MARCUS V MANGLAPUS 1. "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

"
[Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive
Facts power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain
1. February 1986 Marcos was deposed by the people power revolution powers by the President
2. Marcos, in his deathbed, signified his wish to return to the Ph to die 2. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
3. Pres. Aquino denied the request considering the dire consequences to imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President,
the nation at a time when the stability of the nation was threatened by: it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
a. Manila Hotel coup "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said
b. Plot of Marcoses to return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
c. Honasan coup so enumerated,
d. Communist insurgency 3. whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
e. Secessionist movement in Mindanao judicial has to be executive
4. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
1. They argue that they have a right to return to the Ph under the Bill of Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at
Rights: a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
a. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to
due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national
protection of the laws interest.
b. Liberty of abode 5. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor
c. Right of travel inflexible
2. The president is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the 6. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare
Marcoses since only a court may do so and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
3. The president is also without power to impair their right to travel because individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
no law has authorized her to do so protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people
Respondents
7. This case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of
1. This is a political question beyond the cognizance of the court the peace
2. For the primary of the right of the state to national security over individual 8. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
rights exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
a. Sec. 4 prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence.
people The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
b. Sec. 5. Maintenance of peace and order and the promotion of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems
general welfare are essential for the enhoymeant of the of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times
blessings of democracy when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
3. There are international precedents to this decision i.e. Trujillo of the
Dominican Republic

ISSUE: W/N THE DECISION TO BAR THE MARCOSES FROM RETURNING

WAS VALID

Ruling: YES
MACALINTAL V COMELEC
Facts
1. RA 9189 Oversees Absentee Voting Act of 2003 was enacted to ensure
equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of the Ph abroad in the exercise
of their right to vote
2. Section 18.5 of RA 9189 provides that COMELEC is empowered to order
the proclamation of winning candidates
Macalintal
1. The provision above-cited insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice is
unconstitutional because it violates Sec. 4 Art. VII of the Constitution:
a. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city,
shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of
the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided
by law, canvass the votes.
Respondents
1. This provision must be harmonized with the constitution and mist be
taken to mean that COMRLRC can only proclaim the winning Senators
and members but not the president and vice
ISSUE: W/N SEC. 18.5 OF RA 9189 IS VALID
Ruling: NO
1. The Constitution is explicit when it said that Congress has the power to
canvass and declare the winning president and vice of the Ph pursuant
to Sec. 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
2. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach
"on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-
president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions."
The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land
should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and
hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must
remain in the hands of Congress.
FERNANDO POE V ARROYO
Facts
1. In the 2004 elections, GMA was proclaimed winner of the presidential bid
garnering 12 million votes as opposed to Poe’s 11 million votes
2. Refusing to concede defeat, Poe filed an election protest. However, he
died pending appeal.
3. His wife, Susan Roces, filed for a motion to intervene.
Roces
1. In the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need
for her to continue and substitute for her late husband to ascertain the
genuine will of the electorate
2. De Castro v. COMELEC: the death of a protestant does not constitute a
ground for the dismissal of the contest nor the oust of the trial court of
the jurisdiction to decide the election contest.
Arroyo
1. Widow of the deceased is not the proper party to replace the deceased
protestant since she has not legal right to substitute for her husband
2. Under ROC, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2 nd and 3rd
highest votes for the presidency may contest the election
3. Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias,10 we recognized substitution upon the
death of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since
they are not the real parties in interest.
ISSUE: W/N A SPOUSE MAY SUBSTITUTE FOR THEIR LATE SPOUSE WHO
FILED AN ELECTION PROTEST
Ruling
1. Rule 14. Election Protest.–Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
2. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined
the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It
envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly
voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the
3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a
successful election contest.
3. Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. 8 This
rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from
the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this
 Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant
prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to
an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is
personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs
upon death.9 Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or
the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the
pendency of the protest.
4. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit
5. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential
aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be
substituted for the deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real
parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be
unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable – and this is not
the policy of the law.19 It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict
limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules.
LEGARDA V DE CASTRO
Facts
1. De Castro was proclaimed the vice in the 2004 elections who garnered
15 million votes as against Legarda’s 14 million votes
2. Legarda filed this protest for the annulment of the proclamation of De
Castro as the elected vice citing election fraud as ground
3. Some time pending appeal, Legarda ran as senator and won. She
assumed office upon her proclamation.
4. The Hearing Commissioner further recommended, following the
precedent set in Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,36 that the protest be
dismissed for being moot and academic due to abandonment and
withdrawal resulting from protestant's election and assumption of office
as senator.
ISSUE: W/N AN ELECTION PROTEST IS MOOT AND ACADEMIC UPON
ASSUMPTION OF THE PROTESTANT TO ANOTHER PUBLIC OFFICE
Ruling
1. Further, we are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the
office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can
take judicial notice of,38 has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her
protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public
interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate
2. Santiago v. Ramos: In assuming the office of Senator then, the
Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the
very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to
protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the
real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates
to render moot the instant protest.
3. In the case at bar, protestant's tenure in the Senate coincides with the
term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest.
In Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, the protestant's tenure in the Senate
also coincided with the term of the Presidency she was vying for. Like
the protestant in the aforementioned case, the protestant in the case at
bar filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate, campaigned for the
office, assumed office after election, and discharged the duties and
functions of said office. Thus, we agree concerning the applicability of
the Defensor-Santiago case as a precedent in the resolution of the
present protest, though they differ in that Defensor-Santiago's case
involves the Presidency while Legarda's protest concerns only the Vice-
Presidency.
SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR
FACTS: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1)
whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel
were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and (3) whether the President may file a suit
considering their privileged immunity. Petitioner Beltran contends that
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-affidavit,
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court’s jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would
be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION, MAY INITIATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE PETITIONERS THROUGH FILING OF A COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
Ruling: YES
1. While the president is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from
instituting suit.
2. This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the President’s behalf.
3. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the
President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege).
ESTRADA V ARROYO | ESTRADA V DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
Facts:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June
30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the
President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from
jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based
numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation,
which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-
tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the
Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd
continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-
wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as
lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined
in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning
of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the
impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him
from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential
election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May
14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same
day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd
at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”,but
saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he
countered by filing a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the
He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
provisions of the Constitution.”
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him
before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not
been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

