Int Polit (2018) 55:141–159

https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0074-4

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

What does international relations theory tell us

about territorial disputes and their resolution?

Jong Kun Choi1 • Yong-Soo Eun2

Published online: 3 October 2017

 Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2017

Abstract This article explores the conditions under which territorial disputes are
likely to lead to major armed conflicts and considers mechanisms through which
territorial disputes can be resolved. In doing so, it attempts to discover the insights
and suggestions that the competing major IR theories, namely neorealism, neolib-
eralism, and conventional constructivism, can offer. Several pathways through
which to address territorial disputes are provided from the perspectives of these IR
theories. In addition, the article discusses how each pathway can be employed in
practice in addressing territorial disputes. In conclusion, we point out the complex
and multifaceted nature of disputes over territory, arguing that their resolution calls
for a synthetic interactive approach based on a combination of the values of two IR
theories, liberalism and constructivism.

Keywords International relations (IRs)
Territorial disputes
IR theory
Theory

and practice

Introduction

States exist physically within geographical parameters. Maintaining territorial

integrity is the unyielding goal of a state’s ontological security. Territorial disputes
are thus difficult barriers to the construction of stable interstate relations, and

& Yong-Soo Eun

ysir@hanyang.ac.kr
Jong Kun Choi
jongchoi@yonsei.ac.kr
1
Department of Political Science and International Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, South
Korea
2
Department of Political Science and International Studies, Hanyang University, Seoul, South
Korea
142 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

resolving them can significantly reduce the possibility of military conflict (Kocs
1995; Gibler 2007; Vasquez and Henehan 2011; Aran 2012; Mitchell and Vasquez
2013). To be sure, it is empirically clear that not all territorial disputes culminate in
war. For example, several countries, including China and Japan, have wrangled over
territory in the South China Sea for centuries, but these disputes have not (yet)
generated major conflicts. It is thus important to understand both under what
conditions territorial disputes are more likely to lead to major armed conflicts, and
how territorial disputes can be resolved peacefully.
Although the field of international relations (IRs) recognizes territorial disputes
as an important cause of war, there is a shortage of theoretical investigations into
what mechanisms are useful and/or necessary in resolving territorial disputes. Of
course, IR theory has generated insights into states’ behavioral motivation when it
comes to conflict and cooperation in world politics—be it the balance of material
power from a realist perspective, economic gains and ‘democratic peace’ from a
liberal perspective, or identity and norms from a constructivist perspective.
However, the application of these theoretical insights into the study of boundary
conditions as regards the relationship between territorial disputes and war and the
specific ways of resolving territorial disputes remains underdeveloped. In other
words, while there is a relatively large quantity of IR literature on territorial
disputes, the focus in the studies has not been on the relevance of theory.
Furthermore, the existing studies pay only scant attention to appraising the manifold
implications for resolving territorial disputes that can be adduced by theoretical
perspectives of international politics.
This article explores the conditions under which territorial disputes are likely to
lead to major armed conflicts and considers the mechanisms through which
territorial disputes can be resolved. We analyze what drives territorial disputes and
extract real-world prescriptions for their resolution from IR theory. Empirically, our
research is motivated by the recent upsurge of territorial disputes in East Asia, and
therefore, most of the empirical examples are from that region,1 but our conceptual
discussion is not limited to East Asia. Rather, we attempt to discover the insights
and suggestions that mainstream IR theories, namely neorealism, neoliberalism, and
(conventional) constructivism, can offer in relation to territorial disputes. Assuredly,
contemporary IR has a theoretical palette more varied than that of these three
approaches: since the third (or fourth) ‘great debate’ in the 1980s, the terrain of IR
theory has become ‘richer and wider’ due to the development of post-positivism
(Eun 2016a, p. 95). Nevertheless, a detailed examination of all IR theories and
related variables is beyond the scope of a short piece such as this. Rather, for the
purposes of systemic analysis and knowledge accumulation, it seems appropriate to
zoom in on what is most frequently debated and employed in the theoretical and
conceptual toolbox of IR: power (neorealism), interests and institutions (neoliber-
alism), and identity and norms (constructivism). Moreover, the three major IR
theories are rarely subjected to comparative scrutiny in relation to territorial

1
According to Wright’s (2012) ‘Outlaw of the Sea,’ published in Foreign Affairs, the number of
territorial disputes in East Asia has increased dramatically in recent years: for example, between 2000 and
2010, there were 45 territorial disputes, whereas there had only been nine between 1950 and 1990.
What does international relations theory tell us about… 143

disputes, and especially their resolution. To rectify this serious problem, we focus
our attention on these theories’ prescriptive insights regarding territorial disputes
and compare their plausibility.
More specifically, the article first briefly discusses the political weight of
territorial disputes in international relations and the relationship between territorial
disputes and war. While noting that not all territorial disputes escalate to war, the
article pays particular attention to the conditions under which the relationship
between territorial disputes and war is expected to be closely interwoven. Having
specified the scope conditions, we focus on how territorial disputes can be resolved.
Here, several possible pathways regarding how to manage and resolve territorial
disputes are provided from the perspective of the three mainstream IR theories.
Further, we discuss how each pathway can be employed in practice in addressing
territorial disputes. In conclusion, we point out the complex and multifaceted nature
of disputes over territory, arguing that the resolution of territorial disputes calls for a
synthetic interactive approach based on a combination of the values underlying two
IR theories, liberalism and constructivism.

Territorial disputes and war: a nonlinear relationship

Why is territory important? Why do states become involved in territorial disputes

and seem to be less able to resolve them than other disputes? Answers to these
questions appear rather obvious. No rational state will voluntarily give up the
territory that defines the physical parameters of its sovereignty; hence, territorial
disputes are difficult to resolve. In short, states have the intrinsic desire to control
territory precisely because such control affects the material and perceptual elements
of state entities (Carter and Goesman 2011).
Territorial disputes can be defined as an explicit expression of disagreement
between states over the location of borders or ownership of ‘territory including
islands but excluding maritime demarcation disputes over exclusive economic
zones’ (Huth and Allee 2002, p. 298). Although territorial disputes, over both land
and offshore areas, differ and vary in scale, history, and the number of involved
states, there are more or less common elements to the tangible and intangible factors
that influence them. These factors encompass both material attributes—i.e., the size
of the disputed area, the population therein, natural resources, and the number of
population killed and/or wounded—and ideational or institutional attributes
(historic animosity, cultural differences, and third-party involvement). At base,
the variety in these factors is due to the fact that the meanings or values embedded
in territory as such are essentially diverse.
Territory, as a piece of land, has tangible or real value that results from its
residing population, natural resources, and strategic location. Conflict over the
control of oil reserves and pipelines, freshwater sources, ocean fish stock, and arable
land, all of which are of great significance in an era of intensified global
consumption, tend to concentrate in conflict over territory. Put simply, territory and
territorial issues involve various types of values and can thus give rise to state
conflicts in diverse realms. At the same time, however, the very same piece of land
144 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

