PHILOSOPHICAL TOPfCS

Volume XIII, No. 3, Fall 1985

Freedom and the Problems 01 Evil

ERIC KRAEMER and HARDY JONES
University 0/ Nebraska

Introduction
The main argument against the existence of an all-powerful, all-Ioving
and all-knowing deity is what is known as the problem of evil. This problem
is succinctly stated by Philo in David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Nat-
ural Religion as folIows: I
Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is
he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and
willing? Whence then is evil?
The problem, according to Philo, is how we can suppose that the existence
of evil is consistent with the existence of the sort of deity accepted by the
traditional theist. For it would seem that such a deity, if he or she were
all-powerful, all-good and all-knowing, would not permit all the evil that
does exist in the world. Alvin Plantinga has recently claimed, in response
to Philo and his followers, that: 2
The Free Will Defense ... shows that the existence of God is com-
patible, both logically and probabilistically, with the existence of
evil; thus it solves the main philosophical problem of evil.
We argue that Plantinga has not successfully dealt with the difficulties that
Philo raises.

I. The Contradiction Problem of Evil

Suppose we are asked to answer the question, "What is the problem
of evil?" A difficulty in putting the question this way is that the questioner
seems to assume that there is only one problem of evil. Suppose we state
one problem, and it becomes possible to solve it. Some might then be led

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to believe that the existence of evil in the world poses no further philo-
sophical difficulty for the rational theist. (The rational theist claims that
there are no overwhelmingly strong reasons for rejecting the claim that
there is an all-powerful, all-good, and all-knowing creator ofthe universe.)
The reason why the question, "What is the problem of evil?", is mis-
leading in that there seem to be a number of claims about evil that pose
problems for the rational theist.
Once we suppose that there may be several problems of evil we are
naturally led to ask what they are and whether any of them constitutes a
serious philosophical difficulty for the cause of rational theology. Let us
now, therefore, consider several answers to the question "What is a prob-
lem of evil?"
Philo says:3
Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely.
From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he
is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is
almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short,
so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed
all human capacity , and that our common measures of truth and
falsehood are not applicable to them ... (our emphasis)
One natural interpretation of this passage is that the existence of evil is
logically incompatible with the existence of the deity that the rational theist
accepts. Several recent philosophers have taken the problem of evil to be
precisely this claim. 4 This problem is the one towards which Plantinga
directs much attention. Let us call this problem the contradiction problem
of evil, for it states that the existence of God and the existence of evil are
logically incompatible.
Although this claim is both clear and simple, it also seems to be false.
Plantinga stresses that there is no formal contradiction in asserting both
the existence of God and evil. 5 In order to see that this is the case we need
only imagine that there might be some small bit of evil which is required
for some greater good, so that God's creating the greater good requires
the slight evil as well.
A rational atheist might amend the simple lögical incompatibility charge
to include certain other obvious truths, so that a formal contradiction may
yet be derived. J .L. Mackie, for instance, says:6
the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need
some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-Iogical rules con-

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 necting the tenns "good," "evil," and "omnipotent." These ad-
ditional premises are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that
a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there
are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.
Tbus, according to Mackie, the set of propositions consisting of
(1) God (an all-good and omnipotent entity) exists
(2) Evil exists
(3) A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can
(4) There are no (physical) limits to what an omnipotent thing can
do
is fonnally inconsistent. Plantinga' s response is that there would be no
logical inconsistency involved in holding all four of these claims. For it
is possible that there is some evil that is logically required in order for
God to bring about some greater good. Philo agrees: 7
1 will allow, that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite
power and goodness in the Deity ...
Thus, the project of finding a set of necessary truths such that there
conjunction with the statement that evil exists yields a contradiction is a
difficult task. One reason for the difficulty is alluded to by another par-
ticipant in Hume's Dialogues, Demea: 8
This world is but a point in comparison of the universe: this life but
a moment in comparison of etemity. The present evil phenomena,
therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period
of existence. And the eyes of men being then opened to larger views
of things, see the whole connection of generaliaws, and trace, with
adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through the
mazes and intricacies of his providence.
Tbe basic tactic of theists such as Demea is to claim that humans have
only finite knowledge and experience of the world and that if we only
knew more we would understand the divine plan according to which every-
thing works out for the best. We refer to this claim as the Appeal to
Ignorance. Tbis claim may weIl be false, but it does support the idea that
the logical contradiction approach to the problem of evil will not be suc-
cessful. For this appeal seems coherent. It amounts to the claim that it is
possible that the evil that exists in the world is required for God' s making
this world a maximally good world. And we know of no good reason to
suppose that this claim is necessarily false.

