisions vs.
Need for Implementing Legislation
Facts:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC)
which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement.
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent MHC. In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid
of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad. In a subsequent letter, petitioner sent a
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match
the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad
. . . which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. Petitioner also argues that since
51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being
a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of
the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered
by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
Respondents maintain that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s). . . .
Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be
existing laws "to lay down conditions under which
business may be done."
Issue: Whether or not Section 10, paragraph 2, Article
XII of the Constitution is self-executing.
Ruling: Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
if a law or contract violates any norm of theconstitution
that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. Admittedly, some
constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to
enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers
who merely establish an outline of government providing
for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of
the right conferred, and the liability imposed are fixed by
the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by
an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently,
if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
G.R. NO. 190779 March 26, 2010
ATTY. REYNANTE B. ORCEO vs COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Atty. Reynante Orceo, a long-time player of
airsoft sport, questioned the validity of Resolution No.
8714 promulgated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) pursuant to the rules and regulations of
Sections 32 and 33 of the Election Firearms Ban under
R.A. No. 7166, insofar as the former provides that the
term “firearm” includes airsoft guns and their
replicas/limitations.
Petitioner alleged that there is no law that covers airsoft
guns. He further argued that the continuing
implementation of Resolution No. 8714 will make him
liable for an election offense if caught in possession of an
airsoft gun in going to and from the game site and playing
the sport during the election period. Thus, Atty. Orceo
prayed that the Court would render a decision to order
COMELEC to annul and amend the said resolution as far
as airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are
concerned since by including it in the term “firearm,” in
effect, criminalizes the sport.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TERM “FIREARM”
PROVIDED IN RESOLUTION NO. 8714 VALIDLY INCLUDES
AIRSOFT GUNS AND THEIR REPLICAS/IMITATIONS.
those that may normally arise after its approval as
well.”
Applying the said doctrine in the instant case, R.A. 7166,
by construction, is extended to all subjects or conditions
within its general purpose or scope that come into
existence subsequent to its passage. Hence, the election
firearms ban applies as well as to technological advances
and developments in modern weaponry.
An air rifle is a kind of firearm that fires
projectiles by means of compressed air or other gas and
is subject to the law on firearm. Airsoft guns are firearm
replicas manufactured for recreational purposes and is
operated either manually or cycled. The latter appears to
operate on the same principle as the former and
therefore can be considered a firearm subject to
regulation by the proper authorities.
PNP Circular No. 11 requires that airsoft guns be
given the same treatment as firearms and air rifles as to
licensing, manufacture, possession and transport
limitations.
In sum, with this circular, it is clear that airsoft
guns are considered as weapons subject to regulation
and is included under the term “firearm” within the
contemplation of R.A. 7166, and are therefore
appropriate subjects of COMELEC Resolution No. 8714.

RULING:
Section 2 (b) of Resolution No. 8714 provides the
definition that the firearm shall refer to the “firearm” as
defined in existing laws, rules and regulations. The term
also includes air guns, airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in whatever form that can cause an
ordinary person to believe that they are real.
The Court finds that the inclusion of airsoft guns in the
term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of
the gun ban during the election period is a reasonable
restriction, since the objective of which is to ensure the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.

In the concurring opinion of Justice Brion, he said that

the definition if “firearm” has evolved through various
statutes and issuances. However, the statutory definition
of the said term is not provided for under R.A. 7166.
Thus, in this case, as a rule of construction, the principle
of progressive interpretation can be applied, which says
that:

