Nuclear Zero in South Asia

Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia: a Realistic Narrative
Author(s): Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Source: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 22 (2011), pp. 75-97
Published by: Royal Irish Academy
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Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia: a Realistic
Narrative
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal*
Department of International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad,

Pakistan
ABSTRACT
President Obama's expressed desire about a nuclear-weapon-free world

unattainable in the prevailing global strategic environment. India and Pa
have adopted an apathetic approach towards the concept of Nuclear
because the intellectual and political movements in favour of a nu
weapons-free South Asia suffer from unconvincing rationales, inherent c
dictions and unrealistic expectations. New Delhi and Islamabad have fai
negotiate and execute a bilateral arms control agreement or treaty, which w
prevent a nuclear arms race and decrease the mistrust between them. Thus,
are continuing to produce fissile material and are manufacturing, testin
adding dual-capable ballistic/cruise missiles to their arsenals. The India-s
amendment in the Nuclear Suppliers Group export guidelines in Septem
2008 has further toughened Pakistan's stance in the Conference on Dis
ment on the idea of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
*The author wishes to thank the two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful and i
comments, and the copy editor, Ms Helena King, for her thorough review, thoughtful sugg
and above all constructive editing.
Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is Associate Professor at the School of Politics and Intern
Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, where he teaches various asp
Strategic Studies; International Security; Nuclear/Missile Proliferation; Arms Control/D
ment; and the Domestic and Foreign Policies of the country. He is also advisor o
proliferation to the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London. He was previously a
coordinator at the Foreign Services Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad. D
has also been a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad a
Islamabad Policy Research Institute, and frequently a guest speaker at the distinguishe
School, Oberammergau, Germany; Center of Excellence: Defence against Terrorism, A
Turkey; Pakistan's National Defence University; Intelligence Bureau Academy, Comman
Staff Cöllege Quetta; and the Foreign Service Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Af
Pakistan.
Author s e-mail: znjaspal@qau.edu.pk

Irish Studies in International Aj fairs, Vol. 22 (201 1), 75-97.
doi: 10.3318/ISIA.201 1.22.75
76 Irish Studies in International Affairs
INTRODUCTION
The nuclear non-proliferation regime has received a positive response f

international community during the past two years. On 5 April 2009 in a s
in Prague, President Obama disclosed his vision of a nuclear-weapo
world.1 This had the effect of invigorating genuine progress towards
non-proliferation, arms control/disarmament and nuclear infrastructure/m
rial safety and security. Subsequent developments - such as the adoption
Security Council resolution 1887 on 24 September 2009, 2 the signing of th
START arms reduction treaty on 8 April 2010 and its entry into for
February 201 1,3 the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC
13 April 2010 to discuss how better to safeguard weapons-grade pluton
uranium to prevent nuclear/radiological terrorism and the consensus a
on the final document of the eighth Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat
review conference on 28 May 20 104 - all had revived a serious discours
subject of nuclear terrorism. Nonetheless, despite these development
others to maintain and reinforce the NPT and various regimes and init
that complement it, including efforts to secure the entry into force
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)5 and the commencement of n
tions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that would ban
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes6, the tan
outcome is still awaited.
Thus, President Obama's expressed desire about a nuclear-weapon-free
world notwithstanding, complete nuclear weapons disarmament seems
'Ellen O. Tauscher, 'Obama's commitment', eJournal 15 (2) (February 2010), 5. See also
'Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradčany Square, Prague, Czech Republic', available
at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered (20 July 201 1); hereafter cited as Obama, 'Remarks in Hradcanv Square'.
Resolution 1887 (2009) on the maintenance of international peace and security and nuclear
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, was adopted by the Security Council at
its 6191st meeting, on 24 September 2009. The text of the resolution is available at: http://
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/N0952374.pdf?OpenElement (13 May
2010).
3The New START treaty requires the US and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic
arsenals by 30% below earlier limits and establishes a new and more intrusive system of
monitoring and verification that will increase predictability and stability. It does nothing,
however, to prevent nuclear proliferation - or to take the Russians down the 'road to zero', a
world without nuclear weapons. The text of the treaty is available at: http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/1 40035.pdf (20 July 2011).
4The text of the final document that emerged following the review conference, which took
place in New York on 3-28 May 2010, is available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol = NPT/CONF.20 10/50 (VOL.1) (20 July 201 1).
5The CTBT was negotiated in Geneva between 1994 and 1996; to date it has been signed by
182 countries and ratified by 144 of those, but in order for it to enter into force it must be signed
and ratified by 44 specific nuclear technology holder countries, and nine such ratifications are
outstanding. Further information is available at: http://www.ctbto.org/specials/who-we-are/ (20
July 2011).
6A factsheet about the proposed FMCT is available from the Center for Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation; see http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/
07 1 509_factsheet_fmct/ (20 July 2011).
Jaspal- Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia 11
unattainable in the prevailing global strategic environment. T

in the international Conference on Disarmament (CD)7 highl
ability of the perceived consensus on moving towards 'Glob
theless, the developments outlined above have encouraged pr
optimistic movement. Realistically, however, the movement
zero' has failed to receive substantial support in India or Pak
strategic environments discourage initiatives for their denu
Cortright and Raimo Väyrynen have pointed out that:
The nuclear competition in the region also involves China,
as a strategic rival. India seeks to gain strategic parity wi
neighbor, while Pakistan's nuclear program is entirely or
keeping pace with India.9
Therefore, instead of capping their nuclear weapons program
Islamabad have been augmenting their nuclear arsenals. The r
nuclear hot-spot due to India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrine
mutual distrust and the autonomous terrorist groups operat
Since the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests,
neighbours have come to the brink of full-scale war in 199
In addition, since November 2008, despite Islamabad's nume
New Delhi has remained adverse to resume the suspend
'Composite Dialogue' aimed at reaching agreement between
on issues such as Kashmir, nuclear weapons and terrorism.1
alarming strategic environment of course, demands serious
strategic discussion to chalk out a practical strategy to reduc
the region.
7The Conference on Disarmament is a body within the UN that was establ

single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international commu
For further information on the Conference see: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE6
BF 1 8ABFEFE5D344DC 1 256F3 1 003 1 1 CE9?OpenDocument (20 July 2011
Katz, 'No end seen to deadlock at Conference on Disarmament', Global Secur
2010; available at: http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100607_59
For a detailed discussion on the Conference on Disarmament stalemate, see Za
agenda in 2011: critical appraisal', Research Report no. 50, South Asian Strat
(London, 2011).
8'Global Zero' is an international movement established in 2008 to secure t
elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. The idea for an organisation pr
was sparked by a wave of private initiatives led by former US secretary of
former US secretary of defense William J. Perry, former US secretary of st
and former US senator Sam Nunn and numerous other former senior off
and security analysts in many countries. See below for further discussion o
9David Cortright and Raimo Väyrynen, Towards nuclear zero (London,
,()The Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, arrived m Islamabad o
the twelfth South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SA ARC
President of Pakistan Pervaiz Mushaaraf on the sidelines of SAARC sum
between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Mushaaraf resulted in the t
to hold a Composite Dialogue on bilateral relations in February 2004. The
India and Pakistan met on 18 February 2004, and this meeting started th
between India and Pakistan. The primary focus of the dialogue was on
between the belligerent neighbours, and among the issues to be dealt w
building measures, particularly a nuclear confidence building measure; settl
about Jammu and Kashmir; resolution of the Siachen Glacier, Wullar b
disputes; terrorism and drug trafficking; economic and commercial co-oper
of friendly exchanges. The Composite Dialogue was suspended by India on
response to the terrorist attacks on Mumbai.
TOWARDS NUCLEAR ZERO
The demand for a nuclear-weapon-free world is not a recent developme

