Difference in Translation Edited with an Introduction by JOSEPH F. GRAHAM CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS hace164 Robert J. Mathews rida cups itl poston within i ow plbsopicl ton targus te ene that hve aeopragmatts would Ste wy win i rept ay et shy sleet to ae of Dera «raga of 27 Stn Boer we sald singy an tht php vena talaton, ot piso, which it 050 that oh a on my not poem's greater arty withthe oer 7 Des Tours de Babel JACQUES DERRIDA Translated by Joseph F. Graham Babel": first a proper name, granted. But when we say “Babel” today, do we know what we are naming? Do we know whom? If ‘we consider the su-vival ofa teat that sa legacy, the narrative ‘or the myth of the tower of Babel, it does not constitute just one figure among others. Telling atleast ofthe inadequation of one tongue to another, of one place in the encyclopedia to another, of language to itself and to meaning, and so forth it als tells ofthe need for figuration, for myth, for ropes, for twits and turns, for translation inadequate to compensate fr that which multiplicity denies us. In this sense it would be the myth af the origin of myth, the metaphor of metaphor, the natative of narrative, the ‘translation of translation, and so on. It would not be the only structure hollowing itself out lke that, but it would do so in its (wn way itself almost untranslatable, like a proper name), and Its idiom would have to be saved, ‘The “tower of Babel” does not merely figure the iredueible ‘multiply of tongues; it exhibits an incompletion, the irmpose sibility of ishing, of totalizing, of saturating, of completing something onthe order ofedifcation, arhitectual construction, system and architectonies. What the multiplicity of idioms act 5,166 Jacques Derrida Ay nits ny 2 ue tanto, 3 wang ed rst regen, i ar a stale 9 ecco wns The then et wu wnting ian nen! tt fmaluaton, a incomplete of he Conroy apc pt sted tether the talon ot yen in Goss Owe shold never ps ve nsec the Question ofthe tone In which the quo the tongue Fed and ito wh dune on anda tnd Fes nla fongoe with over ef Bake constated and deconstruct tongue thin whith he proper name of Haba sold ao, by conion, be tandted by sone {he poor eal as opr me shuld ean ttl, ut yw td aoa coon sone Cane ened pb on tag tated nth Cog, aommen nesting wha or ete con fon, Vlue showed hi utoshnet nhs Ditonto ‘hip a the Babel ee {do ot knw why sat Cena Babel sige of. 4a, Be Since father he Orta onton al Bel Sieuter Cay abet spies he ey of Cd, the by cy, Te feet gre thi name foal hr cps: Ba Rca thet Bel means confine beeuve the uciets were edd hor having aed th work op 9 iy rowan Jevth fet. or beat the tongs wee then co fonds an sel fom tat ine otha he Cera nelnge anders he Chinese fr icles, secoing tt ‘hols Bacar, Ut Choco bs rgaly hese tone a Tigh Gorman ‘The calm irony of Voltaire means that Babel means: tis not only & proper name, the reference of pare signifier toa single being— sede thcronntrotblbutacmmonnowreated the generality of a meaning. This common noun means, an means not only confusion, even though “confusion” has atleast too meanings, as Voltaire aware, the confusion of tongues, but Des Tours de Babel sy also the state of confusion in which the architects find themselves with the structure interrupted, so that a certain confusion has already begun toalfect the tvo meanings ofthe word “confusion.” ‘The signification of “confusion” i confused, at least double, Bat Voltaire suggests something else again: Babel means not only confusion in the double sense of the word, butalso the name ofthe father, more precisely and more commonly, the name of God as ‘name of father. The city would bear the name of God the father andofthe fither ofthe city that sealed confusion, God, the God, ‘would have marked with his patronym a communal space, that city where understanding is wo longer forse. And understand ing is no longer posible when there are only proper names, and understanding is no longer possible when there are no longee proper names. Ingivinghis name, aname of is choice, in giving llnames, the father would be at the origin of language, and that power would belong by right to Cod the father. And the name of God the father would be the name ofthat origin oftengues. Butit 's also that God who, in the action of his anger (like the God of| Bohme or of Hegel, he who leaves himself, determines himselfin bisfinitude and thus produces history) annul the piftof tongues, ‘oratleast embril it, sows confusion among his sons, and potions the present (Gift-gif). This is also the origin of tongues, of the multiplicity of idioms, of what in other words are usually called ‘mother tongues, For this entire history deploys lations, genera: tions and genealogies: all Semitic. Before the deconstruction of Babe, the great Semitic family was establishing its empire, which it wanted universal, and its tongue, which it also attempts to ‘impose on the universe. The moment of his project immediately precedes the deconstruction of the tower. I cite two French translations. The fis translator stays away from what one would ‘ant tocall “lterality,"in other words, rom the Hebrew figure of speech for “tongue,” where the second, more concerned about literality (metaphoric, oF rather metonyimic), sas “lip.” siace in brow “lip” designates what we eal, in another metoaymy, ongue." One will have to say multplety of lips and not of268 Jacques Derrida tongues to name the Babelizn confusion. The first translator, then, Louis Segond, author of the Segond Bible, published in 1930, writes tis “Those are the sons of Sem, according to their fails, thee tongues ther countries, their nations Sch are the fies of thevsons of Noah, scoring o thelr generations, ther nations. ‘And ts rom theo tha emerged the nations which Spread over ‘Nsetet ar the aod All the arth bad wig tongue and the Same werd. As they bad Tf the origin hey Ton plain in the ‘runny of Schnee, and they dwelt there, They sail to one Srother Come! Let ur make brik, and bake therm in the Bre ‘nd brick served them sone, and tar served as cement. Asin they suid: Come! Let us build urrlves sly and a wer whose Smit tones the heavens, an Tet us make ourselves a ame, Sorthat we not be seatered over the face of al the eat, 1d not know just how to interpret this allusion tothe substite tion or the transmutation of materials, brick becoming stone and tar serving as mortar, That already resembles a translation, 8 translation of translation. But let us leave it and substitute 3 second translation for the first. It is that of Chouraqul, Te i fecent and wants to be move literal, almost verbum pro verbo, a6 Cicero said should not be done in one of those first recommend tions to the translator which can be read in his Libeltus de Op- timo Genera Oratorum. Here itis: ere ar the sons of Shem fer their clans for thei tongues, In thei lads, for their peoples. Here are the clans ofthe sons of Nosh for thelr exits, in thee pooples: From the inter divide the peoples on earth afer the food. Andi ill the earth: a singe lp, one speech ‘Andi a thelr departure from the Orient they find» anyon, Inthe land of Shine ‘They sete there ‘hey sy. each to his ike ‘Come, ete brick some bis, Des Tours de Babel 169 et ws Bie thes in the fe ‘The brick becomes for them stone, the tar, mortar, They sy ‘Como let us bul ourselves ty and tower, is hea in the heavens Let us make ounces name, that wel nat be setered over the face ofall the exh.” What happens to them? In other words, for what does God punish them in giving his name, or rather, since he gives t to nothing and 10 no one, in proclsiming his name, the proper name of “confusion” which will be his mark and his seal? Doet hhe punish them for having wanted to build as high atthe heav- ‘ens? For having wanted to accede tothe highest, up tothe Most High? Perhaps for that too, no doubt, but incontestably for hav- ing wanted thus to make a name for themeloes, to ive ther selves the name, o construct for and by themselves their own name, to gather themselves there ("that we no longer be seat- tered"), a inthe unity ofa place which is at once a tongue and a tower, the one as well as the other, the one as the other. He punishes them for having thus wanted to assure themselves, by themselves, a unique and vniversal genealogy. For the text of Genesis proceeds immediately, as fit were al a matter ofthe same design: raising a tower, constructing a ety, making « name for oneself in a universal tongue which would also be an idioms, and gathering a flition Thy Come, fet sul ourselves yan tower. {tsa nthe heavens. los ake rele ame, thot weno be sstored over the fe fal the eth "aw descends ose the ly and the tower Unt the sos af man have bale vino "es A single people, ingle lp for hati ha thy bead Come! Let v seen Lat cond tt, tan wl no ngernderstand the pa hi ihn.”aro Jacques Derrida Then he disseminates the Sem, and dissemination is here deconstrction: disperses the fom bene over the fice ofall he cath They cate to ut heey (Over which be procaine hi name Boel, Confusion, Sorthere raven conoands the lip of al the earth, tnd fom here wt disperses them over the face ofall the eath Can we no, then, speak of God's jealousy? Out of resentment fagainst that woique name and ip of men, he imposes his name, Tis rane of father, and with this violent imposition he opens the deconstruction of the tower, as of the universal language; he scatters the genealogel fiiation, He breaks the lineage. He at the same time impores and forbids translation. He imposes it and forbids it, constrains, but asf to fallure, the children who hence- forth sill bear his name, the name that he gives tothe city. Tis font a proper name of God, come fiom Cod, descended from God or from the father (and it is indeed said that YEW, an Upronounceable name, descends toward the tower) and by bie that tongues are seattered, confounded or multiplied, according toa desoendance that in its very dispersion remains sealed by the only raze that wall bave been the strongest, by the only ‘dione that will have triumphed. Now, this idiom bears within Itself the mark of confusion, improperly means the improper, to wit: Bavel, confusion. Translation then becomes necessary snd impossible, like the effect ofa struggle for the appropration fof the name, necessary and forbidden in the interval between two absolutely proper names. And the proper name of God (given by God) is divided enough in the tongue, already, to signify also, confsely, “confusion.” And the war that he de= ares has Bist raged within his name; divided, bifid, ambivalent, polysemic: God deconstructing, “And he war,” one reads in innegons Wake, and we could fallow this whole story from the side of Shem and Shaun. The “he war” does not only in this place, tie together an incaleulable numberof phonie and seman- tie threads, in the immediate context and throughout this Des Tours de Babel 78 Babelian book; it says the declaration of war (in English) of the ‘One who says Tam the one who am, and who thus was (war) it renders itself untranslatable in its very performance, atleast in ‘the fct that itis enunciated in more than one language at time, at least English and German. Ifeven an infinite translation ex: Ihausted its semantic stock, i€ would stil translate into one lan oage and would lose the multiplicity of "he war.” Let us leave for another time less hastily interrupted reading ofthis “be war,” and let us note one of the limits of theories of translation: all oo often they treat the passing from one guage to another and do not sulfciently consider the possibility fr languages to be implicated more than two ina text. How i a text written in several languages at atime to be translated? How isthe effect of plurality to be “rendered”? And what of translating with several languages ata time, will that be called translating? Babel: today we take it as « proper name. Indeed, but the proper name of what end of whom? At times that ofa narrative {ext ecounting a story (mythical, symbol allegorical: it matters litle for the moment, a story in which the proper aaine, which {5 then no longer the ttle ofthe narrative, names a tower or a city but a tower ora city that receives its naue from an event during which YHWH "prodaims his name.” Now, thi proper sine, which already names atleast three times and three dfer- ent things, also has, this is the whole point, as