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Italians in Brazil
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Studies in Modern European History
Frank J. Coppa
General Editor
Vol. 30
PETER LANG
New York • Washington, D.C./Baltimore • Boston • Bern
Frankfurt am Main • Brussels • Berlin • Vienna • Canterbury
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Gloria La Cava
Italians in Brazil
The Post-World War II Experience
PETER LANG
New York • Washington, D.C./Baltimore • Boston • Bern
Frankfurt am Main • Brussels • Berlin • Vienna • Canterbury
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
La Cava, Gloria.
Italians in Brazil: the post-World War II experience / Gloria La Cava.
p. cm. — (Studies in modern European history; vol. 30)
Includes bibliographical references (p. – ).
1. Italians—Brazil—History—20th century. 2. Immigrants—Brazil—History—20th
century. 3. Brazil—Emigration and immigration—History—20th century. 4. Italy—
Emigration and immigration—History—20th century. 5. Brazil—Emigration and
immigration—Government policy. 6. Return migration—Italy—History—20th century.
7. Brazil—Ethnic relations. I. Title. II. Series.
F2659.I8L3 981’.00451—DC21 98-4986
ISBN 0-8204-3971-1
ISSN 0893-6897
Die Deutsche Bibliothek-CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

La Cava, Gloria:
Italians in Brazil: the post-World War II experience / Gloria La Cava.
−New York; Washington, D.C./Baltimore; Boston; Bern;
Frankfurt am Main; Brussels; Berlin; Vienna; Canterbury: Lang.
(Studies in modern European history; Vol. 30)
ISBN 0-8204-3971-1
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To the memory of my parents
To Warren Dean,
unforgettable mentor of studies and life
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
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to many people and institutions for the completion of

this dissertation throughout its various stages. I am especially thank-
ful to Antonio Gnoli for encouraging me to resume the writing after a
long interruption and for sharing with me the last weeks of writing in
New York before the defense. I am also very grateful to Oswaldo La
Cava for his loving support, which greatly contributed to the comple-
tion of this project.
My friends and former colleagues as well as faculty members at
New York University collaborated with their precious comments and
in many other ways to the completion of my dissertation, especially
Profs. Marylin Young, Jeff Lesser and Deborah Levenson. A very spe-
cial thanks goes to Prof. Ligia Prado who accepted to advise the final
phase of this research.
Many Brazilian scholars offered their precious advice during the
four years (1985-1989) of my field research, particularly Profs. Gustavo
Franco, Raquel Rolnik and Zuleika Alvim. I am equally grateful to the
Centro Historico do Imigrante in Sao Paulo, the Istituto de Cultura
Italiano in Sao Paulo, the Italians of ABC and many others who are
not specifically mentioned here.
Finally, a number of institutions provided academic and financial
support: the Italian Foreign Ministry, particularly the Istituto di Cultura
Italiano of Caracas, Venezuela; the Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa
of Brazil, the Center for Migration Studies of New York and the
Centro Studi Emigrazione of Rome. Prof. Angelo Trento kindly ac-
cepted to read the first draft and provided very useful comments to it.

Introduction
This study focuses on the failure of Italian immigration to Latin America.

This may stem an unusual hypothesis since most studies tend to cel-
ebrate the Italian experience in Latin America, emphasizing its posi-
tive contributions, success and integration or at least the special abili-
ties of this ethnic group to endure all sorts of difficulties and sufferings.
I myself part of a long Italian chain migration to Latin America,
going back and forth for nearly a century, I always felt uncomfortable
with celebratory studies of Italian ethnicity, not because they were
inherently wrong, but because something always seemed to be miss-
ing. There was never an explanation for the feelings of restlessness,
of not belonging entirely to any particular place, of constantly moving
back and forth and from one place to another.
The history of post World War II Italian emigration to Brazil pro-
vides an interesting way of studying some of these questions. Brazil
was and still is a country that praises itself for being a racial democ-
racy, lacking any sort of ethnic prejudice. Multiculturalism is notably
absent from official as well as popular discourse, owing to the assump-
tion that only one race, the Brazilian race, exists.1 Within Brazil, Sao
Paulo was studied in more detail, since that country underwent one of
t he most encompassi ng a nd promisi ng exper ience s of
“developmentalism” and modernization in post-World War II Latin
America and did welcome, as it had done in the past, Italian immigra-
tion. In addition, Sao Paulo attracted the majority of post World War
II Italian immigrants.
Although in quantitative terms, Italian immigration to Brazil was
not as large as in Venezuela and Argentina, from a qualitative point of
view it illustrates a new type of emigration that responded more to the
political necessities of the post-WW2 order than to immigrants’ aspi-
X Introduction

rations. In Brazil, subsidized immigration was more predominant than
elsewhere, allowing this study to look in greater depth at the relation
between individual immigrants, official migration sponsors and the
receiving state. Finally, there were scattered indications here and there
that returnees outnumbered immigrants who settled permanently.
What caused so many immigrants to return and how can this ap-
parent failure of Italian immigration be explained? Were economic fac-
tors sufficient to understand repatriations, or was there something
beyond economic disadvantage that affected the immigrants’ decision
to repatriate? These are some of the key questions addressed here.
At the same time, this study is tuned to a recent scholarship aimed
at interpreting Brazilian immigration history in the light of ethnic and
cultural complexities, transcending a simplistic model of racial rela-
tions confined to “Blacks” and “Whites”. From this new perspective,
the history of the immigration of any particular group becomes mean-
ingful only insofar as it is studied within the larger context in which it
takes place, particularly the policies and the ethnic attitudes of the
receiving society and the experiences of other immigrant groups.
Cross-country as well as historical comparisons are frequently made
to highlight the central case study on the Italian post World War II
migration to Brazil. Within Brazil itself, the Italian experience was
compared to that of other immigrant groups in order to (a) gain some
insights on the overall official design and discourse on the ethnic ques-
tion, as well as (b) to stress the special character of Italian immigra-
tion. In addition, a view at the turn-of the-century mass emigration
helped to identify new elements or continuities with the past.
In addition, the Italian post-World War II migration experience is
analyzed from a variety of viewpoints: that of international institu-
tions at the beginning of the Cold War, the state of origin, the host
state’s as well as the immigrant’s view. The research was conducted in
libraries and archives in Italy, the U.S. and Brazil and also reflects the
author’s direct experience as an Italian living in Brazil for nearly four
years. If one can assume that the same “proof” may be interpreted in
different ways according to the historian’s cultural background and
personal experience, then the subjective experience of the researcher
certainly influenced her.
The key conclusions were generally reached by juxtaposing statisti-
cal and other official written sources with oral testimonies. For ex-
ample my argument that post World War II Italian migrants generally
returned to Italy or at least desired to do so, this contradicting the
Introduction XI

theories of easy assimilation, was reached by interviewing subsidized
immigrants and through Brazilian newspaper articles and official Bra-
zilian statistics.
Chapter I discusses immigration policies in the Americas from a
historical perspective, showing how racial concern was shared by all
Latin American national elites since the XIX century. While Euro-
pean, and particularly Italian immigration, followed a specific course,
the racist motivations behind its official promotion were by no means
a peculiar feature of a single country. The chapter then deals in some
detail with Brazilian Federal and State of Sao Paulo immigration sub-
sidies. It argues that the institutional framework and huge budgets,
particularly in Sao Paulo during the “Great Italian Emigration” years,
essentially resulted from racist considerations, well connected to an
economic rationale. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, when Euro-
pean immigration dropped, Brazilian policy-makers pursued what can
be called a double standard immigration policy, whereby less desirable
ethnic groups such as Jews and Asians would be admitted only if they
were useful from a strictly economic point of view to the national de-
velopment.
Chapter II analyzes Italian and Brazilian policies in the post World
War II period showing how the Italian government and the United
States promoted and subsidized the emigration of the unemployed and
unskilled in order to relieve Italy from internal social tensions that could
strengthen the Communist Party politically. The Intergovernmental
Committee for European Migrations, ICEM, created in late 1951, was
encharged with the recruitment and transportation of immigrants of
various European nationalities abroad. Yet Italians were the largest
group transported and Latin America was the region where subsidized
migration was on the whole most important. It is argued here that
subsidies were especially necessary because immigrants would not
choose spontaneously to go to Latin America over the U.S., Canada
and Australia, because of the relatively unfavorable economic condi-
tions. On the other hand, although Brazilian elites in the 1950s de-
manded skilled workers for the industrial modernization of the coun-
try, Brazilian Federal officials accepted the available Italian immigrants
- mainly peasants or unskilled workers - because of the old time double
standard rationale in national immigration policies. Since Italians were
considered a highly desirable ethnic group for Brazil, their lack of skills
and economic inadequacy were ultimately tolerated.
XII Introduction

Chapter III provides a critical analysis of the main trends in the
immigration historiography, ethnic and modernization theories, con-
fronting the most common assumptions with the immigrants’ experi-
ence. This analysis is further expanded in Chapter IV which shows,
through the case study of Italian post war immigration to the State of
Sao Paulo, that Italians were unable and unwilling to integrate into
Brazilian society and economy. Their experience, it is argued, denies
the axiomatic belief whereby the assimilation and cultural integration
in Latin America was easier for immigrants proceeding from Euro-
pean countries with a similar cultural background to Brazil’s.
Finally, Chapter V shows the dramatic dimensions of Italian repa-
triations in the 1950s, the highest among those recorded for all major
immigrant groups, and explains them through a gap between the im-
migrants’ high expectations and the reality they found in Brazil. Ulti-
mately, it is argued, economic factors alone cannot provide a full an-
swer for the Italian immigrants maladjustment in Brazil. Indeed, cultural
factors such as different lifestyles from the older immigrant commu-
nity and higher aspirations, which were measured in terms of a rela-
tively more developed society than the Brazilian one, were crucial in
their decision to leave Brazil.
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Notes
1 Originally, it was Gilberto Freyre who pointed out that Brazil was the first
successful country in trascending racial barriers through race mixture. For a
recent critique of racial issues in Brazil see Jeff Lesser, Welcoming the Unde-
sirables. Brazil and the Jewish Question, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1995).

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................ vii

Introduction .................................................................................... ix
List of Figures .............................................................................. xvii
List of Tables ................................................................................ xix
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................... xxi
I. Immigration Policies in Historical Perspective ......................... 1
II. Italian Post World War II Subsidized Emigration

and Brazil’s Immigration Policies...........................................31
III. Immigration Historiography, Ethnic Theories

and the Immigrant Experience ..............................................91
IV. The Immigrants’ Experience:

The Case of Sao Paulo, Brazil ............................................ 111
V. Immigrants’ Repatriations .................................................. 149
Conclusion .................................................................................. 161
Bibliography................................................................................ 165

List of Figures
Fig. 1 Brazilian Federal Immigration Agencies, 1883–1962 .. 16

Fig. 2 Evolution of Private and Public Immigration
Agencies in the State of Sao Paulo, 1886 to
the present .................................................................... 17
Fig. 3 Italian Immigrants directed to plantations in the
State of Sao Paulo from June to December 1952 ........ 74
Fig. 4 Location of Italian Colonization Settlements in
Latin America ............................................................. 117

List of Tables
Tab. 1 Brazil: Immigration Expenditures over

Total National Budget .....................................................18
Tab. 2 State of Sao Paulo: Immigration Expenditures
over Total State Budget ..................................................19
Tab. 3 Italian Migration to non European Countries,
1946–1970 ....................................................................35
Tab. 4 Internal Composition of Immigrants Subsidized
by ICEM to Latin America in the first year of
activities, 1952 ..............................................................40
Tab. 5 Internal Composition of Italian Emigration,
1958–1960 ....................................................................41
Tab. 6 ICEM Administrative Budgets, 1952 and 1957 .............50
Tab. 7 Major Migration Flows to Argentina, Brazil
and Venezuela, 1950–1957 ...........................................59
Tab. 8 Italian ICEM-Subsidized Emigration to
Latin America as compared with that of
other European Countries ..............................................60
Tab. 9 Italian Emigration Subsidized by the
Inter-Governmental Committee for European
Migrations, 1952–1957 .................................................60
Tab. 10 Italian Emigration Subsidized by the
Inter-Governmental Committee for European
Migrations, 1952–1970 .................................................61
Tab. 11 ICEM Migration, 1952–1968 .........................................63
Tab. 12 Analysis of Composition of Italian Maladjusted
Families in the Sao Paulo Coffee Plantations .................76
Tab. 13 Italian Immigrants in Brazil and Sao Paulo,
1946–1950 ................................................................. 112
XX List of Tables

Tab. 14 Italian Returnees to Hospedaria de Imigrantes,
Oct. 1952 to Jan. 1953 .............................................. 124
Tab. 15 Cost of Living as compared to wages in major
Brazilian Cities, 1957 ................................................. 129
Tab. 16 Cost of Living Indexes in Selected Latin
American Countries, 1950–58 ................................... 130
Tab. 17 Urban Salaries in Some Emigration and
Immigration Countries ................................................ 131
Tab. 18 Brazil: Rate of Settlement by Major Immigrant
Groups entered through the Port of Santos,
1908–1935 ................................................................. 151
Tab. 19 Italians’ Rate of Settlement in Brazil, 1955 to 1960 ... 152
Tab. 20 Departures by Major Immigrant Groups from
Brazilian seaports, 1955 to 1959 ............................... 153

List of Abbreviations
CGE Commissariato Generale dell’Emigrazione (General Emi-

gration Bureu)
CGIL Italian General Labor Confederation
CIC Conselho de Imigracao e Colonizacao (Immigration and
Colonization Council)
CITAG Cooperativa Italiana di Tecnici Agricoltori (Italian Coop-
erative of Agriculture Technicians)
CITAL Compagnia Commerciale Italo-Cilena (Italo-Cilean Trad-
ing Company)
CLACSO Centro Latino-Americano de Ciencias Sociais
DGE Direzione Generale dell’Emigrazione (Directorate General
for Emigration)
DGIE Direzione Generale degli Italiani all’Estero (Directorate Gen-
eral of Italians Abroad)
DIC Departamento de Imigracao e Colonizacao do Estado de
Sao Paulo (Department of Immigration and Colonization)
ECA Economic Cooperation Administration
ECLA Economic Commision for Latin America
ERP European Recovery Program
ESP Escola de Sociologia e Politica (School of Political Science
and Sociology)
ICEM Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migrations
ICLE Istituto Nazionale di Credito per il Lavoro Italiano all’Estero
(National Credit Institute for Italian Labor Abroad)
INIC Instituto Nacional de Imigracao e Colonizacao (National
Institute for Immigration and Colonization)
IRO International Refugee Organization
PICMME Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Move-
ment of Migrants from Europe
UNESCO United Nations Agency for Education and Culture
Chapter 1

Immigration Policies in
Historical Perspective
The historiography on European migrations to Brazil is rich in refer-

ences to the official policies adopted in this country since the XIX
century. Yet, until the time this research was conducted (late 1980s),
no comprehensive study had analyzed the evolution of the official ide-
ology on immigration till the Second World War, as expressed through
legislation, official institutions created for managing immigration mat-
ters and writings by established public figures.1 Brazilian immigration
history has been widely studied, particularly the Great Immigration
period (1880–1920), but the focus appears to have been directed mainly
to statistical trends, ethnic experiences in rural/urban settings, politi-
cal movements led by immigrant groups or the economic impact of
mass immigration.
This chapter therefore attempts to outline the evolution of immi-
gration discourse as a basis for understanding Brazilian immigration
policies through the developmentalist era (late 1940s to 1960s): it
analyzes, in the first part, immigration policies until 1945 mostly
through secondary sources; it then draws on primary sources, for in-
terpreting the post-war changes in the light of the new international
order.
The central assumption is that European immigration in the XIX
century was encouraged as a response to the racial anxieties of the
emerging Latin American nation-states. It served a purpose of racial
improvement, which was translated into a set of policies, laws and
institutions. The history of European immigration, especially the Ital-
ian one, went hand in hand with all major projects for economic de-
velopment and modernization in Latin America, so that its successes
and failures, its overall meaning, have been sometimes fused with the
material achievements of an age of profound economic changes.
2 Immigration Policies in Historical Perspective

The “Great Italian Emigration” to the Americas
The policy of settling European immigrants on the land was one of

the earliest forms of public intervention in the newly independent Latin
American nations, especially after the second half of the XIX century.
It was a kind of intervention that aimed at planning, selecting and
subsidizing immigration flows more actively than the neighboring United
States. This attitude can in part be explained in terms of the different
political traditions of Latin American societies as compared to that of
the USA. As a US scholar of Latin America incisively argued, the
Iberian culture inherited by the independent Latin American nations
was shaped by a holistic view of society, in which the state predomi-
nated on the individual; on the other hand, the emphasis on individual
freedom and association in communities prevailed in the Anglo-Saxon
tradition.2
These different attitudes towards immigration may also be explained
through other arguments: (a) the strength of market mechanisms in
the US as compared to Latin America and (b) the desire of whitening
Latin American societies which prompted national states to subsidize
European immigrants. The case of Italian immigration to Brazil, where
official subsidies were more common than elsewhere in Latin America,
is then analyzed in some detail.
After the war for the independence of Venezuela, the Libertador
Simon Bolivar dictated laws favoring immigration to increase the popu-
lation (lower than 700,000) in a national territory of over 1.5 million
square kilometers. Throughout the XIX century many laws continued
to address this issue and in the 1870s the President Guzman Blanco
even financed the passages of a few thousand immigrants a year. Yet
until the mid-twentieth century Venezuela was a marginal destination
in relation to other South American countries given its limited economy
and lack of industrialization.
In 1852 the Argentinean statesman Juan Bautista Alberdi coined
the expression “to govern is to populate”, thus offering a project of
nationality for the rest of Latin America. In the case of Argentina, the
origins of immigration ideology were brilliantly outlined by Tulio
Halperin Donghi. He argued that although the immigration project
was usually attributed to the Generation of 1837—to which Alberdi
belonged to—it was actually the “caudillo” Rosas, paradoxically con-
sidered the most anti-European leader of the XIX century, who first
subsidized the immigration of poor Spanish immigrants during his
Immigration Policies in Historical Perspective 3

government (1829–1852).3 Similarly, in Brazil, between 1818 and
1824, the Swiss settlement of Nova Friburgo, province of Rio de
Janeiro, and the German one in Sao Leopoldo, in Rio Grande do Sul,
constituted the earliest colonization experiments promoted at the Fed-
eral level. The province of Sao Paulo decided in 1835 to directly pro-
vide for the introduction of immigrants and in 1852 established a
money reward for private individuals who were able to bring settlers4.
Nevertheless it was only in the last quarter of the century that immi-
gration would become significant, both in Argentina and in Brazil due
to a combination of political and economic factors which marked the
export-oriented period.
The Great Italian emigration to the Americas occurred between 1880
and the First World War. The United States received approximately 5
million Italian immigrants (between 1875 and 1913), Argentina 2.4
million and Brazil approximately 1.4 million (between 1880 and 1924),
whose majority entered in the period 1880-1904.5 This massive mi-
gration can be subdivided in two great flows.
The first flow, comprised between 1875 and the turn of the cen-
tury, was directed to Latin America especially to the Argentine and
Brazilian countrysides, and originated mainly from push factors. As
an Italian historian put it, the sudden impoverishment of small holders
in some Northern Italian regions, particularly Veneto, as a result of
the agricultural crisis and the subsequent land property concentration
caused the first mass exodus. The emigration from Veneto, in turn,
occurred during two periods: between 1876 and 1886, involving small
holders and sharecroppers who eventually became land proprietors
through official colonization schemes in Brazil and Argentina; between
1887 and 1901, a flow directed for its largest part to the Brazilian
coffee plantation in the state of Sao Paulo.
The second flow, from the turn of the century on was, on the other
hand, strongly marked by “pull” factors. Immigrants were mostly South-
ern peasants and emigrated above all to the United States, engaging
in industrial activities as unskilled laborers.6
In the United States, whose population had been constituted since
the colonial period by European settlers, Italian immigrants were at-
tracted by the higher wages and living conditions the country offered.
Certainly they did not respond to a concerted plan by federal and
state-level policy makers resulting in public subsidies. Some private
subsidizing did occur, but for the most part it was a matter of sponta-
neous traveling with expenses covered by the immigrants themselves.


For Latin America, on the other hand, market pull factors were not
as important. At times of economic boom (especially in Argentina
and Brazil) the prospects of higher social mobility certainly motivated
masses of Italian immigrants to depart. But the fact that even
Argentina’s government had to subsidize the trips of numerous foreign
laborers indicates that market mechanisms alone were insufficient to
spontaneously attract immigrants in the scale desired by the host coun-
tries. Looking comparatively at the Italian immigrants’ experience in
the new continent, it appears that spontaneous departures were even-
tually directed to the more promising US economy. This trend oc-
curred either directly or through re-emigration from Latin America to
the North. Many such cases of triangular migration are known from
the literature,7 while re-emigrations in the opposite direction (North
to South America) appear more rarely.
Migration scholars now tend to agree on the fact that spontaneous
immigrants (usually coming from Southern Italian villages, especially
Sicily and Calabria) came from the middle, not the poorest strata, of
peasant society;8 this seems quite natural, since emigration consti-
tuted an “expensive” initiative, which deprived, at least momentarily,
the family economy of its most valuable members. It was a sort of
investment to be financed with the hope that the family at home would
gain remittances from abroad as well as new possibilities to emigrate.
The pattern which generated from it, is usually referred to by scholars
as “chain migration”. This has been defined as the “movement in which
prospective migrants learned of opportunities, were provided with trans-
portation, and had initial accommodation and employment arranged
by means of kin relationships with previous migrants”.9 Three types
of chains have been identified:
first, there is a chain of recently established immigrants including some padroni

who encourage others from their home town or area to migrate; second, is
a serial migration of breadwinners; and third, is a delayed migration of
families.10
On the other hand public-oriented migration is defined as a “move-

ment based on impersonal recruitment and assistance”. Immigrants
subsidized officially by Latin American states were recruited among
the poorest strata of the Italian peasantry, which otherwise would not
have had the opportunity to migrate. 11 Indeed, the sort of destination
offered by this type of opportunity must not have been otherwise
appealing.
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
Assuming push factors as a constant element in Italy, as land was
scarce and the economy of urbanization unable to absorb the exodus
from rural areas, XIX-century Latin America experienced a “compara-
tive disadvantage” versus the United States. Certainly that was the
case of the Brazilian State of Sao Paulo, from where “desperate” let-
ters of Italian peasants working in the coffee plantations in servile
conditions did not contribute to encourage spontaneous arrivals. 12 In-
deed, the degree of economic opportunities Latin America offered to
subsidized immigrants, is still subject to different interpretations.
A brief, yet illuminating article by a US scholar compared the tranfer
of savings to the homeland by Italian immigrants from some Latin
American countries and the U.S. Basing his research on postal and
telegraphic money orders, published by the Italian Ministry of Posts
and Telegraph from 1873 onward, Warren Dean found that:
The gap between the volume of remittances from the U.S.A. and Latin
American countries is staggering: the size of remittances (from the U.S.) was
considerably greater, they were sent by a much larger proportion of the immi-
grant group, and represented much larger sums per capita immigrant. Even
under conditions of great prosperity in Brazil in the last four years before
World War I, money orders from Brazil were extremely small in comparison to
the U . S . . . . 13
In addition, referring to Brazil, the author noted that remittances

from the coffee rich state of Sao Paulo did not surpass those from Rio
de Janeiro. Although this could indicate that the coffee plantations to
which the majority of Italian immigrants were directed “provided very
little surplus for the Italian workers and that most of the remittances
originated from urban-located immigrants and small-holding colo-
nists”,14 the author concludes instead that the low remittances from
Sao Paulo may show a trend which may be valid for Latin America as
a whole: Italians in Latin America “were prosperous enough to have
sent back remittances as great or greater than those from the U.S.,
but chose instead to invest their savings locally because their social
acceptance was greater”.
Angelo Trento’s study partly confirms Dean’s thesis. His wider sta-
tistical series for Italian remittances based on money orders sent
through postal, consular offices and the Bank of Naples shows indeed
the same general trend with lower remittances from Argentina and
Brazil.15 Yet his explanation emphasizes the contrast between the in-
dividuals-based migration to the U.S. vs. immigrants to Brazil arriving
with their families who:

were decided to build their future in the host country and in any case did not
leave (or did so to a smaller extent) close relatives to whom they needed to
send money.
Unlike Dean, Trento argues that Italian immigrants met harder eco-
nomic circumstances in Brazil, as illustrated by the number of single
transactions: between 1902 and 1920, for example, there were
11,440,826 remittances from the U.S., 736,022 from Argentina and
only 344,949 from Brazil, although the average value of transactions
from Brazil is the highest (509 lire, vs. 323 from the U.S. and 322 lire
from Argentina). Another explanation for these gaps may lie in that
the period 1902–1920 coincided with the massive arrival in the U.S.
of first-generation Italians who obviously maintained stronger ties with
their families back home than the massive flow arriving in Brazil in
the two previous decades.
In any case, it now appears that remittances from Brazil originated
from urban artisans and salesmen rather than from laborers working
in the coffee plantations whose saving capacity is supposed to have
been considerably lower.16 On the other hand, the hypothesis of a
larger volume of remittances from Rio de Janeiro than from Sao Paulo,
as suggested by the data of the Italian Ministry of Posts and Tele-
graph, is not corroborated by recent findings. A recent study indicates
indeed that if banks money orders from Sao Paulo are considered, a
higher volume of Italian remittances from the coffee state is obtained.17
The same study also compares remittances from Italian and Portu-
guese immigrants, allowing for an analysis of the impact of the differ-
ent migration patterns on the financial performance of expatriates.
Although the total value from the Italian group was slightly higher than
from the Portuguese between 1870 and 1900, the latter resulted higher
in the years 1895, 1896, 1897, 1899 and 1900, although Portu-
guese ranked second after the Italians in demographic terms. This
fact illustrates the greater opportunities offered to immigrants in ur-
ban as opposed to rural settings in Brazil: Portuguese immigrants
usually settled in large cities (for example, they accounted for 20% of
the population of Rio de Janeiro in the census of 1890); their most
common occupations were in small trade and crafts, while the major-
ity of Italians were first directed to the countryside, although cases of
internal re-migration to cities were frequent. Higher Portuguese re-
mittances also reflect the fact that this immigrant group was for the
most part composed of young males who left their families back home,
to whom they sent savings at least in the first years:

Presently [Portuguese] migration is not made of families, but of individu-
als: immigrants are mostly men; they leave hoping to return home sometime,
although this is not always the case.18
The fact that Italians (most numerous in relation to the Portuguese

group) arrived in families then explains their relatively limited remit-
tances. This fact —perhaps more than the greater economic opportu-
nities offered to them in Latin America, and therefore their choice of
reinvesting their savings locally— may answer the question of why
remittances were lower than those from their U.S. counterparts.
Scholars agree on the fact that the social acceptance of Italian im-
migrants in Latin America was greater than in the U.S. for two rea-
sons. First, they had been the first and largest immigrant group to
arrive; they therefore occupied a vantage position even as compared
with other Southern Europeans (particularly the Spanish and Portu-
guese mass immigrants) who arrived relatively later. Italians in Latin
America, whose majority came from Northern Italy and began to ar-
rive as early as the mid-XIX century, thus symbolized the ideal laborer:
hard working, culturally superior to the local laborer and, above all,
white. Even though this reputation was at times tarnished, by Italian-
led union and anarchist unrests and, later, by nationalist feelings, their
collective image remained extremely positive.
On the other hand, Italian mass immigration to the United States
occurred at the turn of the century—almost two decades later than the
one to Latin America—at a time when all the major European immi-
grant groups (English, German, Irish, etc.) had already settled and oc-
cupied key position in the urban economy: factories, unions and trade.
So in this case they had both the difficulty of being latecomers and the
“ethnic” disadvantage. Mostly Southerners, and less educated than
the early comers (or than contemporary Jewish immigrants), Italian
immigrants to urban industrial America experienced a strong feeling
of discrimination. This discrimination was widespread in society at
large as they were regarded as ignorant and ethnically inferior. But it
was particularly strong among the organized labor force who regarded
them as a threat to workers’ solidarity since Italian immigrants were
often introduced in factories in times of strikes. In such circumstances,
they remained clustered in urban “villages” or Little Italies, from where
mafia networks, unknown in Latin America (even in areas where South-
ern immigrants were predominant), emerged. Yet the U.S. was the
fastest growing economy at the turn of the century and its wage levels,
including those of Italian immigrants, clearly reflected this fact.

The majority of the immigrants who went to Latin America, espe-
cially to Brazil, were subsidized by the host countries, although cases
of spontaneous emigration of the aforementioned “chain” type are
widely known (f.e. calabresi from Paola and Fuscaldo settling in Rio
de Janeiro or genovesi clustering in La Boca, Buenos Aires).19 An
active supporter of subsidized immigration from the State of Sao Paulo
recalled that over half of the 3.354.829 immigrants entering the country
between 1820 and 1914 had been officially subsidized through the
coverage of their transportation expenses and other costs.20 Out of
1.450.957 immigrants who reached Sao Paulo between 1890 and
1913, 62% had received subsidized passages from the State govern-
ment. The Argentinean government offered free passages to a minor
extent than Brazil, although subsidies were common in the 1880s.
Vasconcellos therefore argued that it was necessary in the post World
War period to resume the subsidies policies which had proved suc-
cessful in a historical perspective.
In addition to their comparative economic disadvantages in relation
to the U.S., Latin American countries opted for subsidizing immigra-
tion as a response to their racial concerns. The whitening ideal was
shared by all Latin American independent nations, whose populations
were mostly constituted by Blacks, Indians and mestizos. There were
varying degrees in that essential racial ideal, depending on the ethnic
composition of each nation. But the immigration projects of the vari-
ous national elites had a common objective: bringing a foreign group
of individuals which would contribute to the creation of modern states.
Immigration and the Racial National Project in Brazil

What were the motivations of the immigration project promoted by
the Brazilian elites? The historiography has usually emphasized eco-
nomic motivations. In the case of Brazil, the recurring theses focused
on the need to (a) create rural settlements which could provide food
staples for the growing urban markets and increase the value of fron-
tier lands;21 (b) reduce the labor costs in the coffee plantations in the
transition period from slavery to free labor;22 (c) have access to a more
disciplined and efficient labor force than the one available locally.23
The belief that European immigrant workers—especially Italians—
were superior to local laborers was widely accepted by Brazilian elites
throughout the XIX century. In addition, it has been correctly argued
that “unfortunately this theory has been uncritically accepted by histo-
rians until our times”, as exemplified in the following passage.

For the freed slave, work is a stigma and that attitude prevents him from
using in an efficient way the only instrument of social integration and mobil-
ity he has: his labor force. Freedom is for the slave a way for being lazy. 24
Nevertheless, several studies published since the late 1960s reinter-

preted this chapter of Brazilian history from a new angle which fo-
cused on racist biases. Florestan Fernandes’ The Negro in Brazilian
Society, originally published in 1969, explained racial inequality with
Blacks’ difficulties to enter the mainstream of Brazilian society, a re-
sult of the legacy slavery. He therefore stressed class factors such as
illiteracy, malnutrition, criminality and so on, rather than racial dis-
crimination, as the main causes preventing their social mobility.25
On the other hand, Dean’s socioeconomic history of a coffee plan-
tation system in Rio Claro, State of Sao Paulo, showed that the mar-
ginal position of people of color, including freed men, “appears likely
to have been the result of discrimination.”
Once the planters had a chance to hire Europeans, whom they considered
racially superior, perhaps even to themselves, they were bound to make op-
erative their prejudices against mulattos, blacks, and mestizos. In particular,
it was generally accepted that Italians were better farmers—more careful and
hardworking, and therefore more productive. This lamentable theory has been
received quite pacifically by historians, up to the present. . . . (But) The
four plantations with a higher-than-average productivity per worker in spite
of a lower-than-average productivity per tree had the highest percentage of
Brazilian-born workers. Clearly, in Rio Claro the Italians did not improve cof-
fee productivity on the plantation sector. 26
Thomas Skidmore’s study traced the ideological foundations of white

supremacy in Brazil through the political literature of the XIX and XX
century. According to Skidmore, the ideal of “whitening” the local
population (which had stronger African roots than elsewhere in Latin
America) led to the official promotion of European immigration with
the aim of modifying the racial composition within the country.
Skidmore also documented an optimistic implication of the whitening
ideal: “miscegenation did not inevitably produce ‘degenerate people’
(as supporters of racial purity would argue), but a mestizo population
able to turn always whiter, both culturally and physically.”27
Skidmore emphasized how different the post-abolition Brazilian
experience had been from the U.S.’. While in the United States—par-
ticularly in the South—a dominant white population established a le-
galized segregation system that isolated blacks from the rest of soci-
ety, segregation was unviable in Brazil. This occurred not just because

Black people represented the majority of the population; a more lib-
eral approach to racial mixture going back to the colonization by the
Portuguese had created the premises for easier race relations com-
pared to the US. 28 In spite of the fact that the whitening ideal was
essentially racist in that it assumed that white people were superior to
all others, it did promote, according to Skidmore, the creation of a
multi-racial, non-segregated society. In addition, the use of miscege-
nation as a means for whitening the local population, created the illu-
sion- and ultimately the official ideology- that racial prejudices did not
exist in Brazil. At the same time, liberalism offered an encouragement
for abandoning to its own destiny the Black local majority.
Also George Reid Andrews showed how European immigrants were
bluntly favored over the local labor force. Both in rural and urban
settings, immigrants concentrated in the most prosperous professions,
while Blacks and mestizos withdrew to the poorest regions of the State
of Sao Paulo and to the least profitable activities.29
Finally, a recent study on the Jewish question added a new dimen-
sion to the paradigm of black/white relations in Brazil, by showing
how racial and ethnic discrimination was applied to immigrant groups
who could not be labeled neither black nor white.
While many academics have challenged Brazil’s “racial democracy” by point-

ing to the disadvantaged position that most people of color face in Brazil,
they have often assumed that all Europeans, including Jews, were considered
desirables members of the “acceptable” white category. . . . L o o k ing at
Brazil in terms of “nonwhite” and “ nonblack”, however, makes explicit the
operational connections between ethnic and racial labels.30
The following pages will attempt to show how Brazilian immigra-

tion policies, although fundamentally racist, did pursue pragmatic so-
lutions. What emerges is a complex picture, in which the whitening
ideal inter fered w ith economic considerations, and nat ional-
assimilationist feelings coexisted with the belief in the supremacy of
the European race.
A central issue within the debate on national identity, the whitening
ideal was well represented in the national budget. The largest expenses
at Federal and State level were concentrated in the years around the
abolition of slavery, when the official objective was to substitute the
local colored labor force with European workers. Considered a hard-
worker even more obedient than a Black man, the Italian immigrant
embodied in the minds of the Brazilian elite the ideal type of laborer

who would contribute to the resolution of the problems of “order and
progress” so typical of the turn of the century.
In a study on the historical formation of Latin American states, the
Argentinean social scientist Oscar Oszlak argued that the analysis of
the evolution of state institutions should be linked to that of social
issues requiring direct public intervention (policy making, official state-
ments, etc.).
The main advantage of studying issues of public domain is that they oblige the
state to take positions, making its material existence apparent. Problematic
issues bring state decisions to the forefront which are directed to obtaining or
allocating resources, imposing sanctions, or creating symbols and institutions.
They are all objective manifestations of its presence in social relations. 31
State action is therefore meant as part of the social process result-

ing from the appearance and the resolution of issues which a given
elite considers crucial for the reproduction of the social order.
As Table 1 will show, there was an upward trend in federal ex-
penses for immigration until 1891, when the highest figure was re-
corded. Then until 1909, when official subsidies were finally inter-
rupted, there was a progressive decline in immigration expenditures.
Immigration subsidies had an even greater impact in the State of Sao
Paulo budget (see Table 2, in the following section of this chapter).
This is quite natural owing to the fact that it developed its own immi-
gration policy thanks to coffee earnings. An old time coffee plantation
State whose flourishing economy had been built on slavery, Sao Paulo
promoted through official channels the arrival of the largest amount of
immigrants ever landed in the country, precisely following the aboli-
tion of slavery (1888). Indeed, the 1890s witnessed the peak of immi-
grants arrivals.
As to the selection criteria applied to the turn-of-the century immi-
gration, the requirement that immigrants came in family groups was
apparently more rigorously followed than that concerning the profes-
sional qualification or health conditions. In the contracts signed be-
tween the Secretaria de Agricultura do Estado de Sao Paulo and
private shipping companies it was stated that immigrants be (a) Euro-
pean and (b) rural workers; it was however difficult to verify the immi-
grants occupation in their home countries and most government offi-
cials believed that urban laborers would frequently lie about their true
occupation in order to have access to a free ticket.32 At the same time,
most subsidized immigrants did arrive indeed in family units, accord-

ing to Immigrant Arrival Register in the port of Rio de Janeiro and in
the documentation of the Immigrants’ Hostel in Sao Paulo.33
The requirement that immigrants arrive in families has been fre-
quently explained by the planters’ need to create a more obedient la-
bor force and also to have access to a low cost reserve of laborers
made of women and children. 34 However, other reasons in addition to
mere economic concerns with the labor market, should be considered.
In Brazil all subsidized European immigration gave priority to family
groups independently of the public entities (federal or state) involved,
the destination (rural or urban) and times (turn of the century/post
WW II immigration). Families were always considered ideal units for
the integration of immigrants into Brazilian society, as they would
tend to settle in the country on a permanent basis, thus contributing
to change the racial composition of the local society.
Yet, one should also consider that Brazilian elites, and particularly
those of Sao Paulo, were also very pragmatic when it came down to
labor demands. For example while the entrance to Asians was forbid-
den by a legislative decree of 1890, in the early twentieth century and
racial intolerance towards potential Chinese immigrants was cried out
by many Brazilian leading figures”,35
elites increasingly voiced concerns about a perceived failure of early republi-

can policy to attract workers who would remain on the land. Some began to
wonder if European labor was too politicized, too lazy, or too greedy, and
emphasized the need to find a compliant work force. The Japanese, perceived
as docile yet hard workers, seemed to fit the bill, and a reformulation of racial
notions and their relation to immigration took place. When Japanese were
denied entry rights by the United States in 1908, a Japanese-Brazilian agree-
ment led Japanese immigrants to Move to Brazil on a large scale. 36
So that it is possible to identify an essential tension in Brazilian immi-

gration policies between the support for the most desirable immigrant
groups in racial/ethnic terms and that for less desirable groups who
nevertheless seemed more functional for internal labor needs.
Although referring to different ethnic groups, two studies reached
the same conclusion about anti-foreign feelings, associated with the
emergence of a strong nationalism in the 1930s, especially during the
Estado Novo.37 The immigrant is portrayed as an undesirable charac-
ter; sometimes, he would be persecuted almost as an outlaw. Never-
theless, it seems peculiar that the whitening ideal, which continued to
set the pace for the project of Brazilian nationality, coexisted with an
anti-foreign feeling, also directed against European immigrants, the