very first resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assemb
London in 1946, called for eliminating 'weapons adaptable to mass des
tion'." In September 1961, speaking to the UN General Assembly, Am
president John F. Kennedy, warned: 'Every man, woman and child lives un
nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, cap
being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madne
weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us'. Kennedy p
that to end the nuclear danger, 'disarmament negotiations resume pro
and continue without interruption until an entire program for gene
complete disarmament has not only been agreed but has actually
achieved'. This program, he argued, should involve 'a steady reduc
force, both nuclear and conventional, until it has abolished all armies
weapons except those needed for internal order and a new United
Peace Force'.12 President Kennedy, very rightly, pointed out the undeniabl
between nuclear and conventional arms and thereby indicated th
control/disarmament initiatives ought to address simultaneously both
of mass destruction and conventional weapons.
The strategic competition between the Super Powers during the Co
undermined all nuclear disarmament initiatives. The end of the Cold War and
demise of the former Soviet Union generated a hope that nuclear genie could be
controlled. The endeavors for an FMCT in 1993, the indefinite extension of the
NPT in 1995 and the finalisation of the CTBT Draft in 1996 had a soothing
impact on the nuclear abolitionist movement. All these hopes gradually faded
away, however, with the materialisation of the 1996 Rumsfeld Commission
Report. This report justified and advocated for the development of Missile
Defense Systems. Consequently, the United States withdrew from the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002.
The current wave of public agitation in favor of nuclear non-proliferation
and nuclear disarmament is very much a reflection of four eminent American
statesmen's bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Former secretary of
state George P. Shultz, former secretary of defense William J. Perry, former
secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger and former senator Sam Nunn co-wrote
an op-ed piece entitled 'A world free of nuclear weapons' in the Wall Street
Journal published on 4 January 2007. They pointed out that 'unless urgent new
actions are taken, the US soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that
will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even
more costly than was [the] Cold War'.13 To achieve the goal of 'a world free of
nuclear weapons' and to bring the world back from the tipping point, their
vision aims to reduce nations' reliance on nuclear weapons, prevent such
weapons from falling into dangerous hands and rid the world of nuclear
weapons as a threat. This vision was endorsed in 2008 by a host of former US
secretaries of state and defense and other former senior American officials, both
"United Nations, 'Establishment of a Commission to deal with the problem raised by the
discovery of Atomic Energy', Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee , 24
January 1946; see http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/NR
003252.pdf?OpenElement (15 April 2010).
'-Quoted in Zia Mian, 'Obama's nuclear postures', Middle East Report on line , 5 July 2010;
available at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070510 (5 August 2011).
"Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn, 'A world free of nuclear
weapons', Wall Street Journal , 4 January 2007.
Republican and Democrat, including Madeleine Albright,

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Warren Christopher, Colin Powell and R
mara.14 In addition, the increasing fragility of the internation
proliferation regime was paid serious attention by the WMD
by Hans Blix, the New Agenda Coalition, a seven-nation initia
Disarmament and Non-proliferation, and Australia and Japan
Commission on Nuclear Non-Prolifera tion and Disarmament.15
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, while speaking at the East- W
24 October 2008, also demanded a nuclear-weapon-free world. H
following five-point proposal for abolishing nuclear weapons:16
• All NPT parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon-states,
their obligation under the treaty to undertake negotiations
measures leading to nuclear disarmament. The nuclear w
could pursue this goal by agreement on a framework
mutually reinforcing instruments. Or they could consider
nuclear-weapons convention, backed by a strong system of
as has long been proposed at the United Nations. In addition
powers should actively engage with other states on thi
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
• The Security Council's permanent members should commence discus-
sions, perhaps within its Military Staff Committee, on security issues in
the nuclear disarmament process. They could unambiguously assure non-
nuclear-weapon states that they will not be the subject of the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons. The Council could also convene a summit on
nuclear disarmament. Non-NPT states should freeze their own nuclear-
weapon capabilities and make their own disarmament commitments.
• The reformed procedures should be adopted to enter the CTBT into force
and for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile
l4Mian, 'Obama's nuclear postures'.

,5The Swedish government established the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Commission in December 2003, under the leadership of Dr Hans Blix to explore ways
to reduce threats posed by biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. On 1 June 2006, Dr Blix
presented UN secretary-general Kofi Annan with a report recommending 60 steps for reducing
global dangers posed by biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. For more details see: http://
www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2006/20060601_WMDC_Report, and also http://www.
armscontrol.org/print/125 (5 August 201 1).
The New Agenda Coalition was established in 1998. New Zealand, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, South Africa and Sweden are the members of the New Agenda Coalition. This group is
very much concerned about the lack of progress in the nuclear disarmament realm. Importantly,
it is the only group focusing, at governmental level, on the nuclear disarmament pillar of the NPT,
and pushing the nuclear weapon states to live up to the commitments that they have made. See
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/l-Global-Issues/Disarmament/O-Nuclear/O-new-
agenda-coalition.php (6 August, 2011).
The Seven-Nation Initiative was a response to the acute challenges confronting the multilateral
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It represented the strong commitment of
Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom to all
three 'pillars' of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. See http://www.7ni.mfa.no/About/ (6 August, 2011).
The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament is a joint
initiative of the Australian and Japanese governments. It aims to reinvigorate international efforts
on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in the context of both the 2010 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and beyond. See http://www.icnnd.org/Pages/default.
aspx, (6 August, 201 1).
,6Ban Ki-moon, 'The United Nations and security in a nuclear- weapon-free world , address to
the East-West Institute, 24 October 2008; available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/
sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID =351 (6 April 2011).
material treaty immediately, without preconditions. In addition,

Central Asian and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties should
enter into force. The nuclear-weapon states should ratify all the protoc
to the nuclear-weapon-zone treaties. All NPT parties should con
their safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and voluntarily adop
strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol.
• There is a need for greater accountability and transparency. The nu
weapon states often circulate descriptions of what they are doing
pursue these goals, yet these accounts seldom reach the public. Therefor
the nuclear-weapon states should send such material to the U
Secretariat, to encourage its wider dissemination. The nuclear pow
could also expand the amount of information they publish about th
of their arsenals, stocks of fìssile material and specific disarmam
achievements.
• Finally, a number of complementary measures are needed. These include
the elimination of other types of WMD; new efforts against WMD
terrorism; limits on the production of and trade in conventional arms;
and new weapons bans, including of missiles and space weapons. The
General Assembly could also take up the recommendation of the Blix
Commission for a World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and
terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.
The aforementioned proposals are some of the important initiatives that have
emerged in the recent years for restoring and strengthening an increasingly
fragile international nuclear non-proliferation regime. These initiatives have
been strongly supported by President Obama. In his speech in Prague on 5
April 2009 he warned:
Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have
not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone
down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have
acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black-market trade in
nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a
bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our
efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation
regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the
point where the center cannot hold.17
President Obama promised that for the sake of a nuclear-weapon-free world the
United States would strengthen the global effort to curb the spread of nuclear
weapons; move forward on long-overdue disarmament measures; and prevent
nuclear terrorism. To pursue these objectives, he proclaimed his intention to
negotiate a new strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russian Federation
in 2009, to lobby for the ratification by the United States of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and to seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of
fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons.18
President Obama chaired a historic 6191st meeting of the UN Security
Council (UNSC) on 24 September 2009. The fourteen heads of state and
government present at that meeting unanimously adopted resolution 1887. This
was the first comprehensive action on nuclear issues since the mid-1990s. It
sanctioned President Obama's initiative on committing all nations to work for a
"Obama, 'Remarks in Hradčany Square'.

