G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000 childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong.
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he
arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and
lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of
Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of
the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was
not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization
was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of
petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the
testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present
any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather
surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the
history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that
petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this
reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony
of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of
residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no
known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. 6 The state also
annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net
income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State
contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married
twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived
with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State
also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by
petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on
February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil
Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife
since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that
when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, 10 petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address
in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to
the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not
presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court
held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed
to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA
ONG," which name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction
No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and
failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a
mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other
names to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might
adversely affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he
formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present
and former places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the
petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason
for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof
and voice their objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this
provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity,
thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock.
It has been the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife
without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a
conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised
Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization . . .
 Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an
income tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his
income is low. . . "It is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for
his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an
income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be
able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public
charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are
living on the allowance given to them by their children. The monthly pension given by
the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative
because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent,
speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN
BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED
IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF
RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents
which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which,
justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered
as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was
argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13
of the Rules of Court which
provides that —
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be
the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We
are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which
has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have
included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767)
which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In
fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the
case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said
document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in
resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be
accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No.
031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed
by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed
as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the
authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed
under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any
flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our
conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to
settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the
address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address
appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the
records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to
mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence
containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating
agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any
community where he may have lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the
applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of
residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases
defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996 Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed
with merit:"2
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he
DECISION maintains that:

MENDOZA, J.: ....

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the 4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent. prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6,
1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari,
this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
The facts are as follows:
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order,
respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin
had filed against her husband.
himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore,
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
the documents and papers in question.
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used
the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent,
by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition
Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his
for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the
knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to
prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso
Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of
respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no
reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this provision
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix,
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga,
Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime
of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of
P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation. 1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal
knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal
injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof,
accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had
carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel
Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their
aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil
Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning. 3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for
their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed,
Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be
able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt,
Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of
Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the
back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing
there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. 5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend
the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants,
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and
his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be
getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s
eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had
something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left
and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her
house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground
floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day
was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was
upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While
she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. 9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of
her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was
given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor
naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to
offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police. 10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in
Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and
found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the
ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her
naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer
Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running
away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw
appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when
Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he
was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In
his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
 I DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A person’s
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented
necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the
former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the
result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s
highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the
accused committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5)
incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines
to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo
examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be
approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor
mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00
p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of
appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej
Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on
the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim.
During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal
could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim. 21 In addition, it is apparent from
the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested
by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault
on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene
type.
DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in
a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of
hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. 24 Most importantly, because
of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the
notable exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has
been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate
account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault
would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be
left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or
furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault.27Forensic DNA
evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim.
If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known
samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this
case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied
exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier
since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of
the analyst who conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution
as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s
testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that
of the extracts subject of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that
he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11,
which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match
exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in
open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively
uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that
has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated
by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal,
the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel
Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter
from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by
Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the
house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn
Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty
white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left
when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in
a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by
a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding
from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed
sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in
the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H",
compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two
days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of
guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is
the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence,
three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken
from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well
as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process
of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood
and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination.
The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post
facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of
DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under
the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA
profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s
house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998
incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be
in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the
same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime,
and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely
weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed
reversible error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on
reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on
mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more
than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a
"plus value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters
of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence
without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent
upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that
would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which
the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral
certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies
the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty
beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the
accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. 43 In view of the totality of evidence
appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity
of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not
saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.60
witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of
the same house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga,
latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the
Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for
school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five
the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June
he be ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the
25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of
amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The
appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According
award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant,
the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will
kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
appellant. amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It
is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of Costs de oficio.
witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission
of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for
SO ORDERED.
committing it may be inferred.51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by
reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the
victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force,
threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means
of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.52However, in rape committed by close
kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not
negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of
rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch
without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual
abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the
victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his
mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the
house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house.
Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to
have moral ascendancy over the victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason
or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court
maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional,
and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the

family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00, 58 and moral
damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence.
 G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007
NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS
TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision1 dated
February 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject
lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating
(Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner
Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject
property was transferred in the name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and
1988.6 However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to
transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by
mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses;
she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the
title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her. 7
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad,
Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered
the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are
demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of
Daniela.9 Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the
TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the
heirs of Daniela.10 The complaint also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint with leave of court for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff,
he having died intestate and without issue in March 1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and
Nena as his sole heirs.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the
subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.
She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court
for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.12
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969
(Exh. "Q") executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL
and VOID and further ordering:
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to
issue a new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼)
portion of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼)
portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion and Nena Lazalita
Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the
prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672
and in lieu thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, ¼ Pro-
indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, ¼ Pro-
indiviso portion; and Nena Lazalita Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well
as the house standing thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons
mentioned in the same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed
fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱20,000.00 by
way of moral damages, ₱10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, ₱5,000.00 by way
of attorney’s fees and ₱3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision affirming
the judgment of the RTC.14
Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 22,
2002.15
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided the instant
case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this
Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has
affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence on record." 16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
CA finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of
jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the
Court decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
especially considering that it was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same. 17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests
on the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because
Daniela’s actual intention was not to dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by
providing her with a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both
the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of
Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement
should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been
dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-
examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the
Sworn Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered
only after the death of Daniela in 1994.18Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed
simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the petitioner during her lifetime. However,
the fact remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed, she never uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time
and again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also
argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between
Daniela and petitioner created a trust relationship between them because of the settled rule that
where the terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show
that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed
judgments; that Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of
sale by and between her and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement
between petitioner and Daniela created a trust relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is
simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely
simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated). 19 The primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. 20 Such
intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as from their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.21
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their
allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is
the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said
sworn statement as part of private respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also
accorded great probative weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.23Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.25 Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for
being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand
as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s
sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was
simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation
that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject
deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private
respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is
the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his
rights of ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present case, however, the evidence
clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her
name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due
on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon.
While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. 32 Such an act
strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.33 On the other hand, private
respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela paid
taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax
Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers
only to the house standing on the lot in controversy.34 Even the said Tax Declaration contains a
notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really
reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never
told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply
chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on
December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her
declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than
ten years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the
subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in petitioner’s
favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while,
in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that
ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts. 35Just as possession is not a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first
paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance.36 Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case, it is of
no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the
disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she was already
able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the subject property.

As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the validity
of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the sworn
statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not able to
cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.

However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance of evidence37 that the contract of sale between Daniela and petitioner was
simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who
impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation.38 Since private respondents failed
to discharge the burden of proving their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela was simulated, the presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969
Deed of Absolute Sale stands.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to
be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to
whether or not a trust relationship was created between them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the
conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible
either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of
Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005. 1
and his witness’ testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his residence the day after
the incident and had stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that
had he not been hiding, there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence,
especially because he was also working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found guilty of
the crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other
aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.

Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00 representing
witnesses who had incriminated him.
death indemnity.

The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.
Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away;
that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek
help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to SO ORDERED.6
the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon
eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing the dying declaration
the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13
made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive identification
years, who was in the complex at the time.2
as the culprit by Mendoza.9 It stressed that Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home
during the incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly
the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at indicative of his guilt.10
the Manila City Jail.
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating: beyond reasonable doubt.

