The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 653–658

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Capacity building for self-regulation of the Artisanal and Small-Scale

Mining (ASM) sector: A policy paradigm shift aligned with
development outcomes and a pro-poor approach
Nellia Mutemeria,* , Joshua Z. Walkerb , Nancy Coulsona , Ingrid Watsona
a
Centre for Sustainability in Mining and Industry (CSMI), University of the Witwatersrand, Chamber of Mines Building, Third Floor, West Campus, Wits
University, Enoch Sontonga Road, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 2017, South Africa
b
Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WiSER), University of the Witwatersrand, Richard Ward Building, Sixth Floor, East Campus, Wits University,
Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 2017, South Africa

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history:
Received 4 February 2016 Despite its importance for sustainable development, strategies for regulating artisanal and small-scale
Received in revised form 10 May 2016 mining (ASM) in Africa are often maladapted to local contexts. In this article, we describe ASM’s
Accepted 10 May 2016 dimensions in Africa and current regulatory frameworks, most of which are based on a “scaling-down” of
Available online 31 May 2016 large-scale mining regulations. We then argue that ASM policy should be reformed in two ways. First, it
should become outcomes based, seeking to achieve such goals as the protection of natural resources,
Keywords: good health and safety standards, skills development, and access to legitimate channels for the
ASM processing and/or sale of minerals. In order to achieve particular outcomes, ASM policy will need to begin
Africa
to regulate spaces rather than individual miners. Second,
Development
we argue that more inclusive approaches to policymaking are required: they must incorporate local
Self-regulation
Artisanal miners’ associations and cooperatives and build their capacity in order to make ASM regulation effective.
ã 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

1. Introduction strategies, such as that embodied within the Yaoundé Vision

Given that artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) preceded the
advent of industrial mining in Africa, the lethargic policymaking
toward, and inadequate regulation of, its activities in Africa at first
glance suggests a fallacy: that, unlike large-scale operations, it is
not viewed as a legitimate part of national economies. In this
opinion piece, we build a case for policy and regulation to treat
ASM similarly to industrial mining as an imperative, arguing that it
is a key ingredient of an inclusive, minerals-based sustainable
development in Africa.1 Rather than being viewed as a problem
that must be eradicated or phased out, ASM should be embraced as
an integral aspect of rural livelihoods and local economic
development, and therefore incorporated into poverty reduction
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: nellia.mutemeri@wits.ac.za (N. Mutemeri),
joshua.walker@wits.ac.za (J.Z. Walker), nancy.coulson@wits.ac.za (N. Coulson),
ingrid.watson@wits.ac.za (I. Watson).
1
We understand artisanal and small-scale mining activities under the rubric of
ASM as constituting a continuum rather than two distinct types of extraction.
Statement (see Labonne, 2002:25-29).
This paper argues for a paradigm change in the policymaking
process and approach for ASM in Africa (cf. Hilson, 2016). More
than a decade on from the Yaoundé Vision, the response from
policymakers toward ASM has been mixed. On the one hand, it
appears that the negative impact of ASM continues to weigh
heavily on the minds of policy makers: there is some evidence
across the continent of a heavy handed, ad hoc rush to police or
‘formalise’ the sector, rather than a move to align it with
development outcomes (Oramah et al., 2015). And yet, on the
other hand, there is significant progress in the current mining
policy and regulatory regimes of many African jurisdictions to
embrace ASM (UNECA, 2011). Despite its association with the so-
called informal sector, ASM is also partly shaped by formal
regulatory and legal regimes. The present status of the sector in
Africa, however, is that millions of artisanal mineworkers operate
outside of the legal framework. Despite this shift to embrace the
potential of ASM, the negative impacts of its activities continue to
persist and it is evident that there are major shortcomings
associated with the prevailing regulatory and policy approach
towards the sector (see e.g. Hilson and McQuilken, 2014; Labonne,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2016.05.002
2214-790X/ã 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
654 N. Mutemeri et al. / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 653–658

2014). Currently, there is an ASM policymaking failure in Africa. At

International & Regional Agreements
the core of this failure is the inability of current policies to address Governing the ASM Sector

the negative impact of ASM and optimise development outcomes.