“a word of general signification employed in a statute

should be construed, in the absence of legislative intent
to the contrary, to comprehend not only peculiar
conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment but
 Lambino v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)
PRINCIPLE:
Logrolling; There is logrolling when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same
petition; Under American jurisprudence, the effect of
logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only
the unrelated subject matter.—The Lambino Group’s
initiative springs another surprise on the people who
signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes
mandate the interim Parliament to make further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The
proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, provides: Section 4(4). Within forty-five days
from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the
principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a
strong bureaucracy. During the oral arguments, Atty.
Lambino stated that this provision is a “surplusage” and
the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far
from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the
Lambino Group’s initiative. Section 4(4) is a subject
matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system.
American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as
logrolling—when the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts
the people in a dilemma since they can answer only
either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them
to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is
to nullify the entire proposition and not only the
unrelated subject matter.
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.—
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In
Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985),
the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against
“inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative
process, all of the problems that the single subject rule
was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an
initiative’s passage, and there is a greater opportunity for
“inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in the enactment-by-
initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process.
They often emphasize particular provisions of their
proposition, while remaining silent on other (more
complex or less appealing) provisions, when
communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative
promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present
their initiative to potential petition signers and eventual
voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the
initiative before the election. More importantly, there is
no process for amending or splitting the several
provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties
clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative
process.
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later
law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the
later law prevails.—In the present initiative, the
Lambino Group’s proposed Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions states: Section 2. Upon the expiration of the
term of the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be
amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted,
all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to
26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary
system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary
form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The
basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is
irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of
constitutions. However, the Lambino Group’s draft of
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head
this rule of construction by stating that in case of such
irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision “shall
be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government.” The effect is to
freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier
one “shall be amended,” which requires a future
separate constitutional amendment.
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under
Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 73 of Republic Act No.
6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group
also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of who express their assent by signing such complete
government. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly
filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating proposed by the people through initiative upon a
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
Provisions) of their initiative. contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. the constitutional requirements in gathering the
COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the that they complied with the constitutional requirements
Constitution. in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained,
or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
ISSUES: proposed amendments.
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition The Lambino Group did not attach to their present
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino
initiative; Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when
declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
essential terms and conditions” to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; 2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
and The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to
comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
RULING: XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA
Proposal by the People 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to
constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of
to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section Santiago will not change the outcome of the present
states: petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago
which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be with the requirements of the Constitution to implement
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft
of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be
“ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they
sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers
also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare
that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This
means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second,
as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text
of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
 REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL
ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION vs.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE
SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the
Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to
declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate
Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law on
June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It
aims to professionalize the real estate service sector
under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and
supervision of real estate service practitioners (real
estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and
salespersons) in the country.
Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners
were under the supervision of the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade
Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the
exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such
authority is now transferred to the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created
under the new law.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman
Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case
No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and
unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No.
9646:
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the
Practice of Real Estate Service. – The provisions of this Act
and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the
following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who
shall directly perform by himself/herself
the acts mentioned in Section 3 hereof
with reference to his/her or its own
property, except real estate developers;
SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service.
(a) No partnership or corporation shall engage in the
business of real estate service unless it is duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the persons authorized to
act for the partnership or corporation are all duly
registered and licensed real estate brokers,
appraisers or consultants, as the case may be.
The partnership or corporation shall regularly
submit a list of its real estate service practitioners
to the Commission and to the SEC as part of its
annual reportorial requirements.
There shall at least be one (1) licensed real estate broker
for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.
(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and
corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real
estate development project in the regular course of
business must be headed by full-time registered and
licensed real estate brokers.
(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or
consultants must be manned by a duly licensed real
estate broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may
be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of
a real estate service practitioner, the same shall be
reported by the employer to the Board within a period not
to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of effectivity of
the resignation or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation
or partnership may hire the services of registered and
licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on
commission basis to perform real estate services and the
latter shall be deemed independent contractors and not
employees of such corporations.
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally
infirm because it violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that “every
bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof”.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 9646 is unconstitutional for violating
the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI, Section
26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution.
Ruling:
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule. Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter
and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation.
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not
a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.

The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject

requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the
parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title.

An act having a single general subject, indicated in the

title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general object.

R.A. No. 9646 is entitled “An Act Regulating the Practice

of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the
Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate
Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes”.

Aside from provisions establishing a regulatory system

for the professionalization of the real estate service
sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate
developers with respect to their own properties.

Henceforth, real estate developers are prohibited from

performing acts or transactions constituting real estate
service practice without first complying with registration
and licensing requirements for their business, brokers or
agents, appraisers, consultants and salespersons.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is
germane to the law’s primary goal of developing “a corps
of technically competent, responsible and respected
professional real estate service practitioners whose
standards of practice and service shall be globally
competitive and will promote the growth of the real
estate industry”.