proper name the function of a common noun. This story recounts, among other things, the origin of the confusion of tongues, the reducible multiplicity of fioms, the necessary and impossible task of tran lation, its necessity as impossibility. Now, in general one pys litle attention to this fact: i isi translation that we mast often read this narrative. And iy this translation, the proper name retains a singular destiny, since i isnot translated in its ap- pearance as proper name. Now, 2 proper name as such remains forever untranslatable, a fact that may lead one to conclude that it does not stridy belong, for the same reason as the other words, to the language, to the system of the language, be it translted or translating, And yet “Babel,” an event ina singleira Jacques Derrida tongue, the one in which t appears so as to form a “text,” also ‘has a common meaning, a conceptual generality. That it be by way of a pun or a confused association matters lite: “Babel” ‘ould be understood ia one language as meaning “confusion.” And from then on, just as Babel is at once proper name and ‘common noua, confusion azo becomes proper namne and com ‘mon noun, the one as the homonym ofthe other, the synonym as wel, bt nt the equivalent, because there could be no question of confusing them in their value. It has for the translator no satisfactory solution. Recourse to apposition and capitalization (COver which he proclaims his name: Bavel, Confusion”) is not {ranslating from one tongue into another. It commonts, explains, parapheases, but does not translate. at best st reproduces ap proximately and by dividing the equivocation into two words there where confusion gathered in potential, in all ts potential, inthe internal translation, if one can say that, which works the word in the so-called original tongue. For inthe very tongue of| the orignal narrative there i translation, a sot of transfer, that sives immediately (by some confusion) the semantic equivalent ‘ofthe proper name which, by itself, as a pure peoper name, it would not have. AS matter offict, thie ntalingistle transl tion operates immediately: itis not even an operation in the strict sense, Nevertheless, someone who speaks the language of| Genesis could be attentive to the effect ofthe proper name is cffacing the conceptual equivalent (ike piere [rockin Pierre (Peter), and these are two absolutely heterogeneous values oF functions) one would then be tempted to sy frst that a proper name, in the proper sense, does not properly belong to the language; it doesnot belong there, although ond because its call, nas the language possible (what would a langeage be without the possibility of ealing bya proper name?) consequent it can properly inscribe itself in a language only by allowing itself to be translated therein, in other words, interpreted by its semantic ‘equivalent: from this moment ican no longer be taken as proper name. The noun pierre belongs tothe French language, and its translation into foreign language should in principle transport Des Tours de Babel 175 its meaning, This isnot the case with Pierre, whose inclusion in the French language is not assured and isin any ease not of the sume type. “Peter” fn this sonse isnot a translation of Pierre, say more than Londres isa translation of "London," and so forth, ‘nd second, anyone whose so-called mother toniue was the tongue of Genesis could indeed understand Babel ss "confi- sion’ that person then effect a confused translation othe prop {er name by its common equivalent without having need for an- other word, It is asf there were two words there, twa homonyms fone of which has the value of proper name and the other that of common noun: between the two, 2 tfunsation which one can ‘evaluate quite diversely. Does it belong tothe kind that Jakob- som cals intrlingual translation or rewording? I donot hink 3: “rewording” concerns the relations of transformation between ‘common nouns and ordinary phrases, The essay On Translation (ag50) distinguishes three forms of translation. Intratingual translation interprets linguistic signs by means af other signs of the same language, This obviously presupposes that one can know inthe final snalyss how to determine rigorously the unity and identity ofa language, the deidable form oft limits. There ‘would then be what Jakobsoo neatly calls translation “proper,” ‘nterlingual translation, which interprets linguistic signe by means of some other language—this appeals tothe sare presup position as intralingual translation. Finally there would be inter Semiote translation or transmutation, which interprets linguistic signs by means of systems of nonlingustc signs. For the two forms of translation which would not be translations “proper,” Iskobson proposes a definitional equivalent and another word ‘The first he translates, soto speak, by another word: itralingval translation or rewording, The third likewise: ntersemiotc trans. lation or transmutation. In these two eases, the translation of “Wanslation” is @ definitional interpretation. But inthe case of| translation “proper,” translation in the ordinary sense, n= terlinguistic and post-Babelian, Jakobson does not translate; he peats the same word: “interlingual translation or translation proper.” He supposes tha ts not necessary to translate; every=ir Jecaues Derrida ne derstand wht ht meas bo rr/oe has eps ed it, everyone is expected to know what is a language, the relation of one language to another and espectlly identity or Aiference in fact of language. If there is a transparency that Babel would not have impaired, this is surely i, the experience ofthe multiplicity of tongues and the "proper" sense of the word “vanslation.” In relation to this word, when itis a question of| translation “proper,” the other uses of the word “wanslatin’ would be ina position of intralingual and inadequate translation, like metaphors, in short, ike twits ot turns of translation in the proper sense. There would thus be a tanslation in the proper sense and a translation inthe figurative sense. And in order to translate the one into the othe. within the same tongue or from ‘one tongue to another, in the figurative or in the proper sense, ‘one would engage upon a course that would quickly reveal how this reassuring triparttion ean be problematic. Very quickly at the very moment when pronouncing “Babel” we sense the mn- possiblity of deciding whether this name belongs, properly and simply, to one tongue. And it matters that this undecidabiity is at work fn 2 struggle for the proper name within a scene of {genealogical indebtedness, In seeking to “make a name for themselves.” to found atthe same time a universal tongue and & unique genealogy, the Semites want to bring the word to reason, nthe reson can sign slant 2 clo vlnee (since they would thus universalize their idiom) and a peaceful transparency of the human community. Inversely, when God Imposes and opposes his name, he ruptores the rational tans- prency but interrupt also the colonial violence orth linguistic Jmperalism. He destines them to translation, he subjets them to ‘he la of translation both necessary and impossible; i a stroke with his tranlatable-antranslatable name he delivers universal reason (it will no longer be subject to the rule of a particular in bt be inlay nist ery nr: den transparency, impossible univocity. Translation becomes law, duty and debt, but the debt one can no longer discharge, Such insolvency is found marked ia the very name of Babel ee Toure da Babel 75 which at once translates and does not translate itself, belongs without belonging to a language and indebts tse titel for an insolvent debt, to itselfas Fother. Such would be the Babelian performance, This singular example, at once archetypical and allegorical, could serve as an introduction to all the so-alled theoretical Problems of transition. But no thearization, inasmuch as iis Produced in a language, will be able to dominate the Babelin performance. This i one of the reasons why I prefer here, in stead of treating it in the theoretial mode, to attempt to tran late in my own way the translation of another teat on translation. ‘The preceding ought to have led me instead to an early text by Walter Benjamin, "On Language as Such and on the Language of Man” (1936), translated by Maurice de Gandillac (Mythe et Violence, Paris: Denoél, 1973). Reference to Babel is explicit there and is acecompanied by a discourse of the proper tame and on translation, But given the, in my view, overly enigmatic character ofthat essay, its wealth and ite overdetertinatons, I have had to postpone that reading and lint myself to "The Task ofthe Translator” also translated by Maurice de Gandille inthe same volume). Its difficulty is no doubt no less, but its unity remains more apparent, better eeatered around is theme. And this toxt on translation is also the prefice toa translation ofthe Tobleaux porsiens by Baudelaire, and I refer first to the French translation that Maurie de Gandillac gives us, And yet, transla tion—isit only a theme for ths text, and especially its rims it only is primary The ttle also says, from its fist word, the task (Aufeabel, the Imission to which one is destined (always by the other), the com: nt, the duty, the debt, the responsibility. Already at stake ‘sla, an injunction for which the translator as to be responsi be, He must also acquit himself, and of something that implies ‘perhaps a fault, «fll, an error and perhaps a crime. The estay hasas horizon, it will be seen, a “reconciliation, "Aad all tha ins discourse multiplying genealogical motifs and allusions—mare ‘or les than metaphorical—to the transmission of «family seed.76 Jacques Derrida ‘The translator is indebted, he appears to himself as translator fn A situation of debt; and his tasks to render, to render that which rust have been given, Among the words that correspond to Beojamin’s title (Aufgabe, duty, mission, task, problem, tht Which is assigned, given to be done, given to render) thee ae, from the beginning, Wiedergabe, Sinnwiedergabe, restitution, restitution of meaning, How is such a restitution, or even such an aoquittanee, to be understood? Is it only to be restitution of meaning, and what of meaning in this domain? For the moment let us retain this vocabulary of gift and debt, fand a debt which could well declare itself insolvent, whence & sort of “transference,” love and hate, on th part of whoever isn positon to translate, is summoned to translate, with regatd to the text tobe translated (I donot say with regard tothe signatory or the author ofthe origina), to the language and the writing, to the bond and the love which seal the marrige between the author of the “orignal” and his own language. At the center of the essay, Benjamin says ofthe restitution that it could very well ‘be impossible: insolvent debt within « genealogical scene. One ‘ofthe essential themes ofthe tex is the “kinship” oflanguages in 4 sense that is no longer tributary of nlneteenth-century histor ‘cal linguistics without being totally foreign to it. Perhaps i hhere proposed that we think the very possibilty of «historical inguistis. Benjamin has ust quoted Mallarné, he quotes him in French, alter having left in his own sentence a Latin word, which ‘Maurice de Gandillac has reproduced a the bottom ofthe page to indicate that by “genius” he was not translating from German but from the Latin (ingentam). But of course he could not do the same with the thied language of this essay, the French of Mel larmé, whose untransltablity Benjamin had measured, Once ‘gai: how isa text written in several languages at a time to be translated? Here is the passage on the insolvent (L quote as vays the French translation, being content to iachude here of there the German word that supports my point) Des Tours de Babel apy Philosophy and traslaton ae ot utile, however, a sentient ts allege. For there exists philosophic geist, whose ost es harcter th aarti ma Les langues imparts en cola que sluscurs, manauc bs supréme: penser cant derive san aoutoizes hi chuchote: ‘ment, mais tate encore Tinmertelle parle, lever ror terre, des iciomes empéche personne de roe les mots 42 non, se trowersent, par une Eappe unique, lle. ‘ndine matélement a vere the ely that thee words f Malla evoke i apps in fll igor. the philenopher, taste wit sce etme) the cares within tel of