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11. The Agnostic Problem of Evil
Even if we abandon the attempt to demonstrate the logical incompati-
bility of God' s existence and evil' s existence, there remain other problems
for the rational theist as regards the existence of evil and misery in the
world. The natural atheologian may argue that the existence of evil makes
it most difficult, if not impossible, to prove that God exists. Philo says:9
Is the world considered in general, and as it appears to us in this
life, different from what a man or such a limited being would,
beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise and benevolent Deity?
It must be astrange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence
I conclude, that, however consistent the world may be, allowing
certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a Deity,
it can never afford us an inference conceming his existence.
Plantinga suggests that the following version of the ontological argument
is sound: 10
(1) There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instan-
tiated.
(2) Necessarily, a being is maximally great only if it has maximal
excellence in every world.
(3) Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world.
(4) Therefore, there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally per-
fect being.
(5) Hence, God exists.
Plantinga admits that this argument is not "a successful piece of natural
theology, " because "it must be conceded that not everyone who under-
stands and reflects on its central premise-that the existence of a maximally
great being is possiJlIe-will accept it. " 11 Philo points out, in connection
with a house or a palace, that: 12
If you find many inconveniences and defonnities in the building,
you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn the ar-
chitect.
And, in connection with our understanding of evil, he says: 13
All that belongs to human understanding ... is to be sceptical, or at
least cautious; and not to admit of any hypothesis, whatever; much
less, of any which is supported by no appearance of probability .
Now this I assert to be the case with regard to all the causes of evil,

36
 and the circumstances on which it depends. None of them appear to
human reason, in the least degree, necessary or unavoidable; nor can
we suppose them such, without the utmost licence of imagination.
It seems clear that Philo and his followers would affirm that Plantinga's
initial premise is false. They would assert that it is obvious from our
experience of this world alone that:
(1 ') There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is not
instantiated.
And from this claim it follows by parity of reasoning that God (a necessary
being as conceived by the theist) does not exist.
Plantinga would, of course, reject (1 '). But it seems that he has no good
argument against (1 '). If we can give no good argument against Plantinga's
premise (1), then we will be left in astalemate. That is, if both (1) and
(1 ') are equally reasonable, then we would seem to have no conclusive
reason either to be rational theists or to be rational atheists. We should,
in such a case, be rational agnostics. But if we should be rational agnostics,
then this second version of the problem of evil-the claim that the existence
of evil makes proof of God's existence difficult or impossible-is vindi-
cated.

111. The Reasonability Problem of Evil

There is yet a further problem that evil may pose for the existence of
God. This is the claim that the existence of the evil that occurs in this
world makes it unreasonable to believe that God exists. Let us refer to
this claim as the reasonability version of the problem of evil. Suppose
we grant that there is no apriori argument against God's existence, so
that the logical contradiction versions of the problem of evil will not be
successful. One may still hold that our evidence as to the existence of the
amount and kind of suffering in the world makes it most unlikely that God
exists.
There is clearly no contradiction in the following set of claims: (1) God
exists, and (2) evil does not exist. We mayaiso suppose that some amount
of evil is required for the existence of greater good in the world. Let us
call this non-gratuitous evil. There is also no contradiction in this con-
junction of propositions: (1) God exists, and (2) gratuitous evil does not
exist. But it is plausible to suppose that there is gratuitous evil in the world.
An all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good entity, it is reasonable to be- ,