may also have intangible, perceptual, symbolic, relational, and even sentimental
value. States attach historical, religious, social, and cultural significance to a
particular piece of land. For example, conflicts over Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and
Kurdistan fundamentally raise issues of territorial control grafted onto broader
concerns of ethnicity, religion, and historical memory. Given the weight of
territorial issues associated with both tangible and intangible values, it is not
surprising that territorial disputes have been associated with armed conflict more
frequently than any other issue in world politics and that armed conflicts over
territory are more likely to escalate to wars. States do not shy away from disputing
over territory, no matter how small that territory is. We can see that many existing
territorial disputes, particularly in Northeast Asia, essentially involve small rock
islands and/or a geographically small piece of land. Put otherwise, territorial
disputes are a key variable producing interstate conflict involving the use of force
and leading to the outbreak of major war (Vasquez and Henehan 2001). It is also
known that states rarely come to an agreement over territorial disputes (Hensel
1994; Starr 2013). Moreover, in resolving territorial disputes, if a concerned state
uses coercive strategies, other states tend to respond in a similar manner (Senese
1996); this, in turn, sparks an arms race and can escalate to war (Colaresi and
Thompson 2002). All of this makes territorial disputes one of the most common
sources of interstate wars and militarized conflicts (Vasquez 1993; Holsti 1991;
Hensel 2012).
Nonetheless, it is important to reiterate that territorial disputes per se do not
necessarily result in military conflicts. The relevant empirical studies indicate that
129 territorial disputes occurred during the Cold War period, yet about a half of
them did not involve the threat or use of military force (Huth 1996, p. 8). There is
also a recent tendency for territorial disputes to escalate to war less frequently
(McLaughlin 1999). These nonlinear dynamics of territorial disputes raise the
following delicate and important question: under what conditions are territorial
disputes more likely to lead to war? This question seems to capture the essence of
the problem. Put formally, we need specific knowledge of boundary and scope
conditions with respect to the likelihood that territorial disputes will escalate to
major armed conflicts. And such specific knowledge can help us discern the
mechanisms through which territorial disputes can be managed and resolved
without resorting to war.
With this in mind, the following survey first examines two main aspects of
territorial disputes, namely material and ideational values, in order to identify what
factors or conditions exist within the relationship between war and territorial
disputes.

Material values

It is obvious that state territory has certain tangible/material properties. Territory

confers strategic and economic benefits in that it offers control of trade or
communications routes (Dalby 2002; Gleditsch 1998). It can also improve a state’s
military position relative to its rival or neighboring states simply because states
extract material gains from territory. As such, states suffering from resource scarcity
What does international relations theory tell us about… 145

are more likely to become involved in territorial disputes and try to win the disputes
in order to ameliorate their relative weakness (O’Lear 2005). In other words,
territorial disputes can emerge from an uneven distribution of natural resources.
Relatedly, if a territory in dispute is known to possess globally valued resources and
such resources contribute to power dynamics (e.g., state-to-state conflict over access
to these resources, or resource-funded sub-state rebellion as a challenge to state
sovereignty), territorial disputes tend to linger and become hard to resolve unless
one state overwhelms the other by force. In short, the issue of territory becomes
more salient if the area is known to possess valuable natural resources such as oil,
minerals, or natural gas (Barnett 2000). As Taylor Fravel notes, states are ‘more
prone to use force in disputes over land highly valued for its strategic importance,
economic potential, or symbolic significance, or when they are stronger militarily
than their adversary’ (Fravel 2007/08, p. 46).
Surely, not all states, even those desperate for the material benefits associated
with territory, end up waging war over their territorial disputes. Here, it is worth
recalling the insights of early security theorists. They emphasized the role of
contiguity in relation to territory and war. More specifically, if the ownership of a
territory that has significant material resources is claimed by more than two states
that share borders, then conflicts between them are more likely, because of
enhanced military access and greater opportunities for intervention. For example,
Diehl analyzed the effect of geographic location on the likelihood of territorial
disputes that would escalate to war (Diehl 1991). According to his analysis, of the
50 territorial conflicts over geographically contiguous areas involving major power
rivals between 1816 and 1980, 12 escalated to war. But of the 54 noncontiguous
territorial disputes involving major power rivals over the same period, only one
escalated to war. Bremer also argued that war was about 35 times more likely
among geographically contiguous states than between noncontiguous states in any
given year from 1816 to 1965 (Bremer 1992). Given this, it seems that geographical
contiguity, the material values that territory can offer, and territorial disputes are
closely associated with war.

Ideational values

The importance of territory is not exclusively limited to its material and strategic
value. States also value territories for intangible (such as historical and sentimental)
reasons. Although these intangible values may appear superficial, they do have a
real impact on states’ behavior in regard to territorial disputes (Goertz and Diehl
1992; Hensel and Mitchell 2005). As discussed earlier, territory can be seen as part
of the national identity, whether because it is perceived as a religious sanctuary or
cultural icon or related to ethnic origin. Indeed, even beyond the discipline of
geography, there is recognition that territory is best understood as having a dynamic
meaning that influences conflict—and not just in terms of ‘on–off’ features like
proximity or contiguity (Starr and Thomas 2002). Territory has tangible or ‘real’
value as measured by population, resources, or the number of people killed in a
conflict. The very same territory also may have intangible, symbolic, or relational
value to others who equate the land with historical claims, attach religious or
146 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