,8Obama, 'Remarks in Hradčany Square'.
nuclear-weapon-free world. The resolution calls for stepped-up eff

the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote disarmament and to
of nuclear terrorism'.19 It calls for better security for nuclear we
and underscores the Security Council's intention to take action
or nuclear weapons get into the hands of terrorists. The part
Security Council meeting underscored that disarmament and no
ought to proceed together. They endorsed President Obama's nucle
strategy; in reality, however, that strategy was ambigious, be
objective was to hinder the horizontal proliferation of nuclear w
any practical scheme for nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless,
generated provisional optimism among the nuclear abolitionists
President Obama was awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize in t
of his nuclear non-proliferation stance. The prize committee said t
the award it 'attached special importance to Obama's vision of
world without nuclear weapons'.21 In April 2010 Obama conven
Security Summit in Washington. He called for strengthening t
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards apparatus. The com
at the conclusion of the Washington summit envisaged strong
measures as the most effective means to prevent terrorists, cri
unauthorised actors from acquiring nuclear materials.22 In th
acknowledged the significance of the IAEA and reaffirmed:
the essential role of the International Atomic Energy A
international nuclear security framework and will work to
continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and ex
to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accor
Statute, relevant General Conference resolutions and its Nu
Plans.23
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) - the official US government statement on

the role of nuclear weapons in its deterrence and defense policy - released on 6
April 2010, had also made considerable progress toward a safer nuclear world.24
It announced that Washington would remove one entire class of nuclear
weapons delivery systems - the nuclear-armed Tomahawk sea-launched land-
attack cruise missile - from the arsenal. In addition, the review called for
further Russian and American nuclear arms reductions and promised that the
US would only consider using nuclear weapons in response to nuclear attacks
against the US or allied nations. More precisely, the United States assured non
"UN Security Council, SC/9746, 'Historic summit of Security Council pledges support for
progress on stalled efforts to end nuclear weapons proliferation', Security Council, 6191st
Meeting (AM), 24 September 2009; available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.
doc.htm (6 April 201 1).
2"Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 'UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009): idealistic euphoria', Weekly Pulse, 1-6
October 2009, 6.
21 See Mian, 'Obama's nuclear postures'.
"The full text of the communiqué issued following the conclusion of the Washington Nuclear
Security Summit, on 13 April 2010, is available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofnce/
communiqu-washington-nuclear-security-summit (21 July 2011). Hereafter cited as Washington
Summit Communiqué.
"Washington Summit Communiqué.
24This report is required by Congress and is meant to establish US nuclear policy, strategy and
capabilities. The Obama review was the third such exercise: The first occurred under President
Bill Clinton in 1994 and the second under President George W. Bush in 2002. Only Obama's was
published in full; the earlier reports were summarised and excerpted. The full text of the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review Report is available at: http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%
20posture%20review%20report.pdf (21 July 201 1); hereafter cited as ÑPR Report.
nuclear weapon states that it would not use nuclear arms against t
provided those nations remain 'in compliance with their nuclear nonpro
tion obligations'.25
CONTRADICTORY FACTORS
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's 2008 proposals were convincing, bu

seem impractical. The trends in international politics do not support
scheme of action. The noncompliance with Article VI by the members
NPT highlights that nuclear weapons remain the currency of great
Moreover, the 2010 NPR Report called for investment to rebuild Am
aging nuclear infrastructure.26 The cover-letter to the NPR Report, prepa
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, called for making much-needed investme
rebuild America's aging nuclear infrastructure. He had asked for alm
billion to be transferred from the Pentagon to the Department of E
National Nuclear Security Administration. On 13 May 2010, Presiden
sent a bill to the Senate, which demands $85 billion over 10 years in
funding for a robust strategy for maintaining the existing nuclear
without the renewal of nuclear explosive testing. Secretary Gates explaine
the funds were needed to 'rebuild and sustain America's aging nuclear s
and would be spent over the course of a decade.27 Thus, the
administration's willingness for robust investment in its nuclear infrastru
and the NPR's strategy for warhead life extension represent a credible
weapons modernisation plan. As Zia Mian pointed out:
For the next fiscal year, the Obama administration has proposed on
largest increases in nuclear warhead spending in US history. Los A
National Laboratory will see a 22 percent increase in its budget, sa
the largest one-year jump since 1944. The flagship project is the Ch
and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility, which
produce 125 plutonium pits per year and as many as 200 pits per ye
annual production capacity is roughly equivalent to the total ar
Britain (less than 200 weapons) or a large fraction of the arsenals of
(250 weapons) or France (less than 300 weapons).28
The nuclear modernisation plan of the Obama administration accentu
American nuclear force's significant role in deterring potential adversa
reassuring allies and partners around the world.29 Hence, the existence of
fissile material stockpile and the Stockpile Management Program is pr
as a means to extend the life of US nuclear weapons and also ensure
secure and effective deterrent without amassing more fissile materi
developing a new generation of nuclear warheads. These factors, how
underscore the absence of sweeping changes in the Obama administr
-'Scott Sagan, 'After the Nuclear Posture Review: Obama's disarming influence'. B
the Atomic Scientists , 19 April 201 1; available at: http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/
after-the-nuclear-posture-review-obamas-disarmine-influence (23 April 2011).
26 NPR Report. 41.
"The Obama administration has proposed additional spending of 'well over $100 bi
nuclear weapon delivery systems, including new land-based missiles, new submarine
missiles, new submarines and bombers. See, Washington Post, 14 May 2010.
:8Mian. 'Obama's nuclear postures'.
^Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has suggested, for example, that if Iran proceeds to acquire
nuclear weapon capabilities, then the US may use nuclear weapons to defend its 'partners' in the
Gulf.
nuclear policy that would be required to move towards nuclear

of contradiction obviously undermines and derails support fo
nuclear zero in global politics.
The NATO nuclear policy into the new century underscores th
would continue deployment of 200 US nuclear gravity bom
Though this persistent nuclear weapons deployment is suited m
War doctrine of the 1960s, yet the Europeans feel comfor
extended nuclear deterrence policy of the United States. On 17
NATO group of experts set up to advise on a new strategic con
recommended that:
As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO should continue to maintain secure

and reliable nuclear forces, with widely shared responsibility for deployment
and operational support, at the minimum level required by the prevailing
security environment.30
NATO's strategic concept supports the nuclear optimists' understanding about

the role of nuclear weapons in global security. In the words of Shyam Saran:
The objective of the nuclear weapon states party to the NPT appears to be
firstly, to blunt any criticism of their failure to live up (after 40 years) to their
commitments under Article VI of the Treaty with respect to nuclear
disarmament; secondly, to create the basis for an even more restrictive
technology denial regime and intrusive verification, to lower the risks of
proliferation to additional states, as well as to non states actors.31
He added: 'If this were the case, then the new found enthusiasm for nuclear
disarmament may prove to be tactical and temporary, rather than representing
a serious effort towards eliminating such weapons from the planet'.32
SOUTH ASIA: DESTABILISING MILITARY ASYMMETRY
In the aftermath of the Cold War, New Delhi realistically readjusted its fo
and strategic policy and has begun to work closely with the governm
Washington, Tel Aviv and other countries advanced in the field of nuc
space technologies. It altered its previous international outlook
adopted policies that were suitable to Washington's post-Cold Wa
agenda. This shift in New Delhi's policies has had a constructive impa
India's political, economic and strategic stature in global politics. The
W. Bush administration committed practically to support New Delhi's d
'Great Power' status in the twenty-first century. Numerous bilateral agree
were approved and implemented. For example, Washington finalised th
US nuclear-deal for a far-reaching strategic partnership in October 2
'"NATO Public Diplomacy Division. "NATO 2020: Assured security; dynamic engagem
Analysis and recommendations of the Group of Experts on a new strategic concept f
(NATO Brussels, 17 May 2010), 11.
"Shyam Saran, 'Nuclear zero: the shining city on the hill', in V.R. Raghavan (ed.), India and
global nuclear disarmament (Delhi, 2009), 6-11: 10.
12Saran, 'Nuclear zero'.
"This is officially called a '123 Agreement' (named after Section 123 of the United States
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which deals with cooperation with other nations and establishes an
agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear deals between the US and any other
nation), but it is generally referred to as the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation or Indo-US
nuclear deal. For the details of the deal, see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 'Indo-US nuclear deal: altering
global nuclear order'. Strategic Studies 27 (2 and 3 ) (Summer and Autumn 2008), 18-38: 26-32.
Since then, the United States and India have been gradually cementing
strategic partnership. The partnership has been destined to bring a
revolution in Indian military affairs and make India's military muscle stron
Indeed, India is acquiring conventional military power more than suffici
defeat Pakistan's conventional military force.34
Importantly, political and military competition with India remains
centrepiece of Pakistan's foreign and strategic policy since the time of
founding of the state of Pakistan in 1947 to date. In over 60 year
independence, Pakistan has fought three (and a half) wars with India.35
wars and unlimited border skirmishes, the perennial Kashmir dispute, a
involvement in each other's intra-state conflicts, the contesting regiona
global outlook and, above all, power asymmetry, oblige Islamabad t
remain oblivious to India's increasing military strength. The Pakistani d
planners seem convinced that through nuclear weapons capability, they
be able to accomplish various strategic objectives, such as, deter the adv
from contemplating aggression; increase bargaining leverage; reduce d
dence on allies; and acquire military independence by reducing dependen
external sources of military hardware. Therefore, the nuclear deter
capability vis-à-vis India's nuclear and superior conventional capability
been the prime mover of the Pakistani nuclear weapon program since th
1970s.
Pakistan's defence posture remains Indo-centric despite the dramatic
in the global and regional politics in the last two decades. The United Sta
been contributing constructively in New Delhi's drive for great power, a
engaging in strategic partnership with Pakistan. Nevertheless, Washin
strategic partnership with both New Delhi and Islamabad has fail
transform the belligerent neighbours' bilateral relations. Both sides trea
other as strategic competitors in South Asia.
The implementation of the 2008 nuclear deal has cemented the Indo-
strategic partnership, opened India's gigantic economic market for Ame
investment and encouraged New Delhi to emerge as a balance in souther
against China. The United States policy to checkmate China and mould
Asian security architecture could have serious regional and interna
^The Indian Chief of Army Staff, General N.C. Vij unveiled the Cold Start doctrine d
the Army Commanders Conference on 28 April 2004. This doctrine visualised a tri-s
doctrine, which necessitates restructuring of the Indian Army and reorganising the Indian
offensive power away from three large strike corps into eight smaller division-sized 'inte
battle groups' (IBGs) that combine mechanised infantry, artillery and armour. These eight
groups would be prepared to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan along different axes of
to destroy its defensive and offensive corps. The ground operations of the IBGs req
integration with close air support from the Indian Air Force and Naval aviation assets to p
highly mobile fire support. In addition, the holding corps are redesignated as 'pivot cor
would be bolstered by additional armour and artillery. This would allow them concurre
man defensive positions and undertake limited offensive operations as necessary. The
emphasis of Cold Start is on the speed of both deployment and operations to multiply
war-fighting capability against Pakistan. Importantly, the execution of this doctrine r
massive Indian military buildup. See Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A cold start for hot wars? The I
Army's new limited war doctrine', International Security 32 (3) (Winter 2007/08), 158-9
164-5; see also Gurmeet Kanwal, 'Strike fast and hard: Army doctrine undergoes chang
nuclear era'. Tribune , 23 June 2006.
35India and Pakistan fought three wars in 1948, 1965, 1971, and a half war in 1999. The
1971 resulted in the division of Pakistan, a defeat that instilled a great sense of insecu
Pakistan and a greater determination to find a way to overcome India's military super
Christoph Bluth, 'India and Pakistan: a case of asymmetric nuclear deterrence', Korean Jou
Defense Analysis 22 (3) (September 2010), 387-406: 387.
strategic repercussions. The policy has had the effect of un

