PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT

GUIDELINE

MECHANICAL INTEGRITY (MI)

PTS 60.2202
OCTOBER 2009
 PREFACE
PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication, of
PETRONAS OPUs/Divisions.

They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design, construction,
operation and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where appropriate they are based on, or
reference is made to, national and international standards and codes of practice.

The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied by
PETRONAS' OPUs in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas processing plants, chemical
plants, marketing facilities or any other such facility, and thereby to achieve maximum technical and
economic benefit from standardization.

The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and decision
to implement. This is of particular importance where PTS may not cover every requirement or diversity
of condition at each locality. The system of PTS is expected to be sufficiently flexible to allow
individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in PTS to their own environment and
requirements.

When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use PTS they shall be solely responsible for the quality
of work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In particular, for those
requirements not specifically covered, it is expected of them to follow those design and engineering
practices which will achieve the same level of integrity as reflected in the PTS. If in doubt, the
Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without detracting from his own responsibility, consult the
owner.

The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users:

1) PETRONAS and its affiliates.

2) Other parties who are authorized to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual
arrangements.
3) Contractors/subcontractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers under a contract with users
referred to under 1) and 2) which requires that tenders for projects, materials supplied
or - generally - work performed on behalf of the said users comply with the relevant
standards.

Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with users,
PETRONAS disclaims any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage (including injury or death)
suffered by any company or person whomsoever as a result of or in connection with the use,
application or implementation of any PTS, combination of PTS or any part thereof. The benefit of this
disclaimer shall inure in all respects to PETRONAS and/or any company affiliated to PETRONAS that
may issue PTS or require the use of PTS.

Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual
arrangements, PTS shall not, without the prior written consent of PETRONAS, be disclosed by users
to any company or person whomsoever and the PTS shall be used exclusively for the purpose they
have been provided to the user. They shall be returned after use, including any copies which shall
only be made by users with the express prior written consent of PETRONAS.

The copyright of PTS vests in PETRONAS. Users shall arrange for PTS to be held in safe custody
and PETRONAS may at any time require information satisfactory to PETRONAS in order to ascertain
how users implement this requirement.

PTS 60.2202
3 OCTOBER 2009
 TABLE OF CONTENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................. 6

1.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................................. 6

1.1.1 Structure and Content............................................................................................. 6
1.1.2 Format....................................................................................................................... 6
1.1.3 User Base ................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Using the Mechanical Integrity PTS ................................................................................... 6
1.2.1 Language .................................................................................................................. 6
1.2.2 Application ............................................................................................................... 7
1.2.3 Feedback .................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 Relationship with Other Systems ....................................................................................... 7

2.0 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY............................................................................................................. 9

2.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................... 9

2.1.1 Aim ............................................................................................................................ 9
2.1.2 Expectation............................................................................................................... 9
2.1.3 Link with Other System Elements........................................................................ 10
2.1.4 Basis and Compatibility ........................................................................................ 11
2.1.5 Scope if Mechanical Integrity ............................................................................... 11
2.2 Ensuring Equipment Integrity........................................................................................... 13
2.3 Mechanical Integrity Model ............................................................................................... 14
2.4 Mechanical Integrity Process............................................................................................ 15
2.4.1 Controls for Mechanical Integrity ........................................................................ 15
2.4.2 Identifying MI-applicable equipment ................................................................... 16
2.4.3 Management of equipment files ........................................................................... 17
2.4.4 Establish inspection, testing, and preventive maintenance programmes ...... 17
2.4.5 Execute activities................................................................................................... 19
2.4.6 Documenting Results and Updating Plans ......................................................... 19
2.4.7 Managing Deficiencies .......................................................................................... 20
2.5 Quality Assurance.............................................................................................................. 20
2.5.1 Quality Assurance for Service Providers............................................................ 20
2.5.2 Quality Assurance for Equipment, Materials and Spares ................................. 21
2.6 Mechanical Integrity Database.......................................................................................... 21

3.0 DELIVERABLES FROM MECHANICAL INTEGRITY .................................................................. 22

PTS 60.2202
4 OCTOBER 2009
4.0 PERFORMANCE MONITORING .................................................................................................. 23

4.1 Monitoring........................................................................................................................... 23
4.2 Assurance ........................................................................................................................... 23
4.3 Actions Tracking and Follow-Up ...................................................................................... 24

5.0 RECORDS MANAGEMENT .......................................................................................................... 25

6.0 MANAGEMENT ACTIONS............................................................................................................ 25

APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................ 27

APPENDIX 2: ESTABLISH MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM........................................................... 31

APPENDIX 3: DETERMINING EQUIPMENT LISTING ............................................................................. 34

APPENDIX 4: MANAGING EQUIPMENT FILES....................................................................................... 36

APPENDIX 5: PREPARING SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY PLAN............................................. 38

APPENDIX 6: EVALUATING RESULTS AND CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES....................................... 40

APPENDIX 7: TRAINING AND EVALUATING MI RELATED COMPETENCY OF PERSONNEL .......... 42

APPENDIX 8: SELF ASSESSMENT OF MI PROGRAMME ..................................................................... 44

APPENDIX 9: CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF MI PROGRAMME .................................................... 56

APPENDIX 10: FAILURE MECHANISMS ................................................................................................. 59

APPENDIX 11: MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES .................................................. 64

APPENDIX 12: MI INTERVENTIONS ........................................................................................................ 65

PTS 60.2202
5 OCTOBER 2009
1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objectives
This PTS covering Mechanical Integrity (hereinafter referred to as MI) has been written to
provide the guidance and tools necessary to develop and operate a system for managing and
controlling change with respect to business, operational, and HSE matters in PETRONAS
HCU/OPUs at the corporate and business activity levels, following and aligning with the
principles described in the PETRONAS Health, Safety, and Environmental Management
Systems (PTS 60.0101 : HSE MS) which incorporates process safety standards and
requirements.

This PTS provides:

• A reference for HCU/OPUs’ line managers and senior staff needing guidance in the
essential MI requirements of any area of PETRONAS operations.

• A route map and linkage to more detailed references and cross-references with guidance
on their application.

1.1.1 Structure and Content

Refer to the Table of Contents for an overview of how this PTS is structured.

1.1.2 Format

This PTS is arranged in either hardcopy or softcopy format, which are available on the
PETRONAS intranet for downloading and subsequent reference and usage.

1.1.3 User Base

Users of this PTS on MI are expected to be HCU/OPUs and selected contractors. The
PTS will either serve as a reference for others to assist in the development of 'in-house'
specific reference documents, or will be used as a first-line reference in the case of
smaller organizations.

1.2 Using the Mechanical Integrity PTS

1.2.1 Language

In this document the recommendations for a course of action are made with varying
degrees of emphasis. As a rule:

‘shall’ indicates a course of action with a required, mandatory status within the
HCU/OPUs. The English language equivalent or interchangeable term of “shall” is ‘must.”

‘should’ indicates a preferred course of action.

‘may’ indicates a possible course of action.

In this PTS document the collective expressions of PETRONAS are sometimes used for
convenience in contexts where reference is made to the HCU/OPUs in general. These
expressions are used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular
company or companies.

PTS 60.2202
6 OCTOBER 2009
 1.2.2 Application

Should any significant deviations be made from the guideline or recommendations in this
PTS document, then users are required to inform PETRONAS of the nature and
justification for these if it is intended that the deviations are to be permanent.

1.2.3 Feedback

This PTS document is not intended as a static set of rules, but a growing collection of HSE
expertise. Users are invited to comment on the PTS to PETRONAS and to suggest
changes or additional material which they consider would be useful for inclusion in future
revisions.

1.3 Relationship with Other Systems

This PTS has been designed and written so as to link back to the higher level document, the
PETRONAS Health, Safety and Environmental Management System (PTS 60.0101 : HSE
MS). It has been developed to be an integral part and tool to assist in managing integrity and
reliability of facilities or equipment within the overall PETRONAS HSE MS. Figure 1 below
illustrates the elements of the PETRONAS HSE MS and their interactions.

Leadership and Commitment

Policy and Strategic Objectives

Organization, Responsibilities,
Resources, Standards, & Doc.

Hazards and Effects Management

Corrective
Planning and Procedures Action

Implementation Monitoring

Corrective Action and

Assurance
Improvement

Corrective Action and

Management Review
Improvement

Figure 1: The PETRONAS HSE MS

The MI activities covered in this PTS fit into the overall PETRONAS HSE MS, and include, but
are not limited to, the following examples:

Leadership and Commitment: HCU/OPU Management shall commit and expect all leaders
to proactively lead, establish and maintain MI System, programs and initiatives in their
respective HCU/OPU.

PTS 60.2202
7 OCTOBER 2009
Organization, Responsibilities, Resources, Standards, and Documentation: The roles
and responsibilities for establishing and maintaining an MI System and to ensure that it is
effective shall be clearly defined within the HCU/OPU’s existing organizational structure. This
includes designation of responsible personnel / custodian(s) to manage all aspects of the MI
System; allocation of sufficient resources to the system; development of standards to ensure
suitable, adequate, and effective performance of the MI System on site; and establishment of
both document and records control management systems to handle MI-related
documentation.

Hazards and Effects Management (HEMP): MI processes shall be suitably, adequately and
effectively integrated into the Hazards and Effects Management Process. This commonly and
minimally would require that all MI activities be subject to a relevant and robust risk
assessment process prior to such activities being approved.

Planning and Procedures: All business / HSE planning activities shall consider the potential
effects of practicing MI at site, and the potential effects of NOT introducing MI at site, where a
structured MI System may be necessary. Documented procedures shall be in place to
mechanical integrity.

Implementation and Monitoring: Evidence of the suitable, adequate and effective

implementation of the MI shall be available at the HCU/OPUs.

Assurance: From time to time, and based on planned schedules, the MI system shall be
subject to PETRONAS Assurance activities.

Management Review: The suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of the MI System shall be
periodically reviewed by the HCU/OPU Management as part of their formal and periodic
Management Review processes at site.

PTS 60.2202
8 OCTOBER 2009
2.0 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY

2.1 Overview

The MI System follows and aligns with the HSE and business principles of PETRONAS in
preventing or minimizing the consequence of major incidents involving hazardous substances
or conditions of the operations.

HCU/OPUs shall establish an MI System and review the associated programs and schedules
to ensure a focus on pro-active management of integrity. Facilities used to process, store or
handle hazardous substances needs to be designed, constructed, installed and maintained to
minimize the risk of releases of such substances.

MI is a subset of Asset Integrity within the HSE MS PTS 60.0101 which provides documented
assurance that equipment and structures remain reliable for continued service

2.1.1 Aim

The aim of MI is to manage the integrity of facilities through the application of effective
inspection, maintenance and operational strategies reflecting predictive, risk-based
assessment of facility deterioration.

For HCU/OPUs, this requires ensuring that the lines of defence, for operating and
maintaining the process as designed and to keep the hazardous substances contained,
are protected by the MI program and strengthened where appropriate.

A well implemented MI System ensures that the people, assets and surrounding
environment of the HCU/OPUs are not adversely affected by inadequate evaluation of
hazards, threats, and other potential undesired events related to failure of facilities.

2.1.2 Expectation

For each HCU/OPU implementing a MI System, there should always be clear expectations
and outcomes as a result of such implementation. As a guideline, HCU/OPU Management
shall ensure that the following expectations, as a minimum, are delivered:

• All process, control and utility equipment and system shall be identified,
catalogued and categorised. The inventory of equipment shall be comprehensive
and up-to-date, and should be focused on the needs of the MI System and not
adopted from other sources such as registers for financial/depreciation purposes.

• Risk-based assessment techniques shall be used to determine the priority of

facilities with regard to the impact on health, safety, environment and
business. The methods used, such as ECA, FMECA, RBI, SIL and extent of the
risk based techniques should be commensurate with the likelihood and severity of
potential hazards. These techniques should be applied comprehensively.

• Effective operation, maintenance and inspection activities shall be carried

out by competent personnel and suitably reported. Whether the activities are
preventative or corrective, the methods used, timing of the activities and
competency of personnel should reflect the identified risk exposures.

• Collected data shall be analysed to identify imminent threats to integrity, and

to determine trends of deterioration that shall be used to update risk profiles
and set future intervention programs. The analysis of collected data is vital for
improving performance of the equipment integrity.

• Where failures occur, these shall be investigated to determine the root

causes, recommendations made to prevent recurrence, actions tracked to

PTS 60.2202
9 OCTOBER 2009
 completion and risk profiles updated. Learning from unexpected events is
essential to ensure that such events are predicted in future and dealt with in a
suitable manner.

• The ongoing quality and technical basis for MI activities shall be monitored
and corrective actions shall be taken where necessary. Continual improvement
is a key requirement of the HSE MS.

2.1.3 Link with Other System Elements

The following HSE MS activities will normally have a direct link to the MI activity. The MI
Custodian is accountable for ensuring that all suitable links are identified for their
relevance on a case-by-case basis, and if affected, appropriate change control measures
are identified, implemented, and monitored. Figure 2 below illustrates the relationship
between MI activities with various stages of equipment lifecycle.

Industry Regulations Company

Guidelines Standards

Project Safety Equipment Design

Review Package

Project
Equipment File

Fabrication/ Installation
Tests and Inspections

Training

Process Hazards Analysis Preventative

Maintenance Tests and Equipment
Incident Investigation
Inspections, and Maintenance File
Management of Change Repairs

Decommissioning

Demolition

Figure 2: Process Equipment Integrity Chart (Source: CCPS Guidelines for Auditing
PSM Systems, pg 74)

PTS 60.2202
10 OCTOBER 2009
 Use of systematic checklists for each change request can help ensure this process is
robust and complete.

• Management of Change (MOC) – MOC may be triggered by MI finding or may

require revisions to MI program.

• Design Integrity (DI) – The design specifications will have significant impact on the
operation, maintenance and inspection of facilities. As such, facilites shall be
designed to optimise the MI burden and permit MI activities to be undertaken.

