G.R. No.

L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS,
NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO
T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO
A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO
ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ,
SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for
petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal
of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by
Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8
Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases
filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common
ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed
to state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all
other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A — The Information filed by the People —
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9
of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one
(1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾
inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or
implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and
the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
 The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice
pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his
livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the
crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM.
CASE NO.
933
For:
ILLEGAL
POSSESSI
ON OF
DEADLY
WEAPON
(VIOLATI
ON OF PD
NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2,
1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province
of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument
which from its very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act
committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. — The Orders of dismissal —
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the
offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or
public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be
prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon
charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor.
Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not
allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under
consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons
brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before,
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife
or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in
jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But
it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court,
and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply said
checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and
order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of
bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of
P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously
 existing laws that also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or
impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried
in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui,
contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful and punishable, particularly by
paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala
prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home
by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that the
same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with
such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife
is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that
that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in promulgating this decree may thus be
perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of
extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President intended to make unlawful
and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to
abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-
46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or there should
be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the
country was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in
order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in
the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the
same would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the
penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would
mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying
deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for self-
preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-
46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of
(First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused
were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on other charges.
C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23,
1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under a
state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order
No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly
weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older
to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order
and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in
authority or their agents in the performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or
their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity
causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions
promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated
under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms, companies, corporations
 or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but
not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any
chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such
proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation
of all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or
death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen
years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger,"
"bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements
to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of or for the
purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in
addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
D. — The arguments of the People —
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration
is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is
essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. 1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial;
that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in
connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless
violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. 2
E. — Our Ruling on the matter —
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must,
inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific
statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute
violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the
subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris,
or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of
competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not
exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a
fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry
concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in
any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the
statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the
penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does
not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with
regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7
of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal,
under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to
be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of
oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the
nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation
of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not
used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city
ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal
offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act
falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the
weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory
construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation.
When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic
principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases — the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per
Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the
letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses
of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged
fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part of an
act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or
enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory
note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate
the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied,
and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d
635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult
of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du
Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be ascertained
from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a
limited application if read together with other provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order
to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order
and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081
and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D.
9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its
issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government and against our
people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed
raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and
private buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have
seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder,
turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly constituted
government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids,
ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations,
treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless
elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and
unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this
country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration
of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted
desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v.
American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731;
emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construed
with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the
paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended
by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an
oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so
on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons
brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before,
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife
or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in
jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-
42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his example We may
add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to
his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being
carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived
to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to
enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within
them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36
Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such
laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the
meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently
valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do
not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when the facts
charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the
trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act
145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is sustained the court may order
that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be
admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be
specified in the order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in
custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the second element of the offense
as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a
punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City
Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to
arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was
based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or liability had been extinguished
(Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be filed
against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they
have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and
just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This
obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written
for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons,
specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the
serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to
determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the
Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a
law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the
citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the
Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the
State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other
existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997]
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and
EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
In our predisposition to discover the “original intent” of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we
realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance,
the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provision of the Constitution,
hence void; because its provision that “Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order to process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever”
i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott
garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners’ favor in violation of substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since
criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign
currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank.
The antecedents facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go
with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape
the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people
living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from
Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No.
104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account – China Banking Corp., US $/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal
Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24,
1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure
Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners,
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the
amount P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March
13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of
garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation
saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment
properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the
Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section
113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered
nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of
preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:
“May 26, 1989
“Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmeña Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila
“Dear Ms. Carolino:
“This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
“The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the same been repealed nor
amended.
“The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country’s banking system which would help in the
development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your
subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
“Very truly yours,
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director”i[1]
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners’ motion for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No.
89-3214 entitled “Karen Salvacion. et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott.” Summons with the complaint was published in the Manila Times
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7,
1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter:
“1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
“2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each
or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;
“3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
“4. To pay attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein awarded;
“5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
“6. Costs of the suit.
