TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................................................... I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................. III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................................... IV
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................................................. X
ISSUES RAISED ............................................................................................................................................. XII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ...................................................................................................................... XIII
WRITTEN PLEADINGS .................................................................................................................................... 1
A. THAT THE PETITIONER AND THE SUBSEQUENT INTERVENERS DO NOT HAVE THE LOCUS TO FILE
THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION. .................................................................................................................. 1
(A.1) THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT HUMBLY CONTENDS THAT THE PETITIONERS DO NOT
HAVE LOCUS STANDI IN THE PRESENT CASE......................................................................................... 1
(A.2) THE PETITIONER CANNOT SEEK THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS........................................................ 2
(A.3) THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT HUMBLY CONTENDS THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
PROTECTED BY ARTICLE 26 TO REGULATE THEIR FUNCTIONS. ............................................................ 2
B. THAT THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE JURISDICTION IN DEFINING THE
BOUNDARIES OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC SPACES. ........................................................................................ 5
(B.1) ARTICLE 12 AND ARTICLE 13 DO NOT CONFER POWER ON THE COURT TO REGULATE THE
ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONS OF RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS. ................................................. 5
(B.2) AUTONOMY OF THE RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 26: ...................................... 7
(B.3) THE PROTECTION OF CELIBACY OF LORD ODIN IS ESSENTIAL...................................................... 8
C. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE NOT VIOLATED.................................................................................. 10
(C.1) ARTICLE 14 IS NOT VIOLATED. .................................................................................................... 10
(C.1.1) RULE 3(B) VORMIR HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORHSIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY)
RULES,PASSES TWIN TEST. .................................................................................................................. 10
(C.1.2) RULE 3(B) VORMIR HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORHSIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES,
HAS A VALID OBJECT. .......................................................................................................................... 12
(C.2) RULE 3(B) OF VORMIR HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY
)RULES, DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 15............................................................................................. 13
(C.2.1) RULE 3(B) OF VORMIR HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF
ENTRY)RULES, DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 15(1).............................................................................. 13

I
 (C.3) RULE 3(B) OF VORMIR HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY
)RULES, DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 17............................................................................................. 15
D. THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUDING WOMEN CONSTITUTES AN "ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE" AND
THIS RELIGIOUS PRACTICE DOES COME UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF ARTICLE 26................................... 18
(D.1) THE LOKESHWAR TEMPLE CONSTITUES A RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION. ................................ 18
(D.2) THE PROHIBITION ON ENTRY IS AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE. ...................................... 20
PRAYER ......................................................................................................................................................... IX

II
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.R. All India Reporters.

Anr. Another
C.J. Chief Justice
ed. Edition(s)
Etc. et cetera
H.C. High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
J. Justice
Ltd. Limited
Ors. Others
p. Page
⁋. Paragraph
Pvt. Private
Rep. Report(s)
S.C. Supreme Court
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
UOI Union of India
v. versus
Vol. Volume

III
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Sr. No. Name of the case Citation Page No.

1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras 1950 SCR 88 13
2. Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta (1983) 4 SCC 522 13
v. Commissioner of Police
3. Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s (1943) 67 CLR 116 20
Witnesses Incorporated v.
Commonwealth
4. Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala (2016) 2 SCC 725 17,21
Sangam & Ors. v. Government of
Tamil Nadu & Anr
5. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722 1
6. All India Sainik School Emplyees AIR 1989 SC 88 1
Association v. Sainik Schools Society
7. Ameeroonisa Begum v. Mahmood 1953 SCR 404 11
Begum
8. Arya Vyasa Sabha & Ors. v. AIR 1976 SC 475 21
Commissioner of Hindu Charitable
and Religious Institutions &
Endowments, Hyderabad
9. B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical (1983) 4 SCC 582 1
Institute
10. Baburao v. State of Bombay Housing 1954 SCR 572 12
Board
11. Balbir Kaur v. SAIL (2000) 6 SCC 493 1
12. Bhau Ram v. Baijnath AIR 1962 SC 1476 6
13. Bhimashya v. Janabi (2006) 13 SCC 627 6
14. Bihar School Examination Board v. AIR 1970 SC 1269 2
Subhas

IV
15. Carlos Frank v. State of Alaska 604 P.2d 1468 20
16. Chander Mohan Khanna v, NCERT AIR 1992 SC 76 5
17. Commissioner, Hindu Religious 1954 SCR 1405 17,19
Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri
Shirur Mutt
18. D.S, Nakara and Ors. v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 130 14
and Ors
19. Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji vs 1970 SCR (1) 143 7
State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr
20. Dr. M.C. Sharma v. University of AIR 1997 P&H 87 15
Punjab
21. Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State Of (2014) 5 SCC 75 18
Tamil Nadu & Ors
22. Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. AIR 1961 SC 1402 17
Syed Hussain Ali & Ors
23. Electricity Board, Rajasthan SEB v. AIR 1967 SC 1857 1
Mohan Lal
24. Ewanlangki-E-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills (2006) 4 SCC 748 6
District Council
25. Gita Ram Kalsi vs S. Prithvi Singh And AIR 1956 P H 129 21
Ors.
26. Hindu Public v. Rajdhani Puja (1999) 2 SCC 583 7
Samithee
27. Holiness Peria Kovil Kelvi Appan 73 IA 156 3
Thiruvenkata Ramanuja Pedda
Jiyyangarlu Varlu v. Prathivathi
Bhavankaram Venkatacharlu and
Others
28. Indra Sawhn Indian Medical (2011) 7 SCC 179 14
Association v Union of India

V
29. Jamshedji Cursetjee Tarachand vs (1907) 1 IC 834 9
Soonabai And Ors.
30. K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central (2001) 2 SCC 259 12
Board of Directors
31. Kamini Kumar Das Choudhary v. AIR 1972 SC 2060 2
State of West Bengal
32. Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva (2013) 4 SCC 97 6
33. Lt. Governor Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi AIR 2007 SC 2885 5
34. M.P Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. (1981) 4 SCC 535 14
State Of M.P.
35. Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi AIR 1959 SC 942 18
36. Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. UT of AIR 1985 SC 364 1
Chandigarh
37. Municipal council, Raipur v. State of (1969) 2 SCC 582 17
Madhya Pradesh
38. Muthukumar v. State of Tamil Nadu (2000) 7 SCC 618 14
39. Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal (1973) 1 SCC 500 12
Rao
40. Nain Sukh Das v. State of U.P. AIR 1953 SC 384 13
41. Nallor Marthandam Vellalar v. (2003) 14 SCC 712 17
Commissioner, Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowment
42. Raja Birakishore vs The State Of 1964 SCR (7) 32 7
Orissa
43. Rajasthan State Industrial (2013) 5 SCC 427 1
Development & Investment
Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi
Cooperative Housing Society
44. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. (1979) 3 SCC 489 1
International Airport Authority of
India