same who some years earlier had been in high demand. It is however
important to remember that at that moment there was a small number
of Europeans ready to migrate to Brazil, as it will be explained in more
details in the next section.
The measures adopted in 1934, elaborated by a special commis-
sion within the Labor Ministry then chaired by Oliveira Vianna—an
influential conservative lawyer and intellectual—certainly came about
in an unfavorable moment for the Brazilian economy: the drop of cof-
fee prices in the early 1930s, the economic depression and high un-
employment. But the restrictions against immigration which peeked
with the inclusion of the quota system in the Constitution of 1934
also reflected the renewed racial anxieties connected with the emerg-
ing authoritarian nationalism.
At that time intellectuals and policy makers came to be influenced
by eugenics according to which a racial improvement would occur in
Brazil with the decline of non-white races. In the inter-war period the
eugenic movement came of age world-wide, with strong repercussions
on racial policies and in the medical legislation. In Brazil, the first
Latin American country to develop an interest towards eugenics, it
was hailed as a “new science”, able to bring about a “new social
order” by means of a racial improvement of the human race.38 In
addition,
the racial improvement was especially attractive to an elite that believed in the
power of science for establishing the principles of “order and progress” (the
Republic’s leitmotif) and was uncomfortable with the racial composition of its
country. As it occurred elsewhere, eugenics also pleased an upcoming medi-
cal class, anxious to promote doctors as specialists of social life; owing to its
professional training and its political interests, this group was not inclined to
develop deep and revolutionary analysis on the racial and classist roots of
unequality in Brazil.39
Dr. Artur Hehl Neiva himself, author of the law that restricted im-
migration, was a strong eugenic supporter. Although some eugenic
supporters adopted anti-foreigner tones, as was the case of Rodrigues
Valle who declared that “in order to populate Brazil we do not need
outsiders”, their objective was rather to avoid that racial composition
in Brazil would deviate from the whitening course which had begun
with European immigration.
The question of foreigners’ assimilation also became during the thir-
ties and forties one of the central themes in the political and intellec-
tual debate in Brazil. The concern with diluting foreigners in the national

society was not completely new, having appeared in 1890, i.e. at the
peak of European immigration, with a naturalization law which auto-
matically had turned into Brazilians all foreigners who within six months
would not declare the wish to maintain their original citizenship. From
the thirties on, however, when white immigration had clearly dropped,
the assimilation concern was directed to the maximum dilution of Eu-
ropean immigrants and their descendants in the Brazilian “melting
pot”. All residues of racial and cultural differentiation would thus be
eliminated in a an attempt to create a holistic society.
Oliveira Vianna, one of the most respected analysts of Brazilian
society in the inter-war period laied out the problem in a 1932 essay,
“Race and Assimilation”. In this study the well known lawyer and his-
torian depicted in a pessimistic way the progress made by the Brazil-
ian melting pot, and revealed the strength of racial and ethnic concen-
trations. First, he criticized the inadequacy of the criteria used in the
national census to establish, for example, the precise regional origins
of foreigners as well as the national descent from the mother and
father sides. What the 1920 census defined as a Brazilian could be in
fact the son of any foreigner. This, argued Oliveira Vianna, made an
assessment of apparently exogamous marriages very difficult. Through
a research based on marriage statistics in the states of Sao Paulo and
Rio Grande do Sul, he elaborated melting ratios, respectively of 16
and 4.6 percent, which he considered quite low.
We all considered the extreme south as a marvellous field of foreigners’ as-

similation, with the various ethnic groups intensively merging one another.
Yet numbers indicate exactly the opposite: the ethnic groups seem to live
there in absolute isolation, in a markedly endogenous regime. 40
It is interesting to note that Vianna’s concern for the assimilation of

foreigners was part of a broader and very articulated vision of politics
and society, whose influence in modern Brazil is increasingly being
recognized by scholars.41 Unlike Gilberto Freyre’s best known postu-
late of Brazilian “racial democracy” or lack of racial prejudice,42 Vianna
accepted the dominant scientific racism of his era.
For Vianna, given the racist assumptions of African inferiority and mulatto
degeneracy, the conclusions to be drawn from black centrality in Brazilian
society were singular. First, the work of Brazilian civilization and nation build-
ing had to be understood as the labor of Europeans and their purebred de-
scendants, with only a few notable exceptions... Second, the inherent weak-
ness of people of mixed race would lead to the survival of those with greater

number of European traits and the effective integration of these superior types
into the European-descent group.... A third conclusion was that Afro-Brazil-
ians, essentially inferior, would forcibly diminish to extinction in the inevitable
conflicts with superior groups of European descent or recent immigrant origin.43
This analysis of race ultimately brought him to harshly criticize the

viability of liberalism in Brazil, for Brazilians “had neither the genetic
capability nor the historical tradition necessary for liberal democracy”.44
Brazil: The Politics of Subsidies

from the Empire to the Estado Novo
In Brazil, the political continuity in the transition from the Colony to

the Empire contributed to maintain the central state structure. Indeed,
an official immigration policy was more likely from an administrative
and financial point of view to be pursued there, as compared to the
politically unstable Latin American neighbors. The Imperial authori-
ties developed an active land settlement policy in the frontier by sub-
sidizing small-plot tenures in Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina,
Parana’ and Espirito Santo. In 1876 the Inspectoria Geral de Terras
e Colonizacao was created for the administration of all services re-
lated to the colonization, the promotion of spontaneous immigration
or through private individuals and their reception. The objective of the
Imperial Government was to establish a self-sufficient peasantry styled
on yeomen in the United States. This project was revived, quite unsuc-
cessfully, before the end of the Empire (1889) by the Central Immigra-
tion Society, promoted by a group of intellectuals in Rio de Janeiro
under the patronage of Dom Pedro II (Figure 1).
On the other hand, the policy that became dominant at the time,
promoted the massive immigration of Italian colonists to the coffee
plantations in the western part of the State of Sao Paulo; this basically
implied a model of landless laborers. Created in 1886 by the large
coffee landowners in the state of Sao Paulo, the Sociedade Promotora
da Imigracao began recruiting, subsidizing and bringing in thousands
of peasants from Veneto. This activity, which was protracted until
1927, was later carried out by the State Secretaria da Agricultura
(Figure 2). From an economic point of view, the triumph of this policy
resulted from the primacy of the new landowners, established in the
frontier territories in the State of Sao Paulo, over the traditional
latifundia interests, located along the coast of Rio de Janeiro. The
conflict which led to that configuration can be traced to the political

Figure 1 Brazilian Federal Immigration Agencies, 1883–1962


Immigration Policies in Historical Perspective
Figure 2 Evolution of Private and Public Immigration Agencies in the State of São Paulo, 1886 to present
17

Table 1 Brazil Immigration Expenditure over Total National Budget
(in million milreis)

Percentage of
immigration
Total Revenues of Migration expenditures on
Fiscal Year the Union expenditures the national budget

1883–84 153,540 947 0.6%
1884–85 153,848 977 0.6%
1885–86 138,796 1,038 0.7%
1886–87 228,186 1,369 0.5%
1888 149,274 3,853 2.5%
1889 184,565 6,383 3.4%
1890 219,262 3,481 1.6%
1891 173,844 20,034 11.5%
1892 205,948 6,909 3.3%
1893 298,858 6,237 2.0%
1894 364,550 2,355 0.6%
1895 344,882 8,208 2.4%
1896 373,894 17,996 4.8%
1897 312,523 960 0.3%

Source: Brazil, Relatorios do Ministério da Fazenda, 1883–1897.
debate over the Land Law in 1850.45 From a political and administra-
tive perspective, the materialization of the great immigration repre-
sented the defeat of the central power of the Empire and the strength-
ening of state interests, to which the Constitution of 1891 attributed
the jurisdiction over terras devolutas as well as the full financial
autonomy.
Table 1 indicates Federal immigration expenditures between 1883
and 1897; Table 2 covers the years 1892 to 1910, showing the stron-
ger incidence of immigration expenditures on the State of Sao Paulo
budget as compared to the Federal one (see years 1892–1897), fol-
lowing precisely the approval of the new constitution.
Although a comparison between the two tables is limited to a six-
year period, the figures show, also in absolute terms, how important
the expenditure of a single State was. In 1897 Sao Paulo even spent
over 6 times more for immigration than the Federal Government.
From an ideological perspective, the great immigration was per-
ceived with highly contradictory feelings. If, on the one hand, the Eu-
ropean inflow which occurred between 1880 and 1914 helped to sat-
isfy the Brazilian elites’ desire to whitening the population, it also


Table 2 State of São Paulo: Immigration over Total State Budget
(in Million milres)

Percentage of
Total Revenues Ependitures for immigration
of the State Migration expenditures over
Year of São Paulo programs total revenues

1892 36,452 1,507 4.1
1893 31,982 3,738 11.7
1894 34,592 1,220 3.5
1895 46,384 7,279 15.7
1896 41,840 4,645 11.1
1897 44,094 5,927 13.4
1898 37,549 2,739 7.3
1899 38,550 2,278 5.9
1900 38,270 1,129 3.0
1901 40,924 4,501 11.0
1902 33,003 2,094 6.3
1903 29,926 238 0.8
1904 33,215 668 2.0
1905 27,586 3,172 11.5
1906 34,830 2,610 7.5
1907 38,520 1,659 4.3
1908 32,414 2,001 6.2
1909 44,048 2,609 5.9
1910 30,665 3,096 10.1

encouraged the first xenophobic attitudes. At the peak of the great

immigration, the Decree N. 396 of May 15 1890 declared that all
foreigners who within six months from their arrival did not express
the will to maintain their original citizenship would automatically be
considered Brazilian citizens. This decree however did not obtain the
desired effect, since most foreign groups, and especially the Italian
one which was the most numerous, usually maintained their original
nationalities.46
The difficulty to incorporate the various ethnic groups within the
Brazilian society became more apparent with the increasing immi-
grant participation in social unrests. In a study centered on the politi-
cal life in Rio de Janeiro during the Republican period, Murilo de
Carvalho pointed out that in spite of the fact that “the first expulsion
law was formally approved as late as 1907, there are records of for-
eign activists being imprisoned in the city as early as 1893.47 The first
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
decree which actually denied entrance to immigrants “whose behavior
is considered harmful to the public order or to the national security”
appeared in 1921 (Decree N. 4247 of January 6, 1921), following a
large series of general strikes in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, and
the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution. 48
The immigration restrictions enacted by the Provisional Govern-
ment following the coup in 1930, and institutionalized by the Consti-
tutions of 1934 and 1937, had instead a strong element of racial dis-
crimination. Theoretically such restrictions were inspired by the quota
law enacted in the United States in 1924, but major social and politi-
cal differences existed between the two countries. In the US the law
resulted from a conservative public opinion movement which origi-
nated at the turn of the century, amidst the last great immigration
wave constituted by southern and eastern Europeans. These immi-
grants were considered ethnically inferior to the earlier waves of north-
ern Europeans who had settled the United States since the XVII cen-
tury. Already in 1882 the American Congress had approved a legislation
prohibiting the entry of all Chinese. But the concern to preserve the
Anglo-Saxon ethnic predominance in American society later motivated
the discrimination towards Italians, Polish, Slavics, etc. In addition,
the concern over the political consequences of the citizenship rights
enjoyed by immigrants reinforced ethnic prejudices. The US legisla-
tion- in force from 1924 to 1965- finally limited arrivals to 150,000
per year, establishing quotas for each national group according to the
proportions registered in the national census of 1890, when northern
and western Europeans were predominant.49
Art. 121, Section 6, of the Brazilian Constitution of July 16, 1934
established that:
The arrival of immigrants in the national territory is subject to the neces-
sary restrictions that guarantee ethnic integration and the physical and civic
rights of the immigrant. Each national flow must therefore not exceed annu-
ally the 2 percent limit over the total number of its respective national group
settling in Brazil in the last 50 years (January 1, 1884 to December 31,
1933).50
In Brazil the whitening ideal still lasted in the 1930s but it would
then serve as a justification for legislators against Japanese immigra-
tion. The older European immigrant groups would enjoy higher pro-
portions of allowed entrances than, for example, the Japanese who
had arrived as late as 1908. European immigration had constantly

decreased due to anti-emigration measures adopted by the European
regimes. On the other hand, Japanese immigration had grown from
2,673 arrivals in 1924, to 11,169 in 1928, to 24,494 in 1933. Be-
tween 1922 and 1932, “no European nation had reached the quota
that would be fixed by the Constitution. It was because of these num-
bers that we finally accepted the amendment”. So did Miguel Couto
justify the acceptance of the quota amendment in Congress.51 It was
then quite evident that the constitutional amendment was mainly di-
rected to restrain Japanese and Arab immigration. Differing from Eu-
ropean immigration, which had received wide subsidies, the Japanese
was only subsidized by the State of Sao Paulo between 1908 and 1922,
and consequently by Japanese immigration agencies.52 The strongest
critics against the quota system emerged precisely in the State of Sao
Paulo which received the entire Japanese immigration. Since 1934,
Japanese arrivals dropped sharply (1.548 in 1941 and none in 1942–
45).53
In a study on anti-semitism in Brazil, it is argued that the establish-
ment of immigration quotas was also meant to restrain the entrance of
German Jews, in addition to that of Japanese and Black Africans.54
Many German Jews were indeed reaching Brazil in the 1930s as they
escaped Nazism. Nevertheless a US scholar added a different empha-
sis to the issue of anti-semitism: the Estado Novo would have had a
contradictory attitude towards Jews who, in spite of these restrictions,
continued to be allowed to enter into the country. The great Jewish
immigration occurred between 1924 and 1942 (approximately 60,000
people) and 1939 represented the peak year.55 Brazil was interested
in a traditional European immigration but, since the moment was un-
favorable, Jews then appeared as a possible alternative. Artur Hehl
Neiva so defended the commercial and entrepreneurial qualities of Jews:
We do not need simply peasants, but skilled individuals in all fields, and good
tradesmen who know how to organize Brazilian trade abroad. This is practi-
cally inexistent since all shipping companies are foreign.56
Brazil did apply very rigorous social and professional criteria to

immigrant Jews, selecting those who had technical qualifications and
capital. This new criterion would reappear more clearly in future projects
for economic growth, particularly in “developmentalism”. Racial preju-
dices did not appear to affect Jews whose entrance, according to Lesser,
was rather selected on economic criteria. Many public figures in Brazil

showed a great interest for the professional qualifications and capital
assets that Jews would bring into the country. In addition, although
considered a less desirable ethnic group, the immigration of European
Jews did not contradict the whitening ideal of the Estado Novo, espe-
cially at a time when the arrival of Southern Catholic Europeans had
sharply dropped independently of the wishes of Brazilian policy-makers.
From an administrative point of view, the Revolution of 1930 opened
the way for a centralization of many functions which were until then
managed at a state level. The creation of the Labor Ministry in 1931,
to which the Departamento Nacional de Povoamento (Department
of National Settlement) was subordinated, would be a first step to-
wards the absoption of all immigration measures by the Federal Gov-
ernment (see Figure 1). Such reorganization clearly hit Paulista coffee
planters whose political power was drastically reduced, as illustrated
by the complaints of one of their eminent representatives, Henrique
Doria de Vasconcellos, Director of the Immigration Service of the State
of Sao Paulo. The coffee state attempted unsuccessfully to resume
subsidized European immigration in 1935 due to the high per capita
costs resulting from the imposition of too “insignificant” quotas.
On the whole, it would therefore be incorrect to argue that the Estado
Novo closed the doors to immigration. In addition to promoting Jew-
ish immigration, Brazil actively participated in the migration confer-
ence called on by the International Organization of Labor in Geneva
on February 1938.57 That conference brought foreword the need to
create a permanent migration commission by means of international
funding in order to promote rural colonization, since many receiving
countries, including Brazil, could not afford to direct their meagre pub-
lic budget to subsidize immigrants.
Two months later, Vargas created the Conselho de Imigracao e
Colonizacao, CIC (Immigration and Colonization Council), with De-
cree Law N. 406 of May 4, 1938. In spite of the new possibilities for
the resumption of European immigration, the beginning of the War
changed this promising picture. According to Arthur Hehl Neiva, a
Government immigration advisor:
The Council adopted far reaching measures. It increased the quotas of various
countries, took advantage of differentials, made agreements with some na-
tions to establish larger immigration flows, exempted Portuguese immigration
from any numerical restriction, and so on, when unfortunately the war un-
leashed on the globe with all its consequences, deeply affecting the terms of
the equation.58

Article 86 of Decree Law N. 406 of May 4, 1938 prohibited the
publication of books, reviews or newspapers in foreign languages in
the rural areas of the country, and all such publications, even outside
of the rural areas, were subject to prior authority from and registration
with the Ministry of Justice. Earlier, Decree Law N. 483 of April 18,
1938 had already forbidden foreigners to run newspapers, reviews or
other publications, to print articles and commentaries in the press, to
grant interviews, give lectures, etc.59 Foreigners could not become civil
servants, official interpreters and translators, dock workers, drivers,
workers or entrepreneurs in fishing activities, lawyers, doctors, etc.60
Although a 1938 decree ruled that ten years of continuous resi-
dence were required from foreigners before they could apply for the
Brazilian citizenship, the legislation which discriminated immigrants
from various urban professions or reduced their proportions in local
firms ended up by pressing them to naturalize. The official statistics
on the percentage of naturalizations among the foreign population
confirm this argument: from 1 percent in 1920 to 11.8 percent in
1950. In addition the rate of naturalization appeared to be higher
among males residing in urban centers.61 It is therefore possible to
assume that such labor regulation has more the objective of assimilat-
ing foreigners than to protect Brazilian workers against immigrants.
This would then justify its endurance even following World War II,
when the official policy was again in favour of bringing European im-
migrants into the country.
Placed directly under the President of the Republic, the CIC stated
objective was to “assure the ethnic, social, economic and moral integ-
rity of the Nation”, as specified in the Decree N. 3010 enacted on
August 20, of the same year. Among its various administrative func-
tions, CIC was entrusted with the execution of assimilation policies,
avoiding the concentration of foreigners in rural colonies which were
to maintain at least 30 percent of Brazilian-born settlers, assuring the
compulsory adoption of the Portuguese language in foreign schools,
prohibiting all foreign publications, etc.
In addition, the sub-mentioned decree specified the new regulations
for immigration. For the purpose of this study two elements will be
emphasized. First, the decree clearly pointed to the intention of the
Federal Government to fix immigrants in the hinterland in agricultural
activities, as no mention of industrial professions is made. Art. 10
stated accordingly that “eighty per cent (80%) of the annual quota of
each nationality will be reserved for agricultural workers and their


respective families”. Also, “agricultural workers or technicians of rural
industries” could not abandon their profession during a period of four
consecutive years from the date of their landing. Finally, Art. 19 speci-
fied that the “Union is empowered to draw up immigration treaties for
the purpose of settling agricultural laborers in the country”. It ap-
pears, therefore, that immigration was still perceived strictly in a rural
dimension and that there was no clear urge, at least at Federal level,
for using foreign workers in skilled urban professions.
Secondly, referring to collective permits, the decree unequivocally
stated what were the criteria for selecting immigrants:
The officer in charge of the selection will use extreme discretion so as to avoid
loss to the National interests in regard to the ethnical assimilation and to
economic, political and social security. The said consideration will be based:
on the examination of individual traits, eugenic value, physical and moral
qualities;
on the examination of collective attributes of original inhabitants, espe-
cially in the study of their habits, their rural qualities, . . . propensity for
agricultural life and for secondary occupation . . .
The eugenic requirement appeared candidly listed before any occu-

pational or cultural one, thus indicating the priority of race over eco-
nomic development. It should be stressed that the thrust of these regu-
lations was maintained also in the years following World War II, and
therefore cannot be regarded as an exclusive domain of the Estado
Novo.
If on the one hand the assimilation laws—enacted after the attempted
Integralist coup of 1938—embodied the response of the central state
to the political activism of the Italian and German communities, they
also expressed a renewed holistic desire to homogenize the entire
society. The notion of eugenics—or the “refinement” of the Brazilian
race through the white ethnic groups already present in the country—
was central to the social and political ideology at the time. The state-
ment of Rodrigues Valle that “in order to populate Brazil we do not
need foreigners” referred mainly to non-white immigration.62
Ultimately, the coming of the economic depression and the conse-
quent unemployment favoured Getulio Vargas’ strategy to strengthen
the relation between the Estado Novo and the native Brazilian work-
ing class. The nationalist discourse would become more credible thanks
to immigration restrictions and later through the new labor legislation
enacted on May 1st 1943. Such legislation compelled all industrial
and commercial businesses to have in their payroll at least two thirds
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
of Brazilian-born employees.63 Some historians have seen the so called
“law of the two thirds” as a new orientation towards national inter-
ests. From another perspective, it seemed rather to reconcile two ob-
jectives: on the one hand, it fed the nationalist image of the govern-
ment which finally proved to protect Brazilian laborers versus
immigrants, on the other, it struck directly at the problem of citizen-
ship, encouraging foreigners to naturalize.
In 1943, Vargas requested a special study by the National Council
of Industrial Policy in order to identify some basic principles for eco-
nomic growth. Roberto Simonsen was chosen to elaborate the report
whose title was “Planning for the Brazilian Economy”, in which a model
of growth based on five-year plans was presented. The main objec-
tives were:
• to provide the country with electrical power;

• to modernize agriculture;
• to create basic industries (metal works and chemical);
• to promote technological research;
• to create industrial banks and other financial institutions;
• to promote a selected immigration of skilled workers and techni-
cians in order to expand production and strengthen the internal
market, since “they are used to high consumption levels”. 64
The Simonsen report anticipated the immigration policy of

desenvolvimentismo, in which the European entered as an essential
part of the modernization strategy launched by the State. On the other
hand, it anticipated a central argument in modernization theory dur-
ing the 1950s, i.e. that immigrants would necessarily bring the techni-
cal qualifications and a more advanced culture which were necessary
to unleash the new targets of the Latin American progress.
Notes
1 A recently published study dealing with such issues is Jeff Lesser’s Welcom-
ing the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Question, (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1995); see also Jose’ Sebastiao Witter, “A politica
imigratoria no Brasil”, in Inmigracion y politica inmigrante en el Cono Sur
de America, ed. Hernan Asdrubal Silva, (Washington D.C.: CPDP-CAS-PAIGH,
1990).
2 Richar Morse, El Espejo de Prospero (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1982), pp. 112–
114.
3 Tulio Halperin Donghi, “Para que la inmigracion? Ideologia y politica

inmigratoria y aceleracion del proceso modernizador: el caso argentino”,
Jahrbuch fur Geschichte Von Staat, Wirtshaft und Gesellschaft
Lateinamerikas, Band 13, 1976, p. 453.
4 Trento, p. 19.
5 Angelo Trento, Do outro lado do Atlantico: Um seculo de imigracao italiana

no Brasil (Sao Paulo: Nobel, 1989), p. 18.
6 Emilio Franzina, La Grande Emigrazione. L’esodo dei rurali dal Veneto

durante il secolo XIX, (Venice: Marsilio, 1976), p. 47.
7 Emilio Franzina, Merica, Merica. Emigrazione e colonizzazione nelle lettere

dei contadini veneti in America Latina, 1876–1902 (Milano, 1979); Trento,
p. 66.
8 Piselli, Fortunata, Parentela ed Emigrazione. Mutamenti e continuita’ in

una comunita’ calabrese. Torino: Einaudi, 1981.
9 John S. MacDonald and Leatrice MacDonald, “Chain Migration, Ethnic Neigh-

borhood Formation and Social Networks”, Milbank Memorial Fund Quartely,
XIII, 42 (1964), cited in Baily, Samuel L, “Chain Migration of Italians to Ar-
gentina: Case Studies of the Agnonesi and the Sirolesi”, Studi Emigrazione,
65 (March 1982), pp. 72–3.
10 Ibid, p. 74.
11 Franzina, La Grande Emigrazione.
12 Franzina, Merica Merica.
13 Dean, Warren, “Remittances of Italian Immigrants: from Brazil, Argentina,

Uruguay and the U.S.A., 1884–1914”, New York University Occasional
Papers, N. 14, 1974.
14 Ibid, p. 8.

15 Trento, pp. 73–74.
16 Trento, p. 74.
17 Gustavo Franco, “O Brasil e a Economia Internacional, 1870–1914”, unpub-
lished paper, Departamento de Economia PUC-RJ, Rio de Janeiro, June 1988,
p. 27.
18 A. Sampaio, Estudos, Vol I “A Propriedade e a Cultura do Minho” (prior to
1884), quoted in Miriam Halpern Pereira, A politica portuguesa de imigracao,
1850– 1930, (Lisbon: A Regra do Jogo, 1981), pp. 35–36.
19 Mario C. Nascimbene, “Origini e destinazioni degli italiani in Argentina (1835–
1970) in Euroamericani: la popolazione di origine italiana in Argentina,
(Torino: Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli), 1987, p. 86.
20 Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, “O problema da imigracao no apos-guerra”,
Boletim do Departamento de Imigracao e Colonizacao, N. 5, Sao Paulo,
December 1950, p. 141.
21 M. Thereza Petrone, “Politica imigratoria e interesses economicos (1824–
1930)”, in Emigrazioni europee e popolo brasiliano, (Roma: Centro Studi
Emigrazione, 1987), p. 260.
22 Michael Hall, “The Origins of Mass Immigration in Brazil, 1871–1914,” Diss.
Columbia University 1969, p. 141.
23 Paula Beiguelman, A Formacao do Povo no Complexo Cafeeiro: Aspectos
Politicos, (Sao Paulo, 1968), pp. 128–129.
24 Eunice Ribeiro Durham, Assimilacao e Mobilidade: A historia do Imigrante
Italiano num Municipio Paulista (Sao Paulo, 1966), p. 8, quoted in Trento,
p. 25.
25 George Reid Andrews, Blacks and Whites in Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1888– 1988,
(Madison, Winsconsin: The University of Winsconsin Press, 1991), pp. 7–9.
26 Dean, Warren, Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820– 1920,
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 173–174.
27 Thomas Skidmore, Preto no Branco: Raca e Nacionalidade no Pensamento
Brasileiro, (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976), p. 81.
28 Ibid, p. 81.
29 George Reid Andrews, “Black and White Workers: Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1888–
1928”, Hispanic American Historical Review, 68(3), August 1988, pp. 502–
503.
30 Lesser, p. 5.
31 Oscar Oszlak, “The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some
Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for its Study”, Latin American
Research Review, XVI (2), 1981, p. 13.

32 Thomas Holloway, Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in Sao
Paulo, 1886-1934, (Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980),
pp. 45–47.
33 A sample of immigrants entered in Rio de Janeiro between 1873 and 1932,

indicated that 60% were in family groups. See Elisa Maria da C. Pereira Reis,
“Analise da Viabilidade de um Estudo sobre a Magnitude e o Perfil da Imigracao
Estrangeira para o Brasil no periodo de 1873 a 1932”, Programa Nacional
de Pesquisa Economica ( Rio de Janeiro), 6 (March 1983), p. 18. For the
records of the Immigrants’ Hostel in Sao Paulo, see Holloway, op. cit.,
pp. 56–59.
34 Andrews, op. cit., p. 516–517; Zuleika Alvim, Brava Gente, (Sao Paulo:
Brasiliense, 1986), p. 12.
35 Just before abolition, Joaquim Nabuco declared as to Chinese immigration:

“even if it were limited, Brazil would become mongolized as it was africanized
when Salvador Correia de Sa’ brought in the first slaves” (cited in Skidmore
p. 42).
36 Lesser, p. 13.
37 Maria Luiza Tucci Carneiro, O Anti-Semitismo na Era Vargas, (Sao Paulo:

Brasiliense, 1988); Berenice Corsetti, “O crime de ser italiano: A perseguicao
do Estado Novo”, in De Boni, Luis, ed., A Presenca Italiana no Brasil, (Porto
Alegre: Escola Superior de Teologia, 1987).
38 Nancy L. Stepan, “Eugenesia, Genetica y Salud Publica: El Movimiento

Eugenesico Brasileno y Mundial”, Quipu, 2 (3), September-December 1985,
p. 357.
39 Stepan, ibid., p. 361.
40 Francisco de Oliveira Vianna, Raca e Assimilacao, (Sao Paulo: Companhia

Editora Nacional, 1932), p. 144.
41 Jeffrey D. Needel, “History, Race and the State in the Thought of Oliveira
Viana, Hispanic American Historical Review, 75 (1), 1995, p. 1.
42 See in particular The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development
of Brazilian Civilization (New York, 1946) and The Mansions and the Shan-
ties: The Making of Modern Brazil (New York, 1963).
43 Needel, pp. 14–15.
44 Ibid., p. 18.
45 Warren Dean, “Latifundia and Land Policy in Nineteenth-Century Brazil”,

Hispanic American Historical Review, 51 (4), November 1971.
46 Brazil. Ministr y of Justice and Internal Affairs. Documentat ion Center.

Estrangeiros (Legislation since 1940 to 1949), Vol. II, 1950, pp. 531–533.


47 Jose’ Murilo de Carvalho , Os Bestializados, (Sao Paulo: Companhia das
Letras, 1987), p. 61.
48 Brazil. Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs. p. 152.
49 Carl Degler, Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped Modern America,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 229.
50 Cited in Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, “O problema da imigracao”, Boletim
da Diretoria de Terras, Colonizacao e Imigracao, (Sao Paulo) N. 1, October
1937.
51 Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, “O problema da imigracao”, Boletim da
Diretoria de Terras, Colonizacao e Imigracao, (Sao Paulo)N. 1, October
1937.
52 Alinda Nogueira Rocha, A Imigracao Japonesa para a Lavoura Cafeeira
Paulista, 1908-1922, (Sao Paulo: Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros, 1972), p.
11; Maria Thereza Petrone, “Politica Imigratoria e Interesses Economicos”,
Emigrazioni Europee e Popolo Brasiliano, (Roma: Centro Studi Emigrazione,
1978), p. 268.
53 Maria Stella Ferreira Levy, “O papel da migracao internacional na evolucao
da populacao brasileira (1872 to 1972)”, Revista de Saude Publica, 8 (suppl.),
1974, p. 72.
54 Maria Luiza Tucci Carneiro, O anti-semitismo na era Vargas (1930–45),
(Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1988), p. 161.
55 Jeff Lesser, “O preconceito desarquivado”, Senhor, April 4, 1988, pp. 62–
63.
56 Arthur Hehl Neiva, Estudos sobre a Imigracao Semita no Brasil, (Rio de
Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945), p. 26.
57 "Conference of Experts on Migration for Settlement”, Industrial and Labor
Information, LXV (12), March 21, 1938, pp. 302–304.
58 Arthur Hehl Neiva, “Getulio Vargas e o Problema da Imigracao e da
Colonizacao”, Revista de Imigracao e Colonizacao, 3(1), 1942, pp. 52–53.
59 Arthur Hehl Neiva and Manuel Diegues Jr., “The Cultural Assimilation of
Immigrants”, in W. D. Borrie et al., The Cultural Integration of Immigrants,
(Paris: UNESCO, 1959), p. 213.
60 Fernando Carneiro, Imigraçao e Colonizaçao no Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro:
Faculdade Nacional de Filosofia, Universidade do Brasil, occasional publica-
tion n. 2, 1950), p. 34–36.
61 Fernando Bastos de Avila, L’Immigration au Bresil: Contribution a une
Theorie Generale de l’Immigration (Rio de Janeiro: Agir, 1956), p. 150.
62 Tucci Carneiro, p. 146.
www.Ebook777.com

63 Brazil. Conselho de Imigracao e Colonizacao, Assimilaçao do Imigrante, (Rio
de Janeiro, 1949), pp. 16–17.
64 Diva Pinho And Helena Fanganiello, Aspectos do Pensamento Economico,
1940-1960, (Sao Paulo: IPE/USP, 1986), p. 16.
Chapter 2

Italian Post World War II
Subsidized Emigration and
Brazil’s Immigration Policies
Italy and Post World War II Emigration
From the perspective of home state policies, Italian emigration his-

tory experienced three distinct phases. A first period, characterized
by laissez-faire attitudes, covered the period from the XIX century
until World War I. During this period, and until the rise of Fascism the
only official measure concerning the migration problem was the Par-
liamentary Law of January 29, 1901. 1 This law was designed to pro-
tect the immigrant from the frequent abuses on the part of recruiting
agents in Italy; for the first time the law also enacted a specific admin-
istrative organization of official migration services by creating the
Commissariato Generale dell’Emigrazione, CGE (General Emigra-
tion Bureau) placed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which re-
sponded directly to Parliament on national migration policies. This
bureau had the task of approving and fixing transportation fees, as
well as promoting emigration committees at the town level aimed at
immigrant protection. The committees were composed of a police
representative, a mayor, a priest, a doctor and a labor representative.
A transition period occurred during the Fascist years, when the
State intervened in a restrictive sense to reduce emigration flows and
established, on the other hand, stronger political and cultural links
with Italian communities abroad.
The emigration policy during the Fascist regime passed through
two different phases. A first phase, covering approximately the years
1922–26, was marked by a continuity with the pre-war years both in
32 Italian Emigration and Brazil’s Immigration Policies

the policy approach and in the number of expatriations (1.6 million
persons). Unemployment and overpopulation were still considered as
negative factors, a view that was clearly expressed by Mussolini on a
speech on April 2, 1923:
emigration is a physiological need for the Italian people. We are fourty mil-
lion squeezed in this narrow and adorable peninsula with too many moun-
tains and a land which cannot nourish everyone.2
This phase also marked the first attempts to organize migration

according to coherent criteria which were anticipated by Mussolini as
early as 1925:
Emigration may be considered, like I do, an ill impoverishing our people of

active members who go to feed anemic foreign countries with red globules. It
will be, however, a lesser ill, if it will be prepared, selected, financed or, in
other words, organized. It will be more valuable and weigh more on our
balance of payments.3
The agency then encharged with emigration, CGE, worked actively

to find countries of destination other than the US which had strongly
restricted immigration through its Quota Act. Numerous labor con-
tracts were thus stipulated with French entrepreneurs, with a total
Italian emigration accounting for 46 percent of total expatriations in
1922–26. Argentina, which at the time had a free immigration policy,
was the second most important receiving country with approximately
22 percent (353,451) out of the total number of expatriations.4
A new course in the emigration policies of the Fascist years began
to be evident in 1927, when the CGE was extinguished and replaced
by the Direzione Generale degli Italiani all’Estero, DGIE (Director-
ate General for Italians Abroad) set up within the Foreign Ministry.
From then on, the official discourse would be centered on demographic
power as the basis for political and economic strength. As a result,
repatriations were encouraged and ties with Italian communities abroad
strengthened. The migration balance in the following years clearly
reflected this trend, with outflows gradually diminishing and increas-
ing repatriations, so that in 1937–42 a negative balance was regis-
tered (219,854 expatriations vs. 287,757 repatriations).
A third phase, following World War II, was instead characterized by
strong official support of overseas migration as the end of the war
revived and strengthened the expectation that a massive European
migration could be resumed to Latin America.
Italian Emigration and Brazil’s Immigration Policies 33

During the second half of the 1940s, Italy was experiencing the so-
called “population surplus” exemplified by the highest unemployment
in Europe. Economic recovery had also been slower than elsewhere in
Europe, in spite of the aid received under the Marshall Plan. By the
end of the decade observers constantly referred to the failure of indus-
trial production to recover its pre-war levels.5
As in the turn of the century, once again massive emigration was
considered by Italian authorities as the only immediate solution to
relieve domestic economic pressure. This time, however, stronger gov-
ernmental action and fund raising seemed necessary.
In 1946 Italy replaced the DGIE, created in 1927, with the Direzione
Generale dell’Emigrazione, DGE (Directorate General for Emigra-
tion) which was aimed at reorganizing and extending the national mi-
gration services, reduced drastically since 1927. The DGE had the
following tasks:
(a) providing economic, social and health assistance to immigrants

in the ports of embarkment and frontier areas;
(b) surveying foreign labor markets on a permanent basis in order
to identify the best outlets for the Italian emigration;
(c) providing general information, guidebooks and other instruc-
tive materials to immigrants;
(d) establishing transportation fees and assuring the immigrant pro-
tection and assistance both during the trip and in the receiving
country;
(e) placing Italian laborers abroad through proper contracts;
(f) establishing the necessary links with the Labor Ministry which
was entrusted with the workers’ recruitment, selection and train-
ing in Italy.6
In fact, overlapping and bureaucratic conflict between the Foreign

and Labor ministries on migration matters were frequent. There were
even cases of false information concerning labor contracts, dissemi-
nated by the Labor Ministry to potential migrants.7 Urging the re-
union of all public tasks concerning emigration under one single agency,
a Christian Democrat Congressman denounced to a Parliamentary
hearing that there was no other sector in the Italian Public Adminis-
tration with such inadequate means and organization as the migration
services.8 He added that one of the main causes for the low perfor-
mance of Italian emigration was precisely the existence of too many
agencies dealing with emigration with a subsequent confusion of roles.