Since the marketing aspect of real estate development

projects entails the performance of those acts and
transactions defined as real estate service practices
under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered
by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire
real estate service sector.
TAÑADA VS TUVERA GR NO. L-63915 (136 scra 27)
APRIL 24, 1985
PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS - PRINCIPLE THAT LAWS TO BE
VALID AND ENFORCEABLE MUST BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE
Facts: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.
The provision in question in this case is Article 2 of the Civil
Code which states that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.”
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances
in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity.
Issue: Whether or not publication is a necessary requirement
for laws to take effect
Ruling: The court ruled that publication is an indispensable
requirement. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
Thus, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect.
Tanada v Tuvera ( GR No. L-63915, December 29, 1986 )
146 SCRA 446
Facts :
In the decision of the case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed
the necessity for the publication of some of the decrees issued
by the President , declaring in the dispositive portions as
follows, “ Wherefore, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all published presidential
issuance which are of general application, and unless so
prohibited, they shall have no binding force and effect.”
The petitioners from the original case now move for
reconsiderations or clarification of the previous decision on
the distinction and meaning of law of public nature or general
applicability.
In resolving their own doubts, petitioners suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not, that the publication means complete
publication, and that the publication must be made in the
official gazette. The solicitor general contend that the request
was merely an advisory opinion and that should be dismissed
and that the publication is not necessarily be made in the
official gazette.
Issue : Whether or not the term “law” provided in Article 2 of
the civil code qualifies only the laws of general applicability.
Whether or not laws should only be published in the official
gazette.
Ruling : The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only
to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
related to people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. It surely cannot be said that such law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not
apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body politic
may question. In fact a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of legislature, to be valid the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.
This Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of the
law or to repeal or modify if we find it impractical. This is not
our function. The function belongs to the legislature, our task
is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, we have no choice
but to pronounce that under Art. 2 of the civil code, the
publication of law must be made in the official gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of sulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules can not be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law
is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation vs. Hon.
Judge Nelson F. Lidua Sr. (G.R. No. 169588)
October 7, 2013
Presidential Issuances, Rules and Ordinances: SC
Circulars
Facts:
Petitioner in this case is private parking operator
that manages parking spaces in Baguio City,
pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. They are
authorized under section 13 of City Ordinance to
render any motor vehicle immobile by placing a
clamp in the wheels it is illegally parked.
On May 7,2003, a complaint filed by the petitioner
was made against Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffery
Walan, and 2 John Does who also forcibly removed
a clamp off of an illegally parked Nissan Cefiro. Also
on May 17, 2003, petitioner alleged in their
affidavit-complaint that herein Respondents Edwin
Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and a one John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Misubishi
Adventure owned by Edwin Ang as the said vehicle
was also parked illegally at a loading zone without
attendance.
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the
criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month
prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged
have not prescribed.
Issue Has the action prescribed?
Ruling
Yes, he action has prescribed. With the examination
of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense, the Courts
ruled that, with regard to the prescription period,
Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation
of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other
special law provides any other prescriptive period,
and the law does not provide any other distinction.
Since there is no distinction to prescriptive periods
made in Act No. 3326 as amended, the action had
already prescribed in accordance to law.

They were accused of violating Baguio City

Ordinance No. 003-2000. The cases were filed to the
Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003.

In a filing a motion to quash, the respondents allege

prescription, stating that the offense was
committed on May 7, 2003, and the complaint was
filed on October 2, 2003, which was 5 months after
the alleged information was charged. In their
defence the action had already prescribed pursuant
to Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, which
provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months."