VI
45. Ramkanya Bai v. Jagdish (2011) 7 SCC 452 6
46. Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538 12
Justice S.R.
47. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The AIR 1954 SC 388 19,20
State of Bombay & Ors
48. Riju Prasad Sarma v. State of Assam (2015) 9 SCC 461 6
49. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra & (2002) 4 SCC 388 2
Anr
50. S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, AIR 1993 Ker 42 3
Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors
51. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors (1983) 1 SCC 51 17,18
52. Sahara India Real Estate Corporation (2012) 14 SCC 603 9
Limited & Ors. v. Securities and
Exchange Board of India & Anr
53. Salekh Chand v. Satya Gupta (2008) 13 SCC 11 6
54. Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of (2005) 5 SCC 665 11
India
55. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb AIR 1962 SC 853 8,18
v. The State of Bombay
56. Sarika v. Administrator, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 490 8
Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee
57. Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1972 SC 1586 3,21
58. Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors (2017) 9 SCC 1 5
59. Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 449 1
60. Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. 1958 SCR 895 2,20
State of Mysore & Ors.
61. State of A.P. v. Nalla Raja Reddy AIR 1967 SC 1458 12
62. State of Gujrat v. Islamic Relief (2018) 13 SCC 687 7
Committee of Gujrat
63. State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki (1974) 1 SCC 19 14
Nath Khosa

VII
64. State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490 14
65. State of Madhya Pradesh v. AIR 1958 MP 352 16
Puranchand
66. State of Punjab v. Brijeshwar Singh (2016) 6 SCC 1 13
Chahal
67. State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75 14,12
68. Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar (1975) 1 SCC 421 1
Singh Raghuvanshi
69. Suraj Mall v. Biswanath AIR 1953 SC 545 11
70. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious AIR 1954 SC 282 7
Endowments, Madras v. Sri
LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Sri
Shirur Mutt
71. The state of Bombay v. Narasu Appa AIR 1952 Bom 84 5
Mali
72. Tilkayat Shri Govinda ji Maharaj ·v. (1964) 1 SCR 561 8,9,20
State of Rajasthan
73. Tilokchand v. Munshi AIR 1970 SC 898 2
74. Union of India v. M. V. Valliappan (1999) 6 SCC 259 14,11
75. University of Mysore v. Govinda AIR 1965 SC 491 2
76. V.N.Sharma v. Lt. Governor 1996 1 LLJ 94 14
77. Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. AIR 1958 SC 255 20
State of Mysore & Ors.
78. Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University (2003) 8 SCC 440 (4) 14
79. Virendra Kumar Srivatava v. U.P. (2005) 1 SCC 149 1
Rajya Karmachari Kalyan Nigam
80. Western U.P. Electric Power & (1969) 1 SCC 817 14
Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh
81. Zee Telefilms Ltd. V. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 5

VIII
BOOKS:

1. .C. JOHARI, “INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS”, (SHOBAN LAL & CO.,
14TH ED. (2012))

ACTS / STATUTES / LEGISLATIONS:

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.

2. ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
(WADHWA AND COMPANY, NAGPUR, 2ND ED. 2007).
3. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES VOL III, VOL VIII.
4. DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,
WADHWA AND COMPANY, NAGPUR, 8th ED. 2008).
5. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (LEXIS NEXIS, 7TH ED. 2014).

IX
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE LOKESHWAR TEMPLE
1. The Lokeshwar Temple, located in Vormir (a city in the Union of Asgard), is a renowned
religious spot. Millions of pilgrims visit the place every year and complete trek of 1.5km to
reach the shrine. This temple welcomes men and women of every caste. Devotees dress
uniformly in saffron coloured clothes.
PETITIONERS
2. The Shield Lawyers Association and groups of women lawyers have approached the
Honourable Supreme Court of Asgard seeking a direction to allow entry of women into the
temple without age restrictions.
BACKGROUND
3. The temple has selective ban on (menstruating) women aged between 14 and 55 entering it.
Although there are numerous Temples of Lord Odin in Asgard, the Lokeshwar Temple
depicts Lord Odin as a ‘Naistika Brahmcharya’, that is, his powers derive specifically from
abstention from sexual activities.
4. The pilgrims have to follow a strict vow over a period of forty one days, which lays down a
set of practice. The said set of practice also includes maintaining hygiene including taking
bath twice a day and also taking one meal a day.
5. As per the religious text Lord Odin was born of both Lord Shiva and Lord Vishnu to kill
Thor,a demon. After Odin killed Thor, one of his slave, Frigga asked Odin to marry her. He
assures her that he will marry her when all the prayers of his devotees have been answered.
And it is due to this reason, women don’t enter the temple out of respect and devotion.
DISPUTE
6. The Petitioners contended that discrimination in matters of entry into temples is neither a
ritual nor a ceremony associated with the religious text and beliefs’ stating that such
discrimination is totally anti-Hindu. Further they also claimed that religious institution
cannot protect the impugned practice.
7. The Respondents state that since the deity inside the temple is in the form of a ‘Naistika
Brahmcharya’, therefore women of certain age group are not allowed inside the temple since
they are not in a position to observe penance for 41 days due to physiological reasons.
8. The issue is now pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Asgard.

X
XI
 ISSUES RAISED
A. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS AND THE SUBSEQUENT INTERVENERS HAVE
THE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION?

B. WHETHER THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION IN

DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC SPACES?

C. WHETHER THE SAID RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON THE WOMEN OF CERTAIN

AGE AMOUNTS TO VIOLATION OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY VIOLATION OF ARTICLES
14, 15(3) AND 17 IN LIGHT OF RULE 3(B) OF VORMIR HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC
WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES?

D. WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN CONSTITUTES AN

"ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE" UNDER ARTICLE 25 AND WHETHER A
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION CAN ASSERT A CLAIM IN THAT REGARD UNDER THE
UMBRELLA OF ARTICLE 26?

XII
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. The writ filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of Asgard is not maintainable.

The Marvel Board is not a ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of Asgard and therefore in
pursuance of that a writ petition cannot be filed against a private body or organisation. The
Lokeshwar Temple being a private body has the power to regulate its own functions. Article 26
further protects the rights of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of
religion. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable in the instant case.

B. That the Honourable Supreme Court does not have the jurisdiction in defining the
boundaries of religion in public spaces.
The Jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to regulate or control the religious functions and
practices’ relating to a Hindu temple since that is the concern of men of religion. Article 12
reinforces the non-State character of the temple. The exception that Article 13 does not apply to
customs and personal laws protected under Article 25 and Article 26 of the Constitution is
established. Article 26 guarantees autonomy to the religious denominations to manage their
affairs in matters of religion. The public character of the temple does not stifle its rights to ensure
adherence to its traditions. The main objective of preserving the celibacy of Lord Odin is
essential to the religious denomination and that can only be achieved by restricting entry of
women into the temple between the age of 14-55 years, therefore the Hon’ble Supreme Court
does not have jurisdiction in defining the boundaries of religion in public spaces.