cultural significance to it, or recognize third-party involvement in the dispute

(Murphy 1990; Hensel 2012). Thus, if territory symbolizing such ideational values
is disputed, states do not easily give up, thereby making a mutually acceptable so-
lution difficult to achieve. This is because territory often coincides with national
identity and thus nationalism. People tend to equate themselves with a particular
territory and identify territory as belonging to part of their own history and
civilization. Numerous events in the history of world politics show that we equate
defense of the collectivity with specific territories and boundaries (Hensel and
Mitchell 2017).
In this regard, much the same can be said about rivalry: it can also be understood
in perceptual and emotional terms. It is often said that the most dangerous territorial
contests intertwine with rivalry and that territorial issues between nonrivals are less
difficult to manage (Rasler and Thompson 2006; Hensel 2012). Some territorial
disagreements are embedded within rivalry contexts, and these disagreements are
the very ones that are the most likely to develop into armed clashes. Territorial
disputes between rivals act as a hair trigger for all the psychological baggage and
mistrust associated with protracted antagonisms. It is not territory per se, but the
mistrust of rivals’ presumed intentions, fear of domination, and the dislike of rivals
that magnify territorial disputes. When contested territory is combined with rivalry,
there is a greater chance of militarized conflict.
In this vein, the territorial disputes in Northeast Asia showcase a complex layer
of identity, power, and interest elements that limits the usefulness of legal and
institutional remedies. The Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute between South Korea
and Japan enflames South Korea’s memory of colonization as Japan, its former
colonial power, continues to claim sovereignty over what Koreans perceive as their
symbol of national independence. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the East
China Sea between Japan and China has become China’s ultimate testing ground for
its status as a regional hegemon, while Japan sees China’s assertiveness as an
attempt to change the status quo in Asia. While these three key Asian states are
enjoying the indispensable benefits of ‘economic interdependence’ (Choi 2013,
p. 89), the so-called island disputes in the region exemplify how territorial disputes
can involve inner and ideational issues.
The above survey on territorial disputes, despite its necessary brevity, indicates
clearly that territory is an important variable in generating tensions and conflicts
among states and (more importantly) that territorial disputes are likely to lead to
military conflicts under the following conditions: first, when the territory concerned
involves highly valuable strategic and economic benefits, and second, when the
states involved share borders and are rivals whose basis for rivalry involves
nationalism. These points are explored in the following section, which discusses
major IR theories. In addition, several possible solutions to territorial disputes from
the perspectives of the mainstream theories are provided in an attempt to understand
when and where each theoretical approach offers greater insights and understanding
with respect to managing and resolving territorial disputes.
What does international relations theory tell us about… 147

IR theory and the resolution of territorial disputes

We can think of several ways through which territorial disputes can be managed
and/or resolved on the basis of the root assumptions that underpin theoretical
perspectives in IR. The different schools of thought disagree in their substantive
analysis of causes of states’ external behavior and accordingly offer different
solutions to territorial disputes.

Neorealism

Neorealism holds that the distribution of material power among states defines the
structure of the international system, which in turn influences how states behave in
the system. This line of reasoning derives from the key assumption upon which
neorealism is premised: the international system is anarchic. Waltz writes: ‘In
anarchy, there is no automatic harmony … because any state may at any time use
force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay
the cost of weakness’ (Waltz 1959, p. 60). In this regard, neorealists posit that this
conflictual anarchy forces states to maximize their security by maximizing power
(Mearsheimer 1994/95; Wohlforth 1999; Waltz 2000; Layne 2009). According to
neorealists, states are prone to be more concerned with relative than absolute gains:
states are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us gain?, but Who will gain more?’
(Waltz 1979, p. 105).
If we apply the power factor of realist theory to the issue of territorial disputes,
one obvious insight is that these disputes can hardly be managed, let alone resolved
diplomatically or peacefully. Going a step further, from the (offensive) realist
perspective, the most effective solution to any territorial dispute may be to invade
and conquer. The strong will win, and the territory will be a trophy for the victory.
In short, realism argues that peace or diplomacy remains fleeting when it comes to
territorial disputes and that conflict is a norm because anarchy forces states to
compete with each other. Due to the absence of any formal higher authority to
resolve disputes, states are inclined to protect their vital interests against external
threats by balancing power with power.
This trend is most visible in the territorial disputes in Northeast Asia. For
example, China’s Defense Minister, General Chang Wanquan, issued a warning
statement in April 2014, indicating that Beijing would never compromise on its
claim to the disputed territory in the East China Sea, which is known as the Senkaku
Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands in China: ‘China will make no compromise,
no concession, no treaty. The Chinese military can assemble as soon as summoned,
fight any battle and win’ (Cooper 2014). To substantiate its resolve, China has gone
from a green to blue water navy, its air force is actively acquiring a cutting-edge air
power platform, including fifth-generation stealth J-20 fighters, and pouring
resources into anti-ship ballistic missiles specifically designed to defend its
innermost defense zone—the First Island Chain, consisting of the Kuril Islands,
Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo (Mizokami 2014). A rising China with
this maximalist stance has pushed its neighboring states to look for balancing factors
148 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

in the region. For example, the Philippines has thus far welcomed ‘a rearmed Japan
shorn of its pacifist constitution as a counterweight to the growing assertiveness of
China’ (Pilling et al. 2012, p. 1).
However, the typical behavior suggested by realist IR theory (Wohlforth 2012,
p. 40), such as states’ building up of their capabilities (‘internal balancing’) or
aggregating their capabilities with other states in alliances (‘external balancing’),
does not bring territorial disputes to an end. Rather, it incubates future conflict, as a
changing balance of power may come to favor today’s loser in the future.
Furthermore, balancing power with power could produce structural conditions under
which security dilemmas become the prevailing pattern of interaction between states
involved in territorial disputes. Any defensive action on the part of one actor to
strengthen its grasp on a disputed territory can be perceived as an offensive action
by the other actor. Territories—especially disputed ones—serve to foster percep-
tions of aggressive intentions, and, with exaggerated perceptions of threat, states are
more likely to engage in armed conflicts. Power-balancing thus ratchets up tensions
and hostility between not only concerned claimants, but also neighboring states. In
addition, resolving territorial disputes by force will invite strong nationalistic
resistance on the part of the defeated, and it will generate lingering territorial-
dispute dynamics that will last into the next generation, which will further intensify
the existing security dilemmas.
Given the above discussion, there is a need to examine the issue of territorial
disputes from other theoretical perspectives that employ other logics and
assumptions. To this end, let us look first at neoliberal IR theory, which takes a
very different view of international relations, especially regarding the effect of
institutions and trade on state behavior.