• Process Safety Information (PSI) – Process Safety Information is essential for

effective MI program.Results of MI program may require updating of PSI documents.

• Operating Procedures (OP) – Operating procedures and practices are necessary to

support the MI programs. Likewise, in developing OP, the input from MI program
shall be considered to ensure equipment are operated within safe operating envelop

• Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) – The HEMP assessment

processes may result in new requirements for the MI programs.

• Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) – The PHA process of hazard identification and
risk assessment (HAZOP, FMECA, etc.) may result in new requirements for MI
programs.

• Training and Competency – Trained and competent personnel are required to

execute MI activities.

• Contractor Management – Contractors may be engaged to conduct certain

specialized MI activities.

2.1.4 Basis and Compatibility

This PTS:

1) Supports PTS 60.0101, HSE MS Manual, which provides “global” HSE

management system guidance for PETRONAS companies,

2) Recognises the need for compliance with corporate and legal regulatory
requirements.

3) Is compatible with ISO 14001 : 2004 Standard for Environmental Management

Systems and the OHSAS 18001 : 1996 Specification for Occupational Health and
Safety Management Systems

4) Incorporates internationally accepted “best management practices.”

2.1.5 Scope if Mechanical Integrity

The MI system is defined and implemented in line with the HCU/OPU HSE policy.
Strategic elements of the programmes include the following provisions:

• Management System: The management of an important activity requires the

implementation of policies, procedures, work instructions and documentation. It is
imperative to ensure roles and responsibilities are assigned, authority is given,
supervision is provided, resources are made available, and people are held
accountable for MI activities.

ƒ The Head of HCU/OPU shall demonstrate leadership and commitment in

ensuring that all reliability and integrity matters are systematically and

PTS 60.2202
11 OCTOBER 2009
 structurally managed, discussed, implemented, monitored and communicated.

ƒ The Facility Owner is accountable for ensuring that the jurisdictional

requirements relating to MI are met.

ƒ The MI Custodian is accountable for implementing the MI System, and

responsible for coordinating the MI activities and ensuring that the MI programs
are being carried out in accordance with the established procedures.

ƒ Line Management is responsible for ensuring that activities required to support

the application of the MI System are in place and operational, and that the MI
System is adequately implemented in their area of responsibility.

ƒ All relevant personnel are responsible for understanding the requirements of

the MI System, identifying deficiencies in facilities that are outside acceptable
limits, recommending changes of the MI System, and performing MI activities in
a safe manner.

• Applicable Facilities: For the purpose of this program, the term “MI-applicable”
facilities shall apply to all equipment and systems that is managed under the MI
program. See section 4.4.2 for examples list.

• Codes and Standards: There are many industry codes and standards that apply to
MI, particularly for establishing effective testing and inspection frequencies for
preventive maintenance e.g. API, ASME and IEC. All referenced codes and
standards shall be documented.

• Maintenance, Inspection and Testing: Appropriate programs that ensure proper

and systematic maintenance shall be developed using risk-based approaches such
as the RBI and RCM methodologies to establish credible Preventive Maintenance,
Inspection and Test Plan based on criticality assessment, i.e. risk and
consequence. There is a continuous improvement process for defect elimination to
avoid business losses. Specific Equipment Reliability Plan shall be established, and
scheduled for execution as planned; routine or turnaround. See Appendix 5 for
guidelines on preparation of Specific Equipment Reliability Plan.

A combination of breakdown/corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance may be

employed.

• Quality Control of Maintenance Materials and Spares: As a minimum, essential

receiving inspection shall be conducted at the site. System shall be in place to
handle any non-conformance. Where appropriate, vendor quality systems should
be assessed

• MI Procedures: Written procedures shall be developed and implemented for MI

activities, covering the lifecycle of the equipment and facilities. The plant operations
and processes are evaluated in terms of the risk to people, asset, environment,
reputation and business interests. The MI program shall include equipment which
may cause or contribute to a loss of containment of hazardous substances.
Rationale for excluding any equipment shall be documented.

• MI Training: All personnel, including contractors, involved in operating, and

inspecting, testing and maintaining the integrity of equipment, shall be competent
for the tasks they will perform. Suitable training and assessment programs covering
relevant procedures and safe work practices shall be defined and implemented.

• Operational Deviation: Critical operating parameters and limits shall be

established and monitored. This should include deviation reporting and
investigation.

PTS 60.2202
12 OCTOBER 2009
 • Controlling and Managing Deficiencies: A written process shall be implemented
for identifying, evaluating, and correcting deficiencies in MI-applicable equipment
that are outside acceptable limits. Equipment deficiencies found during tests and
inspections shall be rectified before further use or addressed in a safe and timely
manner when protective measures and continuous monitoring are taken to assure
safe operation.

• Quality Assurance (QA): A QA system shall be in place to ensure that process

equipment is suitable for its intended process service. The QA system includes
appropriate activities to verify that equipment design, procurement, fabrication,
construction, and installation is consistent with manufacturer’s recommendations
and good engineering practices. A QA program for management of equipment
including repair and maintenance, materials, and spare parts ensure that such
equipment is suitable for its intended service.

2.2 Ensuring Equipment Integrity

Requirements

In ensuring the process equipment integrity programme is successful, the Mechanical

Integrity system is appropriately supported by the several elements.

The following basic elements shall be managed:

• Written Procedures: Types of procedures needed for an MI program shall be identified

and developed, made accessible and cross-referenced. Once these documents are
approved, they shall be implemented and maintained.

• Quality Assurance (QA) : The QA is applied throughout the equipment life cycle, namely
design, procurement, fabrication, goods receipt, construction and installation, in service
operation and decommissioning.

QA is necessary for the handling of equipment, spares, suppliers and contractors. The
QA program shall define roles and responsibilities for managing the QA process.

• Safe Operating Limits (SOL) and Critical Operating Parameters – Never to Exceed
Limit (COP-NEL): In implementing the MI program, it is essential that both SOL and COP-
NEL are known, such that deviations can be monitored and investigated. The limiting
parameters shall be mapped, recorded and communicated to the relevant personnel.

PTS 60.2202
13 OCTOBER 2009
 The limiting parameters shall be updated to account for in-service repairs, alterations and
rerating, if required. MOC should be applied in these cases. See PTS 60.2206: Design
Integrity for more information on SOL and COP.

• Reliability Engineering: Reliability engineering is intended to prevent occurrence of an

equipment failure by identifying equipment that is critical to process safety and predicting
its failure or malfunction.

Various techniques or tools such as FMEA/FMECA, RCM, RBI, LOPA, IPF/SIL etc. are
available to systematically assess the reliability requirements of equipment. Such
techniques or tools are based on risk and the basis is incorporated into the MI decisions.

• Deficiency Management: All deficiencies or defects shall be managed. This includes

setting the acceptance criteria to place a limit on tolerating equipment deficiencies.
Further to that, a method to identify defects is needed and a response process for
handling defects shall be determined. Such a process includes immediate interventions,
investigation, communication and correction activities.

• Training and Competency: The MI training program shall be developed following a

needs assessment linked to the Reliability Engineering activity. Training shall cover new
and current workers, and the training programs should be subjected to verification and
documentation of their effectiveness. Skills training, especially for technical positions,
shall be evaluated in line with the needs assessment and periodic refresher training
conducted.

• Maintenance, Inspection and Test Programs: The maintenance, inspection and test
programs include defining the relevant tasks, and applying the correct tools, techniques
and competencies. Once the tasks are defined, they shall be executed, monitored and
the results assessed against a pre-defined acceptance criteria.

The management of maintenance, inspection and test programs include program

monitoring, scheduling and performance reporting.

• MI Planning and Scheduling: The execution of MI System falls under the MI programs
implementation. This requires planning of MI activities in line with business plans for the
HCU/OPUs and taking into consideration available resources. Adequate resources shall
be made available to deliver successful implementation of the MI program.

2.3 Mechanical Integrity Model

The model defines the means to assure and document that equipment systems, especially
those in highly hazardous services, are designed, installed, and maintained properly through
the application of:

• Inspection
• Testing
• Preventive maintenance, and
• Quality assurance

The requirements within the model are described in the diagram below and are explained in
the following sections.

PTS 60.2202
14 OCTOBER 2009
 MI System MI Resources MI Process
TOP LEVEL CONTROL: ENABLING RESOURCES: EQUIPMENT FILE:
ƒ Mission/Objectives ƒ MI Organisation Inventory of equipment, relevant
technical data and historical records
ƒ Key Business Activities ƒ Human resources
ƒ Responsibilities ƒ MI Equipment
PLANS:
ƒ Record systems
Who, what, when/how often, where,
ƒ Databases & IT support needed, techniques to use.

UPDATE/REVISE RECORDS & PLANS

PROCEDURES & WORK ƒ Budget and Finance
INSTRUCTIONS
ƒ Spares holding & purchasing EXECUTION:
MI SYSTEM REVIEW & UPDATE

ƒ Reliability Assessment
ƒ Contracting & contractor management Competent application of integrity
ƒ MI Planning techniques to gather good quality
ƒ Training & competency assurance
data.
ƒ Condition Assessment
ƒ Execution
ANALYSE:
ƒ Deficiency reporting &
tracking Collating results, identifying
deficiencies, action planning and
prioritising.

REFERENCES:
ACT:
Documents, Codes &
Standards Carry out actions for deficiencies

ASSURANCE:
Measuring performance

Mechanical Integrity involves a lifecycle process with multiple checkpoints to verify:

• The equipment complies with applicable codes and standards

• The materials of construction are compatible with the process service
• Manufacturer’s recommendations for installation are being followed
• The equipment specification is appropriate for the process service
• All installations (including spare parts installations) are suitable for the process application
• Personnel involved in installation are qualified to carry out the work
• Systems or equipment are operated within SOP, COP-NEL
• Systems or equipment are inspected and maintained as per SERP
• MI documents updated or revised to allow proper and safe decommissioning of systems
or equipment

The various stages of an equipment lifecycle are depicted below. The critical list of typical
requirements or issues that need to be addressed in order for the Mechanical Integrity
Programme to function as intended is given in Appendix 2.
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2.4 Mechanical Integrity Process

2.4.1 Controls for Mechanical Integrity

HCU/OPU Management shall appoint an MI Custodian for establishing the MI System and
coordinating the MI programs. To ensure MI programs are carried out in accordance with
the established Procedures, HCU/OPUs shall form a team to assist in the development of
MI programs and the roles and responsibilities of the team shall be defined and include the
following:

PTS 60.2202
15 OCTOBER 2009
 • Determine the equipment for MI
• Establish equipment files
• Establish inspection, testing and preventive maintenance programs
• Perform activities
• Updating Plans and Records
• Responding to Deficiencies

These activities are discussed in the following sections.

Personnel shall be given appropriate training to ensure they are competent to carry out the
work. The competency requirements for all MI activities shall be defined by the HCU/OPUs
based on industry standards and best practices

The following aspects govern the MI System and guidance on them can be found in
relevant PTS and other standards:

• Quality Assurance that applies throughout the equipment lifecycle, refer PTS
70.001 Introduction to Quality Management and the other 70.000 series PTS
documents.

• Working procedures controlling activities such as inspection, testing and handling

of non-conformance, refer PTS 60.2205 : Operating Procedures

• Guidelines for conducting inspection and maintenance tasks, refer PTS 50.007
Inspection Manual and PTS 50.001 Maintenance Management Philosophy and
the other 50.000 series PTS documents.

• Codes and Standards that shall be applied, refer to PTS 60.2206 : Design
Integrity for information on the identification of correct codes and standards.

The scope and coverage of MI activities are also influenced by applicable local and
international legislations which may apply to specific HCU/OPUs, such as:

• The type and inventory of hazardous substances as defined by CIMAH

Regulations under Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994, Act 514, Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under Factories and Machinery Act 1967, Act 139,
Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under Environment Quality Act 1974 and Act 127,
Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under the Energy Commission (EC) Act 447, Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under the Fire Services (Bomba) Act 1988, Act 341,
Malaysia
• Equipment as covered under the Atomic Energy Licensing Board Act 304,
Malaysia
• Regulations related to Metering and Weighing Equipment, Tele-Communication
• Equipment, Navigation Lights and Signals, Transportation of Dangerous Goods
by air, land or sea etc.

2.4.2 Identifying MI-applicable equipment

Equipment and systems that need to be covered within the MI system shall be
selected with due consideration to HSE and business losses. Some general
guidelines to determine what equipment is covered by MI is given in Appendix 3.

During this process, the safe operating limits shall be recorded such that working
limits of the equipment are known, and monitored for deviations.

The outcome of the screening will identify equipment/equipment groups to be

included in MI and these may include:

PTS 60.2202
16 OCTOBER 2009
 • Pressure Equipment (e.g. Vessels, Boilers, Heat Exchangers)
• Storage Tanks and atmospheric vessels
• Pipework and Pipelines
• Rotating Equipment (e.g. Pumps & Compressors)
• Flexible connections (e.g. Hoses, Bellows, Expansion Joints or Loading Arms)
• Safeguarding Systems (ESD etc.)
• Pressure Relieving & Venting Devices and Systems
• Electrical Equipment including Distribution, Grounding/Bonding & Cathodic
Protection Systems
• Detection Systems for flammable gas, toxic gas and fire
• Fire Protection Equipment
• Fibreglass Reinforced Plastic Components
• Plant Alarms and Communication Systems
• Secondary Containment Systems
• Isolation Valves, Check Valves and Back-flow Protection Devices
• Ventilation Systems
• Control (monitoring devices, sensors, alarms and interlocks)
• Dry Material Handling Systems
• Buildings, structures and supports
• Dust Collection and Process Vent Systems
• Rigging Devices & Lifting Equipment

2.4.3 Management of equipment files

Equipment files shall be established and shall include the following information
(where applicable) :

• Original and current design information.