sucha angage iste Iytween tery eration and thor” is work has ower re {ec ing it ayo tte wot tna pears int ight athe os aceon teen rik becoming obscure na silt ore impentle wy ets sy ore: of th tak at sont the wanton "pening th ed ofa pare guage [den Ste eer Space ‘ir Rel 2 bringen’ sevens pons vert scp eel {aise Atte scheior nia sar scene that 20 sie wel dig er Livny Se dep to ny hf vending meaning ‘ceases to be the standard? * Benjamin has, first ofall forgone translating the Mallarmé; he has lft it shining in his tet lke the medallion of «proper name, bat this proper name isnot totally lasigniican; It is merely ‘welded to that whose meaning does not allow transport without damage into another language or into another tongue {and Sprache is not translated without loss by either word). And in the text of Mallarmé, the effect of being proper and thus un. translatable is ted less to any name orto any truth of ede«quation than tothe unique occurrence ofa performative free. Then the ‘question is posed: does not the ground of translation nally re- cede as soon as the restitution of meaning ("Wiedergabe des Sinnes"} ceases to provide the measure? Its the ordinary con. ‘cept of translation that becomes problematic: t implied this prov78 Jacques Derrida ‘ess of restitution, the task (Auffabe) was finally to render (iedergeben) what was frst glen, and what was given was, one thought, the meaning. Now, things become obscure when one tries to accord this value ofresttstion with that of maturation (Ox what ground, in what ground, wil the maturation take place lf the restitution ofthe meaning given i for tao longer the rule? ‘The allusion to the maturation of seed could resemble & vitalist or geneticist metaphor: it would come, then, in support ofthe genealogical and parental cade which seems to dominate this tet. Infact it seems necessary hereto invert this order and recognize what I have elsewhere proposed to call the “meti- hore catastrophe”: far from knowing first what “life” or “ami |y" mean whenever we use these familiar values to talk about language and translation; its rather stating fom the notion of language and its “survival” io translation that we could have access tothe notion of what life and family meun. This reversal is operated expressly by Benjamin. His preface (or let us not for. Bets this essay isa preface) elles with values of eed, lif, and especially "survival," (Uberleben hasan essential elation with Obersetzen.) Now, very near the begin- ning. Benjamin seems to propose a simile or a metaphor—it opens with “just a8. ."—and right away everything moves ia sand about Cbersetzen, Ubertragen, Uberleben: esta the anfnaton of ae intimately ened with he ing to sig any ing fr fsa see fom borg ndoe nt 9 mich oleae ns ‘tol Oeleber- For wasn ees afer he pe od forthe inorant vont never Sd he roel te tor a th tine of eh hares te sags of stevel [vlan iene, sural es contain a inert nen No: tine ay ‘hut any meer slg amcor ier)" near to snine the eo ie asd vil aban ir wars a And according toa scheme that appears Hegelian, in a very ‘roumserbed passage, Beajamin calls us to think life, starting Doe Tore de Babel arg fom spit or history and not for “organte eorporeality” alone. There i life at the moment when “survival” spirit, history, works) exceeds biologie life and death "Its rather in recogni. ing for everything of which there is history and which is not merely the setting for history that one dacs justice to this con- cept of ie. Forts startng from history, not from nature -- that the domain of life must Bally be circumscribed. So is bors fr the philosopher the task (Aufgabe] of comprehending all nat- ral fe starting fom this hfe, of much vaster extension, that i the life of history." From the very ttle—and for the mioment I stay with it— Benjamin situates the problem, in the sense ofthat which i precisely before oneself a task, as the problems of the translator and not that of translation (nor, be it said im passing, and the {question isnot negligible, that ‘of the transltoress. Benjamin doesnot say the task or the problern of translation. He naines the subject of translation, as an indebted subject, obligated by = duty, already in the position of heir, entered a survivor in a sencalogy, a survivor or agent of survival. The sur-vval of ‘works, not authors, Perhaps the survival of authors! names and ‘of signatures, but not of authors, Such survival gives more of le, more than surviving, The work does not simply live longer, it lives more and better, be: ond the means of its author. Would the translator then be an indebted receiver, subject to the git and to the given of an ‘original? By no means. For several reasons, including the follow. ing: the bond or obligation ofthe debt does wot pass between & ‘donor and a donee but between two tets (two "productions" or {wo “ereations’), This is understood from the opening of the preface, and if one wanted to isolate theres, here area few, a brutally asin any sampling 1 The task of the trinsator doesnot announce tel or follow {rom « reception. The theory’ of translation does not depend for the essential on any theory of reception, even though it can inversely contribute to the elaboration and explanation of such a theory38 Jacques Derrida ‘2 Translation does not have as essential mission any commu nication. No more than the origina, and Benjamin maintain, socure fom all danger of dispute, the strict duality between the ‘orignal and the version, the translated and the translating, even though he shifts thetr relation. And he is interested in the wans- lation of poetie or sacred texts, which would here yield the ex sence of translation. The entire essay extends between the poetic and the sacred, returning fom the fist to the secoad, the one that indieates the ideal of all translation, the purely transferable the intrainear version of the sucred text, the modal or ideal (Urbild of any translation at al possible. Now, hiss the second thesis: fora poetic text or a sacred text, communication isnot the essential, This putting into question does not directly concern the communicative structure of language but rather the hypoth- esis of a communicable content that could be striedy dis: tinguished ftom the linguistic act of communication. In 1916, the critique of semiotism and of the "bourgenis conception” of lan guage was already directed against that distribution: means, ob- ject, addressee, “There is no content of language.” What lan- ‘guage First communicates i its “eommunicability” ("On Lang tage as Such,” trans, M. de Candillac, 85). Will tbe said that an ‘opening is thus made tovard the performative dimension of ut- terances? In any ease this warns us against precipitation: slat lng the contents and theses in "The Task ofthe Teanslator” and ‘wanslating it otherwise than as the signature ofa kind of proper name destined to ensure its survival as «work 23 Hither is indeed between the translated text and the trans Inting text a relation of original” to version, it could not be representative or reproductie, Translation is neither an image nor 9 0p), ‘These three precautions now taken (nelther reception, nor communication, nor representation}, how are constituted the debt and the genealogy ofthe translator? Or frst, how those af ‘that which i to-be-tranlated, ofthe to-be-tranlated? Lot us follow the thread of life or survival wherever it com rmunictes with the movement of kinship. When Benjamin chal- Der Toure de Babel 81 lenges the viewpoint of reception, it is not to deny it all peti rence, and he will undoubtedly have done much to prepare for a theory of reception in literature. But he wants est to retuen the authority of what he stl ells “the original.” not insofar a t produces its foceiveror is translators, but insofar ast requis mandates, domands or commands them in establishing the lave ‘And it isthe structure ofthis demand that here appears most unusual, Through what does it pass? In a iterary—more strictly speaking inthis case, “poetie”—text it does not pas through the suid, the utored, the communicated, the content or the theme. And when, inthis context, Benjamin stl say “communieation” or “enunciation” (Mitelung, Aussage), its not about the set but shout the content that he visibly speaks: “But what does a liter ary work [Dichtung ] ‘say’? What does it communicate? Very litle to those who understand i. What it has that essential not communication, not enunciation,” ‘The demand seems thus to pass, indeed to be formulated, through the form. “Translation is form,” and the law of tit form has its Brst place in the original. This law fst establishes ‘sel, let ws repeat, as « demand in the strong sense, a requlte- ment that delegates, mandates, prescribes, assign. And as for this law as demand, two questions can arise; they ae different in ‘essence. Fiest question: in the sum total ofits readers, can the ‘work always find the translator who i, as it were, capable? See- ‘ond question and, says Benjamin, “more properly” (as if this ‘question made the preceding more appropriate, whereas, we shal se, it does something quite diferent): “by its essence does it (the work) bear translation and i so—in line with the sigaifia- tion of this form—, does it require translation?” ‘The answers to these two questions could not be ofthe same nature or the same mode. Problematic in the frst case, not necessary (the translator capable of the work may appear oF not spear, but even ifhe does not appear, that changes nothing in the demand orn the structure of the injunction that comes from the work), the answer is properly apodietic in the second case: necessary, a priori, demonstrable, absolute because it comesSa Jocques Derrida fom the internal lw of the original. The original requires tra lation even ifno translator s there, ft to respond to this njune tion, which i a the sume time demand and deste in the very structure of the original. This stature isthe relation of ie to survival. This requirement ofthe other as translitor, Benjamin ‘compares it to some unforgettable instant of lie: i 6 lived as ‘unforgettable, iis unforgetable even if in fet Forgetting finally wins out, It will have been unforgettable—there is its essential significance, its apodite essence, forgetting happens to this un- forgettableness only by accident, The forgettable—which i here constitutive piired by the Fnitode of memory. Likewise the requirement of translation in uo way suffers from not being stisted, atleast it doesnot suffer in so faras itis the very stracture ofthe work. ln this sense the sureiving dimension isan a prlori—end death ‘would not change it at all. No more than i would change the requirement (Forderung) that rns through the original work and to which only "thought of God" can respond or correspond (entprechen). Translation, the desie for translation, is not thinkable without this correspondence with a thought of Go, In the text of 1936, which already accorded the task of the transe lator, lis Aufgabe, with the response made tothe sift of tongues and the gift of names ("Cabe der Sprache,” "Gebung des Ne- ‘mens), Benjamin named God at this point, that of «correspon dence authorizing, making possible or guaranteeing the corre- spondence between the languages engaged in translation. In this narrow context, there was also the matter ofthe relations be: ‘ween lunguage of things and language of men, between the silent and the speaking, the anonymous and the nameable, but the axiom held, no doubs, fo all translation; “the objectivity of this translation is guaranteed in God” (tans. Mt. de Candia, (9). The debt, inthe beginning, Is fashioned inthe hollow ofthis thought of God Strange debt, which does not bind anyone to anyone. Ifthe structure of the work is “survival,” the debt dacs not engige in relation to « hypothetical subjectauthor ofthe original text— ee Tine de Babel ay ead or mortal, the dead man, or “dummy,” ofthe text—but to Something else that represents the formal law in the immanence oF the original text. Then the debs does not involve restitution of ‘copy ora good image, a faitfal representation ofthe original: the latter, the survivor, i itself in the process of transformation The original gives itself in modifying ise this gift is not an abject given; I lives and lives om in mutation: "For in is sur vival, which would not merit the name ft were not mutation and renewal of something livin, the original is modified. Even for words that are solidified there is stil « postmaturation.” Postmaturation (Nachreifé) of «living organism or a seed: this {s not simply a metaphor, either, for the reasons already indi cated. In its very essence, the history ofthis language is dater- ‘mined as “growth,” “holy growth of languages.” 