37
lieve, would prevent such gratuitous evil. So it is unreasonable to believe
that such an entity exists.
Philo seems to endorse this version of the problem of evil. He says: 14
What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say, that
these circumstances [on which all or the greatest part of natural evil
depends] are not necessary, and that they might easily have been
altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too
presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more
modest in our conclusions ... But let us still assert, that as this
[Divine] goodness is not antecedently established, but must be in-
ferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an
inference, while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as
far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject.
Concerning this claim Plantinga says15
How indeed could one argue, from the existence of evil, that it is
likely that God exists? I certainly don't see how to do it.
But the following remarks from Philo seem pertinent. 16
There seem to be four circumstances, on which depend aIl, or the
greatest part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures ... None of
them appear to human reason, in the least degree, necessary or
unavoidable.
These circumstances are 17
(i) There is no good reason for any individual to have the capacity
for pain in the world since it is "plainly possible to carry on the
business of life" without any pain.
(ii) The Deity might "extenninate aIl ill" without relying on any
causal processes in which pain served to notify an individual of
some danger.
(iii) Each individual could have been endowed with more powers to
,'guard against accidents, and secure the happiness and welfare
of the creature in the most unfortunate concurrence of circum-
stances. "
(iv) The "springs and principles of the great machine of nature"
could weIl be better adjusted to keep many individuals from
perishing from such natural occurrences as droughts and hur-
ricanes.

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 Consider an analogy. Suppose we were to observe a parent treating his
child in the following manner. Every day the parent viciously beats the
child for several hours. The parent also refuses to feed the child on a
regular basis, so that the child is severely undemourished. Suppose that
someone were to tell us that, contrary to what we might think, the parent
really is a very good parent who always acts in the child's interest. On
the basis of our knowledge of parenthood it would be reasonable to reject
this claim as unlikely, since it is contrary to our experience. Analogously
the theist's God, as creator of the universe, may be regarded as a kind of
parent to everyone. But is the condition of the world consonant with what
we would expect from a supremely good, powerful and wise parent? This
seems not to be the case. If any ordinary mortal were suddenly to acquire
enormous power and wisdom and goodness, then she would do something
to lessen the amount of suffering in the world. If even one person who
has been in pain for ten minutes had only been in pain for nine minutes
and fifty-nine seconds, this world would very likely have been better than
it iso To use Philo's phrase, "an indulgent parent" would, we have reason
to believe, have done things differently.18
Plantinga says that "the existence of God is neither precluded nor ren-
dered improbable by the existence of evil" because he thinks we have no
evidence against the claim that: 19
(6) All the evil in ... [this world] is broadly moral [i.e. human] evil;
and of all the worlds God could have created, none contains a
better balance of broadly moral good with respect to broadly
moral evil.
Let us suppose, he says, that there are 1018 turps (a unit of measure) of
evil. He contends that
(7) There are 10] 8 turps of evil.
does not disconfirm (6).20 Plantinga is correct but the point is of Httle
significance. Consider the following:
(8) God could have created a world in which there were (10 18 -1)
turps of evil and in which there was no less good than there is
in this world.
Now (8) seems to be a reasonable and modest claim, especially if we take
the attribute of omnipotence very seriously. It seems that any serious and
sensible person who reflects on (8) will find it compelling. But if (8) is
correct, or even just highly reasonable, then we do have some evidence

39
against Plantinga's claim (6).
If the theist remains intransigent, what can be said to resolve the issue?
One basic strategy has already been suggested. First, one should imagine
oneself as an all-powerful and all-knowing creature. Then one should
consider Philo's points as to how much evil might have been avoided in
the world. One should ask oneself whether one could probably have done
just a little better, by preventing even one of the 10 18 turps of evil while
maintaining as much of the good. Most people will be inclined to grant
some plausibility to the claim that since they could have done better, so
too could a creator of the universe. This approach, however, will not be
successful against the hardened theist.
A second strategy to remove the impasse is to examine Plantinga's
positive response to the problems of evil. Plantinga claims that 'the Free
Will Defense ... shows that the existence of God is compatible, both
logically and probabilistically, with the existence of evil. .. '. 21 He says22