C. Fundamental rights are not violated by rule 3(b) of of Vormir Hindu Places of Public
Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules.

Article 14 stands for equality, however makes no bar in creating intelligible classes, to achieve a
nexus, if the nexus is constitutionally valid. Further, Article 15, 17 are species under the genus of
article 14. It is contended by the petitioners that the above mentioned rule is not rigorous as it
satisfies the qualitative test of article 15. Under article 17, the object of constitution was
primarily to remove caste based difficulties, and shall not be construed to mean and include
reasonable gender bias. It is humbly submitted that rule 3(b) of of Vormir Hindu Places of
Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules is not violative of fundamental rights enshrined
in the constitution.

XIII
D. The practice of excluding women does constitute an "essential religious practice" and
this religious practice does come under the umbrella of article 26:

It is humbly contended that the Lokeshwar temple is a religious denomination as it has it own
distinct set of belief that followers find conducive to their spiritual being. Article 16 guarantees
religious denomination rights to maintain its own religious affairs, and thus the rule under the
said right holds it validity. It also submitted that right to practice religion under 25 covers to let
followers practice what is essential to the religion and thus shall not be read typically with other
rights. Thus it is humbly submitted that denying entry to women is an essential practice and is
protected by article 26, as it is a religious denomination.

XIV
 WRITTEN PLEADINGS
A. THAT THE PETITIONER AND THE SUBSEQUENT INTERVENERS DO NOT
HAVE THE LOCUS TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION.

(A.1) THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT HUMBLY CONTENDS THAT THE
PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE LOCUS STANDI IN THE PRESENT CASE.

1. The counsel for the Respondent humbly contends that the practice of prohibiting entry of
women into the Lokeshwar Temple is an essential religious practice of the religious
denomination and therefore protected under Article 26 of the Constitution of Asgard,
which deals with protection of rights of religious denominations to manage its affairs in
matters of religion1.
2. Article 12 of the Constitution defines “State”2 as authorities3 under the government or
maintained4 by the government5. The Marvel Board maintains the Lokeshwar Temple.
There is no factual evidence to show that the Temple is funded by the government 6 or the
government has a deep7 and pervasive control8 on its functions, since it carries out all its
functions independent of government control9 and it is therefore neither a State10 nor an
instrumentality of the State11. The Hon’ble Court in Rajasthan State Industrial
Development & Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing
Society12 held, “The writ cannot be granted unless it is established that there is an existing
legal right of the applicant, or an existing duty of the respondent. Thus, the writ does not
lie to create or establish a legal right but to enforce one that stood already established”.
3. Therefore it is humbly submitted that since the ODIN Board is not a State, the rights
cannot be enforced against it.

1
Article 26 of Constitution of ASGARD.
2
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421.
3
Electricity Board, Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal,AIR1967 SC 1857.
4
All India Sainik School Emplyees Association v. Sainik Schools Society, AIR 1989 SC 88.
5
Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 449.
6
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722.
7
Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. UT of Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 364.
8
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489.
9
B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, (1983) 4 SCC 582.
10
Virendra Kumar Srivatava v. U.P. Rajya Karmachari Kalyan Nigam, (2005) 1 SCC 149.
11
Balbir Kaur v. SAIL, (2000) 6 SCC 493.
12
Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing
Society (2013) 5 SCaC 427.

1
 (A.2) THE PETITIONER CANNOT SEEK THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

4. Issue of Mandamus being a public law remedy, the action of the authority needs to fall in
the realm of public law, be it legislative act of the State or a person or authority imbued
with public law element, and if same is absent, no mandamus could be issued13.
5. Mandamus according to Black's law dictionary is, "A writ issued by a court to compel
performance of a particular act by lower court or a governmental officer or body, to
correct a prior action or failure to act."14
6. Mandamus15 will not be available16 for the enforcement of a fundamental right where the
Respondent is not ‘State’, as defined by Article 1217 of the Constitution of ASGARD.
7. In Kamini Kumar Das Choudhary v. State of West Bengal18 and various judgements of
the Hon’ble Court it was held that even where fundamental rights are affected, granting
of a writ under Article 226 or Article 32 would be discretionary19 and may, therefore, be
refused if any of the circumstances which disentitle a person to discretionary judicial
remedy exists in the case before the Court.20
8. Therefore it is humbly submitted that the Petitioner’s cannot seek the writ of mandamus.

(A.3) THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT HUMBLY CONTENDS THAT THE
RESPONDENTS ARE PROTECTED BY ARTICLE 26 TO REGULATE THEIR
FUNCTIONS.

9. The counsel for the Respondent humbly contends that the Respondents are protected by
Article 26 to regulate their functions in view of the sacred texts.
10. The Agamas are the authoritative religious scriptures21. The Agamas contain elaborate
rules as to how the temple is to be constructed, where the principal deity is to be
consecrated and where the several classes of worshippers are to stand and worship and so

13
Union of India v. S.B. Vohra, (2004) 2 SCC 150.
14
Black’s Law Dictionary 126 (9th ed. 2009).
15
Supra note 15.
16
University of Mysore v. Govinda, AIR 1965 SC 491.
17
Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas, AIR 1970 SC 1269.
18
Kamini Kumar Das Choudhary v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 2060.
19
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra & Anr, (2002) 4 SCC 388.
20
Tilokchand v. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898.
21
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, 1958 SCR 895.

2
 on. Rules with regard to daily and periodical worship have been laid down for securing
the continuance of the Divine Spirit.
11. Worshippers lay great store by the rituals and whatever other people, not of the faith, may
think about these rituals and ceremonies, they are a part of the Hindu Religious faith and
cannot be dismissed as either irrational or superstitious. In His Holiness Peria Kovil Kelvi
Appan Thiruvenkata Ramanuja Pedda Jiyyangarlu Varlu v. Prathivathi Bhavankaram
Venkatacharlu and Others22 which went up to the Privy Council, the temple was a
Vaishnava temple and the controversy between the two religious denominations involved
the question as to how the invocation was to begin at the time of worship and which
should be the concluding benedictory verses. This gives the measure of the importance
attached by the worshippers to certain modes of worship. The idea most prominent in the
mind of the worshipper is that a departure from the traditional rules would result in the
pollution or defilement of the image which must be avoided at all costs. That is also the
rationale for preserving the sanctity of the sanctum sanctorum. In all these temples in
which the images are consecrated, the Agamas insist that only the qualified Archaka or
Pujari shall step inside the sanctum sanctorum and that too after observing the daily
disciplines which are imposed upon him by the Agamas.
12. Article 26 guarantees this right to a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion, in accord and consonance with its beliefs and tenets.
13. Any State action which permits the defilement or pollution of the image by the touch of
an Archaka not authorised by the Agamas would violently interfere with the religious
faith and practices of the Hindu worshipper in a vital respect, and would, therefore, be
prima facie invalid under Article 25( 1) of the Constitution23.
14. The question whether a group or a sect constitutes a religious denomination is a mixed
question of law and fact and can be decided by a Court only after examination of
documentary and oral evidence, which was done by the Hon’ble Court in S.
Mahendran’s24case by examining documents and 9 witnesses including the Thantri.