Neoliberalism

While IR realists characterize international relations as an endless succession of

wars due to states’ need to accumulate the material power to be secure in a self-help
world, liberal theory implies that cooperation is more pervasive than realism allows.
In the liberal view, states cooperate because cooperation yields better prospects for
their prosperity and relational stability in world politics. Based on this assumption,
liberals, particularly neoliberal IR scholars, posit that the success of international
cooperation depends largely on two factors: international institutions and economic
interdependence. They argue that international institutions and interdependence can
enable states to forego short-term advantages and discourage them from using force
against each other (Nye 1993; Baldwin 1993).
On the basis of neoliberalism, several pathways for addressing territorial disputes
can be proposed. First, economic liberalism supplies support for the proposition that
states’ conscious effort to deepen and widen economic ties with those with whom
they have been engaged in territorial disputes will increase their motivation to
remain cooperative. ‘The greater the volume of trade and investment flowing
between two countries’ (Papayoanou 1996, p. 45), the more that groups on both
sides have a vested interest in avoiding conflict between them due to the economic
gains at stake. Further, international economic ties—which involve various social
What does international relations theory tell us about… 149

and political groups at both the domestic and international levels—often act as
powerful constraints on national leaders when it comes to making policy, especially
regarding countries with which they are economically interdependent, because
‘economic interest groups and the society at large as voters’ affect national leaders’
political actions (Papayoanou 1996, pp. 44–46). For these reasons, when national
leaders make policy decisions, including those concerning territorial disputes, they
become more cautious and prudent. Stated more succinctly, economic ties between
states involved in territorial disputes can work as a buffer between them.
Although its implications for territorial disputes are not inconsequential,
economic liberalism is not well suited to addressing the problems of territorial
disputes per se. First, the remedy it proposes, namely deepening and widening
economic interdependence, is not a specific and direct measure aimed at resolving
territorial disputes. Furthermore, economic ties can also have negative conse-
quences on states involved in a territorial dispute. The 2010 trade embargo imposed
by China on Japan is a case in point. Since China produces more than 90 percent of
the world’s supply of rare earth materials, which are ‘crucial for a wide range of
technologies, including hard drives, solar panels, and motors for hybrid vehicles’
(Aston 2010, p. 1), and thus crucial to the economy, Japan’s trade dependence on
China is significant; this enabled Beijing to impose an embargo on shipments of rare
earth materials to Japan in response to the growing tensions over the disputed
islands (Bradsher 2010; Kurashige 2012). In short, depending on the level of
interdependence, trade can be deployed as political ‘leverage in a territorial dispute’
(Bell 2012, p. 1). As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye aptly explain, under the
condition of ‘asymmetric interdependence,’ the less dependent party may have a
‘source of power’ in relation to the ‘more dependent party’ (Keohane and Nye 2001,
pp. 10–13).
Let us, then, turn to liberal institutionalism. The centerpiece of liberal
institutionalism is international institutions, or, more to the point, the role of
institutions in obviating or mitigating conflict. Although institutions cannot
eliminate anarchy, they can nevertheless influence states’ preferences and thereby
their actions. According to liberal institutionalism, international institutions do this
‘through a variety of methods that either create strong incentives for cooperation
like favorable trade status, or through powerful disincentives like trade sanctions’
(Navari 2008, p. 39). The core of neoliberal institutionalism is the concept of
transaction costs. These include ‘the costliness of information, the costs of
measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of
protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements’ (North 1990, pp. 27–28).
Even though international institutions impose certain constraints on sovereign
states, they reduce ‘transaction costs associated with rule-making, negotiating,
implementing, enforcing, information gathering and conflict resolution’ (Keohane
1984, pp. 12–14, p. 50). Institutions can also serve as means of providing
information about their member states, which in turn helps states have a better
understanding of the intentions of other states and thus reduces the uncertainty
inherent in anarchic international politics. It is in this respect that a number of
liberal institutionalists argue that ‘international actors should promote institution-
alization as a means of promoting the collective interest in international stability’
150 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

(Navari 2008, p. 43). In short, institutions and institutionalization can alleviate fears
of betrayal and mistrust embedded in anarchy, which can in turn prevent states from
engaging in disputes and wars.
With the precept of liberal institutionalism, two specific sorts of institutions (or
approaches to institutionalization) can be presented to help solve the problems
associated with territorial disputes, namely bilateral and multilateral institutions, for
consultation, management, and negotiation. As one can imagine, the bilateral form
of institution is a very specific and direct approach to territorial disputes from the
liberal institutionalist perceptive. It is often aimed both at demarcating state borders
in order to remove sources of conflict among neighboring states and at maintaining
the status quo and stabilizing the situation in areas of disputes. This management
may take place when the states involved aim to improve their current relations in the
hopes of increasing trade, strategic partnerships, and sociocultural exchanges that
both states perceive as mutually beneficial (Wang 2003). Therefore, as long as
bilateral institutionalized settings exist, they can lower the probability that such
disputes will escalate to a major armed conflict, as these institutions allow the states
involved to meet directly and regularly. And this, in turn, enables close monitoring
of the dispute and ensures better awareness among the parties to the dispute of each
other’s intentions. Hence, in Keohane’s words, bilateral institutions help provide
‘focal points’ on which competing actors may agree (Keohane 2012, p. 128).
Viewed in this light, bilateral institutional approaches seem to be an effective way
of resolving territorial disputes.
Iterated meetings can also take place through multilateral institutional arrange-
ments. However, multilateral institutions will be effective only if the states involved
in the dispute accept the organization’s efficacy and legitimacy in managing
territorial disputes. This is so because the multilateral institutional approach to
territorial disputes essentially involves third parties that encourage bilateral
settlement of disputes while acting in the role of arbiter. Moreover, for this
approach to work, the conflictual intensity of the territorial dispute must be
relatively low. Actual and strong commitment on the part of the enforcer and mutual
agreement between the states involved in the dispute are also required for effective
enforcement through multilateral/third-party intervention. In this regard, multilat-
eral institutions are often regarded as less effective in resolving territorial deputes,
given the fact that the multiple actors involved usually have different preferences,
yet such institutions can be more effective when it comes to preventing deputes
from leading to war for that same reason. For example, less effort as regards
hedging against possible defections is needed in multilateral arrangements than in
bilateral settings, because more actors are involved in monitoring states’ compliance
with their commitments. Therefore, different institutional arrangements are
necessary to address different types of conflict and cooperation problems.
As seen above, liberalism in general and liberal institutionalism in particular
yield important insights. Nonetheless, one should not consider that such theoretical
perspectives offer a satisfactory basis upon which to resolve territorial disputes,
since they mainly focus on the material aspects of states’ interactions, on the
premise that states behave rationally when engaging in cost–benefit analysis. Recall
the ideational values and perceptual factors related to territory and territorial
What does international relations theory tell us about… 151

disputes discussed earlier. As recent events in regard to the East Asian territorial
disputes—especially between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,
and South Korea and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands—have demon-
strated, the danger of escalating to war seems to be greater when ideational
significance—i.e., nationalism—is attached to the disputed territory, no matter how
small or insignificant the territory is from a material and rational perspective (Choi
2013). This takes us to a consideration of constructivist IR theory, which challenges
the predominant rationalist mode of analysis, arguing that rationalists—including
both realists and liberals—ignore or downplay the role of identity and social norms
in international relations.

