jocp_1611 660..

667

jiyuan yu

TRANSLATION OF REN IN VAN

NORDEN’S MENGZI

It is hard to imagine that henceforth, anyone who seriously works on

the philosophy of Mengzi will be able to bypass Bryan Van Norden’s
Mengzi, with Selections from Traditional Commentaries.1 This fine
work, along with two other recent Hackett translations of Chinese
classics, Edward Slingerland’s Confucius Analects, with Selections
from traditional Commentaries2 and Brook Ziporyn’s Zhuangzi: the
Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries,3
stand out by including substantial selections from classical and influ-
ential commentaries. In Van Norden’s Mengzi, the interpretive and
historical commentaries are drawn mainly from Zhi Xi’s monumental
Sishu Jizhu (Collected Commentaries on the Four Books). By doing
so, these translations have made a distinctive and magnificent contri-
bution to the study of Chinese philosophy in the English-speaking
world. They will not only bring our understanding of these core
Chinese classics to a new level of clarity and sophistication but will
also become valuable scholarly resources themselves.
Furthermore, these new translations will promote significantly the
interest in the rich tradition of ancient commentary itself. In the study
of Greek philosophy, the ancient commentators on Plato and Aristo-
tle have been studied intensively in recent years. Reading the ancient
commentators has offered us new insights into Plato and Aristotle.
Ancient commentaries help to free us from our familiar assumptions
and approaches in interpreting. They also provide us with perspec-
tives and points that we might have missed. I expect that, with the
publications of these translations, a similar development will flourish
in the study of Chinese philosophy. With the increasing interest in
Chinese philosophy, it will be very exciting to have these ancient
commentators to join our discussion.
While these three excellent translations commonly demonstrate
the value of ancient commentaries, they still disagree on the transla-
tion of ren , the key term in classical Confucianism that has been
translated in many different ways in English and has caused much

JIYUAN YU, Professor, Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at

Buffalo; Changjiang Visiting Chair Professor, Shandong University. Specialties: Greek
philosophy, Chinese philosophy. E-mail: jyyu@buffalo.edu
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37:4 (December 2010) 660–667
© 2010 Journal of Chinese Philosophy
 translation of REN 661

confusion. Van Norden’s Mengzi translates it as “benevolence”; Sling-

erland’s Analects renders it as “goodness,” and Ziporyn’s Zhuangzi
chooses to use “humanity.”
None of these choices is new. D. C. Lau used “benevolence” in
translating ren in the Mengzi;4 Arthur Waley preferred “Goodness” in
his translation of the Analects;5 Wing-tsit Chan and Chichung Huang
chose “humanity.”6 In addition, Ames and Rosemont employed
“authoritative person,” or “authoritative conduct.”7 James Legge ren-
dered it as “virtue” as well as “benevolence.” The list can be much
longer.
Different translations reflect different understandings of this key
concept among translators; and different translations in turn contri-
bute to different readings of the texts, especially among those who do
not know Chinese. In Chinese translation of Western philosophy, one
of the most puzzling concepts is “being” (to on). It has three transla-
tions: shi, you, and cunzai. Commentators have been intensively
debating over the past century which one is more faithful, and the
debate has turned an issue of translation into a number of compli-
cated problems of cross-cultural interpretation and understandings. It
has been puzzling for me why, in the Western translation of Chinese
philosophy, people can tolerate so many different translations of the
same term. These diverse translations with rather different connota-
tions have given rise to perplexities and frustration in classroom.
This discussion focuses on Van Norden’s choice of ren as “benevo-
lence,” and tries to present what I see to be the problems with it. The
purpose of the discussion is to take this chance to learn from the
translator himself the considerations behind the choice, and to have a
dialogue over the translation of this central term itself. Toward the
end of the discussion, I will also touch on the difficulties with other
translations. It is, of course, not practical to desire to achieve a unified
translation of ren, yet some discussion of the term itself should be
helpful in making progress toward a translation with wide consensus.
When translating a term in Chinese classics, we usually first look at
it in the Shuowen lexicon. According to it, “ren means affections,
following ‘man’ and ‘two.’ ” Two important points can be drawn from
this explanation. First, the term means affection or love; and second,
the character ren has two components: “person” on the left, and “two”
on the right. In line with the first point, Wing-Tsit Chan holds that in
the pre-Confucian texts, ren is “a particular virtue of kindness, more
especially the kindness of a ruler to his subjects.”8 This explanation
leads to the translation “benevolence.” However, the second point
enables some translators to claim that the term is cognate with the
word meaning “human being” (ren ); hence it should be translated
as “humanity” or “humanness.”9 Many scholars conclude from this
662 jiyuan yu