Local Legislation & Institutional
2. Defining and qualifying ASM Arrangements – Laws Governing ASM in
African Countries

Though there is debate around the use of the term, ASM is

commonly understood to describe certain sectors of the mining
industry, where the activities concerned with mineral searching
THE PRECARIOUS WORLD OF ASM
(i.e. prospecting), ore extracting, processing and trading of mineral ᇏ Exploitation of marginal and/or very small
deposits.
products, usually feature simple methods, low levels of technology
ᇏ Poor access to technology and equipment.
and capital, and are labour-intensive. We posit that the term ASM ᇏ Low level of occupational safety & health.
Large – Scale Mining
Security Forces Operations
in and of itself takes no position on legality or formality, and that Impact on ASM ᇏ Insufficient consideration of
environmental issues.
legal status whether granted or not is determined by the laws of ᇏ Poor qualification of personnel at all
ᇏ Role of private
ᇏ Role of private sectors in areas
the particular country. Thus, the legal status of different forms of security forces in levels of the operation. of limited
areas of limited ᇏ Chronic lack of working and investment statehood.
ASM differs across the continent. Further to this, the distinction of statehood and capital. ᇏ Corporate
problems related
ASM from LSM at times appears to be based on arbitrary to such non-state
ᇏ Inefficiency in exploitation & processing contribution to/
of minerals (low recovery value). and effects upon
boundaries set by legal regimes, which define what constitutes governance. ᇏ Low level of wages and income. local governance.
the former on the basis of criteria such as level of investment, ᇏ Sporadic activity driven by season or
rushes.
methods of production, and production capacity. ᇏ Illicit trade minerals and associated
Accurate ASM statistics are notoriously difficult to obtain and conflict.
ᇏ Land use conflict and competition for
likely underreported, but approximate figures exist. Presently, it is resources.
estimated that there are 9 million ASM workers in Africa, making ᇏ General criminality and exploitation