Constructivism

Contra realism and liberalism, constructivism emphasizes the importance of a range

of intangible, ideational values ‘social, cultural, and historical factors that encourage
particular forms of meaning to be given to different actors and their intentions’
(McDonald 2008, p. 67). According to constructivism, perceptual and ideational
factors, such as national identity, form our conceptions of who we are and what we
value; they in turn determine the content of states’ interests and therefore the way
they will ‘act’ in global politics. Identities construct ‘a particular set of interests or
preferences with respect to choices of action’ in disputed territory situations (Hopf
1998, p. 175). A nation’s prevailing discourse(s) and its historical experiences or
cultural context define its identity and interests, which affect how it behaves in
world politics.
In regard to security and territorial disputes, conceptions of who we are and what
we value encourage particular ways of thinking about where threats to those values
come from, what form they take, and how they might be dealt with (Fierke 2007;
Wendt 1992). Viewed in this light, territorial disputes involve more than states’
material interests. Instead, they reflect the relational identity of the self and the
other. A disputed territory can become an icon of past history and present identity.
In particular, a territory that had once been invaded tends to lead people to become
emotionally attached to the territory (Eun 2016b, p. 80).
Power and interest in territorial disputes may cause and resolve territorial
disputes at the dyadic level. However, power and interest do not provide satisfactory
explanations of why dyadic disputes involving territory continue to linger, or why
people and leaders become emotionally attached to the territory in question.
According to social psychology explanations, people have the instinctive tendency
to understand themselves as territorial creatures (Buss 1995; Brown and Baer 2015).
This tendency is deeply ingrained in a society’s collective conscience, cultural
heritage, and teaching and learning. The ongoing dispute between Japan and South
Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands is a good example here. For Koreans, the
islands have become an integral part of their national identity as a symbol of the past
colonial period and their recovered sovereignty. Any claims to the islands by its
former colonizer, Japan, are thus interpreted as a direct threat to Korea’s identity
and territorial autonomy. By perceiving the disputed islands not only in legal terms,
but also in terms of identity, Koreans tend to become emotional and more accepting
152 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

of risk, willing to fight for the small and uninhabited islands against the former
perpetrator.
Aside from identity—i.e., a perception of who we are—the most prominent
ideational dimension of world politics addressed by constructivist theory is the role
of norms (Hofmann and Yeo 2014; Katzenstein 1996). Norms can be defined as
shared expectations about appropriate or legitimate behavior by actors with a
particular identity. In the context of international relations, this is applied to
dominant ideas about what constitutes appropriate behavior for the key members of
international society: states. In this sense, constructivism in IR is concerned with
how international norms evolve and come to provide constraints on acceptable state
behavior (Jepperson 1996, 3; Finnemore 1996; Epstein 2011). Relatedly, some
constructivist IR scholars have explored the possibilities for the development of
‘security communities,’ namely groups of states for whom the use of force in
resolving disputes between each other has become unthinkable over time (Adler and
Barnett 1998).
In short, while realism and liberalism focus on the material factors of state
behavior, such as a state’s capabilities, geography, or international trade and
institutions, constructivist approaches emphasize the importance of a range of
social, cultural, and historical—i.e., ideational—factors that encourage particular
forms of meaning to be given to different actors and their intentions. The question is
what concrete measures can be taken to address territorial disputes on the basis of
constructivist theory?
The first is the development of benign norms to manage interstate competition
and disputes. As noted, shared norms or ideas provide limits to ‘acceptable’ state
behavior. In other words, they significantly constrain and/or facilitate the manner in
which issues are defined, the range of options that may be considered, and the
decisions and choices that states make. Once peaceful norms are established, they
act as constraints on and disincentives for conflictual types of foreign-policy
behavior, since states ‘develop their relations with, and understandings of, others
through the media of norms and practices’ (Hopf 1998, p. 173). Secondly, the
creation of political communities that maintain ‘intersubjective’ identities, namely
common understandings and beliefs about actors and their intentions, can be
considered another constructivist pathway through which to address disputes over
territory. When ‘intersubjective’ identities are established in a certain community of
world politics, states have motivations to designate other states as ‘friends’ and
approach them as such. European security cooperation since the Second World War
can be seen here as ‘emblematic of the possibility of building alternative security
futures through the development … of shared norms’ and intersubjective identities
(McDonald 2008, p. 67). In a related vein, constructivism, particularly conventional
constructivism, often suggests that we should look for intersubjective communities
in world politics, domains within which states share understandings of themselves
and each other (Biersteker and Weber 1996: Weber 1995).
Following from the foregoing constructivist suggestions, a critical and delicate
question emerges. How can cooperative norms and intersubjective identities that
help manage and resolve disputes among states be established? In order for states to
share cooperative norms and common understandings—or, more to the point, in
What does international relations theory tell us about… 153