point that in Confucian thought human relationship is essential for

being a good person. A good person is the product of human rela-
tionship, not individual achievement or striving.
There are however other interpretations of how this term was used
in pre-Confucian texts. Lin Yu-Sheng thinks that ren originally means
“manly,” “manliness,” or “manhood” and refers to a man’s distinctive
quality.10 This view is followed by Benjamin Schwartz11 and reminds
us of the Latin virtus (from vir, literally, “manhood,” from which the
current term “virtue” comes). The account is mainly based on the two
songs in the Book of Poetry in which a lady praises a man riding out
to hunt as “so handsome, and so ren,” “so handsome, so good,” “so
handsome, so brave,” “so handsome, so strong.” Following this usage,
ren should be translated as “manly.” A further view, held by Graham,
is that ren is a term “which aristocratic clans of Zhou used to distin-
guish themselves from the common people,” and which “covers like
English ‘noble’ the whole range of superior qualities distinctive of the
human of breeding.”12 This would support a rendering of “noble.”
Apparently, the pre-Confucian use of this term gives some support to
the translation of “benevolence,” but does not establish that it is the
only correct rendering.
Van Norden explains ren (as “benevolence”) as follows:“The virtue
that consists in having, and acting on, compassion for others; for
Confucians it should extend to everyone but be strongest for close
family members.”13 This is close to Shuowen’s explanation. It has been
popular to use “benevolence” to render ren in Mengzi. It is also the
case that the choice of “benevolence” is supported by ample textual
evidence. It conveys well the story of the child by the well, which
indicates that all men have the unbearable mind/heart or compassion
to see the suffering of others. In many passages ren is inseparable from
compassion, especially filial love, and “benevolence” works well in
these passages: 2a6.5, 4a27.1, 6a6.7, 6b3.2, 7a15.3, and so on.
Mengzi’s idea here is in line with Analects, especially 12.22: “Fan
Chi asked about ren. The Master replied, ‘care for others.’ ” According
to Chan,“It is on the basis of this meaning, no doubt, that the standard
Chinese dictionary, the Shuo-wen (ad 100), defines ren as ‘affection.’ It
is also on this basis that ancient Chinese philosophers, whether Con-
fucian, Daoist, Moist, or Legalist, and practically all Han Confucian-
ists have equated ren with love.”14
The major problem, however, is that ren seems to have a particular
sense and a general sense. The distinction between ren as a general
virtue and ren as a particular in the Analects has long been noticed.
Yun-lan Fung explicitly points this out;15and as does Chan: “Except in
a few instances Confucius understood ren not as a particular virtue
but as a general one.”16 In many texts ren is distinguished from other
 translation of REN 663

