, respondents

Paras, J.

February 14, 1992

Nature:Petition for review from the decision of the Executive Secretary
Summary: Petitioner Carpio assails the constitutionality of RA 6975 which established the PNP and placed it
under the DILG. Carpio mainly argues that the Act derogated the power of control of the NAPOLCOM over
the PNP by vesting different powers in the local officials. The SC upheld the constitutionality of the act and
clarified that there is no usurpation of the power of control as the local executives merely act as
representatives of the NAPOLCOM.
Doctrine:
 The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executiv department
 The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a
civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature. His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chied is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.” (Art. II, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution)
 (from the reviewer)
o Is this good law? As to the PNP structure, no. Now, the PNP is attached to DILG.
o “Operational supervision and control”
 day to day operations only; so it does not have to go to NAPOLCOM all the time
Facts:
 Pursuant to Sec. 6 1 , Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution, Congress passed RA 6975 entitled “An Act
Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and
Local Government, and for other purposes”.
o It was approved by President Corazon Aquino on December 13, 1990 and took effect 15
days after pblication (Jan. 1, 1991)
 Petitioner Carpio, as citizen, taxpayer, and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the
Constitution, filed the present petition seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the said
RA. The following are his arguments:
o Carpio advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated the National Police Commission by
limiting its power “to administrative control” over the Philippine National Police (PNP),
thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National
Police Commission and the PNP were placed.
o That in manifest derogation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP, RA
6975 vested the power to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in
the Governors and Mayors, respectively.
o That Sec. 122 of RA 6975 constitutes an encroachment upon, interferences with, and an
abdiction by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers
o That Sec. 84, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members is an
unconstitutional encroachment upo and a diminution of, the President’s power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices
Issue # 1: WON RA 6975 is unconstitutional
Ratio # 1:
History of Philippine’s police force and the reason for Sec. 6, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution
The structure – basically, police was under the military
 Commonwealth period – Philippine Constabulary (PC)
o PC is the nucleus of Philippine Ground Force (PGF) or what is now the AFP
o PC was made part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional control
was handled by the then Department of the Interior
o After the war, PC remained as the National Police under the Department of National
Defense (DND), as a major service component of the AFP
 Integration Act of 1975 created the Integrated National Police (INP)

1
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
2
 o INP was under the Office of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police
forces as the civilian components
o PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent Director-General of the INP,
exercised command functions over the INP
 The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercised administrative control and supervision .
The local executives exercised operational supervision and direction over the INP units assigned
within their respective localities.
Result of the structure
 The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component, which is
the PC, severely eroded the INP’s civilian character and the multiplicity in the governance of the
PC-INP resulted in inefficient police service.
 The integration of the national police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the military
component had superior benefits and privileges
 Hence, the goal of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 was to remove the modern police from
the military. The Commission made a postulate that the military cannot occupy any civil service
position.
 As a result, the “one police force, national in scope, and civilian in character” provision was set in In
short, the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executiv department
 Hence, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are places under the reogranized
Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the
integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the RA.
Consequently, the set-up laid down in the RA does not detract from the Constitutional mandate that
the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
 SC also found that full control remains with the NAPOLCOM
o The local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. As such
deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their
functions. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and
binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM.
o Also, it is important to note that the local officials will choose the officers concerned from a
list of eligibles (those who meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) to
be recommended by PNP officials
 As regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, the provisions in question
(concerning the appointment of PNP officers and Members – the appointment and examination are
subject to the Civil Service Commission) underscore the civilian character of the national police
force, and will undoubtedly professionalize the same
o The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the People’s Law Enforcement
Boards (PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the
Commission’s power of control over the PNP
 The Commission still exercises appellate jurisdiction over the PLEB. It is also the
Commission which shll issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be
adopted by the PLEB.
 SC also does not agree with Carpio that Sec. 12 constitutes an encroachment upon the President’s
commander-in-chief powers
o Sec. 12 enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. The police force is not integrated with the
military and is not part of the AFP. Hence, as a civilian agency of the government, it
properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control.
o Sec. 12 simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national
police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of
the State.
o SC also reiterated that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the
Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief
provision represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other
functions are clearly civil in nature. His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chied is
consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at
all times, supreme over the military.” (Art. II, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution)
 As regards Sec. 84, SC held that there can bo no intereference with the President’s power of
control because the Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body,
 established and tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate trnsfer, merger, and/or
absorption into the DILG of the involved agencies.
o As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it exercises, decidedly do not constitute
an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly belongs to the
President. What is more, no executive dpartment, bureau or office is places under the
control or authority of the committee.
 SC also pointed out that under the Constitution, there are independent Constitutional Commissions
namely: The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections.
Further, there is also an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.
o These independent Commissions and office perform functions and must be protected from
external influences and political pressures. Hence, they were made independent and not
under any department of the government. Certainly, they are not under the control of the
President.
o The NAPOLCOM is different from these independent Commissions/office. NAPOLCOM is
not independent.
Disposition: Petition dismissed.