this by far the largest mining workforce on the continent. Fig. 1

shows those countries that have an ASM population of more than
150,000. Although there is a tendency to only associate ASM with Socio-economic and Other Drivers
ᇏ Historical, economic, developmental, geological, social backgrounds and circumstances
high value minerals such as gold and diamonds, those engaged in in African countries are varied.
the sector also exploit copper, cobalt, tin, tantalite, tungsten, ᇏ Wide differences with respect to the mineral exploited (more than 50 different minerals
across Africa).
industrial minerals and construction materials like sand, clay and
dimension stones.
Fig. 2. The Precarious World of ASM and Related Complexity (Diagram produced by
Fig. 2 lists some of the major difficulties integral to ASM authors).
practice, such as inefficient exploitation of marginal deposits; use
of poor equipment and limited capital and skills; low levels of 3. Current regulation of ASM
safety and health; inadequate environmental management prac-
tices; and exploitation of workers particularly women and To date, most of the policies and regulations concerning ASM in
children. These factors also have an interplay with governance Africa have focused on individuals and small entities. These
regimes and legislation, security forces, large scale miners, and endeavours are largely motivated by a desire to regulate and
traditional authorities, all of which more often than not exacerbate control ASM by forcing it to submit to state-based logics of
the negative impacts by increasing the potential for violence, regulation and modernisation. Even in places like Eastern Congo,
opportunities for an illicit trade in minerals, as well as land use where the governance structures surrounding ASM are shifting to
conflict and competition for resources (see e.g. Geenen and include national, regional, and international policies and initia-
Claessens, 2013). Indeed, the experience of ASM in much of Africa tives, they are nevertheless enacted around, and sometimes in
is reflective of the precarious nature of work in a global neoliberal opposition to, the idea of Western statehood (Radley and Vogel,
economy (cf. Ferguson, 2006). 2015:407). As such, the prevailing legislative paradigm for ASM in
Africa is one of authorisations and permits in other words,
placing the sector within a bureaucratic framework. This set of
arrangements reflects an awkward regulatory fit that comes from
the scaling down of the logics of regulation that govern large-scale
Angola 150000 mining. This ‘scaling down logic’ is evident in much of the rights
Uganda 150000 and obligations of ASM licenses and permits when compared to
Sudan 200000
those of large-scale mining. Table 1 illustrates how the provisions
Mozambique 200000
Burkina Faso 200000
under the law for ASM in five African states mirror those made for
Ghana 250000 large-scale mining. Provisions made for ASM include: smaller
Sierra leone 300000 aerial extents allowed for permits and licensed areas; the much
Mali 400000 shorter duration of the validity of said permits and licenses;
Eritrea 400000
limited depth of excavation; less rigorous environmental, health
CAR 400000
Niger
and safety requirements; and limiting mineral trading to local and
450000
Zimbabwe 500000 national boundaries. Even though this ‘scaling down logic’ is meant
Nigeria 500000 to provide less onerous obligations for ASM, empirical evidence on
Ethiopia 500000 the ground indicates that they are difficult if not impossible for a
Tanzania 1500000 lot of individuals and small entities to meet, in Africa and
DRC 2000000
elsewhere in the world (Quaresma de Lima, 2012). Further to this,
Fig. 1. ASM numbers from countries in Africa where the miner population is greater some of the ASM provisions are technically unworkable or
than 150,000. Approximately 92% of the total miner population on the continent. undesirable. For example, arbitrary limitations of mining depth
(Source: PACT, “2008 Regional Workshop: Small-scale Mining in Africa A Case for with no consideration for the shape and size of the ore body,
Sustainable Livelihood”).
 N. Mutemeri et al. / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 653–658 655

Table 1
Comparison of legal provisions for ASM and LSM in five African States.

Provision Democratic Republic of Tanzania Sierra Leone Ghana South Africa

Congo
Law Mining Code, 2002 Mining Act, 2010 Mines and Minerals Minerals and Mining Act, Minerals and
Act, 2008 2006 Petroleum Resources
Development Act,
2002
Categories of ASM 1. Artisanal: Artisanal Primary mining license (covers all 1. AM SSM (covers all ASM Mining Permit
license Mining (AM) ASM activities) activities) (covers all ASM
Exploitation Card 2. SSM activities)

2. Small-scale Mining
(SSM)
LSM Exploitation License Mining License & Special Mining Mining Lease Mining Lease Mining Right
License
Eligibility by ASM 1. AM only for nationals Only nationals 1. AM only for Only nationals No restrictions
Nationality nationals
2. SSM entity applicant
must be owned 25% by 2. SSM entity applicant
nationals must be owned 25% by
nationals
LSM No restriction No restriction (except for gemstone No restriction No restriction No restriction
Mining License which is restricted to
nationals)
Where license/ ASM 1. AM Miners card to be No restrictions, can mine any area 1. AM licenses to be No restrictions, can mine No restrictions, can
permit can be issued for working only where licensed issued for areas only in any area where licensed mine any area where
issued in specific designated specific designated licensed
AM areas AM areas

2. SSM no restrictions 2. SSM no restrictions

LSM Any unlicensed area, Any unlicensed area, except for Any unlicensed area, Any unlicensed area, except Any unlicensed area,
except for special areas special areas like forest reserves etc except for special for special areas like forest except for special
like forest reserves etc areas like forest reserves etc areas like forest
reserves etc reserves etc
Validity ASM 1. AM 1 year renewable 7 years renewable indefinite times 1. AM–1 year <5 years renewable at 2 years, renewable 3
as long as designated renewable 3 times Minister’s discretion times for a period 1
area for which it is year each time
granted exists 2. SSM–3 years
renewable indefinite
2. SSM < 10 years times
including all renewals
LSM <30 years and 1. Special Mining License –Less than <25 years <30 years <30 years
renewable for a period of life of mine
15 years at a time
2. Less than 10 years