Like most post-war social issues, the ultimate development of emi-
gration did not depend exclusively on actions to be pursued at a na-
tional level; multilateral action, with the participation of various gov-
ernments and official institutions was, from the point of view of policy
makers, the most appropriate answer to control the new course. Thus,
at a time when the reconstruction of Europe was a social and political
priority, the difficulties in guaranteeing extensive outflows to Latin
America through mere market mechanisms led to a new migration
typology.
Between 1946 and the end of 1951, before international funding
for emigration became finally available, Italy adopted a policy of sign-
ing bilateral agreements under which immigration countries covered
all travel expenses while the home government was responsible for
the recruitment and selection of candidates. The immediate post-war
emigration to Argentina, which at the time was experiencing the great-
est economic boom in Latin America due to the increasing world de-
mand for its food exports, occurred precisely under such a scheme.
Table 3 shows that Latin America was the most significant non-Euro-
pean destination for Italian emigrants between 1946 and 1957. The
largest flow, of which Argentina alone absorbed 73 percent, arrived
in the period 1946–1951.
The peak year was 1949 with 126,651 expatriations, but from
then on there was a progressive drop: 110,559 in 1950 and 85,770
in 1951. Such a downward trend made more apparent the fear that
emigration resulting from mere bilateral agreements was unstable and
subject to oscillations that could not relieve Italy from its unemploy-
ment problem on a permanent basis. The figures on Argentina show
even more clearly the downward trend: from 98,000 Italian entries in
1949 to 55,000 in 1951. 9
Table 3 also shows that the peak emigration period for Latin America
was precisely 1946–51, while thereafter there is a constant drop, even
for 1952–57, when international funding became available.
In 1949, a confident ial repor t of the Direzione Generale
dell’Emigrazione of the Italian Foreign Ministry indicated a growing
concern with the crisis of the Argentinean economy, exemplified by
its high inflation. Nevertheless, an annual increase of 10 percent was
expected over the 100,000 immigrants entered in 1949 in Argen-
tina, which was still considered as the most attractive destination. 10
On the other hand, the document warned that, in spite of Brazil’s
interest in Italian immigration, the economic conditions it offered
www.Ebook777.com

Italian Emigration and Brazil’s Immigration Policies
Table 3 Italian Migration to non European Countries 1946–1970

Expatriation
Countries of
destination 1946–1951 1952–1957 1958–1963 1964–1969 1970 Total

Canada and USA 113,300 268,500 206,800 228,900 22,700 840,200
Latin America 451,100 355,600 93,300 18,800 3,800 922,600
Oceania 44,200 127,000 88,500 70,900 6,600 337,200
Total 608,600 751,100 388,600 318,600 33,100 2,100,000
Percentage of
Repatriation repatriations
Countries of over total
destination expatriations

Canada and USA 19,800 29,800 13,300 13,100 9,600 85,600 10.1
Latin America 68,400 116,300 71,200 22,500 4,900 283,300 30.7
Oceania 1,300 11,700 9,400 7,600 4,000 34,000 10.1
Total 89,500 157,800 93,900 43,200 18,500 402,900 19.1

Source: Lucrezio, G. and Favero, L. “Un Quarto di Secolo di Emigrazione Italiane”, Studi Emigrazione, 9 (May-June 1972), 25–26, p. 26.
35

immigrants were very unfavorable: practically no subsidies, low wages
in the countryside and jobs available only to skilled workers and tech-
nicians in the urban centers. Both Argentina and Brazil had indeed
experienced a rapid urbanization throughout the 1940s with massive
internal migration from rural areas, causing an excess supply of un-
skilled workers.11
Nevertheless, the assumption that immigration, particularly of skilled
workers, technicians and foremen, could play an important role in the
economic development of Latin America had been widespread in lo-
cal governmental circles as well as among planners within the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America since the end of the war.12 Latin
American countries also welcomed agricultural colonists. But, with
the exception of Venezuela, it was already clear to perceptive Italian
observers that Latin America offered just limited prospects for Italian
immigration. The report, however, insisted that Italy, with its 4 mil-
lion unemployed workers out of a total active population of 20 mil-
lion, urgently needed to increase emigration to that area, something
that could be achieved only through international funding. Until that
moment, limited economic resources had prevented the development
of large-scale immigration programs in the hemisphere.
Since late 1948, Italy started to receive the reconstruction funds
assigned by the Marshall Plan. Between 1948 and 1952 it received
on the whole US $ 1,470 million, accounting for about 11 percent of
the European Recovery Program, ERP, total funding. In spite of some
benefits resulting from ERP, the Italian economy was reacting more
slowly than that of other European countries. Italy continued to have
the highest unemployment rate in Europe and was the only country
that had not gained back the pre-war GNP levels. These circumstances
brought the ERP, chief in Italy, Paul Hoffman to blame the lack of a
coordination plan for reconstruction policies and enlargement of so-
cial infrastructures. Hoffman’s viewpoint is summarized by the histo-
rian Valerio Castronovo as follows.
For U.S. officials, the Italian Government policies were incompatible with
the spirit and the objectives of the Marshall Plan, which aimed at moderniz-
ing Western Europe through a Keynesian approach. A controlled balance of
payments, the limited public spending the exaggerated restriction of credit
and investments . . . were exactly opposite to the measures pursued by ERP
in order to raise the low productive levels of the Italian economy and face
unemployment. 13

On the other hand, the view of the leading political party, the Chris-
tian Democrats, presented in a report of the DGE, stated that the
ERP funds poured into the Italian economy were not large enough to
solve the problem of unemployment and that emigration was a neces-
sary complement for any other economic measure. The urge for im-
migration funds became so strong that the Christian Democrat Prime
Minister De Gasperi declared that if the United States subsidized at
least part of the emigration, Italy would be willing to give up the finan-
cial aid allocated by the Marshall Plan, that was believed to be too
slow to relieve the country from unemployment14.
Italy eventually received, within ERP, a contribution of US $ 1.3
million for technical assistance in migration matters in 1949 (see the
section on rural colonization in Chapter IV) and in 1950 a contribu-
tion of US$ 10 million for rural emigration schemes15.
In the modernization model to be pursued by Italy, emigration was
a means to balance off the population surplus, that was considered to
be a structural cause for unemployment and low per capita income.
This would ensure foreign remittances, a traditional mechanism to
offset the Italian balance of payments. Italian firms would also be re-
lieved from emigration, since they could invest in industrial technol-
ogy and in the mechanization of agriculture, rather than bearing the
high cost of maintaining labor surplus as resulting from the strict labor
legislation that prohibited firings. Another positive effect for Italian
firms would be to become more competitive in international markets
with benefits for the entire economy.
Beyond a general concern for unemployment, emigration was con-
sidered by the Christian Democrats “as an essential element of eco-
nomic, social and political balance”. Indeed, emigration policy was to
play a central role among the measures adopted. Unquestionably, there
was an economic dimension behind the official concern with post-war
emigration; however, there is strong evidence that the new govern-
mental attitude came as a response to the political challenge posed to
the Christian Democratic Party by growing popular unrest. In the April
18, 1948 elections, the Party had conquered 48.5 percent of the
votes to the detriment of the Socialist and Communist parties, which
until then had experienced a constant popular growth following their
commitment in the struggle against Fascism. In the South, however, where
unemployment was higher, the situation appeared different, with the Left
gaining increasing strength. Between 1946 and 1948, unemploy-

ment went as high as 50 percent among the peasantry of Puglie and
reached 33 to 37 percent in Calabria and Lucania. On the whole ap-
proximately 50 percent of the Southern rural population was esti-
mated to be below the poverty line compared with 6 percent in the
North. These circumstances brought to a new peak agrarian upris-
ings, with Puglie in an outstanding position thanks also to the local
mobilization led by a major Communist trade union leader: Di Vittorio.
Between 1948 and 1950, strikes and social protests resumed in
Italy with unprecedented strength, particularly in the Mezzogiorno
with take-overs of uncultivated latifundia and the agricultural work-
ers’ strike to gain collective contracts. The areas mostly affected were
Catanzaro, Foggia (Puglie), Abruzzo and Basilicata, in addition to Val
Padana (Veneto). At the same time, the strategy of the labor union
movement, led by the Socialist and Communist Parties, was to link
employed to unemployed workers so that the latter would not be played
against the former. Social conflicts could not be solved by mere re-
pression, given the legitimacy that the Left had gained in Italian soci-
ety in the struggle against Fascism.
The agrarian reform carried out in Southern Italy since mid-1948
failed to reach all landless peasants, although it helped to contain
social unrest. The reform pursued a short term objective (reduction of
rural unemployment), rather than a long term policy aimed at the
comprehensive development of the peasant sector. It involved the ex-
propriation and redistribution of 760,000 hectares, (60 percent of
which located in the South), among 113,000 peasant household heads,
with an average of 6 to 8 hectare per holding. Through statements
made by Brazilian immigration officials, it is possible to assume that
the removal of unemployed workers, mainly unskilled, and landless
peasants from “heated” areas, particularly to Latin America in the
early 1950s, became the other side of the strategy to contain social unrest.16
Interestingly enough, trade unions also supported emigration. For
example the Italian General Labor Confederation, CIGL, argued that
planned emigration was allowing the government to prevent various
categories of skilled workers, necessary for industrial reconstruction,
from leaving the country. Latin American countries were objectively
offering, according to CIGL, the best opportunities, at least in the
large urban centers, although some criticisms were expressed as to
the conditions provided to Italian immigrants in the rural plantations. 17
The key elements of the official emigration philosophy emerged
clearly in the first National Emigration Congress, held in Bologna in

March 1949. The Government spokesman Amintore Fanfani stressed
on that occasion the importance of emigration as a “means to reduce
the plague of unemployment and thereby to contribute to the re-es-
tablishment of some basic conditions in the Old Continent, without
which the European Union or even the world peace would be unthink-
able”.18 This view was reinforced by the third National Congress of
the Christian Democratic Party in June 1949, when politicians like
Mariano Rumor portrayed the immigration problem like a mechanism
to reduce the unemployment pressure and to balance the internal po-
litical forces. In the closing statement De Gasperi commented:
We need that expansion . . . we need to make an effort to make people

study foreign languages . . . to introduce the emigration issue in our schools
and training courses.19
This policy of “expulsion’ faced the criticism by leftist parties which

argued that unemployment could not be solved through the dominant
economic model, but they did not seem to have offered concrete po-
litical challenges or alternatives. Some years later a perceptive ob-
server recalled that:
the early indifference was gradually substituted by political denunciations of

the causes and effects of the departure of thousands of Italian workers from
the South, Veneto and other Italian regions. But, for example, still in the
electoral campaign of 1953, the criticisms addressed to the governmental
migration policy were quite weak in the propaganda of the Socialist and
Communist parties, in spite of the fact that, between 1946 and 1953 more
than 1.3 million citizens had left the country.20
Initially, the commitment to domestic political struggles led leftist

parties to look down at workers who emigrated, thus abandoning the
class struggle. Only after the second half of the 1950s, political and
welfare ties were created with migrant workers in Northern Europe.
On the other hand, the Italian overseas emigration to Latin America,
Canada and Australia would be excluded from any sort of welfare
assistance for a long time.
Table 4 and 5 allow for some useful comparisons on the internal
composition of Italian immigration to Latin America in the beginning
and in the end of the 1950s. In the case of Brazil and Chile, peasant
families were predominant during the first year of ICEM activities,
while in Venezuela immigrants were mostly members of Italians who
had already migrated (family reunion schemes). On the other hand,

40
Table 4 Internal Composition of imigrants subsidized by ICEM to Latin America in the first year of activities, 1952

Total
Immigration country immigration Germany Austria Greece Holland Italy %


Brazil 10,269 627 146 288 98 8420 82
Refugees selected by the Brazilian Government 486 104 — — — 185
Selection programs of the Brazilian Government
– Agricultural families 5,885 — — — 73 5,811
– Family dependents reunion scheme 1,853 — — 62 — 1,791
– Urban and industrial workers 236 — — 167 — 69
Agricultural families of ICLE immigration plan 503 — — — — 503
North American Refugee Program 78 21 45 — — 7
Individuals 885 338 44 50 18 25
Individuals sent by non-governmental organizations 344 164 57 9 7 29
Chile 1,472 317 17 — — 1,086 74

Agricultural families 1,351 266 — — — 1,086
North American Refugee Program 10 — 4 — — —
Individuals 4 — 1 — — —
Individuals sent by non-governmental organizations 107 51 12 — — 1
Venezuela 1,647 306 34 2 — 1,289 78

Agricultural families 240 240 — — — —
Family reunion scheme 1,344 49 23 — — 1,272
Urban workers 9 3 — — — 6
North American Refugee Program 4 — — — — 3
Individuals sent by non-governmental organizations 47 14 11 2 — 8

Source: ICEM, “Migrants transported by the ICEM 2/1/1952-1/31/1953”, mig/11/A/53, p. 1 e 2, proc 9987, São Paulo, Arqaivio Historico de Imigrante.

Table 5 Internal Composition of Italian Emigration, 1958–1960

Countries of Total ICEM ICEM % Family Industrial Rural
destination Expatriations Emigration over total Reunion % Workers % Workers %

Argentina 36,405 29,466 81 27,903 95 980 0.3 317 0.1
Brazil 17,535 14,272 81 11,177 78 2,761 19.3 205 0.1
Venezuela 56,712 15,189 27 15,129 79.6 9 0.05 0 —
Uruguay 2,334 1,894 81 1,891 99.8 0 — 0 —
Canada 95,783 1,776 2 0 — 874 49.2 899 50.6
USA 68,121 104 0.1 0 — 0 — 0 —
Australia 63,113 15,405 24 3,734 24.2 10,180 66 1,298 8.4
Total 340,003 78,106 23 59,834 14,804 2,719

Source: ICEM, Rimpatri Italiani dai paesi di oltremare, 1962, tables 1 and 2.
41

family reunions became predominant also in Argentina and Brazil in
1958–60, as compared with rural and industrial workers. The latter
group was more consistent in Brazil (19.3 percent of industrial work-
ers) than in Argentina (0.3 percent).
In Brazil Italian-subsidized immigration followed the political
economy orientations. Therefore, if in the first half of the 1950s im-
migrants were yet directed to the coffee plantations, in the second
half, at a time of rapid industrialization, rural immigrants practically
disappeared while the industrial immigrant workers increased.
Like most European governments, Italy did not encourage the emi-
gration of skilled workers and technicians, who were in high demand
in national industries. This attitude was predominant in spite of the
fact that the demand for such workers in Brazil was very high. For
example, such hypothesis finds corroboration in Brazilian statistical
sources. Immigrants who entered that country in 1955 had the fol-
lowing occupational backgrounds: 27,665 persons (50.16% of the
total) came from domestic activities and therefore included a large
number of women; 9,585 (17.37%) were skilled workers; 396 (0.72%)
were technicians. The insignificant percentage of the last category
was attributed to the fact that “in general technicians have good labor
opportunities in their original countries and therefore do not have
either need or interest to emigrate. When they do so, they enter the
country on a temporary basis and already with a good contract”.21
A similar view emerged from the letters exchanged between two
immigration officials from Sao Paulo in 1952. “In Rome I was in-
formed by the Immigration Attaché, Consul Jacintho de Barros, about
the selection of 5,000 skilled workers . . . I still have the impression
that they are not the human material that interests us both qualita-
tively and politically”.22
In spite of the large demand, especially in the State of Sao Paulo,
for some skilled professions (mechanics, construction workers, elec-
tricians, tailors, etc.), Italian officials tended to recognize that “those
who emigrate . . . are usually unemployed workers who expect to
improve their standard of living”.23
A comprehensive profile of unemployed workers in Italy emerges
from a survey on unemployment and underemployment ordered by
the National Parliament in December 1952. On the basis of data pro-
vided by placement bureaus all over the country, it was estimated that
1.7 million people were enrolled in such bureaus, two thirds of whom
had already had working experience and one third were in search of

their first job. In addition these showed that the number of skilled
workers among them was very limited; also their general educational
and training level appeared extremely low, with only 6 percent
(103,300 persons) out of the total having a degree higher than pri-
mary school and 8 percent (134,000) illiterate persons. Other parts
of the survey carried out on a sample of unemployed workers showed
that a high percentage of them suffered from illness related to lungs or
blood pressure (45.7 percent) while 40.7 percent could not carry out
certain jobs. Doctors estimated that at least in 13 percent of cases
illness was the main cause of their unemployment.24
It can be assumed that many candidates for subsidized emigration
from the early 1950s on came precisely from these groups of unem-
ployed persons. Interesting evidence of this can be drawn from a
public call for applicants for an immigrants’ training course to take
place in Messina in 1961. The call was directed specifically to “all
unemployed male workers, unmarried, between 21 and 28 years old,
residing in Veneto, Emilia, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzi,
Campania, Puglie, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia” who wished
to emigrate to Brazil or Argentina. The minimum educational require-
ment was primary school. The trainees would receive free room, board,
training as fitters, milling-machine operators and turners and a daily
salary of 300 lire.25
A strong official encouragement was needed to convince people to
leave for in spite of the high unemployment and post-war difficulties,
the Italian population as a whole did no longer feel so compelled to
leave the country as in the turn of the century, when it was estimated
that 90 persons out of 100 were ready to emigrate. In 1953 a special-
ized institution conducted a survey, commissioned by the Italian For-
eign Ministry, which showed that only 28 percent of the interviewees
were prone to migrate. As to the motivations to depart, the survey
noted that:
One no longer emigrates to flee from hunger (even hunger in Italy now is
more bearable), but to feel and live better . . . those who want to emigrate
today no longer search for a mere salary, or a piece of bread, but for a more
stable guarantee of social well-being.26
Finally, it was pointed out that the desire to emigrate appeared stron-
ger among the younger population, decreasing gradually with age. In
this sense it met the entrepreneurs’ wish in immigrant countries to
hire precisely young men.


In spite of the war, the social and economic standards, including
educational levels, of the new Italian immigrant strata were on the
whole considerably higher than those at the turn of the century. The
new migrants departing for the Americas were not only expecting to
find “better living conditions, but also greater possibilities of rapid
upward mobility”. On the other hand, their aspirations were mea-
sured with those of a relatively developed society, with increasing
salaries and more adequate levels of consumption and social legisla-
tion than Latin America’s.27
In conclusion, the Italian emigration policy to Latin America in the
post-war decade resulted from a clear plan to meet what was consid-
ered an emergency situation, characterized by very high domestic un-
employment. This plan attempted to provide a quick outlet to a prob-
lem that was politically destabilizing for the Italian Christian Democratic
government. But it would neither meet the immigrants’ general ex-
pectations, nor it would guarantee their overall well-being and eco-
nomic adjustment in the receiving countries.
Italian Emigration within the International

Setting of Post Wold War II
This section reviews Italian emigration within the larger international

migration scene which led to the creation of the Intergovernmental
Committee for European Migrations, ICEM. It tries to evaluate the
effectiveness of subsidized emigration and to explain the main diffi-
culties throughout the 1950s and 1960s in achieving its main objec-
tives. It finally compares ways in which Italian planned migration to
Europe and Latin America was handled and analyzes the trends in the
Italian outflow to Latin America. Ultimately, the downward trend of
Italian emigration to Latin America is interpreted as workers’ resis-
tance to leaving for unattractive destinations, in spite of the official
facilities to migrate.
In 1954 the International Labor Review classified European coun-
tries of overseas emigration into four main groups: (a) the United King-
dom, Spain and Portugal as countries without great difficulties since
their citizens would find a ready welcome, respectively, in the Com-
monwealth and in Latin American countries; (b) Italy, the Netherlands
and, to some extent, Greece and Malta as countries with greater ob-
stacles to overcome as they needed to look for new immigration open-
ings, their immigrants would often not know the language of the re-
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
ceiving country and would have to adapt to its occupational require-
ments; (c) the Eastern European countries experiencing an outflow of
refugees and (d) the other European countries. 28
By 1947 Italy and Greece had also become the two countries in
Europe with the largest labor surplus, so that they were considered
the two countries in greater need of governmental assistance on emi-
gration matters. In Italy, for example, mass unemployment affected
an estimated 2 million people with the following sectorial distribution:
industry, 55.2 percent; agriculture, 22 percent; trade, 7.3 percent,
other sectors, 15.5 percent.
For this reason, trade Unions all over Europe were not opposed to
planned emigration. In 1953 the International Confederation of Trade
Unions meeting in Stockholm issued a resolution on international mi-
gration recognizing the “desirability of emigration from those coun-
tries where inadequate employment opportunities affect adversely the
standard of living of a large proportion of the population”. It demanded,
however, that “through agreements between governments and ulti-
mately within the framework of an international labor convention, the
social security rights of workers migrating from one country to an-
other be preserved.”29
Indeed most emigration treaties signed between Italy and other
European countries did provide for some sort of immigrants’ social
protection. Belgium, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia mines and
railways received several thousand Italian workers in the second half
of the 1940s. As the International Labor Review points out, “in the
matter of living and working conditions, the Belgian, Czechoslova-
kian, French and United Kingdom Governments have undertaken to
provide immigrants with housing and to guarantee them, as far as
food supplies, insurance, social security and wages are concerned,
treatment not less favorable than that given to their own citizens.”30 In
addition, immigrants were able to sign their labor contracts in ad-
vance with all the necessary information so that they were guaran-
teed a job suited to their skills. The agreement with Belgium even
provided for the appointment in each of the five Belgian coalfields of
a trade union member to represent the interests of his fellow citizens.
On the other hand, these agreements ensured receiving countries
that they would host precisely the categories of workers they required,
who would not compete with local manpower. The careful technical
and physical selection of immigrants was therefore deemed of the ut-
most importance. Criticisms were raised by Italian Leftist Congress-


men suggesting that immigrants in France and Belgium were not
granted family checks or in the latter country, insurance for mining
diseases.31 It was also denounced that most immigrants in Europe did
not benefit from old age pensions. With time, the immigrants’ welfare
in Europe improved substantially, due to the strong lobbying of Italian
labor unions on these issues as well as the equality of treatment be-
tween national and foreign workers granted within the European Com-
munity countries on matters of employment, social security and wages.
The experience with planned migration agreements signed with
Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, proved to be far less
successful in guaranteeing adequate protection and social security to
Italian immigrants. The agreement with Brazil, ratified in Rio de Janeiro
on July 5, 1950, was considered “the worst stipulated in the last fifty
years”.32 As members of the opposition parties pointed out during
debates in the Italian Congress, the agreement was oriented towards
rural emigration at a time when the Brazilian agricultural sector was
experiencing strong competition from African and Asiatic producers
and crop prices as well as rural wages tended to drop.33 In addition it
remained quite vague as to the protection of immigrants and lacked
any social security guarantee for them.
The agreement was nevertheless supported by the Italian Govern-
ment as part of a larger diplomatic effort to reestablish relations be-
tween the two countries and put an end to war hostilities. Accord-
ingly, Brazil would return to Italy all properties confiscated during the
war, while Italy would employ all funds previously confiscated as start-
ing capital for the set up of the Companhia Brasileira de Imigracao
e Colonizacao for rural colonization purposes. The immigration agree-
ment envisaged that the receiving country would anticipate all travel
expenses for Italian immigrants who would reimburse them two years
after their arrival. In addition, immigrants directed to the rural colo-
nies would be provided with long term credit to purchase small land
plots. Had it not been for the lack of financial resources on the part of
Brazil, the rapid failure of the first cooperatives which settled in Brazil
(see the next section) and, therefore, the limited number of immi-
grants transported, the experience could have led to a much greater
ended disaster.
As far as the agreement with Argentina was concerned, a Socialist
Congressman denounced in 1954 that this country no longer paid the
old age pensions and insurances for labor accidents to repatriated
Italian immigrants (as it had been agreed upon), while the project of as-
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
similating the Italian and Argentinean social legislations had been
abandoned.
By 1949 the phase of intensive Italian emigration, peaking in 1947
and 1948, was over. For example, Belgium which had absorbed more
than 60,000 Italians in coal mining between 1945 and 1948, had
accomplished its reconstruction and no longer needed foreign labor-
ers. The same was also true for other European countries as well as
Argentina, which entered a recession phase following the introduc-
tion of the Marshall Plan in Europe. In Argentina, which had received
mainly Italian immigrants, the downward trend began in 1951. In
Brazil the peak year of immigration was 1951, but a substantial drop
occurred since 1952. Most Latin American economies were also by
then at a critical stage.
In 1949, U.S. President Harry Truman pointed out what he re-
garded as essential needs for the world’s progress: the rational distri-
bution and use of surplus labor and the development of backward
areas.34 Since then, the United States gave increasing attention to
emigration as an international political problem. The American plan
for a large reconstruction program for Western Europe, its participa-
tion in the War of Korea since 1950 and the strengthening of anti-
Communist feelings were some key international elements which
brought to the financing of European, and especially Italian emigration.
The United States was inaugurating Cold War policies, which viewed
social unrest, particularly in Southern Europe, as a destabilizing fac-
tor for the East-West balance of power. In October 1951, the Interna-
tional Labor Office convened an emigration conference in Naples in
which 27 countries participated. No final resolution was taken be-
cause the United States established the condition that only non-Com-
munist countries would be allowed to participate in an international
organization that would be funded to a large extent with American
money (about 40 percent of the total budget). Finally, a month later,
the Provisional Inter-governmental Committee for Migratory Move-
ments in Europe was created with the membership desired by the U.S.35
The Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the movements
of Migrants from Europe, PICMME, was founded by the Migration
Conference held in Brussels from November 19 to December 5, 1951.
The Conference was convened by the Belgian Government at the sug-
gestion of the U.S. to contribute to the solution of European popula-
tion and refugee problems by means of an internationally coordinated
effort. Member countries were initially 14, including most Western

European countries; five American countries: Brazil, a most active
supporter of international cooperation, Chile, Uruguay, the U.S.,
Canada and Australia. Argentina was initially opposed to any interna-
tional interference on migration matters, but entered afterwards.
The idea behind PICMME was that the volume of migration was
insufficient to meet the demands of emigration countries, and to take
full advantage of the opportunities offered by immigration countries.
The US proposed a plan for the emigration of 115,000 Europeans (of
which 35,000 Italians) to be carried out in one year, which was ap-
proved by the majority of the 14 participant countries, although some
Italian observers considered it too limited in relation to the challenge
of mass unemployment.36
PICMME’s general objective was to arrange the movement of mi-
grants for whom existing facilities were inadequate and who could not
otherwise be moved. It should be stressed again that the problem of
overpopulation was considered politically dangerous in Europe. As
stated by the Delegate of Italy to PICMME’s Twenty Fifth meeting in
Washington, “there were humanitarian, social and economic aspects
to the problem, but there was always a political interest in draining off
the surplus population of Europe. Europe must be freed from this
problem. History proved that if a crisis existed in Europe, a crisis
existed in the whole world”. 37
Therefore the Committee mission should be considered above all
political. As a contemporary observer pointed out:
The most important aspect of (its) activities is political as it is the first real
acknowledgement of the fact that the Italian excess population is not just a
national issue but concerns the entire Western world. This is why not only the
Italian government, but the entire free world, should find a solution for it.38
As far as its activities were concerned, PICMME was expected: (a)

to supply various services related to emigration and transport refu-
gees and national migrants to countries offering final resettlement, (b)
to help meet the specific needs of receiving countries by selecting
European migrants and refugees for emigration and, upon request
from member governments, by providing such services as medical
examination, vocational and language training, organization of adap-
tation courses, transportation and reception in the host country. The
Committee would provide, when requested, technical assistance both
to emigration and immigration countries in the recruitment, pre-selec-
tion, selection, embarkment, training and final placement of immi-
grants as well as sectorial evaluations of manpower demand and supply.

PICMME was transformed into the Intergovernmental Committee
for European Migrations, ICEM, on November 15, 1952 which some-
time later became a more permanent organization. In the following
years five other Latin American countries (Argentina, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Paraguay and Venezuela) joined ICEM.39 Now, the international
funding available through ICEM membership would enable these coun-
tries to resume European immigration. Italian emigration to Latin
America, as previously recalled, had experienced indeed a constant
drop between 1949 and 1951.
By early 1958, 27 governments had become ICEM members. Its
personnel was composed of 138 international officers and 769 local
employees from 26 different nationalities, of which 210 were set in
Geneva and 697 in various international missions.40
The Committee finances were organized as follows: an administra-
tive budget was made up by the contributions of member countries,
expressed in percentages which were agreed upon while an opera-
tional budget was covered by voluntary contributions by member Gov-
ernments, immigrants’ payments, the US Escapee Program, several
non-governmental organizations and so on. Table 6 shows that ICEM’s
administrative budgets for the years 1952 and 1957 remained quite
constant (US $ 2.2-2.6 million), in spite of the fact that member gov-
ernments increased from 21 to 27. The United States made the larg-
est contribution (35.6 percent in 1952, 30 percent in 1957), while
Italy, Germany, Canada and France made contributions of approxi-
mately 8 percent each.
According to 1957 data, the operational budget appeared ten times
larger than the administrative one, (US $ 27.2 million versus US $
2.6 million). In addition, unlike the administrative budget which re-
mained essentially constant, it grew from US $ 22.8 million in 1954
to US $ 27.2 million in 1957. In those years, the percentage distribu-
tion of the contributions to the operational budget by major member
countries followed consistently the variations in the migration flows,
with an ever increasing role of Canada and Australia, and a declining
Italian share. In 1957 the US had the lion share: 42 percent (US $
11.4 million) compared with 29 percent in 1954; Canada: 15.5 per-
cent (US $ 4.2 million) compared with 4.4 percent in 1954; Austra-
lia: 11.4 percent (US $ 3.1 million) compared with 4 percent in 1954;
while Italy: 9.3 percent (US $ 2.5 million) compared with 12 percent
in 1954.41 ICEM’s approved administrative budget in 1958 accounted
for US $ 3.2 million and its operational budget jumped to US $ 40.6
million.

Table 6 ICEM Administrative budgets, 1952 and 1957 (in US$)—Member
Government Contributions

1952 1957
Member  
Government Contributions Percentage Contributions Percentage

United States 785,567 35.6 775,807 29.6
Austria 33,027 1.5 35,173 1.3
Germany 132,161 6 210,796 8.1
Greece 33,027 1.5 35,173 1.3
Italy 198,161 9 210,796 8.1
Netherland 61,336 2.8 65,146 2.5
Australia 146,262 6.6 155,805 5.9
Bolivia 18,872 0.9 — 0
Brazil 103,798 4.7 110,476 4.2
Canada 198,161 9 210,796 8.1
Chile 23,590 1 25,266 1
Israel 7,000 0.3 12,633 0.5
Paraguay 10,000 0.4 10,430 0.4
Venezuala 23,590 1 25,266 1
Belgium 61,336 2.8 65,146 2.5
Denmark 27,000 1.2 28,734 1.1
France 198,161 9 210,796 8.1
Luxemburg 2,359 0.1 3,219 0.1
Norway 17,000 0.7 17,814 0.7
Sweden 61,336 2.8 65,146 2.5
Switzerland 61,336 2.8 49,046 1.8
Argentina — — 110,476 4.2
Colombia — — 25,266 1
Costa Rica — — 3,219 0.1
Indonesia — — 12,633 0.5
New Zealand — — 25,266 1
Spain — — 65,146 2.5
South Africa — — 49,046 1.8
Total 2,203,080 100 2,614,516 100

Source: ICEM Fifty Session “Status report on the budget plan for expenditure for 1952,”
Geneva, April 15, 1953, ICEM, II Comitaro Letorgovernativo per le Migrazioni Europee, La
sua struitura e le sue Attività, n.d., Anex 1.
Between 1952 and 1957, ICEM also contributed US $ 7,9 million

to various voluntary agencies such as the International Catholic Mi-
gration Commission, the International Rescue Committee, the Inter-
national Social Service, the Catholic Relief Services, the National

Catholic Welfare Conference and the World Council of Churches. Ap-
proximately 90,000 persons lacking the means or the ability to qualify
for mass migration were transported by voluntary agencies in those
years. 42
The most substantial agreement for European migration to Latin
America was signed between the Italian Government and ICEM in
April 1952, subsequently ratified by the National Parliament by Law
n. 244 of March 25th 1953. Through such agreement ICEM would
implement specific schemes of emigration for Italian citizens and refu-
gees, while the Government of Italy would pay a contribution of US $
198,161 for the financial year 1952 and US $ 60 to the operational
budget for each person transported. Italy was also to be responsible
for all costs prior to the embarkation of migrants. A Joint Working
Group would be established with Italian officials, the chief of the local
ICEM Liaison Mission and other persons he might designate in order
to ensure the coordination of all activities implemented. 43
In 1952 Brazil was the major receiving country of ICEM-transported
immigrants (Table 4). Italians accounted for 82 percent of the total
European ICEM migration. Most of them (69 percent) travelled as
rural families and to a minor extent in family reunion schemes (21
percent). The agricultural family scheme failed due to the unsuitability
of some of the migrants, lack of correct information obtained in Italy
concerning labor contracts and unsatisfactory placement. In the fol-
lowing years, the ambitious Italian migration targets were never met
by ICEM, while the Italian immigrants’ difficulties to integrate became
increasingly evident.
Argentina, which joined ICEM at the end of 1952, drew up a plan
for the transportation of up to 50,000 immigrants during 1953-54,
consisting of relatives of Italian emigrants who had previously settled
in the country (family reunion scheme). Unlike Brazil, the Argentinean
Government made a substantial financial contribution to the program,
which was placed under the supervision of the Delegaciòn Argentina
de Inmigraciòn en Europa, DIEA. .
Finally, Venezuela received in the period 1952-57 24,483 Italian
immigrants as part of a family reunion scheme which followed the
large spontaneous migration flow that had taken place until 1952.
PICMME’s problems emerged from its early inception as the num-
ber of people moved, particularly from Italy and Greece, had been far
less than anticipated. In most Latin American countries it became
clear that their further intake of large numbers of immigrants would

only occur if investment capital became more available. As pointed
out by the Delegate of Brazil to PICMME Twenty Seventh Meeting,
“in the creation of the Committee too much stress had been laid on
the mechanical means of transportation, without sufficient attention
being paid to the economic and social problems which would arise in
immigration countries . . . and that a transfer of surplus population
from one place to another was no solution unless they could be as-
similated into their reception countries”.44
Venezuela had a similar position to that of Brazil. Venezuela’s Del-
egate showed no surprise at the failure to reach the objectives set for
the first year. “The Committee’s activities, to be useful, would have to
be extended . . . linking migration problems with existing plans for
economic development, thus creating possibilities for the absorption
of substantial numbers of immigrants”.45 In addition, Latin American
member countries urged PICMME to improve its system of pre-selec-
tion, recruitment, selection, medical examination and placement which
was causing so many problems to them in handling inadequate labor.
From another perspective, the Delegate of Canada complained that
the figure of 14,000 migrants to be moved in 1952, as opposed to
the original 40,000, “did not do justice to the efforts of Canada in the
field of migration”, which in the first eight months of the year had
hosted 126,029 spontaneous migrants.46 Similarly, the Delegate of
Greece expressed its disappointment about the fact that the Commit-
tee had only moved 129 Greeks out of the 8,000 announced in the
1952 programme. Many prospective migrants had sold their land or
their tools in preparation for the journey and as a result a reduction of
Greece contribution to the administrative budget was being advocated
by several quarters.47
Finally, UNESCO officials lamented that contacts between PICMME
and their agency had been modest in the beginning since the Com-
mittee had not included questions of assimilation, in which UNESCO
was very involved, and hoped that a greater cooperation would take
place from then on.48
It would seem that a useful collaboration among the various inter-
national agencies concerned with emigration never occurred. The is-
sue of the provision of information to immigrants is a good case in
point. As an Italian observer pointed out, ICEM, UNESCO and the
International Labor Organization, ILO, were all contending with one
another for the primacy for the provision of this service to immigrants.49

When a collaboration did occur the apparent results seemed to be
quite poor. For example, the same Italian observer commented caus-
tically on the quality of the information provided by a guidebook en-
titled “Brazil: Information on living and labor conditions”, prepared
jointly by ICEM and ILO for Italian immigrants.
We read for example chapter 16 entitled: wages. No mention of wages is

provided . . . yet in the last paragraph one can read literally “monthly earn-
ings can be calculated approximately by multiplying the hour wage by 240.”
Since (the guidebook) does not say how much the hour wage is, we would
like to know how the immigrant can calculate it. “Overtime is usually paid
out by a 20 percent premium over the standard wage per hour.” But what is
the standard wage per hour? The editors, i. e. ICEM and ILO, do not tell us.
Chapter 10, entitled “labor tools”, reads: “it is recommended to all quali-
fied workers who own tools to take them to Brazil . . . owning tools facilitates
greatly the immigrant placement. “ The following chapter specifies better
what are the labor instruments which the immigrant should take with him:
“for example a used plow, if the immigrant can prove he can use it in the
fields”. We were used to the image of poor immigrants leaving with a back-
pack, but with a plow no. Either the ICEM and ILO experts wanted to make
a joke or they do not know what a plow is.50
By 1955, after massive repatriations of ICEM subsidized immigrants

and a strong popular movement against migration to Brazil, Italian
authorities prepared a declaration to be signed by all immigrants mov-
ing to that country. The immigrant would thereby become aware, be-
fore his departure, of low wage levels, of the impossibility of sending
remittances back home and of the great difficulties in adjusting to the
new environment. 51
With time, immigrants were provided with a set of services ranging
from assistance to departure to vocational training, although the num-
ber involved was always quite limited. Selection centers were estab-
lished, with the cooperation of the Italian Ministry of Labor, in various
Italian cities and immigrants were given free transportation from their
home town as well as free hospitality in immigrants’ hostels placed at
ports of embarkment.
Finally ICEM organized, in collaboration with the Italian Foreign
and Education Ministries two types of training courses for Italian im-
migrants: (a) preparatory training aimed at providing basic professional
background and (b) skilled training courses aimed at offering immi-
grants with a formal professional qualification.52 In 1957, 1,300 Ital-


ian laborers participated in 108 training courses concerning activities
requested by the immigration countries. In the years 1958–59, 2,020
laborers were reported by ICEM official sources to have passed the
two courses.
In early 1960 the International Training Center for Migrants in
Salerno was set up by ICEM and other labor organizations to provide
specific training for metalworking, electrical and electronic industries..
ICEM contribution to start the center amounted to US $ 298,000.
The objective was to train up to 1,000 laborers per year (2 courses of
500 each) who would be guaranteed placement either in Europe or
overseas. This center would serve as a pilot project for the set up of
about twenty others in Italy aimed at providing highly skilled immi-
grants in the most requested professions in foreign labor markets.53
ICEM also transported 360,000 refugees in the first six years of
activity: 95,000 Hungarians were moved after the October 1956 cri-
sis, 167,000 refugees from the United Nations High Refugees Com-
mittee and the remaining 98,000 were either Germans refugees from
East Germany and various other refugee ethnic groups.54
In spite of its numerous activities and the large resources employed,
ICEM’s emigration schemes raised many problems, particularly in re-
lation to the transference of Italian workers to Latin America. These
problems were clearly stated in a paper presented by ICEM in May
1959, entitled “Immigration and Economic Development in Latin
America” to the Eighth Session of the Economic Commission for Latin
America taking place in Panama. The paper stated that:
ICEM believes that in addition to technical assistance and the raising of the
educational and technical standards of the national labor forces, a contribu-
tion can be made to a solution of the productivity problem (in Latin Ameri-
can economic development) through planned migration which offers the coun-
tries of Latin America a reinforcement of workers who have acquired technical
skills and enterprise in the industrial milieu of Europe. Until such time as
Latin America can train the qualified workers it requires to make effective
progress with its development programs, qualified immigrant workers could
be invaluable. . . . For these immigration programmes to achieve their poten-
tial value, they must be planned in relation to the long-term manpower needs
of the developing economies.55
An ICEM report for 1961 emphasized three sets of problems that

prevented the revitalization of migration flows to Latin America which
had been steadily declining. First, unlike the booming European
economy, Latin American countries were suffering from diminishing
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
export earnings, insufficient capital formation, balance of payments
deficits and inflation. This resulted in unemployment of both national
and immigration workers, discouraging potential migrants from leav-
ing Europe. Second, recruitment problems were emphasized as “the
skilled and highly skilled workers, technicians and engineers which
Latin America needs are scarce throughout the world and competi-
tion for them is fierce even within national industries . . . workers
more readily available for emigration from Europe are semi-skilled or
unskilled and require training”. Third, institutional problems related
to the ineffectiveness of national services in terms of planning, re-
cruiting, reception and placement of immigrants. ICEM was not able
to guarantee immigrants sure labor contracts signed before departure.
In addition, no social security rights enjoyed by laborers in Europe
were granted to immigrants in Latin America, unlike those provided
for by migration agreements within Europe. 56 Finally, it was argued
that financial difficulties limited ICEM activities in services and tech-
nical assistance sectors, allowing for mere transportation activities.
Indeed ICEM primary task had been since the beginning that of
providing transportation to immigrants and refugees. Its policy had
been to promote sea transportation, favoring the mercantile fleets of
emigration countries, particularly the Italian one, as emphasized by a
contemporary observer.
Naturally, the benefits granted to the shipping companies cannot be con-

sidered a net benefit for the Italian economy, since one should subtract from
it both the sums disbursed by the Treasury for each immigrant or refugee
departed from Italy, accounting to US $ 60 per capita, and the extraordinary
contributions made by Italy to offset ICEM operational deficits.57
On December 9, 1960 Italy signed a new emigration agreement

with Brazil, in an attempt to increase the declining flow towards that
country. The new agreement contained substantial advantages for
immigrants in comparison to the one signed ten years before. As to
social security, the agreement ensured that immigrants would continue
to benefit from all rights enjoyed in the home country before depar-
ture, so that they could decide to return without being penalized. In
addition, the Brazilian government committed itself to currency ex-
change facilities for immigrants remittances, customs’ exemptions for
tools, and a greater assistance from arrival to final placement. ICEM
was specifically mentioned in the agreement for the provision of free
transportation for planned immigration, including some new catego-

ries such as industrial or technical enterprises or relatives accompany-
ing subsidized laborers. Unlike previous agreements, the laborers’ fami-
lies would no longer be separated from the household head, therefore
allowing a less traumatic adjustment process for the immigrant58. ICEM
also funded the Program for Individually Funded Emigration), provid-
ing reimbursable passages to spontaneous immigrants who could not
afford to pay for their trip.
Was it possible that this agreement would allow for a new upsurge
of Italian emigration to Brazil? A quite skeptical answer was provided
by the pseudo-official publication of the Italian DGE, named Italiani
nel Mondo.
The reduction of the European migration flow—Italian in particular—towards
Latin America has been determined by two factors: economic depression
and a greater labor demand by European countries. These causes will en-
dure until Latin American countries will be able to offer the same salaries
provided by European countries. . . . There are quite many European labor-
ers who, having arrived to serve as employers in a given firm, after some
years . . . started their own business. . . . we would say that if a turner
emigrates to a European country, in most cases he is likely to remain a
turner; if instead he emigrates to a Latin American country, given the differ-
ent circumstances, he can improve considerably his position in the firm where
he is employed or . . . start his own business. Can these potential opportu-
nities offered by Latin American countries compete with the actual opportu-
nities offered by European countries? We believe that at present European
countries have a vantage position in relation to the Latin American ones.59
In 1963 Italy even decided to stop the emigration of the so called