A world containing creatures who are significantly free ... is more

valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free crea-
tures at alle Now God can create free creatures, but He can't cause
or determine them to do only what is right .... To create creatures
capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable
of moral evil .... The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong,
however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His
goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil
only by removing the possibility of moral good .... The heart of the
Free Will Defense is the claim that it is possible that God could not
have created a universe containing moral good (or as much moral
good as this world contains) without creating one that also contained
moral evil. And if so, then it is possible that God has a good reason
for creating a world containing evil.
We might note that what Plantinga calls the 'heart' of the Free Will Defense
is a form of the Appeal to Ignorance.
Is the defense successful? Does it really go beyond the appeal to ig-
norance? Does it provide a good reason for the existence of the evil in the
world? Many philosophers have objected that God could have created
people who freely always choose the good. 23 Plantinga's only response is
that it is possible that all people suffer from transworld depravity, which
means that they perform evil actions in every world in which they exist. 24
He needs to maintain the stronger claim that it is possible that, because

40
of the value of the free actions that occur in this World, God could not
have created a world in which there was a better balance of good over
evil. But is this a reasonable belief to hold? Again, it is difficult to believe
that the value gained through human freedom outweighs the great variety
and amount of evil. It is hard to see how the evil due to bone cancer, for
example, can be justified due to the greater good that human freedom
makes possible. Plantinga has seemingly failed to advance the theist's
position beyond Demea's original claim.
Plantinga's response might be that, although bone cancer is not reason-
ably attributed to human moral evil, the evil that results from such diseases
may be due to the free actions of non-human moral agents. 25 He follows
Augustine in asserting the possibility that there really is no such thing as
natural evil, evil due to non-moral causes, that what we call natural evil
may be the work of 'Satan and his cohorts'. 26 Thus, Plantinga may con-
clude, the Free Will Defense is not refuted by alleging the existence of
natural evil, for there may be no such thing as natural evil in the world.
But in order to support the conjecture that all evil is moral evil, it seems
that again the theist must ultimately rely on the Appeal to Ignorance. For
there are many kinds of instances of evil that do not seem to be caused
by the actions of moral agents of any sort.

Some Problems with Freedom

Tbere are more direct ways to attack the Free Will Defense. We may
certainly grant that, other things being equal, astate of affairs in which
there is human freedom is better than astate of affairs which lacks freedom.
But it does not follow that the presence of freedom always outweighs
whatever evil results from that freedom.
Let us again consider an important contribution from Philo: 27
A Being ... who knows the secret springs of the universe, might
easily, by particular volitions, turn all these accidents [upon which
all human life depends] to the good of mankind, and render the whole
world happy, without discoveling hirnself in any operation ... Some
small touches, given to CALIGULA' s brain in his infancy, might
have converted hirn into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than
the rest, by burying CAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the
ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind.
What is important about Philo's suggestion is that it would have presumably
taken little effort for God to have made some minimal changes in the world

