CITIZENSHIP CASES

G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C.
Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil
Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the
fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the
Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and
causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to
do so."
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied,
the case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are
these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the
Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month
(Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March
13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on
April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart
from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau
Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4").
On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of
respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after
the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds,
that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as set
forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which
read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be
held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman
may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen
only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in
the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be
naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No.
L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully
naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization),
is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM
YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to
be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on
March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of
residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3,
Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under
the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to
become a citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in
the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962,
having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month
before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely
for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say
deportation. This cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor
on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay
only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she
had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-
9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017,
September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the
decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very
provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul
the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act
503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration
of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of
his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration
a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro
Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that
his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in
excess of his jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and
insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write
either language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some
bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-
appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown
thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual
matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower
court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung
was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE
LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW)
INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE
POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS
SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT
POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A
FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS
TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A
FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS
CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED
STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY
PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD
MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND
IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING
PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR
WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED
MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL).
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision
upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the
court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on
the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay
only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she
had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-
9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017,
Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on
the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the
disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-
11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would
necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will
base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in
appellants' second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy
discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an
alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here
permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country
to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of
entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the
assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same
line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe
to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner
had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they
would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without
having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of
the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul
the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act does not apply to aliens who after coming
into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire
Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to
stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to
reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their
bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient
ruses employed by alien to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent
residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already
mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020,
wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs.
Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and
thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently
to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the
Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements
of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or "correction", for the
law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as
stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences;
every alien so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to
permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our
government to spend time, money and effort to examining and verifying whether or not
every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the
meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port
whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages
inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here
as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be
required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-
entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when
after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his
assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon
him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is
naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines.
Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have
to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they
have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which
such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a
rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil.
459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a
citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in
consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the
decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth
Act 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the
alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-
463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of
an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him
ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay
in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-
a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration
Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense
thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well
taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is
that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a
Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it
appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the qualifications required
of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act
473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been
established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the
qualifications required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been
recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring
her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the
view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-
11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713,1 for it was only in Zita
Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967
(19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that
for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for
naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization
Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has
complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for
naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the
motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging
Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca
but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule,
having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act
473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case,4 one almost
identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary
visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond
to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of
her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March
9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and,
contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for
the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner
required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the
Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the
lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave, because she
had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner
appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present
Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a
Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from
the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view,
petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a
citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in
consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the
decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth
Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of
the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the
sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus the
issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines
follows ipso facto his political status.
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners
rely, reads:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an
opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of
section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified
from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;

(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws
does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha
does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who
claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified
in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden
of proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking,
petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-appellants.
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower
court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may
"be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are
of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be
given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-
464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the
above decision as regards the following propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might
be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the
limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under Section
4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the
action to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow
left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications,5 specially
considering that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of
Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important
of which are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15,
Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law
of the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by
judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be
naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason
[D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice
Sec. Jose Abad Santos.
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have
the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by
judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be
naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law,
it results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June
17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she
possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose
Abad Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of
inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the
Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which
reads in part as follows:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above
provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to
any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops.,
Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s.
1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be
among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate
of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in
consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of
his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s.
1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be
deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op.
No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so
appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The
Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same
ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out
that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her
arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo
Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered
her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so, the
husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the
petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice
to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that
the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might herself
be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last
condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified
under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by
Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court,
therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings,
where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of
Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo
Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101
Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied].
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the
parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of
the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization
proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law
in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is
that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such
marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of
the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings
under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications,
that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact
that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not
be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a
distinguished member of this Court,6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent
to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
needs only to show that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those
relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial
proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen
[U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-
10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the
abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits
of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive
factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire
Philippine citizenship. xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of
Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground
that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.
We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for
naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based
on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may
not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a
Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of
her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a
Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship
pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of
said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to
any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-
10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-
quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully
naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive
factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire
Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new
one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and,
quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No.
168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of
section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified
from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S.
Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of
the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts
were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in
the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration
asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from
receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the
bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of
Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an
order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash
bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must
enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity
to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final
judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan,
22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the
Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions
of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may,
under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government.
(In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were
joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices
Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve
the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955,
and the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond — failure to
depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in
the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of
Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice — were committed before the
marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically
confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required
by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There is no showing that the
appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in
the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement
therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473
and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other
hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly
Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly
held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman
to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization
by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be
naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the
construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the
seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have been
in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October
31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo
Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no
immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue now, since
it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on
the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited
himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a
citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," so that the
fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this
Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as
to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without
explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua.
Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely
lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both
qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what
seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of
rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775,
November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese
woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority
to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six
months before the expiry date of her permit, and when she was requested to leave after
her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a
Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating
explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial
judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications
referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the
qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc.,
provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether
or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart
from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out
thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of
the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the
Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman "should be a
person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in
respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a
citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a
citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the life of
the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding,
the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only
prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further
qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will
be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have
existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon the
subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman
or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen,
because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character,
etc., she was presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as
amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become
citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent
provisions of that law provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens — Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones
Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing therein.
Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine
citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association
or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government;
(b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (c)
polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and
the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.
Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of
this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than
twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to
being not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition,
have all and each of the following qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five
years, except as provided in the next following section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the entire period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession; and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under
oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the
foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then stood,
alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens
of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof
under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or
(3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States
might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the
qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the
same for all intents and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473)
on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the
qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in
eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing
naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics
who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster
amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in
Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" must be understood in the context in which it is now found, in a
setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as
the Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are
qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not
belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who
is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines,
because the law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications" in separate sections. And
then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former
law, it was to be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2
of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not
belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow the
citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the phrase "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons
qualified to become citizens by naturalization — the assumption being always that she is
not otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of
her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the
qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does
not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in
any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the
trial court, the same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R.
No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong
and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband
two years after the decision granting him nationalization and required her to leave and
this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775,
promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790,
promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a
naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It
must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less
showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself.
Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition
of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to
make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9
SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San
Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November
12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the
Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino
citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary
ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when
Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No.
L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted
Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same
year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between
Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to expire on
February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of
Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the
reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a
mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the
need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of Justice
Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with
the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship.
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965,
14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court
granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of
Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the
qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the
disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito
v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to
expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of
relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the
other affirmative requirements of the law."
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice
Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the dependency
of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to
take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of
Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from
any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the
decision to such effect discussed above, 11 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the
ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the
point now under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman, who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization
of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child,
who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen
even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the age of majority
he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the
country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to
a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that,
aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she
must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? if nothing but the unbroken
line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is
obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is
noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964
yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even
before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however,
which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There
has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of
those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice
Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because
(they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are
concerned. Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious
relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of
the amici curae in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored,
since they project in the most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical angles of
the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual
situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades,
considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or
otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by
the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under
these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views
of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion),
the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee
Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha,
did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the
first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in
this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear
further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are
construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly,
copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision
is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its
history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature
under American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as
a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic
Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23,
1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to
express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained
autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the
Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said
subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently:
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March
23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially:.
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives
of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the
effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the
Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however,
abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of
the wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision
regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife,
nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had
become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as
the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had
been rendered during the life of the petitioner.

It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977,
that the following provisions were added to the above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen
and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being
under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents,
shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens
thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17,
1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier
in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically
word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of
Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this
legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of
this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was
quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino
citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a
Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of
the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no
mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2
thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of
qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that
Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law
should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a
Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as
follows: That "like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the
classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were
disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since
1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order
to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only
logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must
now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to
become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the view that the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as requiring
merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law."
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may
be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases.
The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications
required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang,
L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun
Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy
v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the
question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of
the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of February 10,
1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448,
was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine
Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this
Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of
persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the
other insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or
foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter
country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may
become American Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified
races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were
concerned there was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two
countries and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the
interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision concerning the
citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment
of the Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The
racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No.
3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain
the said provision — that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife
must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is no longer to
the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial,
but to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in
Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might
herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled
norms of statutory construction.

The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed
to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship,
which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not
indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a
citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and
identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization,
even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition
as a Philippine citizen.
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same
conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been
residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n.,
id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.);
and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages
(pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized
indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a
Filipino husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to
not being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the
appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the
law demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at
issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise
pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to
the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the
rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization
Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one who "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated
in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by
section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun
Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-
21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v.
Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30,
1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2
of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not
mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not
disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred
upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies
only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously
convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that
the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement
of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in
government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
"herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution;
yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to
organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines
opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance
of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on
the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative
requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly
does not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived
from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial
and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same
in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v.
Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a
closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely
affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived
thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927
providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act
473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for
naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of
allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy.
It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the
whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones
Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any
mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship.
What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination
of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable
stations flowing from our staffs as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty
of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express
authority without which it could not have been done, granted by an amendment to
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States
Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916,
the pertinent provisions of which have already been footed earlier. In truth, therefore, it
was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of
our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act
that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial
discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally
wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In
other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather
than the intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in
subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American
citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly,
the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of Philippine
citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which
were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American
citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of
favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but more
accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before
1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States
already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29,
1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized
government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and
teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or
teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any
officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his
or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a
citizen of the United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship
under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly,
as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of
Aliens throughout the United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement,
except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed by
this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section
1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were
traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already
mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the rationalization in the qouted decisions
predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth
Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our
naturalization law has no clear factual basis.
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the
construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly
Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the
first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section
13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact
copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as
it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable
construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to
apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it were written in the
statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they
knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting
verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as
thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney
General of the United States and all administrative authorities, charged with the
implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v.
Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v.
Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill,
305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and
administrative authorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora
Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided
November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:

Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p.
117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February
10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided "that any
woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall
be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7
& 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided that "any woman married, or who shall
be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken
to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born
subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat.
4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the
Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman who
marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not become a
citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or
retained under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of
September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage
of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the
meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284,
construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might
lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application of the law to
free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required
that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an
alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the
class or race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other
provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the
provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the
Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the
case," the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is
of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who
marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary
that it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time
of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in
United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the
United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the
concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen
of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions of the
statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall.
496, 19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might be lawfully
naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to
the United States from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws.
The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with the view
of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending
the disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit
court of appeals for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was
entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: "The rule is well settled that
her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged.
The status of the wife follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her
husband's domicil became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980,
had before it the application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It
appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York
on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel
on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization would be to confer
citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to
pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it
was determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on
the express ground that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At
the same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization would not effect
her naturalization, as she was not one who could become lawfully naturalized. "Her own
capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining
citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon
her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views expressed
therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as
something more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge,
unable to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned
Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an
American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be
excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the
immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she bad not had
the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was
affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the
relators married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we
assume the contention of the district attorney to be correct that marriage will not make
a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not
affect these relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said
to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and the
wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now before the court is
that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been
made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after such an order was made. But such
an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a
court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances
that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change
prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an
order of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted
with a contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual
deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain that
the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the
order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith
marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she
thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes,
American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities
lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to
citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right
of the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this
country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken
into custody by the immigration authorities in the following September, and in October a
warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of that order,
she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation
was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her
entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had
married a citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her deportation.
Judge Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown." He
held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the
immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a
naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a
class of persons excluded by law from admission to the United States does not come
within the provisions of that section. The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in
the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and
held that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien
prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a
citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due
process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was conceived
in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the
appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute
by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen.
402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United
States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to
constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the United States
abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and her husband having
continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an
opinion rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman,
twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once
to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after her
arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by way of instituting
proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat.
4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had
entered this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a
house of prostitution and practicing the same within three years after landing. It
appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United States commissioner,
but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was lawfully
married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time
of her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with
her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but
professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to
deport her, the claim being advance that by her marriage she bad become an American
citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled against the right
to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the words, "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully
naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was
not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that
Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the
marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ... shall not
invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female
shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts which make her
liable to deportation under this act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class
avoiding deportation through the device of marrying an American citizen.
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman
of any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention, should not
confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its
intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to
women of the immoral class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We
have found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar,
even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the
subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which
appears to be the most cited among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to
citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization
the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who shall be married,"
do not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated,
but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous
Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship
existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she
becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under
the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women
whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater
number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion,
was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any
application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason
for the restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at
the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white
person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in
Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its
provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized
under existing laws" only limit the application to free white women" 20 it hastened to
add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that the
person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ...
not an alien enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United
States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already
been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding
footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race
requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial
requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is
demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the
previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is
impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by
Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be naturalized under
existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white women, must be
interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then
existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen
would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more necessarily,
but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in force at the
time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the
Court drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by
Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section particularly
its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully
naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under
Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2,
such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or
ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the
principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying
that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1
of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have come, to the
conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already explained
above of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that
such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 is,
an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at
the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by
American courts and administrative authorities.

Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted
above, there can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded provision
in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken, from the
Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed
that the qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution,
etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into
account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of
which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra,
discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the
American authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act
of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that the
person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the
usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and
proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a
citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and,
therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of
any person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning "such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly.
When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the
usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a
situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for word,
it is understood that the construction already given to such statute before its being
copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a
different connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have already
seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in accurate
factual premises related to the real legislative background of the framing of our
naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot
bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927.
In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the same
provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase "who
may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448,
referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard
to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the
effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American
jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved,
such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in
the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and
that what should be considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for
in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in
Section 15 could have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it
by the American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448
which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473,
was enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States was no longer in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of
September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of
American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization
proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other
words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as already
demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already
abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be
natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the
time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of
Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the
Americans of requiring judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the
first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous
American Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in
1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress,
had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make one of our own, or, at
least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators
chose to maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not
that the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was
eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans had
amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction
that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature
adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts had given it a
construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would
be possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but
as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was
already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators
even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old
phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the
principles of Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and
selective orientation and that it should be construed independently of the previous
American posture because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United
States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on
possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view
seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality
and in effect, the so called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or the
Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same sense as
those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473. More accurately, they have always been considered as disqualifications, in the
sense that those who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be lawfully
naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under
Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which,
incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in
paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone will
surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited
in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of
this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the
opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called
racial requirements were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the
other disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or
understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should
such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as
irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the
holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth
Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as
amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter,
necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in question
"who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the
qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act
2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those
falling under Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of
one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process of
reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that
used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such
elimination could have convicted qualifications into disqualifications specially in the light
of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law
distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American
jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in
determining "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute
governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was
merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and
judicial opinions, whether here or in the United States, there are practical considerations
that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for
reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the
case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications" —
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that
Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove
that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be
deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably
onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such
requirement is shown by the following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization under Section 2
of the law is that the applicant "must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous
period of not less than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an alien wife married
to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope
to acquire the citizenship of her husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country
whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses her
citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a period
of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous
residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for
naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite
period of time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he
"must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation." Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of
real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an
alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she
has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income
requirement has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to
possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs.
Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29,
1965). In other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income derived from
sources other than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common
knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the
Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law,
recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the
duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that
universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty is to
be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how
can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have enrolled his
minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized
by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during
the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of
his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has minor children
by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor
children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of residence in the
country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The
reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in recognized
educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v.
Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian
Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim
Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children by
her first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such
requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by
Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is)
married to a Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife
should be required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for
citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino husband must reside for ten
years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife
related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who
is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first
paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her
marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled
that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old
Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of
Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this
situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the
observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the
nationality of the husband; but the Department of State of the United States on October
31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing
out that our Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil.
315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political have been abrogated
upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the stated
taken by the Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that
marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this
counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section
13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941;
emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court
did, in such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications
prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is
submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the
statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is
susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such
manifest object, it should receive the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt.
493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v.
Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court
will, if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and
in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will result in
oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which
will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a
construction which will result in absurd consequences.
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent
inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or
which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the
legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to
produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the legislature, an
interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague
is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an
illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for
aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that
in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult if not
practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to
become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been
demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was
intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino
irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that
marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there can
and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine
citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound
to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to
believe that in joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to
assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to
live and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage.
Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made
by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following
observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha
(the second) to be quite persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question.
The avowed policy of "selectives admission" more particularly refers to a case where
citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a
case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who
are worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the
application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship
is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or
reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal
proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise
than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to
prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of
his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs,
and traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove
the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has
lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an
alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be
lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in
Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.