ISSUE:
1.) WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ESTRADA WAS A PRESIDENT-ON-
LEAVE OR DID HE TRULY RESIGN.
2.) WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY INVOKE IMMUNITY FROM
SUITS.

Ruling:

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to

resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The press
release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as
president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the
presidential seat for the sake of peace is worth noting. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo

2. He said he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process
3. He thanked the people for the opportunity to serve them as president
4. He said that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in
the same service of the country.
5. He called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the
Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The
Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the
policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
DAVID V. ARROYO This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
Facts: grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative power by
lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the issuing decrees.
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies
issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA.
The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at
the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made
against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom
suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President
Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased
to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three
(3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the
legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of
Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and assembly.

PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x
x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."

ISSUE:
1.) WHETHER OR NOT PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 1017 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESIDENT’S POWERS TO
ISSUE DECREES?

Ruling: YES

1.) President Arroyo's ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances.

She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos
under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category
and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.121
RODRIGUEZ V. ARROYO
FACTS:
Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP).
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy
of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie
Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced
him to get inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was
holding a .45 caliber pistol).
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the
Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA
member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since
Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was
also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree.
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him
(accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They
insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.
Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members
went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite
Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.
On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of
Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December
2009.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George
Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted
on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president).
Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged
the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC
directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa,
Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. On
President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.
ISSUE:
1. WON PRESIDENT ARROYO SHOULD BE DROPPED AS A
RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF HER PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
FROM SUIT
2. WON THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY CAN BE
USED IN WRITS OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA CASES.
HELD:
(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from
suits only applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure but not beyond.”
“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts
should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially
when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to
hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office.
The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power
of the incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the
president’s immunity from suits during their tenure (and not term).
“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from
suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the
abduction of Rodriguez.”
(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures
to protect his rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal,
civil or administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the
doctrine of command responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation
of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance.
Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden
of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R.
No. 191805, and allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine
to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through
substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or
accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise
failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of
respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed
with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac,
Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
1. EO 284 was enacted by Pres. Cory Aquino which provided that members
of the cabinet, undersecretary, assistant secretary, or other appointive
officials may hold not more than two positions in government other than
his primary position and to receive the corresponding compensation
therefor.
2. It also provided that the abovementioned limitation does not apply to ad
hoc bodies or boards of which the president is the chairman.
3. Petitioners contend that such is unconstitutional because it violates Sec.
13 Art VII of the Constitution as the assailed order adds exceptions to
Sec. 13 other than those provided in the Constitution
a. VP may be a cabinet member
b. DOJ Sec as a member of the JBC
Issue:
1) WHETHER OR NOT EO 284 IS VALID FOR ALLOWING CABINET
MEMBERS, UNDERSECS, ASST. SECS, AND OTHER APPOINTIVE
OFFICIALS TO HOLD OTHER POSITIONS IN GOVT.
Ruling: NO
1) The constitution only allows not more than 2 other positions that they
may hold provided it is allowed by law or their primary function.
2) The EO allows them to hold multiple offices
3) Sec. 13 states that such officials shall not hold any other office during
their tenure unless otherwise provided for in the constitution.
4) Thus, if the constitution does not provide for an exception to this rule, this
provision cannot be overruled by an executive order providing for an
expansion of the number of offices that such officials may hold.
DE CASTRO V JBC, G.R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010
Facts:
This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of
former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days
after the Presidential election in 2010.
After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the
position of Chief Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial
Bar Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken
into consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President from
making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next
Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5)
candidates for the position from the most senior of the Associates of the court
and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the
President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme
Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the
Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief
Justice..
RULING:
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions
in the Constitution.
If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the
appointment of Chief Justice, then they should have expressly stated it in the
Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT), Article VII and
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).
Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in
the Executive Department.
EXPOUNDED RULING:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect
of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily
and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section
4 (1) thereof.
Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, December 17, 1987.
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Cutoms by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by
the President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito
Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law
professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since the appointment
was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval. Under
the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the
confirmation from COA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the
confirmation from COA is valid.
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the
office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors,
other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of
the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if
the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following
the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only
those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau

head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that
need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

The first group are the only public officers appointed by the president which
requires the confirmation of COA. The position of Mison does not belong to the
first group, hence, his appointment need not be confirmed by the COA.