particular virtues such as courage,17 knowledge,18 and “trustworthi-

ness, uprightness, resoluteness.”19 In most places, however, ren is
described as a general quality that embraces particular virtues or
character traits, and is thus virtue in its entirety or in its inclusiveness.
Ren includes knowledge, courage, filial piety, loyalty, li, “respect-
fulness, tolerance, trustworthiness in word, quickness and generos-
ity,”20 and so on. Ren is said to be even more important than one’s
life.21
The distinction between ren as a general virtue and ren as a par-
ticular virtue is also in the Mengzi. On the one hand, according to
Mengzi, ren is one of the four roots in our original human nature.22 It
grows from one of the four roots that constitute our good nature, the
root of “unbearable mind.” On the other hand, ren is also the general
virtue that comprises these four virtues. It is the whole of human
heart/mind. At 6a 11.1, Mengzi said, “benevolence is the human
heart.” Indeed, the other major translation of ren, humanity (or
humanness), is based on The Doctrine of the Mean, chapter 20 and
Mengzi 7b16.1: Renyezhe, renye; heeryanzi, daoye.
(Benevolence is simply being human. The Way is
simply to harmonize with benevolence and put it into words.)
(Compare: Chan translates this sentence as: “Humanity is [the distin-
guishing characteristic of] man.” And Chung-ying Cheng’s translation
is: “‘Ren’ is what characterizes a person as a person, but when we
speak of ‘ren’ as relating two or more persons, it refers to the dao [of
humanity].”23) Ren in this general sense signifies the fullest manifes-
tation of humanness. It does not seem to be suitable to use “benevo-
lence” to refer to this general virtue.
Some commentators see a difference between the Analects and the
Mengzi, to the effect that whereas ren in the Analects might be
ambiguous, the Mengzi has narrowed the word to compassion and
benevolence. Accordingly ren in the Mengzi should be translated as
benevolence with confidence. For instance, Graham says: “By the time
of Mencius [Mengzi] however ren is directly translatable by ‘benevo-
lence.’”24 Yet the above quotations have shown that ren in the Mengzi
has also a general sense of humanity, just as ren in the Analects has a
particular sense of benevolence. Indeed, Mengzi, 7b16 is one of the
major textual sources to render ren as “humanity.”
Van Norden himself is fully aware of the distinction. In the
“English-Chinese Glossary,” appended to his book, he also lists
“humanness” as a translation of ren and specifies: “for Kongzi, this
refers to the summation of human virtue. . . . For Mengzi, this term
normally means ‘benevolence,’ but it sometimes has overtones of this
broader meaning (e.g., 7B16).”25 Nevertheless, he still uses “benevo-
lence” throughout, even in translating 7B16 (quoted above).
664 jiyuan yu

My sense is that when ren is a particular virtue among others, it is

related to love and affection, and is suitably translated as “benevo-
lence.” Yet when ren is taken as a general virtue, “humanity” is more
faithful. Is it possible to have a term that can reflect the distinction
between general ren and particular ren, but at the same time accom-
modate both of them? Or should we use two terms instead of one to
capture the distinction between general ren and particular ren? So far
as I am aware, the only translator who tries to differentiate is James
Legge. He acknowledges that “We cannot give a uniform rendering of
this term.”26 In his translation of the Analects, he uses “benevolent
actions” and “benevolence” on the one hand, and “perfect virtue,”
“virtue,” “true virtue,” and so on on the other (but he also translates
another notion, de, as “virtue”). In his translation of the Mengzi, he
mainly uses “benevolence” (even for 7b16, his translation is “benevo-
lence is the distinguishing characteristic of man”). Yet at 2a5 he
renders “man of ren” as “virtuous man.”
There are, however, difficulties for this approach of using two terms
instead of one in order to capture the distinction between general ren
and particular ren. First, the use of different terms to translate the
same word in the original text easily misleads readers. It is something
that a faithful translation should avoid. Second and more important,
in many passages it is unclear whether ren refers to a general quality
or to a particular character trait. The translator has to decide and
choose.As a result, this translation becomes an explicit interpretation.
There is even a difficulty in using “benevolence” for particular ren.
As a particular virtue, ren is a cultivated disposition, not simply a kind
of feeling. Yet ren is rooted in the feeling of compassion and is the
maturity of that feeling.27 Ren involves a process of development that
starts from a feeling, and ends up becoming a cultivated disposition or
second nature. Mengzi seems to use the same term ren to refer to both
the beginning point and the ending point, and thus does not seem to
distinguish between feeling and disposition. See, 2a6.5, 6a6.7, 4a27.1,
6b3.2, 7a15.3, and 2a7.2.
This situation raises a challenge to English translation. Ideally we
need a term that indicates that ren is a virtue instead of a feeling, but at
the same time is closely related to feeling.“Benevolence” does the best
job conveying the relation between ren and feeling, and hence it is
appropriate to refer to the beginning stage. However, it does not seem
to do a good job in expressing a settled disposition. A similar problem
occurs in translating eudaimonia. The conventional rendering is “hap-
piness.”Yet since the main sense of happiness in contemporary English
is subjective, scholars have to emphasize time and again that eudaimo-
nia has an objective sense. If we use “benevolence,” should we also try
to distinguish different senses of benevolence?
 translation of REN 665