44 Ifthe debt of the translator commits him nether with re- tsrd to the author (dend insofar as his text has structure of san vival even if he is living) nor with regard toa model which mast be reproduced or represented, to what or to whom is he commit ted? How is this to be named, this what or who? What is the proper name ifnot that of the author finite, dead or mortal ofthe text? And who is the translator who i thus commited, who perhaps finds himself committed by the other before having eom- intted himself? Since the translator finds himself, as to the sur. vival of the text, in the same situation as is Dnite and moral producer its “author”) iis not he, aot he himself as afnte and ‘mortal being, who is committed. Then who? It she, of eourse, ‘but in the nsme of whom or what? The question of proper names 4s essential here. Where the act of the living mortal seems to count less than the survival of the text in the translation — translated and translating —it is quite necessary that the sige ature of the proper noun be distinguished and not beso easily ‘ffaced from the contractor from the debt, Lat us not forget that ‘Babel names struggle for the sur-vval of the name, the tongue or the lips. From its height Babel at every instant supervises and sur- Prses my reading: I translate, T translate the translation by184 Jacques Derrida Maurice de Gandia of a text by Benjamin who, prefucing a translation, takes it as a pretext to say to what and in what way ‘every translator i committed-—and notes passing, an essential prt of his demonstration, that there could be no translation of | translation. Ths wil have to be remembered. Fecalling this strange situation, I do not wish only or essen- tually to reduce my tole to that of «passer or passerby. Nothing i ‘more serious than a translation. I rather wished to mark the fact that every translator is na position to speak about translation, in a place which is more than any not second or secondary. For if the structure ofthe original is marked by the requirement to be translated, is that in laying down the lw the orginal begins by Indebting itself es well with regard tothe translator. The original isthe frst debtor, the fint petitioner i begin by lacking and by pleading for translation, This demand is not only on the side of| the constructors of the tower who want to make a name for themselves and to found a universal tongue translating itself by Itself it also constrains the deconstructor ofthe tower: in giving his name, God also appealed to translation, not only botweea the tongues that had suddenly become multiple and confused, but frst of his name, of the name he had proclaimed, given, and ‘hich should be translated as confusion to be understood, hence to let ite understood that (is dificult to translate and 0 to understand. At the moment when be imposes and opposes his law to thot ofthe tribe, he is also a petitioner for transaton, He: is also indebted, He has not finished pleading forthe translation of his name even though he forbids it. For Babel is untransats- ble. God weeps over his name. His text isthe most sacred, the ‘most pectic, the most originary, since he creates a name and sive it to himself, but he is left no less destitute in his force and fever in his wealth; he pleads fora translator. As in La folie du Jour by Maurice Blanchot, the law does not command without ‘demanding tobe read, deciphered, translated. Itemands trans ference (Ubertragung and. Obersetaing and Oberleben). The double bind is in the law. Even in God, and i 8 necessary to follow rigorously the consequence: in his name. Des Tours de Babel 155 Insolvent on both sides, the double indebtedness passes be: ‘ween names. It surpasses prior the bearers ofthe names, by that is understood the mortal bodies which disappear behind the survival ofthe name, Now, a proper noun does and does not belong, we said, to the language, nat even, let us make ¢ precise nove, to the corpus of the text to be translated, of the to-be- voanslated. ‘The debt does not involve living subjects but names at the ferdge of the language or, more rigorously, the trait which con- tracts the relation of the aforementioned living subject to his tame, insofar a the latter keeps to the edge of the language. And this trait would be that of the tocbestranslated fom one language to the other, from this edge tothe other of the proper name. This language contract among several languages is abso- lutely singular. First ofall, tis not what i generally called « language contract: that which guarantees the institution of one language, the unity of is system, and the social contract which binds s community in this regard, On the other hand it is gener- ally suppased that in order to be valid orto institute anything at all, contract must take place in single language or appeal for ‘example, in the case of diplomatic or commercial treaties) 9 a transferability already given and without remainder: there the :nulliplicty oftongues must be absolutely dominated. Here, on the contrary, a contract between two forelgn languages 38 such engages to render possible a translation which subsequently will, authorize every sort of contrat in the orginary sense. The si: ature ofthis singular contract needs no writen document oF record: it nevertheless takes place as trace or at tsi, and thie place takes place even If its space comes under no empirical or ‘mathematical objectivity. ‘The topos of this contract is exceptional, unique, and prac tically impossible to think under the ordinary category of con tract: ina classical code it would have been called transcenden- tal, since in truth it renders possible every contract in general starting with what is called the language contract within the limits ofa single iiom. Another name, perhaps, fr the origi of180 Jcques Derrida tongues. Not the origin of language but of languages—before language, languages, ‘The translation contract, inthis transcendental sense, would bye the contract itsell, the absolute contract, the contrat fort of ‘he contract, that which allows a contract to be what i Will one say thatthe kinship among languages presupposes this contractor thatthe Kinship provides a frst ocasion forthe contract? One recognizes here a classic circle. It has always bes aun to turn whenever one asks oneself about the origin of lane |Ruages or society. Benjamin, who often talks about the kinship among languages, never does so as a comparator ae a historian ‘oflanguages. He is interested les in families of languages than 8 more essential and more enigmatic connection, an affinity which is not sure to precede the trata the contract ofthe to-be- translated. Perhaps even this kinship, this affaity (Verwand- schoft) is like an alliance, by the contract of translation, to the extent thatthe sur-vvals which it associates are not natural lives, blood tes, or empirical symbiose. This developrent Whe tha of fe orga and elevated. Aeternined by ay oa ned eleated, Lean ait thet corelaton sparen eviden, yt cos beyond he pap lewd, onl reveal when te ga in ew af hich SU snglr ates ie a ot ougt nthe popes domain lh abt thr evel moe cael Aeon Bhenomens, ke thet ery Sty, ae, aera Bled nat {ova ie but todd apes sce toed te teprsenttin[Derteang te sigtion Ths tras, {alas pal expen the most Intimate reston aon Kae A translation would not seek to say tht or that, to transport this or that content, to communicate such a charge of meaning, but to resmirk the alfinity among the languages, to exhibit its ‘xn possibility. And that, which holds for the Iterary text or the sacred text, perhaps defines the very essence ofthe literary and the sacred, at their common root, I said "re-mark’ the alfnity 'mong the languages to name the strangeness ofan “expression ee Tours de Babel 267 ("to express the most intimate relation among the languages), which is nether a simple “presentation” nor simply anything else, Ina mode that is solely anticipatory, annuneatoy, emost prophetic, translation renders present an afnity that is never Drosent in this presentation. One thinks of the way tn which Kant at tines defines the relation tothe sublime; a presentation ‘inadequate to that which is nevertheless presented. Here Ben. Jamin's discourse proceeds fn twists and turns 1 i impossible that it [the translation] be able to revel this hidden relation sel, that it be able to estat (ertlen ‘bt trapton can represen [darstellen tht relation tn actuals: fing i ins seed or ins intensity And this tepresntation of Sigied (‘Darstellung eines edeuteten| by the endenvor, by the sed of 5 resttutom isan satcely orginal mae of ecb [ematen ts bly Sut th oan oe. Inte Me. Por the later has, in sali and sgn, types of teference[Hindeutung other than the intensive, tha ists) !ntipatory,annnclatory feorgrefend, andewende)acaian ton. But the relation we are thinking of ths very intone ela tion among the lnguages, Is that of an orginal convergence. 1 ‘onl in this the languages ae not foreign to one another ut, ‘pier and abstracted fom al historical relation, are elated to ‘ve anther in what they mean. ‘The entire enigma ofthat kinship is concentrated here, What ‘smeant by “what they mean”? And what about this presentation in which nothing s presented inthe ordinary mode of presence? At stake here are the name, the symbol, the truth, the letter ‘One ofthe basie foundation ofthe essay, as well a of the 936 text, isa theory of the name. Language ls determined starting fiom the word aud the privilege of naming. Ths in passing. & very strong if not very conclusive assertion: "the orignary ee ment of the translator” is the word and not the sentence, the syntactic articulation. As food for thought, Benjamin offers « curious “image”: the sentence (Sts) would be “the wall in font ofthe language ofthe original," whereas the word, the word for word, ltealty (Wordlichkeit), would be its “arcade.” Whereas188 Jacques Derrida ‘the wall braces while concealing (it is in front of the original), the arcade suport while etng light pas andthe orginal show (ve eno fa from he Pasian passages), Ths priege ofthe word slvouly support that of the name nd wth whats proper {he pmper name, th ster and the very possibly the rans Ion contract. opens onto the economie problem of tase tom, whether tbe a mate of economy the lw of the proper or of economy as «quattative elation it ranting te rant De a proper name into several words, tos phrse or into description, and 0 for). ; “Theres some tosbe-trandlted. From bth ide it assign aed rakes contacts Ie commit not so mich authors at proper names at the edge ofthe langage, it essentially commits ater tocommunicte nora rpresnt, nr to keep an already signed commitment, but rither to draw up the camrit snd to give Uh to the pact, in ther words othe symbaon, nso that Benjamin docs not designate by ths term bt suggests, no doubt wath the metaphor of the amphioa, let uss, sce fom the Start we have suspected the ornary seme ofmetapho wth the smmetphor Ifthe trnltor neither resivtes nor copies an ovina, is because the orgies om ad transform tel. The transla sion il rly be moment in the growth af he orginal. which well complete tal enlarging tll. Now, tha indeed to be, {dn this ht the seminal” log must ave posed itself fon Benjamin, tht growth not give et jot any frm In just ty direction. Growth most socomplish, Al complete (Erne Zungis ere the most ree term). And the orignal lls or complement, ts beease at the origin twas not there thot fal il complete ota dential to el From the orga of the rig nb trasltd thor al nd exe, The translator anist redeem (rtsen), absolve, resolve, in tying to absolve himself of his own deb, which is at Bator the stne-and letomless. "Fo redeem in his owm tongue that pte language cred nthe foeig tongue, to Mberate by transposing this pare lansvae captive nthe work such ithe ask ofthe tansltor Des Touts de Babel 189 ‘Translation isa poetic transposition (Umdichtung). We wil have to examine the essence ofthe "pure languaga” that i liberates. But lt us note for the momnent that this