A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this

regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is
universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien
wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of
allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.
W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical
Background and Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by
allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is
particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as
head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the family
group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family
(Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest.
(See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there
is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and from the
nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal,
41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of husband
and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the
nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as
the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The
status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her
husband's domicile became her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law
being that the property relations of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal
partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity
that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment
of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form
part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot,
through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition,
and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances
where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of
all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way
as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized,"
found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was
applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course
in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine
circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should
realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called
"melting pot" of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing
country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer of
this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence
should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled
to admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable
authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law
now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually
taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating
influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on
the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity
to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed,
even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922
that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without
undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous
American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso
facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and without having to
prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character,
adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show they did
not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization
Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be
instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of
law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot
as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the
provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant
considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering
such undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.

III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this
Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before
the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case
which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided
earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose
of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her
marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any
naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that she is not
disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling,
the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting
to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must
necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has
not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for its
reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by
this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this
case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a
citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting
that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said
petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least
one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any
other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the
judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of
the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a
"petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will
reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards,
compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself
apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared
petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be
vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications
prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its
Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial
naturalization apparently from declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can
become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no
consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be
the national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she
desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that
any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year
residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle local
languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage
in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration
of intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of
two credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc.,
until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of
probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to
be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a
Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other
hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to
spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as
plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly
conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than
that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second
hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked
any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that complained
therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its
consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein made by
the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our decision in any
case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the law
or by the national policy it seeks to endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and
standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal
acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the
quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the
impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case --
that an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself
become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization
proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions
"certifying or declaring such woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" — has
consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the present case. Considerably more
people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The
newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens
are affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of many and diverse
nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish,
Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of whom have
been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised rights and
privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in
conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold
and transferred such property. Many of these women may be in professions membership
in which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees
in companies engaged in business activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino
equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now faced with
possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in
reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as
correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of government charged with the
administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which
would visit such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of
Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung
vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 — when Chief Justice
Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases —
although referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining
in the case at bar — may have contributed materially to the irregularities committed
therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe,
although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the
Solicitor General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state "how
many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have
been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been published
in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when
the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong
Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the
decision in the present case was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion
for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data
contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui
case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not
on or before May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to
expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction of the law made in a
previous decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice and
equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the
decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San
Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become the law
of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have
to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of
the parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor
child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed
a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in
the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine
citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority,
he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the
country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised
Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete
procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens.
After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of
all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our
citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an
alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his immediate
family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that:
(a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered
citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling
here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but
those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such
naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose
said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before
becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such
naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate
themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of
the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to
the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized".
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the
minor children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and residence
prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative
fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or
declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision, is not
susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression "shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily
connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the
antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone
the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a
Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and
intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately
treats the wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of
the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat.
(U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon,
Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular
individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it
for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the
members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born
or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature hag
done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr.
Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law in the Philippines
28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is often observed
by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married
to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes
who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law
498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the
1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of
the United States statutes from which our law has been copied, 28a the American courts
have held that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by
operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect
of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States
becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and
regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v.
Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed.
297.)
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as
paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of
November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already had a long
accepted construction among the courts and administrative authorities in that country
holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon
such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage
itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that, it could
be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized
under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made of these
undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only
point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the
United States, the American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects
of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all
such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than
those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine Legislature,
instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on
November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the
Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and its settled
construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as
the United States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national
policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic
incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny
of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but proper,
without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the
Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature
has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to
construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to
do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not institutionally permissible
for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going precisely against the grain of the
implicit Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite
clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization
Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the
proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in
order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16
provides:
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as
the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had
been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under
said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same
proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications
of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor
children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or after
final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said
Section 16 contemplate the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains
the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in
the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same
legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology
emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased as the
theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor
children.xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not
be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal
matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for
the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to
take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the
naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been completed, not on
behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the
benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the
oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No.
473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do
not show that the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the
time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born
in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a
citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal,
pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required
to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for
reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views of
counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be
considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that
Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which
foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by
legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1
Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution
itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under
this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal
proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by
"derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of
an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172; Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967
ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the
Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a
similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994),
American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien
woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had
complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S.
v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14
Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920
[32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp.
Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2),
"shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens" while it may imply that the person to whom
it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way,
as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it
does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The
word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever
an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing
must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning
such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress
declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be "deemed" an
American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being
naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van
Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first
paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis
of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically become"
as used in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or
purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon
certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by
affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of
relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of
citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said persons to
become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean
that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of
relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory
requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in
order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those
persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the
operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them.
Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences.
Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized
under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the
Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of
his parent, and the time when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time
that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some
25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and
should, therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a
Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a
Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her marriage (perhaps,
because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status became in
question), that she is one who might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable
to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired
Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of
the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed
a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso
that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition
precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of
fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact
established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely
replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had
(the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v.
Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she
establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her
marriage, she became a citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status
of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully
naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of citizenship by the
alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is
not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It
is clear from the words of the law that the proviso does not mean that she must first
prove that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by
Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by this Court
(at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only
after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was
that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they
failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459
[l957], the case was remanded to the lower court for determination of whether
petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the
Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her
alleged change of political status from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101
Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine
citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was
not disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such
evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe
Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will be observed
that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might
(themselves) be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not
become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions
merely held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a
proven fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when
citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is
established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose
citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for
instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his
claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although
his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien
woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the
time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that
status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a
citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a
citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But
neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the
Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she
obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the
presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil.
375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a
representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A.
Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what
substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine
citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may
not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter in to
a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer
to such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural,
stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship
under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even
as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred
to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good
sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the
effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent
official findings, even if these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and
so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following
observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus
G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested
parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of
her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a
Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship
pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of
said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to
any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien,
there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other
proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue. We have passed upon
was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court
prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing
appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of
Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing
the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung,
who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino
citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION,
respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
preliminary injunction, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), ordering the deportation of
petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
I
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he
married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in
January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina
and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made
it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying
the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter
alia, that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 years
old, and her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all
Indonesian citizens, who are coming as temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitality
they have accorded me during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia in
connection with my employment thereat.
That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they
are in the Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they will not become a
public charge.
That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized stay
granted them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under
Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner.
She filed a complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.

On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14,
1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the
Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said
letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. She later released pending the
deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash bond (Rollo, pp.
15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily
from the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10).
However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on
the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents,
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners finds the
second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously
granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution
dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and
desist from executing or implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the
Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).
On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August
14, 1994 and that he and his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of
a permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).
II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085,
the Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that
premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article
68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the husband and wife are
obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public
respondents have no right to order the couple to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).
When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the
CID could not order petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had prescribed
under Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).
III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the
CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to
a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first resolved is the question on petitioner's
immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into the country and the
change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding that
she was not lawfully admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire
permanent residency, the next question is whether the power to deport her has
prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the
country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in
her applications for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that
could influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The
immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims
to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to another woman
(Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the
fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a
matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part
of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside
in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United
States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted,
much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of
the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah
Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR
1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon
the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362
[1970]).
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit
any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has
no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay
temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent
resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife
or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of
aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even
if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public
respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration
Act of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this
section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any clause unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court,
or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of
Immigration that the alien be not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien:
1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means
of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the
immigration authorities at a designating port of entry or at any place other than at a
designated port of entry.
2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was
not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines
and sentenced for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years after his entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than
once;
4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing
prohibited drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is
connected with the management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;
6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes
not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition
under which he was admitted a non-immigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force
and violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority,
or who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials because of their
office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or
who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or
teaching such doctrines, or who on any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or
otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;
9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-
six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him:
Provided, That in the case of an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to
suffer both imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of
his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, however, That the
imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of
the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the
Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head, and upon payment by the
alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the
Department Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);
10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted
of violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred
and fifty-three, otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now
Republic Act No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more
than once of violating the provisions of the same Act;
11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent
of any criminal action which may be brought against him;
12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act
Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine
citizenship;
13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties, to
prevent them from being attached or executed.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective
date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place
other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period
and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made
within five years after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec.
37[b]).
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country
(Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v.
Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that
under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be
barred after the lapse of five years after the cause of deportation arises. Justice
Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law as follows:
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year limitation is
applicable only where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37
(a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought
to be effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and
that to the contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."
Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation
does not apply.
In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained
entrance into the Philippines fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese
resident-merchant other than that of her lawful husband. The Court, however, held that
she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that more than 5 years had
elapsed from the date of her admission."
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on
the basis of false and misleading statements in her application and in the other
supporting documents submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first
complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was
admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the
EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980
letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez
informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years
had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.
In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is
the deportation of an alien and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation
of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa
previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).
The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of
carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to
determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When public respondents revoked
the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and
deportation as an overstaying alien.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on
June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the
issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January
29, 1991 are REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------x
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND
ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No.
15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo)
on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6
September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and
Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar."
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the
trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother
discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled
petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live
Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter
with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her
COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila.
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876
by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May
1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport
Nos. L881511 and DD156616.
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for
the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston
College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree
in Political Studies.
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in
the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29
July 1991.
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16
April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika)
were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively.
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She obtained
U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to
support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this
time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with
her two daughters on 8 July 2004.
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3
February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in
the settlement of his estate.
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and
her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the
first quarter of 2005. The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
for the next semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog
into the country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3)
children immediately followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to
complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her
husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005. The corresponding
Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.
Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. She travelled back to
the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. The family home was
eventually sold on 27 April 2006. Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S.
in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major
Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the
couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering
said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a
sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. As can be gathered
from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared
that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification
Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children.
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006. She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999. This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before
assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary
public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the
said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From
then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that
day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she
stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the
intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. In the same
questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically
in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months"
to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." Petitioner
obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her
COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing
of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated
cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001
(DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. She is convinced that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over her petition. Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. Elamparo claimed
that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born
Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound
by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated
that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May
2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is
qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the
ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be
counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under
the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile
in the Philippines.
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a
petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential
elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke
the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations
which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the
place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of
her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and
effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an
honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of
reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino
people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's
next leader.
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding
that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material
representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner
which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying
the same.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner
before the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite
residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,
persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-
born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.
Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He
averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of
citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.
Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support
her claim that foundlings have a nationality. According to Tatad, international
conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary
in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. He also stressed
that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings.
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option
to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former
natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with
the ten (10) year residency requirement. Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her
domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship
which was sometime in 2010 or 2011. Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed
thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed
as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did
not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that
former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had
only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior
to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim
that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not
meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition, docketed
as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that
petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not
possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made
false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. Contreras contended that the
reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from
18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was
approved by the BI. He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country before
18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since
she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the
Philippine immigration laws.
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action.
His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Instead, Tatad completely
relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are
not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective
office.
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they
focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not
the COMELEC.
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents. Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-
born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality
and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently,
the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated
under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the
official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the
issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her
appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started
reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's
resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan
City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.100 She reasoned out that
there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the
acquisition of a new domicile of choice.
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for
Senator was a mistake made in good faith.
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division
ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten
(10) year residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in
her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a
period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May
2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present
petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the
COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral
arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to
ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled
Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is
a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied
due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a
false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the
discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications
of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in
Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for
the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion
or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of,
or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of
each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which
provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the
President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in
Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action
which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making
power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the
right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their
grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different
from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already
stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office.
In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start
or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and
the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent
from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not
imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate
for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization
Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does
not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the
respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack
of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual
should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification
is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are
established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his
favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship
or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the
beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case
(G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's
residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This
is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy.
That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of
the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates
of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections
for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives.
(R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in
Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September
2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by
final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or
a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate.
Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration
by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided
by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides
of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of
jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by
statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate
of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is
not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of
the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-
evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such
are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral
arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders
on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot
rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is
certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has
the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither
unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a
whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient
evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner
is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters
shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines
was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo
Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970,
the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented
were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were
210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299
Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were
245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not
dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population
in Iloilo was Filipino.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that
she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has
typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped
eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a
person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would
be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents
are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under
Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the
norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the
Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not
face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50%
chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our
questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average,
there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to
1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the
ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that
the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986
while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period,
the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that
any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is
99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I
am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be
a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at
all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher
than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do
not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those
infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a
foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because
there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings
might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty -
99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision
denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered
by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is
inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized
by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The
gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them
Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage
born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a
child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the
Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for
amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or
the children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child,
is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a
Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not
unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter]
does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from
Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that
the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children
or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized,
and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who
said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to
include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who
was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated
primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were
already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the
mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found,
thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16
February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was
the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the
way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola
and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct.
Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are
imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What
matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos
because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic
efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution.
This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate
to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the
constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal.
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just
and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to
impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the
grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the
Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express
intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to
use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the
laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several
provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,"
Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section
3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws
is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights,
duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v.
Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens.
This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court
may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and
over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well
as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality.
Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
(Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes"
(otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to
the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a
naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place,
"having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In
this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or
the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother
under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of
Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora
Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario
Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a
foundling.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the
general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles
which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change
his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this
field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a
nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and
the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our
present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to
wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of
birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the
rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory
of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing
the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131
effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had
not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced
disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted
principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban
as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been
ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the
ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the
Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional
state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out
that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the
Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition
of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered
and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but
also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and
the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of
Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the
right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South
America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-
two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-
three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not
signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this
Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them,
foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been
pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to
citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of
nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which
suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their
application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those
treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that
the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if
this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect
and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship.
The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired
is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC where we described it as an "abbreviated
repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is
Parreno v. Commission on Audit, which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, where we said
that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires
his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born
citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit
to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost.
It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to
mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to
"acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that
there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen
and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,
ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,
where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a
doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected."
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner
committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the
BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data
required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the
effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A.
No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the
fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear
any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records,
books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law
therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as
that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of
strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she
was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make
in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before
and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held
on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May
2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence
in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months"
which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25
May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is
the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or
bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned
their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include
petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to
the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in
March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of
their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June
2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding
tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the
Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family;
March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address;
final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S.
Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May
2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May
2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was
purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only
to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim
conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus
manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC
disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the
position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the
Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by
the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private
respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases
decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a
permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a
balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24
May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from
her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community
tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in
the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count
residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing
that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's
acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the
candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his
frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an
American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The
COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient
to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by
the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted
only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together
leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from
the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address
in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from
U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is
clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended,
otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is
no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one
year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and
"comes or returns to the Philippines." The law institutes a balikbayan program
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to
become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country" in
line with the government's "reintegration program." Obviously, balikbayans are not
ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms
that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted
him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community
before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And
that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children
and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile
is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's
evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close
to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC, and
the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings
there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence
has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner,
the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six
( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator.
Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the
statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required
in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in
2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period
when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25
May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC,
is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which
is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first
version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her
U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had
returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the
school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding
and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her,
yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's
mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as
her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked
at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the
Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually
and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because
COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact
that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently,
on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As
already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as
early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement
of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an
established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012
COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by
Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco
discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and
were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for
quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that
she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months
as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period.
Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have
been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which
was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to
hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner,
moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily
constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course
to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for
public office.
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good
number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines
and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of
coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which
the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her
residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that
"based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it
is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for
purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as
President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency
have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less
in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores,
above all else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by
her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the
SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration
in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six
(6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the
residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years
of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time
the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie
for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by
petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential
candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There
are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such
other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat
include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however
stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
[Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in
San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson
Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former
lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new
name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to
the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of
the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to
the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills,
where they eventually built their family home.
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the
case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date
than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in
Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion
from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled
Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the
Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National
and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------x
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,vs. VICENTE D.
CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the
age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving
the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St.
Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations.
In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his
Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the
following documents:
1.Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2.Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of the said place; and
3.Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that
Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during
the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was
one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees
was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's
citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court,
dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the
same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing
his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child
of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a
Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of
majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in
order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother
of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said
election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But
in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election
of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his
Manifestation, Ching states:
1.I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2.I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school
records and other official documents;
3.I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
4.I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5.I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
from 1992 to 1995;
6.I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 625;
7.My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary
public;
8.I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9.I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil
Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question
raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the
affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This
right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional
provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by
the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the
old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age
of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper
period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age ofmajority. However, we held in
Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching
the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is
the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision
adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when
the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of
age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when
he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five
(35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June
1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on
the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election
was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to
exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former
elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously
labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re:
Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was
a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about
22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for
certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship.
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein
are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under
the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be
applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed
out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship
because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this
regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,
and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111,
June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-
filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives, where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive
act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare
rule. Xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting
during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar
nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or
his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we
consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes
and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span
of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application
for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------x
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is
whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This
was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See
Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use
of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that
under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by
the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id.,
at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission,
(Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power
to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a
matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the
exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or
curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional
grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated
that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the
exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination
that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that
there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the
power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a
denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to
correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only
when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so
grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of
the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the
Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that
the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a
matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus,
177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals,
although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of
their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court.
The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the
balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where
the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the
situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political
composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however,
that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or
its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should
not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this
party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process
on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te,
arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the
then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He
was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation
into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the
years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in
love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in
1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up
a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up
in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his
legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February
15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the
decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already
take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine
years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing
in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar
was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one
in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was
their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire
gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still
another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were
reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA
Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work
here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder
brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on
the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had
to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending
the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and
spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of
their family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public
office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their
representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined,
Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2.Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3.Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4.Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or
would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas:It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the
provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January
17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations
and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a
natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that
persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be
natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well
written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former
delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect.
Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino
citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas:Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the
body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a
Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol.
1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable
situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution,
those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However,
those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but
not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p.
356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in
by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail
over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and
injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which
should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is
not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their
form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . .
(p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one
born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still
have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino
mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as
natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the
fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the
same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of
that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment
was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and
thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for
the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time
of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords

natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they
elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined
when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement
would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have
elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien
enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since
birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a
Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession
requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has
participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a
Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace
Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to
show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any
member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have
him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting
during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar
nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or
his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It
observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan
became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it
was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by
declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his
citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This
can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be
done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null
and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already
been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man
cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted
to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal
remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this
case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan.
Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in
the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship
through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the
father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a
Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and
father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship
unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality.
Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of
his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest
grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been
decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa
convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full
blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by
both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the
Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary
and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born
citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish
Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1.Persons born in Spanish territory.
2.Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3.Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4.Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile,
once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil.
768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being
a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even
went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his
business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-
paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the
Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of
no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the
Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a
town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the
Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a
place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori,
there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private
respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it
were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the
private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence,
testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the
aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the
exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the
Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by
Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective
testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency
which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
(TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February
1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant
Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such
execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated
by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce,
the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough
that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see
Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately
established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof
or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in
the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty.
Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the
private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented
during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private respondent.
(TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional
Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated
on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of
names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice
Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to
refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did
they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They
merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence
presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be
a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole
judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies
deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions
were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties
wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot
declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear
the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term
"residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the
previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence
vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as
that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a
resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding
the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention,
Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad
may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile
is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents,
is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that
after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door
apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family
residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang,
Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.

The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's
parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant
to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding
the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the
Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it
is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in
that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires
that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in
order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing
his studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the
residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home
province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an
interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of
Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial
diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person,
for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon
Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically
more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special
privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of
too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share
in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only
the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities
of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor
bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the
judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to
be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an
applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less
technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is
declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision* of
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the
tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar,
and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners' motions
for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private
respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives and to
declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest number of votes among
the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of the second legislative district
of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court
declare private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified
for membership in the House of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the
duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong
Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar during the 11 May 1987
congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987
with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who
obtained the next highest number of votes.

Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private
respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively. Both
protests raised almost the same issues and were thus considered and decided jointly by
the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation
to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent
Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to the May 1987 congressional
elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the
House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, representing the second
legislative district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the
following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan
also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is
now one of the municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act
No. 6132 approved on August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on
December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he took up residence in
Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated
according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the Municipality of
Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born
Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits
E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship,
filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Samar, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision
approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and declaring said
petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities and
obligations inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization
in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to take his oath and register his name
as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new
christian name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines as prescribed by
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son
born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E.
Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade
school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished his secondary as well
as his college education. While later employed in Manila, protestee however went home
to Laoang whenever he had the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as
frequent as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he
registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in said municipality in the 1984
and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the
country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay Tumaguinting
in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang
since birth. (Exh. 7)
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied,
petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to
review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional
provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that,
contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence
to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar,3 construing
Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867;
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities
in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which
cases, it may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the
electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive,
made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for
membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have
been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its
duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely
because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the
tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office
of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at
the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office illegally held by private
respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly perceived
right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable
controversy proper for this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts
supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional
separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a function entrusted
and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional
(and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches
of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has
engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental
power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine
whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public
office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino
citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion
that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to
be presently stated.
The Constitution5 requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives,
a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted
constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic
definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall within said
definition?
To the respondent tribunal, Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he
already became a Filipino citizen by declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-
born citizen at the time of her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine
citizenship at the moment of his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec.
15 of CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without
his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination.
The records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses
Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in
Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese
citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen
(not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at
the time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were
citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were
citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens.
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in
relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his
father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to
elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the
age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a
naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization
of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens,8 this does not alter the fact that
private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of
CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he
did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born
citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid and void from the beginning,
and, therefore, private respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for
nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral
attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an electoral contest which does not
even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong
Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the Government and must be made in a
proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the
proper party, who in such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of
impregnability under the principle of res judicata.9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion made in the proper
proceeding by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial
fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may
accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed conditions,
but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon
and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high
privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he
seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional
facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he takes
nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other person is
entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to grant it, and any such
certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive it must be treated as a mere
nullity, which confers no legal rights as against the government, from which it has been
obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as
delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor."
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the
naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should
make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings. This course of action
becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat for
stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is

derived from his father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning,
then there is nothing from which private respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino
citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void
naturalization of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense
against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section
12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the
clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the
applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of
allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for
naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking
of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order.
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting
citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic vs.
Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines,
121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan
(private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the private respondent
did not acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization of his father and thus he
cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the
certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance
was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as
previously stated, an automatic naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a
Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the
status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother
was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to an examination of the second
sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of
speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a
natural-born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. The right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those
born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973 Constitution
took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or
gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment
by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who
elect Philippine citizenship — all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support
private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino mothers with
alien father, born before 17 January 1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and
thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled
to the status of natural-born Filipino citizen.
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions'
interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed, without distinction,
to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more than persuasively
established by the extensive interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the
official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made
irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of the
respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as provided by law, I still
consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding the meaning of the
constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions
expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in ascertaining the
meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus —
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV
in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of
petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 and who
would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treñas specifically
asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of
who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution,
by adding that persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But
whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that has been debated before and is
being debated even now. We will recall that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
the status of natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged
precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention considered him a natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a
Member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The reason behind that decision was
that a person under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a citizen by
the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention formalized that recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971
Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy
whatever injustice there may be so that these people born before January 17, 1973 who
are not naturalized and people who are not natural born but who are in the same
situation as we are considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee
in proposing this is to equalize their status.
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas
replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it
also cover those who elected it under the 1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue
of the provision of the 1935 Constitution, whether the election was done before or after
17 January 1973.
And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of
what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable situation.
Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet,
but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and those
born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973 when the 1973 Constitution took
effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien fathers are natural-born Filipino
citizens. Also, those who are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born
Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother and that
born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a chance to a child born before January 17,
1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born
of a Filipino father — namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the
child. I would like to state also that we showed equalize the status of a child born of a
Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child born also of a Filipino
mother on January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien
father one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine
citizenship, but he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who
luckily was born 24 hours later — maybe because of parto laborioso — is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a
natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino
mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words,
after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born
Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still
elect Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be
deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of
the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation
appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution which is
to protect and enhance the people's individual interests, and to foster equality among
them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a
Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on
19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or soon thereafter, in order to
have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital
question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I
believe that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling
of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the right of
suffrage when he came of age, the same constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering
as a voter, participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were held
by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, even without complying with the formal requisites for election, the
petitioner's Filipino citizenship was judicially upheld.
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly
untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made in accordance with
Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 224 of the Act mandate that the option to elect
Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare which held that Esteban Mallare's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of
Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed
to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17)
years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before the
1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect
considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no
particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship,
granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution.
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an
illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her citizenship. I
therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing the Mallare case, the
respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship
by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine
citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private
respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private respondent
to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this
did not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an
election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides,
election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon
reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time
thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born
Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that
private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article
IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of
Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence,
inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of the House of Representatives
must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in
the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace
private respondent as the Representative of the second legislative district of Northern
Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of
private respondent in the House of Representatives representing the second district of
Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,27 is controlling. There we held
that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L.
Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the
second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a
quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest. It is a proceeding to
unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his
place.
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an
ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed
to make a choice and the election is a nullity.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is
found ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of
fraud or irregularities in the election is quite different from that produced by declaring a
person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that
another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In
the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. . . .
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born
Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them
having the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention32 to
the effect that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the House
Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This
submission, while initially impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not
supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal
adopted the same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The
tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's citizenship
based on an entirely different set of circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that
the matters attempted to be brought in issue in connection therewith are too far
removed in point of time and relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the
Tribunal, we view these two issues as being already inconsequential.
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged
citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's father (Ong Chuan) and on the
alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral
protests, numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D.
Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his citizenship qualification. The Committee on
Election Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention heard the protests and
submitted to the Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of
which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898,
thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth,
the conclusion is inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is
therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
the election protests filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of the
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials.
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in
the case of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved the
1935 Constitution; the present case, on the other hand involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of
the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise and specific definition of a
"natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private respondent
does not qualify under such definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was
a decision of a political body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a
decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-
judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or
character of res judicata in the present judicial controversy, because between the two
(2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other
involves private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of
action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves the
1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the
evidence submitted before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court,
does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional
Convention and inferentially adopted by private respondent in the present controversy.
This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" — and
this appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te
became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his
descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent) became natural-
born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention said:

Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April
11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of 1902).
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is
whether or not Ong Te private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an
inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject
on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong
Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral
Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the
"Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as
an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal
exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management
and Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro
Central de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least,
as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar
close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines
after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these
proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal skirted any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong
Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son
of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim Filipino
citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill of
1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal
should no longer have reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in
the light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to
have become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to look
into the question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee
vs. Commissioners of Immigration:
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding Court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984.1âwphi1 In connection with said resolution, it is contended
by private respondent that the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the
Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L. Ong's
disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to
private respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the
circumstances of the case brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both candidates for the Batasang
Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification with the
Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending that
Ong is not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical issue
before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the
COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the COMELEC, docketed
as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) except to
dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
and considering that at the hearing this morning, it was brought out that the 1971
Constitutional Convention, at its session of November 28, 1972, after considering the
Report of its Committee on Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest
questioning the citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein) was groundless and
dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner (p. 237,
Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session as well as of the said Committee's
Report having been duly admitted in evidence without objection and bears out, for now,
without need for a full hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court
Resolved to ISSUE, effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case
entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this
afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss the same. This is without prejudice to any
appropriate action that private respondent may wish to take after the elections.
(emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without
the benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and
merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
that this Court (and this is quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action that
Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the
1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further proceeding in regard to the same
question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to such
recognition. How much more when the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution
but the 1987 Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such
proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably
obtained the highest number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of Northern
Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full
membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the legislative
district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in cases of this nature is the
Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the
electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their
votes for private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible and
qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous
assumption and belief cannot prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the
Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that
members of the House of Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says, "Filipino citizens will do."
This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even
aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as
he clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT QUALIFIED
to be a Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the majority.
(1) I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a
rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite
agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of
all contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman is the best judge of facts and this Court can not
substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, it was held that this Court can not
review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election
contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes — and that this
Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the
Court, but as the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It is not to review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law.
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men
may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal
has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has begged to differ. It does not
form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino
citizen and consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the
House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the Court cannot be more popish
than the pope.
(2)I cannot say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on
indefensible grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated
September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Committee6 on Election
Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained
the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother. According
to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having
complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his
successors need not have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:x x x xxx x
xx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te
protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11,
1899, and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4,
Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule were Spanish subjects
who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving
their Spanish nationality.x x x xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in
1895, as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also issued a certificate of
registration. He established a business here, and later acquired real property. Although
he went back to China for brief visits, he invariably came back. He even brought his
eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter was only 10 years old.
And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing
certificate, his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 — i.e., as a
permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back to China in the 1920's for
another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines
— obviously because he had long considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he
established in 1895 is presumed to have continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899,
for, as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is
gained. The only conclusion then can thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in
the Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil
Code of 1889 — and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization
in the belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan
(protestee's father), appear to have been registered as Chinese citizens even long after
the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the extent
of having to seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The
point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter
of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one
thinks his status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a particular state or
not. Mere mistake or misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has been held, is not a
sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does not even
constitute estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only
to questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957).
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on
November 28, 1972, approved without any objection by the Convention in plenary
session.
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all
candor, I speak from experience, because when the Convention approved the Report in
question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question
involving Emil Ong's qualification to sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)
in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's
citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R.
No. 67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however, that
what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the
unanimous ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this Court.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in
any of the following ways and/or events:x x x
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not
divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with
said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned,
at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the
oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his
service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under
any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said
country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by
his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the
U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He
won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who
was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on
the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid,
the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition
could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became
an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born
Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United
States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article
citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born
citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2
refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-
born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen
of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as
the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory
only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the
intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated
himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As
a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under
this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of
C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces
of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States
at any other time,(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists
of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided.
In Angat v. Republic, we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of
his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as
a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he
had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by
the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III,
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be
a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens
which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those
born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered
natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act
to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of
the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had
to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e.,
did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge"
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House. The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the
part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise
its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's
judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. There is no such
showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part.
Panganiban, concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.
Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban
Ynares-Santiago, certify majority opinion of J. Kapunan.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House
Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a
member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente,
Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1
(2),1 Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or
perfect the Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino
citizen, in accordance with Section 22 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United
States Marine Corps from November 1958 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was
naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military service.
Consequently, under Section 1 (4)3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the
Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994,
availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering
Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Force of the United States,"4 Cruz
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation,
Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born
citizen? I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET
was correct in its ruling.