• Process fluid composition and inventories.
• Location and layout.
• Safe Operating Limits and Critical Operating Parameters.
• Relevant control and safeguarding systems description and operation.
• Maintenance, inspection, test and change history.

MI equipment files shall contain links to the relevant PSI and may summarise it if
required. Information specific to the MI files shall include:

• Predicted deterioration mechanisms, failure modes and timeframes.

• Specific maintenance, inspection and testing activities to be undertaken.
• Quality assurance specifications for materials / spare parts
• Specific equipment reliability plans.

An example checklist for maintaining equipment files is given in Appendix 4.

Specific Equipment Reliability Plans (SERP) shall be created from equipment

guidelines, applicable codes and standards, and references from RBI, RCM, etc. The
Appendix 5 provides some guidance to the content to such plans.

2.4.4 Establish inspection, testing, and preventive maintenance programmes

Programme(s) shall be developed to ensure adequate inspection, testing and

maintenance is conducted using the systematic approach. To ensure these objectives
are met, there is a need to:

• Understand and identify potential equipment deficiencies for all equipment

(information can be obtained from predictive reliability engineering models using
various techniques)
• Establish procedures for required activities

PTS 60.2202
17 OCTOBER 2009
• Identify suitable inspection, testing or maintenance activities to address the
deficiencies.
• Establish appropriate timeline for the activities
• Establish appropriate acceptance criteria for the activity
• Document the inspection, testing and preventive maintenance plan

Use of predictive technologies in planning MI activities would allow HCU/OPUs to:

• Determine priorities
• Optimise effort and resources
• Balance preventive and breakdown (corrective) maintenance
• Continually evaluate the effect of changes to process materials, operating
parameters and surrounding environment.

This is depicted in the Figure 3 below:

1. Develop a model of equipment

and related damage mechanisms

2. Predict the location of each type of

failure

3. Estimate the extent and severity of

Update model
the failure

4. Determine the most effective

means for finding the failure

5. Inspect for the failure

6. Collate and analyse results

Figure 3: Planning MI Activities

The basic requirements for Specific Equipment Reliability Plans are:

1. Define the purpose of the activities to be completed.

• Serves as a record of the intended plan for the equipment, and is

documented and maintained
• Helps the Planner schedule activities

2. Describe in details the description of the activities to be completed.

• Defines the inspection, testing, and preventive maintenance activities that will
be performed on equipment
• Plans should be prepared for each equipment item or groups of similar items
in similar service

PTS 60.2202
18 OCTOBER 2009
 3. Highlight the contents of the plan.

• Contains the description of the activities to be performed

• Describes how often the activities will be performed
• Specifies the competency required to perform the activities
• States the acceptance criteria

4. Comply with applicable

• Regulatory requirements
• Corporate and site requirements
• Industry standards

2.4.5 Execute activities

The execution of planned activities shall utilise a planning/scheduling system to

ensure that activities happen and are monitored for progress and quality.

The execution of MI activities is the responsibility of the relevant discipline functions

within the HCU/OPU organisation. It is the responsibility of the MI Custodian to
ensure that MI Activities are performed in a manner as prescribed by the procedures,
competent personnel are assigned for the tasks, proper recording and evaluation of
the activity results, and changes to the Specific Equipment Reliability Plans are
initiated as appropriate.

2.4.6 Documenting Results and Updating Plans

The HCU/OPU shall demonstrate the effective implementation of the MI programme

through the creation and maintenance of documentation and records. This means
that formal documentation exists describing the activities defined in the MI
programme and that records are created regarding the results of the activities, the
analysis of those results, and the decisions taken in light of that analysis.

The HCU/OPU shall verify compliance with documentation requirements, through the
application of assurance processes any deviations from the MI programme shall be
reported, tracked, resolved, and documented. All records shall be updated and
maintained.

Considerations for documenting MI Activities include:

1. Establishing minimum requirements for reporting

2. Establishing activity results review process
3. Establishing mechanism to manage and correct deficiencies in a safe and timely
manner
4. Updating MI plans & equipment record

The results from conducting the MI plans are analysed. From the results it is
considered that a deficiency exists when equipment conditions are outside
acceptable limits.

Deficiency may have an effect on the integrity of the equipment and would need
timely response from the HCU/OPU. See section 4.4.7

There are several tools and methodologies available during the review process to
determine the interval of MI activities in relation to relevant equipment:

1. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) (Reference : PETRONAS Risk Based Inspection,

API 580)
2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

PTS 60.2202
19 OCTOBER 2009
 3. Fitness-For-Service (FFS) (Reference : API 579)
4. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
5. Consequence Analysis (CA)
6. Instrumented Protective Function / Safety Integrity Level (IPF/SIL) (Reference :
PTS 32.80.10.10 Classification And Implementation Of Instrumented Protective
Functions, IEC 61508/61511)
7. Reliability Centred Maintenance

For statutory pressure vessels, there may be an option to follow a risk based
approach for setting inspection intervals, such as the Special Scheme for Inspection
(SSI) introduced by Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) in
Malaysia.

2.4.7 Managing Deficiencies

A deficiency exists when equipment conditions are outside acceptable limits. These
limits are defined by acceptance criteria.

Appendix 6: Evaluating Results and Correcting Deficiencies provides suggested

procedures to apply under the circumstances of comparing the activity results in-
relation to the acceptance criteria and when a field observation identifies an
equipment deficiency.

Typically the deficiency management process is as follows:

• Review inspection results by comparing the result to the predetermined

acceptance criteria
• If deficiencies are identified, log the deficiency in a tracking system
• Determine the criticality level of the deficiency
o emergency (immediate attention)
o continue operations (continue to operate, but monitor)
• Decide if proper action is to re-rate, repair, replace or remain (as-is condition)
• Apply Management of Change where required
• Plan and schedule deficiency corrective action plan
• Track deficiency until resolution and retain history in the equipment file
• Revise SERP if necessary

2.5 Quality Assurance

2.5.1 Quality Assurance for Service Providers

The MI System shall ensure competent service providers are engaged to perform
spcialised MI activities either on-site or off-site. Examples of specialised MI activities
may include:

• Specialised preventive maintenance activities such as Condition Based

Monitoring (CBM)
• Corrective actions from deficiency correction plans
• Statutory inspection of equipment
• Meter proving/calibrations
• Function testing of fire prevention and protection equipment
• Shop testing of pressure relieving devices (rebuild/retest)
• Non-destructive testing

PTS 60.2202
20 OCTOBER 2009
 2.5.2 Quality Assurance for Equipment, Materials and Spares

The MI System shall ensure that equipment, materials, and spare parts are suitable
and comply with relevant standards.

This applies to both in-kind replacements and to replacements of an alternative

design which have previously been authorized through the MOC process. The
replacements may be:

• Materials (e.g. fuels, lubricants, catalysts)

• Spare parts
• New or replacement equipment

QA process for equipment, materials and spares should include the following
activities:

• Approval of vendors and suppliers

• Creation or amendment of purchasing specification
• Purchase of materials
• Receiving inspections
• Storage, handling and protection
• Evaluation of vendor and supplier QA systems

These requirements apply to projects where new equipment is being specified and
delivered.

2.6 Mechanical Integrity Database

To facilitate the implementation of MI System, it is highly recommended that suitable

computerised software be used to provide:

1. Equipment Database

• With asset hierarchy that allows for comprehensive cataloguing of

equipment/equipment types
• Provide standard datasheets that include information on design, materials and
manufacturing and operation parameters for each equipment
• Search function to allow search of specific equipment by key words

2. Document Link

• Allows PSI, such as technical documents, images, scanned files, pictures and site
drawings, to be attached for online reference and viewing
• Provide information about the design and construction of the equipment including
details of orignal vendors, and suppliers of consumables.
• Record information of technical and work history such as findings, recommendation
and work-done with reason and date, and view of change history

3. Scheduling and Execution Tool

• Computes fitness for services calculation and provides basis for MI plans using
accepted approaches
• Establishing standard work items for MI schedules and register tags for MI Activities
by generation of automatic work-list and next inspection, testing and maintenance
date based on schedule

PTS 60.2202
21 OCTOBER 2009
 • Recording of MI work history on job done and creates management reports to
analyse technical results.

4. Monitoring Data

• Defines measurement points and allows transfer of bulk data from monitoring
devices.
• Produce customised reports for management, technical specialists and field
engineers

5. Technical Software Interface

• Interfaces with RBI/RCM analysis packages to automatically update asset,

degradation rates information
• Allows reports and graphics from interfaced software packages to be viewed by all
authorized users online

6. System Administration and Security

• Define organization and provide level of access by user groups by only permitting
access to user related work items, working content and operating menus
• Provide capability for users to define additional fields for local customisation.
• Provide multiple language user interface if required

3.0 DELIVERABLES FROM MECHANICAL INTEGRITY

The deliverables from the MI process are both tangible and intangible, but both forms are
important because they support other activities within the HSEMS and other management
systems. The main purpose of the deliverables is to demonstrate good governance of the
equipment integrity and provide assurance of the same to management and relevant
stakeholders. Key deliverables include:

• Equipment Inventory This is an important document for understanding the extent of

risk exposure as it will include the type, service and age of
equipment. It will be useful in supporting studies under HEMP
(such as RBI, PHA, HAZOP) by defining the extent, nature
and identity of equipment on site. It also supports the
financial management function in determining capitalisation
and depreciation of equipment of insurance purposes.

• Condition Assessment These results give management an understanding of

Results exposures and support strategic and tactical decision making
on ongoing equipment operation, budgeting and resourcing,
risk mitigation options, product reliability and quality, future
expansion, construction of similar facilities, etc.

• Reliability Analyses
This sets a standard for the expected, achievable, reliability
of equipment. This helps define intervention activities – e.g.
inspection & maintenance – but also assists in completing the
Hazards and Effects Register as part of HEMP by assessing
the risk exposure due to the failure of equipment.

• Improved Plant A good MI program should enable the prediction and

Availability prevention of equipment failures. This improves the
availability of the plant and equipment and supports business
success.

PTS 60.2202
22 OCTOBER 2009
 • Increased Awareness The MI program should support the development of
competency within key functions of the organisation.
However, it should also build a general awareness of MI
issues throughout the workforce.

• Equipment The consistent, comprehensive, competent and timely

Performance History collection of data provides a clear picture of the performance
of the equipment. This demonstrates good management of
the company assets and supports other processes such as
purchasing, operational planning and risk assessment.

4.0 PERFORMANCE MONITORING

HCU/OPUs shall establish mechanisms and procedures to measure, monitor and provide
assurance with respect to performance of MI implementation.

4.1 Monitoring

HCU/OPUs shall set clear indicators to allow tracking of the performance of the MI System.
These shall be monitored on a regular (e.g. monthly) basis by the HCU/OPU Management.

Indicators should be specific and measurable, have realistic targets and delivery timeframes
and be achievable with the resources available. Following are examples of indicators which
would allow HCU/OPU Management to monitor performance of the MI System:

• Number of loss of containment events due to MI System failure

• Number of loss of production events due to MI System failure
• Number of remedial maintenance activities
• Number of inspection on critical items
• Number of outstanding failure investigations
• MI activity backlog
• MI competency program completion
• Number of non-standard repair
• Number of Assurance conducted on MI System
• Number of NCR raised against MI procedure

The results of monitoring the indicators will help identify needs for resources, training and
focused assurance activities.

4.2 Assurance

HCU/OPUs shall assess the suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness of the MI System
through Assurance process. The purposes of the Assurance are to:

• Determine whether HCU/OPU’s MI procedures and practices are complete, up-to-date

and compliant with applicable governmental regulations, policies and good HSE
management practices.

• Determine whether MI processes are implemented, effective, apply good engineering

practices and meet the requirements of the MI System.

• Determine the status and quality of MI activities versus identified objectives, goals and/or
other targets.

HCU/OPUs shall develop checklist or protocol for the MI Assurance, example of which can be
seen in Appendix 8.

PTS 60.2202
23 OCTOBER 2009
 Assurance on MI may be conducted as part of the overall HSE MS Assurance activity at
the facility (as per PTS 60.0102 and PTS 60.0301), or specially organized such that the
scope only cover the MI System.

The Assurance shall be undertaken in three tiers as follows:

1. Tier 1 Assurance, normally conducted in the form of site inspection, will provide evidence
of the compliance to the MI procedures and practices within the respective
unit/area/department. This shall be conducted at a periodic interval as determined by the
HCU/OPU Management and shall be undertaken by the relevant personnel within the
HCU/OPU. The results of Assurance activities shall be presented to the relevant
Management of the facility.

2. Tier 2 Assurance is aimed at ensuring that the overall MI System is effective, adequate
and implemented in all areas. This Assurance activity shall be led by the relevant senior
Management within the HCU/OPU and supported by technical specialists on at least a
yearly basis. The results of the Assurance activities shall be presented to the relevant
management of the facility for review.

3. Tier 3 Assurance is aimed at confirming the compliance of the MI System to corporate

requirements and to assess its performance as part of the wider HSE Management
System. It can be conducted as part of the overall HSE MS Assurance activity at the
facility, and is normally carried out by independent external parties, such as
representatives of the PETRONAS Corporate HSE Department or other HCU/OPUs and
supported by relevant technical expertise.

4.3 Actions Tracking and Follow-Up

HCU/OPUs shall ensure that an action tracking system is established and maintained to
manage all follow-up requirements from the MI System.

Action tracking, as a minimum, requires the establishment of a formal system and procedure
for :

1. Tracking the status of, and following-up on, key milestones and performance indicators
identified in MI Plans, i.e., the implementation life cycle of the change.

2. Tracking the status of, and following-up on, identified corrective and preventive action
items during the monitoring of MI Plans, i.e., the implementation life cycle of the change.

3. Tracking the status of, and following-up on, identified corrective and preventive action
items arising from Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 Assurance activities and their respective
Assurance Reports.