nuclear non-proliferation regime, intensifying the insecurit
worrying the Chinese and Russians. The Indo-US strategic p
be ignored by Pakistan and China. The latter's political, milit
capabilities insulate it from the negativity of the Indo-US strat
in the current prevalent strategic environment and may contin
near future. The vulnerabilities of the former were, howev
result of America's inclination towards India. Indeed, Pakista
concerned about New Delhi's growing conventional power p
ities, its adoption of limited war plans (such as the Cold Star
closer ties to Washington.36 Though Washington declared,
occasions has reiterated, that its strategic partnership with
undermine its relations with Islamabad, the constructive and
the strategic partnership on India's military muscle carries with
strategic dynamics.
Thus, the Indo-US strategic partnership, the New Delh
defense partnership37 and Moscow's colossal milita^ sal
amplify the existing military asymmetry between India and
missile (both offensive and defensive) build-up program, nuclear
Force, etc. are important areas of concern for Islamabad, and
investment or supply in these areas alarms it. It is a known fact
assistance of the United States, Russian Federation and Israel, the Indian
defence industry would remain backward and non-productive. These states'
military-technology transfer, weapons sales and Indian reverse engineering
strategy, collectively, have qualitative and quantitative productive effects on
India's military infrastructure. For instance, Israel's arrow-missile transfer to
India and US assistance to New Delhi in the realm of space research and
development revolutionised India's Agni multi-series ballistic missile project. In
addition, it was reported in the Indian press that New Delhi would purchase the
Patriot-3 Anti-Missile System. The system is expected to include missile
launchers and upgraded AN/MPQ-65 radar to enhance detection in high-
clutter environments. The Indian Air Force has also expressed its interest in
purchasing ten US C-17 military transport aircraft. The aircraft was on show
during the October 2009 Indo-US training exercises in Agra.
Table 1 assists us in understanding the war-fighting capabilities of China,
India and Pakistan.
ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA: AT ODDS WITH ACTUALITY
The intellectual and political movements in favor of a nuclear-weapon-f

South Asia suffer from unconvincing rationales, inherent contradictions
unrealistic expectations. They have failed to bring about any shift in
perceptions of India-Pakistan nuclear optimists. Interestingly, the United Stat
and like-minded states have been facilitating India in its pursuit of peaceful u
of nuclear technology, despite its categorical rejection of the existing nu
non-proliferation regime. Washington and its partners singled out Pakistan
"•Michael Krepon, 'The limits of influence: US-Pakistani nuclear relations', Nonprolifer

Review 18 (1), (March 2011), 85-101: 85.
"The Israeli Military Industries (IMI) company had signed a deal to build five factories in
India to produce ordnance and ammunition, and the Indian special forces and Army were
especially dependent on Israeli equipment. Other Israeli firms (Israeli Aerospace Industries and
Rafael) were critical to the Indian defence modernisation process. See Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil
Dasgupta, Arming without aiming: India's military modernization (Washington, DC, 2010), 38.
Table 1. Conventional military capabilities of China, India and Pakistan.

State Defence budget in US$ 2008 Active troops Reserve troops Population
China 61.1bn 2,185,000 800,000 1,330,044,605

India 25.3bn 1,281,200 1,155,000 1,147,995,898
Pakistan 3.56bn + 297m 617,000 ? 167,762,040
(FMA* from the US)
*FMA = Foreign military assistance.

Source : International Institute for Strategic Studies, Th
rejected the proposal for a Pakistan-United Sta

the Indo-US nuclear deal. Ironically, without be
in the nuclear realm, international non-proliferat
programme of work adopted by the CD on 29
includes convening a working group to start
discussions on progress toward nuclear disarma
race in space; and the provision of negative se
possessing nuclear weapons.39 Islamabad's repr
consensus clause about decision-making an
FMCT on 19 January 2010.40 It insisted tha
the future production of fìssile material and
material. Since then, it has maintained its sta
First Committee of the UN General Assemb
stated that 'an FMCT that purports only to b
material, will permanently freeze a strategic d
therefore unacceptable to us'.41 The trends in
policies of India and Pakistan reveal the follow
order.
Vertical proliferation: upward trajectory in South
The vertical proliferation of nuclear capabilitie

to the emerging South Asian regional security
neither for nuclear arms control nor for movement towards Nuclear Zero. The
latter certainly requires halting production and gradually eliminating uranium-
enrichment and weapon-grade-plutonium manufacturing programmes in India
and Pakistan. Conversely, New Delhi and Islamabad are continuing to produce
fissile material and are manufacturing, testing and adding dual-capable
ballistic/cruise missiles to their arsenals. As Bruno Tertrais has pointed out,
'the most significant trend is happening in Asia. All three Asian nuclear
countries China, India, and Pakistan are steadily building up their capabilities
38Cole Harvey, 'CD breaks deadlock on work plan', Arms Control Today , June 2009; available
at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/CD (26 April 2010).
'"Harvey, 'CD breaks deadlock on work plan', and see also Paul Meyer, 'A fìssile material (cut-
off) treaty: some observations on scope and verification', Disarmament Diplomacy 91 (Summer
2009); available at:http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd91/91pm.htm (20 April 2010).
"Jonathan Lynn, 'Pakistan blocks agenda at U.N. disarmament conference', Reuters, 19
January 2010; available at: www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60I26U201001 19 (24 April 2010).
41 Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the
United Nations, in the First Committee at the 65th United Nations General Assembly on 12
October 2010.
and show absolutely no sign in being interested in abolition,