Aerial extent ASM 1. AM–determined by Not specified in the law 1. AM 0.5 ha <21 ha <1.5 ha
Provincial Head of
Mining 2. SSM 1–100 ha

2. SSM–Determined by
size of preceding
exploration licence area
LSM Less than the area Less than the area covered by the Not more than <300 contiguous blocks (a Not more than
covered by the exploration license preceding exploration block being 15  15 min of preceding
exploration license license area latitude and longitude) exploration license
area
Depth ASM 1. AM–30 m None 1. AM –< 10 m None None
restrictions
2. SSM–none 2. SSM–< 20 m
LSM None None None None None
Number of ASM 1. AM–Not specified Not specified Not specified Not limited Not limited
licenses
allowed 2. SSM–50 non-
contiguous
LSM Not restricted Not restricted Not restricted Not restricted Not restricted
Restrictions on ASM 1. AM–Artisanal tools <USD100 000 investment, 1. AM–not specified Not to use explosives No restrictions
level and methods; sell to explosives only allowed with special without permission. To buy
Mechanisation, authorised traders & permission; use of mercury 2. SSM–not specified mercury from authorised
use of trading houses permitted only with retort suppliers only
chemicals etc.
2. SSM–semi-industrial
or industrial processes;
use of explosives
allowed
LSM No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions
Right to prospect ASM 1. AM–Includes Includes prospecting and 1. AM–Includes Includes prospecting and Includes prospecting
prospecting and exploitation prospecting and exploitation and exploitation
656 N. Mutemeri et al. / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 653–658

Table 1 (Continued)
Provision Democratic Republic of Tanzania Sierra Leone Ghana South Africa
Congo
exploitation exploitation

2. SSM–Has to be 2. SSM–Has to be
preceded by an preceded by an
exploration license exploration license
LSM License has to be License has to be preceded by an License has to be License has to be preceded License has to be
preceded by an exploration license preceded by an by an exploration license preceded by an
exploration license exploration license exploration license
Number of ASM 1. AM–Not restricted Not specified 1. AM–; <50 workers Not specified Not specified
employees
2. SSM–Not restricted 2. SSM–no restrictions
LSM Not restricted Not restricted Not restricted Not restricted Not restricted
Transferrability/ ASM 1. AM–Not transferable Transferrable in part or whole 1. AM–not Transferrable only to Not transferrable,
Leasing transferrable citizens Not leasable
2. SSM–Transferrable;
Can be leased 2. SSM–Transferrable
LSM Transferrable; Can be Transferrable; Can be leased Transferrable; Can be Transferrable; Can be Transferrable; Can
leased leased leased be leased