The following components shall be considered to ensure suitability, adequacy and

effectiveness of the above:

• Time frames and functional accountabilities for reporting, implementing follow-up,

verifying the effectiveness of follow-up and closing-out follow-up items are clearly defined.

• There are periodic reviews of the status of outstanding / overdue actions.

• Adequate attention is given to coordination among various areas of functions / personnel

affected by follow-up actions.

• Information about problems and progress is communicated adequately to all personnel

concerned.

PTS 60.2202
24 OCTOBER 2009
5.0 RECORDS MANAGEMENT

MI programs will result in a large volume of records as required under sections 4.4 and 4.5
covering “Mechanical Integrity Process” and “Quality Assurance” respectively.

HCU/OPUs shall develop a system for generating, collating and indexing records in a
consistent and accurate manner. The HCU/OPU shall manage the storage and retrieval of
records in a similar manner. The accessibility and period of retention of records shall be
determined on the basis of the criticality of the information, the frequency with which it is
required, the lifecycle phase it supports, legal requirement and industry/company practice.

The records management system shall be formally described and an Assurance process put
in place.

6.0 MANAGEMENT ACTIONS

The following RACI 1 Chart describes the list of the actions and associated responsibilities
with regard to developing and operating a MI system. These are high-level actions and are
intended to provide guidance about the extent of accountability and responsibilities for the
main roles.

Support Function
HCU/OPU/ Corp
Management

Maintenance

Engineering
MI System
HCU/OPU

Inspection
Custodian

HSE Unit
Function

Function

Action
Determine role of MI within
HCU/OPU
Appoint responsible person
Develop structure of MI System
Define scope of MI System
Develop the MI management
system
Sec
Ref Comment
2.1 A/ This will involve defining the
R goals for the MI programme
within the existing HCU/OPU
management systems, and
defining key interfaces.
2.1 A/ I The MI System Custodian
R needs to be empowered to
work with the various
supporting functions in
delivering the MI goals.
2.3 A R C C C The MI System needs to be
aligned with the existing
HCU/OPU management
systems and to interface in an
effective manner. The
supporting organisation and
competencies need to be
defined at this time.
2.4.2 A R C C C The types of equipment
covered by the system needs
to be defined.
2.3 A/ C C C Create high-level
R management system
documents and plan for
development of procedures
and practices

1
RACI – Responsible, Accountable, Consult, Inform

PTS 60.2202
25 OCTOBER 2009
 Support Function
HCU/OPU/ Corp
Management

Maintenance

Engineering
MI System
HCU/OPU

Inspection
Custodian

HSE Unit
Function

Action
Implement MI Process
Develop Quality Assurance
processes
MI Database Systems
Performance Monitoring and
Assurance
Records Management
Review and Improvement
Key: R - Responsible, A - Accountable, C - Consulted, I - Informed
Function
Sec
Ref Comment
2.4 A/ R R R Each function further
R develops and implements the
MI programme in its area.
Communication and training
will be key components. The
MI System Custodian
provides an overview
function.
2.5 A/ C C C The management of quality
R may require its own function.
2.6 A/ R C C C MI will require IT systems to
C support its programmes,
models and systems. This will
be a key component of the
operational system.
4.0 A/I R C C C R Monitoring ongoing
performance is the
responsibility of the MI
System Custodian, but
HCU/OPU HSE Dept provide
Tier 2 assurance and the C-
HSE Unit provides tier 3
assurance. Accountability lies
with the HCU/OPU
management.
0 A R R R The management of records
needs to be coordinated and
consistent, but responsibility
lies with each function.
A/ C C C C HCU/OPU management
R review the MI system on a
regular basis to ensure it
remains adequate and
effective.

PTS 60.2202
26 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY

Acronyms

Term Definition
Activity A test, inspection, or maintenance process on a type of equipment.
Activity Controlled Operating Documents that establish responsibility, authority, and the
Procedure acceptable methods for performing a test, inspection, or maintenance activity.
Activity Procedures are used within a department and give an individual or group
the steps, information, and safety requirements needed to perform the task.
Activity Report Documentation of activity results.
Activity Result The information gained or outcome of an activity.
Assigned The person ultimately responsible for the performance and initial review of
Person's activities.
Supervisor
Assigned Person The qualified person who performs a test, inspection, or maintenance activity. The
Assigned Person may be referred to as an Examiner, Mechanic, Technician, etc.
by different work groups, and may require certification by API, ASNT or other
agencies to perform certain tasks.
Best Practices Method/approach/practice of managing synergistically of people, business and
technology for maximum effectiveness of overall business performance.
Cause and Effect A diagram used to collect ideas about possible causes of a problem, The problem
Diagram (effect) is listed on the right, and possible causes are listed by categories on
branches of limbs that lead to it.
Certification The process of proving the accuracy of a Shop Standard in a manner which can be
traced to NIST standards, and of calibrating Test and Calibration equipment
against the Shop Standard.
Charter A definition of the scope of work for a team, an organization, a project or a person.
Typical components of a charter are: purpose, membership, activities,
deliverables, and guiding principles.
Company PETRONAS (also referred to as the Principal) or any duly appointed party
authorized to act for, and on its behalf.
Compliance A formal investigation to verify compliance by assuring that the procedures and
Assurance practices are adequate and are being followed.
Confidential, Records which could place the company at a competitive disadvantage or could be
Sensitive, or used to defraud the company in the hands of an adversary or competitor.
Proprietary
Records
Contractor A party to a contract with the Company that is responsible for the supply of all or
part of any facilities, product or service to perform the duties specified by the
Company. The Company may undertake all or part of the duties of the Contractor.
Contractors Personnel who are not employees of the site owner but who perform work in and
around processes containing hazardous chemicals.
Controlled Copy The original signed document
Critical Speed The frequency or speed of a rotating mass system (pump impellers, couplings,
pinion gears, compressors, rotors, etc.) that corresponds to a resonant frequency
of the system.
Database A set of data elements, consisting of at least one file or a group of integrated files,
usually stored in one location.
Deficiency Activity results that are outside acceptable limits.
Deficiency The management report generated by the Mechanical Integrity Coordinator which
Tracking Report gives the status of all outstanding corrections of deficiencies.
Deliverables The tangible products of a team, organization, or person's efforts that are specified
in the charter.
Equipment Data A data sheet which contains design and operating information needed as reference
Sheet for developing an effective Equipment Plan. A blank data sheet which identifies
the necessary data is included with each Equipment Guideline.

PTS 60.2202
27 OCTOBER 2009
Term Definition
Equipment Files A file system which is part of the MI program. This file contains copies of the
Equipment Data Sheet, Equipment History, Equipment Plan, and Activity Results.
Equipment File A checklist which identifies documentation and data required or recommended for
Checklist build-out of an equipment file.
Equipment Documents which describe recommended inspection and test requirements
Guidelines needed for developing Equipment Plans.
Equipment Plans Plans that match appropriate inspection, test, or maintenance activities with
identified potential failure mechanisms of a piece of equipment. These plans define
where the activities are to be performed, extent, and timing for the activities,
preparations which may be required, personnel assigned, responsibilities, and
acceptance criteria.
Equipment Specifications furnished to the equipment fabricator which describe in detail
Specifications requirements for fabrication of the new or replacement equipment, administration of
the purchase order, and delivery of the equipment to the job site
Examiner A person who assists the Assigned Person to inspect fixed equipment by
performing specific nondestructive examination (NDE), but does not evaluate the
results of those examinations in accordance with API standards, unless
specifically trained and authorized to do so by the owner or user.
Facility The buildings, containers or equipment which contain a process.
Function A group within a Manufacturing site (e.g. Operations, Planning, HR, etc.)
FMA Factories and Machinery Act 1967
FMEA/FMECA Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis
Hazardous A substance, owing to their physical and chemical properties, are capable of
Substance producing major accident hazards either falling within the criteria laid down in
Schedule 1 or listed in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Occupational Safety and Health
(Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulation 1996.
Hot Work Permit A written and authorized permit which lists the detailed requirements which must
be met prior to initiating an activity which could generate a spark or other energy
source sufficient to ignite process or other flammable materials which may be in the
work area.
HCU PETRONAS Holding Company Unit - A business entity operating under the control
of a PETRONAS Group Holding Company.
In-Service Fixed equipment that has been placed in operation, as opposed to new
construction prior to being placed in service.
Inspection and A management report generated monthly from data in the MI System which show
Test Status the test and inspection due date and the inspection status of each piece of
Report equipment within a plant area.
IPF Instrumented Protection Function
ISO International Organization of Standardization in Geneva, Switzerland. ISO, which is
made up of national standard institutes from all regions of the world, develops
voluntary technical standards that add value to all types of businesses
KPI Key Performance Indicators
LOPA Level of Protection Analysis
Management of A formal work process to assess the impact of changes in process chemicals,
Change (MOC) technology, equipment, and procedures on employee safety and health
Mechanical The tests, inspections, and maintenance procedures to assure that equipment has
Integrity (MI) been designed, constructed, installed, and maintained in a way which minimizes

PTS 60.2202
28 OCTOBER 2009
Term Definition
the risk of releasing highly hazardous chemicals.
MI Custodian The individual who has been assigned the responsibility and given the authority to
establish, implement, maintain and oversee the MI System and its performance
MI Program The proactive management system that defines the tests, inspections, and
maintenance procedures to assure that equipment has been designed,
constructed, installed, maintained, and continuously improved in a way which
minimizes the risk of releasing highly hazardous chemicals and maximizes
equipment and process reliability.
MI System Mechanical Integrity System
mpy Mils per Year
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
NBIC National Board Inspection Code
Operating Written operating procedures, consistent with the process safety information, that
Procedures (OP) provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the covered
process.
OPU PETRONAS Operating Unit - A business entity operating under the control of the
PETRONAS Group
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PHA Process Hazard Analysis
PM Preventive Maintenance
Policy Statement from Management indicating commitments and strategic direction.
Process Safety A compilation of written information pertaining to the hazards of highly hazardous
Information (PSI) chemicals, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information
pertaining to the equipment in the process.
PSM Process Safety Management
PTS PETRONAS Technical Standard
Quality A gathering of procedures that document what is supposed to occur in work
Assurance processes.
(QA)
QA Procedures Documents which describe the methods used to fabricate and install new or
replacement equipment and to assure that incoming materials meet requirements.
Quaility Control A measurement process, a gathering of statistics that evaluate the compliance of
(QC) work by sampling its flow
RACI A technique used to identify and document roles and responsibilities by assigning
RACI codes (Responsible, Accountable, Consult, and Inform) to the individuals or
groups involved in a specific activity or decision, according to the following
definition; clarifies roles and identifies breakdowns that keep us from working
efficiently. Responsible (R) the person(s) actually working on the activity –the
"doer”. Accountable (A) the person with yes/no authority--where "the buck stops".
Consult (C) those who should be involved prior to decision or action; stay "in the
loop". Inform (I) those who need to know of the decision or action after the fact--
keep "in the picture". There can only be one "A" for any activity or decision, but
multiple "Rs" and "Cs" and "Is" are appropriate.
RBI Risk Based Inspection
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance
Records Written or electronic format that describes a history (data, descriptions); cannot be
revised.
Reference Supporting information of external or internal origin. Reference information must be
maintained current.
SIL Safety Integrity Level
System A description of interdependent processes and procedures, with narrative text
endorsed by management, that describes the organization, policies and principles,

PTS 60.2202
29 OCTOBER 2009
Term Definition
and how it is organized to manage either core values, operating units, or functions.
Standard Established overall requirements and is directive in nature. Describes what "good"
ooks like.
Template A template provides guidance on formatting, content, etc. for controlled documents
and is the shell of the document.
ULPO Unexpected Loss of Production Opportunity
Verification Plan A plan which defines the activities to be applied to verify that replacement
maintenance materials, spare parts, and equipment meet requirements. The
Verification Plan is normally a part of purchasing documentation.
Work Details “how” a work step or process is performed specific to a piece of equipment
Instructions/Task or unique task. These are usually site specific and only required as needed for risk
Lists reduction / local optimization.
Work Processes Supports the Standard with details of “who”, “what”, “when”, “where” (and
sometimes in a very broad sense “how”) a process is to be accomplished to meet
the customers needs.

PTS 60.2202
30 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 2: ESTABLISH MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM

The following table summarizes typical requirements or facilities that must be in place before or during
implementation of the Mechanical Integrity Programme. In order for the Mechanical Integrity
Programme to function as intended, the overall Process Safety program must be defined and the
corresponding data and document management systems must be in place to support the activities.
This attachment identifies typical requirements or issues that need to be addressed early in the
Mechanical Integrity Programme implementation.

MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PROGRAM SUPPORT ISSUES

Item Assigned To Due Date Done
1. Verify that piping and instrument diagrams are
complete and correct
2. Verify that process flow diagrams are complete and
correct
3. Complete the Process Hazard Analyses
4. Establish or verify the plant policy on equipment
numbering and identification
5. Tag or otherwise uniquely identify equipment in the
field
6. Verify/define electrical classifications
7. Complete/verify relief system design validation
8. Verify that the MOC process addresses changes to
maintenance/MI procedures
9. Verify that the MOC process includes provisions for
training on new or revised maintenance/MI
procedures
10. Verify that a written description for managing
projects is in place. This description will be
referenced by the Quality Assurance Procedures.
11. Verify that a written process is in place for
engineering design specification.
12. Confirm that equipment specifications are in place
(e.g. piping specification) as appropriate.
13. Prepare training modules for MI Programme
awareness training
14. Verify that adequate training facilities and training
tools exist.
15. Consider providing external training/certification for
appropriate Competent Persons (e.g. CWI or API
certifications.)
16. Identify existing Vendors that need to be included in
the vendor assessment program.
17. Verify that records of vendor approvals or
assessment are retained and managed

PTS 60.2202
31 OCTOBER 2009
 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PROGRAM SUPPORT ISSUES
Item Assigned To Due Date Done
18. Verify that the Plant Safety Programme has an
established program for Safe Work
Procedures/Practices
19. Verify that the stores warehouse facilities are
suitable and have adequate controls.
20. Verify that purchasing procedures and policies are
in place for purchase order processing, standard
material receiving, and vendor appraisal.
21. Establish physical location for paper equipment
files.
22. Ensure that equipment history is compiled, correct,
and current
23. Ensure that equipment data (including Process
Safety Information) is compiled, correct, and current
24. For operator-performed activities, ensure that the
operating procedures include sufficient detail for
conducting inspection/tests
25. Verify that appropriate scheduling tools are in place
to ensure that operator-performed activities are
triggered.
26. Obtain adequate file cabinets, files, duplication
equipment, etc. to support the file room.
27. Verify that electronic equipment files (if intended)
can be managed by the computer system.
28. Verify that the plant policy for Contractor Safety
Programme is in place.
29. Identify and obtain access to codes or standards
that will be required to support implementation
efforts.
30. Verify that the MI System is functioning as intended.
31. Establish or define special progress reporting
templates in the MI System
32. Verify that planners are trained in use of the MI
System
33. Obtain OEM manuals as needed
34. Verify that electronic equipment files have a backup
policy.
35. Verify that the Process Safety Information is current
and subject to a data management program.
36. Compile a master list of all equipment.
37. Verify that data management tools (such as
vibration monitoring software) are initialized
38. Verify that users of data management tools are
adequately trained in it use and capabilities.

PTS 60.2202
32 OCTOBER 2009
 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY PROGRAM SUPPORT ISSUES
Item Assigned To Due Date Done
39. Validate existing mechanical drawings
40 Validate existing electrical and instrumentation
drawings
41 Verify that electrical classification is established
42 Verify that operating procedures are in place and
controlled
43 Verify that safe operating limited are defined
44 Verify that work permitting and lock-out tag-out are
in place
45 Verify that Process overview training is in place
46 Verify that Hot work permit practice is in place

PTS 60.2202
33 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 3: DETERMINING EQUIPMENT LISTING

This methodology defined below, applies to evaluation of all process facilities and associated
equipment.

Guidance for Determining MI-Covered Equipment

By definition, a covered process is a process which;

Might contribute to or cause a catastrophic release of hazardous chemicals, and critical

facilities are those that serve to prevent or mitigate catastrophic release.

On that basis, equipment within a covered process (including most utilities), connected to a covered
process, or adjacent to a covered process is considered a single covered process. When equipment
is excluded from the MI program, the justification for the exclusion must be documented. The best
mechanism for excluding equipment is a Process Hazards Analysis (see PTS 60.2204 Process
Hazard Analysis). A Process Hazards Analysis is a study which addresses:

• the hazards of the process

• previous incidents which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences in the workplace
• engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such
as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases
(Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with
alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors)
• consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls
• facility siting
• human factors
• a qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls on
employees in the workplace

Following are some general guidelines to be used to determine which equipment is covered under MI:

Process Containing Equipment (Pressure vessels, storage tanks, piping, rotating equipment,
relief devices and vent systems)
• All process equipment which contains highly hazardous chemicals above the threshold quantities
as defined by the HCU/OPU or relevant regulations, codes or standards, is MI-covered.
• Process equipment which does not contain hazardous chemicals but is connected to MI-covered
equipment is also covered. It may be possible to exclude the connected equipment, or a portion
of the connected equipment, if it can be shown that highly hazardous chemicals will not migrate
into the connected equipment or that failure of the connected equipment could not affect the
covered process and cause a catastrophic release.
• Process equipment adjacent to but not connected to a covered process is included unless it can
be shown that the equipment cannot affect the covered process and cause a catastrophic release.
The Process Hazards Review should include the effect of flying debris (thus becoming a siting
consideration).
• A boiler used to supply heat to a covered process or a furnace or process heater receiving
condensate returned from a covered process is considered part of the covered process. By
extension, if the boiler is covered, processes to which a covered boiler is connected may also be
covered.
• A boiler is covered if a portion of its fuel is from a covered process.
• A non-stationary vessel or tank (such as a rail car or tank truck) is MI-covered if it is directly
connected to a covered process and used as a storage container. Such equipment may be
regulated by another standard (e.g. Department of Transportation) and subject to specific
inspection, test, and maintenance requirements. The MI Programme must ensure that the
connected equipment is suitable for its service; however, since non-stationary equipment may not
be owned by the facility, the MI Programme should specify the appropriate level of scrutiny given
to equipment which is regulated by another entity.

PTS 60.2202
34 OCTOBER 2009
Process Controls Systems (Including emergency shutdown systems)
• All instrumentation which was installed for the purpose of taking the process, or specific
equipment in a process, to a safe state is MI-covered. This does not include instrumentation and
controls installed for non-emergency shutdowns or routine operations, but do include
instrumentation which is backed up by secondary measures such as pressure relief devices. A
Process Hazards Analysis should be used to determine if questionable instrumentation should be
included.
• Instrumentation on utilities and non-covered equipment is covered if failure can affect the covered
process and cause a catastrophic release.
• Electrical Systems
• Electrical systems connected to MI-covered equipment are covered if failure of the electrical
systems would contribute or cause a catastrophic release of highly hazardous chemicals. Thus,
the electrical supply to motors, instrumentation, etc. is covered unless it can be shown, under a
worse case scenario that failure of the electrical supply cannot affect the covered equipment and
cause a catastrophic release.
• Uninterruptible power supply systems and emergency power supply systems (emergency
generators) supplying a covered process are covered unless it can be shown that, under a worse
case scenario, failure cannot affect the covered process and cause a catastrophic release.

Prevention, Mitigating, and Alarm Systems

• Fire water and foam systems, including water and foam storage, pumps, headers, deluge,
sprinkler systems, and their controls are covered.
• Detectors such as flammability monitors and their alarms are covered.

Utilities
• Utilities are covered if they are required for the proper operation of covered equipment. For
example, the instrument air supply to covered pneumatic instrumentation is covered. This would
include the air compressor, dryer, headers, etc. The electrical supply to electronic instruments
would likewise be covered.
• Utilities such as cooling water, condensate, nitrogen, etc. which are connected to covered
equipment are covered.
• Utilities within a covered area but not connected to covered equipment are covered unless it can
be shown that failure of the utility cannot affect the covered process in a way that could cause a
catastrophic release.

Mechanical Material Handling Equipment and Rigging Devices

• Rigging devices, such as cranes and hoists, are MI-covered if failure of the rigging device could
contribute to a release of highly hazardous material. Overhead cranes which routinely maneuver
equipment or product over a covered process may be MI-covered.
• Mechanical material handling equipment (such as bucket elevators, pneumatic conveying
systems, or conveyors) are covered if failure of the equipment could contribute to or cause a
release of highly hazardous material.

Vendor Supplied Equipment

• All equipment supplied by Service Providers shall comply with the requirements of the MI system.

PTS 60.2202
35 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 4: MANAGING EQUIPMENT FILES

The equipment checklists provided a standardized approach for maintaining equipment files for MI
covered equipment. As the equipment files are established, the MI Manager at HCU/OPU sites is
accountable to ensure the files are manages and maintained by the respective plant functions e.g.
maintenance, inspection and engineering.

An EXAMPLE Equipment File Checklist

Description: Pressure Vessels / Storage Tanks Equipment No:

PEFS No:

Content Description Doc/Drawing Date Rev File Comment

No. . Status
Construction Records or
Design Information

*Design Calculations
*Date Put In Service
*Pertinent Process Conditions
Equipment Spec Sheet
Vendor Drawings
OEM Manual
Material Test Reports
Fabrication Records
Name Plate Rubbing
Inspection, Test, and PM
History

*Specific Equipment Plan

*Corrosion Rate Timing Calc
*Records Of All Examinations
*Potential Modes Of Failure
*Base Line Readings
Certified Test Reports
Hydrotest Records
Repair/Alteration History

*Repair Alteration Forms

Service Changes
Maintenance History

Comments and associated

equipment

PTS 60.2202
36 OCTOBER 2009
FILE STATUS CODES
C - Complete NA - Not Applicable
P - Partial M - Missing
D - Discrepancies

PTS 60.2202
37 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 5: PREPARING SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY PLAN

This procedure applies to new or revised Equipment Reliability Plans for equipment covered under MI
and requires use of the equipment guidelines, equipment files, and applicable codes and standards.

Tools that employ Reliability Engineerning such as RBI and RCM are recommended for this purpose.

Specific Equipment Reliability Plan Contents

The following text provides guidance on the Equipment Plan.

1 Master Plan No. A “master” plan number assigned to Equipment Reliability Plans that may be
used for referencing purposes. Such master plans may be assigned to
equipment items in identical service that will have an identical Equipment
Reliability Plan. The list of equipment must be listed in the block provided or
attached to the Equipment Reliability Plan
2 Performance The function of an equipment in operation to deliver maintenance
management strategies, e.g. to achieve low maintenance costs, high
reliability and high availability etc.
3 Significance of A significance of failure is defined as the inability of an item to perform a
failure specific function within the specified limits such as causing a complete
shutdown, slowdown or maintenance costs only. May be classified as
effecting HSE and/or ULPO
4 Consequence of Specific cost penalty for failure is defined as the inability of an item to perform
Failure a specific function within the specified limits such as causing a complete
shutdown, slowdown or maintenance costs only.
5 Equipment Type Type of equipment used for the service.

6 Can Be Definition if the equipment can be bypassed

Bypassed
7 Maintenance Standardized priority level used for the equipment.
Priority
8 Equipment Target level for the equipment.
Throughput
Target
9 Quality Target: Target level for the equipment.
10 Availability Target level for the equipment.
Target
11 Reliability Target Target level for the equipment.
12 Scheduled Target level for the equipment.
Shutdown Target
13 Other S/D Target level for the equipment.
Targets
14 LPO of Unit Monetary penalty for the unit shutdown.
Shutdown
15 Failure Cause / Description of the potential problem which has been identified. More than
Potential one potential problem is likely and each is addressed separately.
Problem

PTS 60.2202
38 OCTOBER 2009
16 Failure Mode A failure mode is a specific physical condition that causes a functional failure.
The failure mode statement should include a description of the failure
mechanism (e.g., fatigue) whenever possible. Many failure modes could be
listed, but only failure modes that are “reasonable” will be considered.
17 Degradation Rate Rate of system performance degradation or failure through simultaneous
deficiency in several system components, due to occurrence of a single event
such as increased corrosion, design error or human error
18 Risk Risk is the measure of the potential for harm or loss (i.e. hazard) that reflect
both the likelihood (e.g. frequency) and severity of an adverse effect to health,
property, or environment.
19 Action An element of an operation and / or maintenance event. One or more tasks
(i.e., fault localization, fault isolation, servicing and inspection) necessary to
retain an item in or restore it to a specified condition.
20 Activity A procedure which provides instruction on how to perform and document an
Procedure Title activity. The activity is selected to measure or detect the potential problem.
and Number Sometimes more than one activity could be selected to investigate a potential
problem. The Competent Person should select the activity that will give the
required data at minimum cost including the cost of interruption to operation.
21 Activity Timing The timing at which the activity is to be repeated. Such timing should be
established through use of the Equipment Guideline, and must be based on
sound principles.
22 Timing Start A date upon which the activity schedule should be based. This may be the
date of a baseline inspection or other previous work. In the event that the
activity has never before been carried out, enter the date by which the activity
must be performed
23 Acceptance The specific limit of test or measurement results which can be accepted
Criteria based on the design of the equipment, operating conditions, and recognized
and generally accepted good engineering practices.
24 Location The location on the equipment where the test or inspection is to take place.
In most cases, it will be necessary to attach a drawing or sketch to clarify the
location.
25 Extent The area of the test or inspection around the identified location.
26 Equipment The operating status of the equipment when the activity is performed.
Availability
27 Preparation A list of preparations which are needed before the test or inspection activity
Required can be performed.
28 Performed By The person, qualification, or certification required to perform the test or
inspection activity.
29 Estimated Hours The hours or costs associated with execution of the activity. The amount
entered should not take into account the hours or costs associated with the
preparations required for the activity (e.g. blinding, decontamination, etc.)
30 MMS Plan A reference to associated job plan numbers assigned by the Maintenance
Number Management System.

PTS 60.2202
39 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 6: EVALUATING RESULTS AND CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES

This procedure applies to all activities related to ensuring the integrity of MI-covered equipment. This
procedure must be applied in the following circumstances:

• Upon completion of reporting the results of activity performed, i.e. the results in-relation to the
Acceptance Criteria.
• When a field observation identifies an equipment deficiency

Deficiency Corrective Action Plan (Guideline)

The corrective action plan describes how deficiencies will be corrected in a safe and timely manner.
This attachment addresses some of the key issues to consider while preparing corrective action plans.
The issues presented in this attachment apply to all deficiency corrections.

Correction Method

Correction of a deficiency may involve repair, re-rating, or replacement of equipment components.

Those responsible for the corrective action plan must determine the best method to correct the
deficiency.

Rerate - Establish new operating conditions and determine other required modifications, such as new
relief valve settings, new alarm or interlock settings, etc., to assure that the rerated equipment cannot
be operated in a manner which could result in loss of containment of hazardous materials.

Repair - Define the maintenance repairs to be made to restore the equipment to acceptable condition.
Example repairs to damaged equipment are shown Attachment D.

Note:
If the repair does not restore the equipment within the design intent, the change must be authorized
by the Management of Change process.

Replacement - The replacement materials, spare parts, or new equipment must be managed in
accordance with the QA for Materials and Spares.

Note: Detailed calculations (e.g. Fitness for Service API510) may be used to demonstrate that
continued operations are acceptable.