41
with beneficial results. In our own day we can only wonder what small
touches given to the brains of Hitler and Stalin might have produced instead
of a legacy of evil and horror with which we are familiar. And surely, if
we had had it in our power to make these small adjustments and if we had
had the knowledge of what would result without such changes, we would
have gladly made these changes. Moreover, we probably would have feIt
morally required to do so. But if this is true of mere frail mortals, why is
it not reasonable to believe that God would have prevented the evil that
has resulted from not altering the brains of Hitler and Stalin? Wouldn't
that have been the morally right thing to do?
One may respond that we have failed to portray accurately the role that
God plays with respect to the etiology of evil. For atheist may argue that
God never deliberately causes evil, as does the parent who beats the child.
God, says the theist, only allows there to be evil in the world, because
without His doing so there could not be human freedom. He refrains from
preventing evil; but, again, this is because otherwise the world could not
contain the free decisions of free persons. And, of course, God is not
responsible for the bad consequences of those free decisions. So the parent
analogy distorts the theist's position and makes it appear more vulnerable
to attack than it really iso
This reply conveys an image of God's activity as passive with regard
to those actions that result in evils. Such an image of passivity and restraint
suggests a lack of responsibility for these evils. 28 There are good reasons,
however, for rejecting these suggestions.
The theist's reply rests on an overly strong moral dichotomy between
doing evils and allowing evils. Suppose that a child wishes freely to decide
to ride his tricycle on a major highway. Or suppose the child wishes to
make his own free decisions while walking through a dangerous obstacle
course. In both of these cases there are likely to be bad consequences,
both for the child and for others. There is, for instance, a high probability
of injury and death. But suppose the child's father allows the free choices
to be made. He believes that human freedom is very valuable; he does not
wish to interfere because any intervention would diminish the freedom that
he cherishes for the sake of his child. Suppose that terrible results ensue.
A "free will defender" of the parent might then say that the parent is not
responsible for these results. This disclaimer would be based on the claim
that the parent only a1lowed the evils to occur. He did not cause them;
he only refrained from preventing them. And he did so for good reasons-
freedom is of immense value.

42
 Should one accept this defense and conclude that the parent is good,
kind, and loving? We think it obvious that one should not. Such a parent
would be deemed irresponsible and would be held accountable for these
bad things. Though he would have been much worse had he caused the
evils, he is still morally culpable for allowing evils that were so easily
avoidable. He would have had to limit the child's freedom, but some such
limits are eminently reasonable. Indeed, a reason for so regarding them is
that one values human freedom. For ifthe child is left free in such instances
now, he will probably have (and, as things develop, does have) far less
freedom later. This may also be true for others who may suffer as a result
of the child' s free decisions.
Freedom is a value, but it is only one value among others. It is not the
case that it is always to be preferred to other values, such as life and
health. Moreover, as we have seen, we do not always value the freedom
at a certain time (the "freedom of the moment") above the possibly greater
quantities of freedom that it would render impossible. In this rejoinder we
take the theist's stress on freedom seemingly more seriously than he does
himself. For if freedom is of enormous importance, freedom at all times,
including future ones, is important. The "free will defense" theist seems
to undermine his own position by not countenancing fully enough the need
for all-Ioving beings to restrict freedom from time to time so as to maximize
freedom in the long rune The free will defense, strangely, sets freedom
absolutely above all other values. We have now seen that, paradoxically,
it also sets freedom above freedom itself.
There is another important rejoinder to the theist's reply to the parent
analogy. Let us concentrate on a slightly different dangerous obstacle
course example. We have so far considered the claim that God is not
responsible for evils that He passively allows in order to preserve human
freedom. The parent in our above example is also passive: he merely
refrains from preventing the child from getting on the course though weIl
aware of the perils that lurk there. According to traditional theism, how-
ever, God' s relation to the world is not quite like this. For God created a
world full of natural dangers and put human beings in it.
Now suppose a person builds an obstacle course and creates an ingenious
array of pitfalls with which one must risk confrontation. There are dangers
of all sorts-trap doors, alligator ponds, land mines, and pools of quick-
sand. This enterprising developer then decides to produce a child whom
he intends to place on the course and leave free to travel it precisely as
the child chooses. The child's paths will not be restricted even though he