The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the The appeal lacks merit.
victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanon’s neck stabbing
the latter with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanon’s
Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The
death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo
RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and reliable. The
Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that
determination of the competence and credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the
when he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from
RTC as the trial court due to its unique and unequalled position of observing their deportment
hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed
during testimony, and of assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty
him.3
and candor. Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and
conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such assessment
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness Mendoza on and conclusions,11considering that the CA as the appellate court could neither substitute its
how Salafranca had effected his attack assessment nor draw different conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC
misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary matters that would alter the
result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence,
against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the victim on
the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the
the latter’s neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand," Salafranca did not give
CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.13
Bolanon "any opportunity to defend himself."4 The RTC noted inconsistencies in Salafranca’s
Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."
as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by
Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the truth.14

A Yes, Sir.
Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had "encircled
his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right(hand) and
coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the Q Will you look around and point him to us?
left nipple."15 Relying on Mendoza’s recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the
RTC found treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
the CA’s concurrence because Mendoza’s eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained
uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca
employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an COURT
aggressive physical control of the latter’s movements that ensured the success of the attack
without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal
Code,16 treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just
might make. suffer more.

The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements Q What happened when you told him that?
identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:
A He kept silent.
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
Q What time was that?
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A 12:50 a.m.
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."
A He was pronounced dead.17
Q What did you do?
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estaño, his
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH. uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up
to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital,
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired? Estaño had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estaño that his
assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be
having a hard time breathing, causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and
Salafranca. had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a
dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca? the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all
the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an
exception to the hearsay rule.18
A Yes, Sir.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character,
Q How long have you known him? may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b)
that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. 19
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño,
identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon
was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and,
according to Estaño, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in
the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the
imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion
of his physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution
for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely,
when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would
bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the
assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only
in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified
Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." 22 In
a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of
the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous
with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.24 The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of
₱50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than
such indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may
include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b)
actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e)
temperate damages.26
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which were
different from the death indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to
crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish
and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim. 28Although mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the
Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their
moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is reasonable as
moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to award despite
the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering.
The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victim’s family.1âwphi1 It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and
anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or
brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them
forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an
injustice has been done to them.30
The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition of the right
of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual damages for
burial and related expenses are not substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least
₱25,000.00 are warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to
deny them compensation by way of actual damages.31
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases
as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances."32 The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."33 Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have
recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the
attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in
murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v.
Catubig:34
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has
a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation
of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of ₱30,000.00 is deemed reasonable
and proper,35because we think that a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of
₱50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which
awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO
ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled "State
Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC Chemical Corporation." The
questioned decision affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case NO. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiff the following: a) To pay plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the sum of
P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum reckond (sic) from April, 1984
until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25% of
the total amount due and demandable as attorney's fees and to pay the cost(s) of suit.
SO ORDERED.1
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27,
1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporation's motion for reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman,
private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan
from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan
carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining
balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the
payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation
on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters
to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the
promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to
settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was
agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and
that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the
defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date
which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation
the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed
a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with
maturity date on January 12, 1984.2
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable
to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case
was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear
despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-
examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that
the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its
claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no
showing that he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no
proof was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally,
SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.
Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVERCAME IT'S
BURDEN OF PROOF.
II
 THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private
respondent SIHI had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness
of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal
knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.

Respecting petitioner's other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorney's
by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it
fees to SIHI.
through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of
the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 411 Rule 129 of the
testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in
violation of Sections 363 and 48,4 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the
Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule"12 advance its cause. Respondent SIHI
Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness of
had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission
SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented in evidence executed or written by
by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter.
SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2, 5 Rule
It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence
132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and authenticity of private
of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any
documents before the same can be received as evidence. Petitioner likewise submits that none
evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.
of the signatures affixed in the documentary evidence presented by SIHI were offered in
No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its
evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of the requirement of Section 34,6 Rule
obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:
132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate court to
consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the
documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence provided ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
for in Section 3 (e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play. contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us. On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having
sustained the trial court'' award of attorney'' fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of
the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899, 909 (1990), where we held that when attorney's
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled
fees are awarded, the reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the
hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates,
court's decision. Petitioner submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding
petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case.
the same, the award of attorney's fees should have been disallowed by the appellate
Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to
court.1âwphi1.nêt
disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to the "hearsay rule" contained in
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We find for petitioner in this regard.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is
necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A
the exception and justify the grant of the award.13 Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorney's fees, the same shall be
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to
rules.
explain the award of attorney's fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule,
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November 12,
hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. 8 However, the rule does admit of
1996 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's
an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is
fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
admissible.9 The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-
examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the
matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.10 However, the right to cross-examine may be SO ORDERED.
waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such
right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other
party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error
was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that
 G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422
hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares
(5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, 1 as
amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
1992,2 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,3 the Land Bank of the
Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the property:
Acquired property Area in hectares Value
Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
P173,918.55
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD
rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for
determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as
respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation
of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount
of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following
admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as
amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the
provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR. 5
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and
directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the
coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which
is beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded
interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente
Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of
SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN
PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of
riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in
bonds in the proportion provided by law; and
3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the
compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED."7
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established
in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using
the following formula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net
Income (NI)
2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula
under Republic Act No. 38448 )
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the
formula under Executive Order No. 2289 )
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR
AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision10 affirming in toto the judgment of
the trial court. The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the LV = Land Value
trial court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged
"primarily" with "the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands
CS = Comparable Sales
suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition
arrangement…" For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and
compensation by the Landbank.12 MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. 13 If The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after
he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the
government.14 In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
adjudicator15 conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land.16 These functions by the DAR are in LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which
provides:
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula
(DENR). x x x." shall be:

A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court17 "for final determination of just compensation."18
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court 19 and, on its own
initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to
examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of
properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x."20 In determining just compensation, the RTC
is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended,
thus:
LV = MV x 2"
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements
in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and
merely ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly
erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following
factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;

"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation,

the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual 2. the current value of like properties;
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and 3. its nature, actual use and income;
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as 4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
additional factors to determine its valuation."
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued 6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as and by the government to the property; and
amended.21
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows: institution on the said land, if any.