Influence of Codes, Standards and Statutory Requirements

Industry codes, standards, statutory requirements, or other regulations may influence the content of
the corrective action plan. Provision for hold points, inspections or tests, or special personnel
requirements should be considered in the plan. Example considerations include:

• Repair of pressure retaining items in accordance with an approved ASME R-Stamp program.
• Alteration of pressure vessels that requires involvement of DOSH, Bomba and JBE Inspector.
• Engineering Fitness for Service evaluation.

Temporary Operation with Deficiencies

If the equipment is to be operated temporarily with an identified deficiency, define operating conditions
and/or put in place controls such as tracking or monitoring system which will assure that the
equipment will be operated in a safe manner.

PTS 60.2202
40 OCTOBER 2009
Acceptable safeguards for temporary operation of equipment with an identified deficiency include:
New temporary operating limits, such as reduced temperature, pressure, or flow, which will prevent
loss of containment of the process material in spite of the deficiency.

• Standby personnel to monitor the equipment with instructions to follow in event conditions change
toward conditions which could result in a release. This technique can be used, as an example, in
the event of a deficiency in the emergency shutdown system or if a relief valve is removed for
repair.
• New temporary safety device settings (such as relief valve or safety shutdown settings).
• Special monitoring activities, such as daily vibration monitoring or weekly measurement of
thickness to assure that deterioration do not progress into an unsafe condition. These would be
added to the Specific Equipment Plan as a temporary activity.
• Temporary repairs such as a welded patch or additional supports for corroded piping.

Content of a Corrective Action Plan

A corrective action plan should contain the following items:

a) Equipment Tag Number and Service

b) Equipment description
c) Activities which will be required to correct the deficiency, including temporary safeguards. The
activities may include engineering evaluation work performed off-site.
d) Special skills or resources needed to complete the work in accordance with good engineering
practices
e) Define the recommended due date for work to ensure that the deficiency is corrected in a safe
and timely manner
f) Proposed verification activities that will be needed to evaluate whether the corrective work was
performed satisfactorily including QA/QC plan.
g) Names of the deficiency evaluation personnel
h) Reference to Work Order(s) associated with the deficiency

PTS 60.2202
41 OCTOBER 2009
 APPENDIX 7: TRAINING AND EVALUATING MI RELATED COMPETENCY OF PERSONNEL

To define the specific training requirements to gain competency, including refresher training for
personnel involved in MI Activities e.g. in maintaining the mechanical integrity of process equipment.
The categories of training are:

• Process Overview
• Process Safety Management
• Safe Work Procedures (e.g. Core HSE procedures)
• Maintenance Procedures (MI System)
• Inspection and Test Procedures (MI System)
• Job Skills and Knowledge (MI System)

Contract employees involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of covered process equipment must
meet the same requirements for safe and effective performance of their job tasks. Contract employers
are responsible for training their own employees in job skills and knowledge.

All the training records are stored and maintained in a central database.

Responsibility

The Site Management is accountable for managing the Mechanical Integrity training program.

The MI System Custodian is responsible to assure that each person has received the required
training as scheduled and is competent to perform the assigned task.

The Training Function and Competent Person are responsible for detailed planning, locating
training materials (Competent Person), and developing the training schedule.

The person performing the training is responsible for assessing the trainees’ understanding of the
subject matter and for documenting the training.

Attachment an Overview of Required Training for Affected Personnel

Training Initial Training Refresher/ Scope of Training

Category Ongoing Training
Frequency

Process All new When new process General Requirements

Overview Maintenance or added or three • Plant processes and
Inspection years, which ever chemistry
employees who did is less
not have this • Hazards exposure and
training in other control measures
departments • Personnel protective
equipment
• Emergency response

HSE MS All new When new Requirements focus on

Maintenance or procedures are process safety aspects
Inspection issued or old • Safety compliance and
employees procedures are management
revised
• Emergency planning and
response

PTS 60.2202
42 OCTOBER 2009
 • Safe working practices and
training
• Change management
• Incident investigation

Safe Work All new Annually Requirements cover

Procedures Maintenance or • Safety and medical policies
Inspection
employees • Corporate and plant safety
procedures
• Safe working practices and
training
• Hazardous material
handling
• Personnel protective
equipment

Mechanical All new When new MI System requirements cover

Integrity and Maintenance or procedures are • Level I: Overview of MI
Maintenance Inspection issued or old programme
Procedures employees procedures are
revised • Level II: Detailed MI
procedures
• Level III: Specific
procedures for the
performance of MI
activities
MI Procedure requirements
cover
• MMS
• Tool use qualification and
tools handling
• Scaffolding and rigging
• Working from height and
mounted platforms

Job Skills and All new Required As necessary to meet craft or

Knowledge Maintenance or frequency to match inspector skill or certification
Inspection needs for needs
employees certification to code
or to maintain skill
proficiency.
Training to be
scheduled per
agreement
between
Maintenance /
Inspection Line
Manager and
Training
Coordinator

PTS 60.2202
43 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 8: SELF ASSESSMENT OF MI PROGRAMME

To provide a process for self-assessing the Mechanical Integrity Programme under each discipline
group periodically and identify improvement opportunities.

Attachment A Self-Evaluation Checklist for MIP

PETRONAS HCU/OPU

Date Evaluation
Performed By:

Prepared By

PTS 60.2202
44 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

MI Policy Has management

communicated a commitment
to MI?

Does the commitment satisfy

the Policy as written?

Do employees understand the

policy?

Are responsible persons

informed and aware of
responsibilities?

Has ownership of the system

been accepted by all
employees?

MI System Have new or changed

Description processes undergone
evaluation for MI-covered
equipment?

Have there been new or

revised site procedures and
policies, regulations, codes, or
standards that affect the scope
of MI?

Have policy changes affected

inspection priorities?

Are acceptance criteria

adjusted appropriately?

Has organizational changes

affected the basic MI Structure
that may impair the
effectiveness of MI
implementation and
execution?

Integrating MI Is there evidence of employee

into HSEMS participation at all levels?

Has MOC been effective to

ensure that MI procedures and
equipment data is up-to-date?

Is Process Safety Information

maintained to support MI
efforts?

PTS 60.2202
45 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

Have Process Hazard

Analyses been performed
since the last evaluation?

Are there outstanding PHA

actions requiring disposition or
resolution?

Are there overdue PHA/MOC

actions that require resolution?

Has outcome of PHA that

affect MI Activities been
communicated to the MI
Leader?

Definitions Do changes to codes or

and standards affect definitions?
References
Have definition changes been
reflected in all MI documents?

Have organizational changes

occurred that would require
modification of definitions?

Determining Is the covered equipment list

MI System reviewed periodically?
Equipment
Has the status of equipment
coverage been consistently
evaluated in the MOC
process?

Have changes to MSDS data

been reviewed for the effect on
the covered equipment list?

Has all equipment been

identified and a master list of
equipment been maintained?

Has all equipment been

evaluated for MI coverage?

Has equipment undergone

changes that would affect the
MI coverage status?

Is there any equipment type

that may be added to the
existing MI program?

Document Are MI procedures available to

Control all workers who need them?

PTS 60.2202
46 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

Has the MI system

documentation been reviewed
on an annual basis?

Do all MI-system manual

holders have the current
revisions of MI procedures?

Are procedure change

requests verified and followed
up to completion?

Have MI document revisions

been managed and hardcopy
versions been issued?

Have document revisions been

made on a timely basis?

Document Are all procedures conforming

Format to the format defined by the
Mechanical Integrity
procedure?

Measuring Has a self-assessment

System schedule been defined?
Effectiveness
Have self-assessment been
completed on a timely basis?

Have results of the plant-wide

assessment been used to
prepare action items for
improvement?

Have results of the

assessment been used to
prepare action items for
improvement?

Are self-assessment action

items dealt with in a timely
manner?

Are self-assessment questions

reviewed and prepared in
advance?

Are MI program evaluations on

schedule?

Have MI program evaluations

been performed?

PTS 60.2202
47 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

Have benchmarks or key

performance indicators been
defined to measure
effectiveness?

Has a strategy and timeline

been defined to reduce
reactive activities?

Is there a need to manage

reactive tasks (routine
maintenance work) under the
MI-system?

Have improvement actions

been acted upon and
resolved?

Training Has each employee’s training

Maintenance requirements been reviewed
and annually?
Inspection
Personnel Are all personnel (employees
and contractors) requiring
training identified?

Have contractor training

programs been evaluated,
approved and documented?

Is there evidence that the

training has taken place as
scheduled?

Does training documentation

include all the records required
by this procedure?

Has the training program been

updated for training on
new/revised procedures?

Have personnel requiring

training been identified?

Has training schedule been

updated for training on
new/revised procedures?

Have there been changes in

employee function, or have
new employees been added?

PTS 60.2202
48 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

Has required refresher training

been placed on training
schedule?

Has required refresher training

been carried out on schedule?

Is competency certification
forms part of the training
program requirements?

Have provisions been made

for training personnel in
preparation for vacation
coverage?

Have project managers

informed or trained
engineering and construction
companies of project
deliverables and
requirements?

Training Have training materials and

Maintenance modules been archived as a
and record of training purpose and
Inspection scope?
Personnel
If a report of training is
required, is it in place and
reflect the current level of
training?

Have Subject Matter Expert

attended technical seminars or
conferences?

Have inspectors been

adequately trained and
certified to satisfy role as a
Lead Person?

Vendor For new and replacement

Fabrication fabricated equipment:
Quality
Assurance a) Were written specifications
prepared?

b) Were written inspection

plans prepared and carried
out?

c) Did site personnel

participate in inspection
and testing in accordance
with the inspection plan?

PTS 60.2202
49 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

d) Were design calculations

prepared and included in
the job file?

e) Were in-service failure

mechanisms taken into
account during the design
phase?

Does the project manager hold

QA/QC documents from
vendors?

Maintenance Have warehouse receiving

Equipment, procedures been carried out?
Materials, and
Spare Parts Are vendor
QA certifications/approvals in
place?

Have supplier audits been

carried out and documented?

How many suppliers are

subject to annual review?

Are certified vendors re-

assessed every three years?

Are ‘special’ verification

activities, when specified,
carried out in accordance with
the inspection plan?

Have receiving
nonconformances been
satisfactorily resolved?

Are receiving
nonconformances reported to
the supplier to improve
service?

Are detailed specifications

prepared for purchase of
material and equipment?

Has receiving and material

management been effective?

Is NCR reported, resolved and

tracked in a systematic way to
prevent recurrence?

PTS 60.2202
50 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

Maintenance Have Maintenance and

and Construction Job Plans been
Construction developed?
Installation
QA Have QA activities been
specified in the job plan?

Have required checklists been

used (e.g. QA/QC, inspection
and test records)?

Preparing and Have Activity Procedures been

Using Activity annually reviewed for content
Procedures and format?

Has action been taken to

assure that revisions are
carried out and communicated
to the personnel who use the
procedures?

Data and Are Inspection Plans subject to

Report periodic review for content and
Management accuracy?

Are equipment files maintained

in the locations specified in the
Mechanical Integrity
procedures?

Do equipment files for ‘old’

equipment contain the
required information?

Do equipment files for ‘new’

equipment contain the
required information?

Is there evidence that the Lead

Person has properly initiated
Nonconformance Reports
when nonconformances are
identified in activity results?

Have Test and Inspection

Status reports been issued as
required?

Have Deficiency Tracking

Reports been issued as
required?

Are corrective action work

orders placed on the
schedule?

PTS 60.2202
51 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

Are overdue corrective actions

(if any) managed in a safe and
timely manner?

Are overdue inspections and

tests resolved?

Have designated personnel

approved
inspections/tests/corrective
actions via the defined review
process?

Have inspection and test

reports been filed in the
equipment file?

Is the equipment file control

strategy for check-out
effective?

Do equipment files contain the

required information as shown
on the equipment file
checklist?

Does the MOC process ensure

that equipment data (such as
that shown on the equipment
data sheet) is current?

Data and Have required inspections and

Report tests been carried out in
Management accordance with the schedule?

Have nonconformance and

deficiency reports been issued
and reviewed monthly?

Are conclusions from the

nonconformance and
deficiency report review
executed?

Has the inspection and test

status report been issued and
reviewed monthly?

Is the ICS support been

effective for management of
documents and data?

Are equipment files complete?

PTS 60.2202
52 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

Planning and Has a schedule for MI

Scheduling implementation been
prepared?

Are actions being carried out

in accordance with the
schedule?

Have inspection contractor

procedures been reviewed and
approved?

Have equipment files been

verified according to the
implementation schedule?

Are the required inspections

and tests entered into the work
schedule?

Have all baseline inspections

and tests been performed on
schedule?

Have all subsequent

inspections and tests been
placed on the schedule?

Is there a mechanism to
manage “overdue” activities?

Evaluation of Are all activity results reviewed

Non- for nonconformances?
conformances
and Are all nonconformances
Correction of reviewed to determine if a
Deficiencies deficiency exists?

Have corrective actions been

placed on the schedule?

Are NCR/Deficiency reports

fully completed and approved
by appropriate personnel?

Are Inspection Plans

revised/updated to include
activities required for
temporary operation with a
deficiency?

Are new/revised inspection

activities placed on the
schedule?

PTS 60.2202
53 OCTOBER 2009
Subject Activity Yes No Unsure Comments

Are all deficiencies corrected

in a safe and timely manner?

Are delinquent deficiency

corrections dealt with in a safe
and timely manner?

Have nonconformances and

deficiencies been prioritized?

System Are Inspection Plans updated

Updating based on the results of
inspection and test activities
and nonconformance reports?

Does the information flow

process ensure that the
equipment files reflect the
current equipment data and
information?

Have supporting codes and

standards been revised and
subsequently updated in the
reference library?

Has new equipment been

added or service changed that
has not been reflected on the
PEFSs or ISOs?

Maintaining Do equipment files reflect the

Non-Computer content required by the
Equipment Equipment File Checklist?
Files
Does the file checkout
procedure ensure file integrity?