liberation self presup- poses a freedom of the translator, which i elf one other than ‘elation to that “pure language”; and the iberation that it oper- ates, eventually in transavessing the limits ofthe translating fa guage, in transforming it in tur, must extend, enlarge, and ‘make language grow. As this growth comes als to complete, as it is symbolon, it does not reproduce: it adjoins in adding. Hence this double simile (Vergleich, all these tars and metaphoric supplements: (2) “Justa the tangent touches the circle ony ina fleeting manner and a single point, and ust as is tis contac, not the point, that assigns tothe tangent the law according to Which t pursues to inflity its course in a straight line, so the transition touches the original in aleeting manner and only at an infinitely small point of meaning, to follow henceforth its proper course, according tothe law of fidelity in the liberty of language movement.” Each time that he talks about the contact (Berirang) between the bodies ofthe two texts inthe process of translation, Benjamin ealls it "fleoting (flute. On atleast ree corasions, this “fleeting” characteris emphasized, and al- ways inorder to situate the contact with meaning, the fafnitely small point of meaning which the languages barely brush ("The hharmony between the languages is so profound here (in the translations of Sophocles by Hlderlin) thatthe meaning i only touched by the wind of language in the manner of an Eolian lyre"), What can an infinitely small point of meaning be? What the measure to evaluat it? The metaphor ieelf i at once the ‘question and the answer. And here Is the other metaphor, the metamphora, which no longer eoncems extension in 2 straight and ifinit line but enlargement by adjoining along the broken lines of a fragment. (a) "For, just as the fragments of the ‘mphora,ifone is to be able to reconstitute the whale, must be contiguous in the smallest details, but not identical to each ‘other, so instead of rendering iteelf simula o the meaning ofthe ‘original, the translation should rather, in « movement oflove and190 Jacques Derrida 4 full deta, pass into its own language the mode of intention of the original: thus, just as the debris become recognizable as fragments ofthe sume amphora, original and translations become recognizable as fragments ofa larger language.” Let us accompany this movement of lve, the gesture ofthis Joving one (lebend) that is at work in the translation. It does not reproduce, does not restitut, does not represent, as to the es sential, it does not render the meaning ofthe orignal except at that point of contactor caress, the infinitely smal of meaning, It extends the body of languages, it puts lasguages into symbolic expansion, and symbolic here means that, however litle resi tion there be to accomplish, the larger, the new vaster aggre. fate, has still to reconstitute something. It bs perhaps not a ‘whole, butt san aggregate in which openness should not cone tradiet unity. Like the um which lends its poetic topos to 30 ‘many meditations on word and thing, from Hélderlin to Rilke tnd Heidegger, the amiphora is one with itself though opening tel to the outside—and this openness opens the unity, renders itpossble, and forbids it etait. 1ts openness allows receiving and giving Ifthe growth of language must alio reconstitute Without representing, i that isthe symbol, ean translation lay claim to the truth? Truth—wil that till be the name of that hich stl lays down the law for a translation? Here we touch—at a point no doubt infinitely small—the {it of translation, The pure untranslatable and the pure trans- ferable here pas one into the other—and i isthe truth, “tell materially.” ‘The word “truth appears more than once in “The Task ofthe “Translator.” We must not ush to lay hold oft. It is not a matter of teat fora translation i ofa as might conform or be fthfa {o'ts model, the original, Nor any more a mater, ether forthe briginal oF even forthe translation, of some adequation ofthe language to meaning or to realty, nor indaed ofthe representa: ‘ion to something. Then what is It that goes under the name of truth? And will tbe tht new? {Let us start aguin fiom the “symbolic.” Let us cemember the metaphor, or the ammetaphor: a translation espouses the origi Des Tours de Babel sox zal when the two adjoined fragments, ne dilferent as they can be, complete cach other s0 as to form alrger tongue inthe course af A survival that changes them both. For the native tongue of the translator, as we have noted, i altered as well, Such at leat is ‘my Interpretation —my translation, my “tak ofthe translator” tis what I have called the translation contract: hymen of may riage contract with the promise to produce a child whose seed will give rise to history and growth. A marriage contract in the form of seminar. Benjamin sys as auch, inthe translation the original becomes larger; it geows rather than reproduces tell and Iwill add ike a child, ts own, no doubt, but with the power ‘to speak on its own which makes of «child something ther than 4 product subjected to the law of reproduction. This promise signals @ kingdom which is at once “promised and forbidden ‘where the languages will be rooonciled and fuliled.” Tiss the most Babelin note in an analysis of sacred writing as the model and the limit of all writing, in any ease of all Dichtung.in is being to-betranslated. The sacred and the being-o-be-trans- lated do not lend themselves to thought one without the other ‘They produce each other atthe edge of the same limit. ‘This kingdom is never reached, touched, trodden by transla- tion. There is something untouchable, and in this sense the reconcihtion is only promised. But a promise is not nothing, tt 's no simply marked by what it lacks tobe fulflled, As prom. {se translation is already an event, and the decisive siguature of 4 contract. Whether or not it be honored does not prevent the ‘commitment from taking place and from bequesthing ts regord ‘translation that manages, that manages to promise reconellia- tion, to talk about it, to desire it or make it desirable—such translation is a rare and notable event. Here two questions before going clover tothe truth. OF what does the untouchable consist, if there i such a thing? And why does such metaphor or ammetaphor of Benjamin make me thik of the hymen, more visibly of the wedding gown? 2. The always intact, the intangible, the untouchable (ane berithrbar) is what fascinates and orients the work of the want. lator. He wants to touch the untouchable, that which remains of92 Jacques Derrida ‘the text when one has extracted ffom it the communicable mean {ng (point of contact whichis, remember, infinitely sill), when fone has transmitted that which can be transmitted, indeed taught: what Ido ere, after and thanks to Maurice de Gandia, ‘knowing that an untouchable remnant of the Benjeminian text will also remain intact at the end of the operation, Intact and Virgin in spite of the labor of translation, however ecient or Pertinent that may be. Pertinency has no bearing here, If one ‘an risk a proposition in appearance to absurd, the text will be ‘even more virgin after the passage of the translator, and the hnyimen, sign of virginity, more Jealous of itself after the other hhymen, the contract signed and the mariage consummated, ‘Symbolic completeness will not have taken place to its very end and yet the promise of mereiage will ave come about—and this ‘the task ofthe trnsator, in what makes it very pointed as well as itreplaceable, But again? Of what does the untouchable consist? Let us study ‘again the metaphors or the ammetaphors, the Ubertragungen ‘which are translations and metaphors of translation, translations (Chersetzungen) of translation oF metaphors of metaphor. Let us study all ofthese Benjaminian passages. The Bist figure which ‘comes in here i that ofthe core andthe shel, the fruit and the shin (Kern, Frucht!Schal). It deseibes in the final analysis the distinction that Benjamin would never want to renounce or even bother to question, One recognizes a core (the original as such) by the fact that it can bear further tranelatiog and restranslating, ‘translation, ax such, eannot. Only core, because i ests the ‘translation i attracts, can offer itself to further translating operae tions without letting Itself be exhausted. For the relation of the content to the language, one would also say ofthe substance to the form, ofthe signified tothe signfier-—it hardly matters here (inthis context Benjamin opposes tenor, Geka, and tongue or languase, Sprache)—difers from the orginal text othe transl tion. Inthe fist, the unity i just as dense, tight, adherent as between the fruit and its ski, Is shell or its peel. Not that they are inseparable—one should be able to distinguish them by Des Tours de Babel ag rights--but they belong to an organie whole, and i isnot lasge nificant that the metaphor here be vegetal and natural, naturals: te This Kingdom i (the orginal i teasation) sever filly atin, bul iis there that found what maker trandaing more Sa communicating More precisely one can define his esental ore ‘8 that which in he Wansaon, eno ansatabe ea, Fon ‘uch a one may extrac ofthe commiicale inorder fo tins ‘te there aly comains this untouchable fowards which ented the work ofthe true translator, Its ot tansmisable, a ‘isthe creative word of the ogo "shertrabar we das Dice. wort des Original, for the relation ofthis enor the ange Ss covet rent inthe oral ad he tant The ‘ral, tenor and language form determinate vty Ue that of the fa aod the sin, ‘Let us dsseet abit more the rhetoric ofthis sequence. I isnot certain that the essential “core” and the “ful” designate the same thing. The essential core, that which inthe translation is not translatable again, isnot the tenor, but this adherence be. tween the tenor and the language, between the fruit and the skin, This may seem strange or incoherent thow can a core be situated between the frit and the skin‘). It is necessary no doubt to thnk thatthe core i first the bard and central unity that holds the fruit tothe skin, the fruit to itself ar well, and above al, that, at the heart of the feat, the core is “untouchable,” beyond reach and invisible, The core would be the fist metapher of hat makes for the unity ofthe two term in the second meta: ‘hor. But there isa third, and this time one without @ neural Drovenance, It concerns the relation ofthe tenor tothe language inthe translation and no longer fn the original. This relation fs ferent, and I do not think I give in to artifice by insisting on this difference in saying that i is precisely that of artifice to nature, What in fac is it that Benjamin nots, a ifn passing, for thetorcal or pedagogical convenience? That “tho language ofthe translation envelops its tenor Ike a royal eape with large folds For it is the signifier of a language superior to itself and 10a4 Jacques Derrida remains, in relation to its own tenor, inadequate, forced, for- eign.” That és quite beautifl,a beautifi translation: white er- Ine, crowning, scepter, and majestic bearing, The king has indeed a body and is not here the orginal text but that which constitutes the tenor of the translated text), but this body fs only promised, announced and disimulated by the translation, The clothes Bt but do ot cling ststly enough to the royal person This isnot a weakness; the best translation resembles this royal cape. It remains separete from the body to which itis nev- ertheless conjoined, wedding t, not wedded to it, One ean of ‘course embroider on this cape, on the necessity ofthis Ubertra- tung, ofthis metaphoric translation of translation. For example, tne ean oppose this metaphor to that ofthe shell and the core Just as one would oppose technology to nature. An article of ‘othing is not natural its a fabric and even—another metaphor ‘of metaphor—a teat, and this text of artifice appears precisely on the side of the symbolic contact. Now, if the orginal text = ‘demand for translation, then the fruit, unless it be the core, insists upon becoming the king or the emperor who will wear new clothes: under its large folds, in woviten Faleen, one will Imagine him naked. No doubt the cape and the folds protest the ‘king against the cold or natural aggressions but frst, above alt is, ike his scepter, the eminent visibility of the law. Iti the index of power and of the power to lay down the law. But one infers that what counts is what comes to pass under the cape, €2 wit, the body of the king, do not immediately say the phallus sround which a transation buses its tongue, makes pleats, molds forms, sews hems, quits, and embroiders, But always amply lating at some distance from the tenor. 