"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing
wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the
intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even
authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00,
merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending
before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the
knowledge or consent of the parties, thus:
"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants
determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the
very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court
in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland
situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case
are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for
coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per
kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production
per year per hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is
harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also comprehended why in
the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in average production
per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same
place of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52
kilos per hectare per year as average gross production. In the Rodriguezcase, the
defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per
year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the
Rodriguez case to the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land
taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross
production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as
compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land
in both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this
court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of the
coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is
the value that Landbank fixed for this case.
"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net
income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare.
Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19
divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore,
the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has
an area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average
gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare
in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46
cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22
"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted
interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest
on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of
the compounded interest is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court
or before the same judge.24 They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the
knowledge of the opposing party,"25 which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is
explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative
or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case."
(emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No.
22826 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in
granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. 28 It
must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who
furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and
the person who personally cultivates the same."29 Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice
and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is
the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.
11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order
No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under
Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been
compensated. In this case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents
have been paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion,
however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC
wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the
subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits
wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the
subject property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A.
6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,
shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance
of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED
to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial
judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the proper
valuation of the subject property.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON
KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi,"
JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM
TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and
several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060,
10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065,
10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed 1 before the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan
de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, 2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan,
Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The
Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names
of the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with
threats to kill the person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No.
10060] 4 and for the purpose of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario
or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario, 5 a male public officer
of the City Government of Zamboanga, who was then aboard a Cimarron
vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being ambushed by the herein
accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and
brought said Felix Rosario 6 to different mountainous places of Zamboanga
City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and
deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when he was released
only after payment of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the
damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of
armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats
and intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO
SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male public officer of
the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with
the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani,
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk
Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on
the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration,
this Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot
[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping,
their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered,
unless detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10060-10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as
principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom
and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on
them shall be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and
pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer
and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life
imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No.
10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar,
and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art.
268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same
four accused — Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador
Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve two
(2) jail terms ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
 eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10065 and 10067). To Armado C. Bacarro:

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three
charges of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases One Necklace P 300.00
Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).
One Calculator P 295.00
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five
charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Eyeglasses P 500.00

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five One Steel Tape P 250.00
(5) imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum To Edilberto S. Perez:
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-1 0064).
One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN
(charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00
three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these
three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067). Cash P 300.00

To Virginia San Agustin-Gara:

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners,
One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall
to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision be extended to those sentenced.
correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision
mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon
Kamlon a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders Does" and Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
"convicted of an offense punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree
No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais Costs against the accused convicted.
and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by
them. SO ORDERED. 9

Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
sentenced further to return the following personal effects taken on
December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their
liability being solidary.
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. 10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for
"amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of
Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court. 11

To Jessica Calunod:
The Facts
One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00
The Version of the Prosecution
One Bracelet P 2,400.00
The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
Cash P 200.00
agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect
government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of
 Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the
Commission on Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government:
Edilberto Perez, representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod
and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver
from the City Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School
to check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they
proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the
place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who
pointed their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of
their personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain
by the leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander
Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.).
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to
regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others.
(pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest.
During their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who
were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed
the basic chores like cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom
notes which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in
exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were
informed that they would be released. They started walking until around
7:00 o'clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the
victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received
the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was
P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations between
Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the
kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
. . . 12
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto
Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
13
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:
On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their
farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani
was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion
was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel
were already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants
spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion
station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8)
accused were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the
same date, they were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from
the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped
and brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with
Falcasantos and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with
Falcasantos as aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes,
fetch water and run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was
assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-
treatment of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was armed. After about
two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives
were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not looking, she took her
chance and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992,
pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who
was thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of
the instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and
brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for
less than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her
escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military
troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a
"bachelor" bus in going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an
army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali,
then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the
other accused for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of
Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were in their farm,
soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were being
arrested, neither were they shown any papers. The two of them were just
made to board a six by six truck. There were no other civilians in the truck.
The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside
the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians
present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril,
Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya
Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga
City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where
they stayed for six days and six nights. On the seventh day, the accused
were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp.
6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore
narrated, was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm
 on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in
the wake of their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the
present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).
The Trial Court's Ruling
accused were armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages
by fighting off the military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from
place to place, and in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and
Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine armed men who
had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six
terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for
the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows: (1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions
and circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and
accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a
their version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3,
common design, understanding or agreement among the conspirators to
1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution
commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs.
witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
convincing. No taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to
[p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify,
[p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a] (2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
sense of justice, of duty and of truth. which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the
murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only
of alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on
what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the (3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object,
accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
to February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the
of the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
[p]rosecution evidence. performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772
(1968).) 14
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the
course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) The Assigned Errors
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais;
(5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid",
I
and Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted
based on reasonable doubt.
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in
another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty
leader of the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-
as conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as
appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their
accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to
right to cross-examine him.
which the seven accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed
band for the purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut
themselves off from established communities, lived in the mountains and II
forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their hostages. The
wives of these armed band moved along with their husbands, attending to
On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken
their needs, giving them material and moral support. These wives also
attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them or judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the
comforting them. same for being highly improbable and contradictory.

xxx xxx xxx III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani,

II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and
Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al.,
8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male
 with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
kidnapping for ransom cases.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who
IV were with the group?

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and
Norma Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth
offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the commission
of the offense. 15
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-
four days.
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander
appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no
Kamlon we came to know first our foster parents, those who were assigned
longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be
to give us some food.
discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence,
and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty
imposed by the trial court. Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take
care of you?
The Court's Ruling
A Yes.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Q And to whom were you assigned?
First Issue: Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
A To Ila Abdurasa.
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice
of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are
leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. 16 Because he was assigned to, who else did you come to know?
allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant
Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony should not be used against him. 17
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of
Commander Falcasantos — Mating and Janira — another brother in-law of
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been
heard and are actually pending before the same judge. 18 This is especially true in criminal
cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the xxx xxx xxx
witnesses against him.
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the really came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons if
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the you will see the[m] again?
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based
mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica A Yes, ma'am.
Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous
cross-examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of
Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those
of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais. you mentioned are here?

Second Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence A Yes, they are here.

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony: Q Some of them are here?

CP CAJAYON D MS: A Some of them are here.

Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons? xxx xxx xxx
 Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing? Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his
wife are here?
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those
nine armed men who took us from the highway. A Yes, ma'am.

RTC INTERPRETER: Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself]
gave his name as JAILON KULAIS. as Jailon Kulais.

CP CAJAYON D MS: Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?

Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
you alight, what else was he doing while you were in their captivity?
xxx xxx xxx
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
COURT:
Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
Q Who?
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.
A Tangkong.
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril
xxx xxx xxx 19 was one of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not
mention Tangkong?
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of the
culprits: A I did not mention but I can remember his face.

FISCAL CAJAYON: xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you
that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?
Q And what happened then?
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to]
g[i]ve food to us. COURT:

Q [To] whom were you assigned? Q Who?

A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana. A Tangkong, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 20

Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:
how he looks like?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
A Yes.
 xxx xxx xxx Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word
Tangkong.
Q Who else?
ATTY. FABIAN
A The last man.
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
Q Did you come to know his name?
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours
another will be on duty guarding us.
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified
himself as Jailon Kulais.)
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
A The same, guarding us.
xxx xxx xxx 21
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member
from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who
guarded the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped. the conclusion of the trial court that he was a conspirator.

Q They did not fire any shots? Kidnapping for Ransom

A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge,
you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?
A Yes.
Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also
apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and
narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these meetings
for possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by this? What
were you supposed to negotiate?

A Yes. A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms. 22

Q Will you please identify?

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?

A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander
himself as Jailon Kulais.) Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.

xxx xxx xxx Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for
your ransom?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.
Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
A Because I was the one who wrote it. Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the
signature above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable City
Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there are five letters all handwritten. Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us the portion here
which says the terms? . . .
COURT:
A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang kantidad nga
23
P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).
Original?

xxx xxx xxx

CP CAJAYON D MS:

INTERPRETER (Translation):
Original, your Honor.

This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the
exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
ones you were asked to write.

xxx xxx xxx

A (Witness going over [letters])

Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21,
This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more.
1988. 24 Now, could you please explain to us why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the
other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else
will make you remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.

A The signature is there.