PTS 60.2202
54 OCTOBER 2009
Additional Comments

PTS 60.2202
55 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 9: CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF MI PROGRAMME

To provide a quality process for reducing costs of maintaining equipment by eliminating waste in work
processes and improving equipment reliability.

This standard applies to all MI Activities and to the processes in place to operate and maintain the
equipment. The approach to eliminate waste in work processes can be either corrective or preventive.

Attachment a Methods for Identifying Costs of Wastage

Following are some of the methods that can be used to identify costs of wastage in the process of
maintaining equipment reliability:

1. Interviews – One of the most effective techniques for identifying waste costs is to interview the
people who perform the work. When done in a team or group meeting, many ideas will be
presented and ideas will build upon each other. Take notes carefully so that complaints can be
sorted from the useful information for continuous improvement. The interview should be carefully
prepared and the objective clearly defined so that the interview does not turn into a problem-
solving exercise, but remains focused on identifying waste costs. Brainstorming is an excellent
technique for identifying problems causing waste costs.

2. Equipment Failure Reports – Failure Reports should be generated for equipment that fails during
operation. Personnel maintaining equipment that fails during operation should be trained to
perform a “root cause failure analysis” and retain that data in the equipment files.

3. Activity Reports – The Activity Reports have fields for entry of comments by the Assigned
Personnel who performs the activity. The Assigned Personnel should be trained to identify areas
for improvement while performing the activity.

4. Maintenance History Data – The Maintenance Management System contains the performance
history data that can identify equipment causing high costs or frequent outages. Most
Maintenance Management Systems have the capability to generate lists of equipment ranked by
repair costs, repair frequency, and total outage time, and such a list can be generate similar lists
based on equipment type, such as a particular make or model of pump.

5. Incident Investigations and Process Hazards Reviews – Reports from both of these Mechanical
Integrity elements may contain suggestions or data that will identify waste costs.

PTS 60.2202
56 OCTOBER 2009
 Attachment B Charting Techniques

Following is a description of some of the charting methods used for continuous improvement and
elimination of waste costs associated with maintaining equipment integrity:

B-1 Check Sheets

A check sheet is a chart which show how often events occur in a period of time. Its use is to detect
patterns. A typical check sheet is shown below:

Event Month
Total
(Problem) 1 2 3
A XXXX XX XXXX 10
B X XX 3
C XXX XXXX XXX 10
Total 8 6 9 23

B2 Pareto Chart
A Pareto Chart is a vertical bar graph which indicates the number of times an event has occurred. The
chart is constructed with the event which has occurred most often listed at the left axis. A typical
Pareto Chart is shown below:

Mechanical
Seal

Bearing

Corrosion

Alignment

Other

Centrifugal Pump Failures

PTS 60.2202
57 OCTOBER 2009
 Attachment B Charting Techniques (Cont.)

B-3 Cause and Effect Diagram (Fishbone Diagram)

A Cause and Effect Diagram is used if there is need to explore all the possible cause of a problem.
The causes on the diagram are grouped into four or more categories, such as Method, Manpower,
Materials, Machinery for equipment problems, or Policies, Procedures, People, Plant for
administrative problems. Out of the possible problems listed during a brainstorming session, the most
likely causes are selected. The structure of the diagram is shown below:

CAUSES EFFECT

Method Manpower

PROBLEM

Material Machinery

B-4 Flow Chart

A Flow Chart is a pictorial representation showing each of the steps in a process. As such, the flow
chart can be used to:
• Indicate if all the steps of the process are in a logical arrangement
• Identify missing steps
• Identify steps which are not necessary because they add no value to the process
• Identify duplicated steps

All of the equipment guidelines and several other documents in the Mechanical Integrity System
contain flow charts that not only indicate each step in the process, but also indicate the person
responsible for the step. When presented in this manner, the flow chart is also useful for identifying
steps where delays are likely because responsibility passes from one person to another.

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58 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 10: FAILURE MECHANISMS

Introduction

Knowledge in about the cause of damage and the likelihood of further damage that might occur in the
future is very important when conducting integrity studies. Flaws and damages that are discovered
during an in-service inspection can be the result of a pre-existing condition before the component
entered service and/or could be service induced. The root causes of deterioration could be due to
inadequate design including materials selection and detailed geometry, or the interaction with
aggressive environments/conditions that the equipment is subjected to during normal service or
during transient periods.

In general, the following types of damages that can be encountered in oil & gas process equipment
are presented below:-

General and localised corrosion

Most low temperature corrosion problems are not caused by the hydrocarbons themselves, but by
contaminants or injected chemicals within the hydrocarbons. Typical contaminants of concern include:

Air
Air can enter process equipment during shutdowns/turnarounds through the suction side of pumps if
seals or connections are not tight. Although air is considered to be mainly a problem with regard to
fouling, it is has been cited as the cause of accelerated corrosion in vacuum transfer lines and
vacuum towers of crude distillation units. In particular, air ingress is a problem due to the presence of
associated oxygen and moisture, and increases the corrosivity of different waters.

Hydrogen Chloride
Chloride salts are present naturally in crude oil and may be introduced during secondary recovery of
the well or from seawater ballast in tankers. Some operators add organic chloride solvents to remove
wax deposits or to degrease metals. Often, spent solvent is present in slop oil that is introduced with
crude oil charge into the crude unit. Crude oils contain between 0.1 and 2%vol of water. This water
holds the organic chlorides in the form of an aqueous emulsion, typically comprising: 75% NaCl, 15%
MgCl2, 10% CaCl2 (e.g. 0.01% salt). When heated above 150°C hydrogen chloride is evolved from
MgCl2 and CaCl2, while NaCl remains stable up to about 430°C. Dry hydrogen chloride is mainly
formed in the crude preheat furnace and is not corrosive. However, as steam is added to the bottom
of the crude/distillation tower, dilute HCl is formed where the water dew point is reached (about 60°C).
In general, preheated crude oil is passed through a desalter that electrostatically removes 85-95% of
the salt. Apart from lowering HCl levels, the desalter also reduces fouling in exchangers, coke
formation in furnaces and provides for smoother operations by minimising water slugs. However, the
process water entering the desalter is corrosive, as it contains ammonia and hydrogen sulphide.

In downstream refining equipment, chlorides accelerate corrosion by penetrating protective surface

films, increasing electrolyte conductivity, or complexing with steel surfaces. In reforming units, where
organic chlorides may be used during regeneration of reformer catalyst, HCl is stripped off the catalyst
if excessive water is present in the reformer feed. This leads to corrosion, not only in the reformer unit,
but also in hydrotreating units that use excessive make-gas from the reformer. Severe corrosion of
carbon steel occurs in the form of droplet-impingement attack at elbows in the overhead vapour line
and at inlets of overhead condensers (crude/distillation tower). Also in condenser tubes where most of
the water condenses out and droplets of dilute HCl become entrapped under deposits that are present
on tower trays, in condenser shells, and at baffles. The resultant underdeposit corrosion is highly
localised and usually quite severe.

Hydrogen Sulphidation
The processing of crude oils containing high percentages of sulphur compounds such as mercaptans,
mono- and polysulphides and thiophenes, which can result in high temperature corrosion of steel.
Crude oils are often termed "sweet" or "sour" depending on their propensity to form H2S, a sour gas.
The main corrosive sulphur compounds are H2S and mercaptans which may be initially present in the
crude oil or result from distillation. In aqueous solutions a black iron sulphide (FeS) scale is formed
which can lead to fouling of condenser tubing.

PTS 60.2202
59 OCTOBER 2009
Sulphur compounds, are potentially more serious at high temperatures. Sulphidation of steel leads to
uniform wastage at temperatures between 250 and 480°C. The corrosion product is largely iron
sulphide scale and becomes significant temperatures exceeding approx. 250°C. The rate of corrosion
has been compiled from numerous data that has resulted in recommendations for "safe" operating
temperatures for the various materials. These data have been laid down in the appropriate graphs for
the various materials, typically as corrosion rate for the various grades carbon steel and chrome
alloyed steel up to 12% and stainless steel (18-8) against temperature.

Oxygen
Oxygen plays a critical role in the corrosive behaviour of materials. The basic of corrosion
distinguishes between two types of corrosion in which oxygen plays an important role: wet- and dry
corrosion. Wet corrosion, at relative low temperatures up to approx. 120°C. Under wet corrosion
conditions in the presence of oxygen, the corrosion mechanism of iron proceeds further.
Oxygen corrosion of the "wet corrosion type" can occur in steam raising- and cooling equipment, and
any other facility that uses water.

CO2 Corrosion

This refers both to areas of uniform wall thinning and local wall thinning for carbon steels. CO2
corrosion is associated with the water phase, and is therefore likely to e located where water is
consistenly in contact with the metal surface. Such areas are around the 6 o’clock position in piping,
however, CO2 corrosion may also be seen around the 12 o’clock position where unhibited water
vapour condenses on the metal surface. Large amounts of water will ensure that the metal loss is
more widespread; corrosion is also likely in dead legs and other water traps, including irregularities at
welds.Complete dehydration prevents CO2 corrosion. CO2 corrosion rates increases with the CO2
content ( expressed as mole% or volume% in the gas phase), the pressure at which gas and water
were last in equilibrium together, a reduction in pH in the water and a reduction in the effectiveness of
corrosion inhibitor. CO2 corrosion rate can either increase or decrease with temperature depending
on the starting temperature and the presence or absence of protective scales. Corrosion inhibitor
failure can often be tolerated for short periods, but extended lack of inhibitor may give rise to
extensive degradation. Note that methanol, injected in quantity, is expected to have an inhibitor effect.
Coupons can be used to detect corrosion and monitor inhibitor effectiveness, giving due consideration
to their location with reference to water content.

Corrosion under Insulation

This gives external uniform or local corrosion of carbon steel in the presence of water, and occurs
under wet insulation such as under pipe supports and flange joints. CUI corrosion rate increases with
the presence of water and increased temperature; note that temperatures in excess of 100º C will dry
wet insulation but in the process will concentrate any salts and there will be corrosion during the
period when the temperature was rising. Subsequent cooling will also allow further corrosion due to
re-hydration of these salts.

Galvanic Corrosion

When two dissimilar metals come into contact, accelerated corrosion of the less noble metal might
occur, depending on how the metals react (polarise) in the environment and on the relative areas.

In refineries and chemical plant carbon steel can be used for many plant items, because during
normal operation no water is present in the majority of the equipment. If in the case of mis-operation
(feed too wet), too much water is present, corrosion will occur. The severity of corrosion is related to
the electrical conductivity of the solution. Galvanic corrosion does not occur in hydrocarbon or vapour
systems unless free water is present.

PTS 60.2202
60 OCTOBER 2009
Erosion

Erosion and abrasion (often combined with corrosion) can lead to significant material loss by the
abrasive action of a moving stream of gas, liquid, or (fluidised) solid particles. The carrier may be
gaseous (e.g. catalytic cracking units), liquid (e.g. slurries), or gravity pulled (e.g. catalyst transfer
lines or coke handling equipment). Attack tends to increase with (fluid) velocity, especially turbulent
conditions, and is a function of the angle of impingement, depending on the material the greatest wear
will occur either at an angle of 90° impingement or throughout the angle-range 45 - 90°. Metals that
rely on a passive film to provide corrosion resistance are particularly susceptible to erosion-corrosion.
Hardness can act as a simple relative measure of erosion resistance within a particular alloy system.
Attack often takes the form of elongated directional grooves, dependant on the material containing the
erosive medium and the medium itself.

Impingement takes place by the impact, cutting action or frictional wear produced by freely moving
solid particles, such particles are usually fairly small. Because of their mobility, these particles may
move at an angle to the general direction of flow and frequently undercut portions of the material they
strike. Erosion by fluidised particles is an significant problem only at locations where velocities are
high or where directional changes or other conditions produce turbulence. Impingement can also take
place in a special form of erosion-corrosion associated with liquid droplets suspended in a vapour
stream; often containing dissolved acids, H2S or HCl.

Cavitation damage is caused by rapid formation and collapse of vapour bubbles or vacuum cavities
on a metal surface. The resultant shock waves can produce plastic deformation in most metals,
cracking of brittle metals, and removal of material. The plastic deformation induces an increase in
hardness. Cavitation is often induced by vibration with the rate of attack accelerated by corrosive
media. Typical equipment involved are centrifugal pumps, ship propellers and lines or equipment
transporting liquids at high velocities.

Oxidation

Metals and alloys are oxidised when exposed to elevated temperature in air or in other highly
oxidising environment, although oxidation can also occur in nominally reducing environments.
Frequently oxidation contributes to a high temperature corrosion reaction, even if it is not the
dominant mechanism. Carbon steels, low-alloy steels, and stainless steels react at elevated
temperature with oxygen in the surrounding air and become scaled. Scaling resistance increases with
chromium and nickel content (see Table below), as well as small additions of silicon.

At elevated temperatures, scaling resistance decreases in the presence of steam, as steam can
decompose at metal surfaces to form hydrogen and oxygen, which can cause steam oxidation of steel.
In turn, the hydrogen can attack the steel and cause local blowouts, e.g. boiler tube failures. Further
reductions in scaling resistance occur with themal cycling, applied stress, moisture and sulphur-
bearing gases.

Cladding Disbondment

Cladding and linings are used to provide corrosion, oxidation and wear resistance to the under-lying
material, which is usually carbon steel. Cladding and lining materials can be metallic, organic or
inorganic and can be bonded to a substrate by a number of processes.

Metallic cladding by stainless steels and other corrosion resistant alloys are often used for
corrosion/oxidation prevention. These are usually made by explosive bonding, hot rolling or weld
overlay. These processes produce intimate metallurgical bonds between the cladding material and
substrate. A metallic lining is fabricated by attaching a series of small segments of sheet or plate,
usually by welding to the substrate metal, termed ‘wall papering’.