Italian “skilled” laborers to Brazil, due to the excessive repatriations
which were occurring allegedly for lack of adequate labor opportuni-
ties and salaries.60 As pointed out by a Brazilian immigration analyst,
immigration to Latin America was no longer a function of business
cycles, as it used to be until World War I. Indeed Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal, Holland, Germany and Japan were all reported to have equal if
not higher per capita incomes than most Latin American countries.
In addition the latter countries had much higher rates of inflation caus-
ing salaries’ real value to shrink, weaker currencies than emigration
countries’ as well as frequent devaluations compelling immigrants to
allocate more and more money to continue sending the same amount
to his dependants back home.61
Nevertheless, urged by Latin American member governments, ICEM
started in 1964 the “Selective Migration Program for Latin America”


which aimed again at bringing “human capital in the form of already
trained and skilled immigrants”.62 This was designed to help these
countries meet their domestic labor needs since national training pro-
grams were still insufficient. Two different placement schemes were
therefore started: (a) the MOPC or Pre-Placement, based on specific
offers of employment put forward by industrial employers and (b) the
MOP or Open Placement, based on a list of professions for which
there was a permanent demand in the receiving countries.63 The num-
ber of immigrants transported was again rather limited: 6,384 per-
sons between 1964 and 1970, mostly directed to Brazil. ICEM policy
was to follow these individuals only until they were placed, but in fact
it was not known whether they stayed in the country or went back.
In the 1970s and 1980s similar programs for highly skilled labor,
such as the “Integrated Experts” and the “Return of Talent” programs,
were implemented by ICEM involving only a few hundred people.
Beyond technical and economic explanations, ultimately it seems
that the failure of ICEM ambitious programs, concerning in particular
Italian emigration in the 1950s, stemmed in its driving philosophy
that considered immigrants as disposable commodities, placing the
human factor in a lower scale of priorities. A trading notion emerged
throughout all immigration official discourses and activities: Europe
would be relieved by an excess load of unemployed people while pro-
viding Latin America with more qualified and culturally superior indi-
viduals than the native population, who would bring the genes of de-
velopment and progress with them. Very often who these immigrants
were and what they could actually do in the host countries was not
taken into account. Another major problem was the Eurocentric and
top-down approach pursued in planning migration, whereby the needs
of the US and European governments, came before those of immi-
grants, of Latin American national governments and marketplaces.
Hence the primary emphasis on transportation rather than on the
overall adjustment of immigrants. This eventually backfired as many
immigrants repatriated.
The inadequacy of this approach led both ICEM and Italy to at-
tempt to improve emigration services, providing increasingly more
training and social security rights to immigrants. This response came
however too late, when the downward trend had become irreversible
and ultimately could not compensate for the limited attraction offered
by Latin American labor markets.
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
A precise calculation of the entire cost of Italian subsidized emigra-
tion to Latin America is still difficult to assess from available sources.
Yet it seems that this policy drew a substantial amount of public re-
sources without either achieving its underlying objective of reducing
unemployment in Italy, or providing the upward mobility opportuni-
ties desired by Italian citizens. On the other hand, it made the emigra-
tion experience most traumatic for a new generation of Italian immi-
grants whose values, differed considerably from those of old time
immigrants. This experience, as we will see, particularly affected ru-
ral and urban laborers, less so members of family reunion schemes,
whose adjustment was clearly facilitated by relatives who had migrated
at a previous time.
Beyond traditional variables in Italian migration history such as
family networks, township or occupational structure, the post-World
War II official policy—which brought to the creation of ICEM—turned
the relation between the immigrant and the official national or inter-
national institutions central. The new circumstances and means by
which Italians emigrated inevitably affected their behavior in the re-
ceiving country, causing great difficulties to their cultural adjustment.
Trends in the Italian outflow to Latin America
There is not yet a comprehensive study analyzing qualitatively the

Italian post-World War II Italian emigration to Latin America. The
statistical study by Lucrezio and Favero based on the official data of
the Central Statistical Institute of Italy shows the general trend, point-
ing to an interesting correlation between economic development phases
and emigration. The study does not define the percentages and desti-
nations of ICEM-subsidized Italian migrants, nor the regional and so-
cial origins of migrants.
In another study Favero analyzes the regional and professional ori-
gins of Italians migrating to Brazil on the basis of official data avail-
able after 1958. Therefore these data do not allow for an analysis of
the largest proportion of immigrants who departed precisely before
that date. The present study thus attempts to provide some of the missing
elements through various international primary and secondary sources.
As pointed out earlier, Latin America was the most important non-
European destination for Italian immigrants after World War II (see
Table 3). Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil received 93.6 percent of all
Italian immigrants directed to that hemisphere between 1946 and 1970,

i.e. 884,391 out of a total of 944,518 persons. 64 This migration was
in turn the largest (35 percent) in relation to other European groups
departing in the 1950-57 period, when the highest number of post-
war entries occurred (Table 7). Italians, Spanish and Portuguese ac-
counted for 80 percent of the total number of immigrants entering
Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil in the same years.
A downward trend for expatriations to that area paradoxically ap-
peared after 1952, when international funding became available. Table
3 also shows an increasing proportion of repatriations from Latin
America, which as a whole accounted for the largest percentage of
repatriations from non-European destinations. How to explain such
trend?
An analysis of the geographical composition of immigrants trans-
ported by ICEM between 1952 and 1969 presented in Table 8 sug-
gests that more than two thirds, i.e. 204,827 out of the total 305,345
European immigrants who arrived in Latin America, were Italian.65
Italy was the European country with the largest quota of immigrants
transported by ICEM (67 percent), followed by Spain (28 percent),
Greece (3 percent), Netherlands and Germany (one percent each).
Tables 9 and 10 show the major destinations of ICEM-subsidized
Italian immigrants. Official migration was greater to those destina-
tions that the immigrant would not choose spontaneously, either be-
cause he could not afford to pay for his passage or because they were
not attractive enough. Thus ICEM action can be seen as inversely
proportional to the appeal of labor markets. While Italian immigrants
directed to Brazil and Argentina were most often subsidized (69 and
Table 7 Major migration flows to Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, 1950–1957


Percentage
Immigration Total of
countries Italian Spanish Portuguese Japanese immigration Italians

Argentina 220,800 129,700 15,029 a) 439,800 50.2
Venezuela 188,400 175,100 40,800 a) 487,800 41.1
Brazil 74,600 75,800 192,900 19,884 456,800 16.3
Total 482,600 380,600 248,729 a) 1,384,400 34.8

Source: Lattes, Alfredo, Migraciones hacia Amèrica Latina y el Caribe desde Principios del
Siglo XIX, Buenos Aires, CENEP, n 35, 1985; Anuàrío Estatistjco do Brazil (Rio de Janeiro:
IBGE, 1951–1958
a) No data are available.

Table 8 Italian ICEM—Subsidized Emigration to Latin America as compared
with that of other European Counties, February 1, 1952 to December 31, 1969

Country of
origin Total % Argentina Brazil Uruguay Venezuela

Italy 204,827 67 95,077 55,822 7,016 41,740
Spain 83,827 28 18,214 24,286 6,328 26,578
Greece 8,130 3 818 6,995 62 161
Netherland 2,896 1 103 2,640 9 11
Germany 2,841 1 109 1,501 48 282
Total 305,345 100 114,612 93,332 13,479 68,900


Source: ICEM, Selective Migration Programs for Latin America, Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representa-
tives, Washington D. C., July 7, 1970, (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office,
1970).
56 percent, respectively), those who went to Venezuela and Australia,

were less often so (18 and 25 percent, respectively). The reason was
that these more prosperous economies already attracted a large pro-
portion of spontaneous immigrants. Finally, the U.S. and Canada had
the lowest proportion of subsidized Italian immigrants. It is therefore
Table 9 Italian Emigration subsidized by the Inter-Governmental Committee for

European Migrations (1952–1957)

Italian %
ICEM % over total
Countries of ICEM migration Total over the ICEM
destination Nationals Refugees Emigration total emigration

Argentina 74,455 165 132,395 56 92
Brazil 43,456 1,331 64,940 69 69
Venezuela 24,483 350 137,199 18 84
Uruguay 5,554 43 11,583 48 a)
Canada 10,923 4,024 138,091 11 11

USA 7,834 2,452 129,950 7 7
Australia 25,720 5,812 126,877 25 15
Total 192,430 14,117 741,035


Source: Il Comitato Intergovernativo per le Migrazioni Europee: La sua Struttura e le sue
Attività, Annex IV, a) e b), n.d.

Table 10 Italian Emigration Subsidized by the Intergovernmental Committee for
European Migrations, 1952–1970

Italian %
ICEM % over total
Countries of Total over the ICEM
destination ICEM migration Emigration total emigration

Argentina 95,433 164,894 58 82
Brazil 55,901 83,546 67 60
Venezuela 41,787 196,874 21 61
Uruguay 7,029 a) a) 51
Canada 31,436 376,657 8 32

USA 3,062 350,195 1 9
Australia 55,320 a) a) 14
Total 310,500

Source: ICEM, Realizations: 1970, Geneva, n.d.; Rosoli, G., Un Secolo di Emigrazione
Italians, 1876–1976, (Rome: Centro Studi Emigrazione, 1978)
possible to conclude that Italian emigration to Latin America was the

most significant single instance of multi-lateral state intervention of
the post-war period.
From this perspective, the downward trend of Italian emigration to
Latin America can be interpreted as workers’ resistance to leaving for
unattractive destinations, in spite of official facilities to migrate, and
of unemployment and precarious living conditions faced at home. Re-
patriations, which were higher than elsewhere (31 percent) according
to official Italian figures, were in reality even higher, since immigrants
who returned without consular aid would be naturally reluctant to ad-
mit to their authorities that they failed to remain in the guest country,
after using state resources to expatriate.
The creation of PICMME in the end of 1951, with its propaganda,
recruiting and subsidized transportation for immigrants, certainly con-
tributed in reducing the impact of the downward trend, apparent since
the late 1940s. But eventually it was unable to sustain emigration to
precarious labor markets, due to the generalized discontent of the
people who had left and of those fortunate enough to return home. By
the second half of the 1950s, the Italian mass emigration would be
directed to new destinations such as Northern Europe and Australia.

Immigration and Desenvolvimentismo
What were the differences in the approach to immigration in Brazil

between Estado Novo and the post-War Vargas Government? How
did restrictions enacted in the 1930s and 40s evolve afterwards? Did
the criteria of technical qualification substitute for the traditional racial
concern of whitening the population in the selection of immigrants?
This section will attempt to answer these questions and to elucidate
the links between immigration and desenvolvimentismo, the mod-
ernization policies of the 1950s and 1960s.
A Brazilian scholar, emphasizing a continuum with the past, la-
mented that the same immigration restrictions established in the 1930s
were still maintained in 1950. 66 Others argued that the post-war pe-
riod represented a break with the past: the whitening ideal and the
concern with the ethnic future went out of fashion in the 1950s and
certainly could no longer help to shape the development of the nation.67
Although some scholars have argued a qualitative break with the
past, it is clear that there was a continuity in relation to racial issues,
based on new clues emerging from various Brazilian primary sources
and US State Department documents. In view of a possible resump-
tion of European immigration, Brazilian population policies still seemed
to reinforce the traditional ethnical preferences and racial discrimina-
tion of nearly a century before, as will be shown hereafter. Three
examples, in particular, illustrate the centrality of the racial concern
in the post-war years.
A first example refers to Brazilian attitudes towards the United
States’ frequent demands that more refugees be accepted by this coun-
try as well as by other Latin American states. In July 1946, CIC Chair-
man, Joao de Barros, declared to the United Nations Special Com-
mittee of Refugees and Displaced Persons that Brazil was willing to
receive up to 800,000 persons, without religious or racial discrimina-
tion. But until the beginning of 1951 only 25,099 displaced persons
had been accepted. 68 With the end of the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration, UNRRA, in 1947, the task of repatri-
ating or resettling refugees still located in various European camps
was transferred to the newly established International Refugee Orga-
nization, IRO, whose activities lasted until 1951.
Table 11 shows that in Latin America war refugees were less nu-
merous than in any other place (9 percent of refugees vs. 91 percent
of immigrants). On the contrary, 88 percent of those who arrived

Table 11 ICEM Migration, 1952–1968

National
Countries Migration % Refugees % Total %

Latin America 301,132 91 28,998 9 330,130 100
Argentina 113,270 96.7 3,813 3.3 117,083 100

Brazil 92,360 84.4 17,113 15.6 109,473 100
Venezuela 68,443 96 2,818 4 71,261 100
Uruguay 13,404 96.7 455 3.3 13,859 100
Canada 95,729 49 96,855 50 192,584 100

USA 32,567 12 228,251 88 260,818 100
Australia 362,571 71 147,585 29 510,156 100
Total ICEM
immigration 847,953 53 750,357 47 1,598,308 100

Source: “Provisional Report of the Number of Migrants Transported under the Auspices of
the ICEM: November 1968,” Report 3 (Summary Report), p. 1, São Paulo, Centro Historico
de Imìgrante, folder 84, closet 33, shelf 4.
with ICEM in the U.S. were war refugees. In Canada they accounted
for about half of the total immigration while in Australia for 29 per-
cent. By early 1949, Brazil ranked eight among the refugee-receiving
countries of the world: Israel (117,085); USA (155,529); Canada
(79,469), Australia (113,986); UK (83,084); France (36,965), Argen-
tina (28,156) and Brazil (23,356). Venezuela received only 13,300
refugees. A plausible explanation for the limited number of war refu-
gees in Latin America, and particularly Brazil, can be found once
again in the small attractiveness of Latin American countries and in
their policies of ethnic discrimination.
Dumon Stansby, head of the IRO Mission in Rio de Janeiro, noted
that, according to the criteria adopted by the Brazilian Mission for the
selection of immigrants in Europe, approximately 24 percent of
refugees
are rejected since they have no profession that can be useful to Brazil; 28
percent are refused since they do not respond to medical prerequisites. The
Mission is preferably selecting technicians, rural laborers and industrial skilled
workers.69
But the origins of the refugees who had been accepted clearly shows
that the ethnic selection criteria prevailed over professional concerns.


These refugees, mostly from Northern Italy, appeared to be selected
due to the fact that they belonged to a highly desirable ethnic group,
rather than to specific technical or professional attributes:
the main group is formed by refugees from Venezia Giulia, who remained
homeless due to the new boundary line created between Italy and Yugosla-
via. A great majority of them has Italian characteristics and can undoubtedly
provide precious elements that can easily be assimilated by Brazil.
Another example concerns the official rejection of Black immigra-

tion to Brazil, anticipated by the Brazilian Consul in Rome who, ad-
dressing the Ambassador Alves de Souza, expressed his concern that
without a European immigration “we will end up like a large Republic
of Haiti”. 70 In 1950, the Associated Negro Press based in Chicago,
requested an official statement on the policy of Brazil towards admis-
sion of Negroes and people of African and Asian descent. This was
motivated by “instances of refusal to admit Negro Americans who
desired to emigrate to Brazil and had the offer of employment there”
which had come to its attention.71
A third example reported in a US State Department correspon-
dence in 1952 elucidates how determinant ethnic preferences, along
with professional skills, still were in the Federal immigration policies:
The Brazilian Ambassador in Rome visited his collegue in Vienna . . . and
explored with him the possibility of obtaining from Austria 600 refugees
(400 of whom would be Volksdeutsche and 200 non-German-speaking refu-
gees) for settlement in Brazil. All will be required to have some industrial
background or training. . . . the Brazilian Government made its acceptance
of 200 non-German-speaking refugees conditional upon its obtaining the
400 Volksdeutsche. . . . (although) the Austrian Government is doubtful the
Brazilian plan will succeed because Austria does not want young and able-
bodied Volksdeutsche to leave Austria.72
Important legislative and institutional changes took place and, un-

like the inter-war period, special measures were adopted to promote
subsidized immigration. Accordingly, Decree-law N. 7,967 of Sep-
tember 18, 1945, dispensed subsidized immigrants from the limita-
tions imposed by the quota system and stated that “public institutions,
companies or individuals were enabled to introduce immigrants, pro-
viding for their hospitality and directing them to specific locations.”73
The Federal Government, and especially the Foreign Ministry, were
entrusted with the selection of subsidized immigrants. The choice of
migration candidates in their home countries was to be done by the
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
Chiefs of Brazilian Missions abroad, Consular authorities and, later,
by ad hoc Commissions.
In addition to spontaneous immigration, which was still subject to
the 2 percent quota, officially subsidized immigration aimed to attract
a larger number of workers than the one in the inter-war period. The
more requested professions included peasants, technicians and skilled
workers; at the same time, the CIC continued to determine ethnical
preferences in relation to:
traditional ethnic groups, whose ability to adapt to Brazilian circumstances

has been proved, or those nationalities which are more likely to do so. 74
The CIC was clearly referring to European groups. This idea was
underlined in Art. 3, Chapter 1, of Consolidacao das Leis de
Imigracao as the “need to preserve and develop, within the ethnical
composition of the population, the most convenient features of its
European origins”. It is then possible to conclude that the professional
qualification was not the only requirement. Brazilian planners would
indeed give priority to the entrance of German and Mediterranean
groups, just as their predecessors did in the XIX century. However,
the terms of the racial discourse would be quite different: in the last
decades of the XIX century Brazil welcomed mass immigration with
the justification of whitening its population and improving its agricul-
tural yields thanks to the greater productivity of European peasants,
while in the developmentalist era the justification for bringing foreign
laborers was the need to industrialize the country thanks to their more
advanced technique and culture.
Differing from a widespread belief in the 1930s that foreign com-
munities were politically dangerous and “unabsorbable”, the end of
Wold War II brought again to the forefront the idea that immigrants
would be “good” for the growth of the country. The first indication of
this new mood appeared in a study of Roberto Simonsen, in 1944.
Amidst intense debates over the development model to be adopted,
the economist’s thesis was that industrialization should be pursued by
the public and private sectors within a mixed economy. Simonsen
also favored the promotion of a selected immigration made of techni-
cians and skilled workers, so that industrial production and the domestic
market would expand thanks also to the more advanced consumption
habits which characterized immigrant workers.75 Simonsen’s ideas can
be found also in various interventions by politicians, economists and
intellectuals throughout Latin America since the late 1940s. 76


Since the end of World War II, The United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, ECLA, elaborated specialized studies di-
rected at analyzing the interdependence between European immigra-
tion and economic development. The optimistic interpretation of
immigration history supported the design of future plans and the end
of the war encouraged the belief that, within a short time, there would
be large population movements from the European regions mostly
affected by the conflict. ECLA therefore argued that Latin America
would benefit from the population surplus of the Old Continent, as-
suming that it would be a more apt labor force (than the local one) to
meet the demands of developing economies.77
In Brazil, one of the most representative contributions came from
Fernando Bastos de Avila, one of the founders of the Faculty of Social
sciences of the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. In 1956, he
published a study on immigration of Brazil in order to provide a gen-
eral theory for immigration. The author argued that the success of
economic development in Brazil would depend on the adoption of
wide ranging measures oriented to increase the physical and cultural
level of the national population. The short term strategy should have
been centered on the promotion of immigration:
The immigrant is the vehicle of skilled knowledge, allowing for the strength-
ening of the key sectors for the national economic development. He strongly
influences the quality of employment. He can be directed to new industries,
whose localization did not always coincide with the interests and urban hab-
its of Brazilian technicians.78
In addition, he argued that Brazil needed rural immigrants to in-

crease its agricultural output since they had a moral stand and lifestyle
which were unknown to local peasants. This view apparently coin-
cided with that of Paulista planters which considered migrants from
the North East of the country as unstable and unproductive.
The pessimistic view concerning the quality of the local laborers
can be traced back to the end of slavery, when European immigrants
were brought into the country to replace Afro-Brazilian laborers. It is
surprising however the endurance of that idea amidst the national-
populist orientation of the Second Vargas Government (1951–54),
which obtained important political support from national workers for
its project of an independent economic development. In a message to
Congress in May 1952, Vargas formulated the labor issue in the fol-
lowing terms:
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
We . . . have three interconnected problems: one is to provide better condi-
tions for our peasants; two is to orient properly the migration flows towards
the recovery of our lands and the settlement across the country; three is to
enrich the Brazilian population in a short time with immigrants in order to
gain in the industrial and agricultural productivity . . . and to raise the cultural
and technical level of our population. 79
At a time when masses of North-Easterners migration to the large

cities in the South in search of jobs, European immigration was being
justified for its educational effect; according to Vargas, it would serve
as “a schooling for the Brazilian worker”. The need to give value to
native laborers and the open recognition of foreign labor’s superiority
are presented in the presidential speech at once, with no apparent
contradiction.
Even though this contrasts with the official stand expressed during
the Estado Novo with the aim to “dilute” foreign elements wiping out
the cultural differences within society, it is possible to see a marked
continuity in the basic assumptions and objectives of immigration
policy, as the new circumstances emerging following World War II,
finally allowed to carry out the immigration project of the Estado
Novo. This project consisted in a selected immigration pursued by
official institutions with international subsidies, and exempted from
the quota limit established in the thirties and still enforced in the post-
war.
The Brazilian Government thus prepared a number of immigration
agreements. Signed in Rio de Janeiro on December 15, 1950 the
agreement with the Netherlands became effective by a Getulio Vargas
decree on March 29, 1952, following a successful immigration experi-
ment of Dutch farmers into the States of Rio Grande do Sul and Parana’
in 1949–51 in which families had paid their own transportation costs.
Dutch immigration also included “colonizing immigration and the sci-
entific, intellectual and technical cooperation”. However, the cost of
maritime transportation for families of agriculturalists, cattle raisers
and technicians specialized in rural industries would be advanced by
the Brazilian Government and repaid at the proportion of 50 percent
by the immigrant after his settlement. The Brazilian Government was
also to assure their financing and maintenance during the first year of
their arrival in the country.80
An agreement was also signed with the Italian Government on July
5th 1950, in order to encourage the resumption of mass immigration
from that country. Under the terms of Article XIII of the Treaty Brazil

had agreed to finance maritime transportation in “planned” Italian
immigration. Nevertheless, the lack of financial resources in Brazil
and internationally to be conveyed to subsidized immigration delayed
concrete actions for sometime.
A US official reporting on immigration issues noted that although
“Italian immigration in nearly all instances is named as the most de-
sirable . . . since the end of World War II the total number of immi-
grants received has been numerically small. . . . Brazil has either not
had or has been unwilling to use the funds necessary to effect large
scale and successful immigration”.81 As we saw in the previous sec-
tions, until the end of the 1940s, US funds were exclusively allocated
to the European reconstruction and the relocation of war refugees still
displaced in various camps. But in 1949 President Truman announced
that the two major conditions to assure world progress and balance
would be the rational distribution of labor surpluses and the develop-
ment of backward regions. The beginning of the Cold War brought
about a concern for preventing social conflicts in Europe, thus giving
the US a major impulse to finance international migrations.
After winning the elections in 1950, President Getulio Vargas at
last obtained from the US commitment to contribute to an ambitious
program for the expansion of basic infrastructure which had been
requested since the end of the conflict.82 On the other hand, Brazil
committed itself to the newly created PICMME, providing the largest
contribution (4 percent of the total budget) among Latin American
member countries. Brazil was therefore assigned the highest immi-
grant quota by ICEM in relation to the other countries of the region.83
The issue of nationalism in the Vargas Government has been widely
analyzed in the historiography of the 1950s. Besserman Vianna pointed
out that “although during those years there were frequent accusations
directed against the government of having given in to US interests,
the most accepted interpretations go into a different way”. 84 In par-
ticular, the study of Sonia Draibe emphasized the nationalist character
of Vargas second government, showing how its objective was to na-
tionalize the participation of foreign enterprises, to provide public
financing for large projects and to give to the large public enterprises
a primary role in the national economy in relation to private ones.
This approach is then juxtaposed with Kubitschek’s later policies which
tended to promote a greater internationalization of the Brazilian
economy, allowing the massive entrance of foreign capital in the key
areas of industrial development.85

On the other hand, a group of recent works questions the nation-
alist thesis. Both in the domestic economy and in international rela-
tions there is no evidence that Vargas adopted a strategy of confron-
tation with the United States and foreign capital. Private foreign
investments in Brazil were quite large in the 1950s when compared
with other developing countries.86 In addition, Brazil’s participation
in the Korean War, the signing of the Military Defense Pact with the
US and its immediate partnership to ICEM, all indicate an attitude of
cooperation and mutual understanding between the two countries.
Within this framework the immigration policy of the last Vargas Gov-
ernment confirms its deep understanding of the new international order
and the opportunities offered by it.
On February 23rd 1951, an agreement was also signed with the
IRO, which covered all traveling expenses to European refugees di-
rectly selected by Brazilian Foreign Ministry officials in the camps.
The ninth article of the agreement specified that technicians and
skilled workers who “were needed by Brazilian industries” as well as
rural workers “according to the specializations demanded by land-
owners” would be preferred over other candidates.87 Although no pre-
cise figures have been found in the course of this research concerning
European refugees entering Brazil after the agreement, it is possible
to assert that ethnical preferences came first in relation to the profes-
sional selection criteria enunciated in the document.
In a report on the Italian immigration problems presented to the
Immigration and Colonization Council at the beginning of 1952, refu-
gees from Italy were classified in three categories: a) people returning
from the African ex-colonies; b) displaced persons from regions which
had belonged to Italy and were now occupied by other countries; c)
persons affected by the Po river floods. Category b) was made of
approximately 200,000 people of Polish, Russian, Rumanian, Bulgar-
ian, Greek, Checoslovakian, Yugoslavian, German, Austrian and Jewish
origins who were hosted in Italy. The report then pointed out that
since there was the opportunity to select “good immigrants” from
group a), “it was necessary to underline” that group b) was made of
“the worst human drop outs one could imagine”.
The information collected indicate that any agreement on such issue should
be rejected given the inadequacy of those elements. They are human left-
overs, without profession, dignity, skills; among them can be found insane
individuals, aiming at propagating reactionary ideologies who can be highly
dangerous for our country.88


Indeed we saw how the first refugees to arrive in Brazil were exclu-
sively Italian, “precious elements for the country, who would be par-
ticularly easy to assimilate”.89 The professional qualifications required
from them thus became secondary to the traditional ethnic preference
which since the beginning marked Brazilian immigration policies. On
the other hand, the agreement with the International Organization of
Refugees exemplified a new attitude towards foreign relations by the
Vargas Government which, having become closer to US, would now
tend to meet its demands, including those on immigration matters.
Between 1950 and 1957, the peak years of immigration in the
post-war, 456,800 immigrants entered Brazil. The three major groups
were European and accounted for 75 percent of the total distributed
in the following way: Portuguese, 42 percent; Italian and Spanish 16
percent each. Although in absolute terms the Italian immigration was
not very relevant, it became so in terms of the proportion of officially
subsidized immigrants out of the total number entered within each
group. More than 70 percent of the Italians who entered Brazil were
subsidized by ICEM, while almost all Portuguese and Spanish arrived
as spontaneous immigrants throughout the 1950s, according to Bra-
zilian statistics.
It is not surprising to discover that Brazil utilized the ICEM as-
signed quota to bring in Italian immigrants who had traditionally been
hosted by national immigration agencies. What is peculiar is that their
professional background did not match the selective criteria enunci-
ated by the developmentalist policies. It is clear that European skilled
workers were not available in the quantities desired by Brazilian in-
dustries, especially in the field of mechanics and engineering, owing
to the fact that these skills were in high demand also in Europe which
was undergoing its industrial recovery. Therefore this type of worker
usually had a satisfactory placement in his country of origin and felt
no urge to migrate.90 In addition, those skilled workers who aimed at
migrating would certainly avoid Brazil, where wages were known to
be lower than those offered in the US, Canada and Australia. 91 Never-
theless, a large unemployed labor force was available for emigration
thanks also to the encouragement provided by official propaganda in
the countries of origin.
Owing to these circumstances, Brazilian authorities ended up by
not applying rigorously the requirements concerning professional skills.
According to a former director of the Immigration Division of INIC,
Brazilian Selection Commissions throughout Europe recruited immi-
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
grants first on the basis of the eugenic criterion, making sure that they
had good physical conditions, and only secondly on the basis of labor
experience. This behavior was guided by the assumption that Europe-
ans could easily adapt to any job, even without prior experience.92
The developmentalist necessities therefore ended up by coexisting
with the old-time eugenic assumptions of interwar immigration poli-
cies. Apparently, with the establishment of the Estado Novo a basic
tension emerged in immigration policies between the ethnic selection
criterion (which favored some European groups who had certain ra-
cial and cultural characteristics) and the technical selection criterion
(aimed at satisfying Brazilian modernization plans). As to the Italian
group, who already possessed the “qualities” required in the first cri-
terion, the professional requirements became more flexible, while for
the less desirable ethnicities, such as Jews, the requirements for high
social and professional levels would be much more rigorous.
The belief in the technical and cultural superiority of European im-
migrants in relation to native laborers permeated immigration poli-
cies in the developmentalist era, thus creating a continuum—in spite
of apparent language changes—with the belief in the racial superiority
attributed to immigrants since the XIX century, and especially at the
time of the slavery abolition. Grounded in the dualist thesis that split
developing societies in modern and backward sectors, such reformu-
lation of old ideas emerged precisely when internal migrations of na-
tive peasants from the poorest regions flooded the urban industrial
centers of Brazil and other Latin American countries.
The transformation of immigration institutions was another way of
meeting the new opportunities emerged with the creation of the In-
ternational Committee for European Migrations, ICEM, towards the
end of 1951. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic reorganization was slow
and rather inefficient at the Federal level.
Figures 1 summarizes in chronological sequence the major Federal
institutions involved in immigration planning and administration since
the late XIX century. Announced in May 1952, the National Institute
for Immigration and Colonization began to operate as late as 1954; it
was maintained under the Kubitschek Government and was extin-
guished in 1962, when the Ministry of Foreign Relations eventually
absorbed all its functions. A Federal agency placed under the Ministry
of Agriculture, the Institute joined all planning and operational func-
tions previously carried out by three separate bodies: the Land and
Colonization Division within the Ministry of Agriculture, the Immigra-

tion and Colonization Council and the National Department of Immi-
gration within the Ministry of Labor, Industry and Trade. The Institute
became the intermediary institution between the Selection Commis-
sions of the Foreign Ministry in Europe and the demands for immi-
grants by landowners and industrialists in Brazil.
Immigration Policies in Sao Paulo
Estimates of the post W W II Italian immigration to the State of Sao

Paulo range from 60 to 90 percent of the entire flow entered in the
country.93 In Sao Paulo, a traditional host region for Italian immigra-
tion and engine of the Brazilian economy, the leading agricultural and
industrial establishments were concentrated. The State was particu-
larly active in developing a set of immigration services which were the
best organized and innovative in Brazil, in spite of reduced availability
of financial resources.
At first, most immigrants came spontaneously, paying their own
passages to join already established relatives (1946–50). With few
exceptions, these immigrants, according to Henrique Doria de
Vasconcellos, a high state immigration official, “met no surprises or
irreversible maladjustments as it happens, due to incomplete or inex-
act information or false promises, in the case of subsidized migra-
tions, in which the interests of individuals or state institutions [spon-
soring migration] prevail”.94
Their adjustment was therefore seen as quite favorable, unlike rural
colonization immigrants (subsidized by paulista landowners or private
companies) whose failure caused an international campaign against
Italian emigration to Brazil. Vasconcellos thus concluded that spon-
taneous immigration should be encouraged by liberalizing the profes-
sional requirements for Italian immigrants so far imposed by the na-
tional legislation.
This view was shared by many public figures in Sao Paulo, includ-
ing those representing the interests of the planters. The most strenu-
ous defenders of spontaneous immigration were indeed officials ei-
ther of the Sociedade Rural Paulista or of the Immigration and
Colonization Department of the State of Sao Paulo, DIC: Vasconcellos
himself, the agronomist Renato Azzi and others.
According to Trento’s recent study on Italian immigration to Brazil,
spontaneous Italian immigrants who until the late 1940s mostly went
to work as rural laborers in plantations, were not able to bear those

harsh living conditions.95 This is why the scarcity of Italian rural labor
continued to be a problem. The State of Sao Paulo therefore had to
regain an active role in immigration matters, although without the
financial autonomy which it had prior to the Revolution of 1930. As
early as July 6 1946, the Agriculture Department of the State and the
Government of the Union had signed an immigration agreement au-
thorizing such Department to promote the arrival of European labor-
ers who would be directed to the countryside.96
Addressing the Legislative Assembly, lobbying for an immigration
bill, the Governor of Sao Paulo Adhemar de Barros declared:
there are indeed two important weaknesses in the rural labor sector which
can be compensated through the introduction of immigrants. The first is the
large scarcity of wage labor in plantation agriculture—especially coffee—of
vital importance for the national economy. The second . . . concerns the
development of mechanized agriculture which faces both the lack of adequate
machinery and labor. In this case it would be proper to bring immigrant
cooperatives, like those created in Italy, which are able to carry all the neces-
sary machinery and labor at their own expenses.97
The Agriculture Department was to bring in, host and direct immi-
grants through its Immigration and Colonization Department cover-
ing all expenses from their arrival to the Port of Santos to placement
at their workplace. Immigrants would be hosted in the Hospedaria
Visconde de Parnaiba, whose large facilities had been extensively
used for that purpose since 1886. The Hospedaria began to function
again in 1951, after being occupied by the Ministry of Aeronautics in
1943. It also served as headquarter for DIC placement and informa-
tion bureau.
DIC financing was covered by the National Institute of Immigration
and Colonization, INIC, until 1962, when the Institute was extin-
guished; subsequently it was again placed under the financial respon-
sibility of the State and continued to bring in and host immigrants.
Between 1952 and 1978, DIC brought thousands of European immi-
grants by means of a direct agreement with ICEM, and received an
even higher number of migrants from the Brazilian hinterlands. In
1978 its agreement with ICEM came to an end, the Division was
extinguished although the Hospedaria continued to serve as a hostel
for internal migrants, especially from the North East of the country98
(see Figure 2).
A rural immigration agreement was concluded in May 1952 be-
tween the Division of Immigration and Colonization of Sao Paulo and


Figure 3 Italian Immigrants directed to plantations in the State of Sao Paulo

from June to December 1952
the Italian Embassy in Brazil, in spite of the fact that the Italian techni-
cal missions sent in 1949 and 1950 had clearly advised not to send
rural wage laborers to the plantations. This agreement, which followed
the bilateral one signed between Italy and Brazil on October 8, 1949,
established the main clauses for the recruitment of immigrants:
(a) the contract would be agreed upon in Italy and then signed
officially by the immigrants in the Hospedaria de Imigrantes;
(b) rural workers were to embark along with their families and
should have at least three active members between 14 and 50-
years old. Priority would be given to families with active mem-
bers that were most suitable for plantation work;
(c) the plantation owners were to cover the expenses regarding
housing and basic welfare needs and pay for Cr$ 2,000 for
every 1,000 coffee plant. The “colonato” implied therefore a
sort of rural wage labor contract. 99
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
Between June and December 1952, 5,443 Italian immigrants, ac-
counting for 773 families, were subsidized by ICEM and directed to
the coffee plantations in the interior of the State (Figure 3). This group
accounted for 94 percent of the total number arrived in Brazil during
1952, as indicated in Table 4. Maladjustment and repatriations oc-
curred on a large scale, as immigrants refused to accept the harsh
labor conditions they met in the plantations.
The experience of Italian immigrants from Rovigo, Treviso and
Adria—areas that were all affected by the Pò River floods—exemplifies
the failure of Italian agricultural migration to the paulista plantations.
The recruiting had been done by the Italian Labor Ministry in order to
provide some solution to a huge disaster. The impression of the Sao
Paulo representative in the Brazilian Immigrant Selection Commis-
sion in Italy was that “standards of life and labor conditions, before
the Pò disaster occurred, were higher than what we could offer in
Brazil. But following the instructions we received by the Commission
Chief and the Brazilian authorities in Rome, we carried out all the
work we were asked for”.100
The representative also noted that the information provided by the
Italian Labor Ministry to the immigrants concerning their labor con-
tract was completely different from that officially agreed upon by the
Brazilian and Italian authorities: a sharecropping agreement had been
presented instead of the actual wage labor contract under which im-
migrants would have to work. Therefore most immigrants apparently
left without knowing the actual labor conditions they would find in
Sao Paulo. A final concern of this representative was the likely Com-
munist tendencies of the peasantry from those areas, where there was
a strong influence of the Italian Communist Party.
The Italian peasants arriving in the Sao Paulo coffee plantations
from the Pò Valley suffered from maladjustment: they organized up-
risings in the countryside, and had to be repatriated by the Italian
authorities.
Another comment by the same representative of Sao Paulo con-
cerned immigration selection in Naples, where recruiting proceeded
in a disorderly fashion with candidates who did not have the family
composition required by contract and who often were not even peas-
ants.101
According to the Director of the DIC, repatriations accounted for at
least 50 percent of the total number of people arrived in 1952. These
accidents obliged DIC to face substantial unexpected expenses and


Table 12 Analysis of the Composition of Italian Disadjusted Families in the Sao
Pãulo Coffee plantation

Family composition

Com- other
ponents members Place Placement
Name of   of 
head of household a b c a b c origin Estate Town