The petitioner contended that filing of the criminal

complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City, which was on May 23, 2003, not the
filing of the criminal information to the Supreme
Court, is the reckoning point in determining
whether or not the criminal action in these cases
had prescribed.
VICTORIA’S MILLING COMPANY, INC. V. SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION G.R. No. L-16704
March 17, 1962
PRINCIPLE:
Distinction between an administrative rule and an
administrative interpretation of law
When an administrative agency promulgated rules and
regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or
gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis,
Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance
therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided
in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched
in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out
the law are often times left to the administrative agency
entrusted with its enforcement.
FACTS: Social Security Commission issued a Circular No.
22 stating that, among others, all employees in
computing the premiums due the system will include in
the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime
pay, as well as the cash value of other media of
remuneration.
Victoria’s Milling Company, Inc. through counsel, wrote
the Social Security Commission I effect protesting against
the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7,
expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the
computation of the employer’s and employees’
respective monthly premium contributions and
submitting their observations on Republic Act No. 1161
and its amendment and on the general interpretations of
the words ‘compensation’, ‘remuneration’ and ‘wager’.
Victoria’s counsel further questioned the validity of the
circular for lack authority on the part of the Social
Security Commission to promulgate it without the
approval of the President and for the lack of publication
in the Official Gazette.
The Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22
is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of
the President and publication in the Official Gazette to
be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of
a statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion
as to how the law should be construed.
ISSUE: WON Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of R.A. 1161.
RULING: YES. There can be no doubt that there is a
distinction between an administrative rule or regulation
and an administrative interpretation of a law whose
enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body.
When an administrative agency promulgates
rules and regulations, it “makes” a new law with the
force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an
opinion or gives a statement of policy it merely interprets
a pre-existing law.
Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon
the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature
of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided in the law. On the other
hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best
merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means.
Prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances,
and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base
pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the
definition of the term “compensation”, such exemption
or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports
merely to advice employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they
should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the Social
Security contributions should be based, and that such
Circular did not require Presidential approval and
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
While it is true that the terms or words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted
meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is
specifically defined in a particular law, such
interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that
particular law, for it cannot be said that a particular
phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose
and another meaning for some other purpose.
By virtue of this express substantial change in
the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or
judicial construction may have been given to the phrase
in question should give way to the clear mandate of the
new law.
 Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc, & De Los
Angeles (RMBSA) v. Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF) G.R. No. 131082 JUNE 19, 2000
Ordinary meaning | Construction of AOs and IRRs vis-à-
vis Statutes
FACTS:
This deals with the validity of the Amendments to the
Rules and Regulations Implementing (IRR) RA 7742,
which requires the existence of a plan providing for both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for
exemption from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage under PD
1752, as amended.
The law firm of the petitioners (RMBSA) was exempted
for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the
Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent Home
Development Mutual Fund (hereafter HDMF) because of
a superior retirement plan.
On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees,
pursuant to Section 5 of RA 7742, amended and modified
its IRR. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that
for a company to be entitled to the Waiver or Suspension
of Fund Coverage, it must have a plan providing for both
provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to
those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.
On 16 November 1995, RMBSA filed with the HDMF an
application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage
because of its superior retirement plan, and submitted a
letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules
are invalid.
Subsequently, HDMF disapproved RMBSA’s application
on the ground that the requirement that there should be
both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is
clear in the use of the phrase "and/or," and that the IRR
of RA 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of PD
1752 but merely implement the law.
HDMF’s contention was that the amendments to the IRR
of RA 7742 are valid because in promulgating the
amendments which require the existence of a plan
providing for both provident and housing benefits for
exemption from the Fund Coverage, the HDMF Board
was merely exercising its rule-making power granted to
them. It had the option to use "and" only instead of "or"
in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement
the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing "and," the Board has
clarified the confusion brought about by the use of
"and/or" in Section 19 of PD 1752.
RMBSA’s contention was that the amendments issued by
HDMF are inconsistent with the enabling law, PD 1752,
which merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption
from coverage the existence of either a superior
provident/retirement plan or a superior housing plan,
and not the concurrence of both plans. Hence,
considering that RMBSA has a provident plan superior to
that offered by the HDMF, it is entitled to exemption
from the coverage in accordance with Section 19 of PD
1752.
ISSUE: WON the HDMF Board was correct in interpreting
the term “and/or” as “and” only.
RULING: No. The controversy lies in the legal signification
of the words "and/or."
The validity of the 1995 Amendments to the IRR of RA
7742, specifically Section I, Rule VII on Waiver and
Suspension, has been already resolved in the relatively
recent case of China Banking Corp. v. The Members of
the Board of Trustees of the HDMF where the Court held
that these were null and void insofar as they require that
an employer should have both a provident/retirement
plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits in order
to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage.
In this case, the legal meaning of the words "and/or"
should be taken in its ordinary meaning.
The term "and/or" means that the effect shall be given
to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or"; or
that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as
one or the other will best effectuate the purpose
intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole
statute.
It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the
legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the word
"and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably.
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making
power as provided in RA 7742 and PD 1752.
However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations
should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency.
The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it
seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must
not override, supplant or modify the law, but must
remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.
 Wilmer GREGO vs. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and Humberto Basco
G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997
Principle: Construction of Administrative Orders and
Implementing Rules and Regulations vis- à-vis statutes
FACTS: On October 31, 1981, respondent Humberto