purely rhetorical terms'.42 New Delhi and Islamabad are not par
and thereby are not subject to any international inspection re
neither India nor Pakistan announced a moratorium on fìssile material
production. The puzzling factor is that both India and Pakistan's nuclear
doctrines publicise their policy of 'minimum nuclear deterrence'. For instance,
Pakistani officials maintain that they have already determined the arsenal size
needed for a minimum nuclear deterrence and that they would not engage in a
nuclear arms race with India. It is a problematic assertion, because the arsenal
size required for minimum nuclear deterrence is continuously evolving. In
addition, their claims lack tangible supportive facts.
The vagueness in quantifying minimum deterrence facilitates both states to
add more nuclear devices to their existing stockpiles. Therefore, the frightening
reality is that both India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons build-up will
continue in the foreseeable future. As Cortright and Väyrynen pointed out:
Contrary to the trend between the United States and Russia, India and
Pakistan are expanding their arsenals and developing ever more elaborate
launch capabilities. India has begun sea trials of its 6,000-metric-ton nuclear-
powered submarine, Arihant (Destroyer of enemies), the first of several
planned missile-firing submarines.43
In recent years, India has successfully modernised its uranium enrichment
programme. Indeed, it is capable of producing highly enriched uranium for its
nuclear submarine reactor programme and thermonuclear weapons. In October
2008, Srikumar Banerjee, the director of India's Bhabha Atomic Research Center
(BARC), claimed that the Center has acquired the capability to develop advanced
gas centrifuges for a uranium enrichment programme. He pointed out that:
The latest fourth generation design, with output 10 times the early design,
has been successfully developed and an experimental cascade is in operation
at BARC. These would soon be ready for induction at RMP. Third
generation design, with 5 times output of early designs, are presently being
inducted at RMP.44
Pakistan is also increasing its fissile material. Its plutonium facility became
operative in 2010. In January 2011 it was reported in the international press
that Pakistan had doubled its nuclear arms stockpile to more than 100
warheads.45
India and Pakistan have failed to negotiate and execute a bilateral arms
control agreement or treaty, which would prevent a nuclear arms race and
decrease the mistrust between them. Arms control is based upon cooperative
approaches taken by national governments to strengthen national security, to
42Bruno Tertrais, The illogic of zero", Washington Quarterly 33 (2) (April 2010), 125-38: 132.
43Cortright and Väyrynen, Towards nuclear zero , 104.
"Zia Mian, 'India developing new centnfuges and increasing enrichment capacity , Interna-
tional Panel on Fissile Material , 4 June 2010; available at: http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/
2010/06/india_developing_new_cent.html (14 April 2011). RMP stands for 'Rare Materials
Plant'. See 'BARC develops fourth generation uranium enrichment gas centrifuges', Press Trust
of India , 31 October 2008.
45Karen De Young, 'New estimates put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at more than 100 ,
Washington Post , 31 January 2011; available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2011/01/30/AR201 1013004136_pf.html (1 February 2011). See also 'Pakistan
has 110 N-weapons, edges ahead of India: US Report', Times of India , 31 January 2011;
available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/201 1-0 1-3 l/us/28377446_l_weapons-
fissile-material-nuclear-arms (1 February 2011).
protect civilians, or to allocate resources to other objectives, such as

development rather than military build-up. The cooperative nature o
control can also encourage better coordination and confidence among n
governments.46 In South Asia, arms control propagators have been fru
due to India's rejection of Pakistan's Nuclear Restraint Regime pro
Consequently, both states have been continuously producing fìssile materia
weapons, increasing their nuclear weapons stockpiles and augmenting
weapons production facilities, as well as increasing their dual capable d
vehicles - steps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative impro
in their nuclear arsenals.
The demand for a new generation of nuclear weapons is very much prevalent
in the Indian nuclear bureaucracy. In August 2009, the Indian scientist K.
Santhanam, who was director of test site preparations for India's 1998 nuclear
tests, claimed that 'one of the tests - on a hydrogen bomb - had not worked, and
that India would have to carry out more tests for a credible nuclear deterrent'.48
Santhanam's apprehension about India's May 1998 hydrogen bomb tests creates
alarm that India could conduct explosions of its new generation of nuclear
weapons to validate and improve its nuclear force in the future.49 One cannot
ignore his declaration about the thermonuclear test, because Santhanam was in
charge of Pokhran II.50 Moreover, the flzzling-out problem with the thermo-
nuclear test was also confirmed by P.K. Iyengar, former head of India's Atomic
Energy Commission. On 28 August 2009, Iyengar stated that he had made it clear
in 2002 that India's nuclear tests were 'inconclusive and ambiguous'. The
scientific bureaucracy's revelations about sophisticated weaponry is always taken
seriously throughout the world; therefore the anxiety of these two senior
members of the Indian scientific bureaucracy will almost certainly compel
New Delhi to conduct further thermonuclear tests. Scientists are the only
individuals qualified to judge and declare that a nuclear device test is up to the
mark. If scientists dispute or question the validity of a weapon test, it becomes
essential to conduct subsequent perfecting tests of the weapon's ammunition and
design. In the case of nuclear weaponry, it becomes more important, because the
nuclear deterrence strategy is based on the testing credibility of the nuclear
weapon's capability.
^Li Bin and Liu Zhiwei, 'The contribution of arms control to fighting nuclear terrorism',
Disarmament Forum (No. 2, Geneva: 2003), 17.
47Pakistan has repeatedly offered a strategic restraint regime to India since 1998. The strategic
restraint regime proposal indicates Islamabad's willingness to negotiate bilateral arms control
agreements with India. The elements of the proposal were: One, not to deploy ballistic missiles;
two, not to operationally weaponise nuclear capable missile systems; three, formalise the
understanding to provide prior and adequate notification of flight-tests of missiles; and, four, to
declare a moratorium on the development, acquisition or deployment of anti-ballistic missile
systems, since these can destabilise 'minimum credible deterrence'. For more details about
bilateral arms control between India and Pakistan, see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Arms control: risk
reduction measures between India and Pakistan, S AS SU Research Paper no.l (June 2005), 8.
^Sanjoy Majumder, 'India nuclear test "did not work'", BBC News , Delhi, 27 August 2009,
available at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/8225540.stm (7 August 2011).
49Prime Minster Manmohan Singh contradicted the declaration of K. Santhanam. On 29
August 2009 he stated that the Pokhran II nuclear tests were successful and that there was no
need to indulge in needless controversies. Importantly, while negating the scientist's claim, Prime
Minister Singh did not rule out the possibility of nuclear weapon tests in the near future.
^Pokhran II refers to India s three nuclear weapon tests on 1 1 May 1998 and two on 13 May
1998. These tests were conducted at the Pokhran testing site built in the Rajasthan Desert in
India.
Pakistan has always reacted to India's nuclear moves.5