prohibition of mechanisation which could improve efficiency and
productivity, and limited duration and transferability of the
permits or licenses make it difficult to build a business case for
a viable ASM operation (Banchirigah, 2006:168; Kelly and Yagjian,
2014:8). In addition, the supposed enabling rights appear to be
difficult for these ASM individuals and entities to fully utilize,
because of inaccessibility or lack of government capacity to
support their rights either through enforcement or through the
provision of skills and resources that build local level success
(Hayes, 2008).
4. Reforming ASM regulation
The present regulatory and policy framework for ASM in Africa
needs reform. We propose two shifts to the dominant paradigm
that will fundamentally change policy for this sector. The first is a
shift to outcomes based policy and the second to an inclusive
process of policy making.
The new ASM policy framework (refer to Fig. 3) should be
outcomes-based. Such a policy embraces the impact of the policy
without being prescriptive about how this will be achieved. One
group of development specialists, for example, suggest that
measuring development outcomes can help to “identify which –
of the many possible outcomes that aid spending can achieve –
Fig. 3. The key components of the ASM policy paradigm shift.
poor people value the most” (Melamed et al., 2012). At the heart of
outcomes-based policy is the idea that it should be driven by the
attempt to obtain particular results rather than ideology. Out-
comes-based policy is thus closely related to Results-Based
Management (RBM), what the Canadian Government describes
as an “approach to management that integrates strategy, people,
resources, processes and measurements to improve decision-
making, transparency, and accountability” and which “focuses on
achieving outcomes, implementing performance measurement,
learning, and adapting, as well as reporting on performance”
(Foreign Affairs, 2014).
Outcomes relevant to ASM include, but are not limited to, the
protection of natural resources, including appropriate extraction of
the ore body; care for the environment, such as water sources;
social protection for women and children; good standards for
health and safety practices; skills development and use of best
practice technology; and access to legitimate channels for the
processing of minerals and/or the sale of minerals. One element of
a shift to outcomes-based policy is movement away from the
control of individual miners and toward the management of spaces
and ASM activity. In other words, policies should be designed to
regulate the activity itself rather than its practitioners.
The regulation of spaces must also mean strengthening and,
where necessary, guiding these managed spaces toward environ-
mentally, socially, and economically sustainable outcomes. A shift
to the management of spaces rather than people is not new. Several
mining legislative frameworks in Africa have created confined
spaces as part of the regulation of ASM. For example, Article 109 of
the mining code of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 2002
restricts artisanal mining to designated areas (Congo, 2002:69). In
Mali, the Mining Code of 2012 provides for artisanal mining-
designated areas, which are referred to as “orpaillage corridors”
(Mali, 2012:16). In Tanzania, the Mining Act of 2010 provides for
government to create areas designated for small-scale mining,
although it does not speak of “artisanal mining” (Tanzania,
2010:20). However, creating and demarcating spaces for ASM
does not, on its own, ensure that developmental or environmental
outcomes are met. For example, as Morrison-Saunders et al. (2015)
argue, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) implemented for
large-scale mining need to take ASM into account at the planning
stage, since the former’s rehabilitation and closure can lead to the
‘re-opening’ of mines that attract those interested in the latter.
Focusing on spatial regulation might well be a useful approach to
 N. Mutemeri et al. / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 653–658
addressing questions around the interaction between large-scale
mining and ASM over the long-term.2
Anyone who has studied ASM knows that it is not always a
lawless, anarchic enterprise (Jønsson and Fold, 2011:483). Cer-
tainly, differences exist across countries and across commodities.
Yet in every case, forms of association and organisation arise in
order to self-regulate conduct. These cannot be reduced to the
usual binaries of formal or informal, legal or illegal. They all possess
implicit, if not explicit, logics and techniques of regulation. Of
course, not all forms of self-regulation are desirable, and we do not
advocate for the acceptance of militarised forms of extraction and
forced labour. But the Blood Diamond3 scenario is more the
exception than the norm in most ASM activities in Africa.
The top-down approaches hitherto dominant in ASM policy
development that rely on enforcement through government
agencies require urgent reform. Local associations and forms of
self-regulation for ASM need to be strengthened through policy
and laws that makes provision for this. Of course, bottom-up
approaches are not a panacea but they can and do provide the
opportunity for context-specific approaches and capacity building
of local stakeholders especially local level miners and the often
very poor communities from which they come. Neither do we
advocate for a laissez-faire approach to ASM that disregards
important environmental, health, safety, legality and human rights
concerns, but rather we recognize that these concerns need to