order for states involved in (territorial) disputes to share benign ideas and beliefs
with respect to each other—a discourse upon which such ideas and beliefs is
grounded should be generated a priori. Discourse has a certain capacity to (re)shape
how we understand ourselves and others, and to define what is appropriate for our
interests, and thus to affect our behavior (George 1994; Epstein 2008). Stated
differently, discourse reflects and shapes identities and interests and establishes
accepted norms of behavior. Discourse leads to a common interpretation of reality;
certain ‘representations’ of issues or domains are established through discourse
(Wendt 1999, p. 56). In short, discourse among states is a key ingredient in the
formation of a particular identity and norm within a community in which those
states interact. This implies that, if discourse associated with cooperation,
coordination, and common interests prevails within that community, then cooper-
ative norms and common understandings among its members are created, which in
turn discourages them from relying on aggressive strategies or engaging in
conflictual action in regard to disputed issues. Here, top-down and bottom-up
approaches can be considered specific ways of engendering such discourse of
cooperation. The former refers to the role of top policymakers committed to
negotiation and coordination, while the latter refers to the importance of actors at
the grassroots level, such as NGOs or intellectuals. A discourse of cooperation
prevailing in the societies of the states involved in territorial disputes will prevent
any drastic behavior and lay a basis for a confidence-building regime to manage
territorial disputes. Such a regime would involve more than two claimants, which
does not necessarily require a formal and institutionalized setting: constructivists
conceptualize ‘institutions as a collection of norms, rules and routines, rather than a
formal structure’ (Adler et al. 2006, p. 55). Such a confidence-building regime,
based on cooperative norms and shared understandings, is able to function as a
conflict-prevention mechanism and settlement-encouraging framework.
As compared with the suggestions from the perspectives of neorealism and
neoliberalism presented earlier, suggestions from the constructivist perspective
seem to excel at addressing the ideational dimension of territorial disputes,
including nationalism. As already discussed, territorial disputes tend to be
intertwined with the question of national identity, since states often perceive and
identify the area of dispute as a crucial part of their history or dignity. However, the
constructivist pathway is an indirect one. For example, within a confidence-building
regime, territorial disputes are to be treated as one of many other regional security
issues, and such a regime would attempt to incubate a more stability-oriented
regional order, thereby making it unlikely that territorial disputes will escalate. This
strategy is oriented more toward management than settlement. Yet, in terms of
resolving territorial disputes, direct negotiations between the states concerned are
not only useful, but often also necessary. Furthermore, by its nature, an approach
based on constructivism—which involves the formation of discourses of cooper-
ation, benign norms, and common understandings—is part of a long ‘historical’ as
well as social process (Checkel 1998), whereas disputes over territory tend to
escalate to physical conflict more easily and quickly than other security issues.
154 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

Theoretical implications and practical suggestions

Can IR theory solve the daunting problem of territorial disputes associated with
material and ideational values and concerns? A clear-cut answer is yet to be
discovered. It might be beyond the scope of any IR theory aimed at explaining and
understanding, rather than prescribing, the reality of international politics.
Nonetheless, our discussion with respect to the mainstream theoretical perspectives
in the field of IR thus far shows that IR theory can work as a useful guide to
addressing territorial disputes. Put otherwise, although they are far from the Holy
Grail of perfect solutions, their theoretical knowledge and implications are surely
conducive to offering guidelines on how to approach, manage, and resolve disputes
over territory. In this respect, the following section will draw out important
implications that flow from the IR theories examined above for both the study of
territorial disputes and the practice of their resolution.

Theoretical implications for the study of territorial disputes

This article has first examined why and (particularly) when territorial disputes
matter by reviewing the relevant literature and examining mainstream IR theories.
And the results harvested from the survey show that multiple factors derived from
both the material and ideational aspects of states’ interactions—i.e., strategic and
economic benefits, geographical contiguity/proximity, nationalism, rivalry, mis-
trust—are related to territorial disputes. As such, we need to think of territorial
disputes in multifactorial terms (see Table 1).
Even more importantly, the investigation also suggests that although territory is
an important variable in generating tensions and conflicts between states, not all
territorial disputes result in the outbreak of war. Specifically, a territorial dispute is
likely to lead to military conflict when it involves highly valuable strategic and
economic benefits and/or rivalry between states, especially those that share borders
with each other, and when the territory in question is tied to issues of identity. In
other words, when the material interests of the contested territory are connected
with ideational values (and vice versa), the likelihood that territorial disputes will
escalate to war is increased. This point is presented in a summary form in Table 2.
To be sure, there are other configurations of conditions under which territorial
disputes can lead to armed conflict. For example, if IVIs are high—even though
associated MVIs remain low—the states involved will remain vulnerable to
misperceptions in both word and deed with respect to the territory, which may

Table 1 Multiple dimensions and factors associated with territorial disputes

Dimensions Major factors deduced from mainstream IR The IR theories
theories considered

Material values and Strategic and economic benefits, geographical Neorealism,

interests proximity neoliberalism
Ideational values and Nationalism, rivalry, mistrust Constructivism
interests
What does international relations theory tell us about… 155

Table 2 ‘Ideal-type’ conditions strengthening the nexus between territorial disputes and war
Dimensions Major factors Degree: high versus low

Material values and interests (MVIs) Strategic and economic benefits, H L

geographical proximity
Ideational values and interests (IVIs) Nationalism, rivalry, mistrust H L
Theoretically expected outcomes Most likely Least likely

increase the danger of war. A slightly safer configuration that can be gleaned from
Table 2 is one in which high MVIs but few IVIs are attached to the contested
territory. In this situation, territorial disputes are more likely to remain manageable.
Taken as a whole, then, our analysis of when territorial disputes give rise to war and
how the disputes can be resolved ought to be subjected to further theoretical and
empirical investigation.
However, this by no means suggests that we as scholars and practitioners need to
consider all the explanatory levels of IR theory and all the conceivable matrices of
the escalation of territorial disputes to war. This is simply impossible. In the end, as
David Singer has aptly put it, the goal here is not to have ‘total representational
accuracy,’ but to ‘decide where distortion is least dysfunctional and where such
accuracy is absolutely essential’ (Singer 1961, 79). In this respect, we need to focus
analytical attention and practical resources on the matrix that most likely leads from
territorial disputes to war, namely that both MVIs and IVIs are high. How territorial
disputes can be resolved also needs to be examined within this context.