likelihood that the new round of Indian nuclear tests will be
testing by Pakistan and that Islamabad will revise its unila
moratorium policy and go for a matching response. Many sec
Pakistan have concluded that Pakistan could not match
conventional military buildup due to its economic constrains
to devise a new strategy, which minimises the impact o
conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan in the
strategy certainly enhances the significance of nuclear weap
defensive posture. This is because it is very difficult to exp
total war between India and Pakistan in the past 25 years w
account the existence of nuclear weapons.52 The present govern
may be reluctant to take a bold step in favor of manufactu
tactical light-weight-plutonium weapons, due to pressure from
community. However, New Delhi's likely forthcoming nucl
would provide an opportunity for Islamabad to conduct explo
new generation of nuclear weapons. Whereas this anticipated
tests does not substantially affect the regional strategic envi
nevertheless have serious ramifications for the global nuclear
regime.
India remains concerned about China's current military modernisation
efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernisation of its nuclear
arsenal.53 India's Air Force chief, Marshal Fali Homi Major, stated in May 2009
that India faces a greater threat from China than Pakistan, because New Delhi
knows little about Beijing's combat capabilities.54 The extent of China's
conventional military capabilities and its nuclear modernisation increase
demand for fissile material in New Delhi. Simultaneously, the modernising
and up-grading of India's military muscle introduce numerous destabilising
factors in the subcontinent's strategic environment. The important destabilising
factors are; India's Cold Start Doctrine;55 plans for increasing India's
conventional military capabilities;56 New Delhi's policy of amassing nuclear
"In August 2007, New Delhi gave the impression that it might opt for testing a new generation
of nuclear weapons. On 20 August that year Pakistan also hinted that it would renounce its
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing if India were to resume nuclear trials.
52'The bottom line is that it is very difficult to explain the absence of war among major powers
in the past 65 years without taking into account the existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear
weapons have also limited the risk of chemical and biological weapons use: no nuclear-capable
country has ever been the victim of such an attack. The history of the Middle East provides a
good case study. Egypt used chemical weapons against Yemen between 1962 and 1967, but not
against Israel in the 1973 war. Iraq used them against Iran from 1983 to 1988, but did not fire its
Scud missiles loaded with chemical and biological weapons against Israel or the U.S. -led coalition
in 199Г, see Tertrais, 'The illogic of zero', 128.
" India developing advanced fighter jets , Dawn , 24 April 2010.
"■"China bieger threat than Pakistan: India', Dawn, 24 May 2009.
55The Cold Start strategy, which was officially announced in April 2004, is a proactive war
strategy to mobilise fast army strike-formations and strike hard to crush the enemy. This strategy
has, supposedly, been formulated on the basis of the strategic philosophy that India would be able
to control the escalation of conventional war. In addition, fast Indian army strike formations
would minimise Pakistan's time to shore up its defenses and would give insufficient time to the
international community to intervene.
56In January 2010, India s Defense Ministry announced plans to spend more than $10 billion
that year on acquiring new weapons. This was made possible by a 34 percent increase in India's
military budget for 2009-10, to more than $35 billion; in Pakistan, the military budget went up 15
percent, to just more than $4 billion. See Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, 'Playing the nuclear game:
Pakistan and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty', Arms Control Today , April 2010; available at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_04/Mian (16 April 2010).
waste, which would certainly multiply India's plutonium stockpiles unde

guise of peaceful use of nuclear-technology; and above all its efforts to a
reliable missile defense capabilities from Israel and the United States. T
developments would have a deterministic influence on Islamabad's n
posture.
The shift in Islamabad's nuclear posture seems unavoidable, because its
financial limitations do not allow it to match India's conventional weapon
purchases; the international community is apathetic in its attitude towards
Pakistan's genuine nuclear energy demands; and because of the salience of light-
plutonium nuclear devices. The modernisation of Pakistan's nuclear posture
necessitated that its Strategic Plans Division move from larger, heavier nuclear
weapons based on highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to lighter, more compact
plutonium-based weapons, and also that tactical weapons be employed in order
for its forces to thwart Indian aggression in the southern theatre, that is in the
Bahawalpur Corps's area of responsibility.57 Accordingly, on 19 April 2011,
Pakistan successfully conducted the first flight test of the newly developed short
range surface-to-surface multi-tube ballistic missile, Hatf IX (NASR). Accord-
ing to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) press release about the missile
test, 'the NASR missile, with a range of 60km, carries nuclear warheads of
appropriate yield with high accuracy and shoot-&-scoot attributes. This quick
response system addresses the need to deter evolving threats'.58 The director
general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lieutenant General (Retired)
Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, announced that 'the test was a very important
milestone in consolidating Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability at all levels
of the threat spectrum'. He added 'that in the hierarchy of military operations,
the NASR Weapon System now provides Pakistan with short range missile
capability in addition to the already available medium and long range ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory'.59 Importantly, the range and
payload of the NASR missile demonstrate that it is a 'tactical nuclear weapon'
that could be used in the battlefield. In simple terms, it is a low-yield battlefield
nuclear weapon, which is capable of deterring and inflicting punishment on
mechanised forces such as the armed brigades and divisions envisaged in India's
Cold Start doctrine.60
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
Nuclear non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and

disarmament issues were deliberated in the United Nations in New Yor
a month-long eighth NPT Review Conference in May 2010. The part
were able to muster consensus on the final document, which encoura
proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Nuclear disarmam
also addressed vaguely. Smith argues that the 'substantive success' of
review will be better judged by the 2015 review, but that 'the mere fact
S7The Bahawalpur Corps is one part of Pakistan's defence corps. In summer 2010, the
Army conducted a gigantic defensive exercise - AZMA NAU- in the Cholustan desert
the nation that it is vigilant in regard to India's Cold Start doctrine.
^Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), 'Press release,', 19 April 2011.
5'ISPR, 'Press release', 19 April 2011. See also, Anita Joshua, 'Pakistan tests shor
ballistic missile', The Hindu, 19 April 2011. http://www.thehindu.com/news/inte
article 1709352.ece (24 April 2011).
"Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, NASR (Hatf IX) counteracts India s Cold Start Doctnne , Weekly P
28 April 2011; available at: http://www.weeklypulse.org/detaikaspx7contentID = 482&story
April 2011).
2010 conference agreed on a document is a success in itself

whelming majority of the participants demanded the execution
the NPT. Article VI obligates nuclear weapon states to:
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relatin
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmam
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
international control.62
Interestingly, the nuclear weapon states party to treaty reiterated

stances that 'they were willing to give up their nuclear arsena
however, nothing substantial was the outcome of this entire dip
exercise in New York.
The fragility of the twentieth century's well constructed nuclear non-
proliferation regime had increased after the India-specific amendment in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines in September 2008. By virtue of this
amendment the nuclear supplier states could trade with India in nuclear
technology and material, without demanding or ensuring comprehensive
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on the Indian nuclear
facilities. This selective approach has weakened the case of nuclear abolitionists
or those who were lobbying that India, Pakistan and Israel should become
party to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states like South Africa, Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan. The negativity of the India-specific amendment was
noted in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Numerous participants referred the
Indo-US nuclear deal as a dangerous precedent.63
Importantly, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has failed to gain a
significant domestic constituency in India and Pakistan. In June 1998 the UN
Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1 172, which called on Pakistan
and India to cease further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
and urged other states not to supply technology or material that could assist
India and Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons. It specifically called for India
and Pakistan:
immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to

refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to
cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons
and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to
confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that
could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of
delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.64
New Delhi and Islamabad have not complied with the resolution, and both
states maintain that they would not be party to the NPT as a non-nuclear
weapon state and would uphold their staunch stance on nuclear disarmament
61 Duncan Smith 'Perspectives on the revival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime in
the wake of President Barack Obama's Prague speech', Irish Studies in International Affairs 21
(2010) 179-96: 193.
"United Nations, Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons', Article VI. The text of
the treaty, which was agreed in July 1968, is available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/
npttreaty.html (25 July 201 1).
63 M ark Hibbs, 'The Breach', nuclear energy brief Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 4 June 2010; available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?
fa = view&id = 40942 (9 June 2010).
MUN Security Council, 'Resolution 1 172', adopted on 6 June 1998; the text of the resolution is
available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html (24 April 2010).
and a non-discriminatory approach. Pakistan, however, had expres

willingness to be involved with the regional nuclear non-proliferation r
On 26 September 2009, the then Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman A
Basit restated that Islamabad:
had a comprehensive approach to restraint regime based on three points:

nuclear restraint in the light of the Pakistan-India situation, conventional
imbalances should be corrected, and disputes, including that on Kashmir,
should be resolved so that the risk of an arms race could be minimized.65
This confirms that Islamabad could not underplay the regional strategic
environment in its nuclear non-proliferation outlook.
New Delhi has softened its stance on the FMCT during recent years, as part
of the Indo-US nuclear deal announced in July 2005. It pledged to support
negotiations on an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.66
Numerous security observers, however, believe that in real terms if India were
asked to sign an FMCT today, it would not be ready to do so.67 Ambassador
Hamid Rao of India warned at Geneva that '[w]e will not accept obligations not
in keeping with or prejudicial to our national security interests or which hinder
our strategic program, our R&D as well as three-stage nuclear program'.68 This
underscores that New Delhi would not consider any constraints on its
programme of fissile-material production. C. Rajaraman has pointed out that:
India's implicit view appears to be that it is a recent entrant to the group of
nuclear powers, that its nuclear forces are still at the growing stage and that it
needs more time before it can consider any constraints on its fissile-material
production. It is unlikely that India will accept any restriction on its
production till such time as it feels that it has an adequate nuclear arsenal to
deter all foreseeable nuclear threats to its security.69
New Delhi's non-confrontationist approach on FMCT in the CD creates an
impression that it would not block the FMCT. The nuclear history of India
reveals that India had always adopted diplomatic-multifaceted stances during
the preliminary negotiations of treaties. Once the negotiations have entered into
the final stage, however, India could change from a non-confrontational
position and adopt a bargaining tactic, and might finally abstain from the
process or oppose it. For example, it had adopted a similar stance during the
NPT negotiations in the mid-1960s and again in the case of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty negotiations during the early 1990s. The FMCT stake-holders,
therefore, are not very optimistic about the present stance of New Delhi on
FMCT. In addition, another important pessimistic variable is the 2008 NSG
"'Resolution on nuclear disarmament welcomed'. Dawn. 27 September 2009.