Armicanto Giuseppe — 2* 2 — 1 — Potenza São Luis Lia
Cagio Nicola — 2* 4 — 1 — Foggia Mandaguai Sodrelis
Caschera Antonio — 2* — — — — Latina Conceicao Xavantes
Caputo Cosimo — 2* — — — — Lecce Santa Maria Paraguacù
Casillo Antonino — 3 6 — 1 — Napoli Santa Maria Paraguacù
Cerroni Tommaso — 2* — — — — Latina Conceicao Xavantes
Colangelo Pasquale — 2* 4 — 2 — Potenza São Luis Lins
Coppetta Giovanni — 3 2 2 1 — Caserta Santa Maria Xavantes
Del Cero Giovanni — 3 2 — 2 — Verona Legeadinho Ouriados
Bitonti Donato — 2* — — — — Lecce Santa Maria Paraguacù
Fusco Michele — 2* 1 — 4 1 Latina Sào Jose Xavantes
Fusco Eleutero — 2* 4 — 3 — Latina S.J.M. Verm Botucatù
Maiorani Laercio — 2* 3 — 4 1 Latina Conceicao Xavantes
Marchetti Rinaldo — 4 3 — 2 — Latina S.J.M. Verm Botucatù
Paoletti Pio — 3 3 — 1 — Pescara Madaguai Sodrelias
Panella Alessio — 2* 2 — 2 — Latina Redencão Xavantes
Pungelli Giuseppe — 5 2 — — — Latina S.B. Esmeralda Pirajui
Rao Giuseppe — 2* 2 — 3 — Caserta — CAPITAL
Rossetti Stefano — 2* 2 — 2 — Caserta Santa Maria Xavantes
Ruscio Emore — 2* 2 — 2 — Latina S.B. Esmeralda Pirajui
Russo Salvatore — 2* 2 — 2 — Caserta Santa Luiza S.J. Rio Preto
Serecchia Angelo — 2* 2 — 5 — Latina S.J.M. Verm Botucatù
Trombini Silvio — 4 5 — 2 — Ferrara S.B. Esmeralda Pirajui
Zaccagiao Agostino — 2* 2 — 1 1 Potenza São Luis Lins
Lombardi Antonio — 2* — — — — Latina — Capital
Frentano Domenico — 2* — — — — L’Aquila Mombuca Ipaacù
Altieri Giovanni — 2* — — — — Rovigo Monte Alegre Barill
Luce Pasquale — 2* 3 — — — Foggia Harmonia Xavantes

Source: “Plano de Imigracão Dirigida para a lavoura em 1952,” Boletim do Departamento
de Imigracão e Colonizacão, n. 7, December 1952, p. 115.
a) older than 50 years; b) from 14 to 50 years; c) younger than 15 years.
* irregular compostion b) <3; regular composition b) >3.
regular families; 7 (25%); irregular families; 21 (75%).
caused a slow down in the recruitment of families in Italy, following

also the warnings of Brazilian officials. In order to improve the selec-
tion procedures it was suggested that the Brazilian Selection Com-
mission in Italy choose the regions from where the immigrants should
be recruited, stick to the family requirement established by the wage
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
labor contract and prevent families with ill members from depart-
ing.102
One of the reasons for the failure of the immigration plan given by
the DIC official bulletin was that the family composition did not re-
spond to the requirements established in the agreements. As shown
in Table 12, 75 percent of the maladjusted families (analyzed on a
sample of 28 immigrant families) did not have the three active mem-
bers required by contract and brought in, on the other hand, various
dependent relatives under 14 years old. Another reason, even more
determinant, lamented by the bulletin was the lack of coordination
between the recruitment and placement operations, owing to inexact
information provided to immigrants on the labor conditions they would
find in Sao Paulo.
But perhaps the best explanation was provided by Constantino Ianni,
once an immigrant who then became quite successful:
Our planters believed that European colonists would have adapted to plan-
tations, from where local laborers flew, without introducing any change . . .
The lack of labor means indeed the total absence of acceptable living and
working conditions as well as of a tolerable plantation management. As we
already explained in 1953, the coffee cultivation does not require specialized
labor but simply unskilled laborers who abound in Brazil as internal migra-
tions from the Northeast shows . . . To understand the dramatic implications
of that mistake, one should imagine what it means to tranfer 1,000 families
from their home environment, sending them thousands of kilometers away,
in total isolation . . . it should be remembered that few weeks later, the
colonists began to flee the plantations in circumstances which were not fully
clear. 103
The experience with industrial immigrants also proved to be ex-

tremely difficult in the 1950s and 1960s, in spite of the high demand
for skilled workers and technicians by Brazilian industrialists. Between
1947 and 1949, DIC supplied several thousands of such workers to
local industries. They were mostly displaced persons who entered as
mechanics, wood workers, electricians, painters, metal workers, etc.
In addition there was a high local demand for chemical, textile and
steel workers, particularly Italians who were considered to be of easier
assimilation.
The Hospedaria Visconde de Parnaiba was not yet available to
host them, so it was noted that:
the great difficulty for this type of immigration is to find adequate housing,
unless workers have relatives who already reside here. Usually wages are not

sufficient to cover the cost of renting a house. This obliges immigrants to
share housing collectively, a solution that is not satisfactory for Italian work-
ers. 104
In 1952, as soon as the ICEM funding for immigration became

available, Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos designed a plan to bring
1,000 Italian skilled workers and their families to Sao Paulo (a total of
about 3,000 people), as part of some other immigration plan. ICEM
would pay the transportation of all family members, while the Federal
Government of Brazil would cover the passage for family heads.
Leading Italo-Brazilians warned that the emigration of skilled workers
was convenient only to countries were wages were high, such as Aus-
tralia or Canada and also high immigration officials in Sao Paulo were
well aware of the difficulties involved.105 The DIC Director himself
declared on July 1953 that:
present economic conditions in Brazil do not allow for the absorption of that
type of immigrant [referring to industrial workers to be directed to paulista
industries]. We are going through very difficult moments in our daily life:
there is lack of energy, food . . . and we are facing strong labor movement
demands. The issue of currency exchange is particularly deceptive for immi-
grants, who expect to earn enough to cover for their expenses and for those
of relatives in Italy. The present low exchange rate is detrimental to that
objective. 106
Another problem that was brought up by Paulista officials involved

the correct placement of immigrants in accordance with their profes-
sional skills and the job market requirements.
In reality, one of the most difficult problems of non-spontaneous immigration
is the placement of agricultural or industrial workers, in ways that satisfy the
employer and, above all, the worker. It is not enough to solve the financial
problem relative to the transportation of immigrants to the country of desti-
nation. . . . Other obstacles . . . will occur during the long period that is
necessary for the immigrant adjustment to the new physical and social envi-
ronment. 107
Some years later, the head of the Immigration and Colonization

Department of the State of Sao Paulo again warned that:
the most adequate workers for emigration are semi-skilled, since skilled workers
will hardly find in Brazil the European standards of living. Semi-qualified
workers, on the other hand, are younger individuals, mostly without a family,
whose needs are more limited and who can therefore adapt more easily. 108


This type of worker could receive an additional training locally
through the courses provided by the Serviço Nacional de Aprendiza-
gem Industrial, SENAI, the national training school located near the
Hospedaria.
Yet the immigrant selection procedures were not “working out” in
Europe, particularly Italy. According to Rosaura Street, Director of
DIC placement service, who went on a trip to Italy in 1963 to check
procedures, ICEM was embarking people such as “singers, claiming to
be turners, movie projectors claiming to be project designers, and so
on”.109 Apparently Brazilian authorities were no longer so interested
in having Italian laborers, but ICEM continued to make arrangements
for these immigrants. Sao Paulo representatives, in particular, de-
manded rather skilled workers for steel industries, assembly lines, etc.
By 1955 DIC attempted to reorganize its placement services at the
Hospedaria in order to cope with the immigrants’ labor adjustment as
well as with the massive arrival of internal migrants. In 1954 100,000
people had passed through Hospedaria, of which only 4,300 were
foreigners, 50 percent of whom Italian. Between 1956 and 1957 hun-
dreds of Italian refugees, expelled from Egypt at the time of Nasser
nationalist policies, arrived with ICEM, following a specific immigra-
tion agreement signed between Italy and the Brazilian Federal Gov-
ernment, without any previous consultation with Sao Paulo State im-
migration authorities.110 They met great difficulties in finding a job
since many of them, being white collar workers, did not know the
Portuguese language. Yet they would not be easily repatriated by the
Italian Consulates, who considered them foreigners whose reintegra-
tion in Italian society did not seem desirable.
DIC placement services were then subdivided in three areas:
(a) the Official Bureau of Information and Placement which aimed

at placing mostly internal migrants in the agricultural estates of
Sao Paulo (about 100,000 workers in 1955);
(b) the Professional Placement Service which promoted the place-
ment of industrial skilled or unskilled workers in the capital
area (approximately 50,000 workers);
(c) the Placement Service for subsidized immigrants created in com-
pliance with the agreement recently signed between DIC and
INIC.
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
This extensive reorganization of immigration services required
greater funds than available, so that State authorities began lobbying
with the Federal Government for a larger share of financial aid. An
agreement, signed on May 17, 1955 between the INIC and the State
of Sao Paulo, limited such aid to 500,000 cruzeiros. But since in
1955 ICEM had assigned the Federal immigration agency a sum of
4,5 million cruzeiros precisely for that purpose, DIC demanded that
60 percent of that sum be allocated to the State of Sao Paulo which
was receiving that proportion of immigrants out of the total.11 On Au-
gust 23, 1955 an agreement was reached with INIC for the allocation
of the requested sum.
In addition, DIC Director Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos expressed
clear complaints to the INIC Director, his federal counterpart, about
(a) the proper selection of immigrants in Italy (which caused higher
expenses to the State of Sao Paulo) and (b) the lack of coordination
between the activities of the two agencies.
The success of subsidized immigration of workers who have not already been
placed in the job market, as in the case of IRO displaced persons or ICEM
Italians and Greeks, depends unquestionably from their rigorous selection
and professional classification in the home country, and from an adequate
organization of services in the Hospedaria de Imigrantes. In addition an
immediate and efficient coordination is necessary between the two services,
i.e. between the immigrant selection (INIC selection Commission) and the
placement service (DIC). . . . The provision of housing for the immigrant
waiting to be placed in the job market has drawn on the already limited
financial resources of this Department . . . while repatriations of unadjusted
immigrants has meant an additional cost for the home countries.112
The issue of greater financial support was brought up again on

October 1956 by the State Secretary of Agriculture who this time
asked the President of Brazil, Janio Quadros, to intervene with INIC.
He argued that his Department was facing higher expenses than the
budget covered by INIC allowed for and that it was providing assis-
tance to a large number of internal migrants (152,541 a year) from
the States of Bahia, Minas Geraes, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Ceara and
Sergipe who ended up in the States of Parana and Mato Grosso,
rather than Sao Paulo. In other words he was complaining about the
fact that Sao Paulo was helping other States with its migration ser-
vices while bearing for their entire cost.
A set of recommendations were therefore addressed by DIC to INIC,
such as the creation of immigration and placement services in Brazil-

ian states that were receiving internal migrants with proper technical
assistance, the organization of immigrant selection commissions in
Europe with experts from local Brazilian immigration and training
agencies and, finally, a proper coordination between all competent
Brazilian immigration authorities.
In conclusion, tensions arising between the State and the Federal
agencies in the 1950s made the coordination of immigration policies
more difficult. Until 1930 Sao Paulo had enjoyed total financial and
administrative autonomy, on all matters including its immigration policy.
After the war that was no longer the case, as the new Constitution
reinforced the Central Government authority over state administra-
tions. So in spite of the unquestionably superior skills of the Sao
Paulo immigration personnel, they had to cope with less rigorous and
often improvised counterparts at Federal level.
In 1963, when Italy decided to stop the emigration of Italian “skilled”
workers to Brazil due to the extensive repatriations, the Director of
DIC commented this event in the following terms:
what happens indeed is that (INIC) Selection Commissions of skilled labor in
Europe do not work properly . . . They are formed according to political
criteria. The members of the Commissions are not appointed according to
their actual abilities. Even sick laborers are directed to Brazil and our Selec-
tion Commissions let them go.113
In addition, there were substantial differences between the two ad-

ministrations as to their philosophical approach towards the immigra-
tion issue: to put it in simple terms the ethnic improvement orienta-
tion of Federal agencies was not always compatible with the economic
orientation of State agencies. Sao Paulo officials—exemplified in fig-
ures such as Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos and Renato Azzi—were
more pragmatic; they measured the opportunity cost of immigration,
questioned the inadequate selection procedures of Federal immigra-
tion officials back in Italy, were even ready to question the project of
bringing Italian immigrants, unless it would occur under correct cir-
cumstances, and tended to organize immigration services in efficient
ways.
The Federal agencies, on the other hand, tended to accept Italian
immigration in principle, influenced as they were by the thought of
ethnic and cultural improvement and eugenics. They signed numer-
ous international and bilateral agreements promoting planned immi-
gration, almost free of charge for Brazil since Italy and ICEM covered

most expensive. Perhaps this is why they tended to disregard what
practical problems were involved in the executing phase of such agree-
ments. They tended to delegate the practical solutions for the integra-
tion of immigrants to the State of Sao Paulo authorities, without how-
ever including them in the decision-making process. All these factors
brought to a serious lack of coordination between the two bureaucra-
cies which made many Paulistas efforts less effective than possible.
Following a visit to what had been the symbol par excellence of
immigration policies in Sao Paulo, Warren Dean wrote:
The Hospedaria de Imigrantes is Brazil’s Ellis Island. . . . Unlike the grim

old institution in New York Bay, the Hostel has not been closed down for lack
of clients. Now it receives an even larger swarm of people, peasants from the
Brazilian Northeast who come to Sao Paulo to find work on the cotton and
sugar plantations or to harvest coffee or oranges . . . A high fence of iron
pickets, broken by a wide gateway, then a broad courtyard, and one faces
the Hostel itself. A stupendous facade, three stories high and two hundred
yards wide, plastered and painted with Sao Paulo’s ubiquitous cream-colored
white wash, and relieved only by rows of great windows. The Hostel is a
surprise among the shabby working class tenements that share its street.
One passes through an arched vestibule whose walls bear maps showing
where Sao Paulo’s immigrants have come from—Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ja-
pan and lately from Minas, Bahia and the Northeast. Passing through the
archway one finds a large square of buildings; along their unplastered brick
walls run spindly wooden porticoes. In the midst of the square are two more
buildings—a small hospital and a newer-looking commissary. About the court-
yard, leaning against the porticoes, sitting on the porches or simply standing
or squatting on the cobbles, are hundreds of ragged people, men, women,
and children. The whole scene, the aged brickwork, the peeling paint, bro-
ken windows, grimy paving stones, the quite despondent people, even the
sunshine, a cold winter morning sun, is an instantaneous revelation of utter
despair. 114
Notes
1 Antonio Annino, “La politica migratoria dello Stato Post-Unitario. Origini e

controversie della legge 31 gennaio 1901”, Il Ponte, (Special issue 11–12),
1974, p. 1268.
2 Annunziata Nobile, “Politica migratoria e vicende dell’emigrazione durante il
Fascismo”, Il Ponte, (Special Issue n. 11–12), 1974, p. 1325.
3 Benito Mussolini quoted in Orazio Graziani, Emigrazione e Colonizzazione
Agricola Italiana nel Sud America, (Roma: Tipografia dell’Orso, 1955),
p. ?.
4 Nobile, p. 1340.
5 Oblath, Attilio, “O regulamento da emigracao italiana”, Revista de Imigracao
e Colonizacao, (Rio de Janeiro), 4 (1947), p. 40; Castronovo, Valerio, Storia
d’Italia dall’Unita’ ad Oggi, (Turin: Einaudi, 1975), Vol. IV [La Storia
Economica], pp. 383–385.
6 Carlo Furno, L’Evoluzione sociale delle leggi italiane sull’emigrazione,
(Varese: Multa Pacis, 1958), pp. 57–58.
7 Letter of Renato Azzi to the Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Sao
Paulo, Sao Paulo, January 3, 1953, Centro Historico do Imigrante, Processo
9733 (Secretaria da Agricultura do Estado de Sao Paulo), p. 3.
8 "Il problema dell’emigrazione nei dibattiti alla Camera”, Italiani nel Mondo,
(Roma), Vol. X (20), October 25th, 1954, p. 6.
9 ICEM, “L’emigrazione italiana durante il periodo post-bellico”, Italia che
Emigra: Sviluppi Moderni della Emigrazione Italiana, 1960, p. 23;
Gianfausto Rosoli, ed., Un secolo di emigrazione italiana, 1876– 1976,
(Roma: Centro Studi Emigrazione, 1978), p. 355.
10 Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, DGE, Emigrazione Italiana— Situazione,
Prospettive, Problemi, (Roma: Tipografia Riservata del Ministero degli Affari
Esteri, 1949), pp. 29–31.
11 Ibid., pp. 29–34.
12 United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs. Secretariat of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America,
1948, (New York, 1949), pp. 159–160.
13 Castronovo, Valerio, Storia d’Italia dall’Unita’ ad Oggi, (Turin: Einaudi,
1975), IV* La Storia Economica, p. 385.
14 Fontani, Alvo, Gli emigrati: L’altra faccia del “ Miracolo economico” , (Roma:
Editori Riuniti, 1962), p. 36.


15 A. Marinelli, “L’emigrazione italiana ed i finanziamenti internazionali”, Rivista
di Politica Economica, December 1951, pag. 1402.
16 Letters of Renato Azzi to Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, Director of the

Department of Immigration and Colonization of the State of Sao Paulo, June
26, 1952; July 10, 1952; July 17, 1952. Centro Historico do Imigrante, Sao
Paulo, Processo 9733, pp. 87, 101, 141–142.
17 “A Confederacao Geral do Trabalho Italiana e o problema da emigracao”,

Revista de Imigraçao e Colonizaçao, (Rio de Janeiro), VIII (2), June 1947,
pp. 138–139.
18 Quoted in Fontani, A., op. cit., p. 52.
19 Quoted in Fontani, A., op. cit., p. 35.
20 Fontani, A., op. cit., pp. 108–109.
21 Instituto Nacional de Imigracao e Colonizacao, Departamento de Estudos e

Planejamento, Divisao de Estatistica (Rio de Janeiro), Imigracao 1955, n. 5,
1956. p. 3.
22 Letter of Renato Azzi to Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, Naples, Septem-

ber 8, 1952, Sao Paulo, Centro Historico do Imigrante, Processo 9733.
23 "Maiores as possibilidades de vinda de imigrantes italianos para a industria

do que para a lavoura”, Sao Paulo, Folha da Manha, April 16, 1952, n. pag.
24 Roberto Tremeloni, “L’enquete du Parlement italien sur le chomage”, Revue

International du Travail, Vol. LXVII (3), September 1953, pp. 282–283.
25 "Corsi di qualificazione presso il Centro di Messina”, Italiani nel Mondo,

XVII (3), p. 15.
26 Umberto Cassinis, “Chi sono in Italia coloro che vogliono emigrare?”, Italiani
nel Mondo, Vol. XVI (2), January 25, 1958, p. 6.
27 Gino Germani, “La asimilacion de los inmigrantes en la Argentina y el

fenomeno del regreso en la inmigracion reciente”, Revista Interamericana
de Ciencias Sociales, 1 (1), 1961, p. 23.
28 "Features of Post-War European Migration”, International Labor Review,

Vol. LXX, July–December 1954, pp. 2–3.
29 Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. Sixth Session Progress

Report of the Director. Geneva, September 14, 1953. Annex IV, p. 47.
30 “Post-War Manpower Problems in Europe”, International Labor Review,

Vol. LV, n. 6, June 1947.
31 "Il problema dell’Emigrazione nei dibattiti alla Camera”, Italiani nel Mondo
(Rome), n. 20, October 25, 1954, p. 8–9.
www.Ebook777.com

32 Ibid. p. 8.
33 "Considerazioni sull’accordo italo-brasiliano di emigrazione”, Italiani nel
Mondo, Vol. VII (6), March 25, 1951, p. 4.
34 Italy. Ministr y of Foreign Affairs, General Directorate for Emigration,
Emigrazione Italiana (Situazione, Prospettive, Problemi), (Rome: Tipografia
Riservata del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1949), p. 57.
35 Avila, Fernando Bastos de, Immigration in Latin America, (Washington
D.C.: Pan American Union, 1964), p. 234.
36 Alberto Marinelli, “L’emigrazione italiana ed i finanziamenti internazionali”,
Rivista di Politica Economica, December 1951, p. 1399.
37 PICMME, “Progress Report of the Deputy Director”, Summary Records of
the Twenty Fifth Meeting, Washington D.C., June 13, 1952, Geneva July
10, 1952, p. 11.
38 Bettini, Emilio, “L’assistenza del CIME all’Emigrazione Italiana”, in ICEM,
Italia che Emigra, (Rome: Italian Edition of Research Digest, April-May,
1960), pp. 124–125.
39 ICEM, La sua Struttura e le sue Attivita’, n. pag., n.d., pp. 1–2.
40 Ibid., p. 3.
41 Ibid., Annex 1; ICEM. Sixth Session, “Proposed Budget and Plan of Expendi-
ture for 1954”, Venice, October 19, 1953, p. 11.
42 ICEM Handbook, 1959, p. 21.
43 Agreement between the Italian Government and the PICMME, Center for Mi-
gration Studies (New York), ICEM documentation, PIC/LEG/1/Rev. 1, Hq
5974, pp. 1–5.
44 PICMME, “Summary Record of the Twenty Seventh Meeting”, Geneva, Octo-
ber 13, 1952, p. 14.
45 Ibid., p. 16.
46 PICMME, “Summary Record of Twenty Eigth Meeting”, Geneva, October,
14, 1952, Geneva, October 23, 1952, p. 8.
47 Ibid., p. 11.
48 PICMME, “Summary Record of the Twenty Ninth Meeting”, Geneva, October
14, 1952, pp. 5–6.
49 Leonida Felletti, “Il CIME e le Informazioni”, Italiani nel Mondo (Roma), Vol.
IX (23), December 10, 1953, pp. 1–2.
50 Ibid., p. 4.

51 "Gli specializzati emigranti in Brasile col CIME”, Italiani nel Mondo, XI (8),
p. 25.
52 ICEM, Italia che Emigra,, pp. 77–84.
53 Carmine De Martino, “Inaugurato a Salerno il Centro per la formazione

professionale degli emigrati”, Italiani nel Mondo, XVI (3), February 10, 1960,
p. 4;
54 Ibid., p. 10.
55 quoted in ICEM, Twelfth Session,”Some Considerations regarding Policy and

Programmes for the Year 1961", May 6, 1960, pp. 11–12.
56 Ibid., pp. 12–15.
57 Angelo Maria Cossira, “la politica dei trasporti nel CIME”, Italiani nel Mondo,
XVIII (4), February 25, 1962, p. 2.
58 "L’Accordo di emigrazione italo-brasiliano”, Italiani nel Mondo, XVI (24),

December 25, 1960, pp. 7–11.
59 "Alcune considerazioni pratiche”, Italiani nel Mondo, Vol. XVI (24), p.13.
60 "Surpresa com a suspensao da imigraçao de italianos”, Estado de Sao Paulo,

January 1st, 1963, n. pag.
61 Fernando Bastos de Avila, Immigration in Latin America, (Washington D.C.:

Pan American Union, 1964), p. 164–165.
62 ICEM, “Selective Migration Program for Latin America”, Hearing before the
Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-
Fifth Congress, Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, July 7,
1970, Second Edition, 1970, p. 2.

Secretariat General of the Organization of American States, 1964), p. 239.
64 Favero, Luigi, op. cit., p. 274.
65 Inter-governmental Committee for European Migrations, Selective Migration

Program for Latin America, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, second edition, July
7, 1970 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).
66 Fernando Carneiro, Imigracao e Colonizacao no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Na-

tional Faculty of Philosophy, University of Brazil, Occasional paper N.2, 1950,
p. 32.
67 Skidmore, op. cit., p. 235.

68 Letter of U.S. Senator Herbert Lehman to Minister Oswaldo Aranha, June
18, 1947, Oswaldo Aranha’s Papers, Centro de Pesquisas e Documentaçao

de Historia Contemporanea da Fundaçao Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, ref.
OA47.06.18, p. 4.
69 "Chegam ao Brasil os primeiros imigrantes selecionados”, Boletim da
Organizaçao Internacional de Refugiados, n. 18, Rio de Janeiro, May 1951,
p. 2.
70 Letter of Ilmar Marinho, Brazilian Consul in Rome, to Ambassador Alves de
Souza, Rome, November 8, 1949. Centro Historico do Imigrante, Sao Paulo,
Processo 9010 (Secretaria de Agricultura do Estado de Sao Paulo), n. d.
71 Letter of Claude A. Barnett to Paulo Fernandes (Brazil’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs), April 19, 1950. National Archives, Washington D.C. Department of
State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Document 832.1811/4-1950, De-
classified E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 NND 867200, 6.1.1988.
72 US Foreign Service Despatch from the American Embassy in Vienna to the
Department of State in Washington, November 12, 1952. National Archives,
Washington D.C. Document 832.1863/11-1252, Declassified E.O. 12356,
Sec. 3.3 NND 822900, 6.1.1988.
73 Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs, Vol II, p. 632.
74 "Legislacao imigratoria”, Boletim do Departamento de Imigracao e
Colonizacao, N. 7, December 1952, p. 121.
75 Diva Pinho and Helena Fanganiello, Aspectos do Pensamento Economico,
1940– 1960, (Sao Paulo: IPE/USP, 1986), p. 16, 70.
76 See for example Arthur Hehl Neiva, O Problema Imigratorio Brasileiro,
(Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945); Anibal Texeira de Souza, Imigracao
e Desenvolvimento, (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional de Imigracao e
Colonizacao, 1961).
77 United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America, “Situation and
Prospects of Immigration in Selected Latin American Countries”, (Resolu-
tion adopted by ECLA on June 13, 1949), E/CN.12/169, April 29, 1950,
p. 1; ECLA, “Immigration in Brazil”, E/CN.12/169/Add.1, May 1, 1950,
p. 93; ECLA, “Report of the Economic Development and Immigration”,
Working Committee at the Secretariat Level (Fourth Session, Mexico City),
E/CN 12/224, May 10, 1951, p. 6; ECLA, “Immigration and Economic
Development in Latin America,” (Eigth Session, Panama, Immigration in
Selected Latin American Countries City), E/CN.12/520, April 1st, 1959,
p. 10.
78 Avila, op. cit., p. 101.
79 "Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional propondo a criacao do Instituto Nacional
de Imigracao e Colonizacao e da Carteira de Colonizacao do Banco do Brasil,
em 28 de maio de 1952", in Getulio Vargas, O Governo Trabalhista do
Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1952-69) Vol. 3, p. 123.

80 US Foreign Service Despatch from American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to
the Department of State in Washington, May 16, 1952. “Agreement on Im-
migration and Colonization between Brazil and the Netherlands”. National
Archives, Washington D.C. Document 832.1856/5-1652. Unclassified
E.O.12356. Sec 3.3 NND 822900 6.1.1988.
81 Foreign Service of the United States of America, Confidential despatch from
Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State. “Italian Immigration to Brazil”,
January 12, 1951. National Archives, Washington D.C. Document 832.1865/
1-1251. Declassified E.O.12356 Sec. 3.3 NND 822900, 6.1.88.
82 Sergio Besserman Vianna, A politica economica no Segundo Governo
Vargas (1951– 54), (Rio de Janeiro: BNDS, 1987), p. 17.
83 Gloria La Cava, “As Origens da Emigracao Italiana para America Latina apos
a Segunda Guerra Mundial”, Novos Cadernos, (Sao Paulo: Instituto Italiano
de Cultura), N. 2, 1988, pp. 64–65.
84 Besserman Vianna, p. 122.
85 Sonia Draibe, Rumos e Metamorfoses. Um estudo sobre a constituicao do
Estado e as alternativas da industrializacao no Brasil, 1930– 1960, (Rio
de Janeiro: Paz e Terra), 1985.
86 Besserman Vianna, p. 124.
87 “Acordo administrativo entre o Governo dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e a
Organizacao Internacional de Refugiados”, Revista de Imigracao e
Colonizacao, 7(1) 1952, p. 192.
88 "Relatorio apresentado ao Conselho de Imigracao e Colonizacao pelo
Conselheiro Jose’ Caracas sobre a imigracao holandesa, italiana e seus
problemas”, Revista de Imigracao e Colonizacao, 8 (1), 1952, pp. 73–74.
89 "Chegam ao Brasil os primeiros imigrantes selecionados”, Boletim da
Organizacao Internacional de Refugiados, N. 18, Rio de Janeiro, maio de
1951, p. 3.
90 International Organization of Labor, Immigration into Brazil from Western
Europe, (Second Report submitted by V.C. Phelan, Special Representative
of the International Labour Office to Brazil), Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1952,
p. 18; Instituto Nacional de Imigracao e Colonizacao, Departamento de Estudos
e Planejamento, Divisao de Estatistica, “Imigracao: 1955”, Informacoes
Estatisticas, N. 5, 1956, p. 3.
91 Rosaura Street (former Chief Inspector of the Immigration and Colonization
Division of the Department of Agriculture of the State of Sao Paulo), “Relatorio
de viagem em missao aos paises emigrantistas (Espanha, Grecia e Italia)”,
Sao Paulo, February 1964, Private Archive of the interviewee.
92 Interview with Neuza Catete Reis (former Director of the Immigration Divi-
sion of INIC), Rio de Janeiro, November 18, 1988.

93 "Piano Statunitense in Brasile per la nostra emigrazione agricola”, Italiani
nel Mondo, Vol. XIII (11), June 10, 1957, p. 10.
94 Henrique Doria de Vasconcel los, “Imigracao italiana”, Boletim do
Departamento de Imigracao e Colonizacao, N.7, Secretaria de Agricoltura
do Estado de Sao Paulo, December 1952, p. 102.
95 Angelo Trento, Do outro lado do Atlantico: Um século de imigraçao italiana
no Brasil, (Sao Paulo: Nobel, 1988), p. 421.
96 "Acordo entre a Uniao e o Estado de Sao Paulo para a introducao de
imigrantes”, Boletim do Departamento de Imigracao e Colonizacao, N. 5,
97 Adhemar de Barros, “Mensagem a Assembleia Legislativa”, n.d., (circa 1950-
51). Centro Historico do Imigrante, Sao Paulo, Processo 9010 (Secretaria da
Agricoltura do Estado de Sao Paulo), p. 2.
98 Maria Stella Ferreira Levy, “O papel da imigracao internacional na evolucao
da populacao brasileira (1872 a 1972)”, Revista de Saude Publica, 8 (supl.),
1974, p. 88; “Convenio assinado entre a Secretaria de Promocao Social, o
Ministerio de Relacoes Exteriores e o CIME”, Sao Paulo, Arquivo do Centro
Historico do Imigrante, Processo da Promocao Social 039-79, Annex 6861-
76, 1978.
99 “Plano de imigracao dirigida para a lavoura em 1952”, ibid., p. 111.
100 Letter of Renato Azzi to the Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Sao
Paulo, Sao Paulo, January 3, 1953, Centro Historico do Imigrante, Processo
9733 (Secretaria da Agricultura do Estado de Sao Paulo), p. 2
101 Ibid., p. 4.
102 Ibid., p. 4.
103 Quoted in Trento, pp. 422–423.
104 Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, “Imigracao para a Industria”, TS, March 1st,
1950. Centro Historico do Imigrante, Sao Paulo, Processo 9010 (Secretaria
da Agricultura do Estado de Sao Paulo), n. pag.
105 "Pedrinhas e i problemi dell’emigrazione in un intervista col Direttore Generale
dell’ICLE”, Fanfulla, September 29, 1955, quoted in Trento, p. 437.
106 "Nao atende aos interesses do Brasil neste momento a vinda de imigrantes”
(Interview to Renato Azzi, Director of DIC), Diario de Sao Paulo, July 14th,
1953, p. 12.
107 Letter of Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos to the Secretary of Agriculture of
the State of Sao Paulo, April 14, 1952. Centro Historico do Imigrante, Sao
Paulo, Processo 9733 (Secretaria da Agricoltura do Estado de Sao Paulo),
Autos 34933, n. pag.

108 Interview to I. Ferreira, “Piano statunitense in Brasile per la nostra emigrazione
agricola”, Italiani nel Mondo, Vol. XIII (11), June 10, 1957, p. 10.
109 Interview with Rosaura Street, Sao Paulo, August 16, 1987.
110 Ibid.
111 Letter of Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, DIC Director, to Raimundo Firmino
Cruz Martins, Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Sao Paulo, July 28,
1955, Centro Historico do Imigrante, Processo 10437, Oficio 1560, n. pag.
112 Letter of Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, DIC Director, to Procopio Gomes
de Freitas, INIC President, December 9, 1955, Sao Paulo, Centro Historico
do Imigrante, Processo 10659, p. 2.
113 "Emigraçao qualificada: até operarios doentes embarcam para o Brazil”,
Estado de Sao Paulo, January 18, 1963, n. pag.
114 Warren Dean, “Visit to the Hospedaria”, TS, Sao Paulo (Brazil), May 13,
1963.
Chapter 3

Immigration Historiography,
Ethnic Theories and the
Immigrant Experience
Assimilation and Cultural Integration
The notion of easy assimilation or adjustment of the Italian group

became accepted in most comparative historical studies dealing with
its cultural experience in Brazil1 and Argentina which, seemed to have
greater opportunities for social integration than in the US.2 Baily, in
his study on the adjustment of Italian immigrants in Buenos Aires and
New York, argues that different group expectations in relation to their
permanence in the host society were indicated by the different rates of
repatriations, 30 and 50 percent respectively. Italian repatriations from
Sao Paulo (40 percent) were also lower than those from New York in
the same period.3
Similarly, Herbert Klein’s comparative study on the integration of
Italian immigrants in the United States and Argentina argued that their
upward mobility was higher in Argentina than in the US, as demon-
strated by the greater success in real estate, land ownership and occu-
pational distribution (professions and industry).4 Klein’s argument was
questioned by US and Argentinean scholars on various grounds, par-
ticularly as to his lack of analysis of other immigrants’ group status
in relation to the Italian one. Halperin Donghi critique represents per-
haps the most original contribution for a revision of the easy assimila-
tion and upward mobility theses. Drawing on statistical data from the
1914 census, Halperin wrote that:
while in the city of Buenos Aires as a whole Italians owned 32 percent of all
urban properties, the percentage dropped to 14 percent in . . . the older city
92 Historiography and the Immigrant Experience

























center, 13 percent in the new downtown area and 26 percent in the upper
class residential quarter; but 41 percent of all real estates owners were Italian
in . . . an immense swampy district of recent lower class settlements. . . .
What is immediately available does not completely supports Prof. Klein con-
tention that “a remarkably large proportion of Italians succeeded in owning
land”, even in grain-growing areas, where they were “especially successful”.5
Halperin’s conclusion ultimately tarnished the myth of the Italian

success in Argentina in the turn of the century.
It was not merely that wave after relentless wave of new immigrants con-
firmed the new image of the Italian as the poorest among the poor. The older
Italian economic elite did not weather the transition as successfully as some
of the Irish and Basque, who had acquired extensive land bases. By 1850
Italians had a stranglehold on river navigation, but Argentine expansion was
shaped by the railways. By 1890 the very few Italians who somehow man-
aged to reach the top were seen at best as exceptions and—more frequently—
as irritating upstarts, the vanguard in a silent siege against the high places in
Argentine society—a siege that might succeed, so the fears went, because of
the sheer numbers of the plebeian invaders from overseas. 6
As far as Sao Paulo is concerned—to simply associate higher rates

of permanence may not be related with higher upward mobility, since
factors such as lower wage levels and family immigration versus the
single-men migration in the U.S. might have affected these rates. Inci-
dentally, a study on immigrants and the labor movement in Sao Paulo
did show that, according to the 1920 census, just one percent of the
foreign population had naturalized, in spite of limited rights to partici-
pate in public life and that the majority dreamed of returning to their
home land.7 The same trend and attitudes by Italian immigrants were
apparent in Argentina, where there were no particular incentives to
naturalize as the “Constitution accorded foreigners the same rights as
those of the native-born, except the right to vote and to run for elec-
tion”. Foreigners could indeed participate, under certain conditions,
in elections for local administration.8
The historiography on the “Great Italian Emigration” (1880–1915)
concerning Latin America developed along three basic lines. An es-
sentially optimistic vision—partially inspired to the American myth
“from rags to riches”—emphasized the success of the most skilful and
hard-working individuals, originating from the more advanced Euro-
pean regions, who contributed to the progress of the host countries.
In Brazil, these assumptions were strengthened by the belief that Eu-
ropean immigrants, above all Italians, were easily assimilated thanks
to the lack of racial and ethnic discrimination of the local society.
Historiography and the Immigrant Experience 93

























