TOLENTITO V.

SECRETARY OF FINANCE
RA 7716: AN ACT RESTRUCTING THE VAT SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND
ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELAVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NIRC AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
- RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance is
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Included in the law is
the removal of tax exemptions of PAL transactions from payment of VAT.
o H. No. 11197 was first introduced
o S. No. 1630 consolidates the version in Senate with that of the HOR
- Prior to the passing of the law the president certified the bill as urgent.
- Senate approved S. No. 1630 in its second and third reading on the same day March 24,
1994.
- After which, it was referred to a conference committee that added provisions not included
in the bill.
- Petitioners: RA 7716 is unconstitutional
o Violates the rule that revenue bills must originate in Congress
o Violates the three separate days reading requirement
o Conference Committees are not allowed to add provisions in the passed bill.
o Violates the one bill one subject requirement.
- ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RA 7716 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
- Court: RA 7716 is constitutional
o The bill did originate in Congress. The enacted statute need not originate in HOR,
only the bill. To make it so would be to infringe on Senate’s right to propose
amendments.
o The three separate days reading requirement has an exception: if the president
certifies its urgency,
o Legislative practice dictates that conference committees may add provisions in the
bill.
o Removing exemptions widens the tax base, which is germane to the purpose of
the law. The title need not be an index of all provisions in the law. It is sufficient
that it apprises the legislature and the people involved of the content of the law.

TIO V. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

PD NO. 1987: AN ACT CREATING THE VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
- PD No. 1987 seeks to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
o Section 10. It imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local
government
- Petitioner: PD No. 1987 is unconstitutional
o Section 10 is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
- ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PD NO. 1987 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
- Court: PD No. 1987 is constitutional
 o The constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject to be
embodied in the title is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive
enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.
o It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes
to accomplish.
o The requirement is satisfied if the parts of the statute are germane to the subject
matter.
o Section 10 is allied and germane to the object of the PD, which is the regulation of
the video industry.
o The tax provision is not inconsistent with nor foreign to the subject and title.
o As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the decree.

ABAKADA V. PURISIMA (2008)

RA NO. 9335
- RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and BOC.
o It provides incentives for employees.
o Section 12. It provides for the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the IRR.
- Petitioners: RA 9335 Section 12 is unconstitutional
o Section 12 violates the doctrine of separation of powers because it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
- ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 12 OF RA 9335 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
- Court: Section 12 of RA 9335 is unconstitutional.
o Congressional oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation
it has enacted: scrutiny (determine economy and efficiency of the operation of
government activities), investigation (involves intense digging of facts), supervision
(connotes a continuing awareness on executive operations)
o Supervision
 Allows Congress to exercise supervision over executive agencies thru its
veto power.
 Requires the executive to present the IRR for congressional approval prior
to its effectivity.
 Regarded as a violation of the separation of powers for it is an undue
encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. Thus, unconstitutional.
o Any action or step beyond scrutiny and investigation will undermine the separation
of powers e.g. legislative veto.
o Legislative veto requires the executive to present the IRR for congressional
approval prior to the law’s effectivity.
o Section 12 embodies the characteristic of a legislative veto because the JCOC is
granted the authority to approve or disapprove the IRR for RA 9335.
o Section 12 is unconstitutional.
ABAKADA V. ERMITA (2005)
RA NO. 9337: AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
- RA No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills.
o Sections 4, 5, and 6. Stand-by authority granted to the president whereby the rate
of 10% VAT wanted by the Senate is retained until such time that certain conditions
arise when the 12% VAT wanted by the HOR shall be imposed upon the discretion
of the President.
o This provision was added by the Bicameral Conference Committee to reconcile
the disagreement between both houses.
- Petitioners: RA No. 9337 is unconstitutional
o The practice where a BCC is allowed to add or delete provisions in the bill after
these had passed three readings is a circumvention of the no amendment rule in
Sec. 26(2) Art. VI of the Constitution.
- ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
- Court: RA 9337 is constitutional
o The no amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house
of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before
said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment
o Thus, Art. 26 cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the BCC of
amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been
acted upon by both houses is prohibited.
KIDA V. SENATE
THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August
8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No.
10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]

NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they
must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the
following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before
a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENATE
Facts:
Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799) and urging the Senate
to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar
fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Pangilinan, the speech was referred to
respondent, which through its Chairperson Senator Angara, set an initial hearing and invited
petitioners herein to attend the hearing. Petitioners via letter stressed that there were pending
cases in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing
a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent committee to proceed with the inquiry.
Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited resource persons not being all present,
Senator Enrile moved for the issuance of subpoena and an HDO or to include such absentees to
the Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch List. During the hearing, it was apparent that petitioners lack
proper authorizations to make disclosures and lack the copies of the accusing documents being
mentioned by Senator Enrile. Thus, when hearing adjourned, petitioners were later served with
subpoenas by respondent.
Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined from proceeding, citing Bengzon Jr.
v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, claiming that since the issue is already preempted by the
courts, the legislative investigation is an encroachment upon the judicial powers vested solely in
the courts.
Issue:
Whether the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent committee encroaches upon the
judicial power of the courts
Ruling: NO.
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the
error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same
Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling
unregistered foreign securities x x x.” This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at
the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately conduct
an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in
the future.”
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient
ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot
be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The
Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were
subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the
illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective
of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence
of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit.
GARCILLANO V. SENATE
Facts:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The
tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of
the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative
hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of
the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the
questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate
of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing
that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet
web page.

Issue:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

Held:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because
the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of
Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet
is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original)
of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated
cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."
ARAULLO V. AQUINO
FACTS:
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional
₱50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public
statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration
Program,1 explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program
designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that
the funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and
that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had
already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused
the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the funds under
the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services;2 (2)
unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4)
budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing
projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website3 that the DAP releases had been sourced from
savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had
been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
Services4 appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of
slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero based budgeting findings; 5 and (2) the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been
earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings,6 namely: (1) Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to augment
an item for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings
for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5,
Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use
of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special
provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to
the consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable.
That the issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over
Congressional pork barrel – "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district" 7 – excited
the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP
were filed within days of each other
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DAP is constitutional

RULING: YES
Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section
29(1), Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had
sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool
the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant
to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].
GEROCHI V. DOE
FACTS:
On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001.
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law
for being an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of
a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively
of the EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government
debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy
and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross
subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge shall be collected by the
ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp. through
the creation of a special trust fund.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC
HELD:
No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the regulatory
power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the
regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue and
therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power thru
regulation.
Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative parameters
provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming
from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is tasked
of executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass both
the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34
of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any constitutional
defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form.

Issue:
W/N the universal charge is a tax

Ruling:
NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power.
That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies
of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge
reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal
charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry), further boosting
the position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the State’s police objectives.

If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a
tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.

The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government
cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people

DAVID V. ARROYO
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power
I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President
announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant)
petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the
proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress.
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII
of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under
PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x
x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President
Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s
emergency powers.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not PP 1017 encroached on the legislature’s emergency powers
Ruling:

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but
also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to
withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend
that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national
emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the
existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.124
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.