"'India-U.S. joint statement', Press release, 18 July 2005; the complete text of the statement is
available at: http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetaill091/%09-india - u.s.-joint-statement-, and it
is mirrored at: http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/ind05.pdf (25 July 2011).
67R. Rajaraman, 'Country perspective: India', in Banning the production of fìssile materials for
nuclear weapons: country perspectives on the challenges to a fissile material (cutoff) treaty ,
Companion volume to Global Fissile Material Report 2008: scope and verification of a fissile
material ( cutoff) treaty (Princeton. 2008). 22.
''Quoted in Paul Meyer, 'Breakthrough and breakdown at the conference on disarmament:
assessing the prospects for an FM(C)T' Arms Control Today, September 2009, available at http://
www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_09/Meyer (7 August 2011).
"Rajaraman, 'Country perspective: India', 23.
waiver to India that would increase its fissile material stoc

estimated that with the help of American, French and Russia
nuclear companies, India would be able to produce up to 200 ki
of weapons-grade plutonium in its unsafeguarded heavy-water
this is enough for 40 weapons per year.71
Islamabad has been opposing the FMCT having merely an
element. It demands that the treaty should have a comprehen
which ought to include a disarmament element to eliminate the
material stocks. On 18 February 2010, Ambassador Zamir Akr
representative of Pakistan at the CD, while reiterating Pa
position, argued that discriminatory and arbitrary sanctions a
have shifted the balance of power in regard to conventional and st
overwhelmingly to the advantage of India.72 He added that 'I
respond to capabilities and not intentions'.73 At the UNGA Firs
2010, Pakistan was the only country to oppose the resolution
negotiation of an FMCT in the CD during 2011. On 14 Dece
highest decision-making body on strategic issues in Pakistan,
Command Authority (NCA), chaired by the prime minister
serious concern over the policies and trends of selectivity, exc
discrimination relating to strategic export control regimes. Th
cally stated:
Such policies, detrimental as they are to international peace and security,
undermine the credibility of the existing non-proliferation regime and are
inconsistent with the national laws and international obligations. Revision-
ism based on strategic, political or commercial considerations accentuates
asymmetries and would perpetuate instability, especially in South Asia.74
On 25 January 2011, Ambassador Zamir Akram, pointed out that:
Over the last two years, Pakistan has clearly stated that it cannot agree to
negotiations on a FMCT in the CD owing to the discriminatory waiver
provided by the NSG to our neighbor for nuclear cooperation by several
major powers, as this arrangement will further accentuate the asymmetry in
fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan's
security interests.75
70The 2008 nuclear accord allows India to access global nuclear technology and fuel supplies
after more than three decades of international boycott over a 1974 atomic test; see Rama
Lakshmi, 'India introduces controversial legislation on compensation for nuclear accidents',
Washington Post , 8 May 2010.
"Mian and Nayyar, 'Playing the nuclear game'. For a detailed discussion on the Indo-US
nuclear deal, see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. 'Indo-US nuclear deal: altering global nuclear order',
Strategic Studies 27 (2-3) (Summer and Autumn 2008), 18-38.
"'Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akran, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the
Conference on Disarmament', Geneva. 18 February 2010, 1. The text of the statement is available
at: http://missions.itu.int/~pakistan/2005_Statements/CD/cd/20100218.html (25 July 2011).
7 Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akran .
74ISPS, 'NCA Meeting', Press release, no. 1 1/2010-ISPR, Rawalpindi, 14 December 2010. The
text of the press release is available at: http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp7o = t-press_
release&date = 2010/12/14 (25 July 201 1).
"'Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN
and other International Organizations at the Conference on Disarmament', Geneva, 25 January
2011, 1. The text of the statement is available at: http://missions.itu.int/~pakistan/2005_
Statements/CD/cd/20 1 10125.htm (25 July 201 1).
These statements manifest Islamabad's firm opposition on the FMCT, du

perceived evolving South Asian security architecture and the cementing
Indo-US strategic partnership.
PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
The demand for peaceful use of nuclear technology has been increasing i
India and Pakistan.76 International nuclear energy's renaissance, the In
nuclear deal, rising prices of oil and gas, the environmental hazard of h
power generation, and above all the advance of the nuclear programm
India and Pakistan make atomic power plants very attractive for both
Delhi and Islamabad The former currently has fourteen nuclear reactors
sites - Tarapur, Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam, Narora, Kakrapar and Kaiga -
a combined generating capacity of 2,720 megawatts of electricity (MWe),
percent of India's total electricity needs, lbe Nuclear Power Corporatio
India Ltd has ambitious plans to boost output to 20,000 MWe by 2020,
percent of India's total energy-generating capacity. Practically, for boost
nuclear energy-generating capacity, India requires external assistance.
Indo-US nuclear deal has multiplied New Delhi's options in relatio
receiving nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel-cycle buildup assistance. It
also receive nuclear fuel from the nuclear supplier states. It has been est
that with the help of American, French and Russian nuclear companies,
would be able to generate 63,000 megawatts of nuclear energy by
compared with the present 1,700 megawatts of nuclear energy.77
Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear power stations curr
account for nearly three percent of the country's total installed gene
capacity, with Karachi Nuclear Power Plant generating 137 megawatts
Chashma-1 generating 325 megawatts, which is far below the nuclear
generating capacity of many other countries. In 2007 Islamabad announce
it would produce 8,800 megawatts of nuclear power in the next 25 yea
establishing more nuclear power plants. On 16 February 2010, the
Assembly unanimously passed a resolution for setting up nuclear power
in the country. On 20 February 2010, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza
visited Khusab Nuclear Complex, which houses some of Pakistan's impo
nuclear facilities, to reiterate the country's peaceful use of nuclear capa
While addressing the nuclear bureaucracy, he reiterated that his govern
would keep the country's nuclear programme on top of its priority li
claimed that the peaceful use of nuclear technology would help the coun
addressing the electricity crisis, and would help Pakistan to achieve gr
economic progress.
Islamabad has been expressing its willingness to purchase nuclear re
from Western countries to boost its nuclear power generation capacity
NSG trade laws, however, prevent nuclear-reactor and nuclear-fuel trad
Pakistan. Despite this, Islamabad approached Washington and other nu
76The technological line between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons is permeable: th
uranium-enrichment process used to manufacture fuel for energy reactors can be reconfig
produce bomb fuel, and the plutonium that some countries extract while recycling reac
also can be used in nuclear weapons. See, Barry Blechman and Alex Bollfrass, '5 myths
getting rid of the bomb', Washington Post , 27 June 2010.
77The 2008 nuclear accord allows India to access global nuclear technology and fuel su
after more than three decades of international boycott over a 1974 atomic test. Rama L
'India introduces controversial legislation on compensation for nuclear accidents', Was
Post , 8 May 2010.
supplier states to boost its nuclear power production capability