Classical studies argued that “the immigrant was responsible for
breaking the invisible . . . frontiers which prevented innovation from
taking place, after society crystalized in closed compartments: aristoc-
racy, common people and slaves”.9 The Italian immigrant was per-
ceived as the primary agent of modernization. He was believed to be
responsible for establishing small and medium rural holdings in con-
trast to the dominant latifundia properties. He was also believed to
have contributed to start industrialization thanks to his previous urban
industrial experiences and knowledge of market economy.10
The optimistic interpretation, emphasizing the success achieved by
the shrewdest and hardest-working immigrants, was questioned by a
biography on Count Francesco Matarazzo, the most successful among
Italian immigrants in Brazil.11 This study argued that Matarazzo was
not a typical immigrant since he had middle class origins and brought
his own capital to set up a sales business. Later on, he was able to
expand his activities thanks to the financial support of British banks.
Matarazzo eventually became an industrial tycoon and a banker of the
Italian community.
Another approach first introduced by Dean and others (Chapter I),
appears particularly relevant for the comparative study of Italian mi-
gration history by focusing on the racial ideology of the host country
as one major determinant of the migration experience. 12
Finally, a third approach—inspired by Marxist theory—identified a
strong correlation between emigration and proletarization by analyz-
ing the economic motivations for Italian emigration. Accordingly, many
studies in the 1970s showed that the dissemination of capitalism in
Italy in the last decades of the XIX century provoked the exodus of
hundreds of thousand peasants from regions such as Veneto and South-
ern Italy; their emigration would exemplify more a sort of disguised
conflict than a spontaneous wish to carry out an individual challenge. 13
Over the 1980s, however, Italian authors began to question the
simple correlation between proletarization and emigration.14 In a study
on Cosentino communities in Calabria, a traditional region for over-
seas migration, Piselli concluded that correlation was clearly negative
since only small and medium proprietors families, rather than landless
peasants’, could face the costs for the journey of one or more family
members. An essay by a US historian of Italian immigration, Herbert
Klein, also emphasized the fact that “immigrants’ groups usually came
from the better situated and more mobile upper elements of the work-
ing classes in all regions, thus tending toward a homogenization of
immigrants, despite the regional variations that did exist”.15
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While thePiselli argument seems correct as it is restricted to a spe-
cific Southern area, Klein’s generalization is not confirmed by the data
available on Italian immigration to Brazil. In fact there was both an
emigration of landless laborers as well as one of small and medium
proprietors who migrated under very different circumstances. The ru-
ral poor in Veneto and Southern Italy could migrate because their
passages were covered by the Latin American receiving countries. On
the other hand the emigration of small proprietors exemplified a spon-
taneous migration, whose destination was the United States, which
did not offer official immigration projects (some subsidized migration
occurred only through private companies).
In Brazilian historiography on Italian immigration, Alvim’s was the
most representative study based on the proletarization argument. This
most impressive contribution was the first comprehensive work of Ital-
ian migration experience in Sao Paulo from the origins to the settle-
ment in the coffee-producing region, considering also repatriations. If
the journey away from Italy represented a rebellious act against the
process of becoming landless, the maintenance of the family-work
organization, the abandonment of the country for the city, represent
for Alvim a continuity with the past struggle.16
The study also redefines the notion of easy upward mobility and
assimilation of Italian immigrants in Sao Paulo, showing that repatria-
tions accounted for about 40 percent over total entries between 1870
and 1920 and that they could have been higher without the economic
difficulties involved.
Generally speaking, most studies on Italian and other ethnic groups
concentrated on the uniqueness of that experience, rarely on policies
and racial/ethnic ideas of the host society. From this perspective,
Lesser’s Welcoming the Undesirables can be considered an innova-
tive study offering new ways to look at immigration history. First, he
offered a wider picture than the traditional Black and White paradigm
for race relations in Brazil, by analyzing ethnic groups who would not
fit under either categories: Jews, Japanese, Arabs, etc. Second, he
showed how racial prejudice could exist side by side with the accep-
tance, for economic reasons, of undesirable groups. These elements
provided an interesting model for the study of ethnicity in a society
such as Brazil’s, which officially denies its multiculturalism.17
The issues related to the immigrant assimilation and cultural inte-
gration have also inspired most anthropological studies dealing with
this experience in the Americas. This was also true for immigration
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and ethnic oriented-studies in Brazil, particularly in the 1950s, when
Italian immigration was resumed again. As this more recent immigra-
tion is the main concern of the present study, it is useful to recall the
origins and evolution of these theories as well as their empirical appli-
cations.
The term assimilation was originally coined by “melting pot” theo-
rists based at the University of Chicago, led by Robert Park. This
group of social scientists began studying the experience of European
immigrants in American cities since the 1910s, at a time of massive
European arrivals. Various stages were conceptualized in the so called
“race relations cycle” leading eventually to a final amalgamation of the
immigrant with the receiving culture.18 Accordingly, assimilation was
defined as the process of “adopting significant aspects of the domi-
nant culture”. 19
As Steinberg pointed out, the Chicago School was later criticized in
the US by the so called “ethnic pluralists” for implying the inevitable
dissolution of ethnic groups into the American mainstream culture.
This latter group of scholars centered instead on the strength of the
concept of ethnicity in American immigration history, emphasizing
the cultural continuities with the immigrants’ origins.
Assimilation was also criticized for being a unilateral concept within
group relations, “suggesting that the immigrant is completely dispos-
sessed of his old culture and that he virtually goes through a total
renovation, from his clothing to his mentality”. Accordingly the con-
cept of assimilation denied the multiple qualities the immigrant takes
along with him in the host country . . .”.20
The first social studies on ethnic groups in Brazil began to appear
only since the 1930s, along with the establishment of assimilation
legislation. It is interesting to notice that this later concern with the
ethnic issue, compared with the United States, was due to the fact that
generally speaking foreign groups were not considered as a threat or a
problem, by local Brazilian society.21
The Chicago School—with Donald Pierson and Samuel Lowrie car-
rying out their field research in Brazil—particularly influenced scholars
based at the Escola de Sociologia e Politica of Sao Paulo, ESP, funded
in 1932 by social scientists with a technocratic orientation.
Emilio Willems’ Assimilaçao e Populaçoes Marginais no Brazil
on the assimilation of German immigrants and their descendants, which
appeared in 1940 with an introduction of Donald Pierson, was con-
sidered one of the most important of ESP contributions. 22 Several
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articles on the cultural aspects of foreign immigrant communities also
appeared in Sociologia, the ESP review, as well as in the Revista do
Arquivo Municipal.
In 1941 Pierson published an article on racial and cultural relations
in urban setting, defining the process of assimilation as the inner ex-
perience of individuals adopting common ideas, objectives, symbols,
attitudes and feelings.23 In the United States, he argued, assimilation
proceeded very rapidly, as immigrants rejected their original culture
which was considered inferior by the host society. This was especially
true for second and third generations.
Perhaps one the most influential studies (also on Latin Americanist
immigration scholars) was Oscar Handlin’s The Uprooted, published
in the early 1950s. It concerned the assimilation of immigrants from
European peasant societies to the U.S. environment.24 In a revisionist
article, Rudolph Vecoli points out that Handlin described the history
of immigration as a “desperate flight from disaster”, as “a history of
alienation and its consequences”, emphasizing “the isolation and lone-
liness of the immigrant, ‘the broken homes, interruption of a familiar
life, separation from known surroundings, the becoming a foreigner
and ceasing to belong’”. 25 Yet for Vecoli, as for most of the so called
American ethnic pluralists, this view did not provide an adequate frame-
work to understand the Italian experience in America.
Because it overemphasizes the power of environment and underestimates the
toughness of cultural heritage, Handlin’s thesis does not comprehend the ex-
perience of the immigrants from Southern Italy. The basic error of this thesis
is that it subordinates historical complexity to the symmetrical pattern of so-
ciological theory. Rather than constructing ideal types of the “peasant” or
“the immigrant”, the historian of immigration must study the distinctive cul-
tural character of each ethnic group and the manner in which this influenced
its adjustment in the New World.26
In Brazil, an important group of studies on the immigrants’ assimi-

lation was produced by intellectuals connected to official Brazilian in-
stitutions. Giorgio Mortara, head of the Statistics Department of the
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, coordinated various
investigations based on census sources with special attention to
the Italian group.27 A demographer, Mortara was an Italian Jew who
emigrated to Brazil in the 1930s. He emphasized in particular the
high Italian rates of intermarriages with Brazilians and their higher
adoption of the Portuguese language compared with other ethnic
groups.
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The general assumption of these studies was that foreigners assimi-
lation was facilitated, on the one hand, by Brazilian cultural attributes
such as tolerance, warmth and democratic acceptance of different races
and, on the other, by the different immigrants’ background. Immigrant
groups were therefore rated according to their propensity to assimi-
late: first, Italians (followed by Spaniards), because of their supposed
cultural affinities with Brazil; then would come the Poles, the French-
men and finally the Germans. Japanese were considered the most
difficult to assimilate due to their racial differences.28 The higher the
“assimilability” of foreigners, the more desirable they would be. Inci-
dentally, as will be shown later, the post World War II immigration
experience proved quite the opposite: Italians turned out to be less
assimilated than other foreigners such as Spanish and Japanese.
In the post war years the concept of integration begun to replace
that of assimilation in the sense that it was being recognized that im-
migrant cultures may enrich the receiving country and may adapt them-
selves better, if not repressed. In Brazil, where immigration was at the
time regaining some momentum, the concept of compulsory assimila-
tion lost its significance within the nationalist and populist official dis-
courses; the cultural integration of immigrants became the most com-
mon term in contemporary social studies, although some of the old
assimilation assumptions continued to be central to the debate.
Scholars now tend to be critical of the compulsory assimilation
policies of the 1930s, considering them detrimental to the cultural
adjustment of immigrants. Integration was perceived as a gradual pro-
cess “whereby an immigrant little by little becomes adapted to the
physical and socio-cultural environment of the country of his adop-
tion.29 The final obliteration of ethnicity was no longer perceived as
the final objective of assimilation, but rather “the development of a
pluralistic structure in the receiving society” in which individual ethnic
groups would retain, at least up to a certain point, their identity. This
more gradual, tolerant, flexible and pluralistic process was considered
as being more effective for the ultimate integration of immigrants.
Unlike compulsory assimilation that emphasized formal aspects of the
adoption of the new culture, integration looked at the internal process
whereby the immigrant would be assimilated “when he feels that he
belongs to the new society”.30
In the 1950s, particularly when difficulties related to the new immi-
grants’ adjustment were occurring, the United Nations Agency for
Education and Culture, UNESCO, undertook studies in three fields
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affecting migration: the adjustment of migrants, the economics of
migration and the teaching of languages. According to UNESCO, cul-
tural adjustment was important, among other factors, to minimize the
risk of back movement resulting from non absorption of migrants.
These studies were oriented to discover the causes of immigrants’
repatriations and evaluating the methods followed by different coun-
tries to achieve the integration of immigrants. Considerable attention
was given to the methods for selecting immigrants, to the teaching of
the language before departure and to the dissemination of informa-
tion about the receiving countries. Canada, for instance, was taken as
a good example of successful immigration policy implementation as
to the integration of immigrants. The various services offered to them
were object of study by special delegations sent by various immigrant
receiving countries, including Brazil.
UNESCO funded the Centro Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociais,
CLACSO, in Rio de Janeiro which attracted some important scholars
of immigration and cultural integration: Fernando Bastos de Avila,
Manuel Diegues Jr., José Arthur Rios and others. To CLACSO ar-
rived also numerous foreign scholars, such as Bertram Hutchinson, an
Englishman who carried out research on labor and social mobility.
At the same time, a boom in migration studies emphasizing the
success of immigrants, even in historical perspective occurred pre-
cisely at this time of difficulties for official migration programs and
repatriations. UNESCO even prepared a symposium on “The Positive
Contribution of Immigrants” whose preface argued:
At the present stage of the history of migration the odds are staked against
the migrant. In every major country of immigration there now exists a mass
of formalities subjecting migrants to close checks, and well developed govern-
ment machinery for relating the entry of immigrants to national needs. Fur-
ther, trade unions, professional societies and public opinion generally keep a
close watch on the volume and nature of immigration. . . . Some thought was
given before this project was initiated as to whether UNESCO might be criti-
cized for concentrating on the positive contributions by immigrants and leav-
ing aside possible negative factors . . . the consultations we made convinced
us that (this) was in fact the most useful approach.31
Case studies presented on Brazil and Argentina, respectively by

Emilio Willems and Jorge Hechen, therefore concentrated upon the
contributions to the industrial development, demographic and social
structure of pre-World War II by immigrant groups, leaving aside the
problems of contemporary immigration.
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An essay appeared in 1957 by an Italian-Brazilian anthropologist,
emphasized, on the other hand, the difficulties involved in the ethnic
experience. He discussed altogether concepts like assimilation and
marginality of the immigrant, as part of the same experience.
Assimilation is connected to the abandonment of the original social struc-

ture.. and the initial immigrant disorientation reflects the problem of reorga-
nizing his personality. The immigrant experiences in the first phase a subver-
sion of values linked to his social image and an affectional void around him.
To feel someone again, it takes on average from one to two years. During this
period back trips are frequent and they are explained . . . as returns to the
original structure. After two years, back trips are less frequent as the immi-
grant is definitively conquered by the new community. Conquered does not
mean integrated. The immigrant marginality is a shadow accompanying him
for his entire life. This marginality will take to the disintegration of the origi-
nal culture and to the assimilation process, across two generations.32
An anthropological study on the Italian community of Polignanesi

in the capital city of Sao Paulo, published in a collection of essays
edited by Hutchinson, provided new and interesting empirical insights
on the relationship between ethnicity, social mobility and integration.33
Unlike Mortara, who emphasized the trend towards intermarriages
with Brazilians, the author noted an endogamous tendency within
this Southern Italian community, which needed close family connec-
tions to carry out the cereal or fish-selling business. Another reason
for endogamy was the need to avoid that “difficulties could arise at the
moment of returning to Italy, an intention which was shared by the
majority of immigrants, as we had the occasion to point out many
times”.34
The portray of this group’s social mobility appears to be applicable
at a more general level to Italian immigrants in Sao Paulo:
. . . while the (first generation) mobility is based entirely on individual eco-

nomic improvement, that of the second and third generations is based also on
professional skills requiring a greater level of education . . . The depreciation
of ‘folk’ habits occurs in the beginning in the name of an Italian culture, not in
favor of the local one; this was so because the idea of returning one day to
Italy brought immigrants to attempt to gain their connationals consideration;
indeed people who had achieved a high economic status, although they
were not worried about their being illiterate, were concerned about learning
Italian.35
Castaldi noted that the creation of an Italian ethnic identity was an

essential aspect of, not in contradiction with, immigrants’ integration.
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The immigrant’s son who becomes an intellectual represents the extreme
case in the process of the family assimilation, in the sense that other people
of the same generation, for example his brothers, usually stay closer to their
primary group. . . . 36 He becomes “Italian” because the making of the Brazil-
ian middle class acquires ethnic, rather than economic connotations: the Bra-
zilian middle class becomes self-conscious as an ethnic group in the city of
Sao Paulo, where there are as many ethnic groups as nations. . . .37
Historically, the most important catalyst for the Italian ethnic iden-
tity was related to the idea of a hard working group of individuals who
promoted economic modernization particularly in the State of Sao
Paulo. This labor ideology actually enabled Italian immigrants to iden-
tify as an ethnic group in relation to Brazilians, although they contin-
ued to be Veneti, Lombardi, Toscani, etc.38 Italian ethnicity was very
well pictured by another recent anthropological study in Sao Paulo:
Italianità means to know how to work, to adapt, to sacrifice, to participate
and to contribute to another country’s progress. In short Italianità means
pride.39
The first Brazilian working class generation was indeed constituted

mainly of Italian immigrants; urban retailing and craftsmanship were
mostly performed by Italian immigrants originating from specific towns,
such as Polignanesi.
In the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo, where most newcomers did
arrive in the post war years, Italian immigrants found a long time
established group of first, second and third generation connationals.
The latter originated equally from the North and the South of Italy,
although with a strong concentration from certain regions (Veneto
and Calabria), provinces and towns (Polignano a Mare, etc.).
As a recent study on the Italians in Sao Paulo pointed out, “there is
an extraordinary differentiation between social classes among immi-
grants. “The immigrant upward mobility, when it occurred, brought to
a physical and cultural distance from his original “primary” group and
even to a gradual depreciation of it. These primary groups were con-
nected to Italians residing in popular ethnic neighborhoods such as
Bras and Bexiga. At the same time, successful Italians would attempt
to reinforce their ethnic identity by becoming members of Circolo
Italiano, a rare example of national association.40
The Circolo was an exclusive social club funded in 1911 by immi-
grant economic and intellectual elites. During the Fascist years, it gath-
ered the most outspoken supporters of the Italian regime, and main-
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tained a very conservative outlook also from the late 1940s on, when
it was joined by entrepreneurs and professionals, often of Fascist back-
ground, who had migrated at their own expenses after the end of the
conflict.
The joining of Fascist associations by some Italian immigrant strata
reflected the desire by some immigrant strata to obtain a social recog-
nition from official authorities.
Therefore, the immigrants’ participation to these associations should be re-

garded more as an aspect of their upward mobility, than as a political choice.
. . . generally speaking the immigrant sympathies with the regime have the
same meaning.41
Another aspect of the internal social divisions among the Italian

group in Sao Paulo was a strong regionalism, expressed through nu-
merous local cultural associations belonging to different Italian regions
or even towns, each one with its dialect, popular events, food and so
on. Even mutual aid societies were regionally oriented and short-lived.
Constant rivalries to achieve the supremacy in the community were
reported by the local Italian press. Their names clearly reflected a
regional orientation: Southern Union, Puglie, Basilicata, Lazio, Unione
Veneta, Società Popolare Emiliana, Società Dante Alighieri, etc.42 The
regional fragmentation was apparent as late as 1985, when associa-
tions such as Basilicata, Laziale, Regionale Ligure and World Sicil-
ians were still being created.43
The idea of a comprehensive Italian ethnicity does not seem appli-
cable to Sao Paulo, as to many other Italian American communities.
Rather, it seems more appropriate to consider a number of different
ethnic sub-groups, each maintaining an organized system of behavior
and symbols: that casted cultural boundaries to distinguish insiders
from outsiders. Southern Italians, in particular, arriving in huge num-
bers after 1900, concentrated in different urban neighborhoods ac-
cording to their geographical origins: Neapolitans in Bras, Calabresi
in Bexiga, etc.; Veneti, on the other hand, settled in Bom Retiro.
The present perception of ethnicity by Italian immigrants in Sao
Paulo has been portrayed in relation to a general feeling of duality and
dissatisfaction, especially evident in the following quotes.
“I was born Italian, but I’m Brazilian because I love Brazil. I am always in
between: neither here nor there. I can’t deny that I am Italian, though. I am
not naturalized.”
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“There are things that I don’t understand here and there. I’m neither in
heaven nor in hell. The immigrants will always have one foot here and the
other there. We have a painful life.”
“Personally I’d never repeat the adventure of immigration. At the end of
our lives we realize that it doesn’t pay to leave one’s country, family, and
friends. What for? I have friends here, but I am still very connected with my
paese.”44
“The immigrant marginality is a shadow accompanyig him over his

entire life”. 45 This statement by Cecchi, drawn from his comparative
analysis of Italian immigrants in the United States and Brazil, seems
to be still accurate.
In conclusion, the notions of cultural assimilation or integration
appear as too deterministic and therefore difficult to apply indiscrimi-
nately to the complexities of the Italian immigration experience, par-
ticularly in post World War II Brazil. Both concepts, with varying
emphasis, assumed a linear process of disintegration of the original
culture, and subsequent reorganization of personality in which the
immigrant was “conquered” by the new community.
Perhaps the weakest point of assimilation and integration theses
was an underestimation of the importance of the wish to repatriate as
one of the most painful conflict inherent in the migration experience
to Latin America, and one that involved most first-generation immi-
grants. This wish seemed to be felt by immigrants independently from
their actual possibility of returning home.
Only few studies have been carried out concerning post World War
II return migration, such as those by Argentinean sociologists Gino
Germani and Juan Marsal.46 According to Germani, repatriations from
Argentina in the post war years were as high as 68 percent, while
Marsal pointed out through the life history of an unsuccessful Spanish
immigrant returning after 32 years, the lack of reintegration within
the original family group.
Marsal’s life history showed how without a satisfactory economic
position, and being unable to replace his primary relationships, the
immigrant tended to search for his origins, although the process of re-
rooting in the original family and social group turned out to be even
more difficult and painful than the adjustment to the foreign country.47
The author ultimately wondered how many returnees, incapable of
adapting themselves, felt motivated and strong enough to undertake a
third migration.
The literature on Brazil is not particularly rich, but offers enough
hints to evaluate this process. Camilo Cecchi’s anthropological study
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pointed out how the original immigrant community tended to encour-
age immigration, transforming the expatriate from a marginal person
into an active member of the same community. If he returned success-
fully, he was expected to perform as a leading member, while the
immigrant who failed was usually rejected, just as in Marsal’s study.
As far as the post war subsidized emigration was concerned, Cecchi
argued that although the home government helped unsuccessful im-
migrants to repatriate, their failure could not be accepted by the origi-
nal community.48 He did emphasize some important differences con-
cerning repatriations of immigrants proceeding from small town or
large cities, suggesting that the former would meet greater difficulties
in readjusting to the original environment than the latter group.
The metropolitan returnee was partially able to escape the negative
sanctions and jokes of his relatives and friends, because the social
space was larger and it was easier for him to move around. The small
town immigrant, on the other hand, would be deeply affected by the
response of his environment. He would probably emigrate again; oth-
erwise he would become definitely marginalized.49
Immigration and Economic Modernization:

A Critique of the main assumptions
Modernization theory was first elaborated by economists within the

UN Economic Commission for Latin America in the 1950S to provide
an interpretation for the various stages in the economic development
of the continent. In social terms it basically assumed the existence of a
dual society with an advanced or modern sector and a backward or
traditional sector. The classic modernization argument, as far as the
historical role of immigration was concerned, was spelled out by
Argentinean sociologist Gino Germani in his essay “Mass Immigra-
tion and Modernization in Argentina”, where he argued that:
in the process of Argentine’s society transformation, foreigners were prefer-

entially placed in the emerging strata. Entrepreneurs, workers and managers
in strategic areas of industry and commerce were at the root of moderniza-
tion. They predominated especially in the middle class and the new urban
industrial proletariat, both categories belonging to the new economic struc-
ture which was replacing traditional society. It was precisely in the older eco-
nomic activities that the native born continued to predominate, as well as in
activities directly related to government operations. . . . 50 The overseas immi-
grants were the bearers of different attitudes toward agriculture, saving, eco-
nomic life and mobility aspirations. Partly because of a different cultural heri-
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tage and partly as an effect of displacement, they became a powerful impulse
toward modernization.51
During the post World War II years, this dual interpretation of soci-
ety became widely—and often simplistically—accepted by most inter-
national agencies and scholars concerned with labor issues and the
economic development of Latin America. For example, the Director
General of the ILO at a meeting of the Governing Body on March 9,
1951, called for the end of ‘the tragic paradox of the present epoch
. . . namely, the simultaneous existence of countries with too many
hands and brains and of countries where those hands and brains could
contribute to the development of unexploited resources’”.52
Just like in the turn of the century immigrants were believed to have
encouraged the creation of the most modern economic sectors, the
introduction of foreign workers in the 1950s was believed to be able
“to speed up and extend economic development in the country receiv-
ing them, thereby increasing national income”. 53
A former chairman of INIC and a strenuous supporter of immigra-
tion even attempted to quantify the benefits brought about by ICEM-
transported European workers.
Frequently immigration is considered a sort of welfare assistance which the

receiving country offers to the immigrant. . . . Yet, when a “subsidized immi-
grant” arrives in Brazil, the country receives somebody who, up until that
moment, consumed education and many other things in addition to food in
his original country. Let us imagine a milling machine worker who before
becoming an immigrant spent the following amount of money:
1. Living expenses and primary education, up to 15 years=
Cr. 300,000
2. Technical and professional training, from 15 to 20 years=
Cr. 150,000

Cr. 450,000
Brazil spends for each immigrant transportation US $ 40 and 2,000 more for
his disembarking, early hosting and placement, equal to Cr. 10,000. So that
just in the beginning there is a gain of Cr. 440,000. Yet this is very little
compared to the impact of the same immigrant on our economy. . . . A pes-
simistic estimate would attribute to the submentioned worker a yearly partici-
pation in the national GNP not lower than Cr. 240,000.54
The immigrant cultural superiority in economic terms substituted in

the 1950s for the traditional concept of racial and ethnic primacy, as
the general attention was increasingly drawn by the issues of eco-
nomic modernization and industrialization. In this perspective eco-
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nomic development was considered to be resulting from a series of
human and cultural attitudes which were lacking in Latin America, the
sort of “spirit of capitalism” described by Max Weber. Such attitudes
were well summarized in the following passage:
— a more favorable attitude toward social or economic change;
— greater interest in the productive process itself or in its result;
— a stronger conviction of the power of man over his environment;
— greater future level of consumption or of production as compared to present
levels. 55
As far the industrial development of Brazil was concerned, qualified

professionals brought through ICEM special programs were consid-
ered by immigration supporters among the most active participants
“to our development in the automobile, steel, electrical and heavy in-
dustries”. 56 This positive contribution of European immigrants was
perceived as mostly valuable to large industrial firms started in the
1950s in Brazil, especially with foreign investments.
In a paper prepared by ICEM in May 1959 and submitted to the
Economic Commission of Latin America, it was argued that the ECLA
analysis centering on the inadequate rate of capital formation as the
main limiting factor to growth in Latin America was too narrow to
offer a comprehensive interpretation. “. . . An essential key to the
economic development of Latin America is the raising of the produc-
tivity of its labor force”, stated the ICEM paper in an attempt to pro-
vide a complementary approach and “bring out a neglected variable in
the development analysis of the region”. 57 The paper concluded that
to achieve the objective of an adequate industrial manpower, the only
short-term solution would be immigration, since improved education
and vocational training would require a long time span.
In an early and rather celebratory study on immigration published
in 1956, Avila defined the immigrant as:
a bearer of skilled labor; he allows for the equipment and functioning of cer-
tain key sectors, leading the entire economic development, and influences
employment in an important way.58
He also would argue that there was “a positive inter-relation between

development in Latin America and labor census, which was partly fed
by immigration”. 59
However, in a later work, he reversed one of the most common
assumptions of modernization scholarship arguing that “it is not im-
migration that achieves economic progress, it is economic progress
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that stimulates immigration”.60 In what can be considered as a rather
innovative contribution to the immigration and modernization debate
of the time, Avila showed how salaries paid in Latin American coun-
tries could not compete with those offered in other immigration coun-
tries such as Australia, Canada and the US, being this a main reason
for the failure of immigration to Latin America.
Today there is not a single country in the continent which pays salaries on
which the immigrant can maintain his usual standard of living and bring his
family from overseas. The rent of a room, a house or of a humble flat alone,
throws out of balance the budget of any immigrant who is not a professional
specialist. 61
Since unskilled workers accounted for the great majority of immigrants,

he concluded that the little economic attraction that Latin American
countries had for European immigrants brought them to prefer other
destinations. The Italian immigrants’ industrial experience, particu-
larly in Brazil—which received the largest amount of ICEM-subsidized
industrial laborers throughout Latin America—certainly supports this
thesis.
On the other hand, Avila’s view of the immigrants’ contribution to
rural development can be regarded as more in line with moderniza-
tion assumptions, in spite of his acknowledgement of the financial and
technical deficiencies which had characterized immigrants’ rural settle-
ments in the late 1940s and 1950s.
A long-term agricultural settlement by immigrants could be one of the most
progressive and dynamic ways of developing the agriculture of these coun-
tries. Two main elements are necessary for increasing agricultural produc-
tion: the use of modern farming methods and controlled farm credits, by
which we mean the granting of credits to the small landowner, and making
available to him the technical advice of a specialist. Immigrants who settle in
the Latin American agricultural settlements area able to absorb modern farm-
ing methods, thanks to their culture and social organization.62
Although a fervent supporter of European labor in the Latin Ameri-

can continent, this highly respected mulatto intellectual, a Sociology
Professor at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, ultimately rec-
ognized the failure of the immigration design as it had been conceived
in the 1950s. He wrote:
Immigration is not an isolated process. It is part of the general process of
raising a people’s social and economic level; if this general process did not
take place, the only people who would immigrate would be adventurers who
are not always desirable, and pioneers who are increasingly rare.63
Notes
1 Thales de Azevedo, Italianos e Gauchos: os Anos Pioneiros da Colonizacao

Italiana no Rio Grande do Sul, (Porto Alegre: Instituto Estadual do Livro,
1975); Mario Carelli, Carcamanos e Comendadores: os Italianos de Sao
Paulo da Realidade a Ficcao, 1919– 1930, (Sao Paulo: Atica, 1985); Eunice
Ribeiro Durham, Assimilacao e Mobilidade (Sao Paulo: Instituto de Estudos
Brasileiros, USP, 1966); Giorgio Mortara, “Contribution to the Matrimonial
ans Reproductive Assimilation of the Principal Alien Sections of the Popula-
tions in Brazil”, Population Studies, (Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants),
Supplement 3, 1950.
2 Torquato Di Tella, “Argentina: un’Australia Italiana? L’Impatto dell’Emigrazione

sul Sistema Politico Argentino”, in Bezza, B., ed., Gli Italiani fuori dall’Italia
(Milano: Franco Angeli, 1983); Samuel Bailey, “The Adjustment of Italian
Immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York, 1870–1914”, American Histori-
cal Review, 88 (2), 1983; Herbert Klein, “The Integration of Italian Immi-
grants into the United States and Argentina: a Comparative Analysis”, Ameri-
can Historical Review, 88 (2), 1983.
3 Zuleica Alvim, Brava Gente, (Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986), p. 122.
4 H. Klein, p.323.
5 Tulio Halperin Donghi, “Comments”, American Historical Review, 88 (2),

April 1983, pp. 338–339.
6 Ibid., p. 342.
7 Sheldom L. Maram, Anarquistas, Comunistas e o Movimento Operario no

Brasil, 1890– 1920, (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979).
8 Gino Germani, “Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina”, in I. L.

Horowitz, Masses in Latin America, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1970), pp. 314–315.
9 Franco Cenni, Italianos no Brasil, (Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins, n.d.), pp.
181–182.

Theorie Generale de l’Immigration (Rio de Janeiro: AGIR, 1956); Manuel
Diegues Junior, Imigracao, Urbanizacao e Industrializacao, (Rio de Janeiro:
Ministerio de Educacao e Cultura, 1964); Durham, op. cit.; Gino Germani,
“Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina” in Horowitz, ed., Masses
in Latin America, (New York, 1970); Maria Thereza Petrone, O Imigrante e
a Pequena Propriedade, (Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1982).
11 José de Souza Martins, Conde Matarazzo. O empresario e a empresa, (Sao

Paulo: Hucitec, 1976, 2nd. edition).
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12 José de Souza Martins, A Imigracao e a Crise do Brasil Agrario, (Sao Paulo:
Pioneira, 1973).
13 G. Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia Moderna. Lo Sviluppo del Capitalismo e
del Movimento Operaio, 1870-1896, (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1977); Emilio
Franzina, La Grande Emigrazione: L’Esodo dei Rurali dal Veneto nel Secolo
XIX, (Venice: Marsilio, 1976).
14 Fortunata Piselli, Parentela ed Emigrazione, Mutamenti e Continuita’ in
una Comunita’ Calabrese, (Torino: Einaudi, 1981), p. VIII.
15 Herbert S. Klein, “The Integration of Italian Immigrants into the United States
and Argentina: A Comparative Analysis”, American Historical Review, 88
(2), April 1983, p. 311.
16 Alvim, p. 116.
17 Jeff Lesser, Welcoming the Undesirables. Brazil and the Jewish Question,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
18 Stephen Steinberg, The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity and Class in America,
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1981), pp. 46–47.
19 Ibid., p. 47.
20 Thomas Brinley, p. 56.
21 Camilo Cecchi, “Estudo comparativo da assimilaçao e marginalidade do
imigrante italiano”, Sociologia, XIX (2), May 1957, p. 105.
22 Emilio Willems, Assimilaçao e Populaçoes Marginais no Brasil: Estudo
sociologico dos imigrantes germanicos e seus descendentes, (Sao Paulo:
Editora Nacional, 1940).
23 Donald Pierson, “Um sistema de referencia para o estudo dos contactos raciais
e culturais”, Sociologia, III (1), March 1941, p. 14.
24 Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted, (Boston, 1951).
25 Rudolph J. Vecoli, “Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of the Uprooted”, Jour-
nal of American History (51), 1964, p. 407.
26 Ibid., p. 417.
27 Giorgio Mortara, “Contribuiçao para o estudo da assimilaçao matrimonial e
reprodutiva dos principais grupos estrangeiros na populacao do Brasil”,
Pesquisas sobre Populaçoes Americanas (Rio de Janeiro: Estudos Brasileiros
de Demografia, Monography N. 3, 1947); Giorgio Mortara, “Immigration to
Brazil: Some Observations on the Linguistic Assimilation of Immigrants and
their Descendants in Brazil”, Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants, (Lon-
don-New York: Cambridge University Press-UNESCO, 1950), Supplement to
Population Studies, March 1950.
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28 Arthur Hehl Neiva and Manuel Diegues Jr., “The Cultural Assimilation of
Immigrants in Brazil”, in Borrie, W. D. et al., The Cultural Integration of
Immigrants, (Paris: UNESCO, 1959), pp. 223–224.
29 Ibid., p. 181.
30 Ibid., p. 197.
31 International Economic Association. The Positive Contribution by Immi-
grants, (Paris: UNESCO, Population and Culture, 1955).
32 Camilo Cecchi, “Estudo comparativo da assimilaçao e marginalidade do
imigrante italiano”, Sociologia, XIX (2), May 1957, pp. 114–115.
33 Carlo Castaldi, “O ajustamento do imigrante a comunidade paulistana: estudo
de um grupo de imigrantes italianos e de seus descendentes”, in Mobilidade
e Trabalho: um estudo na cidade de Sao Paulo, ed. Bertram Hutchinson,
(Rio de Janeiro, Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Educacionais, 1960), pp. 281–
359.
34 Ibid., p. 293.
35 Ibid., p. 351.
36 Ibid., pp. 354–355.
37 Ibid., p. 358.
38 Matheus Rogatto, “L’Italianità: um estudo sobre a nova politica cultural dos
orgaos oficiais italianos e a cultura tradicional da comunidade italiana da cidade
de Sao Paulo”, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Department of Athropology, III
Project Report, August 1986, p. 16.
39 Maria Eugenia Brighenti Morato, “Ma Io Sonno Brasiliano! An Ethnographic
Study of the Ethnicity and the Vernacular Expressive Culture of the Italian
Immigrants in the City of Sao Paulo, Brazil”. Ph. D. Dissertation in Physical
Education, University of Illinois at Urbana, Champaign, 1987, p. 107.
40 M. Rogatto, Ibid., II Project Report, February 1986, p. 12.
41 Castaldi, p. 352.
42 Jose Arthur Rios, “Aspectos polìticos da assimilaçao do italiano no Brasil”,
Revista de Sociologia, (20) 1958, p. 310.
43 M. Rogatto, Ibid., II Project Report, February 1986, pp. 36–37.
44 Brighenti Morato, pp. 108–109.
45 Cecchi, p. 115.
46 Gino Germani, “La asimilacion de inmigrantes en la Argentina y el fenomeno
del retorno de la inmigracion reciente”, Revista Interamericana de Ciencias
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Sociales, Vol. I (1), 1961; Juan Marsal, ed., Hacer la America, (Barcelona:
Ariel, 1972).
47 Marsal, p. 332.
48 Camilo Cecchi, “Determinantes e caracterìsticas da emigraçao italiana”,
Sociologia, XXI (1), Sao Paulo, March 1959, pp. 78–79.
49 Ibid., p. 92.
50 Gino Germani, “Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina”, in I.L.
Horowitz ed., Masses in Latin America, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1970), p. 302.
51 Ibid., p. 311.
52 "The ILO and Migration Problems”, International Labor Review, Vol. LXV
(2), February 1952, p. 168.
53 "Migration and Economic Development: the Preliminary Migration Confer-
ence (Geneva, April-May 1950)”, International Labor Review, Vol. LXII (2),
August 1950, p. 107.
54 Anibal Texeira de Souza, Imigraçao e Desenvolvimento , (Rio de Janeiro:
INIC, 1961), pp. 40–41.
55 Mario Zanartu, “Latin American Needs for Immigration”, Migration News,
Vol. XII (4), 1963, p. 13.
56 Ibid., p. 44.
57 Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, “Immigration and Eco-
nomic Development in Latin America”, paper submitted to the Economic
Commission of Latin America, Eighth Session, Panama City, Panama, May
1959, pp. 8, 24.
58 Fernando Bastos de Avila, L’Immigration au Bresil, (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria
Agir, 1956), p. 101.
Pan American Union, 1964), p. 19.
60 Ibid., p. 171.
61 Ibid., p. 171.
62 Ibid., p. 207.
63 Fernando Bastos de Avila, “Immigration, Development and Industrial Expan-
sion in Brasil”, Migration, Vol. I (3), July–September 1961, p. 21.
Chapter 4

The Immigrants’ Experience:
The Case of Sao Paulo, Brazil
This chapter examines the extent to which mainstream assimilation

and cultural integration theories are applicable to the post World War
II Italian immigration experience in Brazil, particularly in Sao Paulo.
The rural and urban migration experiences will therefore be analyzed
against the background of ethnic theories and concepts.
A methodological essay by the Argentinean sociologist Gino
Germani, appeared in 1965, offers a useful contribution for the un-
derstanding of the Italian experience in Latin America. He offered, if
not a comprehensive revision to the past literature on assimilation and
integration, a set of sociological as well as historical instruments which
certainly could take the ethnic experience analysis much further than
what his Latin American colleagues had done so far. After defining
and differentiating among the concepts of immigrant adjustment, par-
ticipation and cultural integration, Germani indicated the key elements
any scholar should look at in order to study the immigrants’ assimila-
tion in urban areas: the knowledge of his place of origin, his charac-
teristics before departure (the social strata or groups where he came
from as well as his professional characteristics),
his motivations to undertake emigration (economic, family centered,
educational, mobility-oriented) and, finally, the circumstances or chan-
nels of his transference (chain migrations, individual or subsidized mi-
gration).1
Where possible, the following historical accounts will attempt to
include Germani’s categories, as well as the motivations and dynamics
of immigrants’ repatriations.
112 The Immigrants’ Experience

Early Spontaneous Immigration
In 1940, according to the Brazilian census, Italians in the State of Sao

Paulo were 234,550; this number dropped to 173,652 in 1950, while
by early 1957 that number was estimated to be slightly lower than in
1940. The Italian communities in the coffee state were still numerous,
yet had been shrinking due to the lack of new arrivals experienced in
the 1940s. These communities were by no means homogeneous, as
they were separated internally by regional differences, rural as opposed
to urban locations, and ultimately by cultural and status differences.
Similarly the post world war II Italian immigration was by no means
undifferentiated. Important distinctions, affecting the future immigrant
experience, did occur between spontaneous and subsidized immigrants
in general and, within the latter group, between ICEM subsidized im-
migrants and the rest, a smaller group including rural colonists.
According to the statistics of the Immigration and Colonization
Department of the State of Sao Paulo, the number of Italians who
entered the State through the Port of Santos immediately after the end
of the war can be seen in Table 13.
This limited flow, arriving when restrictions to European immigra-
tion were still in force, concerned mostly spontaneous immigrants,
who paid for their own passages having decided to leave Italy for vari-
ous reasons. The majority joined relatives already established in Bra-
zil, particularly in Sao Paulo. For example, according to data of the
Italian Consulate in Sao Paulo, the number of people “called” by rela-
tives or local entrepreneurs in 1950 was 3,772, of which 2,212 for
family reasons and 1,560 for professional reasons.2 Therefore family-
Table 13 Italian immigrants in Brazil and Sao Paulo, 1946–50


Year Brazil Sao Paulo %

1946 603 142 23.5
1947 4,097 1,611 39.3
1948 4,709 2,687 57
1949 6,949 4,772 68.7
1950 8,980 5,560 62
Total 25,338 14,772 58.3

