1.

In the Federal Court, in the case of Krishnan & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1981] 2
MLJ 121, Salleh abas FJ at page 122 held that:

“Knowledge is a matter of inference and unless it is clear that the law requires
knowledge to be stated in the charge, its omission in our view does not render the
charge defective.”

The principle in the case of Krishnan & Anor v Public Prosecutor[1981] 2 MLJ 121 had been
followed/referred by the High Court in the case of Public Prosecutor v Ong Poh Cheng
[1996] 4 MLJ 279; Ab Malek bin Atan v Public Prosecutor [2002] 4 MLJ 84; Public
Prosecutor v Mohd Bandar Shah bin Nordin & Anor [2005] 2 MLJ 349; Public
Prosecutor v Chung Tshun Tin & Ors [2008] 1 MLJ 559; Public Prosecutor v Uthaya
Kumar a/l Ponnusamy & Ors [2011] 7 MLJ 575; and Public Prosecutor v Muhammad
Rasid bin Hashim [2011] 7 MLJ 845.

2. In Ipoh High Court, in the case of Pek Tin Shu v Public Prosecutor [1948] 1 LNS
41; [1948] MLJ 110, Evans J stated that:

“when a charge, as a charge, is useless and when the accused, though he did not
object to the form of the charge even though he was represented by counsel, must
have been seriously embarrassed, and when it is manifest on the record that the court
was misled, then the conviction and sentence cannot stand.”

The principle in the case of Pek Tin Shu v Public Prosecutor [1948] 1 LNS 41; [1948] MLJ
110 had been followed/referred by the High Court in the case of Ah Poon & Ors v Public
Prosecutor [2006] 5 CLJ 521 and Public Prosecutor v Chung Tshun Tin & Ors [2007] 10
CLJ 527.

3. In the Court of Appeal, in the case of Chin Chan Leong v Public Prosecutor &
Anor and Another Appeal [2010] 5 MLJ 312, Low Hop Bing JCA at page 317 held
that:

“Our perusal of ss 152–154 reveals that they contain comprehensive provisions

regulating the form of a charge, the particulars as to time, place and person to be
included therein and the manner of committing the offence.”
 and at page 312 held that:

“Reverting to the mainstream of the instant appeal, although the prosecution is at

liberty to prefer a charge of abetment generally under s 122C(c), the prosecution
herein has specifically travelled the extra mile and set out the particulars of the
principal charges against the first accused in the abetment charges preferred against
the second accused. We entertained no doubt that, in relation to the abetment charges,
the prosecution has complied with the procedural law contained in ss 152–154, and
the substantive law enacted in s 84(1) read with s 122C(c).”

The principle in the case of Chin Chan Leong v Public Prosecutor & Anor and Another
Appeal [2010] 5 MLJ 312 had been followed/referred by the Court of Appeal in the case of
Aisyah bt Mohd Rose & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2016] 1 MLJ 840.

4. In the Court of Appeal, in the case of Sanjeev Kumar a/l Veerasingam v Public
Prosecutor and other appeals [2015] 2 MLJ 589, Mohd Yunus JCA held that:

“We note with dismay, however, that the charges, unfortunately, do not specify in
what manner the acts of abetment were done by the first and second appellants. All
that is stated in each of the four charges to describe the acts of abetment are only the
words 'telah bersubahat'. Thus, the charges are very vague, and are materially and
substantially defective and the manner they are drafted contravenes s 154 of the
Criminal Procedure Code.

The principle in the case of Sanjeev Kumar a/l Veerasingam v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2
MLJ 589 had not been followed/referred by any Malaysian Court as of today.

5. In the Alor Star High Court, in the case of Yu Kim Seng v Public Prosecutor [2008]
8 MLJ 378, Zainal Adzam J at page 385 held that:

“It is quite clear that before any error or omission in a charge can be found to be
defective or material the court should establish whether the accused was in fact misled
by the error or omission. These are the actual words of s 156 of the CPC.”

The principle in the case of Yu Kim Seng v Public Prosecutor [2008] 8 MLJ 378 had not
been followed/referred by any Malaysian case as of today.