43
may, if he wishes, solicit the guidance of the parent in whom he may
choose to place faith. (Even if he does this, though, there is no guarantee
that he will escape danger; for such a guarantee would diminish, says the
parent, the freedom that he cherishes). Suppose, however, that there is
one important way in which the child's freedom is restricted. He has no
alternative but to live his life on that course. He is not free to choose to
live even a portion of his life in a place that contains no perilous conditions.
We suggest that this is a better analogy for one who wishes to take the
claims of theism seriously. It is clear, we think, that in important ways
the parent is responsible for the evils that ensue even if there is a sense in
which he does not immediately cause them as they occur. (For example,
he does not actually push the child into the quicksand or place the child
directly into the mouth of an alligator). God is not the merely passive
respecter of human freedom that the theist pictures Hirn as being. And,
more importantly of course, neither is God, according to traditional theism,
merely passive. Indeed, He is approximately as passive or as active with
regard to evil and freedom associated with His human creatures as is the
parent with regard to the child.
This discussion suggests a related difficulty for free-will defense theists.
Thus far we have stressed certain evil consequences of free choices, es-
pecially the evil of lessened future freedom in the life of the one who
chooses. But what of the consequences of an agent's choices as they affect
the lives of others? It seems clear that if there is an all-powerful, all-
knowing being, He countenances serious losses of freedom that are caused
by the free decisions of others. His dominant, overriding purpose cannot
then be to preserve human freedom. The theist can, of course, reiterate
the claim that even though God knows that there will be such losses, He
does not actively cause them. He only allows them to occur. But why does
He?
As we have seen, the free-will defense theist does not have the rational
option of emphasizing God's concern to preserve freedom and free choice.
Presumably, all he can say is that it would be bad for God to interfere
with free decisions even to prevent future losses of freedom. This is strange
because some of those free decisions result in these future losses . The
theist must say, apparently, that restricting freedom is worse than allowing
severe losses of freedom through the restrictions of others. So it is not,
then, so much that freedom is the great value to be preserved; rather it is
that not restricting freedom is the great, seemingly dominant, value. It
is not clear why anyone should believe this to be true. Indeed, it is not

44
clearly even compatible with the ethics of traditional theism.
Here, however, the theist faces other serious difficulties. For, apparently,
God (if He exists) does limit and restrict human freedom. According to
traditional theism God has created the universe and its inhabitants. He has
arranged the organization of the world such that human beings are free to
do some things but not free to do others. Free choices take place among
a range of alternatives not themselves always within the full control of the
agent. Suppose a very weak person wishes to kill a very strong one. He
can freely choose, because he has both the ability and the opportunity, to
do one of several things: (1) shoot hirn, (2) stab hirn, or (3) poison hirn.
Free to do these things, he is not able to kill hirn by choking hirn with
bare hands. This is simply not one of his options. Presumably, however,
God could have arranged things differently: He could have organized the
world such that choking were a genuine alternative. It is, we may assurne,
not a bad thing that the potential murderer lacks this option. There is no
less value in the world than there would be were he able to choke his
victim.
It is natural, then, to ask about one of his actual alternatives-poisoning,
for instance. Would there be less overall value in the world if he were not
able freely to choose to poison his victim? It is difficult to see why one
should answer affirmatively. And one can ask similar questions about the
other means of murder. When one focuses on "free will" and "freedom
of choice" in this way, it becomes increasingly mystifying why the theist
insists on attaching such enormous value to the freedom to do evil. Suppose
our potential murderer were stripped of all means to kill his intended victim.
Would there be a serious moralloss? We think not. The same holds true
for other would-be murderers. Indeed, it is difficult to say why we should
not extend this line of reasoning to apply to all who wish to do evil.
What is surprising is that the theist must agree. For he must acknowledge
that there are many evil things that many human beings are not free to do.
They may want to do them, but they cannot. It is most implausible to
contend that human beings have been given "just the right amount" of
freedom, such that to have any less or any more would be bad. Presumably,
the theist will not fault God for the restrictions that He does impose. If
not, why is it not plausible to fault Hirn for not imposing more? (Of course,
in this context "to fault God" is to deny His existence or to contend that
it is improbable.)
The point that we emphasize here is an "external analogue" of one that
is more farniliar. It has often been suggested that a perfectly wise and kind