2. More or less strictly, the cape weds the body ofthe king, but as for what comes to pass under the cape, itis dificult to separate the king from the royal couple. This isthe one, this ‘ovple of spouses (the body ofthe king and his gown, the tenor and the tongue, the king and the queen) that lays down the lv and guarantees every contract fom this fst contract. That is ‘why T thought ofa wedding gown, Benjamin, we know, does not Des Tours de Babel 195, push matters in the direction that I give to my translation, read- Ing himn always already in translation. More or less faithfully I have taken some liberty with the tenor ofthe original, as much as with ts tongue, and again with the original that is aso for me, now, the translation by Maurice de Gandilae, I bave added soother cape, loating even more, but is that not the final dest ‘ation ofall wanslation? At lest if a translation is destined to Despite the distinction between the two metaphors, the shel and the cape (the royal cape, for he sald “royal” where others could have thought a cape suiced), despite the opposition of nature and art, there i is both eases a aniy of tenor and tongue, natural unity i the one case, symbolic unity ta the other. Simply in th translation the unity signals a (metaphorically) more “nat ‘wal unity it promise a tongue or language more originary and almost sublime, sublime to the distended extent thatthe prom ise itself—to wit, the transltion—there remains inadequate (unangemessen), violent and forced (gewaltig), and. foreign (jrema), This “facture” renders useles, ever “forbids,” every Ubertragung, every “transmission,” exaly as the French trans- lation says: the word also plays, like a transmission, with trans. ferential or metaphorical displacement, And’ the word Uhertragung imposes itself again afew lines dawn: the transl tion “transplants” the original onto another terran of language ironically" more definitive, isto the extent that it ould no longer be displaced by any other “transfer” (Obertragung) but ‘only “raised” ferheben) anew on the spot “in other pats." There 's no translation of translation; that isthe axiom without which there would not be “The Task of the Translator.” fone were to violate it, and one must not, one would touch the untouchable of| the untouchable, to wit, that which guarantoes tothe original tha it remains indeed the original. ‘This is not unrelated to truth. Truth is apparently beyond every Obertragung and every possible Ubersetang, Itis not the representational correspondence between the original and the translation, no even the primary a196 Jacques Derrida ‘nal and some objector signification exterior tot. Truth would be tater the pure language in which the meaning and the letter no longer dissociate, If such a place, the taking place of such an ‘event, remained undiscoverable, one could no longer, even by right, distinguish between an original anda translation, In enn taining this distintion at all cost, asthe original given of every translation contract (in the quasi-transcendental sense we dis- ‘eysed shove), Benjamin repeats the foundation ofthe law In so ‘doing he exhibits the possibilty of copyright for works and au- thor, the very possibility by which actual lw claims to be sup- ported. This law collapses atthe slightest challenge to strict boundary between the original and the version, indeed to the ‘dentty oto the integrity ofthe original. What Benjani says bout this relation between original and translation is also found translated ina language rather wooden but faithfully reproduced 4 to its meaning at the opening ofall legal treatises comcerming the actual law of translations. And then whether it be a matter of the general principles of the dierence originalltranslation (the latter being “derived” from the former) or a matter of the transla: tions of translation. The translation of translation is sald to be “derived” fiom the original and not from the fist translation. Here are some excerpts from the French aw; but there doesnot seem tobe from this point of view any opposition between it and the rest of Western law (nevertheless, study of comparative law should also concern the translation of legal texts). As we shall, see, these propositions appeal to the polarty expression/ex- pressed, signiie/sigiied, form/substance. Benjamin also be- san by saying: translation ‘is a form, and the symbolizersym- bolized split organizes his whole essay. Now. in what way i this system of oppositions indispensable to tis law? Beeause only it allows, starting from the distinction between original and trans- lation, acknowledgment of some originality in the trandlation ‘This originality is determined, and this is one ofthe many classic philosophemes at the foundation ofthis las, as originality of ‘expression. Expression i opposed to content, ofcourse, and the translation, which is not supposed to touch the content, ust be Des Tours de Babel 197 ‘original only in its language as expression; but expression i also ‘opposed to what French jurists call the composition of the orig rl, In general one places composition on the se of form, but here the form of expression in which one can acknowledge some Criginality to the translator, and for this reason the rights of suthor-translator, is only the form of linguistic expression, the choice of words inthe language, and so forth, but nothing ele of Whe form. I quote Claude Colombet, Proprité literate et are istique (Paris: Dalioz, 1976), from which I excerpt nly a few lines, in accordance with the law of March 23, 1957, recalled at the opening of the book and “authoring... only analyses and short quotations for the purpose of example o illustration,” be- ‘cause “every representation or reproduction, integral or partial, made without the consent ofthe author or ofhis beneficiaries or executors, is illegal,” constituting. “therefore an infraction punishable under aeticles 4a5 and following ofthe Penal Code.” St—Tranltions are works which are original oaly by ex: Bevan, ey piesa fearon, the ete of apyigh, iis indeed that only the form can becoae property td the dns, the themes, the content, which are sommon ‘nd universal property. (Compare all of chapter in this book labuence deprotection des ites par le dot ute ) ta Best consequence is gpd, since thir form that defines the orig tality ofthe ansatn, another consequence could be rine, fort woul lead to abandoning that which ditingiches the orig ‘al fom the transition i excluding expression, amounts fo ‘tinction of absence Unless the value of ompostion, hewey. rls it may be, wore ail to idiate the ft that betwee ‘original and the translation the relation i neither of expression norof content but of something eee beyond these oppositions Tn folowing the dificult of the juriste—sometimer comic nf, ‘azn sublety~-soasto draw the consequence fa aoms of the type “Copyright does not protect Wear bit thee canbe ‘onetines indirectly, protected by means ater than the liv March i, 1957" id, 3) one measures beter the Mstoriiy sed conceptual fragt ofthis se of axiom aril 40 the I ‘es them among the protected works i fact hs aways been ‘imited hats tansatr demonstrates orga inthe chuce of198 Jacques Derrida expressions to rendor bes ia one language the meaning ofthe feat tn anotber language. ASE Savior 54, "The gens of each Language gies the translated work Is wm physiognomys Sd the tanslator i ota simple workman. He himaelf pst patesin a derived creation fr whch he bears sown respon ‘ys that fat translation isnt theres of wn automate ‘roo, by the choices he maker among several words, several ‘Srpressions, the tansator Eshions a work of the mind: but of couse, he could ever ody the covposiion ofthe work tas ited, fore ts bound to rexpet tht work, Inhis language, Desbois says the same thing, with some ada- tional detail: Derived works which are orginal in expresdon. 29. The wore spe contin 1 be racy arial lemphased by Desbois need not bear the impeint of persnaity at once in composition and exprossion, Uke adaptation Is enough tt the author. ile flowing step by step the development of 3 preexistot work, hive periormed a personal actin the ok fr we ates ice. onan on Ineraton of derived works, Wt puts translations in the pice honor. "Padutore, tate,” he elias are wont oy. ia Tito wit, which, ie every con, has to sides! there ar had tears, who multiply miseadings, otbes are ced forthe perfection of thot lsh. The kof «mistake or an inperdtion ‘hss counterpart the perspective aan aatheati erin, which Impies« perfect knowledge ofthe two lnguages, an abundance of judicious cokes, and thus a creative effort Conlin + dc: inary suices only for mediocre cancates tothe buclasreste ‘heconsietious and competent anlator ‘ges of himeal and ‘reais jst ke the punter who makes «copy of adel —The ‘erfcaton ofthis conclusion i fumathed by the comparison of Severe traslatons fone and the sane text: ec ay ifr fo ‘Be others without any one contatuing a misreading the varity ‘nodes of expression fora single thought demonstrates, with the osblty of cholo, thatthe task of he tender sees om fo ‘manesations of personally. [Le droit outer en France Pas loz, 1978) ‘One will note in passing thatthe task ofthe translator, nafined to the duel of languages (never more than two languages) gives Des Toure da Rabel 209 rise only to “creative efor” (effort and tendency rather than achievement, artisan labor rather than artistic performance), and when the translator “erates,” its like a painter who copies his ‘mode (a ludicrous comparison for many reasons; there any use in explaining?) The recurrence of the word "task" is remarkable ‘enough in any ease, forall the signfiations that ft weaves into & network, and there is always the same evaluative interpretation: uty, debt, tat, levy, toll inheritance and estate tax, nobiliary obligation, but labor midway to creation, infinite task, essential incompletion, as i the presumed crestor ofthe original were othe too—indebied, taxed, obligated by another text, and a rior! translating Between the transcendental law (as Benjamin repests i) and the actual lnw asi is formulated so laboriously and at times 50 ‘rudely in treatises on copyright for author or for works, the analogy can be followed quite far, for example in that which ‘concerns the notion of derivation and the translations of ransla- tons: these are always derived from the original and not from revious translations. Here isa note by Desbois: ‘The wansator will not even cease tofshion personal work when he ges to draw advice and ispteation from preceding rand on We wal ot refse th status of author for a work tats derived, in relation to anterior trndatons, to Someone whe would have been content to shoor, ong several versio ae realy published, the one tht seemed to the mos adequate tothe original going fom one to the ober, aking pasage fom this on, nother from that one, he would erate «new work. By the very fc ofthe combination, which renders his work diferent ffom antacedont productions, He has csered teat. since ‘istration rele «new form se eau from comprows, ffom choices, Tho tanaator would stil predecesor, whose work, by suppostin, he would not have own: his ‘unintentional replica, far fom amounting to lar |Birsm, would bear the mark of his peeonsliy, woud prevents ‘subjective novel.” which would ell for protection The te ‘versions, accomplished separately and each sthout haowledge af the other, gave rise, sepraely and inva, to manestae200 Jacques Derrida tions of personaly. The second wil bea work deioed vine the work that hos been trandated, nt vidas the fit bi, {my empha tnthe lst sentence). Of this right to the truth, what is the relation? ‘Translation promises «kingdom to the reconciliation of lan ‘ages. This promise, a properly symbolic event adjoining, cou- pling, marrying two languages like two parts ofa greater whole, appeals toa language of the truth ("Sprache der Wahsheit”). Not toa language that is true, adequate to some exterior content, but to true tongue, (oa language whose truth would be