Basco was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious misconduct in an
administrative complaint. Subsequently, Basco ran as a
candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City
of Manila during the January 18, 1988 local elections. He
won and, accordingly, assumed office. After his term,
Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992
synchronized national elections. Again, he succeeded in
his bid, and he was elected as one of the six (6) City
Councilors.
However, his victory this time did not remain
unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-
election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his
opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from
his position. All these challenges were, however,
dismissed, thus, paving the way for Basco’s continued
stay in office. Despite the odds previously encountered,
Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor
in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and
final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging
sixth in a battle for six councilor seats. As in the past,
however, his right to office was again contested.
On May 13, 1995, petitioner Wilmer Greg filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for
Basco’s disqualification, for the suspension of his
proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S.
Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila’s
Second District.
On May 17, 1995, the Manila City Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the 2nd
District of Manila. Basco immediately took his oath of
office. In view of such, petitioner Grego lost no time in
filing an action against what he considered to be an
illegal and hasty proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by
the Manila City BOC. He reiterated Basco’s
disqualification and prayed anew that candidate
Romualdo S. Maranan be declared the winner.
Grego submits that although the Republic Act No. 7160
(the Local Government Code) took effect only on January
1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given
retroactive effect and applied to Basco’s dismissal from
office, which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the
provision of the law as worded does not mention or even
qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate
in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence,
Grego asserts that as long as a candidate was once
removed from office due to an administrative case,
regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the
effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. To
him, this interpretation is made more evident by the
manner in which the provisions of Section 40 are
couched. Since the past tense is used in enumerating the
grounds for disqualification, petitioner strongly contends
that the provision must have also referred to removal
from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of RA 7160 (Local
Government Code) is applied retroactively.
RULING: Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code
under which petitioner anchors Basco’s alleged
disqualification to run as City Councilor states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992.
The rule is:
Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has
the power to pass retroactive laws which do
not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect
injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes
are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive
effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such
intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily
implied from the language of the enactment.
There is no provision in the statute which would clearly
indicate that the same operates retroactively.
It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code is not applicable to the present case.
The provision of the Code in question does not qualify
the date of a candidate’s removal from office and that it
is couched in the past tense should not deter us from the
applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in legal
hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and
not retroactively provides the qualification sought by
petitioner.
A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not
be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters
which transpired before its passage.
Lex prospicit, non respicit.
The law looks forward, not backward.
 CONSTRUCTION OF ORDINANCES VIS-À-VIS STATUTES
SOLICITOR GENERAL V. MMA
(THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA,
STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and
GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners vs. THE METROPOLITAN
MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF
MANDALUYONG, respondents. G.R. No. 102782,
December 11, 1991)
Principle: Requisites of a Valid Municipal Ordinances;
Valid Exercise of Delegated Legislative Power
FACTS: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic
District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, The Supreme Court
ruled that (1) the confiscation of the license plates of
motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the
sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2) even the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was
not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed
by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.
Several complaints were filed in the Supreme Court
against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's
licenses and removal of license plates for alleged traffic
violations. These sanctions were not among those that
may be imposed under PD 1605.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance
No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the
license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/
abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing
the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said
ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to
the powers conferred upon it by EO 392.
There was no conflict between the decision and the
ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement
and not supplant the latter.
The Solicitor General expressed the view that the
ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power.
It violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and so
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 11, series of 1991 is valid.
RULING: It is not valid.
A municipal ordinance, to be valid:
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must not be unreasonable; and
6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the
measures under consideration do not pass the first
criterion because they do not conform to existing law.
The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow
either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila.
There is nothing in the decree authorizing the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, now the Metropolitan
Manila Authority, to impose such sanctions.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except only that the power to create
their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is
conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation.
As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which
are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the
decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, the Court nullified an
ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan
City for being violative of the Land Registration Act
because there is no showing that would justify the
enactment of the questioned ordinance. The Court takes
note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing
to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging
to the government.
But as already intimated above, the powers of the board
in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held
valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted
in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated
to a local ordinance.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the
floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
violating national laws in the guise of implementing
them.
Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional
requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to
prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize
carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud;
the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise
of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. Thus,
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Series of l991,of the
The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7,
valid, would be ultra vires. Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL
and VOID; and
The measures in question do not merely add to the
requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions (2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in
the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of
In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43)
effect partially repeal the law. and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations
within the said area.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that
PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area.