Practical suggestions for the resolution of territorial disputes

This article has first discussed the nature of the solutions each of the three major IR
theories can offer. Based on the assumption that international affairs are a constant
struggle for power among self-interested states, neorealism suggests a balance of
power, yet, as already noted, its suggestion would increase tensions and hostility not
only between concerned claimants, but among neighboring states as well. Rather,
the realist approach to territorial disputes is likely to lead to arms races and a
security dilemma, which in turn can cause interstate or regional wars. This helps us
recognize that the suggestions proposed by scholars and policymakers wedded to
realism are not attractive options to any state hoping to resolve territorial disputes
peacefully and that we thus need to search for alternatives, turning our focus to
theoretical perspectives that hold different assumptions and logic, neoliberalism and
constructivism.
Our foregoing discussion on these alternative theories has demonstrated that their
respective solutions—namely the development of institutions and deepening
interdependence, and the creation of cooperative norms and common understand-
ings—are useful in addressing territorial disputes by alleviating fears of betrayal or
mistrust and enhancing mutual understanding. They are better able to find a solution
to the problem of territorial disputes than is realism. The appraisal of liberalism and
constructivism, however, has also indicated that both propose only approximate
156 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

solutions to the problem. In other words, their measures are not sufficient on their
own to provide satisfactory answers to the problem of territorial disputes. As the
discussion has shown, the liberal approach falls short of dealing with the ideational
aspect of territorial disputes, while the constructivist pathway is unable to establish
the formal, direct setting often necessary for negotiations and compromises between
states.
What this brief summary implies is fairly straightforward: a synthetic interactive
framework based on the combination of values from different IR theories,
particularly liberalism and constructivism, is best suited to resolving territorial
disputes in the sense that their proposed solutions can (and should) be supplemented
by each other. Such an integrated, comprehensive framework will be able to
encourage rigor in making solutions, enhance the efficacy of the solutions, and
increase the likelihood that more satisfying and peaceful results will be obtained.
This is especially so given the complex nature of territorial disputes. For example, if
both claimants perceive the territory in terms of tangible (material) values, such as
natural resources, then peaceful division, or at least joint development, is possible,
even if the material interests involved are high, due to the simple fact that physical
and material resources are divisible. However, because of the possibility of betrayal
lingering on in the anarchy of world politics, states may not be willing to commit
themselves to joint development unless mutual trust is built. That is, territorial
division is not a feasible solution without a prior buildup of mutual trust. This
mutual trust requires international or regional institutions in which iterated meetings
take place and uncertainty and the possibility of betrayal can be reduced. In
addition, if the territory in dispute is associated with ideational—i.e., symbolic and
historic—values and concerns, then the states involved will not give up their
respective claims easily even if there exist formal, direct institutions aimed at
building mutual trust and facilitating negotiations between concerned actors. In this
case, formal, direct institutions should be accompanied by the formation of
transnational and inclusive discourses and norms going beyond the existing binary
and nationalistic thinking about territoriality. All of this, once again, calls for
employing an integrated approach to preventing territorial disputes from escalating
to war and eventually resolving them in a peaceful manner. This point is illustrated
in Table 3 in a summary form.

Table 3 ‘The most likely’ way to achieve a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes
Theory Actions to be taken in a parallel fashion Main actors Expected
considered outcomes

Liberal- The establishment of diverse types of State governments Peaceful

constructivist institutions in which direct negotiations (top policymakers) management or
synthesis between concerned states can take place joint
The formation of transnational and NGOs, intellectuals, development
inclusive discourses on territoriality, mass media, state
which in turn can lead to benign or governments
cooperative norms and behavior

For a fuller exploration of the idea of synthesis in the context of methodology, see Eun (2012)
What does international relations theory tell us about… 157

In sum, territorial disputes are a multifaceted and complex set of problems often
involving both material and ideational values. As such, if IR theory is to be helpful
in resolving territorial disputes, different analytical angles and divergent theoretical
positions need to be integrated into a synthetic framework. Assuredly, such a
framework cannot solve all of the problems of territorial disputes at once.
Furthermore, any integrated approach to problem-solving—for example, a solution
based on a liberal-constructivist synthesis—takes time to be formulated and
implemented and thus demands that the concerned states be patient. But, to
paraphrase Stanley Hoffmann’s insight, ‘impatience is the worst enemy’ of the
ability to not only develop a ‘systematic theory,’ but also resolve complex real-
world disputes (Hoffmann 1959, p. 349). Although a synthetic interactive approach
is not a panacea, it is nevertheless a more effective tool for dealing with the reality
of the complexities that pervade territorial disputes. It is, then, a challenge worth
taking up.

References

Adler, E., and Michael Barnett. 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Adler, E., B. Crawford, F. Bicchi, and R. Del Sarto (eds.). 2006. The Convergence of Civilization.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Aran, A. 2012. Arbitrating the Israeli-Palestinian Territorial Dispute: A Riposte’. International Politic
49(3): 388–391.
Aston, A. 2010. China’s Rare-Earth Monopoly. MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.
com/s/421223/chinas-rare-earth-monopoly. Accessed 9 Aug 2016.
Baldwin, D. 1993. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Barnett, J. 2000. Destabilizing the Environment—Conflict Thesis. Review of International Studies 26(2):
271–288.
Bell, L. 2012. China’s Rare Earth Metals Monopoly Needn’t Put an Electronics Stranglehold on America.
Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/04/15/chinas-rare-earth-metals-monopoly-
neednt-put-an-electronics-stranglehold-on-america/#14d8fc6a161b. Accessed 8 Sep 2016.
Biersteker, T.J., and C. Weber. 1996. State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bradsher, K. 2010. Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan. The New York Times, September 22.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html. Accessed 14 Sep 2017.
Bremer, S.A. 1992. Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965.
Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2): 309–341.
Brown, G., and M. Baer. 2015. Protecting the Turf: The Effect of Territorial Marking on Others’
Creativity. Journal of Applied Psychology 100(6): 1785–1797.
Buss, D.M. 1995. Evolutionary Psychology: A New Paradigm for Psychological Science. Psychological
Inquiry 6(1): 1–30.
Carter, D.B., and H.E. Goesman. 2011. The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the
Emergence of Interstate Conflict. International Organization 65(2): 275–309.
Checkel, J.T. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50(2):
324–348.
Choi, J.K. 2013. Bolstering Economic Interdependence Despite Bullying Memories in Northeast Asia. In
Economic Security Nexus in Northeast Asia, ed. T.J. Pempel, 89–109. New York: Routledge.
Colaresi, M., and W.R. Thompson. 2002. Hot Spots or Hot Hands? Serial Crisis Behavior, Escalating
Risks, and Rivalry. Journal of Politics 64(4): 1175–1198.
158 J. K. Choi, Y.-S. Eun