Q January 21, 1989?

Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.

A Yes.

A And over it is a signature.

xxx xxx xxx

Q That is your signature?

Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?

A Yes, ma'am.
Please go over this.

Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

A (Going over the letter)

A Yes, there is the other signature.

Yes, ma'am.

Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did
you come up to know who signed this one?
A (Witness reading)
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic].
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7
colors marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size. 25
 xxx xxx xxx
INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors,
marine-type not including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed by
your companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you know
only.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to
inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already — I was
asked again to write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all
of us are alive. 26 [sic]
Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and Edilberto
Perez. 28 The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and
the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City
Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, 31 having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been
clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of
appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
Kidnapping of Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of
the government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of
kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as
one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were
with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor matter.
In People vs. Domasian, 33 the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even
before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be
held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was
committed, if at all. 34 Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art.
267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was
deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home. The Court justified the
conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but
also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. 35 Likewise, in People vs.
Santos, 36 the Court held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267,
paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact
that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers 37 — Gara was a fiscal analyst
for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a
barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished,
therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the
trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, 38 which held that the crime committed
was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in
that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His
plans, however, were foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl
from him. The Court noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not
indicate that the appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the
victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the
victims.
Third Issue: Denial and Alibi
The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the
defense. 39 Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one
hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod,
Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and
their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to
the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against
him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on
subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates
(December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez,
when they identified him as one of their kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The
penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life
imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a
definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses
penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised
Penal Code. 41
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping
for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of
his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one
each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the
personal effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is
ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the
kidnappers. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well
as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of
Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant
company [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to
plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an
original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted
the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month
probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex
"B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to
five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex
"C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of
a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff
apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the
aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few
days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion
training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having
successfully completed and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April
7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as
captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia.
(Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive
portion of which reads:
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.
Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant
informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to
take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to
terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however,
immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible
promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve
were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November
1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice
(Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short
notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all
possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2)
months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion
was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case
for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a
quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1)
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that
the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in
the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who
have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff
was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or
documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items
demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an
obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case
involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if
the complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner
of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of
the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-
84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon
in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver,
and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp.
102-115)1
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano
and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
the amounts of —
 SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as
consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary
damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's
action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN
YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES
ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN
FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY
HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE
THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under
the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of
Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the
burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law
should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below
from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article
1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1,
1982, was based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should
prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate
court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate
court concluded that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on
June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial
Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this
Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of
the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general
application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291]
is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a
written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to
"money claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims
arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator,
238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261
SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable
to money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily
prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's
petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice
than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion,
prescribed. therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
plaintiff-appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has
already prescribed.
SO ORDERED.

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription
period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on.
In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement
of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or
voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action
had been commenced at all."12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the
appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the
moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-
appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions
set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear
and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the

Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that
when plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with
the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the
aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning
the legality of the said agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline
industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional
operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt
cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of
flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6,
1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including
plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed. 14
 G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013 I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
BALUA, Respondents.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
DECISION
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities.
SERENO, CJ.:
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
THE CASE evasion.8

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA
No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for
applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En
Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y
Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 6
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. 9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his
claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport
No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left
the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July
2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I PASSPORT : 05778270012
divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States
of America.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge
and belief.7
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals. 19
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14
First Division reads:

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
dated 03 April 2009;
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long- Code of 1991 take effect.20
time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously
residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground
that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines
that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary
in 2009;
to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence
Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that
Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April
he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
1986; and

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that
citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not
Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of
disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed
time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction; 23
the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code."17
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s
claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18 6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction
over the case; and
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US 7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto,
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

xxxx Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan,
and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real
Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the
intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation
Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his
of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion
for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is
questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer,
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of
the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by
law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of
proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and
granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that
time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to
his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does
not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in
the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is
misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a
naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is
maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a
naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and
then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for
a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at
bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he
was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it
about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January
12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport
was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As
probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his
control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate
in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or
naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption
stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case
respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a
Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and
competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention
of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance
to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the
privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship
runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship.
Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May
10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of
them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is
not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he
is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of
votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements
regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received
the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition
for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved
against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his
election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex
because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who
expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
enacted the law.27
 THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run
for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En
Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to
run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First
Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of
Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible
error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in
order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed
seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport
after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As
the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he
has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the
latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer
should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division
and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En
Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the
second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court
has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally
filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008
when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado
had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for
public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless
of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. 32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing
his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether
he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy,
thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009,
the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively
and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and
privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar
sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" 37 and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United
States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as
a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s
bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of
the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign
citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote,
but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was
not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which
violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This
does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he
in fact did.
address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad,
Government Code of 1991.
were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad
contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any
public office.
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for
seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be
only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who
sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his
"the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a
irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
such an office."

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of
his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If
indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not
have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after
he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his
US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his
US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty
to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office
are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between
the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible
to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find
that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot
be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question
as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before
the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real
victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest
in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot
spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First
Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person
who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at
the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was
whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot
be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge
exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal
president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all
subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this
decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents
raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without
costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal
basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with
another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality
of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from
adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the
winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By
express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue
of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have
been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However,
notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his
right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure
to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or
that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public
officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a
person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even
the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications
of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets
forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election
laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to
occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis
supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court
ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest
"Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a
sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue
involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating
to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above
ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of
this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our
elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that
effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC.
Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel
or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false
COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if
they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory
then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing
any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against
him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a
disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring
that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot
to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are
disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the
end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained
the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a
void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because
Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his
Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the
winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does
not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining
was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a
the winner of an election.
dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed
who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the
his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already
rules to be eligible as candidates.
proclaimed the winner.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches
be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
the May 201 0 elections.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on
Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a.
Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu
Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE
DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June
2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case
Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three
accused-appellants – namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky – of the complex crime of multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act
No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas
bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).
Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA
southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted
on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men,
because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other – one sat two
seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15
passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When
he approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two
passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was
paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at
the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that
the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if
the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back
appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out
and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the
man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the
suspicious characters to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let
them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at
designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to
alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after,
Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus
passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a
statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group – Abu Solaiman –
announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of
more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive
interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day
bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise
admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The
bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo
Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and
other "John" and "Jane Does" – were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused
remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad
and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing,
the parties stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing
one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG
bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in
front of the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims
taught him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14
bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb
explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less forty
persons injured.
 7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24
each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their
participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes,
because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus
that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a
television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices
which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of
these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of
the Abu Sayyaf.1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and
Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an
apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and
Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged
the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was
read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. 2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the
Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how
to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against
the government in the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light
Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership,
specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum
powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He
then recalled that sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4
kilos of TNT – that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to
confirm that Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was
allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got
another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from
Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT
taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later,
Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly
received a call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro
ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite insufficiency
of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the crimes
charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching
inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The transcript of
stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial
Court is reproduced below:
Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that were agreed
upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the
frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will
recall they entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not
guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain… [I]s that not inconsistent considering
the stipulations that were entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall,
they admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at least four people
and injury of about forty other persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Peña, have you
discussed this matter with your clients?
………
Atty. Peña : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I haven’t conferred with
them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.
………
Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the two accused because if they
are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their pleas,
your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated
multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the murder
case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt.
They are now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
………
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a
clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have withdrawn
their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder.
Thank you. Are there any matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I
will terminate pretrial and accommodate…5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges … must
refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a
speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an
accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an
inevitable conviction."6 Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure
under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In
People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was "not guilty,"
the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to
"guilty."7 According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving
the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the
possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in
cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to
the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still
an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his
counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation
of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. 9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the
duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not
been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance,
effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was
conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court
observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge – multiple
murder – based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court
further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made
two other confessions of guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission
(pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule
on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the case for re-
arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment under consideration.12
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching
inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made … loses much of
great significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission by the person accused of the offense charged." 13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the
Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis
of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely
circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the
prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily
consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-
state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men
who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in
violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the
bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and
Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan
and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their
respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the
perpetrators of the Valentine’s Day bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of
guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-
turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on the
state prosecutor’s direct examination of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he
train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo
Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two
weeks.
………
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr. Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to?
Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.
………
………
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro
Manila, sir.16
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the
bomb explode?
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and
Trinidad.
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me
until after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman that interviewed me after
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2 I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in November 2004?
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode. Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?

