Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Statement of Facts:
Joe and John are both of legal age and American citizens. John
is a former Filipino who acquired his American citizenship in
1990.Joe and John have been together for the past 20 years
but were only married in 2017,after the United State Supreme
Court permitted same-sex marriage in the case of Obergefell
v Hodges. In 1994, Joe, donated his sperm which was
subsequently used to artificially inseminate one of their
female friends. This female friend gave birth to Zuzu, who Joe
and John have raised as their own. When gay marriage
became lawful, they jointly adopted Zuzu.
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Having heard of his accident, John’s family rushed to his side
in the hospital and started making all the decisions with
respect to his medical care. Zuzu objected, claiming that as
the son of John, the primary decision as to his father’s body
and medical care belonged to him. He further argued that
John’s family disowned his father when they were told of his
father’s sexual preference. He, finally argued, that in several
conversations with his parents, they ordered him, that if they
would be paralyzed, or in a state of comatose, or were no
longer responding to medicines, their doctors should be
advised that they should not be resuscitated. John’s family
argued that same sex marriages are not recognized in the
Philippines. Zuzu, being the biological child of Joe, is a
stranger to John and therefore cannot make decisions.
Statement of Issues:
Short Answer:
Discussion:
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and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and
Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father. As ruled in
the case of IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA, G.R.
No. 148311, March 31, 2005.
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G.R. No. 148311
G.R. No. 168992-93
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This policy brief provides the rationale for repealing Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code which exempts a
spouse/parent who inflicts serious harm or death upon the
other spouse/minor daughter caught having sexual
intercourse with another person.
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Any person who shall promote or facilitate the
prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise
have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall
not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
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There can of course be no question that, under the rule
enunciated in the case of Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan et al.,
supra, offenses penalized with destierro fall under the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts.
(See also De los Angeles vs. People, 103 Phil., 295.) That rule,
however, cannot be made to apply to the present case, for it is
apparent that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not
define a crime distinct and separate from homicide, parricide,
or murder, as the case may be, depending, in so far as those
crimes are concerned, upon the relationship of the victim to
the killer and the manner by which the killing is committed.
Weaknesses:
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By maintaining Article 247 in the RPC, we are effectively
giving more importance to a person’s reputation, image and
esteem than to actual lives of people.
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Article II Section 11 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
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Article III Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
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To maintain Article 247 in the RPC is to blatantly disregard the
various other laws and international commitments that we
have which uphold human rights and the rights of women and
children.
Strengths:
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And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted,
the offender is exempted from punishment circumstances
mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstances,
for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted,
the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment
at all. A different interpretation, i. e., that it defines and
penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional
circumstances which practically exempt the accused from
criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby
compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally,
admit them, in the information. Such and interpretation would
be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an
exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the
crime charged. Only "acts or omissions . . . constituting the
offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and
a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts
the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the
offense charged — but a matter of defense that must be
proved to the satisfaction of the court — need not be
pleaded.(Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo,
23 Phil., 368.)
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Recommendation:
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