“SO ORDERED.”
The heinous acts of respondents Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision
as follows:
“The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on
February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention
(Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant
by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro
Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite
the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs through counsel,
defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.
“In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witness the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salacion, Jr.,
a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Mandulio, who gave the following testimony:
“Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred to Arellano University for her
second year.
“In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her
free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her.
She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)
“The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math
teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen’s age and
who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5).
“The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it’s Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house
where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp.5-6)
“They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendant’s house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p.6)
“When they reached the apartment house, Karen notices that defendant’s alleged niece was not outside the house but defendant told her
maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs,
and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
“Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant
got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen’s hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her.
He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)
“Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the
bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could
come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after
the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p.8)
“He then got a Johnsons Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her
but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain.
She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the
defendant was in that position. (Id., pp. 8-9)
“After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could
only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a
shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower,
Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen
had no way of determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before she
went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 o’clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
“The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen
while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In
the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like
“lugaw”. For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex
organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly.
“Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore
but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all those windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted
for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call a police, it was still
possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her
chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
“On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty minutes after breakfast of biscuits; again in
the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because everything was covered by a
carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was
covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and
carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
“That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom
and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through
the hole. She cried: ‘Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan n’yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!’ Somebody heard her. It was a
woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was ‘istorbo.’ Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and
she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
“She woke up at 6:00 o’clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up.
When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On
that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 – 9:00, and the
third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he
caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the
house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she
heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a
woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room
but she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he
might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American bacause the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)
“Afterwards, defendant arrived and opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help because there were many policemen outside
and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell
the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she
could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
“When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could.
She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason
why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking
to them. ‘Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis,’ Karen added. “The policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
“They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode the car of a certain person she called
Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They
were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her
mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
“At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement she gave to the police was marked
Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a
doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in early morning, of the following day when they reached
the NBI, (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.
“She was studying at the St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City at the time of the Incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario
Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She
first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was
denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated
in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
“After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock;
she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad.
(Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she would always
recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this experience.” (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three
consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of
the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the
bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the
lower court? She Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as
the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that “Foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.” should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of
petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners’
favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor
or a class privilege n violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the
herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminal could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their
money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary
Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power when it took away: a.)
the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied
by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No.
960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by
P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits,
but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.)
it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it
applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any
other order process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the
Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines,
thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure; and that it applies to all currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare;
that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to
take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of
restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of
the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A.
No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that
respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands
of Greg Bartelli; that it is not only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings
petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;
and that despite the harsh effect to these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.
This court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained
and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declatory relief.ii[2] However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one
for mandamus.iii[3]
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged
niece the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped
by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was
able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case
for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched
reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the
money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the
favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,
“Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was indoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience
she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so
humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School,
Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the said High
School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case.
xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed
the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault
was in her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial
desire on her nor capable of committing such heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident
happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a snake, xxx.”iv[4]
If Karen’s sad fate had happened to anybody’s own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency
deposit could be more important than his child’s right to said award of damages; in this case, the victim’s claim for damages from this
alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the
questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country’s economy was in a shambles; when foreign
investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times
show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for
being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the
inquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as as the case before us.
It has thus been said that-
“But I also know,v[5] that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes
more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change
with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times… We might as well require a
man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their
barbarous ancestors.”
In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an
alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application
thereof envisaged by the allien. More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment,
garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when
the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient who is not expected to maintain the deposit in
the bank for long.
“The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners
who are merely passing through.
xxx
“xxx Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:
‘Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. – Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.’
“Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:
‘Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the
publication of such rules and regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for
at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank promulgates new rules and
regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations at the time the deposit was made
shall govern.”
“The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426. As amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
‘Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. -- All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential
Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon
the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative
or legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.’
“The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other court process to foreign
currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:
‘WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine
banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;
‘WHEREAS, under provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the establishment of an offshore
banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to receive foreign currency
deposits in certain cases;
‘WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System
and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under the two
Systems such as confidentiality subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income of
depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines;
‘WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign currency deposits,
exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested right of depositors would better encourage the
inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the
Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and
investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country;’
 “Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is to assure the development and
speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines’ (3 rd Whereas).