Q : How did you know, Mr. witness? ………

A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir. A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

……… Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you A : It’s Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
by Trinidad?
………
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
………
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date,
December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?

………
A : No, sir.

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which
detonate a bomb
were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?

………
………

Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
respect to the taking of the explosives from you?

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A : There is, sir… Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
not to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo
Trinidad exploded.
A : He told me that "this is your first mission."
………
 Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
………
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he
took exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at
Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the
bombing in General Santos.
………
A : He told it to me, sir… I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was
sometime in February 2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing
exploded in Makati, any other call?
………
A : There is, sir… The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.
………
A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
………
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky
called you up the following day, that was February 15, and congratulating you for the
success of the mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the
relation of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission,
which have been indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf
should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to
sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger towards the Christians." 18 It can
also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the
Valentine’s Day bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and
Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to
Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of
TNT from Asali, as they were "about to commence" their "first mission."19 They made two
separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentine’s
Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentine’s Day, the Abu
Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf
Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from
Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo." 20
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat.
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on
"principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs – coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in
Metro Manila and Rohmat’s confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of
their mission – prove the finding that Rohmat’s co-inducement was the determining cause of the
commission of the crime.21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the
crime would not have materialized."22lawphi1
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act
would not have been performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that
he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor
Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the
act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. 24 The same finding must be
applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan,
Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the "collective acts of the
accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime." As correctly declared
by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asali’s clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points, coupled
with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient
to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among the four accused, all
members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by
indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive
explosive devices.

While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by
accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latter’s
participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of
the aforementioned evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators’ criminal
design would be realized.

It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly
manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v.
Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused collectively and individually
demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals
(People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).25

In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the
defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the defendants by their acts aimed at
the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to
complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments." 26

Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as
the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his
extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to
both conspirators.27 Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:

… [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as
they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible
against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was given on the
witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his
co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.28

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as
affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs),
MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R.
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO
ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set
aside the February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the
petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane) (3rd motion).
THE ANTECEDENTS
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009)
against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves
and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.4
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of
the late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No.
0009.5
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among them, Civil Case No.
0130.7 The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.
I. Civil Case No. 0130
In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board
of directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special
stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets
of ETPI board and officers were elected.8
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil
Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG.
These Orders directed Africa:
[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting
rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders’ meeting to be held on August 12,
1991, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from
participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.9
During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally ‘exercising’
the rights of stockholders of ETPI,"10especially in the election of the members of the board of
directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual
stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed
guidelines."11
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held
on Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room,
Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The
stockholders meeting shall be conducted under the supervision and control of this Court, through
Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized
representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares.
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final
judicial resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a
proper case the underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]12
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 10778913(PCGG’s petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for
holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our
November 26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed
resolution.
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation
of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case
and the former merely an incident.15
During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a
"Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose
of Increasing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996
Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and
immediate resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No.
0130.17
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former
director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s instance and after serving
notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents18 – on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of
deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of
the Philippine Embassy in London, England.
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to
depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their
answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify
on the facts set forth in his affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the
petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class
A stock in support of the [Urgent Petition]."20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use
the Bane deposition "in evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009."21 On the
scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane.
On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to (5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x
the PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole
purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered
(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x
Class ‘A’ shares of stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as previously
scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock was
"unanimously approved."23 From this ruling, Africa went to this Court via a petition (7) Caesar Parlade - x x x
for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africa’s petition).
IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition
We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled:
At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that –
This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of
directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGG’s petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend
the articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the 1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048,
0050, 0130, 014628 the following witnesses were presented therein:
two-tiered test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the
stockholders meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court
with no other choice but to remand these questions to it for proper determination. a. Cesar O.V. Parlade

xxxx b. Maurice Bane

WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for c. Evelyn Singson
reception of evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the
sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation to
entitle the PCGG to vote them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors d. Leonorio Martinez
and to amend the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized
capital stock of ETPI. e. Ricardo Castro; and

The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
Resolution and in conformity herewith.
II. Civil Case No. 0009
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and
March 17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25
In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following
witnesses:
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES
f. Rolando Gapud
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the
documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and
the said documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the [petitioner] in
[Civil Case No. 0009].
3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-
examine them.
The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;29 in turn, the petitioner filed
a Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.

(1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the
time ETPI was organized. petitioner’s 1st motion, as follows:

xxxx Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is –

(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x 1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on
oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil
Case No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner]
(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents].
(emphasis added)
(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case,
insofar as plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O.
 Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary
exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx,
subject to the following conditions :
1. xxx
2. xxx
3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be
cross-examined on their particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx
[by the respondents].
IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal
Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included
as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion
and/or Request for Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative
prayer that:
1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the same for
trial any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and
limited only to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition] which already forms
part of the records and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;
2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts
established by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended
thereto. [emphasis ours]
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying
the petitioner’s 2nd motion:
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." Apparently,
this provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty
of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the
Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
as something which need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant.
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer
of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds
provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]
On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their
respective demurrers to evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its April 3,
2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).
IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of
the Bane deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents’ demurrers
to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution,40 denying the
petitioner’s 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested its
case as to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the
non-appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to
qualify the admission of the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any
need to dwell on these matters in view of this Court’s Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which
already denied the introduction in evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has become
final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the
15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for this court to grant
plaintiff’s motion at this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of
procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years and it was only in February of
2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to
introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to
take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. But how can such a motion be granted
when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff
having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained
finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion, which though
purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998
ruling. [emphases ours]
The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion:
I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME
FINAL.
II.
x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS
ALREADY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO.
0130) – AS PART OF PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL
CASE NO. 0009).
III.
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE
OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND
TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.
The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory
order; thus, the petitioner’s failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have given it a
character of "finality" so long as the main case remains pending. 42 On this basis, the petitioner
concludes that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Section 47, Rule
of discretion. 130 of the Rules of Court.