1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship

First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA
2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by "taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,
a noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise,
Private International Law. He defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original
nationality upon fulfillment of certain condition." Webster buttresses this definition by
describing the ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as "to restore or return to one's
country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x." In relation to our subject matter,
repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship,
but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again." Ergo, since Cruz, prior to
his becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same
status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise – that Cruz became a non-natural-born
citizen – would not be consistent whit the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It
would be akin to naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New."
Because it is not the same as the with which he has previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its]
claimant x x x." Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private
respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-
born, because was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized
citizens.10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of
the Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure
would properly fall under the second category (naturalized).
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, a
natural-born citizen is a citizen "who has become such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly
who are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined
in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:
"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may
be considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth,
and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's Philippine
citizenship. Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born
citizens" were (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to
include "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof," meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising
therefrom, respondent – being clearly and concededly not naturalized – is, therefore, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately,
they naturally reacquire their original classification before the loss of their Philippine
citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994,
he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen, nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that
Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of
Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to
determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to
reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply because it differs in its perception of
controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an independent,
constitutional body with its own specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the chambers
of Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications their respective members."16 In several cases,17 this Court has held that
the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if
they remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgment are
beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez
Jr.:

"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors
of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a
denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less
than the Constitution calls for remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as
earlier explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of
the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of
discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is
even doubtful. But an interpretation made in good faith and grounded o reason one way
or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial
doctrine. It was definitely acting within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of the qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, one of which is
citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the
law or nay judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the
HRET in the latter's actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged
upon it by our fundamental law.20 Even assuming that we disagree with the conclusion
of public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it "grave abuse of discretion."
Verily, there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
"It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its
Decision upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be
condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of
the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan
with fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They
overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the
House of Representatives. The votes that Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections
were much more than those of all his opponents combined (66, 182).23 In such
instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's
eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws
must be so constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot. Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the
paramount considerations in election controversies. For it would be better to err in favor
of the people's choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving
the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority,
for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are
the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic
to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote."
5. Current Trend Towards Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization.29
Protectionist barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned upon the
opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their
citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants
for citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources
for themselves. They are now being considered potential sources of developmental skills,
know-how and capital.
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman
Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not "aliens"
in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipino by blood, by origin and by culture,
who want to reacquire their former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign
countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should
welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country or
regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these
admirable Filipino is private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the
Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted municipal mayor of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term, he was
overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of
the law bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate
exercise of HRET's prerogatives.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am
convinced that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not natural born citizen and,
therefore, must be disqualified as a member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship – its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and immunities
of citizens – have given rise to some of the most disputations and visceral issues
resolved by this Court. The problem is taken up connection with the sovereign right of
voters to choose their representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not posses the
constitutional requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent,
on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be elected to Congress considering that
by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino
parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in
the United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the
service for almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of
Northern District of California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No.
14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged
from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered
with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed
an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate
of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January
18, 1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States.
In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won
and served as mayor for one term.
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time
declaring himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes
over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the
Second District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of
Representative Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the
House of Representatives. That he should be a natural-born citizen is a qualification
mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "No person shall
be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda
and supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz
reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him
duly elected representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C.
Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be
sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the
Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of
the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but
the same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on
grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renuciation of such citizenship on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid,
the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore
his natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was natural-born
citizen of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat
in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:
"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth"
contained in the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a
definite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The
Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to
respondent, who at one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the
concomitant loss of all the benefits, privileges and attributes of "natural-born"
citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with
requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional
definition of a natural-born Filipino. For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase
"from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-
born". Since he was born to Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to
Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his
inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal
sense, but more in its legal connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born
as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs,2 the Supreme Court traces the
grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1,
1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a
proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the
United States and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could
become citizens of the United State under the laws of the United State, if residing
therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the 11th of
April, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in
this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second
Philippine Commission, considered as our first colonial charter of fundamental law, we
were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or
"natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first
definition of "citizens of the Philippine Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902.
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even
non-existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and
privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the
years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired
under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of
the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their
children born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the
Philippine legislature. Only later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred
by law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine
Island. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom
citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship.
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having
been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that
status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the
definition of natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the
classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two
classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a
naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-
born citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO,
OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES,
provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino
citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to
renounce his American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation and constitution of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the
framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in Constitution are used
according to their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be
understood in the sense most obvious to the common understanding of the people at the
time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and definite.
Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning
conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call for construction of what
the words imply.
In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the
document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning, except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document,
it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible, should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this
petition according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through
any of these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A.
No. 63) results in the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a
naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach and tends to be misleading
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen
concerned cannot be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts
to become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug7 in the instant case, concurred in by
Justice A.R. Melo:
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon the fulfillment
of certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time
consuming process required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, s amended),
he, nevertheless, would still have to make an express and unequivocal act of formally
rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be of section 2, Article IV,
of the 1987 Constitution, one should not have to perform any act at all or go through
any process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to reacquire his citizenship.
willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship
without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this
view, the term 'natural born' citizens could also cover those who have been collectively
deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
those who have been accorded by the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those
born in the Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
had been elected to public office.)"
The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the
Constitution is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and
permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress,
the branch of the government directly involved and given the dedicate task of
legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:

"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973
Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV
thereof, is meant to refer to those ' who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship,' and to those ' who
elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where
the laws speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation – there is only room for application. The phrase 'from birth
indicates that there is a starting point of his citizenship and this citizenship should be
continuous, constant and without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that
a member of the House of Representative must be a "natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent
citizenship requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office of a
Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate
for such position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective
officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and
ratified by the Filipino (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guide and governs the interpretation of Philippine
citizenship and the more narrow and bounden concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 costitution, the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable to
the President and Vice Persident.10 A person who had been a citizen for only five (5)
years could be elected to the National Assembly. Only in 1940, when the first
Constitution was amended did natural-born citizenship become a requirement for
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. A Filipino naturalized for at
least five (5) years could still be appointed Justice of the Supreme court or a Judge of a
lower court.
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the
requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the
years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime
Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and
members of the Constitutional Commission and the majority of members of the cabinet
must be natural-born citizens. The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his
deputies and the members of the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be
natural-born citizens.
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear
intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the
meaning and import of natural born citizen and citizenship in general.
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less that
the constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a
"natural born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished through a
constitutional amendment. Clearly respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been
restored. He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated.
But he cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for
natural-born Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
x—————————–x
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x—————————–x
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.,
respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a “precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,”1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone—either by those who enjoy it or by
those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a
natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the
fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than
distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter “FPJ”), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines under the KoalisyonngNagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party,
in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be “Fernando
Jr.,” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth
to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,” initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that
FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions—first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner,
in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits – 1) a copy of the
certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by
Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage
against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a
certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by
the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that
there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided
or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge
of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being—a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate
of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando
Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February
2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition,
docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and
Victorino X. Fornier,” and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled “Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,” both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny
due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
“Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false” –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code—

“Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections”—
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize “any
interested party” to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
“Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.”
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
which power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could
be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to
make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest
government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke
the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in
urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before
it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
“The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as
“not (being) justiciable” controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, “An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of
the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same.” Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the
members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election scenario.
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of
the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,” promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise—
“Rule 12. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
“Rule 13. How Initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto
shall not include an election protest.
“Rule 14. Election Protest. – Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes
may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner.”
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the
Philippines, and not of “candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5In such context, the election
contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes
could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before
it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.,” and G. R. No. 161634, entitled “Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.” would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on
the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.6 Aristotle saw its significance if
only to determine the constituency of the “State,” which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed,
for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected.
Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with
concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public
life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of
society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship,
which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.10 The 20th
century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.11 The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in
Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.
The Local Setting—from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime but “subjects
of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.” In church records, the natives were called ‘indios’,
denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship
became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult
to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however,
were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by
Royal Decrees.
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the NovisimaRecopilacion, promulgated
in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines
remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;15 however, three royal
decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines—the Order de
la Regencia of 14 August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically
defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and finally, the
Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because
of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the
Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens.—
“(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
“(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
“(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
“(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy.”
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws
then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by
its Congress—
“Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by
the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or
may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including
the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have
the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they reside.
Thus—
“The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.”
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress
on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects.
Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be
“aliens” under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the first time in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines—
“…. that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight.”
Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of
the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
“inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was
a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1899.
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899
to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines.
Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the
common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality,
operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to
the Philippine Bill of 1902—
“Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein.”
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had
for the first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first
Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912—
“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country;
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.”
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship—
“Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines—
“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
“(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
“(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
“(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
“(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil
law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of
the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns—
“Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution – The following are citizens of the Philippines:
“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
“(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
“(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
“(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that—
“A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship.”
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except
for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
“The following are citizens of the Philippines:
“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
“(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
“(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
“(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
“No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.”
The term “natural-born citizens,” is defined to include “those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.”
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship—naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28—had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
“natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs29
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of
Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not
been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed
that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a
mestizaEspañol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an “uncertified” copy
of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05
July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of
their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to
be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino,
twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years
old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that—
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley,
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit “A” for petitioner and Exhibit “3” for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit “21” for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit “5.” While the last two documents were submitted in evidence
for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo
Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner,
who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that—
“Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
“xxx x xx x xx
“(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in
a public office.”
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof
of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
“Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement
made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes
more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954,
at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that
Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony
of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the
crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about
such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise
failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his
death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at
least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records
Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father
to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.
Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent;
voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document. Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—
“In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly
by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter
case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the
father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which
such father could be identified.”
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
being an authoritative document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court
ruled—
“Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here
really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy
of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While
it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original,
let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that
might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to
be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in
the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may
also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there
must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or
her own.”
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be “some other public document.” In
Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof
of voluntary acknowledgment:
“Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed
by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by
competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in
Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first
class.”
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in
any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had
in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which
would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of
the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, “authentic writing,”
so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a
genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument
(one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article
175 provide:
“Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
“(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
“(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
“(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
“(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
“Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which
to institute the action.
“The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
“xxx x xx x xx.
“Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.”
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
“Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
Thus, in Vda.deSy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
“We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided
under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides
that ‘the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code,
even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws’ or before August 30,
1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect.”
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea
of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in
favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect
his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions
on “citizenship” could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly—
“Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the
family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts
which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience
among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the
protection of private interests.”
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:

“In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x xx the laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, ‘all questions
of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial
bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the
extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of
marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that
are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife.”
The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article
15 of the Civil Code, stating that—
“Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”—that
explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions
on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different
parts of the Civil Code, such as on successional rights and family relations.40 In
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive
parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in
the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain
of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of
filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien
to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides—
“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word ‘pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.”
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the
declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the
acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family—
“I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
“1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
“2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
“3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.
“4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke’s Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
“xxx x xx x xx
“7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando
Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
“8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
“9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald,
Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family’s house
on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945,
except for some months between 1943-1944.
“10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children
after Ronald Allan Poe.
“xxx x xx x xx
“18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan
Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
“Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing—
“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in
using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis
is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from
the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father
and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.”
Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.
According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,
1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent
marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less
than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage
certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16
September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his
mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court
in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
most convincing; he states—
“We must analyze these cases and ask what the lismota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguiniswas on the lismota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lismota, the pronouncement would not be a
decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the
Court to look closely into these cases.
“First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father.
It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother
and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of
the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of
the naturalized stepfather.
“Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2)
of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
“Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The
issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still
needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
“Finally, Paa vs. Chan. This is a more complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that
his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the
Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a
Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio
was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
“The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin’s father, were Filipino, Quintin would not
be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a
contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. xxx It was obiter
dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.“xxx
x xx x xx
“Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not
once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child
and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between
the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

“The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by

People vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and
illegitimate children rests on real differences. xxx But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but
not for another purpose.
“xxx What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What
possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming
a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why
deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an
illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
equal protection clause and must be reprobated.”
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant consideration—is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum—
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over
the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC
for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA
No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for
the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that
FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G.
R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the
latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential
election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court
can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has
been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS—
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. “Fernando
Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents,” and G. R. No. 161634, entitled “Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent,” for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission

on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,” for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in
dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The Antecedent Proceedings
Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections (“Comelec”) a “Petition for
Disqualification of Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr.” on the ground that Fernando Poe, Jr. (“FPJ”) is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
The Comelec First Division dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioner failed to present
substantial evidence that FPJ committed “any material misrepresentation when he stated
in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural-born citizen.” On motion for
reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the First Division. Petitioner
Fornier now assails the Comelec En Banc resolution under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
The Undisputed Facts
The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ. The first
document is the Birth Certificate of FPJ, showing he was born on 20 August 1939. The
Birth Certificate is an evidence of FPJ. [1] The second document is the Marriage
Certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that their marriage took place on
16 September 1940. The Marriage Certificate is also an evidence of FPJ. [2] Moreover,
FPJ admits that his mother Bessie Kelley was an American citizen.
Based on these two documents and admission, the undisputed facts are: (1) FPJ was
born out of wedlock and therefore illegitimate, [4] and (2) the mother of FPJ was an
American citizen.
The Issues
The issues raised in Fornier’s petition are:
(a) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to disqualify FPJ as a
candidate for President on the ground that FPJ is not a natural-born Philippine citizen;
(b) Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisdiction
The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all candidates.
Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and
function to “[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election.” The initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates of
candidacies with the Comelec clearly falls within this all-encompassing constitutional
mandate of the Comelec. The conduct of an election necessarily includes the initial
determination of who are qualified under existing laws to run for public office in an
election. Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list of candidates will be cluttered with
unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections unmanageable. For this reason,
the Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of candidates for president
who are deemed nuisance candidates by the Comelec.
Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to “[D]ecide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x.” The
power to decide “all questions affecting elections” necessarily includes the power to
decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election to
public office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is
designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left
without any legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen,
like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless
to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until
after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
Under Rule 25 on “Disqualification of Candidates” of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a
voter may question before the Comelec the qualifications of any candidate for public
office. Thus, Rule 25 provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate.
Section 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. — Any citizen of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may file with the
Law Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec adopted its Rules of Procedure pursuant to its constitutional power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure [6] to expedite the disposition of cases or
controversies falling within its jurisdiction.
The Comelec has ruled upon the qualifications of candidates, even if the Constitution
provides that some other body shall be the “sole judge” of the qualifications of the
holders of the public offices involved. The Court has upheld the jurisdiction of Comelec
to issue such rulings, [7] even when the issue is the citizenship of a candidate. [8] Thus,
the Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially if FPJ meets the citizenship
qualification to run for President.
However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual bases
of its ruling. The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively on the issue
presented—whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec En Banc
affirmed the First Division ruling that “[W]e feel we are not at liberty to finally declare
whether or not the respondent is a natural-born citizen.” In short, the Comelec En Banc
allowed a candidate for President to run in the coming elections without being convinced
that the candidate is a natural-born Philippine citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En Banc
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 1, Article VIII, as well as Section 5,
Article VIII, of the Constitution, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.
To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a candidate
for President only after the elections would lead to an absurd situation. The Court would
have to wait for an alien to be elected on election day before he could be disqualified to
run for President. If the case is not decided immediately after the election, an alien who
wins the election may even assume office as President before he is finally disqualified.
Certainly, this is not what the Constitution says when it provides that “[N]o person may
be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.” [9] The clear
and specific language of the Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a
natural-born citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-
born Philippine citizen must be decided before the election.
Governing Laws
Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth depends
on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth. [10] FPJ’s citizenship at
the time of his birth in 1939, applying the laws in force in 1939, determines whether he
is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Natural-born Philippine citizens are “those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” [11]
If a person has to perform an act, such as proving in an administrative or judicial
proceeding, that an event subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him to
Philippine citizenship, such person is not a natural born citizen.
The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the
governing laws that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen at
the time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship at
birth of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would violate the constitutional
definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen from birth. In short,
one who is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent
legislation a natural-born citizen.
General Principles
A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship of the father. A child born
within wedlock is presumed to be the son of the father [13] and thus carries the blood of
the father. Under the doctrine of jus sanguinis, as provided for in Section 1(3), Article III
of the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, by the fact of legitimacy, automatically
follows the citizenship of the Filipino father.
An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation to any
father unless the father acknowledges the child at birth. [14] The law has always
required that “in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.”
[15] The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is
the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, unless
the father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the illegitimate child can only
acquire the citizenship of the only legally known parent—the mother.
However, if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood relation of
illegitimate child to the father) of the child to the Filipino father is established in
accordance with law, the child follows the citizenship of the Filipino father. This gives
effect, without discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children, to the
provision of the 1935 Constitution that “[T]hose whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines” [16] are Philippine citizens.
Nature of Citizenship
If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a natural-
born Philippine citizen because no other act after his birth is required to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship. The child possesses all the qualifications to be a
Philippine citizen at birth.
If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine citizen as
of the time of the acknowledgment. In this case, the child does not possess all the
qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act—the acknowledgement of
the Filipino father—is required for the child to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be given
effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of natural-born
citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that the child has the
blood of any man who is supposed to be the father. There is only a conclusive
presumption that the child has the blood of the mother. If an illegitimate child claims to
have the blood of a man who is supposed to be the child’s father, such blood relation
must be established in accordance with proof of filiation as required by law.

Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the citizenship of the
putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish a blood relation to the
putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an illegitimate child has the
blood of the putative father. Even if the putative father admits paternity after the birth
of the illegitimate child, there must be an administrative or judicial approval that such
blood relation exists upon proof of paternity as required by law.
Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred on an
illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere say so of the putative Filipino father.
The State has a right to examine the veracity of the claim of paternity. Otherwise, the
grant of Philippine citizenship to an illegitimate child of an alien mother is left to the sole
discretion of the putative Filipino father. For example, a Philippine citizen of Chinese
descent can simply claim that he has several illegitimate children in China. The State
cannot be required to grant Philippine passports to these supposed illegitimate children
born in China of Chinese mothers just because the putative Filipino father acknowledges
paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative or judicial
determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father is true.
The case of the illegitimate Vietnamese children, born in Vietnam of Vietnamese mothers
and allegedly of Filipino fathers, is illustrative. These children grew up in Vietnam, many
of them studying there until high school. These children grew up knowing they were
Vietnamese citizens. In 1975, a Philippine Navy vessel brought them, together with their
Vietnamese mothers, to the Philippines as Saigon fell to the communists. The mothers of
these children became stateless when the Republic of (South) Vietnam ceased to exist in
1975. The Department of Justice rendered Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May 1995 that being
children of Filipino fathers, these Vietnamese children, even if illegitimate, are Philippine
citizens under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1(2), Article
III of the 1973 Constitution. This Opinion is cited by FPJ as basis for his claim of being a
natural-born Philippine citizen. [17] However, this Opinion categorically stated that
before the illegitimate Vietnamese children may be considered Filipino citizens “it is
necessary in every case referred to that such paternity be established by sufficient and
convincing documentary evidence.”
In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial
authority the paternity of the alleged Filipino father by “sufficient and convincing
documentary evidence.” Clearly, an administrative or judicial act is necessary to confer
on the illegitimate Vietnamese children Philippine citizenship. The mere claim of the
illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino father, or the mere acknowledgment of the
alleged Filipino father, does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship on the child.
The State must be convinced of the veracity of such claim and approve the same. Since
the illegitimate Vietnamese children need to perform an act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens. They become
Philippine citizens only from the moment the proper administrative or judicial authority
approve and recognize their filiation to their alleged Filipino fathers.
The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high
public offices [19] is to insure that the holders of these high public offices grew up
knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their formative years they knew
they owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other country claims
their allegiance, they would be faithful and loyal to the Philippines of which they were
citizens from birth. This is particularly true to the President who is the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces. [20] The President of the Philippines must owe, from birth,
allegiance to the Philippines and must have grown up knowing that he was a citizen of
the Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen
would lose its meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth recognized by law as an alien
were declared forty years later [21] a natural-born Philippine citizen just because his
alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his paternity.
Proof of Filiation
Article 131 [22] of the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force in 1939, recognized only the
following as proof of filiation of a natural child:
a. acknowledgment in a record of birth;
b. acknowledgment in a will;
c. acknowledgment in some other public document.
To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an
acknowledgement in a record of birth, or an acknowledgment in some other public
document executed at the time of his birth. An acknowledgment executed after birth
does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such acknowledgment
since the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship.
After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent
legislation liberalizing proof of filiation cannot apply to such person to make him a
natural-born citizen. A natural-born Philippine citizen is expressly defined in the
Constitution as one who is a citizen at birth. If a person is not a citizen at birth, no
subsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at birth since it would
violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen.
Burden of Proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his
Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for President because
he is, among others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of proving he is a
natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born citizen is resolved
against him. The constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express
qualification for election as President, must be complied with strictly as defined in the
Constitution. As the Court ruled in Paa v. Chan:
It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the Court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in
favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must
be resolved in favor of the State.
Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate child, having been born out of
wedlock, the burden is on FPJ to prove his blood relation to his alleged Filipino father. An
illegitimate child enjoys no presumption of blood relation to any father. Such blood
relationship must be established in the appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person because
citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and State interest.
Even if petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is the son of Allan F.
Poe, such admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ the
status of a natural-born Philippine citizen or even of a naturalized citizen. Certainly, the
Court will not recognize a person as a natural-born Philippine citizen just because the
private party litigants have admitted or stipulated on such a status. In the present case,
the Solicitor General, as representative of the Government, is strongly disputing the
status of FPJ as a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Legitimation
Under Article 123 [24] of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of the date
of marriage. There was no retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on the rights of the
legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights of a legitimate child only
as of the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born more than one year earlier on 20
August 1939. Assuming that Allan F. Poe was FPJ’s natural father, the effects of
legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939.
Besides, legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child. As the
Court held in Ching Leng: [25]
The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate therein political
questions. Hence, apart from reproducing the provisions of the Constitution on
citizenship, the Code contains no precept thereon except that which refers all matters of
“naturalization”, as well as those related to the “loss and reacquisition of citizenship” to
“special laws.” Consistently with this policy, our Civil Code does not include therein any
rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28 of the Civil Code of Spain, regulating citizenship.
(Underscoring in the original)
Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley legitimated
FPJ, such legitimation did not vest retroactively any civil or political rights to FPJ.
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902
FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a Spanish citizen who came to the
Philippines from Spain. [26] To benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of
Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ must prove that Lorenzo Pou was an
inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it is established that
Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899, then he
is presumed to have acquired Philippine citizenship under the Treaty of Paris of 1898
and the Philippine Bill of 1902. [27] Being an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines
on 11 April 1899 is the determinative fact to fall under the coverage of the Treaty of
Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902. [28]
There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine inhabitant
and resident on 11 April 1899. The date of arrival of Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines is not
known. If he arrived in the Philippines after 11 April 1899, then he could not benefit
from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of
1902. There is also no evidence that Lorenzo Pou was naturalized as a Philippine citizen
after 11 April 1899. Thus, there can be no presumption that Lorenzo Pou was a
Philippine citizen.
There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the son of Lorenzo Pou and the
alleged father of FPJ, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Thus, based on the
evidence adduced there is no legal basis for claiming that Allan F. Poe is a Philippine
citizen. Nevertheless, there is no need to delve further into this issue since the Court can
decide this case without determining the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe.
Whether or not Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe were Philippine citizens is not material in
resolving whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and
ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a child to mean “every
human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier.” Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention since he
is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he was born half a century before the
Convention came into existence. FPJ’s citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way
be affected by the Convention which entered into force only on 2 September 1990.
The Convention has the status of a municipal law [29] and its ratification by the
Philippines could not have amended the express requirement in the Constitution that
only natural-born citizens of Philippines are qualified to be President. While the
Constitution apparently favors natural-born citizens over those who are not, that is the
explicit requirement of the Constitution which neither the Executive Department nor the
Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could amend. In short, the Convention cannot amend
the definition in the Constitution that natural-born citizens are “those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.”

In any event, the Convention guarantees a child “the right to acquire a nationality,” [30]
and requires States Parties to “ensure the implementation” of this right, “in particular
where the child would otherwise be stateless.” [31]Thus, as far as nationality or
citizenship is concerned, the Convention guarantees the right of the child to acquire a
nationality so that he may not be stateless. The Convention does not guarantee a child a
citizenship at birth, but merely “the right to acquire a nationality” in accordance with
municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was apparently under United States law
an American citizen at birth. [32] After his birth FPJ also had the right to acquire
Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his alleged Filipino father in accordance
with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ
cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
The Doctrine in Ching Leng v. Galang
The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien
mother follows the citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally known parent. The
illegitimate child, even if acknowledged and legally adopted by the Filipino father, cannot
acquire the citizenship of the father. The Court made this definitive doctrinal ruling in
Ching Leng v. Galang, [33] which involved the illegitimate minor children of a
naturalized Filipino of Chinese descent with a Chinese woman, Sy An. The illegitimate
children were later on jointly adopted by the naturalized Filipino and his legal wife, So
Buan Ty.
The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial court’s decision are as
follows:
After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court
dated May 2, 1950 granting his petition for naturalization, he together with his wife So
Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court in Special Proc. No. 1216 for the
adoption of Ching Tiong Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam, Sydney
Ching and Ching Tiong An, all minors and admittedly the illegitimate children of
petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy An, a Chinese citizen. Finding the petition for adoption
proper, this Court granted the same in a decision dated September 12, 1950, declaring
the said minors free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with
respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and purposes the children of the
adopter Ching Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and
obligations provided by law.
On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became therefore a
full pledge (sic) Filipino citizen. Believing now that his adopted illegitimate children
became Filipino citizens by virtue of his naturalization, petitioner Ching Leng addressed a
communication to the respondent Commissioner of Immigration requesting that the
alien certificate of registration of the said minors be cancelled. (Bold underscoring
supplied)
In Ching Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of “minor child or
children” in Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, [34] as well as the meaning of children
“whose parents are citizens of the Philippines” under the Constitution. The Court
categorically ruled that these children refer to legitimate children only, and not to
illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:
It is claimed that the phrases “minor children” and “minor child”, used in these
provisions, include adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory that
an adopted child is, for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever, the word
“children” or “child” is used in statutes, it is generally understood, however, to refer to
legitimate children, unless the context of the law and its spirit indicate clearly the
contrary. Thus, for instance, when the Constitution provides that “those whose parents
are citizens of the Philippines, “and “those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines,” who shall elect Philippine citizenship “upon reaching the age of majority”,
are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions 3 and 4), our
fundamental law clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46 Off.
Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful wedlock,
when the adopter, at least is the father. In fact, illegitimate children are under the
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality, not that of the illegitimate
father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, 335-336; Santos Co vs. Gov’t of the
Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v. Republic, supra; Gallofin v. Ordoñez, 70 Phil.
287; Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953). Although, adoption gives “to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the
adopter”, pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code, we have already seen that the
rights therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in Article 264, and do not include
the acquisition of the nationality of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the term “children” could
not possibly refer to those whose relation to the naturalized person is one created by
legal fiction, as, for instance, by adoption, for, otherwise, the place and time of birth of
the child would be immaterial. The fact that the adopted persons involved in the case at
bar are illegitimate children of appellant Ching Leng does not affect substantially the
legal situation before us, for, by legal fiction, they are now being sought to be given the
status of legitimate children of said appellant, despite the circumstance that the Civil
Code of the Philippine does not permit their legitimation. (Bold underscoring supplied)
Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in October 1958, was a unanimous
decision of the Court En Banc. Subsequent Court decisions, including Paa v. Chan [35]
and Morano et al. v. Vivo, [36] have cited the doctrine laid down in Ching Leng that the
provision in the 1935 Constitution stating “those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines” refers only to legitimate children. When the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
were drafted, the framers did not attempt to change the intent of this provision, even as
they were presumably aware of the Ching Leng doctrine.

Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The
inexorable direction of the law, both international and domestic in the last 100 years, is
to eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children.
Where the Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children,
we should not also distinguish, especially when private rights are not involved as in
questions of citizenship. Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine upholds the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine is also in
compliance with our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the Rights of Children
mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on the status of
children, save of course those distinctions prescribed in the Constitution itself like the
reservation of certain high public offices to natural-born citizens.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine does not mean, however, that an illegitimate child
of a Filipino father and an alien mother automatically becomes a Philippine citizen at
birth. We have repeatedly ruled that an illegitimate child does not enjoy any
presumption of blood relation to the alleged father until filiation or blood relation is
proved as provided by law. [37] Article 887 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
“[I]n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.” The
illegitimate child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the time he establishes his blood
relation to the Filipino father. If the blood relation is established after the birth of the
illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since an act is
required after birth to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Conclusion
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a natural-born Philippine
citizen since there is no showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe
acknowledged him at birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a
Philippine citizen “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect” his
Philippine citizenship. Private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does not meet this
citizenship qualification.
Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X. Fornier. However, I vote to dismiss
the petitions of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo Antonio Velez
on the ground that their direct petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the Constitution are premature, there being no
election contest in this case.
SEPARATE OPINION
DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:
The procedural and factual antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to disqualify private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) and to deny due course to or cancel his certificate of candidacy
for the position of President in the forthcoming 10 May 2004 presidential elections. As a
ground therefore, he averred that FPJ committed falsity in a material representation in
his certificate of candidacy in declaring that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth and in fact he is not, since he is the illegitimate son of Bessie Kelley, an American
citizen, and Allan Poe, a Spanish national. The case was docketed as COMELEC Case SPA
No. 04-003 and assigned to the COMELEC’s First Division.
At the hearing before the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier offered FPJ’s
record of birth to prove that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to Bessie Kelley, an
American citizen, and Allan Poe, who was then married to Paulita Gomez. Upon the other
hand, FPJ tried to establish that his father was a Filipino citizen whose parents, although
Spanish nationals, were Filipino citizens. He adduced in evidence a copy of the marriage
contract of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that they were married on 16
September 1940 in Manila.
In its Resolution of 23 January 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed
COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. It declared that COMELEC’s jurisdiction
is limited to all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of national officials like the President.
It has, however, jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code on petitions to deny due course or cancel
certificates of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained
therein is false. It found that the evidence adduced by petitioner Fornier is not
substantial, and that FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when
he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
His motion for reconsideration filed before the COMELEC en banc having been denied,
petitioner Fornier filed a petition with this Court, which was docketed as GR. No.
161824.
Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. came to this
Court via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 161434, to challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the
issue of the citizenship of FPJ. They assert that only this Court has jurisdiction over the
issue in light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar petition, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 161634.
The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined by the Court during the oral
argument, are as follows:
(1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy of Presidential candidates;

(2) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of (a) Tecson, et al.,
(b) Velez, and (c) Fornier; and
(3) Whether respondent FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, whether he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
These consolidated petitions must be dismissed.
Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as provided
for in the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, and raise the
issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for President on the ground that he is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said provision of
the Constitution are post-election remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo
warranto. The petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-election remedies, such
as those prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section
69 (Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, which
are implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These pre-
election remedies or actions do not, however, fall within the original jurisdiction of this
Court.
Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC
has the original jurisdiction to determine in an appropriate proceeding whether a
candidate for an elective office is eligible for the office for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy or is disqualified to be a candidate or to continue such candidacy because of
any of the recognized grounds for disqualification. Its jurisdiction over COMELEC SPA No.
04-003 is, therefore, beyond question.
Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Fornier’s petition (G.R. No.
161824) under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.
This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
challenged resolution in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of nay branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the
following facts have been established by a weighty preponderance of evidence either in
the pleadings and the documents attached thereto or from the admissions of the parties,
through their counsels, during the oral arguments:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was
not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and
the Philippine Bill of 1902.
From the foregoing it is clear that respondent FPJ was born before the marriage of his
parents. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code then in force, he could either be (a) a natural
child if both his parents had no legal impediments to marry each other; or (b) an
illegitimate child if, indeed, Allan Poe was married to another woman who was still alive
at the time FPJ was born.
Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his
case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a
non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a
Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the
child to follow the citizenship of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
one of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner
Fornier, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a
Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, which reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:…
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or
that the child is acknowledged or recognized by the father.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other
one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo
Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11,
1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American
citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as
a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in
1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under
US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati
City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.4
Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC
en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.5 The
pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age
of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau
of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had
U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted
on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of
votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three
thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S.
Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894)
votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza
III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275)
votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular
choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law
which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second
Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondent's
certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate
for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis
Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of
Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of
vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano
— whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was
not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was
petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of
the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and,
therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for
intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action
or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be
fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati
City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene
in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the
results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of
which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that
there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene.
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,6 reiterated in several cases,7 only applies to cases in
which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present
case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20,
1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local
position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted
the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to
bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor
of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion
for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have
garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That
petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present
petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but
also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification
on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano
possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate
for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from
running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This
provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who
sides with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code,
Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual
allegiance to hold local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.9 For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner
Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance — and I reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more threatening than that
of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious.
That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil.
And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the
problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial
elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of
about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei
ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented
in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor
might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China, they have the
Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia
including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved
after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were
also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance
of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to
be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of
the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner
Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation,
and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority
claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in
downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of common
knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a
capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and
social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider incorporating
a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as
follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH
ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with
dual allegiance, thus:
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant
to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies
a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and
obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of
course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some
noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a
good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10;
and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of
the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and
deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which
is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee
said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering
the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let
us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the
most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws,
such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel
clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17:
"Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position.
Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is
no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must
elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may
such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment
when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of
origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one
can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in
effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is,
at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President.
He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her
in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove
that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he
owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and
is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with
its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were
to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought
or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at
all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree
that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States.
However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in
1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship
under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections
is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged
renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was
ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his
American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of
the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . .
(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision
was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk as beyond
the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH
AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND
DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY
CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in
Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any
elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim —
when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to
his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when
he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance
contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon
private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered
as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds
an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22,
1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March
21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply
as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to
private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even
no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there
can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either
"express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto
and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on
the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal
of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that
he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.
Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared
private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in
these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735.
The petitions were consolidated since they principally involve the same issues and
parties.
I
G.R. No. 104654
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to
R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the
Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private
respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as
amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private
respondent on February 27, 1992.
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the
Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines
under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on
March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last
publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The
order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous
place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-
26).
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of
Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992
elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March
15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be
cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).
The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the
petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy
thereof posted.
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He
submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order
dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2)
Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1");
(4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National Press Club with private respondent’s
picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club
of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7)
Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F");
(8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the record
of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of
Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as
a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him,
all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before
respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).
On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were
tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the
requirements of the Naturalization Law.
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General
interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 105715
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer
for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC,
which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought
to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of
Sorsogon.
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the
position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private
respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats
(Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of
private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1)
that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in
accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine
citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private
respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in
favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of
the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the
petition for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said
section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on
questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it ignored the fundamental issue of private respondent’s disqualification in the
guise of technicality.
Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name in the list of registered
voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a
voter in 1987, he was as American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not
yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before us.
Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent’s proclamation as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondent’s name
from the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the
governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private
respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private
respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case docketed
as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent.
G.R. No. 105735
This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation
to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining
order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution of SPA Case No.
92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of
candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No.
104654 (Rollo, p. 18).
The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen,
and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province
of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court’s decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities
rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private
respondent’s oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned
decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year
waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that
the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from
the date of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the
cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name
from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations
therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same
office for which private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2)
that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid;
and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter.
Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondent’s certificate
of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for
cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all
petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be
decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v.
Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation
controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo,
p. 50).
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino
citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory
(Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not
among the grounds allowed in a pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-
273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time,
thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under
Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a
disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It
also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he
filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto
proceedings sought private respondent’s disqualification because of his American
citizenship.
II
G.R. No. 104654
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent’s citizenship.
In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship
in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere
in the country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United
States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that
repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost
their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request
to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House
of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his
political rivals.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date,
without publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General.
He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.
It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and
that the public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity
given by the media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath
of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the
waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the
applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In
his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with,
claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites
his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon
for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is
meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of
procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization
under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed
by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the
requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard
those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not
distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was
never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who
had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of
private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of
allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting
it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a
freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is
meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.No. 91-58645 was full of
procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization
under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed
by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the
requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard
those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not
distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was
never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who
had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of
private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of
allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting
it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional
(Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of
the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy
v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral
character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3)
that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that
he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition
until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of
intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA
400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons
who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section
7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of
his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted
from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First
Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be
able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated
himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the
applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to
government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any
decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.