“The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
‘WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking system, such as political
stability, a growing economy and adequate communication facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines;
‘WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as possible to the sources of
capital funds for economic development;
‘WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be advantageous and beneficial to the
country by increasing our links with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the
Philippines, creating employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing to the
national development effort.
‘WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other positive factors provide the
Philippines with the clear potential to develop as another financial center in Asia;’
“On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD No. 1035. Its purpose are as follows:
‘WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines has been authorized under a
separate decree;
‘WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
(RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange
transactions and participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
‘WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said depository banks under RA
6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to transaction of the proposed
offshore banking units;’
“It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System
were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of
PD No. 1035). It is these depositors that are induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them.
“Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encourage by PD Nos.
1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
“Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking
Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
“For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not
entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment
or other court processes.”vi[6]
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
“Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of
those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may – but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the
lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient
alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426
are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY
with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, “Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC
Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., no part.
Mendoza, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., on leave.

i[1] Annex “R”, Petition.

ii[2] Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1.
iii[3] Nationalista Party vs. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; Aquino vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275; and Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, supra.
iv[4] Decision, Regional Trial Court, Civil Case No. 89-3214, pp. 9 &12; Rollo, pp. 66 & 69.
v[5] Thomas Jefferson, Democracy, ed. Saul K. Padover. (New York, Penguin, 1946) p. 171.
vi[6] Comment of the Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 128 – 129; 135-136.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27, 1995

PANFILO S. AMATAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:
A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed
by the Philippine National Police Station Commander in Bato, Leyte for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip in the afternoon of September
14, 1987. 1 After preliminary investigation by the office of the provincial fiscal, an information charged Umpad with the crime of
Homicide as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Leyte accused Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon" of the crime of Homicide
committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of September 1987, in the Island of Dawahon, Municipality of
Bato, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one GENARO TAGSIP, with a revolver .38 Cal. Snub
Nose Smith and Wesson (Paltik) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose,
thereby causing and inflicting upon the victim fatal gunshot wound on his head which was the
direct and immediate cause of the death of Genaro Tagsip.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Hilongos, Leyte, October 20, 1987.
Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and the consent of the offended party, entered
into plea bargaining where it was agreed that the accused would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of
homicide as originally charged in the information, and would incur the penalty of "four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum to six (6) year of prision correccional maximum as maximum." 2 Consequently, in his decision
promulgated on the 27th of June 1990, respondent judge found the accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
lesser crime of Attempted Homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six years of prision correccional maximum, as the maximum period, exactly in accordance with the
plea bargaining agreement. 3
On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased,
accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, relative to his disposition of Crim.
Case No. H-223 entitled People v. Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon." In said letter-complaint, complainant contends that the sentence of
respondent judge finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide and not Homicide as
charged is proof indicative, "on its face, of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct.
Responding to the complaint, respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individual — with the consent of the offended party — to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser
jurisdiction. He explains that during the May 3, 1990 hearing, accused and his counsel, with the acquiescence and in the presence of the
prosecutor, informed the Court of the defendant's desire to plea bargain pursuant to the aforestated rule. Moreover, he avers that in a
conference on June 27, 1990, the wife of the victim herself agreed to the accused's plea of guilty to attempted homicide, instead of
homicide as she needed the monetary indemnity to raise her two orphaned children. In a Memorandum dated February 5, 1993, the
Deputy Court Administrator recommended that the complaint be dismissed, explaining that:
Section 2 116 is more liberalized as it allows the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense whether or not it is
included in the offense charged in the complaint or information, with the consent of the offended party and the
fiscal. In this regard, it is inferred that the fiscal consented to abbreviate the proceedings and in order not to run the
risk of the accused being acquitted, because there was no conclusive evidence to obtain the conviction of the
accused to the offense charged in the complaint of information.