45
deity could have provided human beings with personalities that would
ensure that they freely choose good instead of evil. It is surely conceivable
that there exists somewhere a morally good finite person who, because of
superb ethical education and training, always does what is right. She
invariably chooses what is good; no evil consequences flow from her
decisions. There is no incoherence in the statement that she freely does
these good and right things. A correct "secular" explanation might be
that her parents inculcated attitudes, beliefs, dispositions, and motivations
that would maximally serve the ends of morality. There seems to be no
good reason why a perfectly wise and kind deity could not have provided,
using infinite creative ingenuity, such excellent moral character to free
creatures. There would then be a non-secular explanation for a world in
which both freedom and morality were co-existent. It would be a world
lacking in moral evil--evil the lack of which would not preclude freedom.
Our "external analogue" focuses on the alternatives among which free
persons choose. We suggest that it is conceivable that all free choices be
choices among alternatives none of which are bad. And we see no reason
why many of these free choices could not be valuable and significant. It
seems clear that a perfectly kind and wise deity could have structured the
alternatives for free choosers so as to yield these benign results. A person
might make several choices in the course of one day of his life. He chooses
between helping one of two persons; hurting someone is not one of his
options. He chooses between attending law school and attending medical
school. Enrollment in a school of crime is not one of his options. More
generally, for all of his choices, there are no evil options available to hirn.
Some of his decisions are trivial, but many of them are interesting, valuable,
and significant. We see no reason why he might not have a good and
meaningfullife. And we see no reason why all other free creatures could
not, under similar conditions precluding evil alternatives, also have good
and meaningfullives.
The free-will-defense theist may insist that good and meaningful lives
must contain some choices between good and evil. This theist is apparently
committed to the claim that freedom of this sort is of immense value. But
why should one believe it? If there is no moral value in evil, then what
is the value of having the ability and the opportunity to choose freely to
perpetrate evil? Note that the freedom to choose between good and evil
does not ineluctably lead to evil. For (a) one could freely choose to do
evil but be thwarted from actually producing evil, or (b) one could be free
to choose to do evil but have such a good character so as never actually

46
to choose it. The free-will-defense theist may reject (a) and (b) as insuf-
ficient for maximal value in a world. But then he is committed to something
far more controversial than either the claim that freedom is of immense
value or the claim that the freedom to choose evil is of immense value.
His commitment is, rather, to the claim that there is immense value in
freely producing the evil, or in there being the evil, that often results
from free choice. This claim is neither clearly defensible nor clearly com-
patible with the central tenets of such religions as Christianity.
The free- will-defense theist has not adequately confronted the challenges
posed by the existence of evil. He "defends" evil on the ground that there
is need for freedom. But since there could 00 vast varieties and quantities
of valuable freedom without evil, this defense is inadequate to defend
rational theism.
This general point may be usefully extended in another important di-
rection. Most theists will grant that certain human institutions of punish-
ment are morally justified. But one function cf institutions such as prisons
is to restrict certain people from acting on certain decisions. Habitual sexual
offenders, fanatical terrorists , and murderers for hire are all imprisoned if
they are found out. Such imprisonment clearly restricts the freedom of
such individuals. Most theists will also grant that there are cases in which
nations are justified in engaging in warfare with other nations. These
instances of justified war involve threats of dire consequences if war is
not waged. Indeed the evils they are designed to prevent are, it seems,
ones that ought to be prevented. But what is the aim of such warfare?
Clearly, its aim is to prevent certain people from performing certain actions
freely. So if the theist grants that imprisonment and war are sometimes
morally justified, then the theist must also admit that there are cases in
which it is morally permissible to restrict human freedom. Once this is
granted, it seems that God, too, is permitted to restrict human freedom in
certain cases. And it seems that if the evils that punishment and war are
designed to prevent could 00 prevented with less suffering and harm, then
they ought to 00. With His own methods, presumably not necessarily
involving punishment and war, God could have prevented them with less
suffering and harm. Unfortunately, there are many other instances in which
an omnipotent and omniscient OOing could have restricted human freedom
with much hetter results than those which occurred. Thus it seems rea-
sonable to suppose that there is no such entity who is also omnibenevolent.
Let us consider one final difficulty. It is consonant with traditional
Christianity to suppose that, if God exists, He has restricted human freedom