referred only to itself It would be a matter of truth ae authenticity, ruth ‘fact or event which would belong tothe original rather than to the translation, even ifthe original Is already in a position of demand or debt, And if thore weee such authenticity and such force of event in what is ordinarily called a translation, its that it would produce itself in some fasion ike an orignal work. There ‘would thus bean original and inaugural way of indebting onesel that would be the place and date of what sealed an orginal, a ‘work, To translate well the intentional meaning of whst Benjami means to say when he speaks of the “language of the trth, perhaps itis necessary to understand what he reguasly says bout the “intentional meaning” ofthe “intentional aim’ ("Ine tention der Meinung,” “Art des Meinens"). As Maurice de Gan- dlllac reminds us, these are categories borrowed from the scho- lastes by Brentano and Husser, They play a role that i Impor- tant if not always very clear in “The Task of the Translate.” ‘What is it that seems intended by the concept of intention (Meinen)? Let us retura to the point where in the translation there seems to be announced a kinship among languages, be- yond all esemblence between an original and is reprosietion and independently of any historical fiiation. Moreover, kinship ‘does not necessarily imply resemblence. With that sald, in dse missing the historical or natural origin, Benjamin does not ex- clude, in « wholly diferent sense, consideration of the origin in Des Tours de Babel 208 general, any more than a Rousseau or a Husserl did in analogous contexts and with analogous movements. Benjamin specifies uit literally: for the most rigorous access to this kinship orto ‘his afinity of languages, “the concept of origin [Abetarmunes- begrif] remains indispensable.” Where, then, is this original alfnity to be sought? We see it announced in the plying, re- plying, co-deploying of intentions. Through each language some- thing is intended which isthe same and yet which none of the languages ean attain separately. ‘They can claim, and promise themselves to attain it, only by eoemploying or codeploying their intentional modes, “the whole of théir complementary Inten- Yional modes.” This codeployment toward the whole 1s a lying because what i€ intends to attain is “the pure langue’ (die reine Sprache"), oF the pure tongue. What is intended, then, by this co-operation of languages and intentional modes is not transcendent to the language; It isnot a reality which they would besiege from al sides, like «tower that they would try to surround. No, what they are aiming at intentionally, individlly and jointly, in translation isthe language itself as a Babelian ‘even, language that isnot the universal language inthe Leib- nigian sense, a language which isnot the natural language that each remains on is own either; i isthe being language of the language, tongue or language ar such, that unity without any selfidenity, which makes for the fct that there are languages and that they are languages. ‘These languages relate to one another in translation according to an unheard-of mode. They complete each other, say Ben- Jamin; but no other completeness in the world can represent this ‘one, or that symbolic complementarity. This singular (not rep- resentable by anything in the world) comes no doubt frm the intentional mode or from what Benjamin testo translate in & scholastico-phenomenologial language, Within the same inten- tional aim iti necessary to distinguish rigorously between the thing intended, the intended (Gemeinten), and the mode of fntention ("die Art des Meinens”) As sooa ashe sight the org ‘nal contract oflanguages and the hope forthe “pute tongue,” the202 Jacques Derrida tsk he talator exces the intended or vest between Sooke The mode of tenton sone ssi th tk of tanto sry thing nt prtnd sleet for eump, bed tf sntended byway of deren nodes a nage ond in toto ngage son thse mae at he tron sl sek pede o reproduce, camlemen tty of« “harmon.” Aad ce to empleo emlement dons at ant othe smmaton of any erly the ie of harry oe jsnen ad what can re Be tle te accord tng. This isthe ue thd the beltanguge of hence toate neue ther hn preventing eA ong ts cord Jos nt ke place. the pore language remains ide, coeelel (er. Bergen ure the mca inn fh “ce” Only ‘nln cn ake emerge, Emerge and shoved develop, mak gow, Always wording tthe same oti appnance ore vil, one cul the ay tha ach ange oa fale nt lten, meager aed it goth sly: Ovig to rasan Others ings plement by hon a font Bese she whet thy ad ges harmony. ‘Kerang of lnguags oars the gh of hngage soe “nly growth of engage aat nese ie 1) Ao ats sanovnced inthe tmaton proces hoe “he tel sural neg” Can emg Foden der Sprcen or "eit eich [Ache] lage This pepe rvesconc, this const rexracraos o ted Auflbe! by tad sa revelton vl SH, tha anton an allanc anda poms This edur ce metental here, These ota the lint the pre even trae dl of pure te Fey th cl arn fom whch oe cul hk ev tte mere the etl that fo ty post, wanton Tranton,a hly vt of ngage, anaes te Simic ely, bt he sg ofthat nd ano it ro Des Tours de Babel 00, “present” (gogenwartg) only in the “Knowledge of that dis tance,” in the Entfernung, the remoteness that relates us to it. One can know this remoteness, have knowledge or & presenti ment oft, but we cannot overcome it. Yet it puts us in contact sth that “language of the truth” which i the "true language” (Cao it diese Sprache der Wahrbeit—die wahre Sprache"). This contact takes place inthe made of "presentiment,”in the “inten- sive” mode that renders present what is absent, that allows re- moteness to approach as remoteness, fortda. Let us say that the translation i the experience, that which is translated or experl- ‘enced as well: experience is translatia, ‘The to-be-translated ofthe sacred text, ts pure transferability, that is what would give at the lit the ideal messure for al translation. The sured text assigns the task tothe translator, and itis sacred inasmuch a it announces itself as transferable, simply transferable, tocbe-ranslated, which does not alvay mean i= mediately translatable, in the common sense that was dismissed ftom the stat. Perhaps it is necessary to distinguish here be- {eon the transferable and the ranstable. Transferability pure ‘and simple is that of the sacred text in which meaning and liter- ality are no loager discernible as they form the body ofa nique, lnreplaceable, and untransferable event, "materially the truth.” ‘Never ae the ell for translation, the deb, the task, the assgna- ton, more imperious, Never is there anything snore transfers ble, yet by reason ofthis indistinction of meaning and literality (Worlichket), the pure transferable ean announce ieee, give present itself, let iself be translated as intranslatable, From this limit, at once interior and exterior, the translator ‘comes to receive al the signs of remoteness (Entferuna) which iside him on his infinite course, at the edge ofthe abyss, of madness and of silence: the lst works of HOlderlin as transl tions of Sophocles, the collapse of meaning “Tom abyss to abyss," and this danger i not that of accident, it is trans ferablty. it isthe law of translation, the to-bestranslated ae law, the order given, the order received—and madness waits on both sides. And as the task is impossible at the approaches to the204 Jeeques Derrida sacred text which assigns ito you, the infinite gui absolves you immediately. ‘Thats what is named from here on Babel: the lw imposed by’ the name of God who in one stroke commands and forbids you to translate by showing and hiding from you the limit. But its not nly the Babaien stution, not only a scene ora structure, Iti also the status and the event ofthe Babelian text, of the text of| Genesis (a unique text in this regard) as sacred text. It comes under the lav that it recounts and translates in an exemplary way. It lays down the law it speaks about, and from abyss to abyss it deconstructs the tower, and every turn, twists and turns of every sort, in a rhythm, ‘What comes to pass fa sacred text isthe occurrence of pas de sens, And this eveat Is slso the one starting from which its possible to think the poetic or literary text which tres to redeem the lst stcred and there translates itself asin its model. Pas de sens-—that does not signify poverty of meaaing but no mesning that would be itself, mesning, beyond any “literalty.” And right there isthe saceed. The sacred surrenders itself to translation, which devotes itself tothe sacred. The sacred would be nothing ‘without translation, and translation would not ake pace withost the sacred; the one and the other are inseparable. Inthe sacred text “the meaning has ceased to be the divide for the flow of| language and for the low of revelation.” Tt i the absolute text, because in its event it communicates nothing, it says nothing that would make sense beyond the event itself. That event melds ‘completely with the act of language, for example with prophecy. eis literally the literalty of its tongue, "pure language,” And sinoe no meaning bears detaching, transterring, transporting, of translating into another tongue as such (as meaning), it com= mands right away the translation that it seems to refuse. It ‘transferable and untranslatable. There is only letter, and isthe tuuth of pure language, the truth as pure language ‘This aw would not bean exterior constraint; grant a Uberty to liteaity. In the same event, the letter ceases to oppress Des Tours de Babel 205 Insofar a it eno longer the exterior body or the coset of mesn- Ing. Th letor also translates itself of itsolf, and it is inthis self relation ofthe sacred body thatthe tsk ofthe translator finds itself engaged. This situation, thowgh being one of pure lit, oes not exclode—quite the coatrary—gradation, virtuality, Interval and in-between, the infinite labor to rejoin that which is nevertheless past, already given, even here, between the lines, already signed, ‘How would you translate a signature? And how would you refrain, whether it be Yahweh, Babel, Benjamin when ho signs right next to his ast word? But literally, and between the lines, i {is alo the signature of Maurie de Gandillac that to end I quote ‘in posing my question: can one quote signature? "For, to some degree, al the great writings, but to the highest point sacred Seripture, contain between the lines their virtual translation. ‘The interinear version ofthe sacred tex isthe model or ideal of all translation.” ‘Translatr’s Note ‘Translation isan art of compromise, only because the problems of translation have no one saution and none that i fully satisfac. tory. The best translation is merely better than the worst o some extent, more or less. Compromise aso precludes consistency It would have been possible, and it once seemed plausible, to ‘maintain regular equivalents at leat for those terms that figure ‘prominently ia the argument. But the result was not worth the ‘Serle. There was consolation for so much effort to so little ‘fice in that whatever we di, we were bound to exhibit the true principles of translation announced In our txt. And so this trans- lation is exemplary to that extent. To the extent that we were ‘guided in translation, the principles were also those found inthe test. Accordingly, asilhouette ofthe orginal appears for effect in many words and phrases ofthe translation,206 Jacques Derrida Publication ofthe French text s also significant in telling of ‘ur situation, Among the many differences inthis translation, 3 few appear already in Uae original ‘The quotations from Walter Benjamin are translated from the French, not the German. The biblical passages are also trans lated trom their French versions, since Derrida works from translations in both eases, Here are some of the problems for which I found solutions least satisatory ‘Dos Tours de Babel.” The tile canbe readin various ways. Des means “some”; but it also means “of the,” “fromm the,” oF “about the.” Tours could be towers, twits, techs, turns, oF tropes, as ina “turn” of phrase. Taken together, des and tours hhave the same sound as détour, the word for detour. To m that economy in language the tlle has not been changed. languellanguge, Its dificult to mark this diference in En- aiish where “language” covers both. Whenever posible, "tongue has been used for langue, and “language” only tn those cases that are clearly spectic rather than generic. Langoge is then translated as “language” i the singular and without modi. fer, though nt always, The German Sprache itsoduces farther complications ‘urvie. The word means “survival” as well as “afterlife its use inthe text also brings out the subliaal sense of more life and ‘more than life, The hyphenation of “survival” is an admitted cheat performance, The French has not the primarily dramatic connotation of the English but rather the sense of prowess and sucoes; its use here also relates to the “performative” of speech pasde-sens. With this expression Derrida combines the pas of negation with the pay of step in a most curious igure. My English suggested a skip, Des Tours de Babel 307 De ce droit ala efrité quel est le rapport? This sentence could be translated by any and all ofthe following? What i the ‘elation between this law and the truth? What isthe gain fom this law tothe truth? What isthe relation betwoen this ight to the tuth and all the rest?Appendix Des Tours de Babel JACQUES DERRIDA Babel: un nom propre abord, soit. Mais quand nous disons ‘Babel ayjourd’hu, savons-nous ee que nous nommons? Savons- ‘nous qui? Si nous consdérons ls surve dun texte legue, le récit ‘ou le mythe dela tour de Babel, ine forme pas une figure pari autres. Disant au moins Tinadéquation d'une langue & Tautre, un lieu de Feneyclopédie a Fautre, du langage aluisméme eta sens, et. il ditausi la nécessité de a Aguration, du rythe, des ‘wopes, des tours, de la traduction inadéquate pour supper &ce ‘quo la multiplicité nous iterdit, En ce sensi seri le mythe de Torigine du mythe, la métaphore de la métaphore, le réit da rei la traduction de la traduetion, ete ne serait pas la seule structure a se ereuser ainsi mais i le ferait a sa manige (elle rméme @ peu prés intrduisible, comme un nom propre) et i faydralt en saver Vidiome. La “tour de Babel” ne figure pas seulement la multiplicté irréductible des langues, elle exhibe wn inachevement,Fimpos- siblité de compléter, de totaliser, de saturer, 'achever quelque chose qui est de ordre de édification, de la construction archi- tecturale, du systéme et de Tarchitectonique. Ce que la multi plicité des idiomes vient limiter, ce nest pas sealement une 209210 Appendix traduction “wae” une entexpresson traneparente et adé- hate cost au un onde sttua, ie dhérence du com Struc. IL «8 (eaduson) comme uo lm inteme ala foralsation” une inconplétude del construct. sera f- sll et jus uncertain point jute Jy vor In tadecton vn ‘yitime on décontrcton (ne devrt jis pastor sous lence ls question de la lange dans quelle se pote question dl ange tse adit unos su a radon Diabord: dans quelle lngue la tour de Babel fatelle con straitetdécnstite? Danse langue Aina de lace iam no abel a rnin, ie Pat “onuson.” Le nom propce Habel en tan ow Aevait reser Itdusible mais, par une ote de son ‘souatve que seuleTange endl pole on put ere le traduire, das ete linge meine, par un nom commun sin fat ce que row raisons par confusion. Veltae sen nea sins das om Disonairepisopigu, 4 Tarte Babe Jee ips poet an a Ged ie ge ‘lan cr Be i ese ges ete Se sane ics betes Bee te wae {even nae So tutes exes See it ieee gu bibl et Ue ofa et ar a ‘chee fren conn pe va neler oe {oh gta nlp fly pe es a foscminen ces iemtant Saate e Echiserndat rt Choos ren ie ‘st Bice el hina st oagsarenen ete Jangue que le haut-allemand. a Lironietranguile de Voltaire veut dire que Babel veut dire: ee west pas seulement un nom propre, la référence dun signifiant ur un existantsinguier—et cette intraduisible— mais an om commun rapporté a la genéralité d'un sens, Ce nom com> ‘mun veut die, et non seulement la confusion, encore que “eon fusion” ait au moins deux sens, Voltaire y ext atten, la conf. sion des langues mais aussi Tétat de confusion dats lequel se Appendic ain ‘convent ls architectes devant a structure interrompue, si bien «qin cersine confision a dé commeneé 2 afocter es deur sens dv mat “confusion.” La signification de “confusion” est confuse, #4 moins double. Mais Voltaire suggire autre chase tncore: Babel ne veut pas seulement dire confusion au doble sense de oe mot, nats aus le nom du pére, plu préisément et. rhs communement, e nom de Dieu comme nom de pore. La Nile porterat le nom de Dicu le pare, et du pare de la ville qui ‘Bappele confusion. Dieu, le Dieu auratmarqué de son pie twonyine un espace communautsire, cette vile ob Ton ne pet plus ¥entendre. Eton ne peut pls sentendre quand n'y aque dtu nom propre, et onne peut pls entendre quand n'y plus {ae nom propre. Ea donnant son nes, un aom de son cots, en ‘loanant tous es noms, le pre serait Forigne du language et ce pouvoir appartcndrat de doit 4 Diew le pére. Et le nom de Dieu le pre serait le nom de cette oigine des langues. Mais estas co Die qu, dans le mowement des core comme le Dieu de Bahine ou de Hegel, celui qu sort de lu se déter- snine dans 5a nitude et produ ain! histoire) annul don des Inngues, on du moins e broil, sémela.consion pare sess et empoisoune le présent (Gigi). Crest aust orgine des langues, de la multiplets des iiomes, autrement dit de ce quo appele courumment des langues maternlies. Car toute fevte store Uplate des ations, des genéations et des gé- ‘ealogies seniques Avant I déconstruction de Babe, a grane de aml sémitique état en tain dub son empire, elle le voubit universel, ets langue, quelle tente aus dimposer 3 Tunivers: Le moment de ce projet préctde immédistement ta {construction de la our. Je ct deux taductons ranges. Le premier traductour se tient aster loin de qu'on voudrait ap: Daler la “wera,” auteemont dit dela figure hébreve pour fice “lng,” lot le second, pls souciew de literal (méta horigue ou pte métonymigue, dt “ere” puisquen hebrew fn designe par “lee” ce que nous appelons, dune autre Inétonyiie, hngue-" i fudea die mulupicté des loves et ‘on des langues pour nommer I confusion babelieane Le pre-aig Appendix ‘ier traducteur, done, Louis Segond, auteur dela Bible Segond pparue en 2910, éerit cee: Ge soot I les ls de Sem, selon lore fale, selon lear ane ‘gos, selon Teurs pas, selon leurs nations. elles on ls files es fil de Nod, felon leurs géntrations, selon les nation. Et ‘cet deux quo sont erties les nations qu sont répanduer sor Ie'tere apres Te deluge, Toute la torre aval ne seule langue et les mémes ots. Comme ts étaient parts de Torin, it ‘rouvErent une pie du pays de Sehinear, etsy babitren. ls se dent Fun a Taute:Alons! fasons des biques, at cironlee ‘nf. Eta riqu lur sent de pierre, ot le bitune leur seit 4e iment Ms arent encore: Alloa! biteens-nous une ile ot tue tour dont le sommet touche au ee, sone nos uh nos, ain que nous ne soyons ps disperses sue a ace de toute Is ete Jene sas comment interpréter cette allusion ala substitution ou Als transrmutation des matériau, la brique devenant pierre et le Ditume servant de mortier. Cela déja ressemble & une traduce tion, 4 une traduction de la traduction, Mais tuons une seconde traduction & Ia premidre. Ciest cele de CChouraqui. Elle est récente et se veut plus itérale, presque verbum pro verbo comme Cicero dsat qu'il ne fill surtout pas faire, dans un de ces premiers conseils au tradueteur qu'on peut lire dans son Libellus de optima genera oratorum. Voici Voici les Bs. do Shem our leurs clans, pour leurs langues, ‘ins lous teres, pur leurs peuple. ‘oll Jes clans dex ls do Nosh pour leur geste, dns leurs peuple de ceutl te scindent les peuples sur terre, apes le deluge, Et Cet tut a tee: aoe seule bre, digues parle, Br cot lar depre Ont wont uh cade, tn tere de Shing Tay eablavnt 1s dent cacun 8. son serblbe: ‘Alls brgaetone des bases, Flambonele ambée | Appendic ag La vique deve pour eu plese, le tune, mort. Te dao ‘Alans, bison nous oe vl tone tour. Sette ant lene Futons un nom, aoe nour ne eyins daperaa ur a ace de toute a ese Que leur arrive-til? Autrement dit, de quol Dieu les punitt en donnant son nom, ou plutt, car il ne le donne a ren ai & personne, en clamant son nom, le nom propre de “confuslon” ‘gui sera sa marque et son sceau? Les punitl d'avoir woul con- struire & hauteur de cieux? d'avoir voolu acoéder av pls hast, jusqulau Tris-Haut? Peut-tre, sane doute ausst, mais incon- testablement avoir voulu ainsi se faire un nom, se donner 8 ceurméimes le nom, se construire eaxeinémes leur propre nom, sy rassembler (“que nous ne soyons plus dispersés") comme dans Tunité d'un leu qui est la fois tne langue et une tour, Tune comme Tautre. If les punit avoir ainsi voulu sassuer, ‘Ceurmémes, une généalogie unique et universlle. Carle texte ‘dela Genase enchaine imméditement, comme si sagisait du méme dessein: élever une tour, construire une ville, ee fire un nom dans une langue universlle qui soit aussi un idiome, et assembler une fiiation Ts dist “Als, bitisonsaous une ville ot une tout ‘Se te’ ax eu Fatonenove wn nom, que nous ne sions dspersts sur la fe de tote la tere» ‘ct descend pour voir a ile a tou ‘ge ont bites le ls de Thome, dt Out Un seul peuple, une seule lve pour tous ‘ol ce qs commencent fre! homme nentendea pl lave de ro prochain.» Puls il dssémine les Sem, eta disséeninaion est fi désonstruc- tion214 Appendix ‘swat Tes disperse de a sr Is ace de toute a tere Ts casent de it le vile Sur quot Ul elae son nom: Bael, Confusion, car Bisa conn Ia evre de toute I tere, ftde I yn los dapere sur I fae dette I tere, Ne peat-on alors parler d'une jalousle de Diew? Par ressenti- ‘ment contre ce nom ot cette Ibvre uniques des hommes, fim pose son nom, son nom de pere; et de cette imposition violente i entame la déconstruction dela toue comme de langue univer salle, il disperse la fliation généalogique, 1 ompt la lignée. I impose et interdit la fois la traduction. Ii impose et Vinterdit, Y contrant, mais comme a T'écheo, des eafints qul désormais Porteront son nom, lenom quid donne &l ville, est depuis un fom propre de Dieu, venu de Diew, descendu de Dieu ou dy pére [et lest bien dit que YHWH, nom inpronongable, descend vers Is tour), et maryué par lui que ls langues ee dispersent se bile refute, Tl est traductible et intraduisible. n'y a que de la letire, ot cesta verité du langage pur, la vrité comme langage ur. Cette loi ne serait pas une contrainte extérieur, elle acorde une lberé 3 la litérlité, Dans le méme événement, la lettre ‘esse dopprimer das lors quelle n'est plus le corps extérieur ou Te-coret de sens, Elle se traduit aussi delleméme, et ees dans ce apport sol du comps saeré que se trouve engage la che du traducteur. Cette situation, pour étve celle dune pure limite, ‘exclu pas, au contaire, les degrés, le virtulité, Vintevale et Tentre-deus, le labour iafni pour eejoindee ce qui pourtant est passé, deja donné, ici méme, entre les ligne, dé signe ‘Comment traduiiez-vous une signature? Et comment vous en abstiendriez-vous, quill Sagise de Taweh, de Babel, de Ben- jamin quand il signe tout prés de son dernier mot? Mate 2 ls lettze, ot entre les lignes, c'est aussi a signature de Maurice de Gandilla que pour fini je ite en porant ma question: peut-on citer une signature? "Car, A un dearé quelcongue, titer les arandes éeritures, mas au plus haut point Berita site, con- tuennent entre les lignes leur traduction virtuelle, La version Sntralinéaie du teste sacré est le modale ou Tidéal de toute ‘waduetion.” Contributors [Aan Bass received his Ph.D. fom the Johns Hopkins University tnd then went on to psychoanalytic taining in New York Ci where he snow practicing analyst. He has translated and, ‘nnotated four books by Jacques Deri and has lectured and writen widely on deconstruction and psychoanalysis Gymbhia Chase, assistant profesor of English at Cornell Univer- sity, has published essays on Freud, Wordsworth, Rousseau, and George Eliot. She is curently working on intrtextua rela onthips in romans writing Jacques Derrida is director of studies at L'Beole des Hautes Etudes and also directs the Colle Tnterational de Philosophie His work alredy translated includes Speech and Phenomena (ag7s), Of Grammatology (ag78), Writing and Diference (3578), Spurs (978), Archeology ofthe Fricolou (3960), Dissemination (498%), Fosilons (1981), and Margins of Philosophy (1983). Joveph F, Graham teaches French at Tulane University. He has ‘written mostly about theories oflanguage and literature, His new ‘work wll appear fist in Onomotopoctic and later in Principles Sor Literary Criticism, 249