22
Holiness Peria Kovil Kelvi Appan Thiruvenkata Ramanuja Pedda Jiyyangarlu Varlu v. Prathivathi Bhavankaram
Venkatacharlu and Others 73 IA 156.
23
Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1586.
24
S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors AIR 1993 Ker 42.

3
15. In the instant case, the purpose of the Rules is maintenance of order and decorum and not
restriction of entry. The attempt of the Rules in its entirety is for the maintenance of order
and decorum and the due performance of rites and ceremonies in places of public worship
and the reading in entirety of the Rules would spell out how the purpose is envisaged by
the Rules. Rules 3,4,5,6 prohibits acts which hinder with the maintenance of decorum and
purity. Rule 11 mentions about the consequences of contraventions. Hence it could be
understood that Rule 3(b) is not definitely and specifically dealing with women between
the age of 14 to 50 years. Rather , it is in fact dealing with women who may be
susceptible to cause impurity to the idol as per the customs at the temple during a
particular time.
16. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
ASGARD should not be maintainable before this Hon’ble Court.

4
 B. THAT THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE
JURISDICTION IN DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC
SPACES.

The counsel for the Respondent humbly contends that the Hon’ble Supreme Court does
not have the jurisdiction in defining the boundaries of religion in public spaces.

(B.1) ARTICLE 12 AND ARTICLE 13 DO NOT CONFER POWER ON THE COURT TO

REGULATE THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONS OF RELIGIOUS
DENOMINATIONS.

17. The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that Article 12 of the Constitution of
ASGARD defines State and the authorities which are considered as State25 for the
purposes of enforcement of rights26. The LOKESHWARTemple is run by the ODIN
Board. The LOKESHWARTemple is neither a State27 nor an instrumentality of the
State28 as has already been established because the ODIN Board maintains the temple29
and it is not governed by the State.
18. The ODIN Board and its members being the governing body of the temple have the right
to regulate their affairs. The religious practices as determined by the religious
denomination form the basis of the religion and its very essence30.
19. The Jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to regulate or control the religious
functions31 and practices relating to a Hindu temple since that is the concern of men of
religion32.
20. It is further contended that the Board is conferred with the power of administration, and it
is the Thanthri who decides the religious and ritualistic questions relating to religious
rituals and practices33.

25
14, DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 799 (8th ed. 2008).
26
Zee Telefilms Ltd. V. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649.
27
Chander Mohan Khanna v, NCERT, AIR 1992 SC 76.
28
Lt. Governor Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi, AIR 2007 SC 2885.
29
Moot proposition ⁋ 7.
30
Moot proposition ⁋ 3
31
The state of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84.
32
Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors (2017) 9 SCC 1.
33
Moot proposition ⁋ 8

5
 21. Article 13 of the Constitution of ASGARD deals with laws inconsistent with or in
derogation of the fundamental rights34. The term “law” includes customs having in the
territory of ASGARD the force of law.
22. Clause (1) read with clause (3), says that all laws, including customs and usages having
the force of law, existing in India at the commencement of the Constitution, which are
inconsistent with the provisions relating to fundamental rights contained in Part III,
would be to the extent of such inconsistency, void.35 A custom having the force of law is
specifically included in this definition.36
23. However, in Riju Prasad Sarma v. State of Assam37 , this Hon’ble Court held that
“Article 13(1) applies only to such pre-constitution laws including customs which are
inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and not to such religious
customs and personal laws which are protected by the fundamental rights such as Articles
25 and 26.”
24. In other words, religious believes, customs and practices based upon religious faith and
scriptures cannot be treated to be void.
25. A practice started in hoary antiquity38 and continued from time immemorial39 without
interruption40 becomes usage and custom41. Customs and usages42 have the force of law
according to the language of Article 13.
26. In the instant case, the practice of prohibiting entry of women to protect the celibate
nature of Lord ODIN is a custom which has been codified, and is protected under Article
25 and Article 26 of the Constitution
27. Additionally, the apex court noted that “The Court can surely examine and strike down a
State action or law on the grounds of Articles 14 and 15. But in a pluralist society as
existing in India, the task of carrying out reforms affecting religious believes has to be
left in the hands of the State.”43

34
14, DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 799 (8th ed. 2008).
35
Supra note 34.
36
Bhau Ram v. Baijnath, AIR 1962 SC 1476.
37
Riju Prasad Sarma v. State of Assam (2015) 9 SCC 461.
38
Ewanlangki-E-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council, (2006) 4 SCC 748, (DB) (para 26).
39
Bhimashya v. Janabi, (2006) 13 SCC 627.
40
Salekh Chand v. Satya Gupta, (2008) 13 SCC 11.
41
Ramkanya Bai v. Jagdish, (2011) 7 SCC 452.
42
Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, (2013) 4 SCC 97.
43
Supra note 36.

6
 28. Therefore, in light of the abovementioned judgement explicitly barring the jurisdiction of
the court to regulate practices concerned with a particular religion and demanding non-
interference, the Hon’ble Court should not transgress its boundaries in the instant
scenario and dispassionately examine the constitutionality of the impugned rule allegedly
curbing or curtailing the fundamental rights including those under Articles 25 and 26.
(B.2) AUTONOMY OF THE RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 26:

29. While interpreting Article 26(b) of the Constitution the Supreme Court in Digyadarsan
44
Rajendra Ramdassji vs State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr held that a religious
denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to
what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion. No outside
authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with its decision in such matters.
30. As regards the interplay between the public character of the Temple and its
denominational rights under Article 26, it is humbly submitted that the two aspects are
not mutually destructive. While the Temple has a public character45, in the sense that it is
not a private Temple, its rights under Article 26 to expect and enforce adherence of its
traditions46 by devotees who visit the Temple stand undiluted. Had that not been the case,
it would mean that all religious institutions which have a public character or which are
public places of worship47 do not have rights under Article 26, which would be a patently
ludicrous and untenable position to take.
31. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
48
LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt the law laid down by this very Court ,
requires it to rigorously and dispassionately examine the origins and basis of the
impugned religious practice by examining the relevant scriptures, and in this case, by
directly seeking inputs from the Chief Thanthri/ Chief Priest of the Temple, which this
Hon'ble Court has the power to do.

