Using a language, so Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed, is like play-
ing a game, not like using a calculus. Understanding a language game is understanding a form of life. No appeal to rules guaran- tees that a statement has been uttered correctly, if only because it is possible to interpret and apply a rule incorrectly. To understand a way of life presupposes that one understands how its language is embedded in and articulates practices, that one can recognize a cor- rect statement in a particular context, and that one can sometimes recognize different interpretations of that statement as obvious in a given situation. “You must bear in mind,” Wittgenstein wrote, “that the language game is, so to speak, something unpredictable. I mean it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreason- able). It is there— like our life.” 1p. 3
But there is this additional point: the sign as an object
of a knowing mind (a purely cognitive event) is not the same as the sign translated into the sensible body through the cultivation of sensibilities. p. 5