Cooper, Helene. 2014. During Hagel visit, China showed its military might, and its frustrations. The
NewYork Times, April 10. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/world/asia/during-hagel-visit-
china-showed-its-military-might-and-its-frustrations.html. Accessed 15 Sep 2017.
Dalby, S. 2002. Environmental Security. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Diehl, P. 1991. Geography and War: A Review and Reassessment of the Empirical Literature.
International Interaction 17(1): 11–27.
Epstein, C. 2008. The Power of Words in International Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Epstein, C. 2011. Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics.
European Journal of International Relations 17(2): 327–350.
Eun, Y. 2012. Why and how should we go for a multicausal analysis in the study of foreign policy?:
(Meta-) theoretical rationales and methodological rules. Review of International Studies 38(4):
774–779.
Eun, Y. 2016a. Pluralism and Engagement in the Discipline of International Relations. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Eun, Y. 2016b. ‘Marginalized’ IR theory and Korea’s International Political Issues: Revisiting IR and
Korea from Postcolonial Perspectives. Korean International Studies Association Journal 56(3):
51–88.
Fierke, K.M. 2007. Critical Approaches to International Security. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Finnemore, M. 1996. Defining National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Fravel, T.M. 2007/2008. Power Shifts and Escalation Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial
Disputes. International Security 32(3): 44–83.
George, J. 1994. Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Gibler, D.M. 2007. Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict. International
Studies Quarterly 51(3): 509–532.
Gleditsch, N.P. 1998. Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature. Journal of
Peace Research 35(3): 381–400.
Goertz, G., and P. Diehl. 1992. Territorial Changes and International Conflict. London: Routledge.
Hensel, P.R. 1994. One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America,
1816–1986. Journal of Peace Research 31(2): 281–298.
Hensel, P.R. 2012. Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict. In What Do We Know
About War, ed. J.A. Vasquez, 57–84. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Hensel, P.R., and M.S. Mitchell. 2005. Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims. GeoJournal 64(4):
275–285.
Hensel, P.R., and M.S. Mitchell. 2017. From Territorial Claims to Identity Claims: The Issue Correlates
of War (ICOW) Project. Conflict Management and Peace Science 34(2): 126–140.
Hoffmann, S. 1959. International Relations: The Long Road to Theory. World Politics 11(3): 346–377.
Hofmann, S.C., and A.I. Yeo. 2014. Business as Usual: The Role of Norms in Alliance Management.
European Journal of International Relations 21(2): 377–401.
Holsti, K.J. 1991. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hopf, T. 1998. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. International Security
23(1): 171–200.
Huth, P. 1996. Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Huth, P.K., and T.L. Allee. 2002. The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jepperson, R.L. 1996. Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security. In The Culture of National
Security, ed. P.J. Katzenstein, 33–75. New York: Columbia University Press.
Katzenstein, P.J. 1996. The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University Press.
Keohane, R.O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, R.O. 2012. Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism. International Relations 26(2): 125–138.
Keohane, R.O., and J.S. Nye. 2001. Power and Interdependence. New York: Longman.
Kocs, S.A. 1995. Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945–1987. Journal of Politics 57(1): 159–175.
What does international relations theory tell us about… 159

Kurashige, N. 2012. Japan Plans to Import Rare Earths from India as Hedge Against China. Asahi
Shimbun, October 9. http://in.reuters.com/article/rare-earths-japan-india/japan-to-import-rare-earth-
from-india-nikkei-idINKBN0GS04L20140828. Accessed 14 Sep 2017.
Layne, C. 2009. America’s Middle East Grand Strategy After Iraq. Review of International Studies 35(1):
5–25.
McDonald, M. 2008. Constructivism. In Security Studies, ed. P.D. Williams, 63–76. New York:
Routledge.
McLaughlin, M.S. 1999. Beyond territorial contiguity: Issues at state in democratic militarized interstate
disputes. International Studies Quarterly 43(1): 169–183.
Mearsheimer, J.J. 1994/1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security
19(3): 5–49.
Mitchell, S.M., and J.A. Vasquez (eds.). 2013. Conflict, War and Peace: An Introduction to Scientific
Research. London: Sage.
Mizokami, K. 2014. Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear. National Interest, May 7.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-chinese-weapons-war-america-should-fear-10388. Accessed
14 Sep 2017.
Murphy, A.B. 1990. Historical Justifications for Territory Claims. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 80(1): 531–648.
Navari, C. 2008. Liberalism. In Security Studies, ed. P.D. Williams, 32–47. New York: Routledge.
North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Political Economy of
Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Nye, J.S. 1993. Understanding International Conflicts. New York: Longman Pearson.
O’Lear, S. 2005. Resource Concerns for Territorial Conflict. GeoJournal 64(4): 297–306.
Papayoanou, P.A. 1996. Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance-of-power. International Security
20(4): 42–76.
Pilling, D., R. Landingin, and J. Soble. 2012. Philippines backs rearming of Japan. Financial Times,
December 9. https://www.ft.com/content/250430bc-41ba-11e2-a8c3-00144feabdc0. Accessed 15
Sep 2017.
Rasler, K.A., and W.R. Thompson. 2006. Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict
Escalation. International Studies Quarterly 50(1): 145–167.
Senese, P.D. 1996. Geographical Proximity and Issue Salience: Their Effects on the Escalation of
Militarized Interstate Conflict. Conflict Management and Peace Science 15(1): 133–161.
Singer, D. 1961. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. World Politics 14(1): 77–92.
Starr, H. 2013. On Geopolitics: Space, Place, and International Relations. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Starr, H., and D.G. Thomas. 2002. The ‘Nature’ of Contiguous Borders: Ease of Interaction, Salience, and
the Analysis of Crisis. International Interactions 28(3): 213–235.
Vasquez, J.A. 1993. The War Puzzle. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Vasquez, J.A., and M.T. Henehan. 2001. Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816–1992.
Journal of Peace Research 38(2): 123–138.
Vasquez, J.A., and M.T. Henehan. 2011. Territory, War and Peace. London: Routledge.
Waltz, K.N. 1959. Man, the State, and WAR: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University.
Waltz, K.N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House.
Waltz, K.N. 2000. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security 25(1): 5–41.
Wang, J. 2003. Territory disputes and Asian security: Sources, management and prospects. In Asian
Security Order, Instrumental and Normative Features ed. M. Alagappa, 398–410. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Weber, C. 1995. Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, A. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.
International Organization 46(2): 391–425.
Wendt, A. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wohlforth, W.C. 1999. The Stability of a Unipolar World. International Security 24(2): 5–55.
Wohlforth, W.C. 2012. Realism and Foreign Policy. In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed.
S. Smith, A. Hadfield, and T. Dunne, 35–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, T. 2012. A Map of Conflicts in the South and East China Seas. Foreign Affairs. https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/2012-08-07/outlaw-sea. Accessed 11 Aug 2016.