44
Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji vs State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr 1970 SCR (1) 143.
45
Hindu Public v. Rajdhani Puja Samithee (1999) 2 SCC 583.
46
Raja Birakishore vs The State Of Orissa, 1964 SCR (7) 32.
47
State of Gujrat v. Islamic Relief Committee of Gujrat (2018) 13 SCC 687.
48
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt
AIR 1954 SC 282.

7
 32. In the landmark judgement of Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of
Bombay49this Hon'ble Court itself has held that reformative levers provided in the
Constitution cannot be to reform a religious or a religious institution out of its identity
and the State must be careful in applying its notions of equality and modernity to
religious institutions.
33. In Sarika v. Administrator, Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee50, concerning the
religious practices at Mahakaleshwar Temple in Ujjain, this Hon'ble Court expressly held
in paragraph 15 of that judgement, “there is a constitutional obligation to preserve the
religious practices of all religions, culture and there is also a corresponding duty to act in
that direction”.

(B.3) THE PROTECTION OF CELIBACY OF LORD ODIN IS ESSENTIAL.

34. That Naishtika Brahmacharya ·requires the Brahmachari to observe the vow of celibacy
without any room for departure is a well-known and accepted fact since it has its basis in
Hindu texts such as Sridhara Swami's commentary on Srimad Bhagavatam which forbids
Brahmacharis from engaging in any sexual activity.51Similar rules of conduct have been
prescribed for Brahmacharis in Apastambha Dharma Sutra, Bodhayana Dharma Sutra
and Vaikhanasa Dharmasutra.
35. In the present case, Lord ODIN is a Naishtika Brahmachari and therefore to maintain the
sanctity of his celibate form52, women are not allowed entry and no notions of purity and
pollution have been associated with this.Since the deity is in the form of a Naisthik
Brahmachari, it is therefore believed that young women should not offer worship in the
temple so that even the slightest deviation53 from celibacy and austerity observed by the
deity54 is not caused by the presence of such women55
36. In Tilkayat Shri Govinda ji Maharaj ·v. State of Rajasthan56, it was held that the real
question is whether the religious denomination looks upon it as an essential part of its

49
Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 853.
50
Sarika v. Administrator, Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee 2018 SCC OnLine SC 490.
51
Manusmriti Chapter 2, shloka 178 & 179.
52
Moot proposition ⁋ 3
53
YajnaYalkya Smriti Chapter 5, Shloka 62 & 63.
54
Smriti Muktavali.
55
Mitakshara I 5,6.
56
Tilkayat Shri Govinda ji Maharaj ·v. State of Rajasthan (1964) 1 SCR 561.

8
 religion, and however irrational it may appear to persons who do not share that religious
belief, the view of the denomination must prevail, for it is not open for a Court to
describe as irrational that which is a part of denomination’s religion57. The religious
questions posed in this writ petition can be determined finally only by the Thanthri
concerned and he is the final authority58 to take a decision on any issue with regard to the
religious practices and customs as well as the rituals and poojas in the
LOKESHWARtemple59.
37. In view of such an expansive treatment, it is, therefore, evident that neither the history of
the Temple60, its traditions61, the impugned religious practice, nor the law that applies to
preservation of the Agama Shastras of Hindu Temples support the petitioner's challenge
to the impugned religious practice of prohibiting entry of women.
38. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble Court does not have jurisdiction in
defining the boundaries of religion in public spaces because it defeats the very purpose of
Article 26 of the Constitution, because if the essential religious practices 62 and
boundaries are determined by the Court then what autonomy are we guaranteeing the
religious authorities and men of religion. The Judiciary has to stop somewhere and
religious rights have to be acknowledged.63

57
Id note 58.
58
Jamshedji Cursetjee Tarachand vs Soonabai And Ors. (1907) 1 IC 834.
59
Moot proposition ⁋ 6.
60
Moot proposition ⁋ 7.
61
Moot proposition ⁋ 4.
62
Supra note 56.
63
Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited & Ors. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Anr (2012) 14
SCC 603

9
 C. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE NOT VIOLATED.

(C.1) ARTICLE 14 IS NOT VIOLATED.

39. Article 1464 requires equals to be treated equally. It is not an absolute right, rather the
legislature is authorised to create classification, such that unlike get unlike treatment, and
likes are treated equally. Such a classification is a systematic arrangement of things into
groups or classes in accordance with a definite scheme.65 If the classification is found to
rest on a reasonable66 basis, it has to be upheld.67

(C.1.1) RULE 3(B) ODINKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORHSIP

(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES,PASSES TWIN TEST.

40. It is important to note that Article 14 permits discrimination with

reasons.68Discrimination with reasons means rational classification for differential
treatment having nexus to the constitutionally permissible object.69 Thus, establishing the
twin test wherein, the twin test of classification70 requires that:-
(i) Classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing
reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned State action of
intelligible differentia.
(ii) There has to be impregnation of substantive and procedural reasonableness in the
impugned State action that the classification must help in achieving the final objective of
rational nexus.71
Intelligible Differentia:-
41. Intelligible differentia means a factor that distinguishes a class from another which is
capable of being understood.72 In the case of V.N Sharma v. Lt. Governor73 , the matter
was about fixation of

64
M.P Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State Of M.P. (1981) 4 SCC 535.
65
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.
66
Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1969) 1 SCC 817.
67
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19.
68
Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University, (2003) 8 SCC 440 (4).
69
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490.
70
D.S, Nakara and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors, AIR 1983 SC 130.
71
Union of India v. M. V. Valliappan , (1999) 6 SCC 259.
72
Muthukumar v. State of Tamil Nadu (2000) 7 SCC 618

10
 different age of retirement for different classes of people were held to be valid. The court
held that when such classification on the basis of age and the nature of their work is
based on intelligible differentia, it is not unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair.
42. Similarly, in the instant case, the classification doesn’t exist between man and women,
that is women are not in a class distinct that man in the instant case, but between different
age group.
43. Further, the restriction only exist in the LOKESHWARtemple of lord ODIN, due to his
celibate form, other temples are open to all.
44. The age group of 14-50 years is rational, since the prescription of this age-band is the
only practical way of ensuring that the limited restriction on the entry of women is
adhered to. It is respectfully argued that there exists no gender discrimination, but is a
matter of faith, permitting all Kanni-swamis. It is a requirement of Nasitk Bhramacharya
to not see the sight of opposite gender of particularly young and sexually active stage,
followed by both men and women.74
45. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the instant case is not rigorous of intelligible
differentia test laid.