On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial notice In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party
of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case may opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the
No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely
is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence because of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane
offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the deposition should be done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the
"parent" case. Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the petitioner’s 3rd motion as a proscribed motion
for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the dictates of substantial justice
should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of
evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it
formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present further evidence to
would be used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served
substantiate his theory of the case should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence. 50
on all the parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to have waived their
right to cross-examine the witness when they failed to show up.
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent is sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its
not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign
allegation that the respondents’ interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to
residence, his citizenship, and his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule
the government.
23), and not Section 47, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as
explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s formal offer of evidence
was obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their
case was filed and the voluminous records that the present case has generated. 43
respective comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their
comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments and to consider this petition
THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS submitted for decision.
and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY
THE ISSUES
In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 200245 ),
they claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary
On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:
period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 46 This assertion proceeds from
the view that the petitioner’s 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by
the petitioner, likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. Along the same line, 1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
they posit that the petitioner’s 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion –
assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in character, that the petitioner’s failure to
contest the resolution by way of certiorari within the proper period gave the 1998 resolution a
character of "finality." i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;

The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion
supplemental offer of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial for reconsideration;
court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case
since the evidence sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and
available to [it] before [it] rested its case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane
deposition to the petitioner’s cause; and
the petitioner’s 3rd motion – i.e., after the respondents had filed their respective demurrers to
evidence.
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right
to cross-examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution
and the petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the allegations in the 3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -
Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court. The respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence
 i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court; and
ii. The principle of judicial notice.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
I. Preliminary Considerations
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order,
resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision
he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998 resolution
is "final" or "interlocutory" in nature.
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final
if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of
the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order
or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be
done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved party’s
remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment
or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties,
reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the
court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against
each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a
time when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the
denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to
achieve this end.
We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is
finally resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the Sandiganbayan’s
1998 resolution – which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the
evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 – could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision
or final order resolving the case on the merits does) despite the petitioner’s failure to move for its
reconsideration or to appeal.56
I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third
(actually second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section
5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash"
of the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on the
ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.57
I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment
or final order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court
declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order,
the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of
the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that the
60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioner’s notice of
the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long been rendered
by the court, the petitioner’s subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt
to resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.
We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an
interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the
respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by the
petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on
the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party.
As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an
available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the
aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.59
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet
concluded the presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this
stage of the case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to question the
admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy
available to the petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its
position on the admission of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the
Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its formal offer61 – as the petitioner presumably
did in Civil Case No. 0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the
denial of the 1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a
petition.
II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous
but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a
question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. 62Without this showing, the
Sandiganbayan’s erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best,
an abuse of discretion but not a grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should be
dismissed.
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the
unique circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing
of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed
with public interest and has become a matter of public concern. 63 In other words, we opt to
resolve the petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in
the course of completely resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.
Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has
inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the
order of presentation of a
party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of
discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in some measure
depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation of
evidence.67
In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to
oversight, [the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the
presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and insist
on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the
resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally
offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this
present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of evidence
and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the
petitioner had firmly denied having rested its case.71 Before then, the petitioner never found it
appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 2nd motion which
prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.
Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse to
the corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of action.
The petitioner’s non-observance of the proper procedure for the admission of the Bane
deposition, while seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been
rebuffed on its first attempt to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and
without seeking reconsideration of the denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of
evidence and eventually rested its case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane
deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal offer of evidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its
case. In resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000
resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has "become part and parcel" of
Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition
as evidence (considering that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s attempt
to adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be
cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioner’s
motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its case, the petitioner should
have already questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of its
attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration
of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day
reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and
proceeded to file its 3rd motion.
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having rested
its case and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the
petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the Sandiganbayan’s
resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals."73 By pointing to these resolutions,
ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then already ripe for review
on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was that its 2nd motion unequivocally
aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane
deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been
prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the
resolutions.
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion
to reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does
not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after
it has rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission
of additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the
prism of the exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case (for
the purpose of introducing, "marking and offering" additional evidence) should be viewed. We
can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the
case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for
special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial
order and shall proceed as follows:
xxxx
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good
reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their
original case[.] [emphases ours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the
evidence he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious
rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent
delay in the administration of justice.76
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from
introducing further evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity,
for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other;78 or
where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,79 the
party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved
party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan’s action
the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify actually left the petitioner’s concern in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion "redundant."
as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing court to This is tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances
properly interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the and is equivalent to an act outside the contemplation of law.
lower court’s action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has
defined this term as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the
jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore,
personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual
would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition,
refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law. 81 Grave abuse
which was concededly omitted "through oversight."88 The higher interest of substantial justice, of
of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or
course, is another consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89
arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment 82 or mere abuse
of discretion.83
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied
Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the
In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:
submission of the Bane deposition.

After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The
evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
state of the parties’ submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil
may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in
Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the parties
the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence
have more than extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil
is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence
Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration case that is now crying out for complete
or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The
resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been raised on remand and
omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It
would surely stare us in the face after remand.90 We are thus left with no choice but to resolve
was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted; emphases ours)
the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.

Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:

IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition

The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense
relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the
with the usual requisites of admissibility
exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material testimony
should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested,
although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in
deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously." evidence without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.91 The
petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No.
0130, among others,92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly
longer exists.
recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change
the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to
offer evidence upon their original case." These exceptions are made stronger when one Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 – the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130
considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are were consolidated – provided that:
involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not
always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulæ, an opportunity should be
given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of Rule 31
title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours) Consolidation or Severance