China expressed its willingness to assist Pakistan in its pur
reactor construction assistance, despite the opposition of the U
India. Beijing agreed to provide loans and technical assistance t
building two atomic power plants. On 8 June 2010, the China N
Fifth Construction Company and the CNNC China Zhongyuan
Corp., which specialises in foreign nuclear projects, agreed to w
the third and fourth plants at the Chashma complex.78 More
had agreed to build two 340MW power reactors for Pakistan, w
billion. Beijing would also loan some 80 percent of the pro
reactors, designated Chashma-3 and Chashma-4, were to be er
Chashma- 1, which attained criticality in 2000, and it is e
Chashma-2 might become critical in 2011. Chinese official
that the supply of Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 was include
agreement of 1985 pertaining to the supply of Chashma- 1 and
This agreement predated China's NSG membership and, theref
an ongoing cooperation between China and Pakistan in the
nuclear energy and thereby, as a result, it would not be thwar
SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
Nuclear technology has been used for peaceful purposes in vario

including power generation, human health, agriculture and industry, etc.
nuclear materials and radioactive sources fall into the hands of terrorists and
are abused, this could cause enormous harm to human life, health or property.
The intent of certain messianic groups to cause destruction on a massive scale
by using weapons of mass destruction is an established reality. Importantly, the
Indo-US deal did not address the security of India's nuclear facilities beyond
the IAEA safeguards on its declared civilian nuclear facilities.80 Indian nuclear
facilities have poor safety and security arrangements. For instance, in early
April 2010, a machine from Delhi University containing cobalt-60, a radio-
active metal used for radiotherapy in hospitals, ended up in a scrap-yard in the
city. Rajendra Yadav, a 35-year-old worker in the congested yard in Mayapuri,
western New Delhi, died due to multiple organ failure on 26 April 2010. Seven
others were hospitalised.81 The death from radiation poisoning of this scrap-
yard worker in New Delhi has highlighted the negligent enforcement of waste
disposal laws in India.
Pakistan has been called the most dangerous nuclear state in the world by
numerous Western security analysts. Islamabad firmly rejects these negative
assessments about its nuclear program. Its confidence regarding the safety and
security of its nuclear program received an affirmative response from
78'China firms join controversial Pakistan nuclear push', Reuters , 24 June 2010; available at:
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFTOE65N02E20100624 (25 June 2010).
"Since 2004, Pakistan has sought China's help to supply it with two additional power reactors,
Chashma-3 and -4. Beijing hasn't obliged so far, but now that U.S., French, Japanese and Russian
firms are poised to sell nuclear equipment to India, China is finally prepared to press the issue;
see Mark Hibbs, 'The Breach', Foreign Policy , 4 June, 2010; available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2010/06/04/the_breach (9 June 2010).
""Kenneth N. Luongo, 'Securing vulnerable nuclear materials: meeting the global challenge',
Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, November 2009, 6; available at: http://www.
stanleyfounclation.org/publications/pab/Luongo_PAB 1109.pdf (25 July 2011).
""Radiation death exposes India's waste disposal failures'. Nuclear Power Daily, 1 1 May 2010;
available at: http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Radiation_death_exposes_Indias_waste_
disposal_failures_999.html (12 May 2010).
Washington. President Obama stated in April 2010 that he was 'confiden

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was being adequately secured by its army. On 2
2010, while commenting on Pakistan's nuclear weapons, Navy Admiral
Mullen, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:
These are the most important weapons in the Pakistani arsenal. T
understood by the leadership, and they go to extraordinary efforts to pr
and secure them. These are their crown jewels. As much as we are focu
this [terrorism] threat - and the Pakistanis are more than they used t
they see a threat in India and [having nuclear weapons] is their dete
They see this as a huge part of their national security.82
Pakistan has also been cooperating with the United States on improvin
nuclear and border security since 2001. The United States has provided
$100 million for these initiatives. While this work was begun under Pre
Bush and Mushaaraf, it remains a high priority under the Obama admin
tion.83
CONCLUSION
Since the invention of nuclear weapons and their use in August 1945 ag
non-nuclear weapon state, nuclear disarmament has remained an aspir
rather than a reality. Article VI of the NPT makes nuclear disarm
obligatory for the parties to the Treaty. The nuclear weapon states party to
NPT have reiterated on numerous occasions their intention to imp
Article VI in its letter and spirit. In practice, however, they have opted for
opposite course of action. In the context of South Asia, the idealistic ap
is to minimise and eliminate the use of HEU and plutonium stockpiles i
and Pakistan. It seems, however, an impracticable strategy. In both st
nationalism is not only surviving, but is also overwhelmingly influenci
ruling elites' internal and external outlook. Furthermore, chronic conflicts
been hindering mutual cooperation and coordination; and traditional n
of state security have been intensifying a security dilemma that is sus
both a conventional and non-conventional arms race between str
competitors.
The signing of New START between Russia and the US on 8 April 2010 and
its entry into force in January 201 1, the Nuclear Security Summit communiqué,
and an agreed final document of the NPT all indicate that nuclear arms control
rather than nuclear disarmament is a practical approach, which is not contrary
to the defense requirements of the militarily insecure nuclear weapon states. In
addition, at present the primary focus of the nuclear weapon states is the safety
and security of their nuclear infrastructure, to prevent nuclear/radiological
terrorism. Hence, the drafting of nuclear and conventional bilateral arms
control agreements and the establishment of regional nuclear training centers in
South Asia to cultivate a local nuclear security culture and provide access to the
best nuclear security practices is imperative.
The history of the nuclear non-proliferation regime reveals that substantial
development took place only when the nuclear weapon states had a convergence
of interest on the nuclear non-proliferation agenda and they were able to create
82Lisa Daniel, 'Chairman cites importance of US-Pakistan ties', American Forces Press
Service, 1 July 2010; available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx7id = 59836 (1
July 2010).
83Luongo, 'Securing vulnerable nuclear materials', 6.
consensus during negotiations. Therefore, leaving aside even

weapon state would discredit or undermine the effect of any c
Nuclear Zero from the very beginning. Realistically, the i
political movements in favor of a nuclear-weapon-free South A
by unconvincing rationales, inherent contradictions and unr
tions. They have so far failed to bring any shift in the perception
and Pakistani nuclear optimists. Neither India nor Pakista
denuclearise itself. Nevertheless, Nuclear Zero is an all or not
that could eliminate the nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan.

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Nuclear Zero in South Asia

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Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia: a Realistic Narrative

Author(s): Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal*

Department of International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad,

President Obama's expressed desire about a nuclear-weapon-free world

Author s e-mail: znjaspal@qau.edu.pk

The nuclear non-proliferation regime has received a positive response f

unattainable in the prevailing global strategic environment. T

7The Conference on Disarmament is a body within the UN that was establ

TOWARDS NUCLEAR ZERO

The demand for a nuclear-weapon-free world is not a recent developme

Republican and Democrat, including Madeleine Albright,

l4Mian, 'Obama's nuclear postures'.

material treaty immediately, without preconditions. In addition,

"Obama, 'Remarks in Hradčany Square'.

nuclear-weapon-free world. The resolution calls for stepped-up eff

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) - the official US government statement on

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's 2008 proposals were convincing, bu

nuclear policy that would be required to move towards nuclear

As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO should continue to maintain secure

NATO's strategic concept supports the nuclear optimists' understanding about

SOUTH ASIA: DESTABILISING MILITARY ASYMMETRY

strategic repercussions. The policy has had the effect of un

ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA: AT ODDS WITH ACTUALITY

The intellectual and political movements in favor of a nuclear-weapon-f

"•Michael Krepon, 'The limits of influence: US-Pakistani nuclear relations', Nonprolifer

Table 1. Conventional military capabilities of China, India and Pakistan.

China 61.1bn 2,185,000 800,000 1,330,044,605

*FMA = Foreign military assistance.

rejected the proposal for a Pakistan-United Sta

Vertical proliferation: upward trajectory in South

The vertical proliferation of nuclear capabilitie

and show absolutely no sign in being interested in abolition,

protect civilians, or to allocate resources to other objectives, such as

Pakistan has always reacted to India's nuclear moves.5

waste, which would certainly multiply India's plutonium stockpiles unde

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

Nuclear non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and

2010 conference agreed on a document is a success in itself

Interestingly, the nuclear weapon states party to treaty reiterated

immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to

and a non-discriminatory approach. Pakistan, however, had expres

had a comprehensive approach to restraint regime based on three points:

"'Resolution on nuclear disarmament welcomed'. Dawn. 27 September 2009.

waiver to India that would increase its fissile material stoc

These statements manifest Islamabad's firm opposition on the FMCT, du

PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

supplier states to boost its nuclear power production capability

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Nuclear technology has been used for peaceful purposes in vario

Washington. President Obama stated in April 2010 that he was 'confiden

consensus during negotiations. Therefore, leaving aside even

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