become the concerns of the local stakeholders themselves.4 A
creative shift in policymaking needs emphasise more inclusivity.
We argue that beyond creating demarcated, legal spaces for
activities, ASM policy must also emphasise building the capacity for
existing forms of association, organisation, co-operatives and
governance thus building on existing forms of self-regulation.
Some of the structures that have been established in the ASM
sector that lend themselves to self-regulation include miners'
associations and broad based operational groups such as
cooperatives. An example of this is in Tanzania, where Regional
Miners Associations, though enduring their share of challenges,
appear to exert some influence over local miners to operate
responsibly (Mwaipopo et al., 2004).
The key to enact these shifts in policy entails that careful
thought be put into identifying the loci from which policy
frameworks should emanate. This should include associations
for ASM, customary authorities, the state, non-governmental, and
other institutions. The answers to these questions will vary by
country and mineral commodity: what is appropriate for diamond
mining in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) may not be well
suited to gold mining in Tanzania. But in general, a multi-
stakeholder strategy is needed. This would potentially include ASM
and community representatives, customary authorities, NGOs, the
state security apparatus, local government and other state
regulatory authorities, and representatives from large-scale
mining companies. Implemented well, such a bottom-up approach
to managing ASM would take into account what is possible on the
ground and responds to the voices of those most affected and the
voices of the poor. The capacity building should focus on improving
2
For another evaluation of the spatial relationships and overlaps between large-
scale mining and ASM (see Patel et al., 2016).
3 Echavarria, C., 2014. What Is Legal: Formalising Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in
The 2006 film Blood Diamond has been widely credited with bringing popular
attention to the militarisation of diamond mining in Sierra Leone, in which rebel
groups forced artisanal miners to work at gunpoint. While this awareness-raising
was useful, it has created the widespread perception among Western publics that all
mining in Africa in particular, diamond mining produces ‘conflict minerals’,
which is erroneous.
4
For example, particularly in conflict zones such as Eastern Congo, the
relationship between ASM and sexual violence must be addressed when thinking
about ‘bottom-up’ approaches to regulating ASM (cf. Rustad et al., 2016).
657
capabilities of local stakeholders to participate in policy formula-
tion and implementation, as well as self-management. In their
compendium of results and strategies from the field on ASM,
Collins and Lawson (2014) describe successful and unsuccessful
attempts made to implement bottom-up approaches for organis-
ing ASM, particularly in the form of cooperatives and associations.
For example, existing women’s mining associations, such as the
Tanzanian Women Miners Association and the Association of
Zambian Women in Mining (AZWM), have had considerable
success. The latter obtained a contract from a Canadian firm in 2011
to supply it with emeralds (Collins and Lawson, 2014:20).
Existing ASM associations and cooperatives are sometimes
initiated through externally-driven or facilitated interventions,
which are ‘top-down’ in their approach. However, when the
interventions emphasis capacity building for these associations
and cooperatives to self-regulate, it at least signifies some
recognition that input from the bottom is a key to success. Such
interventions for a ‘facilitated organisation’ of the ASM sector can
be found in many recommendations for supporting the sector’s
formalisation (for example Hoadley et al., 2002; UNECA, 2002;
Hayes, 2008; Echavarria, 2014). The Tanzanian Government
supported the formation of ASM associations in an attempt to
have a grassroots structure that the government could interface
with in supporting formalisation of the sector (Mwaipopo et al.,
2004). In the DRC, the NGO PACT is now working together with iTRi
and SAESSCAM, the latter a government body set up to support
artisanal mining, a partnership that has facilitated the formation of
grassroots-based cooperatives in the production of conflict-free
minerals (Hahn et al., 2013).
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have argued that a radical change in ASM
policy in Africa is needed, an approach which emphasises
outcomes-based policy and self-regulation. We argue that the
inadequacy of the present ASM policy and regulatory regimes is a
result of non-inclusive policy formulation processes, which do not
recognise that the poor should be at the core, deriving solutions to
their problems. Doing so would require four major changes: first,
for ASM regulation to become outcomes-based – a move that will
shift the object of policy from individual miners to spaces where
activities occur; second, for policy to recognise that there are
always local forms of association and organisations that assist with
regulating ASM activities – that these should be reinforced and
strengthened; third, that ASM policy must be oriented toward
resourcing these existing forms of self-regulation through
building, or strengthening, associations and cooperatives; and
fourth, that in order to be sensitive to local context, the loci in
which regulatory frameworks are created should be tailored to the
specific country and sector needs.
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