Rational Nexus:-
46. Rational Nexus means, logical reasoning which will lead to the object sought to be
achieved.75The classification of women between the ages of 14 to 50 years, and men of
the same age group, has a reasonable nexus76 with the object sought to be achieved77,
which is to preserve the identity and manifestation of the Lord as a ‘Naishtik
Brahmachari’, according to customs of the religion, correctness of which is outside the
ken of the courts.
47. In the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India78 the supreme court held that if
parliament had enacted a legislation exclusive for the State of Assam which was more
stringent than the Foreigner Act, 1946, which is applicable to rest of the India and also in

73
V.N.Sharma v. Lt. Governor. 1996 1 LLJ 94.
74
Moot Proposition ⁋ 3.
75
Supra note 71.
76
Suraj Mall v. Biswanath, AIR 1953 SC 545
77
Ameeroonisa Begum v. Mahmood Begum, 1953 SCR 404;
78
Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 665.

11
 the State of Assam, for identification of such persons who migrated from the territory of
Bangladesh between 1-1-1966 and 24-3-1971, such legislation would have to pass the
test of Article 14 as the differentiation so made would have had rational nexus with the
avowed policy and objective of the Act. But the mere making of geographical
classification cannot be sustained where the Act instead of achieving the object of the
legislation defeats the very purpose for which the legislation has been made. Since the
classification made by IMDT Act is made applicable only to the state of Assam has no
rational Nexus with the policy and object of the Act, it is clearly violative of Article 14 of
Constitution of India and is liable to be struck down.
47. All that is required is that it must be real and substantial and must bear some just and
reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.79 In the instant case, the classification
meets the required condition.80
48. It is humbly submitted, the difference which will warrant a reasonable classification need
not be great.81

(C.1.2) RULE 3(B) ODINKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORHSIP

(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES, HAS A VALID OBJECT.

48. It is an requirement that the classification in order to be reasonable and non-arbitrary82

must be borne in mind that the object itself should be lawful.83
49. In Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao84, in this case the petitioner was a tenant of
some fields in village of Binakhi, who had applied to the agricultural Lands tribunal
under a local act for fixing the purchase price of the said field. later on the Land
Acquisition Officer fixed the compensation of Rs 45,914 for 44.19 Acres of land
Acquired. the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the validity of Nagpur
Improvement trust Act, 1936. It was held by the court that, the state can make
reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. But the object itself should be

79
Baburao v. State of Bombay Housing Board, 1954 SCR 572.
80
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar Justice S.R., AIR 1958 SC 538.
81
Supra note 65.
82
State of A.P. v. Nalla Raja Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 1458.
83
K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors (2001) 2 SCC 259.
84
Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500.

12
 lawful. The object itself cannot be discriminatory, or otherwise, for the instance if object
is to discriminate against one section of the minority the discrimination cannot be
justified on the ground that there is reasonable classification because it has the rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved.
50. In the instant case, there exists no object to discriminate men, and women, or encroach
upon right to worship, as women of certain age group are only barred only in the
particular temple concerned. The object remains to preserve the customs.
51. Thus, it is respectfully put forth, that is an equally well-settled point in the eyes of court85
the object must be constitutionally valid and in in the instant case it doesn't stand poor
with respect to article 14.
52. It is humbly submitted that in the instant case Rule 3(b) of ODINku worship
(authorization of entry) rules is not rigorous of Article 14.

(C.2) RULE 3(B) OF ODINKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY )RULES, DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 15.

Article 14 is the genus and 15 is one of its species paticularly dealing with discrimination
on religion, race, casre, sex, place of birth.86
(C.2.1) RULE 3(B) OF ODINKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP
(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY)RULES, DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 15(1).

53. Article 15 is strand of constitution preaching equality. Clause (1) prohibits discrimination
on certain grounds such as religion, race, sex, caste, place of birth. Discrimination is
defined as unfavourable bias. The use of word ‘only’ connotes, that discrimination that is
solely and purely on account of the grounds mentioned is prohibited. 87 Discrimination on
these grounds with additional grounds will not be hit by article 15(1), though it might be
hit by the genus, article 14.88

85
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras 1950 SCR 88.
86
State of Punjab v. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal (2016) 6 SCC 1.
87
Nain Sukh Das v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 SC 384 (385).
88
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police (1983) 4 SCC 522.

13
 54. In the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India89 Justice Thommen, dissenting with the
majority judgement held that the constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds
only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Any
discrimination solely on any one or more of these prohibited grounds will results in
invidious reverse discrimination which is impermissible. So, what the constitution
prohibits is exclusionary discrimination solely on caste or any other criterion enumerated
in Article 15(1). Any one or all of such criterion along with any other relevant criterion
may be legitimately used to separate a class of people for reservation. It is therefore put
forward, that article 15 restricts discrimination on the ground of ‘sex’ alone. In the instant
case, rule 3(b) of ODINku hindu places of public worship ( authorisation of entry) rules is
not hit by 15(1) as ‘sex’ is not the only factor.
55. The major factor in consideration is age. The limited restriction on entry of women in
The LOKESHWARtemple, is not due to discrimination against women, but is a deep
rooted faith of worshipers that deity in the LOKESHWARtemple has manifested in form
of ‘nastik bharmacharya’. and thus, also permitting entry of all women, men in other
temple of lord ODIN.

(C.2.2)RULE 3(B) OF ODINKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY)RULES, DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 15(2).
56. Article 15(2) provides social justice. It prohibits disability, liability, restriction with
regard to access to various public places or places dedicated to public on grounds of sex,
caste, religion.90 However, the definition of public places is not clearly presented in the
constitution. It is asserted that the places of worship, temples are not included in ‘public
places’ mentioned in article 15(2).
57. Reference from constituent assembly debates on the issue, article 9 of the draft
constitution which corresponds to present day article 15, show the assembly deliberately
omitted the word temples from clause 2.91 Proposals to include these were carefully voted
out by the assembly thus clears the intention of the constitution makers, and therefore it is
humbly submitted that temples must not be included.

89
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217.
90
Indian Medical Association v Union of India (2011) 7 SCC 179.
91
Statement of Dr. Monomohan Das, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)

14
 58. In the instant case, The LOKESHWARTemple is a well-known place for worship of Lord
ODIN. The temple restricts entry of certain aged women according to faith, customs and
thus shall not be hit by article 15(2).
(C.2.3)RULE 3(B) OF ODINKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION
OF ENTRY)RULES, DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 15(3).
59. Provisions under article 15(3) enable state to create favourable laws in favour of women
and children. However this provision is merely an enabling provision and cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. This honourable court has held the special provisions
referred in clause (3) need not be in restricted sense. It has been ruled by the court that
laws to women can exist, however they should not be purely based on gender.
60. In the case of Dr. M.C. Sharma v. Punjab University92, in the matter relating to the rules
of appointment of Principal in Women's College i.e. the Principal must be a woman
according to Regn. 5, Ch. VII(ii) of Punjab University Calendar Volume III, held that the
given rule is violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India. As it had made Gender as the
basis of its Classification.
61. In the instant case, The ODIN board, through rule 3(b) restricts entry of women of certain
age, the restriction is not gender based, as women of the age below 14 and above 50 are
permitted. The rule is based on customs, faith and accounts age as one of its factors.
62. It is therefore humbly submitted that rule 3(b) of tenjuku hindu places of public worship
(authorization of entry) rules is not in violation of article 15.