In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to
offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of
discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be
properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86
The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.87
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of
issues within those cases.95
A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31
is completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and
the causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases.
Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to
order the actions consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used
generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes. 96 In fact, the title
"consolidation" of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of consolidation, as discussed below.
These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is basically
a function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself (given the
nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and the court’s
capability and resources vis-à-vis all the official business pending before it, among other things)
what "consolidation" will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and
convenient premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the
consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure and the
dearth of applicable case law on the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this Court to
determine the kind of "consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in
this case.
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses: 97
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case
the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and
become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a
situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims
which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)99
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of
consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one
action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100
Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate several incident cases does not at
all provide a hint on the extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the
consolidation it ordered – in view of the function of this procedural device to principally aid the
court itself in dealing with its official business – we are compelled to look deeper into the
voluminous records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that
would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action,
parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have been no need for a motion to adopt
(which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually
resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take
judicial notice of the same.
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a
consolidation for trial.103Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to
the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioner’s 1st Motion on the ground
that the witnesses, whose testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are not
available for cross-examination in" the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses
again in the main case, so that the respondents can cross-examine them.
These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s order of
consolidation had actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with the main
case, in the sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these consolidated cases had
(at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual consolidation without objection. 104
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and
the fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for
reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a
special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the
conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidationand, together with the
parties affected,105 acted towards that end - where the actions become fused and unidentifiable
from one another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in
another action – must find support in the proceedings held below. This is particularly true in a
case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the
respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the provisions
of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence,106 and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the
petitioner’s right to due process. We reach this conclusion especially where the evidence sought
to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon
oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific
provisions on our rules on evidence.
We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993
(that is, before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the
Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal or substantive, to
Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner
even made a representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under
Section 47, Rule 130
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit
incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against
the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court – the rule on the admissibility of
testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues
that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate, prevail over
Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.
At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the
incident cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to
the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioner’s about-
face two years thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency on how to
treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene
esse) provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing
of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence,
may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
 xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that the
Bane deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence."
Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule
23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a
deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47,
Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot
be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered.
This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply
refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule
130 of the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the
pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and
affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. 114 Since depositions are
principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant
facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or
witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the
trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.115
Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded
under the hearsay rule – i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine
the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination
was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for
cross-examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is
actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case.116 However, under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court,
the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.117
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former
testimony or depositionappears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification
of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded. 118 A
fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to
cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter
alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination119 afforded an
adverse party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected
therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-
examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite
identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former
testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be
substantially the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was - or
would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so.120 (The
requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should
be the same.121 Although some issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility
of a former testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned. 122)
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and
therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot
simply be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130,
for purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the
Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the
circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to
those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes
further requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words,
the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with
Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for
its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether the petitioner
complied with the latter rule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for
the admission of a testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
 2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding
are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.124 However, before the former
testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane
deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now
examine and resolve.
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to testify."
On the other hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an action,
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with
the actual testimony of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of
the deponent’s inability to attend or testify, as follows:
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126
The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony. 127 Hence
notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines," which previously appeared in
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioner’s excuse
for the non-presentation of Bane in open court - may still constitute inability to testify under the
same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability
will always be upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to
accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in evidence. 129
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding
between the parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in
evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were testifying de
novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a
witness, otherwise available, is also inadmissible for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No.
0130) is an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of
the present case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis to
presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous condition, which previously allowed the
use of the deposition, remains and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition
in another case or proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the same court.
Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being necessity,131 the
burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of the evidence.
This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the previous condition or
conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the deponent in court.132
IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of
parties; and identity of subject matter
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made
on direct examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an
essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of
cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness
may be called.134 This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the
examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of
hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported
testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential
safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been
satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the
admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is
imputed may not after all be the same "adverse party" who actually had such opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first
proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however,
is not required; substantial identity136 or identity of interests137 suffices, as where the subsequent
proceeding is between persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in
law, in blood, or in estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the
same rights of property.138
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or
privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While
Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should be admissible
only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case
No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While
Africa and the respondents are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all
any privity between them for purposes of binding the latter to the acts or omissions of the former
respecting the cross-examination of the deponent. The sequestration of their shares does not
result in the integration of their rights and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct and
personal to them, vis-a-vis other stockholders.139
IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine
the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices
previously sent to them.140
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996, 141 the
petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to
specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s deposition, the petitioner sent a Second
Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it
likewise moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended
deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent
Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition143to the petitioner’s first notice, where he squarely
raised the issue of reasonability of the petitioner’s nineteen-day first notice. While the
Sandiganbayan denied Africa’s motion for protective orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was
ever handed down on respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral
examination is not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound
thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -
The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be
taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion
conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see to
it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As
aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection
against abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to
discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs —
prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to
be such an aid." For this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is
intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the
deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enrile’s
Opposition (which is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the
bare minimum "safeguards for the protection of," (more so) non-parties,147 and to ensure that
these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the
petitioner’s assertion (that the taking of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the
lingering concerns – e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non-party status of the respondents
in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition
was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s reliance on the prior notice on the
respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party
status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 – the effect of consolidation being merely for
trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot
be bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right
of cross-examination.148 Opportunity for cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence,
cannot be singled out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition since
such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of parties. To reiterate, although the
Sandiganbayan considered the Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was
premised on Africa’s status as a party in that case where the Bane deposition was taken.
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section 5
which provides:
Effect of substitution of parties. — Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use
depositions previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and another action
involving the same subject is afterward brought between the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the
former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. [italics and underscoring
ours]
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the respondents waived their
right to cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition.
Incidentally, the respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine the deponent
speaks loudly that they never intended any waiver of this right.
Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. Section 15 of this rule reads:
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every
other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and
the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a
general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs.
On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge
or shorten the time.
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the
individual notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the
then opponent’s (Africa’s) cross-examination since, to begin with, they were not even parties to
the action. Additionally, we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously
absent was any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure
to appear at the deposition taking would amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination,
without prejudice to the right of the respondents to raise their objections at the appropriate
time.149 We would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to hold that one not a
party to an action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of interest with any of
the parties in the same action, can be bound by the action or omission of the latter, by the
mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant waiver from the
respondents’ mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite notice sent by the petitioner.
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil
Case No. 0009 – the principal action where it was sought to be introduced – while Bane was still
here in the Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines was no longer under the
Marcos administration and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No.
0009 was filed. In fact, the petitioner’s notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is
for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr. Bane
had long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could then have
been taken - without compromising the respondents’ right to cross-examine a witness against
them - considering that the principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery.
These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to the deficient handling of the
present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the handling of Civil Case No.
0009.
After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane
deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling
thereon. On that occasion, where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the
respondents cannot avoid a resultant waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to
appear at the deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be
stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they likewise
have no interest in Africa’s certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can only
express dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his
deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of what he would testify on.
Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioner’s case against
the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an
incident case (instead of the main case) at a time when it became the technical right of the
petitioner to do so.
V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced
and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice
of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on
without proof because these facts are already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the
assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The
principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on
matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or
notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court will
dispense with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes
that the matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule
129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x
judicial departments of the Philippines,"155or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice
of matters "ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 156 On the other
hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may
allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved. 157 In
the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice,
the respondents were also heard through their corresponding oppositions.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually
pending before the same judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of, andabsent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.159
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient
basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. 160
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial
notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously
pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical
perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases – Civil Case
0130 – as evidence in the "parent" case – Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of
cases."161 To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of
judicial notice.
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are inapplicable either
because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which
proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly
procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which,
in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s
argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission
of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case,
simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-
litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks,
instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the petitioner’s attention to our
prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164
Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the
Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of
the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is
up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to
the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument that we should
take judicial notice of the Bane deposition.
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd motion –
the Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) – was a
legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to
reopen the case at the petitioner’s instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3)
notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane
deposition is not admissible under the rules of evidence.165
VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His
covering note states:
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the
public will understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)
In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.
First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at
issue in this case – i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned with
the competence and relevance166 of the evidence, whose admission is sought. While the dissent
quoted at length the Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the
Bane deposition (or, to adopt the dissent’s characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital
witness") is not an issue here unless it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a
competent evidence.
Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine
Jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of
the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our discussion
on consolidation, we footnoted the following in response to the dissent’s position, which we will rigor of cross-examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence –
restate here for emphasis: especially when read in light of the general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute for
the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:
Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning the
reasonableness thereof – an issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions
Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s omission worse, the
consolidated into a single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of actions
Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the petitioner’s assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter
involved had originally been joined in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a
of right and, thus, failed to address the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the
court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is
apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane deposition in
vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the separate
Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa, are the parties). 169 There is
actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action,
simply the absence of "due" in due process.
which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all subsequent
proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1
C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372). Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the
Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the
Sandiganbayan did not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that the
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris
deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that these
Secundum, the following caveat appears:
consolidated cases have reached. Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature, the
most minimum of fairness demands upon the petitioner to move for the taking of the Bane
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling thereon (including the opposition filed by
combined into one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in which a single respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning omission and
judgment is rendered; second, where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured by this Court without itself being guilty
tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.
actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the
entry of a separate judgment. The failure to distinguish between these methods of procedure,
Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary
which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not being consolidation, a fact which
to the petitioner’s claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure
has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107,
involve technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical rules deserve. But the
pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).
resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding
discussions show. They involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to the respondents,
In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term particularly to respondent Enrile, who is portrayed in the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of
"consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 the Marcoses so that these shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They
(Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348). involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are founded and which we cannot
disregard without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking
the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of their evolution.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Francisco’s statement out
of context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled
matter that requires the approach we did in the majority’s discussion on consolidation. 167 In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a
conclusive decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote
resulted in the re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is deemed sustained.
Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of
consolidation – to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases"
and "the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this can only be achieved if the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
repetition of the same evidence is dispensed with.
SO ORDERED.
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is primarily
addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in
keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what consolidation
would actually bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have become
relatively complex). In the present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would
suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents)
had in mind a consolidation beyond joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court – which is not a
trial court – impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal grounds?

Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only
resulted in a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition
considering that they were given notice of the deposition-taking." The issue here boils down to
one of due process – the fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the
 G.R. No. L-47498 May 7, 1987 NULL AND VOID THEY BEING AGAINST THE LAW, MORALS AND
PUBLIC POLICY.
PETRONILO LIGTAS, petitioner,
vs. III. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE DECLARING THAT THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF EXHIBIT "3" WHICH
PHILIPPINES, respondents. ARE NOT AGAINST THE LAW, MORALS, AND PUBLIC POLICY ARE
EFFECTIVE AND ENFORCEABLE.
GANCAYCO, J.:
IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT AS A RESULT OF THE VALID EX- EXECUTION OF
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a judgment
EXHIBIT "3" RESPONDENT PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IS BARRED
of the Court of First Instance of Bohol in Criminal Case No. 785 convicting the accused of
FROM CRIMINALLY PROSECUTING HEREIN PETITIONER FOR THE
adultery as follows:
PRIVATE CRIME OF ADULTERY. 3

WHEREFORE, finding accused Petronilo Ligtas guilty beyond doubt of

The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
adultery with the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, he is hereby
Court of First Instance of Bohol in failing to consider the affidavit, Exhibit "C," as an absolute or
sentenced to undergo the indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment of from
unconditional pardon for which reason petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for adultery. He
TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS to FIVE (5) YEARS and SIX (6)
contends that the conditions of the supposed pardon, namely: "(1) the co-accused Lucia Estillore
months, and the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from
and her husband-complainant Tomas Pigte win live separately; (2) that offended party Tomas
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
Pigte will relinquish all his rights and prerogatives as husband to Lucia Estillore; (3) that
disqualification from the right of suffrage; to indemnify the offended party,
petitioner-Petronilo Ligtas will support complainant's children; and (4) that complainant Tomas
Tomas Pigte, the sum of P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and
Pigte well give up all his duties and rights in rearing all their children," are null and void for being
to pay the costs. 1
contrary to law, morals and public policy, hence, they should be considered as not written at all.
The petitioner then concludes that under the circumstances the affidavit, Exhibit "C" should be
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: considered as an absolute pardon.

Lucia Estillore was married to the complainant Tomas Pigte on November The Court finds no merit in the petition.
26, 1959 (Exh. A). This fact is known to Petronilo Ligtas. On December 14,
1972 at about 8:00 P.M., Tomas and Lucia went to the house of Tomas'
After the complainant reported the offense that was committed on December 14, 1972 to the
sister, Rosal, which is situated near their house. After a short while, Lucia
Chief of Police the following morning the police prepared the complaint and supporting affidavits.
went home when they heard their baby cry. After about three minutes,
However, as the complainant took pity on his young children and his wife besides being
Tomas followed home. Not finding Lucia in their house, Tomas called for
financially distressed so it maybe difficult for him to prosecute the case, he asked the Chief of
her. There being no response, he went to the bulldozer parked nearby in the
Police to hold in abeyance the filing of the case as he had "in mind of giving my wife apology."
possibility that his wife might have gone there to answer the call of nature.
However, he said that the "projected forgiveness he wanted to grant to his wife and paramour is
When he did not find her there, he went up the bulldozed hilt a distance of
conditional, that is, he would give pardon to his wife if she lives separately from him and she to
about 60 meters. Upon reaching the place, he saw his wife and Petronilo
assume the duty of supporting their children and that he would relinquish after his rights and
having sexual intercourse. Lucia was standing, panty-less, holding her
prerogatives as her husband." This affidavit was written in English, a language not understood
raised dress, feet spread apart while Petronilo, naked from the waist down,
by complainant who is an illiterate and appears on its face to be hastily prepared. 4
was embracing Lucia and doing the "push and pull" movement. Petronilo's
trousers were on a stone on top of which rested his .38 caliber pistol-Lucia
noticed Tomas' presence and instinctively, she pushed Petronilo away who There is no doubt that this is no pardon at all but a mere expression of a desire to pardon home
immediately reached for his gun. To save himself, Tomas turned away and out of pity and imposing conditions to its grant which no less than petitioner insists is against
went home to get a bolo. Having second thoughts, he cooled off upon morals and public policy That complainant Tomas Pigte relented in his plan to grant pardon to
reaching his house. The following morning, Tomas confronted his wife. The his wife and petitioner is demonstrated by the fact that on December 19, 1972 complaint
latter confessed that her illicit relationship with Petronilo had started since appeared and swore before the Municipal Judge his complaint for adultery. 5
1969 during the absence of Tomas, who was working then in Cebu City. 2
In this jurisdiction pardon for adultery and concubinage must come before the institution of the
In the petition, accused-petitioner raises the following assignments of error: criminal action and both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party if said pardon is to
be effective. 6 The pardon can be express or in applied. Thus, when the offended party in writing
or in an affidavit asserts that he or she is pardoning his or her erring spouse and paramour for
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
their adulterous act this is a case of express pardon.7 There is implied pardon when the offended
DECLARING EXHIBIT "3" FOR THE DEFENSE WHICH IS ALSO EXHIBIT
party continued to live with his spouse even after the commission of the offense. However such
"C" FOR THE PROSECUTION AS VALIDLY EXECUTED.
consent or pardon cannot be implied when the offended party allows his wife to continue living in
the conjugal home after her arrest only in order to take care of their children. 8
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE CONDITIONS FOUND IN SAID EXHIBIT "3" ARE
In the present case there is neither such express or implied pardon. It is obvious that the affidavit
that the complainant executed (Exh. C) was a mere declaration of intention to pardon his wife
and petitioner. Subsequent acts of the complainant show that he changed his mind and decided
to continue with the prosecution of the case.

Although there is no question as to the commission of the offense, the maximum penalty
imposed is not correct. The offense of adultery is penalized under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal
Code with prison correccional in its medium and maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law while the minimum penalty is within the proper range, the maximum penalty
should be Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and Ten (10) days of prison correccional. And to
avoid the penalty imposed being misconstrued to be indefinite, the minimum and maximum
penalties should be specified. Thus petitioner is hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Two (2) years, and Four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to Four
(4) years, Nine (9) months and Ten (10) days also of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the maximum penalty, the petition is
DISMISSED in all other respects, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.