47
to do evil. 5uppose that of all the evils that free creatures have perpetrated,
there is one that is the worst. Now we may suppose further that, however
bad that action was, there were other merely possible actions that would
have been even worse. That is, it is possible that some action slightly
worse than the worst actual action was conceived, planned, and attempted
but not performed. It is reasonable to suppose that the explanation for this
failure is that, were there a perfectly wise and kind deity, this deity so
arranged the world that the action was prevented from occurring. Fur-
thermore , it is reasonable to suppose that it would have been permissible
and sensible for the deity to restrict the freedom of the frustrated agent,
the would-be perpetrator of this action. But now what of the actually worse
action, the realization of evil that did succeed? Was the freedom of its
agent so valuable that the wise and kind deity had to respect it? What
important difference could there have been between the allowed action and
the prevented action? Any intellectually conscientious free-will-defense
theist must respond to such questions . The same questions apply to the
next-to-worst actual action, the third worst action, and perhaps all the evil
actions that were ever performed. We have here the makings of a slippery
slope toward a far better world than our actual one.

Some Concluding Remarks

The reasonable conclusion is that Plantinga's Free Will Defense has no
more secure a foundation than Demea's Appeal to Ignorance. One who
uses such a defense has no good way to argue against someone who claims
that if only all the facts were known it would be clear that 5t. Francis is
no saint. No amount of known miracles would be adequate to defend any
saint. Thus the theist cannot consistently both (i) use the Appeal to Ig-
norance to reply to the problems of evil, and (ii) claim to have conclusive
evidence that certain plans of action are, on balance, for the worst or for
the best.
In sum, we hope to have shown that much more needs to be said before
the theist's position can be correctly considered as rationally acceptable.
There are still problems posed by evil that, we think, have not been
satisfactorily addressed. In particular, it seems clear to us that the all-too-
common resort to human freedom will not suffice to salvage rational
theism.

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 NOTES

I. David Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Nonnan Kemp Smith, (Bobbs-
Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1947), Part X, p. 198.
2. Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Eerdemans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1977),
p.64.
3. Dialogues, Book X, p. 201.
4. J .L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind, Vol. LXIV (1955), p. 200.
5. See God, Freedom and Evil, pp. 12-24. See also God and Other Minds, (Comell, Ithaca,
1967), Chapter 5.
6. Mackie, pp. 200-20 I.
7. Part X, p. 201. See also p. 205.
8. Part X, p. 199. For an interesting discussion of this strategy see R.M. Chisholm, "The
Defeat of Good and Evil," Proceedings and Addresses 0/ the American Philosophical
Association, Vol. XLII (1968-1969), pp. 21-28.
9. Part XI, 205.
10. God, Freedom and Evil, pp. 111-112.
11. Ibid., p. 112.
12. Part XI, pp. 204-205.
13. Part XI, p. 205.
14. Part XI, pp. 210-211.
15. God, Freedom and Evil, p. 61.
16. Part XI, p. 205.
17. Part XI, p. 206,208, 210.
18. Part XI, p. 208.
19. God, Freedom and Evil, p. 63. For further discussion of the probabilistic version of the
argument from evil, see Plantinga' s "The Probabilistic Argument from Evil," Philo-
sophical Studies 35 (1979), pp. I-53. Plantinga therein provides very pointed criticism
of current attempts to develop a theory of probability . His basic defense of the theist
position there too seems to be aversion of what we have called the Appeal to Ignorance.
20. God, Freedom and Evil, p. 63.
21. Jbid., p. 64.
22. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
23. See, e.g., Mackie, op. cit.
24. God, Freedom and Evil, p. 53ff. Cf. Hugh LaFollette, "Plantinga on the Free Will
Defense," International Journal 0/ Philosophy 0/ Religion, 11:123-132 (1980).
25. God, Freedom and Evil, pp. 61-62.
26. Ibid., p. 58.
27. Part XI, pp. 206-207.
28. Cf. John Hick, The Philosophy 0/ Religion (Prentice-Hall, Englewood-Cliffs, New Jer-
sey) 1963, Chapter 111.

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