Moreover, Mengzi uses many terms that, in English, sound similar to

“benevolence.” They include ai (love), qin (affection), hui
(kindness), en (kindness), ze (affection), and so on. But ren is
distinguished from them. This issue occurs in the following passages:
4a4.1, 4b23, 1b7.12, 4b30.4, 3a4.8, 4a1.2, and 7a45.1. Given the closeness
in English among the words “kindness,” “affection,” “love,” and
“benevolence,” those who do not know Chinese might think these
passages are just talking about “benevolence” and might be con-
fused in reading them. Indeed, Slingerland translates hui as
28
“benevolence.”
A further issue for using “benevolence” is that in the Mengzi, ren is
always coupled together with yi. Van Norden explains yi as follows:
“Integrity; the virtue that consists in avoiding what is shameful or
dishonourable, even when one could acquire wealth or social prestige
by doing so.”29 Yi, as a particular virtue, is rooted in the feeling of
disdain. Yet, when ren and yi are coupled together, the combined term
should refer to the general virtue.30 In this combined term, ren is said to
be the abode, and yi is the path, suggesting that a gentleman not only
has a good character, but also can practice it rightly. I find that to use
“benevolence” does not seem to make a smooth reading of these
passages.
In the above, I focused on “benevolence” as a translation of ren.
The other major English translations of ren each have their own
problems as well. “Humanity” (or “humanness”) is at least as popular
as “benevolence.” Such a translation points to its etymological root, as
ren is cognate with the word meaning “human being” (ren, ).
However, although the translation has its firm textual support in the
statement that “ren is simply being human,”31 in the Analects there
is no solid textual evidence to support this. Moreover, although
“humanity” is good for rendering the general sense of ren, it is hardly
suitable for the particular sense of compassion. In this regard, the
weakness of “benevolence” is probably the strength of “humanity”
and vice versa.
Arthur Waley thinks that “Good” is the only possible translation of
ren.32 Yet “Good” has its own problems. First, in Confucian texts there
is a technical term shan that should be translated as “good.”Waley’s
way of handling this is to translate ren “by Good (Goodness, etc.) with
a capital; and shan by good, with a small g.”33 This leads to confusion.
Second, “Good” has no etymological relation with ren. Third, “Good”
is one of the most ambiguous terms in Western philosophy. It is not
informative and does not help much in capturing the distinct meaning
of ren. Fourth, given the distinction between the general sense of ren
and the particular sense, “Goodness” might refer to the general sense,
but it is not appropriate to reflect the particular sense of ren. Slinger-
666 jiyuan yu

land notices the distinction, but he thinks that the more specific sense
of empathy or kindness occurs in post-Analects texts, and such a later
usage has only hints in the Analects.34 Yet this is highly disputable.
Ames and Rosemount translate ren as “authoritative conduct,” or
“authoritative person.”35 This also faces some problems that the
choice of “Good” faces, such as no etymological relation with ren, and
an inability to accommodate the distinction between the general
sense of ren and the particular sense.
Insofar as its content is concerned, “virtue” is the most tempting
choice for ren as a general quality. Yet there is a technical term “de”
(te ) that should be rendered as “virtue,” as Van Norden has done.36
To avoid the overlapping translation with de, we should have an
alternate but closely related term. Elsewhere,37 I myself suggested
“excellence.” In English translation of Greek virtue ethics, “virtue”
and “excellence” become interchangeable translations of aretē. In
Confucius, although de has been generally rendered as “virtue,” the
term “excellence” is rarely employed. However, I also realize that,
while “excellence” might be an excellent choice for the general sense
of ren, it is not perfect for the particular meaning of ren. Furthermore,
“excellence” does not mirror the etymological root of the word ren
either.
Given these difficulties in finding a single English term to render
ren, maybe we should leave it untranslated. People have accepted yin
and yang, and they can get used to ren as well. Indeed, if we simply use
the transliteration of ren, it is likely to encourage people to under-
stand its complicated meaning from the text itself. In answering the
same question “what is ren?” Confucius has provided various answers
in the Analects. Yet in translating the Analects, I am not sure whether
we still need to have various translations of the term ren.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO

Buffalo, New York
SHANDONG UNIVERSITY
Jinan, China

Endnotes

I am deeply grateful to Professor Chung-ying Cheng and Dr. Linyu Gu for their generous
support, important comments, and editorial work for this set of critical discussions on Van
Norden’s Mengzi, which is developed out of an “Author-Meet-Critics” panel at 2009 APA
Eastern Division Meeting.
1. Bryan Van Norden’s Mengzi, with Selections from Traditional Commentaries (India-
napolis: Hackett, 2008).
2. Edward Slingerland, Confucius Analects, with Selections from Traditional Commen-
taries (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003).
3. Brook Ziporyn’s Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional
Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009).
 translation of REN 667

4. D. C. Lau, Mencius (London; Penguin Books, 1970); D. C. Lau, Mencius (bilingual

edition, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1979).
5. Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
6. Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: University of
Princeton Press, 1963); Chichung Huang, The Analects of Confucius (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
7. Roger T.Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr., Analects of Confucius (New York: Ballantine
Books 1998).
8. Chan, “The Evolution of the Confucian Concept Ren,” Philosophy East and West 4
(1955): 295.
9. Huang, Analects (1997), 16; Raymond Dawson, Confucius: The Analects (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), xxi.
10. Yu-Sheng Lin, “The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Ren and the
Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy,” Monumenta Serica 31 (1974–5): 178–79.
11. Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1985), 75.
12. Angus Graham, Disputers of the Dao (Chicago: Open Court, 1989), 19.
13. Van Norden, Mengzi, 199.
14. Chan, “Confucian Concept Ren,” 299.
15. Fung Yu-Lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1952), 72.
16. Chan, “Confucian Concept Ren,” 298.
17. Analects, 9:20; 14:28.
18. Ibid., 4:2, 6:21, 9:20, and 14:28.
19. Ibid., 17:8.
20. Ibid., 17:6.
21. Ibid., 15:8.
22. Mengzi, 2a6.5, 6a6.7, 2a7.3, 7a21.4, etc.
23. I wish to thank Professor Chung-ying Cheng for pointing this out to me, in the early
version of this article. His translation seems to be more faithful to the original.
24. Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 113. His view seems to be echoed by Slingerland, who
rendered ren as “Goodness,” claims that “In post-Analects texts, it has the most
specific sense of empathy or kindness between human beings—especially for a ruler
toward his subjects—and in such contexts is therefore usually translated as ‘benevo-
lence.’ ” In Slingerland’s view, this later usage has only hints in the Analects (Con-
fucius Analects, 238).
25. Van Norden, Mengzi, 202.
26. James Legge, Confucian Analects, the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean
(London: Dover Publications, 1971), 139.
27. Mengzi, 6a19.1.
28. Slingerland, Confucius Analects, 237.
29. Van Norden, Mengzi, 205.
30. See Mengzi, 4b19.2, 4a10.1, 4a10.2, and 6a11.1.
31. The Doctrine of the Mean (chapter 20) and Mengzi (7b16.1).
32. Waley, The Analects of Confucius, 29.
33. Ibid., 29.
34. Slingerland, Confucius Analects, 238.
35. Ames and Rosemont, Analects of Confucius, 48.
36. In Mengzi, xi, Van Norden notes: “When used as a translation of the Chinese term de,
‘virtue’ is capitalized. When used in a more general sense to refer to good traits of
character, ‘virtue’ appears in lowercase.”
37. Jiyuan Yu, The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue (New York:
Routledge, 2007).