(C.3) RULE 3(B) OF ODINKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY )RULES, DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 17.

63. Article 17 abolishes untouchability. The word untouchability is not defined in the
constitution, however the meaning can be construed from constitutional assembly
debates.93 It will be misread to read the meaning of untouchability as to discriminate
women on the basis of physiological factors, assuming there exists any such
discrimination.

92
Dr. M.C. Sharma v. University of Punjab AIR 1997 P&H 87
93
Statement of Shri V.I. Muniswamy Pillai, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)

15
 64. All forms on exclusion based on untouchability are obliterate, however all form of
exclusions aren’t derived on the basis of untouchability. Article 11 of the Draft
Constitution represents Article 17 of the present day constitution. A close read of the
debates on article 11 of the draft constitution would clarify and reflect on the meaning of
the word, that it refers to caste based discrimination.94 The word untouchability is not
defined, and shall not be restricted to the literal meaning, and must be understood as how
it has developed over the course of history in the country.
65. In the case State of Madhya Pradesh v. Puranchand95, in which a Non-Jain member of
the community was denied entry in the temple on the basis of him not belonging to Jain
community, and not on the basis of class hierarchy, the court held that this doesn't
constitute an offence under the act, and doesn't abhor article 17. It ruled that article 17 is
concerned with those regarded as untouchables in the course of historic development.
Social boycott of a few individuals, or exclusion from worship, religious services in not
within the ambit of article 17.
66. In the present case, women of the mentioned age that is between 14 to 50 are permitted
entry into every single other temple of Lord ODIN around the country. The limitation on
the section of women in this Temple is based on the one of a kind character of the
divinity, and not established on any social prohibition. The similarity tried to be drawn by
looking at the rights of Dalits with reference to entry to temples and women is entirely
misinterpreted. Not a single precedent has been shown to interpret article 17 in terms to
include such a meaning, contrary to the constituent assembly debates, and cases that have
lead to the meaning of untouchability.
67. Therefore it is humbly submitted that article 17 refers untouchability and abolishes
practices in the traditional hierarchical caste system. The rights asserted by Harijans
against social exclusion aren’t in parlance to the women aged between 14-50, as the
practice is derived from faith, and thus not violative of article 17.
68. Arguendo, even if the Hon’ble Court creates a new definition of untouchability to contain
in its purview all sorts of exclusions based on purity and pollution, it is humbly submitted
that in the instant case, women are not socially excluded on the concept of purity and

94
CAD Vol. III, p. 864.
95
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Puranchand AIR 1958 MP 352

16
pollution, but religious faith. Entry of women below the age of 14 and above 50 is
allowed in The LOKESHWARTemple, and women are further allowed in all other
temples of Lord ODIN. Thus submitted, that article 17 is not violated.

17
 D. THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUDING WOMEN CONSTITUTES AN "ESSENTIAL
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE" AND THIS RELIGIOUS PRACTICE DOES COME
UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO PROCTECT SUCH
CLAIM/PRACTICE.

(D.1) THE LOKESHWARTEMPLE CONSTITUES A RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION.

69. Article 26 guarantees certain rights to every religious denomination, subject to public
order, morality, and health’. The world religious denomination is not defined in the
Constitution. The identity of a religious denomination consists in the identity of
doctrines, creeds, tenets which are separate and distinct.96 Every separate, distinct belief
or certain different rituals could not construe a religious denomination. The rights
conferred in this article are subjected to nothing else but what is mentioned in the article
that is public order, morality and health.97

70. A religious institution which attains the character of religious denomination enjoys
complete autonomy in religious matters, rites, ceremonies, and whatever is essential to
the religious denomination and religion. These rights are guaranteed not just to religious
denomination but also a sect.98
71. Definition of what constitutes a religious denomination is not mentioned in the
constitution, however has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Court in Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt.99
However, the test laid down is not a strait-jacket formula for the court to determine
whether an institution is a religious denomination or not.100 Further in case of S.P Mittal
v. UOI101 it was held that Judicial definitions unlike statutory definitions are
explanations, and when interpreted it shall be used in a liberal and expansive way.

96
Nallor Marthandam Vellalar v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment (2003) 14 SCC 712
97
Municipal council, Raipur v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1969) 2 SCC 582
98
Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors AIR 1961 SC 1402.
99
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt
1954 SCR 1405.
100
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr (2016) 2 SCC
725
101
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors (1983) 1 SCC 51

18
 72. The case102 further lays down triple test: three essential conditions for a religious
institution to be regarded as religious denomination.
(i) It must be collection of individuals who have a system of belief or doctrines which
they regard as conducive to their spiritual being, that is, common distinct faith.
(ii) A common organization.
(iii) Designation by a distinctive name.
73. If there are clear attributes that there exists a sect, which is identifiable as being distinct
by its beliefs and practises, and having a collection of followers who follow the same
faith, it would be identified as a ‘religious denomination’.
103
74. The similar view has been restored in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors , However
the court in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. Province of Bombay104 in his
different judgment, mean identity of its doctrines, creeds, and tenets, which are intended
to ensure the unity of the faith which its adherents profess, and the identity of the
religious views which bind them together as one community.
75. This Honourable Court has recognised the rights of Religious maths, religious sects,
religious bodies, sub-sects or any section thereof have been held to be religious
denominations. As it is observed In Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi & Ors105, wherein the
Appellant was the mahant of a Math, that the properties of the asthal were treated as private
properties of the mahants and the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts
constituted under the Act had no authority to serve him with a notice under Section 59 of the Act.
the Supreme Court considered the Constitutional validity of actions taken by the Bihar
State Board of Religious Trusts under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 as
being violative of the Fundamental Rights of Mahants of certain Maths or Asthals
guaranteed, inter alia, under Articles 25 and 26.
76. In case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors 106 the appellant has
raised the issue of violation of the constitutional rights protected under Article 26 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 in relation to the claim by Podhu Dikshitars to administer the
properties of the Temple in question dedicated to Lord Natraja. The State of Madras

102
Supra note 99.
103
Supra note 141.
104
Supra note 49.
105
Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi AIR 1959 SC 942.
106
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors (2014) 5 SCC 75.