It may be stated in this connection that unlike in the crime of murder where the accused may plead to the lesser
offense of homicide, in homicide a misinterpretation may arise, as in this case, when the accused pleads guilty to
attempted homicide, because here the fact of the death of the victim, which is the principal element of the crime is
obliterated. This is specially so because the decision/sentence does not contain findings of fact and conclusions of
law but merely an account that the accused pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and the penalty imposed. 4
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to
lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the
accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the
lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces
death; attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a
misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator
when he recommended an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead
to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil
Code 5 admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat
justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the
vehement urge of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted
homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such
principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not
competence, in the performance of his duties. While it is true, as respondent judge contends, that he merely applied the rule to the letter,
the palpably incongruous result ought to have been a "red flag" alerting him of the possibility of injustice. The death of an identified
individual, the gravamen of the charge against the defendant in the criminal case, cannot and should not be ignored in favor of a more
expedient plea of either attempted or frustrated homicide. We have held before that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as
if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 6
Finally, every judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 7 A judge should not only be aware of the bare
outlines of the law but also its nuances and ramifications, otherwise, he would not be able to come up with decisions which are
intrinsically fair. In failing to exercise even ordinary common sense, a judge could be held administratively liable for a verdict that could
in no way be legally or factually sustained or justified.
We note, however, that under the circumstances of the case, respondent judge's erroneous exercise of his judicial prerogative was
neither tainted with malice nor bad faith. The phraseology of Sec. 2, Rule 116 is not crafted with such precision as to entirely eliminate
possible misinterpretation. This observation is bolstered by the fact that the same provision prompted the Department of Justice, on July
31, 1990, or three months after respondent judge took cognizance of the case on April 17, 1990, to issue Circular No. 35, 8 later amended
by Circular No. 55 dated December 11, 1990, clarifying and setting limitations on the application of Sec. 2, Rule 116. The fact also that
respondent reached compulsory retirement age on April 5, 1995 after a long period of service in the judiciary entitles him to a certain
measure of leniency. Nonetheless, the case at bench stands unique because of the potently absurd result of respondent's application of
the law.
ACCORDINGLY, we are constrained to find the respondent judge GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law for which he is hereby
REPRIMANDED na FINED ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS. Let this decision appear in respondent's record of service.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 7, Annex "A".
2 Id., at 9, Annex "C."
3 Ibid.
4 Id., at 3.
5 Civil Code, art. 10.
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
6 Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, 221 SCRA 95.
7 Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.01.
8 DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 35.
Sec. 2, RULE 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides for a process wherein the accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. To
attain the laudable objectives of the rules on plea bargaining and in order that the disposition of criminal cases may be expedited its uniformly as possible by eliminating
unnecessary and costly litigation and in the interest of justice, you are hereby directed to observe the following guidelines, to wit:
1. The trial prosecutor shall immediately move for suspension of the proceedings whenever the accused manifests his intention in court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, to allow the trial prosecutor to evaluate the implications of the offer.
2. The trial prosecutor, with consent of the offended party, may motu proprio agreed to the offer of the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense if the penalty imposable
for the offense charged is prision correccional (Maximum of six years) or lesser or a fine not exceeding P12,000.00.
3. When the penalty imposable for the offense charged is prision mayor (at least six years and one day) or higher or a fine exceeding P12,000.00, the trial prosecutor shall
first submit his comment/recommendation to the City/Provincial Prosecutor or to the Chief State Prosecutor as the case may be, for approval. If the favorable
recommendation is approved in writing, the trial prosecutor with consent of the offended party, may agree to a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. For this purpose, the
Chief State Prosecutor or the Provincial/City Prosecutor concerned shall act on the recommendation of the trial prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt
thereof. In no case shall the subject plea to a lesser offense be allowed without the written approval of the above respective heads of office.
4. In all cases, the penalty for the lesser offense to which the accused may be allowed to plead guilty shall not be more than two (2) degrees lower than the imposable
penalty for the crime originally charged, notwithstanding the presence of mitigating circumstances. The lesser offense shall also be one that is necessarily related to the
offense charged or that the nature of the offense must belong to the same classification or title under the Revised Penal Code or special laws.
For your guidance and strict compliance.
December 11, 1990