It is an exception to the general authority conferred by

R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land
Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules
elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein
prescribed, including those here questioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were

enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern
of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of
traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the
imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties
upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also
reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may
attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the
illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision.

At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory

authority for — and indeed there is a statutory
prohibition against — the imposition of such penalties
in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be

imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of
the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own

discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions,
either directly through a statute or by simply delegating
authority to this effect to the local governments in
Metropolitan Manila.

Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and

continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of
motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed
in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila.
 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de
Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
renovatedandequipped the same, and prepared to inau
gurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national law making body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter.
It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units
can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree
religious elements echoed the objection and so did the has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
women's groups and the youth. nullified by a mere ordinance.

Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city

legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing
the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos.
On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869
which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents.
Hence, the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance
No. 3375-93 are valid
Held:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code.
It is expressly vested with the police power under what
is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied
in Section 16 as follows: Sec. 16.
General Welfare
. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the
generalwelfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdi
ctions, local governmentunits shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.
There is a requirement that the ordinances should not c
ontravene a statute. Municipal governments are only
Construction of Ordinances vis-à-vis Statutes & Conflict general, one as general law of the land, the other as the
Between Special Provisions of a General Law and a law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields
General Provision of a Special Law to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject
in general, which the special statute treats in particular.
Bagatsing v. Ramirez
(G.R. No. L-41631 December 17, 1976) In the decision of the court, while it is true that the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since
Facts: it relates only to the City of Manila and the Local Tax
On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Code is a general law because it applies universally to all
Ordinance no. 7522, “An Ordinance Regulating The local governments, section 17 of the Revised Charter of
Operation Of Public Markets And Prescribing Fees For the City of Manila of “ordinance” in general, whereas,
The Rentals Of Stalls And Providing Penalties For the Local Tax Code relates to the specific subject of
Violation Thereof And For Other Purposes”. “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other
charges” in particular.
On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila
Market Vendors, Inc. commenced a civil case seeking the
declaration of nullity of the ordinance and it was
presided by the respondent judge.
The respondents’ contentions are:
1. The publication requirement under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila has not been
complied with;
2. The Market Committee was not given any
participation in the enactment of the ordinance,
as envisioned by R.A. 6039;
3. Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act has been violated;
4. The ordinance would violate Presidential Decree
no. 7 of September, 1972 prescribing the
collection of fees and charges on livestock and
animal products.
The respondent judge rendered its decision and declared
the nullity of the ordinance on the primary ground of
non-compliance with the requirement of publication
under the Revised City Charter.
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires
publication in two daily newspapers of general
circulation in the City of Manila before enactment.
The petitioners argued that the Local Tax Code only
prescribes for publication only prescribes for publication
after the approval of “ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges” either in a newspaper or
publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of
the local government or by posting the ordinance in the
local legislative hall or premises and in two other
conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of
the local government.
Issue: Definition, General law and a Special law.
General law v. Special law, what law will prevail?
Ruling:
Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule
affecting the entire community and special law as one
relating to particular persons or thing of a class.
A prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a
subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and
the other general creates a presumption that the special
law is to be considered as remaining an exception of the