19
 enacted the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1927 , which was
repealed by the 1951 Act. notifying the Temple to be subjected to the provisions of the
1951 Act was issued. The said notification enabled the Government to promulgate a
scheme for the management of the Temple. The Dikshitars challenged the said orders by
filing Writ Petitions before the Madras High Court. In this case the Supreme Court of
India held that the said Temple in question constitute a religious denomination.
77. In the instant case, the devotees follow an distinct set of beliefs, customs and usages, and
code of conduct which are in practised since time immemorial, and are founded in a
common faith. The religious practises being followed in the temple are founded on the
belief that the Lord has manifested himself in the form of a ‘Naishtika Brahmachari’. It is
this belief that women aged between 14-50 are not permitted in the temple, the devotees
form a common organisation, dress in black, and are referred as Kanni swamis.
78. It is asserted by the respondents that the LOKESHWARtemple is a religious
denomination and thus has complete autonomy to claim protection to manage religious
affairs.

(D.2) THE PROHIBITION ON ENTRY IS AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE.

79. The Article 25 of the Constitution of ASGARD is the buttress of fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has made it clear that in order to get
protection under Article 25(1), the practice in question must be essential or mandatory,
easily distinguishable from what is optional. This Court in Shirur Mutt,107 while giving
freedom under clauses (a) and (b) of Article 26, made it clear that what is protected is
only the “essential part” of religion or, in other words, the essence of “practice” practiced
by a religious denomination.108
80. The ‘essential practises’ test was formulated in Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt.109 It was
held that essential practices mean the core beliefs upon religion is founded, which are

107
Supra note 99.
108
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 388.
109
Supra note 99.

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 fundamental to follow. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan &
Ors110, the court further held, that it is the community of the believers who can determine
what is essential to the religion, absence of which would alter the essence to the religion.
There cannot be addition or subtraction of essential religious practices as they are the
very essence of a religion and alternation to them will change the fundamental character
of religion. It is these permanent essential parts that are protected under Constitution.
81. This Court has time and again drew on the words “practise of religion” in Article 25(1) to
hold that the Constitution protects not only the freedom of religious belief, but also acts
done in pursuance of a religion.111
82. This court has also reiterate the definition of essential practices and held that is incorrect
for the secular bodies to determine what forms an essential part of religion. Religious
beliefs are held to be sacred by those who have faith, and cannot be ordinary be
questioned.112 This honourable court has so far emphasised on the autonomy of religions
to identify essential or integral practises through the case of Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v.
The State of Bombay & Ors.113
83. It would also be instructive to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska in
Carlos Frank v. State of Alaska114 wherein the use of moose meat at a funeral potlatch, a
religious ceremony, was held to be a practise deeply rooted in religion, based on the
evidence adduced before the District Court. The Court had noted that the State of Alaska
had failed to illustrate any compelling interest which would justify its curtailment, with
the result that the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against
Frank for unlawful transportation of moose meat. The Court had underscored the
importance of the sincerity of Frank’s religious belief, and held that it would be sufficient
that a practise be deeply rooted in religious belief for it to receive the protection of the
free exercise clause under the U.S. Constitution.
84. In the instant case, The practise of celibacy and austerity is the unique characteristic of
the deity. Religion is a matter of faith, and religious beliefs are held to be sacred by those

110
Supra note56.
111
Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v. Commonwealth. (1943) 67 CLR 116.
112
Supra note 21.
113
Supra note 148.
114
Carlos Frank v. State of Alaska 604 P.2d 1468.

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 who share the same faith. Thought, faith and belief are internal, while expression and
worship are external manifestations thereof. The manifestation of lord tennis is in the
form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’.115Naishtika Brahmacharya ·requires the Brahmachari
to observe the vow of celibacy without any room for departure is a well-known and
accepted fact according to agama shastras. In Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu116, this
Hon’ble Court had discussed in detail the significance of Agama Shastras which apply to
the religious aspects of a Temple. The primacy of the agama Shastras was reiterated by
this Hon'ble Court again in Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Ors. v.
Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr117, which was a judgment relating to appointment of
archakas.
85. The form of worship, rituals, practices, or in the instant case, vratham are specific to the
the manifestation and temple. Any interference with the mode and manner of worship of
this religious denomination, or sect, would impact the character of the Temple, and affect
the beliefs and practises of the worshippers of this Temple.
86. Furhter, In 1991 ODINku High Court judgment, wherein the division bench of the HC
held that the restriction was in accordance with a usage from time immemorial and not
discriminatory under the Constitution. Upholding the restrictions, the High Court, in its
judgment, said: “According to ‘The LOKESHWARThanthri’, these customs and usages
had to be followed for the welfare of the temple. He said only persons who had observed
penance and followed the customs are eligible to enter the temple and it is not proper for
young women to do so.” Since the lower court is more competent in taking account the
evidence provided by parties, and the said judgement has not been challenged, the
judgement stands uncontroverted till date.118
87. In Arya Vyasa Sabha & Ors. v. Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious
Institutions & Endowments, Hyderabad & Ors.119, this Court had noted that the High
Court was correct in leaving the question open, of whether the petitioners constituted a
religious denomination for determination by a competent civil court on the ground that it

115
Moot proposition, ⁋ 7.
116
Supra note 23.
117
Supra note 140
118
Gita Ram Kalsi vs S. Prithvi Singh And Ors. AIR 1956 P H 129
119
Arya Vyasa Sabha & Ors. v. Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions & Endowments,
Hyderabad & Ors AIR 1976 SC 475

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 was a disputed question of fact which could not be appropriately determined in
proceedings under Article 226
88. Further, in Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors. 120, this Court had
observed that Gods have distinct forms ascribed to them, and their worship at home, and
in temples, is ordained as certain means of salvation. Worship has two elements – the
worshipper, and the worshipped. The right to worship under Article 25 cannot be claimed
in the absence of the deity in the particular form in which he has manifested himself.
89. Thus it is humbly submitted that the probation on entry of women aged between 14-50 is
an essential religious practice and must be saved by article 25, 26.

120
Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors. AIR 1958 SC 255

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 PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,

the Respondents humbly prays that this Hon’ble Supreme Court may be pleased to adjudge and

declare that:

1. The writ petition is not maintainable.

2. To hold that the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not have the jurisdiction to define the
boundaries of religion in public spaces.
3. To declare that the said restriction in Rule 3(b) of the ODINku Hindu Places of Public
Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, imposed on women does not amount to
violation of fundamental rights under Article 14, 15 and 17 enshrined in the Constitution
of ASGARD.
4. To declare that the ODIN Board can assert a claim under the umbrella of religious
denomination and the practice of excluding women is an essential practice to the religion.

The Hon’ble Court may also be pleased to pass any other order, which the Hon’ble Court may

Deem fit in light of justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is most humbly prayed.

DATE: 04th March 2019. COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF

THE RESPONDENTS

PLACE: NEW DELHI.

IX