G.R. No. 105715

In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino
citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition
for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc
resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition
to annul private respondent’s proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law;
2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being
questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a
duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was
filed outside the three-day period for questioning the proceedings and composition of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the disqualification of private
respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this
aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174
SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the
respondent’s title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for
alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure;
once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is
untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the
electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that
he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent
be considered stray and that he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we
ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See
also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238
[1912]).
G.R. No. 105735
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition
in G.R. No. 105735 moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED
while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT
a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to
SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this
decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 200983 March 18, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HUANG TE FU a.k.a. ROBERT
UY, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This case reiterates the rule in naturalization cases that when full and complete
compliance with the requirements of the Revised Naturalization Law, or Commonwealth
Act No. 473 (CA 473), is not shown, a petition for naturalization must be perfunctorily
denied.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside 1) the November 29, 2011
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91213 affirming the
September 24, 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 in
Nat. Case/Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251, as well as 2) the CA's March 7, 2012 Resolution4
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On March 19, 2004, respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy – a citizen of the
Republic of China (Taiwan) – filed a sworn Declaration of Intent to Become [a] Citizen of
the Philippines6 with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
On April 27, 2005, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial
court) a Petition for Naturalization,7 which was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251
and assigned to Branch 96. The Petition states:
I apply for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines and to the Court, respectfully
shows [sic]:
First: My full name is HUANG TE FU, also known as ROBERT UY;
Second: My places of residence were:
1982 1 Santiago Street, Malinta, Valenzuela City
1982 to 1984 Biak na Bato, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City
1984 to 1994 235 C 3rd Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan City

1994 to present 64-A Parklane Street, Barangay Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City;
Third: My trade or profession is a Businessman engaged in the manufacture of zipper, in
which I have been connected since 1992; and from which I derive an average monthly
income of P15,000.00;
Fourth: I was born on the 15th day of August 1976 in Taiwan. I am at present a Citizen
or subject of the Republic of China, under whose laws Filipinos may become naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof [sic];
Fifth: I am married to a Filipino, IRENE D. CHAN, 28 years of age, having been born on
11 April 1977 at Manila, and with whom I have two (2) children, namely: ROCHELLE IVY
C. HUANG, 3 years of age, who was born on 26 March 2002 at [sic] Quezon City; and
REYNARD IVAN C. HUANG, 1 year of age, who was born on 25 February 2004 at [sic]
Quezon City. My wife and two children are presently residing with me at 64-A Parklane
Street, Barangay Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City;
Sixth: I arrived in the Philippines via China Airlines on the 13th of August 1982;
Seventh: I have filed my Declaration of Intent to Become a Citizen of the Philippines
with the Office of the Solicitor General on 4 March 2004, pursuant to and in compliance
with Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended;8
Eighth: I have resided continuously, for the last twenty three (23) years, in the
Philippines since my arrival. I have received my primary education at Philippine Cultural
High School; secondary education at Philippine Cultural High School; and finished my
college education at Ateneo de Manila University with the degree of Bachelor of Science
in Computer Science, respectively, which are schools recognized by the Government and
not limited to any race or nationality;
Ninth: I am able to speak and write English and Filipino;
Tenth: I believe in the principle underlying the Philippine Constitution. I am of good
moral character and have conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines, in my relations with the
constituted Government as well as with the community in which I am living. I have
mingled socially with the Filipinos, and have evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos. I have all the qualifications
required under Section 2, a special qualification under Section 3, by being married to a
Filipino woman, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473;
I am not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments. I am not
defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of men’s ideas. I am not a polygamist
nor a believer in the practice of polygamy. I have not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude. I am not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable
diseases. The nation of which I am a citizen or subject of is not at war with the
Philippines. The country of which I am a citizen or subject of grants Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof;
Eleventh: It is my intention in good faith to become a citizen or subject of the Philippines
and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to my foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the Republic of China of which at
this time I am a citizen or subject. I will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of the filing of my petition up to the time of my admission to the Philippine
Citizenship;
Twelfth: I have not heretofore made any petition for citizenship to any Court;
Thirteenth: Mr. BENJAMIN A. MORALEDA, JR., of legal age, married, residing at 82-A
Maginoo Street, Barangay Central, Quezon City, and Ms. BELLA RAMONA A. ANTONANO,
of legal age, single, residing at 1 Ligaya Street, Mandaluyong City, who are both
Filipinos, will appear and testify as my witnesses at the hearing of my herein petition.
Attached hereto and made an integral part of this petition are: (a) the Original
Certification of Arrival from the Bureau of Immigration (Annex "A");(b) Declaration of
Intent to Become a Citizen of the Philippines (Annex "B"); (c) Affidavit of the two
witnesses (Annexes "C" and "D"); and (d) my two recent photographs (Annexes "E" and
"E-1").
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that he be admitted a citizen of the Philippines.
After trial, the trial court issued a September 24, 2007 Order10 granting respondent’s
petition for naturalization, decreeing thus:
Petitioner11 thereafter testified that he was born on August 15, 1976 in Taiwan; that his
father, Huang Ping-Hsung, and mother, Huang Wen, Chiu-Yueh are both Chinese
nationals; that he is the holder of Alien Certificate of Registration No. E062035 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 259804; that he resided at Lin 4, Chienkuo Li,
Panchiao City, Taipei County, Taiwan Province since his birth until he came to Manila,
Philippines on August 13, 1982; that he first stayed at Santiago Street, Valenzuela City;
that they transferred to Biak-na-Bato Street, San Francisco Del Monte and they later
transferred to 23-C, 3rd Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan City; that petitioner presently
resides at No. 64- A Parklane Street, Barangay Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City;
that he attended Philippine Cultural High School for his elementary and secondary
education; that he attended Ateneo de Manila University where he took up Bachelor of
Science in Computer Science.
When petitioner graduated from College in the year 2000, he worked as General
Manager of MIT Zipper, a company owned by the family of the petitioner; that as a
businessman he conscientiously files Income Tax Returns; that he is presently married
to Irene Chan, a Filipino citizen on October 01, 2000; that he has two children namely,
Rochelle Ivy C. Huang, 3 years old, and Reynard Ivan C. Huang, 1 year old and that he
and his family are presently residing at 64-A Parklane Street, Barangay Sangandaan,
Project 8, Quezon City.

Petitioner further alleged that he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution. He had conducted himself in a proper, irreproachable manner during his
entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living. These allegations are
evinced by the clearances petitioner was able to secure from the Philippine National
Police, National Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Clerk of Court – Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, and the Office of the City Prosecutor. He has mingled socially with
the Filipinos, and have [sic] evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
Petitioner further alleged that he is not a polygamist nor a believer in the practice of
polygamy. He has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not
suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable or contagious disease. The nation
of which he is presently a citizen or subject of, is not at war with the Philippines. He is
not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments. He has all
the qualifications required and none of the disqualifications under Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended.
Moreover, petitioner’s intention to become a citizen of the Philippines is being done in
good faith, and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign state, prince, potentate or sovereignty and particularly to the Chinese
Government of which at this time he is a citizen and subject, and that petitioner shall
reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition up to the
time of [his] admission to the Philippine Citizenship.
Based on the foregoing, the Court believes that the petitioner was able to establish by
sufficient evidence, both testimonial and documentary, that he has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided for under the law which will warrant the
granting of the relief being prayed for.
ACCORDINGLY, therefore, the petition for admission as citizen of the Philippines is
hereby GRANTED.
This decision shall become executory after two (2) years from its promulgation and after
the Court, after hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his
representative, is satisfied, and so finds that during the intervening time the applicant
has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
profession, (3) not been convicted of any offense or violation of government[-
]promulgated rules, or (4) committed any act of [sic] prejudicial to the interest of the
nation or contrary to any government renounced [sic] policies.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 91213.
Petitioner contended in its Appellant’s Brief13 that respondent may not become a
naturalized Filipino citizen because: 1) he does not own real estate in the Philippines; 2)
he does not have some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation; 3) he is
not gainfully employed, as he merely worked in the business owned by his family and
was merely given allowances by his parents for the daily expenses of his family; 4) in an
August 2001 Deed of Sale14 covering a parcel of land in Antipolo City he and his wife
supposedly purchased, respondent falsely misrepresented himself as a Filipino citizen,
thus exemplifying his lack of good moral character; 5) his income tax returns for the
years 2002, 2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly income differs from his
monthly income as declared in his petition for naturalization, leading to the conclusion
that either he is evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his income; and 6) on
cross-examination by petitioner, he could not cite any of the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to believe in.
In a short Comment/Opposition15 to petitioner’s brief, respondent admitted that while
"he was merely made to sign the Deed of Sale" which falsely represented him as a
Filipino citizen, he "had nothing to do with the preparation" thereof and was "unaware"
that his citizenship was even indicated therein – "he just signed the document as
requested by the broker so that the property will be registered in the name of his wife;"
that the discrepancy between his income declarations in his tax returns and the declared
income in his petition for naturalization came to light and resulted from the fact that "he
does not personally file his income tax returns and that he merely received salaries in
the range of P15,000.00 per month considering that he is employed in a family
corporation;" that "most of his expenses are taken care of by his parents who own the
corporation," and this has been explained during his cross-examination; that while
petitioner claimed that he could not cite any underlying principles of the Constitution, he
was not confronted by the former about these principles during the proceedings; and
that petitioner’s opposition is based merely on conjecture and particular portions of the
evidence which do not represent the whole context of the proceedings.
On November 29, 2011, the CA issued the assailed Decision, pronouncing thus:
First off, an examination of the evidence presented during the proceedings below shows
that the petitioner-appellee16 has been engaged in some lucrative trade or lawful
occupation. He works as general manager in their family-owned business, Crown
Shipper Manufacturer and Trading Corporation, a zipper manufacturing company
employing workers mostly coming from the province.
Prior to his appointment as general manager, petitioner-appellee has also been working
in the family’s business before his parents turned over the management of its affairs.
This is evidenced by the increase in the declared gross income of the petitioner-appellee
in his Income Tax Returns filed for the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. The extent of
the operations of the petitioner- appellee’s family business and his involvement in the
management thereof are corroborated by the testimonies of Atty. Benjamin Moraleda
and Atty. Bella Ramona Antonano, both friends of the Huang family and the petitioner-
appellee since 1987 and 1994, respectively. Both witnesses also testified that the
petitioner-appellee possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
Secondly, the Solicitor General also averred that the petitioner-appellee failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay or residence in the
Philippines. It noted that the petitioner-appellee stated in his petition that he earns an
average of P15,000.00 per month but his declared gross income for 2002 and 2003
indicated that he earned P120,000.00 annually while in 2004, his annual gross income
was P210,000.00. The Solicitor General contended that because of the petitioner-
appellee’s failure to divulge his true income, his moral character has been tainted.
We hold otherwise.
Absent a clear and unmistakable showing that the petitioner-appellee knowingly and
deliberately filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or that he has concealed
the truth in his income tax returns, the presumption that the latter has regularly filed his
return prevails. The petitioner-appellee has, in fact, explained before the trial court that
his salary is not exactly fixed; sometimes he earns more or sometimes less than his
estimated or average monthly earnings which could well be between P15,000.00 to
P18,000.00. He even testified that he is not included in the payroll since his parents own
the company and his salaries are handed to him by his parents.
In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Loh Khuan Fatt, the
Supreme Court did not agree with the argument of the Solicitor General that there had
been a willful failure on the part of the applicant to disclose the petitioner’s true income,
thereby tainting his moral character. The discrepancy between the petitioner’s estimate
of his income in his application and that declared by him during his direct testimony
should not be taken against him as an indication of intent to evade payment of taxes. x
x xx
Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that petitioner-appellee is disqualified from
becoming a citizen of the Philippines because he could not even cite any of the principles
underlying the Constitution during cross- examination x x x.
We agree with the observation of the petitioner-appellee that the oppositor’s
representative during the cross-examination was actually asking the petitioner-appellee
to recite what these underlying principles of the Constitution are in a manner which a
law professor would normally ask his Political Law students. Not being able to enumerate
the principles in verbatim does not necessarily mean that one does not believe in the
Constitution. What is important is that the petitioner-appellee declared under oath that
he believes in the principles underlying the Constitution, and that he had no derogatory
or criminal record which would be a clear violation of the law of the land. Apparently,
during cross-examination the oppositor-appellant did not confront the petitioner-
appellee of the principles which it thought the latter does not believe in.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated September 24, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 in Naturalization Case No. Q-05-55251 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its March 7, 2012 Resolution, the appellate
court stood its ground.
Issue
Thus, the instant Petition was filed, raising the following issue:
WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT X X X HAS DULY COMPLIED WITH THE RIGID
REQUISITES PRESCRIBED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW, AS TO ENTITLE HIM TO BE ADMITTED AS A
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Petitioner’s Arguments
In its Petition and Reply seeking the reversal of the assailed CA dispositions as well as
the denial of respondent’s petition for naturalization, petitioner argues that respondent
failed to prove that he is engaged in a lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation;
that respondent’s admission during trial that he is not even in the payroll of his
employer belies his claim that he is the general manager thereof, as well as his claim
that he is engaged in a lucrative trade; that respondent’s declared monthly income is
not even sufficient for his family, much less could it be considered "lucrative;" that
respondent’s admission that he received allowances from his parents to answer for the
daily expenses of his family further proves the point that he does not have a lucrative
trade; that the monthly income declared in respondent’s petition for naturalization could
not be reconciled with the incomes stated in his annual tax returns; that the
inconsistencies in respondent’s testimonial and documentary evidence point to the fact
the he could either be evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his income, and
indicates that he does not possess the requisite good moral character; that respondent’s
act of falsely declaring himself a Filipino citizen in the August 2001 deed of sale proves
lack of good moral character and defiance of the constitutional prohibition regarding
foreign ownership of land; and that respondent has exhibited lack of knowledge of the
underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment, respondent reiterates that the inconsistencies in his income tax returns
and declarations during the naturalization proceedings are explained by the fact that he
does not personally file his income tax returns; that his monthly salary is not fixed; that
most of his expenses are taken cared of by his parents who own the zipper
manufacturing business which employs him; that the Antipolo property was not titled in
his name, but in the name of his wife, and the title thereto merely describes and
indicates that the owner – his wife – is married to him; that he was merely made to sign
the deed of sale, and he had no hand in its preparation – nor was he aware that his
citizenship was indicated therein; and that as he was not a law student, he could not at
the trial be expected to recite verbatim and specifically the underlying legal principles of
the Constitution, which is what petitioner expected him to do at the time.
Our Ruling
The Court finds for petitioner.
In Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must
show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law;
otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held
that "[t]he courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued
with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of
proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law."
Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an
applicant for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. In regard to the requirement that the
applicant must have a known lucrative trade, this ponente declared:
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough
for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an
income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to
be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public
charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and
consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization."
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the
courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should
not be included in the assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial "for
under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation’ to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the
Court has consistently held that the applicant’s qualifications must be determined as of
the time of the filing of his petition. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it may be concluded that there is no basis for the CA finding that
respondent is engaged in a lucrative trade. Indeed, his supposed income of P15,000.00
to P18,000.00 per month as found by the CA is not enough for the support of his family.
By his own admission, most of his family’s daily expenses are still shouldered by his
parents who own the zipper manufacturing business which employs him. This simply
means that respondent continues to be a burden to, and a charge upon, his parents; he
lives on the charity of his parents. He cannot support his own family on his own.
Indeed, it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a trade at all. He admitted
during trial that he was not even listed or included in the payroll of his family’s zipper
business. If this is the case, then he may not be considered an employee thereof. One of
the most effective pieces of evidence to prove employment – aside from the
employment contract itself and other documents such as daily time records24 – is a
worker’s inclusion in the payroll. With this admitted fact, one may not be faulted for
believing that respondent’s alleged employment in his family’s zipper business was
contrived for the sole purpose of complying with the legal requirements prior to
obtaining Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, even assuming that respondent was indeed employed by his parents,
his non-inclusion in the payroll for all the years he has worked in his parents’ business25
suggests – as correctly argued by petitioner – an intent to evade taxes or to conceal the
true nature of his employment and the amount of his salary or income. It is concealment
of the truth; an attempt to circumvent with impunity the tax laws, labor laws relative to
the employment of aliens, and other laws that would otherwise regulate respondent’s
actions during his stay in this country. Indeed, without payroll records, it can never be
said that respondent works for his parents’ zipper business. If such is the case, then
respondent is not required to state in his income tax return – as is the case – his
employer and what he actually receives as salary therefrom; he is free to conveniently
declare any amount of income in his tax returns.
Either way, respondent’s deliberate non-inclusion in the payroll of his parents’ business
can have only the most unpleasant connotations. And his consent to be part of such
scheme reflects negatively on his moral character. It shows a proclivity for
untruthfulness and dishonesty, and an unreserved willingness and readiness to violate
Philippine laws.
The appellate court’s reliance upon the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals26 is
misplaced. In that case, there was only a discrepancy between the applicant’s estimate
of his income in his application and that declared by him during his direct testimony. In
the present case, respondent is not at all listed on the payroll of his parent’s business,
where he is supposed to be its general manager. As a result, there is absolutely no basis
for the correct determination of his income; instead, he invites Us to conveniently rely
on his income tax returns and his unilateral declarations. As We have earlier said, if We
are to believe them, then still, they are insufficient to generate a conclusion that
respondent is carrying on a lucrative trade; he cannot support his family from his
declared income.
Moreover, respondent’s admitted false declaration under oath contained in the August
2001 deed of sale that he is a Filipino citizen – which he did to secure the seamless
registration of the property in the name of his wife – is further proof of respondent’s lack
of good moral character. It is also a violation of the constitutional prohibition on
ownership of lands by foreign individuals. His defense that he unknowingly signed the
deed is unacceptable. First of all, as a foreigner living in a foreign land, he should
conduct himself accordingly in this country – with care, circumspect, and respect for the
laws of the host. Finally, as an educated and experienced businessman, it must be
presumed that he acted with due care and signed the deed of sale with full knowledge of
its import.
Having decided in the foregoing manner, We must conclude the instant case and
disregard the other issues and arguments of the parties; they are deemed irrelevant and
will not alter the conclusion arrived at. As far as this Court is concerned, respondent has
failed to satisfy the law which renders him completely undeserving of Filipino citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The November 29, 2011 Decision and March 7,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91213 are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The September 24, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 96 in Nat. Case/Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251 is likewise ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and the respondent’s Petition for Naturalization in said case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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--------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201
0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the
Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for
finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely
a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S.
passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an
Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a
citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed
a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and
national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in
his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April
2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back
in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available
Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the
following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to
present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the
following documents as evidence:
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in
his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that
Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in
2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations
Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of
Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April
1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado
has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as one
for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was
dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
contention," whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.x x x x
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real
intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his
claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As
noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not
continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C.
Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.
The Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the
ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said
Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting
of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has
substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship
is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any
act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time,
and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over
the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto,
which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the
winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his
Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that
intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a
second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be
prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6
of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose
qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if
no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the
second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the
dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as
one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period
prescribed by law, having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May
2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division
and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent
embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another
country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine
Citizen again.x x x x
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen
prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US
passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First
Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized
citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not
natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original
citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose
to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a
natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to
repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case
at bar.x x x x
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport.
Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18,
2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he
was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a
certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the
following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010,
March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use.
As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is
within his control during that time.