Source: “20,000 Italianos por mes para o Brasil”, Correio da Manha,
November 4, 1951.
The Immigrants’ Experience 113

related immigration accounted for 68 percent of total Italians arrivals
in Sao Paulo in 1950. The rest had probably not many connections in
the host country. At any rate, these immigrants were either craftsmen
directed to the main urban centers or peasants who tried unsuccess-
fully to work as laborers in Brazilian plantations.
A few spontaneous immigrants had been supporters of the Fascist
regime, as an immigrant from Florence who arrived in Rio de Janeiro
in 1950 recalled:
my country turned foreigner to me . . . it was therefore preferable to really

emigrate. . . . The first problem, since I had no money, was to find a job (in
Brazil). I asked around in the Italian community, but it would have been better
to ask to Chinese people. . . . A mass of Fascists was arriving in Brazil, so
that older immigrants shut the doors to these barbaric invaders. Yet they had
been Fascists themselves.3
Spontaneous immigrants seem to have been generally more moti-

vated to fight against the enormous difficulties met in the host coun-
try. A common theme, as pointed out in Passeri’s life histories, was to
start a business and go back to Italy at least once.4 Many succeeded,
as for example a mechanical worker from Milan who after some years
set up his own shop in Sao Paulo while his wife, set up a small fashion
business. Sewing, as well as hand washing and other domestic jobs,
were indeed frequent among Italian women who settled in Brazilian
urban centers.
A successful surveyor, original of Breda di Piave, who had emi-
grated in 1949 with his wife later recalled:
Although I succeeded in overcoming my homesickness such was not the case

with my wife. Sometimes her unhappiness became quite alarming. The hope
of returning to her native land was the only thought that could lessen her
anguish. 5
Indeed, post War Italian immigrant women appeared to have exerted

great pressure on their husbands to repatriate and they were reported
to be less inclined to accept the harsh living conditions imposed by the
migration experience, both in rural and urban settings.
In spite of the unquestionable difficulties experienced by the major-
ity of Italian immigrants, about 20 percent of the Italians arriving in
Brazil between 1947 and 1956 adopted Brazilian nationality; that
percentage was considerably higher than in 1940 (12.8 percent) and
twenty times larger than in 1920 (1 percent). The number of natural-

ized Italians was, by early 1957, of about 50,000.6 How to explain
this trend?
Traditionally, Italian immigrants tended to maintain their original
nationality. This link with their past gave them an identity, a feeling of
common belonging and acceptance with his immigrant peers who, on
the other hand, tended to reject those who chose to become Brazilian
citizens. This was especially true in the urban centers where ethnic
relations were more alive and dynamic, while naturalized immigrants
were mostly concentrated in the isolated countryside.7
The situation for immigrants changed radically after the passing of
the 1938 assimilation legislation, discussed in previous chapters. Al-
though the most restrictive measures were eliminated, as foreign lan-
guage papers were again in circulation or radio programs in the vari-
ous languages of foreign communities broadcasted, the thrust of the
legislation on foreigners’ assimilation, particularly on labor issues, re-
mained in force in the post-war years. As recalled by an immigrant,
“Italian certificates are not given legal recognition here, and it can
be safely be stated that among the different categories of immigrants
those who practice the liberal professions encounter the greatest
difficulties”.8
Foreigners could not enter yet certain categories of employment, as
recalled by Neiva and Diegues: “the civil service, auctioneering, grad-
ing of agricultural and livestock products and raw materials, fishing
and related industries, coastal shipping, ownership, management and
command of deep sea ships under Brazilian flag, estuary, harbor, river
and lake pilotage, the teaching of the Portuguese language and litera-
ture (except for naturalized Brazilian of Portuguese origins) and of
Brazilian history and geography”.9
The quota system and the law of the two thirds still made the immi-
grants’ position vulnerable in the Brazilian economy. The legislation
which discriminated immigrants from various urban professions or re-
duced their proportions in local firms therefore ended up by pressing
the newcomers, who decided to stay, to naturalize. The rate of natu-
ralization appeared indeed to be higher among males residing in ur-
ban centers.10
Even naturalized immigrants remained, however, second class citi-
zens, especially in terms of political rights until 1956, when the Su-
preme Court of Justice finally decided to grant the right to vote and be
elected to foreigners who became naturalized Brazilians.11

The Rural Colonies Experiment
Compared to the entire post-war Italian emigration, the number of

rural colonists involved was relatively small. Until 1959, the total num-
ber of Italian colonies subsidized by the Istituto Nazionale di Credito
per il Lavoro Italiano all’Estero, ICLE, was limited to 8,111 people, of
which Venezuela and Brazil received respectively 45 and 30 percent.
The major destination of Italian colonists migrated through ICLE was
Australia, rather than Latin America, accounting for 43,351 persons
out of a total of 58,000 people. Financial resources and organization
were yet insufficient to resume a mass migration, which became ur-
gent in the early 1950s.
ICLE was founded in 1923 with the objective of funding coloniza-
tion and other Italian enterprises overseas, collecting information for
rural colonization overseas and promoting and collecting Italian immi-
grant savings. After some years of inactivity, ICLE regained its impor-
tance following the end of the war in order to stimulate emigration.
Since its capital had been reduced owing to war damages and expro-
priations of its overseas belongings, ICLE obtained an official authori-
zation to obtain new financial resources by issuing a debenture loan.
The earliest attempts to officially subsidize Italian emigration were
made in 1949, when the Economic Cooperation Administration, ECA,
finally assigned to the Italian government a technical assistance fund
for emigration of 1.3 million dollars. The fund was administered by
the ICLE and was used to send technical missions to study the quality
of soils in various Latin American regions.
This was meant to encourage Italian rural colonization in Chile,
Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador and Brazil. Many rural cooperatives
were created in areas of Abruzzo, Campania and Sicily, with the aim
of colonizing overseas lands, but these experiences were brief and
occurred in a small scale.12
Figure 4 shows the location of these cooperatives and other Italian
rural colonies in Latin America, and their concentration in Brazil. Italy
sent two official missions to explore the land availability, ways to sus-
tain agricultural cooperatives and the possibilities for setting up pilot
farms throughout the continent. The missions included technical ex-
perts of the Istituto Agronomico per l’Africa Italiana of Florence, which
after the war begun to diversify its activities. The first mission left in
1949 with an ECA funding; the second, arriving in Brazil in 1950,

brought to the set-up of the Companhia Brasileira de Colonizacao e
Imigracao Italiana, which was funded by Italy (capital of 300 million
cruzeiros). Although both missions expressed a favorable opinion as
to land potentialities in Brazil and rural colonization in general, they
were concerned about sending immigrants to work in plantations.
At that time, a few Italian colonization experiments were taking
place throughout Brazil, involving above all laborers from Abruzzi.
The Brazilian Consul in Rome classified Italian rural cooperatives as
follows: (a) those expecting land and credit to set up colonies, such as
Cooperativa Italiana di Tecnici Agricoltori, CITAG in Goias, (b) those
demanding land but not credit, at least initially, (c) those owning capi-
tal to purchase land which only need a support from the Brazilian
Government to locate the land to be bought. He suggested that Brazil
should start from the third group and then gradually accept the other
two. In any case, all groups should have covered their own transporta-
tion expenses.13
The earliest rural colonization experiment was carried out by CITAG,
created in Lanciano in 1948. The State of Goias was then carrying
out an intense propaganda in Italy in favor of colonization. In early
1949 an agreement was reached between the local state government,
CITAG and the Immigration and Colonization Council, CIC, whereby
Brazilians would anticipate the cost for the trip and for the agricultural
machinery transportation, and offer a line of credit to each family
(100,000 cruzeiros per family).
The initial colonization plan expected the arrival of 2,000 to 12,000
families, but as the first groups to arrive were left in a total state of
isolation and without the promised facilities, they began to flee away.
Similar experiments failed in the states of Minas Gerais (Patos), Rio de
Janeiro (Baixada Fluminense e Parati), Sao Paulo (Campinas).14
In Chile, the earliest colonization experiment was promoted by the
Cassa di Colonizzazione Agricola Cilena in La Serena I, a center with
about 20 land plots reserved for Italian immigrant peasant families.
Another colony was established in San Manuel, in the Province of
Linares, on a large farm purchased by ICLE. At the same time ICLE
promoted the Compagnia Commerciale Italo-Cilena, CITAL, which
received a substantial financial aid by the Chilean Government to pur-
chase two large estates and carry out land improvements there. Like
the other Italian colonization estates, they were located in marginal
and isolated lands in the arid Northern or Southern regions of the
country, so that they were doomed since the very beginning. Most

Figure 4 Location of Italian Colonization Settlements in Latin America
Italian families soon abandoned the estates either to repatriate or to

move to other Chilean or Brazilian farms.
One of the few successful experiments of rural colonization in Bra-
zil was Pedrinhas, State of Sao Paulo. The Companhia Brasileira de
Colonizacao para a Imigracao Italiana was established in September
1950, following an Italian-Brazilian agreement signed in October 1949.
This agreement freed Italian assets in Brazil which had been frozen
during World War II by Decree 4,807 (1942). The funds were used to
establish the Companhia’s capital and to purchase in 1951 the land
where the rural colony of Pedrinhas was to be located: a frontier area
covering 3,500 ha. (later increased to 4,500 ha.), quite close to large
urban centers. The objective was to ensure technical, financial and

organizational assistance to immigrants, in order to set up 160 small
farms, of 20 hectares on average, with a good internal road network
linking up the plots with a small urban center.
Italian families accounted for 85 percent of arrivals between 1952
and 1957, most of them from Veneto (29,4 percent), Lazio (25,9 per-
cent) and Abruzzi (11,2 percent). In spite of the early repatriations due
to the initial difficulties in the colony, Pedrinhas prospered and grew
gradually according to its rural development plan15. The colony intro-
duced the wheat cultivation in that region for the first time. An urban
center was built, including schools, a kindergarten, a hospital, a church,
a cultural center, a movie-theater, a hotel with restaurant, a power
plant, and so on. Some processing industries were also established,
such as a large dairy plant and a rice processing plant.
By 1960 all these activities were carried out by over 2,000 people,
including some Brazilian workers who were attracted to work side by
side with immigrant families both in rural and urban enterprises. By
term of comparison, in the early 1950s the local population of that
area lived in extremely destitute conditions, accounting for only about
a hundred people.16
Passeri’s life histories, collected among Italian families in 1958,
highlighted the feelings of those peasants who had opted to remain in
spite of all difficulties.
Our life is not bad, also because we are all Italians, with our habits and our
labor systems. But we are worried about the large debts we owe to ICLE. In
accordance with our contract, it is expected that we can become the owners’
of a plot in fifteen years, paying yearly instalments. Yet we have been unable
so far to pay any instalment due to bad crops, while our debt is always
increasing.17
This situation was shared by all other interviewed peasants, who were
in addition skeptical about the quality of the land and its relative high
value: 6,000 cruzeiros for one alqueire as compared with half the
price for more fertile and better located lands.
One peasant, probably excluded from land reform benefits in Sic-
ily, recalled “without resentment”:
I emigrated because I had worked for twenty years in a large Sicilian estate
and had not saved one penny to ensure the future of my sons and grandsons,
so I wanted to try if life could be better here.18
Another peasant commented on families who had left:


Out of twenty seven families who were here when I arrived, there are only
nine left; the others repatriated or chose other jobs and places... Very often
entire families escape at night, abandoning their house, tools and cattle; women
usually influence these decisions, being unable to adapt to the climate and the
difficulties met here.19
With very few exceptions (such as Turen in Venezuela and Pedrinhas

and Bahia in Brazil), isolation, insufficient capital and low-yield soils
led to the failure of most colonies by the early 1950s, causing the
repatriation of entire peasant families and communities.20
An ICEM official publication did indeed recognize the inadequate
strategy behind the colonization initiatives promoted in particular by
ICLE.
In spite of the fact that the colonization experiments in Brazil and
Chile (as well as other private initiatives in other Latin American coun-
tries), enabled a few hundred families to settle and prosper in such
lands, they made clear the negative relation—in economic terms—be-
tween capital investment and the number of people who settled over-
seas. This raised many doubts as to the economic soundness of such
initiatives.21
Overall the Italian emigration policies, including land colonization,
seemed to respond to a rationale dictated by an emergency situation
rather than by a careful cost-benefit evaluation. This approach was
bluntly criticized by some Italian observers who attempted to explain,
on the other hand, the success of Dutch emigration to Brazil and how
it should be taken as an example by Italian authorities.
It was recalled that the Dutch Government sent a technical delega-
tion as early as 1947 which began negotiating with INIC what land
would be more appropriate for a livestock settlement. This delegation
never took into consideration the most isolated, yet fertile and water-
rich regions of the Brazilian backlands, since the lack of means of
communications made them inadequate from a commercial point of
view. In 1948 the estate of Ribeirao, 5,000 ha. off the city of Campinas,
State of Sao Paulo, was purchased by a Dutch rural association while
other well located estates were bought in the State of Parana. The
Brazilian Government gave extensive long-term credit to the various
cooperatives with no interest. Finally, it was recalled that a careful
peasant selection was conducted in Holland. The candidates were then
thoroughly instructed about local habits, climate, the language, and so
on, in order to ease their adjustment in Brazil. 22
A highly critical evaluation of ICLE was presented by a Socialist
Congressman at a Parliamentary Hearing on emigration in 1954,

whereby he argued that “that institute is very expensive, it employs its
available funds badly and allows its staff to go constantly on luxury
traveling missions, in search of hypothetical lands for colonization.
The lands “discovered” by these ICLE officials have proved to be ei-
ther inadequate or poorly colonized”.23
The Italian situation, in the meantime evolved so that it was no
longer necessary to place excess rural laborers overseas, since from
the mid-1950s on they found employment at home, in Northern in-
dustries, or elsewhere in Europe.
Since 1954, ICLE gradually reoriented its activities towards various
types of financial aid mostly for Italian immigrants directed in Austra-
lia and Venezuela:
(a) loans to private Italian investors who independently undertook

land colonization initiatives;
(b) loans for their traveling and settlement expenses;
(c) mid-term credit for Italian craftsman and small entrepreneurs
in order to develop their economic activity in the immigration
country;
(d) credit for the development of training activities in Italy;
(e) credit for housing facilities for Italian families to be built in the
immigration country.
Overall Composition of Italian Migration

Subsidized by ICEM
As showed in Table 4, ICEM transported 8,420 Italian immigrants to

Brazil in 1952, accounting for 82 percent of the total ICEM-subsidized
European migration to that country. The so called “agricultural fami-
lies”, whose experience will be extensively discussed in the following
pages, numbered 5,811 persons, accounting for 69 percent of total
Italian ICEM immigrants for that year; 1,761 persons were carried
through the “Family dependents reunion scheme”, while urban and
industrial workers were limited to 69 persons.
ICEM was committed to encouraging the emigration of family groups
or reunion of broken families in order to counter one of the most
typical features of Southern European migration, namely the separa-
tion of families, which was perceived as causing demographic, social
and moral disruption. There was however another reason that justi-
fied the emigration of family units and family reunion schemes. Imme-

diately after the war many immigrants who had gone to Latin America
ahead of their family, being unable either to remitting funds back home
or to cover traveling expenses to bring it, had returned to their original
country.
For this reason ICEM created the family reunion schemes in order
to:
1. avoid psychological and social maladjustment resulting from family

separation;
2. avoid the sending of remittances to relatives back home so that
the host country would not waste any of its currency;
3. create better conditions of integration within the receiving society.
As pointed out in the International Labor Review, family

dependants “formed the bulk of the 18,000 persons transported un-
der the auspices of ICEM from Italy to Argentina, Brazil and Venezu-
ela in 1953”.24 Between 1952 and 1956 males and females arriving
to Brazil in the age groups between 20 to 44 years accounted respec-
tively for 52 percent and 47 percent out of the total ICEM transported
immigrants while children under 9 years accounted for 19 percent of
the male immigrants and 21 percent of the female.25 It is possible
therefore to say that the immigrant population was fairly distributed,
in terms of age groups and gender.
In the years 1958-1960, family reunion also accounted for 78 per-
cent of Italian-subsidized migration to Brazil (11,177 people), while
industrial workers to 19.3 percent (2,761), as shown in Table 5. By
terms of comparison, Argentina and Venezuela had even higher per-
centages of “family reunion” immigrants (respectively 95 and 80 per-
cent), but very few industrial immigrant workers (respectively 0.3 and
0.05 percent). The organized emigration of Italian workers to Argen-
tina never represented more than 5 percent.26
As to the immigrants’ regional origins, miscellaneous sources point
to the fact that people came from various Italian regions and that, as
far as southerners were concerned there was a major concentration
from the Campania region, particularly Avellino and Naples provinces.
ICEM Subsidized Rural Immigration
The previous chapter outlined the difficulties met by Italian rural im-
migrants in Paulista coffee plantations in the late 1940s and early

1950s and, generally speaking, in the rural environment. Through a
variety of sources, we will now attempt to define in particular the
ICEM subsidized migration of Italian peasants, occurred in 1952 and
early 1953. The immigrants’ background, the circumstances in which
their departure occurred and their experience in Sao Paulo will be
discussed in this section.
Italian immigrants were recruited in family groups from the regions
of Abruzzo, Marche, Lazio and from the River Pò Valley in Veneto,
affected by water floods. Rural families from the first three regions
were facing very harsh conditions (8 to 12 people accommodated in
two-room housing) and low wages (400–500 lire corresponding to
20–25 cruzeiros a day). Families from the latter region, on the other
hand were quite urbanized with higher living standards; rural laborers
went to the fields by bicycle while the rest of the family worked in
nearby factories. Nevertheless, after the floods most landless laborers
remained unemployed and were keen to emigrate.
In his letters to an immigration official in Italy, the Director of the
Immigration and Colonization Department of the State of Sao Paulo
expressed his concern on the adjustment of families from the Pò Val-
ley due to the isolation and harsh living conditions of Paulista planta-
tions. Their departure had been particularly encouraged by the Italian
Government, rather than being spontaneous as in the case of peas-
ants from Abruzzo and Marche, so that Vasconcellos feared the same
problems, which occured in the rural settlement of Pedrinhas, where
Sicilian peasants who had not benefitted from the agrarian reform
were induced to emigrate by local authorities.27
It was reported that the Italian Government had a clear political
interest in responding to the needs of the inhabitants of the Pò Valley
“which has a strong Communist influence and can be easily manipu-
lated if unemployment conditions worsen”.28 Given these circumstances,
Brazilian immigration officials in Italy decided to collaborate, embark-
ing them to Brazil.
However in early July 1952 the same officials stopped selecting
peasants from the North of Italy, concentrating their recruiting activi-
ties in the South (Abruzzi, Molise, Puglia and Calabria) “where rural
laborers are more in accordance with what we can offer”. 29 “We al-
ways prefer laborers from Abbruzzi, but the Italian Government which
decides the recruiting areas, sent us to various regions where there is a
higher concentration of unemployed. The entire country has this prob-
lem but the Labor Ministry knows where it is more intense.””30 At any

rate, recruitment shifted mostly to the central and Southern areas of
Latina, Naples, Benevento, Pescara, Caserta, Campo Basso during
the months of August, September and October 1952. Rovigo was the
only northern province which remained included among the recruit-
ment areas.
The immigrants’ maladjustment after settlement in the Paulista cof-
fee plantations does not appear to be directly related to their northern
or southern Italian background. Besides the already mentioned upris-
ings of peasants from Rovigo, the small sample of maladjusted fami-
lies presented in Table 12 indicates that the majority did not come
from northern areas. Actually most of them originated from the cen-
tral province of Latina, or southern provinces of Potenza and Caserta.
On the other hand, the articles appeared on the local press or DIC’s
documents concerning the massive flight of Italian peasants from plan-
tations did not provide extensive details regardingly, apart from the
fact that immigrants from Abruzzi were considered by Brazilian au-
thorities to be the most suitable for the harsh plantation labor.
Maladjustment seemed rather to result from (a) improper informa-
tion and (b) recruiting in Italy, (c) wrong family composition and (d)
unbearable life standards in the plantations. The first two aspects have
been already extensively discussed. As to the immigrant family compo-
sition, also mentioned in the same section as one of the main factors
of maladjustment, the local press reported that about 80 percent of
the cases of maladjustment occurred in family groups with older and
non active relatives who, in accordance with contract requirement,
should not have been included.31
Finally, as to item (d), the original contract provided that a family
with four active members would earn approximately 40,000 cruzeiros
per year, a sum enough to support other members as well. A local
paper, however, noted that
They just forgot to foresee the rise in the cost of living, which increased dra-
matically over the past year, turning the contract obsolete. The food which
can now be obtained with that sum is not enough to ensure the 3,000 calories
necessary for one human being. Hence, the laborers’ maladjustment and flight
from plantations. Indebted, becoming ever more dependent on the owner’s
local store credit, many immigrants came to the city of Sao Paulo to then
repatriate, while for the rest the flight goes on.32
In addition, immigrants were not paid in cash but in coupons, expend-

able only in the local plantation store.

Table 14 Italian returnees to Hospedaria de
Imigrantes, Oct. 1952 to Jan. 1953

October 1952 264
November " 237
December " 367
January 1953 764
Total 1,632

Source: “Agrava-se a fuga desordenada dos Imigrantes
das fazendas paulistas”, Folha da Manha, Sao Paulo,
February 5, 1953.
It was reported that hundreds of immigrants escaped the planta-

tions in the second half of 1952 and early 1953, heading to the capi-
tal city of Sao Paulo. Many of them went back to the Immigrants’
Hostel, were they had initially landed, as they could not afford any
other shelter. The number of people officially registered as returnees
in the Hospedaria can be seen in Table 14.
Many others, who could not be accommodated in Sao Paulo, were
transfered to Rio de Janeiro’s immigrant hostel at the Ilha das Flores,
formerly used for housing prisoners.
The first official intervention by policemen occurred on January 5,
1953 when a clash between immigrants from the interior and
Hospedaria officials occurred, apparently as a result of the aggression
of the former on the latter.33 Police districts in the interior of the State
had already been instructed by the head of the Department of Agricul-
ture to collaborate with plantation owners to avoid the escape of in-
debted immigrants, and ensure that local train stations would not em-
bark immigrants directed to the Hospedaria.34 And even before then,
some local security forces had been intervening on the side of planta-
tion owners, without any legal authorization. It was reported, for ex-
ample, that three immigrants denounced were jailed and that one of
them took all his money to pay for the debts of the other two. 35
The testimony of two doctors, asked by the Italian Consulate in Sao
Paulo to collaborate in inquiring about the causes for the immigrants’
massive flight, is quite instructive:
we are astonished and awfully sorry about the transference of human masses
from one continent to the other, which rather than a standard migration re-
minds of war methods and events. The connection between immigrants and
police has become by now a daily issue in the Brazilian newspapers.36

Health conditions in the plantations were unbearable, in spite of
the fact that one of the immigration agreement clauses provided for
free medical care. Various medical reports, commissioned by the Ital-
ian Consulate to assess the causes of morbility affecting “our immi-
grants and especially their children”, provide unequivocal evidence on
this respect:
. . . at least 50 percent of our children are visibly wasted away, they are
affected by chronic diarrhea and conjunctivitis with violent symptoms. It seems
to me that this is the first period of adjustment during which the body is not
yet used to the environment.37
. . . there are widespread infections, verminosis, vitamin deficiency, malnutri-

tion, inadequate health care, extremely high prices for drugs which make
them inaccessible to a poor’s pocket; a total lack of material and spiritual
support characterize social conditions in this country which are totally differ-
ent from those in Italy.38
Brazilian rural workers are among the least protected in the world. The are
mostly mixed blood individuals, who are illiterate, sick, and ignorant about
their most basic rights as human beings. They relieve life pains with alcohol
and superstitions. They are unbelievably malnourished: the average meal is
made of a bit of rice, beans and corn. They live in huts built with hay and
mud... With such state of things, it is reasonable to conclude that the Italian
peasants placement in the plantations is not at all convenient.39
Another medical report mentioned the case of eight Italian families

who had been placed in a plantation, located near Chavantes, the
Fazenda Harmonia”. After demanding urgent hospital care, they were
sent to the Hospedaria dos Imigrantes in Sao Paulo.
The eight families were placed in an annex building that is absolutely inad-
equate for medical care purposes due to its decaying state, the sex and age
promiscuity that residents are obliged to live in, the huge bedrooms with no
sheets and pillows, the lack of health clinics, the primitive conditions of health
services, unfinished floors, still to be covered with tiles, disconnected doors,
lack of wall paint, the general untidiness and dirt, etc. This kind of isolation,
even maintained with soldiers, can possibly be explained by the need to pre-
vent Italian immigrants from impressing unfavorably the newcomers who, on
the other hand, are welcomed in the best equipped parts of the Hospedaria.40
Some years later Passeri’s life histories recalled a strong resent-

ment on the part of Italian immigrants for their abandonment by local
Italian representatives. It was evident the dramatic contrast between
the latter’s attitude and that of the German, Dutch and Japanese offi-

cials who were, on the other hand, strenuous supporters of their re-
spective immigrant communities.41
ICEM— Subsidized Urban Immigration

In addition to the widespread governmental propaganda in favor of
migration to Latin America, personal reasons brought Italians to emi-
grate through ICEM in the post war years. Encouragement by local
relatives and friends as well as exchange of letters with relatives and
friends who had migrated earlier pushed them to leave at a time of
critical economic conditions in the home country. “The emigration
fever was so strong”, commented an immigration anthropologist, “that
9 out of 10 letters exchanged expressed the desire to depart”.42
Having relatives in Brazil, however, did not guarantee the moral sup-
port that new immigrants expected. An immigrant who settled in Rio
told about his first disappointment upon arrival.
It was the same disappointment experienced by most people who hope to
receive some help by relatives and friends already established in the new coun-
try. Relatives in America are always different from the way we imagine them:
in one out of ten chances they are better, nine out of ten chances they are
worse. . . . Those who find themselves already in Brazil, either well settled or
not, become always selfish versus the newcomers from Italy searching for a
job.43
An anthropological study conducted in early 1955 among immi-

grants traveling by boat to Argentina and Brazil had a sample of 160
immigrants. It showed that the majority were subsidized immigrants
(85 percent), of southern origins (69 percent), almost equally distrib-
uted among males and females, with a slight predominance of the
latter (52 percent). As far as the most common original occupations
within this sample, there was a high incidence of domestic work (39
percent) certainly related to women, workers (19 percent) and stu-
dents and children (24 percent), the number of rural laborers was in-
significant.44 In terms of family composition, about one third of the
immigrants travelled in nuclear family groups, 23 percent in incom-
plete families since they had relatives already settled abroad (family
reunion schemes), and there were some brides who had married by
proxy and a few unmarried men. This sample can therefore be consid-
ered quite representative of the ICEM immigrants’ universe, particu-
larly as it reflects the predominance of the family-based pattern for
immigration.

As pointed out earlier, rural immigration was more predominant in
the early 1950s, while the so called industrial workers’ immigration
increased by the second part of the decade. The internal composition
of workers entered in Brazil was available only for 1957 and for all
nationalities, but it can offer a good degree of approximation for the
Italian group which, it is known, accounted for the largest part of it. In
that year ICEM moved 4,828 workers of whom “1,801 were crafts-
men and qualified workers . . . including 724 in the metal trades, 678
were qualified persons in miscellaneous occupations and professions
including 270 farmers, 1,398 were workers without specified occupa-
tions whilst 953 were classified as laborers”.45 Therefore, openly de-
clared unskilled laborers accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total,
although this figure should actually be much higher if one considers
that many unskilled workers were registered as skilled ones in order to
be eligible for subsidized emigration.
The “urban laborers program” financed by ICEM offered a a chance
for Italian males wishing to emigrate to Brazil. The program drew up a
general list of skills required by local industrialists. About 40 percent
of the required skills belonged to the steel and metalworking sector, 20
percent to the construction industry and the rest to various light indus-
tries (wood, graphic industry, etc.). Other programs, with a few hun-
dreds immigrants transported per year, provided the worker either with
a specific labor contract or placement guarantees. According to the
International Labor Review, the transfer of Italian urban workers to
Brazil in 1953 had proved to be more successful than the peasants’
one.46
Recruitment was done among Italian men between 21 and 45 years
old, that were expected to travel alone, while only at a second stage
they would be allowed to bring their family. Married and unmarried
men were equally distributed.
This program brought a second flow of immigrants whose back-
ground was quite different from the previous rural-oriented flow subsi-
dized by ICEM. According to the preliminary data provided by an ICEM
survey in Brazil in 1957, the regional origin of this group was the
following: 46 percent came from Northern Italy, 14 percent from the
Center and the remaining 40 percent from the South. 47 Laborers from
Northern Italy and, generally speaking, from industrialized areas were
reported to be the most politically conscious: skilled workers had usu-
ally a Communist background, while technicians identified more with
the Christian Democrat Party.48

Immigrants traveled by ships which stopped first in Rio de Janeiro,
then in Santos, the main port of the State of Sao Paulo. Immigrants
directed to the city of Rio de Janeiro were accommodated in the hostel
at Ilha das Flores, where they could remain from two to ten days.
From Rio, many were sent to various central and southern cities, such
as Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte and Curitiba. This first stop was con-
ceived so that all immigrants would not remain in Sao Paulo, although
within a period of four-five months most of them moved to Sao Paulo
anyway, often to join friends made during the trip.49
Immigrants arriving in Santos would be sent to the Hospedaria dos
Imigrantes, where they could remain up to thirty days. During this
period they would be directed to various industries, either through
ICEM officials or on their own.
The opportunities for upward mobility for these workers seems to
have been rather limited. The ICEM survey previously mentioned found
that only 4 percent among these immigrants had started their own
business after being in Brazil for some months while the rest contin-
ued to work as employed laborers. Unfortunately, no data was found
regarding business start-ups by post-war Italian immigrants for the
later years.
It was reported that very often ICEM had to provide immigrants
with financial support.
The major difficulty which occurs during the first days of stay in Brazil is the
almost absolute lack of money for which ICEM is often obliged to give imme-
diate aid in order to allow immigrants to take care of themselves before they
receive their first salary. This is so because most immigrants leave their coun-
try with a very limited amount of money.50
So it should not be surprising that most of these immigrants could not

start their own business, once in Brazil.
Between January and September 1959, for example, Italian immi-
grants received the largest financial aid from ICEM, as compared with
Greek and Spanish immigrants, respectively 532,024, 138,906 and
86,081 cruzeiros, although Greeks received the highest per capita al-
lowance (1,375 cruzeiros versus 875 cruzeiros for Italians and 530
cruzeiros for Spanish).
ICEM was therefore acting as the only welfare institution respond-
ing to immigrants’ emergencies, since neither the support provided by
the Italian Consulate nor by the local Patronate were enough to cover
for their needs. Incidentally, the Patronato Assistenziale Immigranti

Italiani, founded in 1950 in Sao Paulo, was reported by various sources
to be unable to deal effectively with the social problems related to the
maladjustment of the new immigrants. This was true also for other
Italian Patronates or Catholic organizations in Sao Paulo, whose ac-
tion was, on the other hand, quite effective in Italy.51
The cost of living in major industrial cities such as Sao Paulo was,
according to the President of the Italian Immigrants’ Patronate in Sao
Paulo, extremely high in relation to the wage level and no favorable
currency exchange was reserved for the immigrants’ remittances.52
The data in Table 15, concerning the year 1957, certainly confirm
this observation, although Sao Paulo appeared, relatively speaking, as
the most convenient city in Brazil:
Yet the cost of living was increasing everywhere. In the city of Sao
Paulo it was recorded an increase in prices of 3.8 percent a month.
The most affected sectors were education, clothing, and some food
products such as meat, vegetables, fats, and cereals.53 In addition,
industrial expansion slowed down in the late 1950s affecting in par-
ticular some industrial sectors, such as the automobile, textile, house
appliances, chemical, pharmaceutical and various small industries.
Unemployment did not affect highly qualified laborers, while it did af-
fect medium level and unskilled workers which met the competition of
the local labor force and ended up—at best—earning just minimum
wages.
A relatively successful Italian immigrant who had arrived in the 1950s
so commented on the experience of his connationals:
Table 15 Cost of living as compared to wages in major

Brazilian cities, 1957

Cost of living Average wages
City (in cruzeiros) (in cruzeiros)

Rio 6,180 8,125–7,400
Sao Paulo 4,010 8,100–8,500
Porto Alegre 4,150 5,200–10,000
Curitiba 5,150 5,200–
Belo Horizonte 3,400 5,600–7,050
Recife 4,500 4,650–6,600

Source: Umberto Cassinis, “Primi risultati di una inchiesta CIME
sull’emigrazione italiana”, Italiani nel Mondo, Vol. XIII (21),
November 10, 1957, p. 8.

There is a constant influx of immigrants who come without any professional
training and who become peddlers. In their travels they cover great regions in
the interior of the country undergo many humiliations and are despised by
society. But they keep on in this unproductive work and finally build up a
reputation for vagabonding and adventure which puts all Italians in a bad light
as far as the local population is concerned. There are, no doubts some excep-
tions, but it can readily be seen that if there are too many people of this type
it would be harmful to those having more solid qualifications, as well as to the
relations between the two nations.54
In addition the same Italian observer noted that many arrived with-
out adequate knowledge and therefore went back not necessarily for
economic or professional reasons, but due to this lack of psychologi-
cal preparation.
The increase in the cost of living was a trend common to most
Latin American countries over the 1950s, as shown in Table 16.
As pointed out by Avila:
under these conditions, the immigrant notices after a few months that it is
impossible to bring over his family or to send them a reasonable share of his
salary. The way out is to re-emigrate, and it can be estimated that for every
immigrant that re-emigrates, ten would-be immigrants give up the idea of
going to that country. 55
Incidentally, salaries paid in emigration countries, except Portugal,

as well as in other immigration countries, were higher than those paid
in most Latin American countries, as the following table shows.
In 1958–59, for example, Italy’s average salary was almost twice
the Brazilian one, while the U.S. salary was almost ten times as much,
so that it is quite easy to perceive the extent of Brazil’s comparative
disadvantage.
Table 16 Cost of living indexes in selected Latin American Countries, 1950–58


(Base year 1953 = 100)
Country 1950 1951 1952 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958

Argentina 51 69 96 104 117 132 165 217
Brazil 64 67 82 118 145 172 206 238
Chile 54 66 80 173 302 471 627 752
Mexico 79 89 102 105 122 128 135 150
Uruguay 72 82 94 112 122 130 149 175

Source: Fernando Bastos de Avila, Immigration in Latin America, (Washington D.C.: Pan
American Union, 1964), p. 66.

Wages and salaries in Brazil varied according to the worker’s expe-
rience and productivity, but as a whole were very much up to the
employers’ will. Unlike Italy, where industrial labor contracts were ne-
gotiated collectively for each category with trade unions, workers in
Brazil had a very weak leverage on their contracts. In addition, the
right to strike was not recognized as a citizens’ right, and therefore
strikers and labor mobilizers could be fired without notice at any time.
Even before 1964, when the militaries took over in Brazil, union lead-
ers could be jailed and even sent in exile.
An Italian mechanical skilled worker in the ABC manufacturing tri-
angle of Sao Paulo recalled that, although the strongest Brazilian la-
bor union—the metal workers’ union—was very militant in that area,
three large-scale establishments such as Pirelli, Firestone and Rodia
each had different dates for renewing contracts. So that if Pirelli’s
workers were mobilizing in May, Firestone’s were doing so in June
Table 17 Urban salaries in some emigration and immigration countries (in US $)


Date $ per month

Latin American Countries
Argentina 1959 51
Bolivia 1957 13
Brazil 1958 37
Chile 1958 43
Colombia 1959 33
Mexico 1958 57
Panama 1957 81
Peru 1957 42
Other Immigration Countries

Australia 1959 320
Canada 1959 295
United States 1959 365
Emigration Countries
Austria 1959 77
Germany 1959 106
Holland 1957 86
Italy 1959 72
Japan 1959 66
Portugal 1959 22

Source: Fernando Bastos de Avila, Immigration in Latin America, (Washington D.C.: Pan
American Union, 1964), p. 169.

while Rodia’s in September. This fragmentation obviously weakened
metal workers’ collective power as a category. In addition, foreign
workers who were apparently very active in the union’s built up in the
1950s and 1960s turned to be particularly exposed to firings.56
An ICEM report, published in 1960, on the living conditions of
subsidized industrial immigrants, who arrived in Brazil in the second
half of the 1950s, provides some interesting elements on their experi-
ence, although these should not be considered significant from a sta-
tistical point of view. The report, which clearly seemed to be biased to
the positive side, overviewed the performance of Italian workers trans-
ported within both the Pre-Placement program (MOP) and the Voca-
tional Training (VT) program for industrial laborers. Most cases con-
cerned males with a similar family status: immigrants were either single
or, when married, they had left their families behind until their eco-
nomic position would be solid enough to justify their move to Brazil.
Among the group of immigrants included in the pre-placement pro-
gram, there were 17 cases of “excellent” performance, 19 cases of
“fair” performance and 9 “failures.57 No information was provided as
to age or place of origin, but it was possible to infer from sparse refer-
ences that those with a strong industrial background came from North-
ern Italy, were placed relatively easily and earned a relatively high sal-
ary. Failures -which unlike what was suggested by this reported actually
accounted for the majority of cases- were reported to be resulting
from lack of industrial background or adequate skills, a difficult per-
sonality (“bad character”, “depressed”), etc. Low wages, frequent
changes in employment (up to 20–25 times), the fact of receiving
subsidies from local ICEM representatives and the demand for official
repatriation were recurrent in this last group of immigrants.
Vocational trainees proceeding from various ICEM training centers
in Italy (Avellino, Catanzaro, Messina, Potenza and Ascoli Piceno) in-
cluded 15 cases of success, 3 fair cases and 4 unsuccessful cases.
These cases involved young workers, usually with no professional ex-
perience other than the brief training period in Italy. An unsuccessful
candidate criticized the course he attended in Avellino, where in spite
of the fact that he had learned very little, he was rated third best.
Another one reported that he passed the course, in spite of the fact
that he had failed the practical test in the training center. Again the
ICEM expert often emphasized the difficult personality or lack of pro-
fessional interest as main causes for failure.58

“There may have been some success stories among ICEM-subsi-
dized Italian immigrants,” commented a former ICEM official of Italian
citizenship stationed in Rio de Janeiro, “but these would be rather
isolated cases, and most Italians went back home.59 Luigi Piccardi, an
immigrant himself who had arrived in Brazil in 1947 paying for his
own passage, recalled the despair of hundreds of Italian immigrants
he personally attended at Ilha das Flores in the early 1950s.
They did not speak the language, had usually no skills whatsoever and came
to me for help. The only fair thing I could do was to send them to the Italian
Counsulate to demand repatriation. I was very much affected psychologically
by all this. I couldn’t avoid getting involved with their sufferings”.60
The only truly skilled industrial laborers were Austrians who went to
work especially in German firms, according to Piccardi. Italians were
the most numerous among European subsidized workers, followed by
Greek and Spanish workers. Greeks apparently went through a similar
experience as they had mostly no skills either, yet they seemed to have
adjusted better than Italians through trading activities.
A study on the social mobility of Spanish urban laborers in Sao
Paulo carried out in 1962, pointed out that less qualified immigrants
employed much longer time to find a job, but eventually did find some
kind of occupation. Only two out of a sample of 70 immigrants re-
quested repatriation, so that the author concluded that maladjustment
occurred very rarely. 61
Although impressionistic, these comparisons with other immigrants’
groups, certainly do raise some doubts about the myth of easy cultural
and economic adjustment on the part of Italian immigrants, so popu-
lar in most immigration literature of the 1950s.
A well established Italian who had arrived with his family as early as
1910 stated:
we are sorry about the bad reputation of new immigrants to Brazil. But we
should recognize that old time immigrants landed with a real determination of
making it in this foreign country. But all this required years of hard work and
sacrifices. May be the mentality and the expectations are very different now.
May be after the last war, which was so devastating, men have changed and
they no longer believe in a future based on hard work and want to have imme-
diate results.62
The distance between older immigrants and newcomers was clearly

very deep, but even more so was the distance between successful and


unsuccessful immigrants. Another way of looking at this stratification
may be perceived from the different viewpoint of those who were proud
to have arrived with their own means and those who had the stigma of
arriving to Brazil through subsidized passages. This distance was well
portrayed by Passeri.
Those who made it, no longer consider themselves as immigrants. I mean

that they no longer have the immigrant’s fears and complexes. They can travel,
move around, save money. He feels he can leave at any time, unlike the others
who do not perceive any supports. Italy no longer appears to him as an im-
possible dream. Knowing that it is possible to go back at any time, he no
longer feels nostalgic. . . . For the rest who fight daily for a piece of bread, the
distance from the homeland becomes obsessive, turning into a real fear . . . of
never being able to return, due to the price of the ticket, pride or other rea-
sons, and therefore they become silent, angry, unsatisfied, immigrants.63
According to the head of Official Bureau of Information and Place-

ment of Sao Paulo Department of Immigration and Colonization, “most
cases of social and professional adjustment coincided with the
immigrant’s good professional qualification”. Their adjustment was
reflected in their greater occupational and spatial stability.64 Yet this
idea of adjustment, which reflected the Brazilian policy makers’, the
industrialists’ and international agencies point of view, was not matched
by a sense of belonging on the part of Italian immigrants’.
Industrial Immigrants: Three Life Histories
The three life histories were collected between August 1987 and Au-
gust 1988 in the ABC industrial district of Sao Paulo, where there is
still a large concentration of formerly ICEM-subsidized Italian immi-
grants. Since the 1950s this area experienced the rapid growth of
multinational industrial manufacturers such as Ford, Willis, General
Motors, Wolkswagen, Pirelli, etc., where most Italian industrial work-
ers went to work.
In the late 1980s Italy was perceived worldwide as a stable and
affluent country both in political and economic terms. For a few years
the government led by the Socialist Party leader Bettino Craxi ap-
peared to have finally provided the necessary conditions for raising
Italy to equal status as the greatest world powers. Economically, the
country was experiencing an unprecedented growth—particularly cen-
tered on central and northern regions with positive effects on the en-
tire national economy—which was referred to as the Italian develop-
www.Ebook777.com

ment model. Incidentally, as that model was based on a very extensive
informal sector, it became very much a subject of interest and some-
how an example to be followed in countries such as Brazil. In addi-
tion, Italy’s social welfare system including old age pensions and medi-
cal care extended to all citizens, seemed much more fair than what
Brazil or any other Latin American country country offered, particu-
larly from the viewpoint of Italian immigrants and their children.
Brazil, on the other hand, was undergoing a deep economic crisis
at that time, with inflation climbing up to 40 percent a month. Wide-
spread violence and a general sense of insecurity about the social quality
of life made Italian immigrants conscious about the bad deal which
meant the whole migration experience to them. Old age pensions, for
example, were said to be insufficient as inflation constantly eroded
their real value, nominal value not being adjusted to price increases.
The life histories reported in the following pages involved the expe-
rience of two Italian skilled workers and one technician transported by
ICEM to Brazil. The three cases were selected as they represented the
experience of what may be defined as agents of modernization, whose
cultural integration also seemed apparently successful. They had all
worked in the most advanced industrial sector of Brazil, came from
Italy with good technical knowledge, married Brazilian women (of Ital-
ian descent) with whom they built stable families, owned their house
and one of them even became a naturalized Brazilian.
Although not a statistical sample of Italian immigration to Brazil,
these life histories do provide a wide-angle portrait of the experience
of post-war industrial immigrants in Sao Paulo. The first two histories
bring to light the testimony of retired skilled workers who arrived re-
spectively in the first half and second half of the 1950s. The third case
is concerned with an Italian technician, still professionally active, who
emigrated in 1960. His profound and broad perception of the migra-
tion experience, his exceptional memory for details, irony and wit,
provides a unique document for the understanding of an untold chap-
ter in Italian migration history.