Linings can fail if process fluids are allowed to enter between the lining and the substrate metal
interface either via failure of the welds or the lining itself. Once this occurs, weld repair is difficult, as
material trapped behind the lining is a source of contamination. This can also occur in clad material if
joining processes have not been correctly applied, and partial disbondment exists. Disbondment is
possible when hydrogen produced by chemical and electrochemical reactions on the cladding surface

PTS 60.2202
61 OCTOBER 2009
is absorbed and migrates into the clad material. Hydrogen accumulation either in voids found in the
clading/substrate interface or in the interface itself can cause mechanically disbondment of the
cladding.

Corrosion resistant alloy weld overlays can be susceptible to corrosion if the underlying substrate
metal dilutes the overlay metal too much and the protective oxide can no longer be maintained. This is
due to depletion of chromium in the weld deposit through chromium carbide formation, leading to
pitting susceptibility. Therefore, usually two or preferably three weld passes are used to deposit the
corrosion resistant weld metal.

Organic linings are used for corrosion resistance or where electrical isolation is required. A number of
organic coating systems are used for lining including, amongst others, systems based on epoxies,
vinyls, urethanes. These are sometimes used with reinforcing materials, such as carbon or glass fibre.
An example of this type of material is fibreglass, which is commonly used for lining internal surfaces of
storage tanks. Disbondment of the lining is possible due to poor application or under the action of
excessive cathodic protection current. Although organic (plastic) linings do not corrode like metals,
they do degrade with time. They can suffer from liquid oxidation degradation, melting, swelling,
chemical embrittlement and stress cracking.

Stress Corrosion Cracking

This appears as cracking in areas with high tensile stresses, typically at welds, and is associated with
salt water retained by insulation. The probability of failure due to SCC increases markedly with
temperature, but is dependent on the type of stainless steel, thus control of temperature is important.
Attention should also be paid to exclude water, by effective waterproofing of the insulation. A coating
on the steel will reduce probability of attack, but the deterioration of coating over time must be
considered.

Short term overheating - boiler SH

Short-term overheating failure occurs when a single incident or a small number of incidents exposes
the tube steel to an excessively high temperature (hundreds of degrees above normal) to the point
where deformation or yielding occurs. Overheating results from abnormal conditions such as loss of
coolant flow and excessive boiler-gas temperature. These abnormal conditions are created by the
following circumstances:

• Internal tube blocking

• Loss of coolant circulation or low water level
• Loss of coolant caused by an upstream tube failure
• Over-firing or uneven firing of boiler burners

The first three circumstances produce starvation or low-coolant-flow failures. A tube can be blocked
by construction and repair debris, tools, steel shot, preboiler oxide, deposits from carryover or spray
water, or loose pieces of internal non-pressure-part hardware such as bolts, nuts, and steel plates. In
pendant superheater tubes, blocking also can occur as a result of condensate that has not been
completely boiled out, especially during boiler start-ups.

In general, short-term overheating failures involve considerable tube deformation in the form of metal
elongation and reduction in wall area or cross section. Such failures often characterized as having
knife-edged fracture surfaces. Wall thinning and local bulging precede the actual fracture, because
the strength of the material is reduced at the higher temperature. A fishmouth appearance with thin-
edge fracture surfaces and considerable swelling is typical for a ferritic steel tube that has failed
before its temperature has exceeded the upper critical temperature.

If, however, the tube temperature were high enough to transform the iron in the steel from ferrite to
austenite, there would be no noticeable ‘necking down’, or reduction in wall thickness, of the fracture
edges. There would still be metal elongation and tube swelling, with an increase in measured tube
diameter. A metallurgical analysis of the microstructure of the steel should be performed to confirm
that the tube temperature before failure was high enough to transform the ferrite to austenite.

PTS 60.2202
62 OCTOBER 2009
Thermal Fatigue

Fatigue can lead to fracture under repeated or fluctuating stresses having a maximum value less than
the tensile strength of the material, known as the fatigue or endurance limit. Sources for fatigue
include thermal/stress cycling, rotation or vibration, like that produced by reciprocating compressors
and positive displacement pumps.

Thermal fatigue occurs in equipment that experiences frequent changes in temperature. For instance,
each start-up and shutdown induces thermal stresses, which, if significant in number, can lead to
thermal fatigue. In particular, coke drums and reactors (heavy section welds) in cyclic temperature
service are prone to thermal fatigue. Austenitic stainless steel is often used to clad the internal
surfaces of thick walled vessels to protect the alloy steel substrate from, say, H2S/H2 environments.

Austenitic stainless steel exhibit significantly higher thermal expansion (more than 30%) than low alloy
steels and start-up and shutdown can cause plastic deformation of the plastic layer and adjacent base
material. Repeated thermal cycles can induce high strain, low cycle fatigue of the cladding. Roll
bonded cladding is significantly more resistant to fatigue than weld overlay cladding. In the latter case,
the requirement for some ferrite in the weld deposit induces sigma phase formation during post weld
heat treatment that reduces fatigue resistance. To minimise the risk of thermal fatigue it is
recommended that the heating and cooling rates in hydrotreater plants are slower than 40°C/hr.

Vibration Fatigue

It is a form of mechanical fatigue in which cracks are produced as a result of dynamic loading due to
vibration. There are two types of fatigue, which are high cycle fatigue and low cycle fatigue. Low cycle
fatigue is based on low cycle/high stress fatigue, e.g. thermal stresses associated with infrequent
start-up/shutdown cycles.

High cycle fatigue is of particular importance in the presence of flaws, e.g. welding flaws and weld
toes, cold (hydrogen) cracks. Under these circumstances, the majority of the components’ life will be
spent propagating the crack. In a nominally defect free welded joint, fatigue life will incorporate a
substantial crack initiation period, as well as a crack propagation period. Understandably therefore,
the fatigue design guidance presented in ASME B31.3 is based on nominally defect free welds. The
sources of fatigue loading that have to be considered in the design of pipes are more numerous than
those for pressure vessels.

In addition to internal pressure fluctuations, pipes may also be subjected to external forces from direct
loads, bending moments, and torques. (These low cycle fatigue loads should be accounted for in pipe
flexibility design analyses). In relatively flexible small diameter pipes, a number of failures have been
caused by high-cycle, resonant vibrations due, for example, to external vortexes, internal turbulent
flow regimes, sustained relief valve discharge, etc. If the frequency of any of the modes of these
vibrations coincides with the natural frequency of the pipe, substantial resonant vibrations can be
produced. Nevertheless, in the absence of complex time-history cumulative damage analyses of the
small diameter piping systems, small diameter piping support design is more often than not based on
field experience.

References

1. NACE Course Book on Corrosion Control in the Refining Industry,”NACE International,

Houston, TX, 1999.
2. API Recommended Practice 571 – First Edition, 1993

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63 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 11: MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

In order to determine the integrity and continual performance of equipment, the analyses listed below
can be used. The findings are fed into the MI task plan for either corrective or preventive actions.

Asset Integrity Management: The overall management of MI which provides support in producing
inspection/maintenance/test plans.

Review Protocols: Audit protocols to ask relevant questions to uncover real performance, compare
best practices and identify improvement opportunities.

Risk Based Inspection (RBI): Provides cost optimised inspection planning designed to manage risks.
Prescribe what, where, how and when to inspect static mechnical equipment and piping.

Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM): Provides optimized maintenance and test plans to ensure
control reliability and safety of plant rotating equipment, valves and controls.

Safety Integrity Level (SIL): Assessment to address the overall functional safety of instrumentations
that are critical to the system/equipment safety.

Reliability Availability Maintainability (RAM): Provides basis for decision making with regard to
solutions and measures toward a more profitable and safe operation of plant, protecting business and
reputation through reduced downtime.

Fitness-for-Service (FFS): Assessment to demonstrate the structural integrity of an in-service

component containing a flaw or damage.

Failure Analysis: Failure investigation to determine root cause, contributing causes and morphology
of failure.

Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA): A systematic review of a mechanical
system where it evaluates the effects of failures of individual components.

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64 OCTOBER 2009
APPENDIX 12: MI INTERVENTIONS

Maintenance Methods

Minimum Surveillance: This requires general visual inspection, typically as part of general walk-
around by facility staff. A formal reporting process can be introduced such that any anomalies noted
on a day-to-day basis by the facility staff can be recorded as observations and followed up if
necessary.

Corrective Maintenance: The items subjected to this maintenance method generally is not expected to
cause significant injury or loss of business income, and it can be described as “fixing” when a problem
occurs. Although the losses are tolerable it may cause minor damage/inconvenience and such items
are repaired or replaced if and when a failure occurs. This maintenance strategy is reactive only, and
monitoring programs do not feature prominently in this approach. The emphasis is more on repairs,
emergency procedures and use of back-up systems after a problem has arisen. A formal reporting
process can be introduced such that any anomalies noted on a day-to-day basis by the facility staff
can be recorded as observations and followed up if considered necessary.

Preventive Maintenance: Items with losses that cannot be tolerated needs measures to be taken to
ensure that failure do not occur. To ensure actions are taken before a failure occurs,scheduled
maintenance feature prominently to facilitate these preemptive actions. Ideally, the planned intervals
of preventive maintenance are arranged so that corrective action is taken just before significant
damage would set in otherwise. This requireds general visual inspection and preventive maintenance
measures to ensure repairs or replacements are carried out before a failure occurs. The checks may
include external corrosion protection, operating parameters, vibrations, materials deterioration and etc.

Predictive Maintenance: The maintenance actions are based on the actual condition, rather than on
fixed schedules. Corrosion sensors and monitoring activities are important for obtaining information on
actual condition. The aim is to minimize (or even eliminate) unnecessary maintenance and inspection
activities and to focus maintenance efforts when and where they are most needed. Overall, this
strategy is of a highly proactive nature, with the emphasis on predicting when and where maintenance
actions are required.

Inspection Techniques

Radiography: Radiography describes those NDT methods where short-wavelength electromagnetic

radiation (normally X-rays or gamma rays) is used to penetrate a component to produce an image of
its internal structure. As radiation passes through an object it is absorbed more by thicker regions and
regions where the physical density is greatest, cracks and voids on the other hand, absorb less
radiation. In radiography these differences in absorption are normally recorded as an image on
photographic film or fluorescent screen.

Ultrasonic: Ultrasonic testing or UT as it is commonly called is the testing method of introducing a high
frequency sound wave into one exterior side of a material, and reflecting the sound wave from its
interior surface to produce a precise measurement of wall thickness. The round trip duration of travel,
divided by the known sound velocity through that particular material provides a wall thickness
measurement equally accurate to a micrometer reading.

Ultrasonic is a well proven and respected diagnostic routinely employed for weld and flaw detector in
industry applications.

Eddy Current: Eddy currents are electrical currents that can be induced in any electrically conductive
specimen to learn something about its material properties or the presence of any defects. Eddy
currents are generated by placing an AC current carrying coil in close proximity to the electrically
conductive specimen and are sensed using the same or different coil. The phase, magnitude and
distribution of these eddy currents depend on a number of parameters, including the test object’s
electrical conductivity, magnetic permeability and geometry, and the presence of flaws. Eddy current
methods are often used for crack detection, positive material identification and to measure the
thickness of surface coatings.

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Magnetic Particle Testing: Magnetic techniques may be used only to examine magnetic materials,
such as ferritic steels and irons, (not generally austenitic steels). In simple terms, a magnetic field is
induced in the material by a permanent magnet, electromagnet or electrical field and any flaw that
interacts with this field causes a local change in the magnetic flux near the surface of the component.
Changes in the magnetic flux can be detected by magnetic particles or by electrical coils or Hall effect
probes.

Penetrant Testing: The first of the surface methods is Liquid Penetrant Inspection. This method is
applicable in detection of surface breakage and can be used on any material. The item being tested is
thoroughly cleaned and then coated with a liquid which is drawn into the surface. After sufficient time
has elapsed for the liquid to be drawn into any cracks, the excess liquid is removed and a second
liquid which acts as a developer is applied. The developer draws the penentrant from the crack which
can then be seen. Some penetrants are colored and require good fluorescent white light to be seen
where others require a darkened room with an ultraviolet light to be seen.

Visual Testing: Although the simplest of all NDT methods, the importance of direct visual examination
should not be overlooked. A careful visual examination of plant equipment can often identify rejectable
flaws without the need to employ more expensive forms of inspection. To carry out visual inspection
good lighting sources should be used together with good vision on the inspector’s part. Magnification
equipment may also be used to assist the inspection. The item being inspected should be thoroughly
cleaned prior to the inspection and this may include simply wiping the item down with a cloth through
to blasting and chemical cleaning. This method is suitable for detection of defects which are visible to
the eye, however this is often not the case with many defects which may occur. As such, other
surface and volumetric methods are used to detect defects which can not readily be seen.

Acoustic Emmision Testing: All solid materials have a certain elasticity. They become strained or
compressed under external forces and spring back when released. If the elastically strained material
contains a defect, e.g. a welded joint defect, a non- metallic inclusion, incompletely welded gas bubble
or similar, cracks may occur at heavily stressed spots, rapidly relaxing the material by a fast
dislocation. This rapid release of elastic energy is called an AE event. It produces an elastic wave that
propagates and can be detected by appropriate sensors and analyzed. AE testing detects and
interprets the acoustic events resulting from these crack processes and can identify, locate, and
display a beginning damage to the tested object within very short time.

Positive Material Identification: This method provides assurance on the composition of materials and
generally uses X-ray fluorescence or spark emmission spectrography for on site testing. It give high
speed confirmation with low radiation exposure and suitable for use to verify high quality metals and
alloys including stainless steels, monels, inconels and etc.

Magnetic Flux Leakage: A magnetic field is applies to inspect ferromagnetic materials. Some of the
magnetic flux escapes in the presence of defects and these are detected by magnetic sensors and
registered as flaw signals. This is usually used in the detection of corrosion on surface and underside
of non-insulated areas of storage tank floors, piping and vessels and coated materials.

END OF DOCUMENT.

PTS 60.2202
66 OCTOBER 2009