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the
use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more
appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by
birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this
assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the
instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed
to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of
clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his
allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the
afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only
his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was
obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once
any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If
a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after
his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that
respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure
to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having
received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held
that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but
was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate
the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional
and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to
breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified
to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that
Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC
En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US
passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that
Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First
Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability
of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed
reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is
disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed
seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public
office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not
yet been any proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En
Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling
contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado,
considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be
considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First
Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that
case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this
provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC
En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the
exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC are present and
therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive
Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be
sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality.
It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the
disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.x x x
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took
the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that
after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run
for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July
2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his
Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American
citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to
run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal
question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public
office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run
counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect
declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen,
with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed
at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the
ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of
his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he
was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it
is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a
former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a
local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political
rights and privileges of the United States of America."
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted
to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for
an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath
of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the
other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He
was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven
days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American
passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue
to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."
This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No.
9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running
for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has
earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a
foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of
which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who
sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation
does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of
Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before
the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from
June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in
possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact
that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of
candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine
passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While
those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those
who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign
citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and
undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding
the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once
again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses
to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to
fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent,
Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and
Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible
in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June
4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition
for seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is
the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was
comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because
of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office.
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast
between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of
fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a
person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared
to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater
number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding
the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no
question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the
ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the
election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in
favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstances of a single individual. (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is
not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we
have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility
of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction
being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge
exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected
president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June
1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer
cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge
exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected
municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said
order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect;
and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show
cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be
entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a
legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one
process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it
is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to
another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops
the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest
number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner.
By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place,
but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he
may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and
duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The
number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met
before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for
and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets
forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our
election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be
proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when
we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased
by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state. (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC where the
Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without
qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements."
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a
sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main
issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while
provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections,
to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang
v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our
above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and
application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law
and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide
a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing
the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s
eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of
the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally
susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what
should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the
resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates
may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure
any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC,
concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any
disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and
win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by
ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken
through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy.
When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot
is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral
anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55
that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must
also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks
any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are
well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast
their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further
complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed
second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the
vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of
no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the
proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because
Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only
filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already
proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship.
It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify
the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed,

Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of
candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy
is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal
effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to
be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted.
This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on
Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League
of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President,
Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission
on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on
January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to
his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was
not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the
case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another
Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we
issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC
and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a
naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of
the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be
elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections
was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy
and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition
were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten
days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they
received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a
proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his
personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.

Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that
Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office
in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of
Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the
Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and
Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of
Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's
incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support
he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German
national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been
obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself
before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization created for
the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate
of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation.
Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested
him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his
Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to
disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has
decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will
after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot permit
this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of
public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this
question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials.
However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC
through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a
foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after consultation with the public
respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC
itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court
and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in
accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the
aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of
the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic
question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution
that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at
all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that
a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself
as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of
such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District
Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was
naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization
No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his
answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of
protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the
United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of
the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was
coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his
naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and
some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do
they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They
did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who
solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or
which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of
the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in
exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils
of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of
effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality
Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be
treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of
personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities
which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the
nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most
closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he
applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak
of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in
Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested
Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German
national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of
Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict
between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is
involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming
Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a
citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We
can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section
1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law
who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein
whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he
has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should
be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture
did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a
result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because
the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to
suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-
fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would
allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned
citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance
to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by
simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law
envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by
legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to
prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator
were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to
her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was
discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly
thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was
elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship.
If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored
by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be
treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is
gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and
limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to
welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade
must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby
declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this
decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9,
1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher
interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural
infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see
how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to
continue holding the office of Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a
protest — whether quo warranto or election contest — is mandatory and jurisdictional.
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and
proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election
results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period
fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the
results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the
settlement of such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to
file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which
works a forfeiture of his office. However, where the Solicitor General or the President
feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court
should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien
holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the
many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-day period should be applied
strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to
wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the
total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his
Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher
interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural
infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see
how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to
continue holding the office of Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a
protest — whether quo warranto or election contest — is mandatory and jurisdictional.

As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and
proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election
results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period
fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the
results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the
settlement of such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to
file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which
works a forfeiture of his office. However, where the Solicitor General or the President
feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court
should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien
holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the
many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-day period should be applied
strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to
wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the
total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his
Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into
the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City.
The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or
not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter,
considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition
itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an
indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings
to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is
shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no
question that this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on
January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on
January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on
February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself
alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee
was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of a Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility
or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the
election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section
5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that —
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment
of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research
fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing
fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings
of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals.
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In
fact he says, it was flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for
Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining
Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation
controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected
although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to
treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19,
serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that
date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC
regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election
protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the
Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988,
seven days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section
4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed
his petition with the COMELEC.

In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not
require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before
that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and
February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent counters that the latter
resolution was intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not
apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-
mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988,
following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on
January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. — The rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after
their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for
quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid
during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was
treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the
payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that
the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already
effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No.
1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the
February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or
after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Tañada v. Tuvera when he argues that the resolutions became
effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We
held in that case that publication was still necessary under the due process clause
despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there
may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true
that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a
precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Asuncion, however this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of
that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the
payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance
therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above prescribed are not
paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may
dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto
should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the
same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is
regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for
public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less
important consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner
is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his
citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early
resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public
interest, we shall directly address it now in this same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear
that our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in
question should indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the extended pleadings of
both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice may not be
timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical ground alone. We
have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably and
comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually competent
counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by broadening the
scope of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enough
basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing,
however, with procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits
of their respective claims.
xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby
allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the
respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been
pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and
follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37)
which states:
... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only
to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to
this Court. (p. 43)

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the
rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring the
case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will not
change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and,
to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See
Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v.
Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco
v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).lâwphî1.ñèt
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal
of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our
judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court
should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing
Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of
justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality.
xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On
many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court
for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by
the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case
or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties.
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat
for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as
"its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino
citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by
reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by private
respondent still pending before it?
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of
this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the
question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on
Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines.
The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on
September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with
Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner
Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of
the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner
Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until
representations shall have been made with the Australian Embassy for official
verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago
and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC,
there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a
citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred
from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport,
and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the
Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines,
that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his
naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate
of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by
the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby
provide the following statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April
1984 in regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO
(SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the
Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not
required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted
Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must
take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath
of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily
have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of
his former country.

C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27
June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50
of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading
information of a material nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If
such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under
Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian
citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under
Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and
voluntary act other than marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian
citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN
THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private
respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows:
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry
made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in
Canberra has elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either
swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a
renunciation of "all other allegiance.
Very truly yours,
or the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian
reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs
and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia
and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which
declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that
I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of
Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the
Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he
deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to
the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was
an alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16
He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former
Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. He
also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn
statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the
barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner.
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes"
that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the
members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is
not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone
the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses
Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the
doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to
questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does
not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private
respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of
parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or
finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and
positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen.
As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or
made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance,
he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a
dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious
argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization
in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which
are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under
Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous,
that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between
him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and
freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the
citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently
rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the
record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to
any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown
that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for
the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we
must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18,
1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the
Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate
for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in
material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in
the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident
therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and
able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that
should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a
"resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for
his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of
that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the
belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the
election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These
qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place
on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections decided
in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default.
That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then with three dissenting
and another two reserving their vote. One was on official leave.

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, Which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in
Topacio vs. Paredes was supported by ten members of the Court without any dissent,
although one reserved his vote, another took no part and two others were on leave.
There the Court held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
Idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared
to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-
eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as
such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities,
God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this
precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other
attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to
renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more
allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with
open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by
it as an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of
re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total
and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by
election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio
City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of
Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining
order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.,concurring:
As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989)
and inspire of what would otherwise be insuperable procedural obstacles, I am
constrained to concur in the Court's decision so forcefully and felicitously written by Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so because I cannot see how the Court can countenance a
citizen of a foreign country or one who has renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the
mayor of one of the most important cities in the Philippines.
What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to inquire
into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to
sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for further
proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7, Article IXA of the
Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty day from receipt of a
copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner's citizenship has been rendered and no
decision can, as yet, be elevated to us for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement in
Frivaldo that my concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty
but not to any of the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring
opinion.
Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing to me because I am
impressed by the singular achievements in the beautification of Baguio City, in the peace
and order situation, and in the resurgence of civic pride so visible to anyone who has
gone up to Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed the mayorship. However, I see no other way
this case can be resolved except by adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute
that a non-citizen cannot be the mayor of Baguio City. I join the rest of the Court.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.,concurring:
As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989)
and inspire of what would otherwise be insuperable procedural obstacles, I am
constrained to concur in the Court's decision so forcefully and felicitously written by Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so because I cannot see how the Court can countenance a
citizen of a foreign country or one who has renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the
mayor of one of the most important cities in the Philippines.
What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to inquire
into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to
sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for further
proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7, Article IXA of the
Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty day from receipt of a
copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner's citizenship has been rendered and no
decision can, as yet, be elevated to us for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement in
Frivaldo that my concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty
but not to any of the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring
opinion.
Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing to me because I am
impressed by the singular achievements in the beautification of Baguio City, in the peace
and order situation, and in the resurgence of civic pride so visible to anyone who has
gone up to Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed the mayorship. However, I see no other way
this case can be resolved except by adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute
that a non-citizen cannot be the mayor of Baguio City. I join the rest of the Court.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs. MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO
HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO,
respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court
on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After
manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a
return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the
return. 2 Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The
parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10
November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed
of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and
(2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24
November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the
aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for
issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on
5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7
December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December
1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the
CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set
case for oral argument on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by
petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for
release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a
vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988
is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist
from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the
Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule
on petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5
December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13
December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14
December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988.
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December
1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13 and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order
dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible
period of three (3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why he should
still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a
Portuguese passport.

Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December
1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988.
Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift
temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport
in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment
before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine
citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese
passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith
and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of
Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In
Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21 express renunciation was held
to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed
or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after
he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special
Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said
TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
citizenship. The material facts are not only established by the pleadings — they are not
disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and
superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by
the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has
failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine
citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look
into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued
Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed
when required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the
petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second
paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is
DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This
Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not meet the
traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner herein is
being effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and
upon pieces of documentary evidence that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial
and probative for the purpose and conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that
"(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures
according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f, however,
in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims citizenship and supports the claim
by substantial evidence, he is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial,
as distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United States ex
rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial under the more
rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers
being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said powers of
review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the light of
the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority to be
inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino
citizenship; Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence and not left to
inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a Filipino of his
citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from being
the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this
reason, I believe that a petition for denaturalization should have been filed and
prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut methods we are sustaining in
the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause,
and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government power find their
fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable
characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according
to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court should
not stand in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where
a person pleads with all his might that he has never formally renounced his citizenship
and that he might die if thrown out of the country, he deserves at the very least a full
trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored and all the facts fully
ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a
Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary
proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal evidence as
that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his
citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of another country
(assuming that other country does not reject him because he formally renounced
citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the
Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto express
renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for convenience,
employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a
Filipino. Or he may do so because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship.
Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is
conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most summary nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been given alien
certificates of registration by our Commission on Immigration and Deportation or who
have in the past, performed acts even more indicative of "express renunciation" than the
mere use of a passport or the signing of a commercial document where a different
citizenship has been typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent
Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be immediately deported for lack of
lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative
determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of voters
who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of
facts and to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being
denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I .
therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome the
presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of
a Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its nationals.
The petitioner has not shown that he comes under the exception and was granted the
Portuguese passport despite his Philippine citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced
his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager.
Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No.
63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in deportation
proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss of
petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence on record, consisting
of the photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner
applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986
and photocopies of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as
Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind, do
not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino
citizenship by express renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such
renunciation.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not meet the
traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner herein is
being effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and
upon pieces of documentary evidence that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial
and probative for the purpose and conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that
"(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures
according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f, however,
in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims citizenship and supports the claim
by substantial evidence, he is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial,
as distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United States ex
rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial under the more
rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers
being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said powers of
review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the light of
the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority to be
inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino
citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence and not left to
inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a Filipino of his
citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from being
the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this
reason, I believe that a petition for denaturalization should have been filed and
prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut methods we are sustaining in
the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause,
and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government power find their
fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable
characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according
to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court should
not stand in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where
a person pleads with all his might that he has never formally renounced his citizenship
and that he might die if throw out of the country, he deserves at the very least a full
trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored and all the facts fully
ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a
Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary
proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal evidence as
that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his
citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of another country
(assuming that other country does not reject him because he formally renounced
citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the
Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto express
renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for convenience,
employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a
Filipino. Or he may do so because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship.
Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is
conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most summary nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been given alien
certificates of registration by our Commission on Immigration and Deportation or who
have in the past, performed acts even more indicative of "express renunciation" than the
mere use of a passport or the signing of a commercial document where a different
citizenship has been typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent
Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be immediately deported for lack of
lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative
determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of voters
who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of
facts and to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being
denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I .
therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome the
presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of
a Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its nationals.
The petitioner has not shown that he comes under the exception and was granted the
Portuguese passport despite his Philippine citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced
his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager.
Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No.
63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in deportation
proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss of
petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence on record, consisting
of the photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner
applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986
and photocopies of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as
Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind, do
not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino
citizenship by express renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such
renunciation.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be
declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in
three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to
hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his
lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the
votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be
deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the
most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly
to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take
over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in
the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and
upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission
on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995,
petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as
SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public
office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the
Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent
is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is
NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is
canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the
May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes
obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying
for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on
June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly,
at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No.
95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his
own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took
his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21,
1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of
governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was
not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having
garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of
governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to
GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the
completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of
Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of
the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and
the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this
resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February
26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining
order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the
parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the
following propositions"15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to
warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing
condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of
Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of
petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of
which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying
Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the
ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995
suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However,
Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not
rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the
election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition
for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by
law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755
since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the
ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the
province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his
lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor?
If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC
No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election
protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of
existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in
promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming
the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period
referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days
before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal
issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day. x x x xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he
possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and
during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act
of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives"
due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his
attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial
and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor
by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections,
57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was
judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging
his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the
people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot.
Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode
of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the
Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he
lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause
(in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of
allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not
disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the
duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30
p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number
of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which
we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions
of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or
Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which
the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best
leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in
her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino
directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your
functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270
dated April 11, 1975, as amended."
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics
be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is
obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her
memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or
impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On
the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are
not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise
of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed
to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for
repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725
but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring
the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in
terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any
other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 .
. . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a
judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his
application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on
August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special
Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee
started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the
FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that
there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the
Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such
allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were
considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a
Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that
the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such
proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under
P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In
fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not
unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into
Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who
is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his
province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was
made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could
not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-
establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to
offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were
granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of
favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of
Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and,
failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the
date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision
in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution
require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office." Obviously,
however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court
held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office
should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now
directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must
consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure
that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people
and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his
term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 --
the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he
was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was
already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the
purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then
should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of
the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he
is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing
this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as
applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34
to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the
candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section
39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a
citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less
a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If
the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent
with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made
citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands
to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a
VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that
the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"),
not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a
voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be
elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective
official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence,
registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words,
the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is
actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed --
that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has
been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct
on May 8, 1995."
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo
has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then
he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court
dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in
all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995."
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from
the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter,
presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the
ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that
authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility
arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days
after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the
issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the
very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was
already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the
afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding
elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage.
Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions40 to this
general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it
CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public
officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their
intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with
some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are
necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative
statutes are "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing
existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to
render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies
or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not
come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against
the retrospective operation of statutes
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides
for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D.
725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law
(C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands
or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the
1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution
does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took
effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire
Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to
P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right
in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but
now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of
P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome
process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire
their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation
The Solicitor General argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since
they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo
vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos
vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization
law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate
only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid
procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations
and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is
unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive
operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the
intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was
meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered
by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is
a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in
the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D.
725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute
must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted,
so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in
the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct,
unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions
on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725
benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo
lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation
even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be
given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor,
August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of
the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and
exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation
granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date
of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no
showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would
result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will
result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or
breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality
should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice
to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special
Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any
substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo --
having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes
outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail.
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and
grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same
were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the
likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to
repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is
possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his
to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and
accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that
is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated,
should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in
treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his
application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of
the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or
the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20,
1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter
would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated
-- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration
as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any
elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim --
when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to
his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when
he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA
No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995
"became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order
having been issued by this Honorable Court. Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the
elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment
disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now
concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and
executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his
political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from
running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final
and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second
Division) in its assailed Resolution:
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections.
However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as
a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of
June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme
Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This
declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by
law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, we held
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in
SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be
entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but
that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6,
1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's
"recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample
power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of
dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably
recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs.
COMELEC, we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that
pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the
winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463;
Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This
rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at
all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of
the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA
883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was
filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec
correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue:Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact remains that he (Lee)
was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a
second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this
Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and
none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate,
much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo
was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992
to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying
due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and
subject to the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in
this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992
when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on
election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which
reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in
1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he
was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the
electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other
words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their
voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-
governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was,
to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is
the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his
citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995
elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently
erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered
beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election
Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on
December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his
election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications
even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a
suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a
suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not
a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64
viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine
citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing
Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this
Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen.
We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as
discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration
as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his
disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question
the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of
a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then
states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really
have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295
that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were
invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as
prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646
authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In
spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely
directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS
G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a
petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period
prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the
Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the
fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by
the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond
the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.

Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that
such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even
the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring
citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for
purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is
settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988
or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining
who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are
not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who
are its own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is:
the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not
been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such
finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in
all three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for
being an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence
for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post
facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court
were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections.
How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that
the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by
candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the
latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official"
while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were
intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have
said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if
Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election
day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in
pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation
on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after
taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however
that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the
applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or
repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective"
in reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice
Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were
already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to
uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT
the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so
it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of
how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the
spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice;
in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the
voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed,
to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute
unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to
be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed
expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have
been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial
or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and
the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to
give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he
abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up
his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of
Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been
proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted
to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been
validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with
our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or
disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein
our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt,
political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (citations omitted).
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and
refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would
give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause
elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In
this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The
Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold
him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a
voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the
Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent
dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But
the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as
a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled
against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms
of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent
with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought
to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him
three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his
nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact
and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to
re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty
to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of
justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the
world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once
more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal
interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over
and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve
to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of
the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
In any event, it has no merit.
No costs
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people
and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is
the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time
and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this
reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus,
section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973
and 1935 Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been cherished
by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it
a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of
government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed
republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its
Filipino framers
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more
people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime
duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also
provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . .
." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations.
Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit
and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ."
All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our
people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions
are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our
Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be
supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente
Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal
theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The
first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively
its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what
it should do at any given time."5 Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified definition
of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The
U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for
it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are
delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by
whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished
from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains: xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is
not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of
republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps
of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf,
serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option
of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government
whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to
the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the people" they are sworn to serve.
The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion
of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is
indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time.9 For
this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only
some of them can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our laws.
Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates vote
for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our
municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our
President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our governors,
only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for
our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the
sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty
has been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people
of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their
governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly
choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering the
uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of
citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this
legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools
of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the
qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the
candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the
office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult
question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of
thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for
this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill
effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo
continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without
transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts
have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see
how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the
votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot
prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due respect, the
analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of
our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of
Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the
list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo
was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has
not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of citizenship.
Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be
disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of
Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory
of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For
three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times,
he was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him
as their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support
for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave
him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then,
Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we
should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the
sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will
of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised
citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
authority."11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the
highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of
the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We
cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join
him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground
that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed"
P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of
the latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to
further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as
amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and
regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other
conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of
Instruction No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836
dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17,
1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related
laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No.
270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is
one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
repatriation and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI
No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said
decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27
March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress
established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March
1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative
power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as
P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by
naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of
Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these
subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the
Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to
accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival
of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the
President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that
Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of executive
power, lift the cease and desist order nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee.
A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's application for
repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of
citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement
must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed
upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-
assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office
of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the
citizenship requirement.

In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local
officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous,
as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which
requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a
victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective -
- not elected -- local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS;
under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins
with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of
candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age
on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of
age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day (emphasis
supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates
for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be
construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the
commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the
citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be
satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself.
Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic
qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE
BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE."
This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of
suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the
possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881)
expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter.
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988
and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be
elected as such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174
SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]).
This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it
void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a
COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his
voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a
registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing
that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in
obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino
citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither act
made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary,
said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's
registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said
judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order
cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of
registration as a voter which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction
Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the
piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and abet the
COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to
vote.

The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be
reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the
ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from
proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's
ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of
a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that
any material representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false.
Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must
state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the
qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any
time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section
reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768
[1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file
the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the
election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days
from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of
the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that
any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo
warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed
within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a
petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation."
Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate. Xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the
ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer
is provided in Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of
the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from
the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a
certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the
contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be
based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7
of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to
disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of
Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification
cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the
periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed,
such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory
because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions
for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies
Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority
to continue hearing the case after the election, and during the pendency of the case,
suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against him is
strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25,
1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in
support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such
goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that
acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege.
Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a)
Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason
of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63).
P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the
termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their
Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation
takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the
decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the
oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the
filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first
Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally
rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act
meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also
mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for
naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which
both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No.
725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No.
725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and
adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to curative
statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect
sought to be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature might have
dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws,
and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to carry into effect that
which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid
that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO,
Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the
marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of
natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of
citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a
new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely
remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not
have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover,
it has also been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating
to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3,
Third ed. [1943], §5704 at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial
statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly
provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself
unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance
retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be
said insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For
under the laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an American national
until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995,
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the
Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who is a
national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his
nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration
Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America, Third ed.,
[1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the
commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per
Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz., (a)
as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory
that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was
disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in
accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
V
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis
of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is
based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or
abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never
did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their
nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire
another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose
country does not give them protection outside their own country, and who are
commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict
of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the
Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by
Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law." However, it has
not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its
national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he
sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the
said Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people
power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-
God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section
1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections
5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1,
4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article
XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life
(Article II, Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond
what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's
sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers
exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is
quite clear on this, thus:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the
sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people
as one people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as
the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine
their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In
such a case, this Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of the
State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may
consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive
branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are
opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a
municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must
not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More
concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and
take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives,
then those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the people of
Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of
rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of
peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing
upon the people of a mere political subdivision that which the Constitution places in the
entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply
because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e.,
a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the
former, then this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside,
for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and
naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding
decisions of this Court affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No.
120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people
and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is
the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time
and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this
reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus,
section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973
and 1935 Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been cherished
by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it
a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of
government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed
republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its
Filipino framers.
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more
people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime
duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also
provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . .
." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations.
Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit
and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ."
All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our
people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions
are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our
Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be
supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente
Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal
theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The
first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively
its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what
it should do at any given time."5 Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified definition
of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The
U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,7 where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for
it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are
delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by
whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished
from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is
not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of
republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps
of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf,
serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option
of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government
whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to
the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the people" they are sworn to serve.
The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion
of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is
indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time. For
this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only
some of them can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our laws.
Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates vote
for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our
municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our
President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our governors,
only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for
our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the
sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty
has been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people
of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their
governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly
choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering the
uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of
citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this
legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools
of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the
qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the
candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the
office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult
question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of
thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for
this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill
effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo
continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without
transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts
have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see
how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the
votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot
prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due respect, the
analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of
our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of
Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the
list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo
was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has
not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of citizenship.
Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be
disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of
Sorsogon.

In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory
of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For
three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times,
he was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him
as their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support
for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave
him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then,
Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we
should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the
sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will
of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised
citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
authority."11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the
highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of
the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We
cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join
him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground
that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed"
P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of
the latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to
further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as
amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and
regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other
conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of
Instruction No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836
dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17,
1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related
laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No.
270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is
one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
repatriation and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI
No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said
decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27
March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress
established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March
1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative
power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as
P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by
naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of
Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these
subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the
Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to
accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival
of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the
President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that
Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of executive
power, lift the cease and desist order nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee.
A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's application for
repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of
citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement
must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed
upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-
assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office
of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the
citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local
officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous,
as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which
requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a
victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective -
- not elected -- local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS;
under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins
with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of
candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age
on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of
age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day (emphasis
supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates
for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be
construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the
commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the
citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be
satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself.
Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic
qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE
BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE."
This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of
suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the
possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881)
expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter.
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988
and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be
elected as such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174
SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]).
This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it
void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a
COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his
voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a
registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing
that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in
obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino
citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither act
made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary,
said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's
registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said
judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order
cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of
registration as a voter which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction
Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the
piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and abet the
COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to
vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be
reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the
ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from
proclamation and not earlier.

I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's
ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of
a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that
any material representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false.
Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must
state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the
qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any
time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section
reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768
[1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file
the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the
election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days
from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of
the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that
any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo
warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed
within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a
petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation."
Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate.xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the
ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer
is provided in Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of
the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from
the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a
certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the
contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be
based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7
of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to
disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of
Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification
cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the
periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed,
such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.

I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory
because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions
for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies
Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority
to continue hearing the case after the election, and during the pendency of the case,
suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against him is
strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25,
1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in
support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such
goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that
acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege.
Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a)
Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason
of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63).
P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the
termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their
Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation
takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the
decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the
oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the
filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first
Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally
rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act
meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also
mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for
naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which
both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No.
725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.

Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No.
725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and
adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to curative
statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect
sought to be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature might have
dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws,
and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to carry into effect that
which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid
that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO,
Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the
marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of
natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of
citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a
new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely
remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not
have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover,
it has also been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating
to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3,
Third ed. [1943], §5704 at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial
statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly
provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself
unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance
retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be
said insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For
under the laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an American national
until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995,
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the
Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who is a
national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his
nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration
Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America, Third ed.,
[1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the
commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per
Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz., (a)
as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory
that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was
disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in
accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
V
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis
of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is
based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or
abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never
did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their
nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire
another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose
country does not give them protection outside their own country, and who are
commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict
of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the
Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by
Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law." However, it has
not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its
national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he
sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the
said Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people
power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-
God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section
1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections
5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1,
4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article
XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life
(Article II, Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond
what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's
sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers
exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is
quite clear on this, thus:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the
sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people
as one people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as
the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine
their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In
such a case, this Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of the
State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may
consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive
branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are
opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a
municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must
not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More
concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and
take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives,
then those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the people of
Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of
rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of
peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing
upon the people of a mere political subdivision that which the Constitution places in the
entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply
because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e.,
a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the
former, then this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside,
for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and
naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding
decisions of this Court affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No.
120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.