Mr. Angelo Donatiello, who now lives with his family in Santo Andre’,
may be considered as an honest, hard-working Southerner.65 Emigrat-
ing alone in 1952 at the age of 20, he originally came from the south-
ern province of Avellino, Campania region, like many post-war Italian
immigrants. Prior to his departure, he had worked in various parts of

Italy as a mechanic without ever being registered for social security.
After passing a professional test in Naples, he expected to embark to
Canada. However, since traveling to that country had been interrupted
for a period of six months, he was encouraged by ICEM officials in
Italy to take the opportunity of going to Brazil immediately, where
they said he would receive free housing, a wage of 18 cr. an hour, and
he would find fair living conditions. “They gave us false information,
we were not able to save a single penny with what we earned in Bra-
zil”, he recalled with some resentment. The wage he actually received
when he started working was almost four times smaller (4.80 cr.) then
what he had been promised. “My entire wage went to pay for board
and lodging”.
His task was to prepare parts for assembly lines at Ford, General
Motors, Aco Villares but, above all, he worked at Pirelli, except for a
brief interruption requested by the firm so that there would be no
obligation to hire him indefinitely. In accordance with Brazilian legis-
lation, a firm was indeed obliged to hire a worker indefinitively after he
had been employed for a period of over 10 years. In 1956, he did a
training course by correspondence at Scuole Riunite Studi e Lavoro
of Rome, to further specialize his mechanical skills
As an Italian mechanic worker, he recalled being active in building
up the metal workers’ unions in ABC along with many other foreign-
ers, although the unions’ leadership was reserved just to Brazilians.
Although foreign citizens were not allowed to enter numerous public
professions, like most of his fellow immigrants, he never applied for
naturalization arguing that he “never needed to do so”.
He married in 1957 with an Italo-Brazilian and was joined by his
father and brothers in 1959. His wife worked at Pirelli in 1956–57 at
Pirelli, before they got married. It was customary for Italian young
women to work in industries just before marrying, as management
was usually reluctant to keep them afterwards. In addition, their hus-
bands would prefer them to do some kind of work in the house, rather
than outside.
He retired as early as 1973 due to a heart stroke and at the time of
the interview he was receiving a very modest Brazilian pension, corre-
sponding to 2.5 minimum wages. He tried at some point to work on
his own as an electrician, but said he needed too much capital for
running the business, so he gave up. Occasionally, when he feels well,
he works in small electrical repairings. He is not entitled to receive an
old age pension from Italy, as he did not fulfill the minimum require-
ments, not having paid any social security contributions. On the other

hand, he complained about Brazilian social security, which did not
cover for most medicines he needed. “As long as I was in Pirelli, medi-
cal care was excellent, but problems come up later, when you are old
and you are more needy.”
“I have been here for 37 years, I left a job to someone else back in
Italy; why can an adequate social security, especially medical care, be
offered to Italian immigrants here?” Although he considered himself
lucky to own his house, he complained about not being eligible, for
that same reason, to any welfare assistance offered by the Italian
Patronate to destitute Italians in Sao Paulo.
He never returned to Italy, not even for a short trip. “People like me
who lived on a wage, were not in the position to travel; just Italian
traders could afford it.” Mr. Donatiello never read Italian papers as
they were too expensive, so that his ideas about the present affairs of
the country were quite vague. “I would not know who to vote for, I’m
not updated about what is going on. I know Italy has changed incred-
ibly, for the better. I would probably choose a party representing labor
interests, but I do not think that would be the Communist Party.”
When asked whether he ever thought of resettling again in Italy, he
answered that he sometimes thought about it but, since most of his
relatives were already in Brazil, they never made enough money to go
back.
I do not live well here, but we decided that if we would ever return to Italy, we
would pay for our own passages rather than asking for official repatriation,
which would prevent us at a later stage to be eligible for additional emigration
subsidies. If I was able to go back in time, I would never emigrate again, not
even to the United States. I would just stay in Italy. If someone feels sick in the
street here, nobody stops to help him. It happened to a friend of mine who
had a heart attack. ‘Leave him alone, he must be drunk, the police will come
to take him away’, people said. This is Brazil.

Mr. Vittorio Tartaro arrived in Brazil alone in 1958, when he was

25.66 Originally from Avellino, just like his friend Donatiello, he passed
a technical test for Olivetti at the Pozzuoli Center in Italy, ranking
among the first 9 best workers, out of a group of 35.
Ironically I was not lucky to be among the top group which was sent to Brazil,
while the rest went to Switzerland, France and Germany. They had an easier
time, as they could go back home to visit their family. On the other hand, we
were so far, across the ocean. . .

From the port of Santos, ICEM sent the group of the nine workers,
mostly of southern origins, to the Hospedaria in Sao Paulo. They then
went to work at Olivetti, where Tartaro remained for nine years.
He recalled that after a few months, three fellow workers repatri-
ated, as they were discontent about wages, the quality of life, etc.
Another one went back in 1962, like many Italians did in the 1960s,
so that only five out of nine remained in Brazil. “When we got here
our salary was equivalent to 100,000 lire, but with inflation after a
few weeks it was worth 80,000 lire, after two months 50,000 lire.”
This is why, he recalled, Olivetti gave them a special allowance of
2,000 cr. during the first two years. In 1968, Tartaro moved to ABC,
working at Chrysler until 1976, when he retired for illness problems.
He married with a Brazilian of Italian descent and returned to his
Italian home town only once, in 1982. Owing to the earthquake in
Irpinia, the Italian Consulate did pay passages then to immigrants who
might have relatives among the victims.
I worked for a week in a mechanical assembly line and I made 300,000 lire,
which was a fortune for me. Had it not been for my family and my kids who at
that time were still in school in Brazil, I would have stayed in Italy. If I could go
back in time, I would never come here again. If things in Brazil keep going
this way, I think I will go back to Italy. My children will get married soon.
. . . I will go to the Consulate and if they do not give me an old age pension,
I will demand that repatriation expenses be covered. Since we (immigrants)
have been out of our country for thirty years, we deserve a pension just for all
the pains we went through and the distance from our families and from our
land. The salary that a technician makes here is just enough to live. If one
didn’t own his house, he would have to live in the streets.
Tartaro now tills a piece of land, growing his own fruits and veg-
etables to help the family budget, so he needs to buy fewer things.
He kept his Italian nationality, like most of his fellow workers and
technicians since, he recalled, there was no reason to naturalize.
In the large urban centers we are very much respected, I have never heard
any Brazilian say something against us. I never read any Italian paper . . .
they are too expensive, and there are very few TV programs about Italy. I
wouldn’t know who to vote for if I were there. I forgot everything . . .

Originally from the central-northern region of Marche, Tullio Violini
lives in Sao Bernardo: he is a young-looking, charming man, aged 50.
He lives with his family in a pleasant house that he owns. He ap-

peared as having the most valuable qualities that any successful immi-
grant should have: courage, self-reliance, ambition and a thorough
knowledge of his trade. The son of a school teacher, he travelled to
Santos in 1960, at the age of 22, without any members of his fam-
ily.67 “I did not pass through any technical selection, just a very thor-
ough medical exam . . . the only important thing was to be in perfect
health, as if we were to be great reproducers, pure Italian-race studs . . .”
Tullio identified and was part of a group of 8 young Italian techni-
cians from various parts of the country who became friends since their
embarkment in Genova, and remained deeply attached to each others.
Only three of them, including Tullio, stayed in Brazil, all married Bra-
zilian women, while the other five repatriated through the Italian Con-
sulate within two weeks. He thus recalled his first days in Brazil.
When we arrived, we were placed in trucks and ‘unloaded’ at the Hospedaria.
We were expecting something like a hotel, a boardinghouse, but no. . . . We
thought we were going to visit a new country, free of charge. The Hospedaria
was made of 4–5 hangars; there was just one large dormitory for people of all
kinds, all nationalities, including Brazilians from the North East. We all just
slept together. The food was terrible, but the main reason for our deep de-
pression was the question, “why are we here, why did I ever leave Italy?” The
disappointment was bitterly impressed in peoples’ faces, we realized every-
thing we had been told was a lie. We used to say “ hope the Italian Govern-
ment enjoys these four coal wagonloads I was sold for”. There was a percep-
tion of being an exchange merchandise. How much were we worth? How
many tons of coffee for a technician? Ten? How many for a skilled worker?
Three? We felt like in a concentration camp . . . we thought of Aushwitz and
things like that . . . and we laughed about it. We were so desperate that had
to laugh about it.
The ICEM bureau in Sao Paulo was completely different from the Pharaonic
stage put up in Italy: just a small room, one employee, one telephone. “Where
were the men in ties, the films, the pictures?” All gone. . . . The ICEM em-
ployee gave us a list of firms that we should contact, without giving us the
name of any particular person. The tragedy started then. I felt like I was
playing in a silent movie. No one I talked to understood Italian, neither I spoke
a word of Portuguese. In the meantime, days went by.
I remained in Hospedaria only one week, then I found an Italian family who
let me stay in their servant’s room for a few weeks (she was on vacation). I
slept on a bed without a mattress, just put some newspapers on it. My diet
was based on bananas. . . . I felt like a monkey.
Tullio found his fist job at AEG, a German firm associated to

Telefunken, as industrial designer. He made a salary of 12,000 cr. a
month which went entirely to pay for his boarding room. The firm

never registered him so that it did not have to pay to him the Christ-
mas bonus, vacations or any other benefit. “I worked from 7 am to
8.30 pm; it was my chance to prove that I was capable of working and
had the energy for it.” He remained at AEG for three months, then
was offered a job at 20,000 cr. a month in a newly established firm
owned by an Italian, where he remained for 15 years. He is now one
of the top technicians in a medium-sized glass factory of 240 people,
owned by a Lebanese. “I never wanted to open up my own business...
I didn’t have my parents or brothers here, I never felt secure enough to
do it by myself. I know I will work until my very last day”. He recalled
that only one Italian from the original group of 8 immigrants started
his own business, selling fruits and vegetables in Bahia.
In the beginning, I never thought of repatriating. Why should I be defeated by

the first difficulties? In Italy there was a whole supporting structure for emi-
gration. My parents, my sister, all my relatives and friends wanted me to
emigrate. No one told me anything, especially my mother, but she said it with
her eyes. . . . There was such a demand on me. . . . When I did a trip back to
Italy last year, my father told me: “one thing for which I will never forgive
myself is having allowed you to leave.” I answered to him that it wasn’t his
fault, that I did want to leave, may be not for ever; I wanted to show I had the
courage of doing it, be independent. . . . It was a childish thing. I wish I had
had someone explaining to me what the emigration experience would mean
for my life. The Italian Government should have made us more aware about
what we were going to face. I hope my story can be useful to somebody else;
there is always someone foolish who wants to leave. We Italians are rebellious
people deep inside; we are never satisfied even if we have everything . . .
Tullio said he had two big regrets. The first one was to be unable to
enjoy, for himself and his children, the advantages offered by Italian
society. “I’m not only talking about old age pensions, medical care,
the general economic well-being, but about social values and a healthier
quality of life. These are the things I most regret, and I will even more
so in 20 years. Although Brazil is a marvellous country, it will never
be grand because its society is too unfair.” Tullio said he admired the
new Socialist Party of Bettino Craxi in Italy, which seemed to have a
more dynamic political style than the older Christian Democrats.
His second regret was related to the loss of his Italian citizenship,
following his decision to naturalize (until 1992, the Italian legislation
did not allow naturalized Italians to keep their original nationality). “I
had to naturalize for professional reasons and to achieve a general
social and political status. I had no choice.”


So many more things could be said about these various experi-
ences and oral testimonies. In addition, some things are clearly miss-
ing or are merely sketched in this chapter, such as the impact of gen-
der and women’s perceptions on the whole migration process,
quantitative indicators of social mobility and oral histories with return-
ees. In spite of the inevitable limitations inherent to any research project
such as this one, I would like at least to point at some general conclu-
sions suggested by the case study presented in this chapter.
First of all, it would seem that, above all other factors, post World
War II Italian subsidized immigration to Sao Paulo was affected nega-
tively by the channels of transference and by the general circumstances
under which it occurred, to go back to Germani’s categories. In other
words, the way emigration was subsidized from Italy and the economic
circumstances met in Brazil, particularly the labor market, mostly af-
fected the material outcome as well as the mental perceptions of this
experience. Although important, factors such as the regional place of
origin, the professional background, the rural as compared to the ur-
ban destination and the family composition of immigrants, did not
appear to have totally influenced—either positively or negatively—eco-
nomic success, cultural integration and the subsequent decision to re-
main in Brazil or return to Italy.
For example, maladjustment and repatriations occurred among both
Northern and Southern Italian immigrants, both among plantation-
directed peasants and urban laborers. Within the latter group, although
unskilled workers appeared to be the least adjustable—and indeed that
which sooner demanded to be officially repatriated, oral histories indi-
cated how also skilled workers and technicians did return to Italy or
wished to have done so.
It is also particularly interesting to look at the role of the family in
this post war immigration experience. Historically, the Brazilian State
and Federal governments had promoted Italian immigration in family
units, directed both to the early rural settlements and to the Paulista
coffee plantations. Italian family units were preferred over individual
immigrants for ethnic as well as economic reasons: they would con-
tribute to the whitening of the Brazilian population and would be more
productive through the use of women and child labor. In addition, the
immigrants’ cultural adjustment in the host society was thought to be
facilited by the existence of a family structure. For similar reasons, the

post-war Italian subsidized emigration to all Latin American countries
was mostly conceived and organized in family units or family-reunion
schemes.
Nevertheless, post-World War II repatriations occurred in spite of
this family orientation, as will be detailed in Chapter V. In some in-
stance, pointed out in various immigrants’ accounts, the family influ-
ence turned out to be quite negative for the sake of integration, as
wives exerted a lot of pressure on their husbands to repatriate, refus-
ing to adapt to the harsh living conditions in both rural and urban
settings in Sao Paulo. Italian industrial workers in Sao Paulo met great
difficulties in supporting a family, owing to the low level of wages. It is
not coincidental, therefore, that many of those who did remain in Bra-
zil, arrived as single men and married there, as was the case of the
three life histories reported in this chapter.
The case study on Sao Paulo also challenges the generalization that
the assimilation and cultural integration in Latin America was easier
for immigrants proceeding from countries in Europe with a background
similar to Brazil’s (Catholic religion, Latin language, etc.), while being
more difficult for Germans, Dutch, Japanese, etc. Repatriations, as it
will be shown in the next chapter, turned out to be higher among the
Italian group as compared with any other, although further research
on other immigrants’ group will be necessary for a final conclusion on
this point. At the same time, this case study raises questions about the
cultural integration of Italian immigrants, even in relation with other
Mediterranean groups such the Spanish and Greek ones.
The statement by Camilo Cecchi that “ the immigrant marginality is
a shadow accompanying him over his entire life” could not seem more
appropriate, as shown by the three life histories of industrial workers
and the larger spectrum of the post-World War II Italian immigration
they represent. In other words, is it possible to talk about cultural
integration as far as these immigrants are concerned? If one takes into
account the personal internal process whereby the integration occurs
when the immigrant “feels he belongs to the new society”, then the
answer is definitively no, although from a more superficial point of
view these immigrants may be considered as integrated.
In addition, one could argue that Italian skilled workers and techni-
cians may have affected the economic modernization of Brazil in a
positive way, but the same cannot be argued the other way around, as
this modernization did not seem to contribute to raise their standard
of living. In particular, the three men recounting their life histories can

hardly be considered successful from an economic point of view, even
if they own property (their family house). The two skilled workers
were never able to save money while they were working and, after
retiring, their income is not enough to make a living. Even the more
comfortable technician (the third life history), said he could never af-
ford to stop working in Brazil, until he was alive.
A common theme emerging from the oral histories is a strong re-
sentment against Italian authorities and generally speaking against the
Italian State for how the emigration process was handled. The lower
the class level of Italian immigrants, the higher the present demands
and welfare-type expectations on Italian official institutions, as a kind
of fair compensation for all the past troubles. On the other hand, the
country itself, its social structure and economy are portrayed in al-
most dream-like imagery; definitively removed from their roots, these
immigrants seem to have idealized their country of origin, and their
lack of factual knowledge of present-day Italy, seems to reinforce, rather
than weaken a myth based on tales and old-time memories.
Notes
1 Gino Germani, “Asimilacion de inmigrantes en el medio urbano: Notas

metodologicas”, Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologia,I (2), 1965, pp. 165–
173.
2 Italiani nel Mondo, Vol. VII (7), April 10, 1951, p. 5.
3 Giovanni Passeri, Il Pane dei Carcamano. Italiani senza Italia: Inchiesta di
Giovanni Passeri, (Florence: Parenti Editore, 1958), p. 73.
4 Passeri, p. 91.
5 "Immigrants Tell the Story of their Integration”, Migration News, VII (3), May–
June 1958, p. 2.
6 "Quanti sono gli Italiani emigrati in Brasile”, Italiani nel Mondo, Vol. XIII (7),
April 10, 1957, p. 24.
7 José Arthur Rios, “Aspectos polìticos da assimilaçao do italiano no Brasil”,
Revista de Sociologia, (20) 1958, p. 310.
8 "Immigrants Tell the Story of their Integration”, Ibid., p. 6.
9 Neiva and Diegues, p. 199.
Theorie Generale de l’Immigration, (Rio de Janeiro: Agir, 1956), p. 150.
11 Diegues and Neiva, p. 198.
12 Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documentazione sul Contributo dell’Italia
alla Colonizzazione Agricola, (Roma: Tipografia Riservata del Ministero degli
Affari Esteri, 1955), pp. 79.
13 Letter of Ilmar Marinho, Brazilian Consul in Rome, to Ambassador Alves de
Souza, Rome, November 8, 1949. Centro Historico do Imigrante, Sao Paulo,
Processo 9010 (Secretaria de Agricoltura do Estado de Sao Paulo), n. pag.
14 Trento, pp. 427–434.
15 For a detailed analisis of this settlement see the anthropological study by Borges
Pereira, Joao Baptista, Italianos no Mundo Rural Paulista, (Sao Paulo: Livraria
Pioneira, 1974).
16 ICEM. Italia che Emigra. Sviluppi Moderni della Emigrazione Italiana,
(Rome: Italian edition of Reasearch’s Digest, 1960), p. 48.
17 Passeri, p. 218.
18 Passeri, p. 211.
www.Ebook777.com

19 Passeri, pp. 229–230.
20 Maugini, Armando, “Qualche considerazione sulla colonizzazione agricola
italiana in territori d’oltremare”, ICEM, Italia che emigra, pp.43–46; Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Documentazione. sul contributo dell’Italia alla
colonizzazione agricola, pp. 111–113.
21 ICEM, ibid., p. 60.
22 Alberto Marinelli, “Come e’ stata attuata l’emigrazione olandese in Brasile”,
Italiani nel Mondo, VI (8), April 25, 1950, p. 7.
23 "Il problema dell’emigrazione nei dibattiti alla Camera”, Italiani nel Mondo,
Vol. X (20), October 25, 1954, p. 9.
24 "Features of Post-War European Migration”, International Labor Review, Vol.
LXX, July–December 1954, p. 6.
25 ICEM, “Immigration and Economic Development in Latin America”, paper
submitted to the Economic Commission of Latin America, Eighth Session,
Panama City, May 1959, p. 16.
26 "Features of Post-War European Migration”, p. 9.
27 Letter of Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos to Renato Azzi, Sao Paulo, July 10,
1952, Centro Historico do Imigrante, Processo 9733.
28 Letter of Renato Azzi to Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, Adria (Italy), June
26, 1952, Sao Paulo, Centro Historico do Imigrante, Processo 9733.
29 Letter of Renato Azzi to Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, Naples, July 12
1952, Sao Paulo, Centro Historico do Imigrante, Processo 9733.
30 Letter of Renato Azzi to Henrique Doria de Vasconcellos, Naples, July 17,
1952, Sao Paulo, Centro Historico do Imigrante, Processo 9733.
31 "Agrava-se a fuga desordenada dos Imigrantes das fazendas paulistas”, Folha
da Manha, Sao Paulo, February 5, 1953.
32 "Retorno em massa dos imigrantes italianos”, Sao Paulo, Ultima Hora, Feb-
ruary 4, 1953, p. 5.
33 Ibid.
34 "Preconizado pela Secretaria da Agricoltura um regime de escravidao para os
imigrantes em nossas fazendas”, Sao Paulo, Folha da Manha, February 1st,
1953.
35 "Retorno em massa dos imigrantes italianos”, Sao Paulo, Ultima Hora, Feb-
ruary 4, 1953, p. 5.
36 Letter of Doctors Antonio Giorgiomarrano and Edgard Croso to the Italian
Consul in Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, February 1st 1953, Arquivo Historico do
Imigrante, Processo 9733.

37 Letter of Mr Mignese, Emigration Attaché at the Italian Consulate in Sao
Paulo, to Doctor Edgard Croso, Sao Paulo, December 10, 1952, Arquivo
Historico do Imigrante, Processo 9733.
38 Letter of Doctor Edgard Croso to Mr. Mignese, Sao Paulo, December 12,
1952, Arquivo Hisorico do Imigrante, Processo 9733.
39 Report of Doctor Edgard Croso, Sao Paulo, February 11, 1953, Arquivo
Historico do Imigante, Processo 9733.
40 Letter of Doctors Antonio Giorgiomarrano and Edgard Croso to the Italian
Consul in Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, February 1st 1953, Arquivo Historico do
Imigrante, Processo 9733.
41 Marinelli, p. 7.
42 Camilo Cecchi, “Estudo comparativo”, p. 114.
43 Giovanni Passeri, Il Pane dei Carcamano. Italiani senza Italia: Inchiesta di
Giovanni Passeri, (Florence: Parenti Editore, 1958), p. 51.
44 Camilo Cecchi, “Determinantes e caracteristicas da emigraçao italiana”,
Sociologia, XXI (1), Sao Paulo, March 1959, pp. 86–87.
45 Ibid., p. 16.
46 "Features of Post-War European Migration”, p. 9.
47 Umberto Cassinis, “Primi risultati di una inchiesta CIME sull’emigrazione
italiana in Brasile”, Italiani nel Mondo, Vol. XIII (21), November 10, 1957.
48 Interview with Tullio Violini, Sao Bernardo (Sao Paulo), August, 20, 1988.
49 Interview with Luigi Piccardi, Rio de Janeiro, September 27, 1986.
50 Mario Venturi, Relazione sulla missione di studio compiuta in Argentina e
in Brasile circa le condizioni dei mercati del lavoro e i programmi di
emigrazione di manodopera europea selezionata, (Rome:CIME, Servizio di
assistenza alla selezione, 1960), p. 7.
51 Ibid., p. 10.
52 Arturo Bozzini, “Una precisazione sui prezzi in Brasile”, Italiani nel Mondo,
Vol. XIII (4), February 25, 1957, p. 11.
53 Mario Venturi, pp. 17–18.
54 Alberto Cimenti, “Immigrants Tell the Story of their Integration”, Migration
News, VII (3), May–June 1958, pp. 5–6.
Pan American Union, 1964), p. 66.
56 Interview with Vittorio Tartaro, Santo André (Sao Paulo), February 3, 1988.

57 Mario Venturi, pp. 208–230.
58 Ibid., pp. 231–240.
60 Ibid.
61 Antonio Jordao Neto, “O Imigrante Espanhol em Sao Paulo: Principais
Conclusoes de uma Pesquisa”, Sociologia, Vol. XXVI (2), June 1964, pp.
251–252.
62 Passeri, p. 63.
63 Passeri, pp. 120–121.
64 Rosaura Street quoted in Jordao Antonio Neto, “Barreiras no Controle da
Mobilidade Ocupacional e Espacial do Imigrante Espanhol”, Sociologia, Vol.
XXIV (2), June 1962. p. 118.
65 Interview with Angelo Donatiello, Sao Paulo, August 10, 1987 and Santo
Andre’, February 3rd, 1988.
66 Interview with Vittorio Tartaro, Santo André, Sao Paulo, February 3, 1988.
67 Interview with Tullio Violini, Sao Bernardo, Sao Paulo, August 20, 1988.
Chapter 5

Immigrants’ Repatriations
“After 1870, for the first time, it became evident that, following a
somewhat indeterminate state, many Italians repacked their chattels
and went home again. No previous immigrants in this land of promise
had done that”. 1 Confirming this argument formulated by Robert
Foerster, an early and most perceptive observer of Italian emigration,
a recent study of the Italian experience in the US by Dino Cinel em-
phasized that “of all the larger groups of immigrants, the Italians showed
a much greater tendency to return home”.2 According to Cinel, 60
percent of the Italians who arrived in the United States between 1908
and 1923 returned to Italy within a few years and often re-emigrated
several times, becoming known as “birds of passage”.3
What caused so many Italian emigrants to return? Did their repa-
triation implied a success or a failure? This question, which has haunted
generations of Italian immigration scholars, motivates this research as
well. Most studies provided an economic interpretation for repatria-
tions. Cinel, for example, argued that “the returnees were for the most
part neither rejected by American society, nor spurred by nostalgia.
Rather they were individuals actively pursuing goals they had set be-
fore departing”. 4 He concluded that they went back to Italy, after hav-
ing accumulated enough capital to buy land.
On the other hand, Italian repatriations from Latin American coun-
tries such as Brazil and Argentina, have been regarded, at all times as
a sign of economic failure.5 Zuleika Alvim explains that repatriations
occurring from Sao Paulo between 1870 and 1920 (estimated at 37
percent), resulted from the peasants’ continuing struggle against
proletarization. Incidentally Italian repatriations, which reached
their peak between 1896 and 1901, did not seem to be driven by
disillusion.
150 Immigrants’ Repatriations

. . . most immigrants who entered after 1886, although originally from Veneto,
did no longer have any illusion as to land ownership: those men and women
perfectly knew that an unsurmountable distance separated them from it. 6
Yet comparatively speaking, the Italian settlement rate in these

Latin American countries was notably higher than in the United States,
something that led most Italian immigration scholars to explain—and
very often praise—the cultural assimilation and economic integration
of this group. In Sao Paulo, for example, the Italian rate of settle-
ment.7 between 1870 and 1920 was estimated to be as high as 63
percent, the same figure as Brazil as a whole.8
The Italian story for the post World War II is, on the other hand,
completely different. Most people who went to Brazil left soon after
refusing to integrate both from a cultural and economic point of view.
How can this be explained, especially if one considers the fact that
Italians were always well received in Brazil and that the compatriots
who preceded them were considered as a whole a most successful
component of local society? To answer to this question this chapter
will (a) analyze immigration figures, comparing Brazilian and Italian
sources, (b) compare Italian repatriations in the 1950s with those by
other major immigrant groups, (c) analyze the internal composition of
returnees and their stigmatization by the most ancient immigrant com-
munity and finally (d) provide an interpretation for the cultural and
subjective meaning attached to the migration experience.
By the late 1940s some immigration analysts connected to Brazil-
ian official institutions rated the Italian immigrants settlement rate as
the lowest among that of other foreign groups, and argued that Ital-
ians showed a preference for “temporary immigration”.9 Official data
for the State of Sao Paulo, which began to be regularly collected only
in 1908, allows to calculate the settlement rate for the seven major
immigrant groups, accounting for 77 percent of all foreign people en-
tered between 1908 and 1935 (Table 18). Interestingly enough, the
Japanese, who were considered the most difficult group to be assimi-
lated by Brazilian society showed the highest settlement rate (93.2
percent), while Italians who, on the other hand, were considered the
most easily assimilated had the lowest settlement rate (12.7 percent).
How to explain this dramatic drop in the Italian settlement rate? As
far as Sao Paulo was concerned, an important consideration is family
composition. Before 1908 the great majority of Italian immigrants
went to Brazil in family groups; this implied an intention of permanent
settlement or at least a greater difficulty to return to Italy. After that
Immigrants’ Repatriations 151

Table 18 Brazil: Rate of Settlement by Major Immigrant Groups entered through
the Port of Santos, 1908–1935

Settlement
Nationality Arrivals Departures Balance Rate(%)

Japanese 171,143 11,677 159,466 93.2
Polish 14,282 6,350 7,932 55.5
Spanish 208,723 101,994 106,729 51.1
Portuguese 272,638 159,151 113,487 41.6
Greek 1,839 1,163 676 36.8
German 42,555 33,731 8,824 20.7
Italian 201,662 176,053 25,609 12.7
Other 279,346 163,984 115,834 41.5
TOTAL 1,192,188 654,103 538,557 45.1


Source: Brazil. Ministry of Agriculture. Directoria de Terras, Colonizacao e Imigracao, Servico
de Estatistica, 1936. Rio de Janeiro, Arquivo Historico do Itamarati. Comissao Nacional de
Economia, Trade Exchange Series.
date, however, at least 42 percent of the Italians travelled individually.

This meant they were free to be “birds of passage”. Particularly from
the late 1920s on, another factor—which is likely to have encouraged
repatriations—was the nationalist rhetoric of the Italian Fascist regime
directed to all immigrants abroad, resulting indeed in large returns to
the country.
The more recent Italian emigration following World War II, espe-
cially that involving subsidized immigrants, also experienced very low
settlement rates. A particular feature of Italian repatriations in the
1950s and 1960s was the fact that a great deal of them took place
within a relatively short period, ranging from six months to two years
after the immigrants’ arrival. 10 Most post-war repatriations concerned
the recent immigration, only about one percent referred to the pre-war
immigrants, who had by then adjusted to the new environment.
Although related to a brief time series, Table 19 suggests that Ital-
ian repatriations were much higher throughout the 1950s and the
1960s than Italian and ICEM official estimates indicated. 11 If the aver-
age settlement rate of percent for the second half of the 1950s can be
taken as a fair indicator for a general trend in the 1950s and 1960,
then it is possible to argue that post World War II Italians migrating to
Brazil experienced one of the lowest degree of integration throughout
their history as an immigrant group. Italian and Brazilian statistics

Table 19 Italians’ Rate of settlement in Brazil,1955–1960

Departures
 Average
Italian Brazilian Settlement Settlement
Arrivals data b data Balancea rate(%) a rate(%)

1955 8,523 2,592 4,896 3,627 43
1956 6,022 2,080 4,422 1,600 27
1957 6,157 2,640 4,887 1,270 20 16.6
1958 4,528 2,503 4,533 –5 –1
1959 3,874 1,784 3,972 –98 –3
1960 2,976 1,579 3,100 c –124 4

Sources: Gianfausto Rosoli, Un Secolo di Emigrazione Italiana, 1876–1976 , (Rome: Centro
Studi Emigrazione, 1978), pp. 354-374; Brazil Instituto Nacional de Imigracao e Colonizacao.
Departamento de Estudos e Planejamento. Divisao de Estatistica. Informacoes Estatisticas, N.
9, 1956; N. 18,1958; N. 25, 1960; N. 29, 1960.
a
Calculated on Brazilian statistics on departures.
b
The Italian statistics compiled by Rosoli are drawn from ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di Statistica
(Appendix II: Espatriati e Rimpatriati—years 1876-1973), N. 1, January 1975, and Annuari
Statistici Italiani.
c
Estimated figure.
differ by approximately 50 percent. This gap can in part be explained

by the fact that approximately 20 percent of Italians departing from
Brazil were directed to other destinations, mostly within the Ameri-
cas, rather than back to Italy. Yet, even considering this remigration,
Brazilian repatriation data are still much higher than the Italian ones.
An Italian diplomat serving in Brazil from the 1950s until the mid-
1960s explained that immigrants who repatriated at their own ex-
pense—probably the majority—would not declare this to customs’ au-
thorities, since their trip had been previously subsidized and they
would no longer be entitled to free passages if they wanted to emigrate
again in the future. 12 For this reason they would not be registered as
repatriates. This occurred because the Italian regulations at that time
forbade officially repatriated immigrants to re-emigrate through public
subsidies. Some interviewed immigrants admitted that it was common
for Italians to expatriate through ICEM passages more than once, some-
times even to the same country.
Ultimately, the interpretation provided by ICEM in its general analysis
of Italian subsidized repatriations is the least convincing.
. . . Out of 84,284 ICEM-assisted expatriates in the four years from 1957 to

1960, only 2,442, i.e. less than 3 percent, returned to Italy by the end of

1960. The remaining 81,842 migrants, i.e. 97 percent of the total subsidized
emigration, remained in the immigration country by the end of the four-year
period. Such a high percentage of settled immigrants finds an obvious
explanation in the fact that it is indeed subsidized emigration which offers
guarantees of duration and stability unknown in spontaneous, non-assisted
emigration. 13
In particular, the official ICEM figure of 438 repatriations concerning

former ICEM-subsidized immigrants from Brazil, between 1958 and
1960, seems at best unrealistic.14 Incidentally we know that 81.4 per-
cent of Italian expatriates between 1957 and 1960 were ICEM-subsi-
dized so it would not be surprising if a similar percentage of originally
ICEM-transported immigrants referred to the 16,492 returnees from
Brazil in the same period. It may well be that only 438 immigrants
were officially repatriated by the Italian Government, but most informed
people in the migration milieu knew that thousands of former ICEM-
subsidized immigrants were returning to Italy by paying their own travel
expenses. Indeed, most repatriations took place without official
subsidies.
The Table 20 compares repatriations by the major immigrant groups
in the second half of the 1950s. The same statistics could not be
found in Brazil neither for the previous nor the subsequent years.
An interesting aspect emerging from these figures is that Italian
repatriations were the highest even compared with larger immigrant
groups. In 1956 only Portuguese departures were higher than the
Italian ones. This is particularly striking when one considers, for ex-
ample, that in the period from 1950 to 1957, as shown in Table 7,
Table 20 Departures by Major Immigrant Groups from Brazilian seaports, 1955

to 1959

female female female female
Nationality 1955 1956 % 1957 % 1958 % 1959 %

Italian 4,896 4,422 36 4,887 44 4,533 40 3,972 36
Portuguese 4,342 5,506 32 4,544 36 3,499 34 3,204 32
Spanish 2,664 2,566 33 2,928 36 2,537 38 2,532 37
German 1,430 1,788 50 1,724 48 1,536 51 1,539 49
Japanese 549 595 36 622 36 642 40 61 37
Greek 236 281 29 353 38 241 36 368 40

Source: Brazil Instituto Nacional de Imigracao e Colonizacao. Departamento de Estudos e
Planejamento. Divisao de Estatistica. Informacoes Estatisticas, N. 9, 1956; N. 18, 1958; N.
25, 1960; N. 29, 1960.

Portuguese and even Spanish immigration to Brazil were actually higher
than the Italian, respectively 192,900, 75,800 and 74,600.
Another element emerging from Table 20 is the lower incidence of
women returning to Italy in relation to their original immigration per-
centage. Prior to the establishment of ICEM, repatriations had been
high among family heads who, having emigrated alone, were discon-
tented since they were unable to bring the members of their family to
join them or to send remittances back home.15 For this reason, as we
saw in Chapter IV, ICEM created the family reunion schemes, account-
ing for an even distribution of Italian men and women from 20 to 44
years old, arriving in Brazil between 1952 and 1956 (52 and 47 per-
cent, respectively).
The percentage of returnee women, on the other hand, ranged be-
tween 36 and 44 percent in the second half of the 1950s.16 This gap
may be explained by the lower propensity to repatriate for Italians
who had arrived in family units or through family reunion schemes,
particularly for those who were urban-based. In addition, they might
have had longer repatriation times, since returning to Italy would en-
tail a more complex operation than for single male immigrants. Nev-
ertheless, what is most striking is to see how high repatriations were
in the 1950s, in spite of the family policy which had promoted the
emigration of women as a stabilizing factor.
Brazilian statistical sources did not record the returnees’ profes-
sion, except for 1955 when Italians were reported to be distributed in
the following occupational sectors: 35.4 household laborers (mostly
women and children), 25 percent trade and industry laborers, 18 per-
cent industrial workers (both skilled and unskilled), 6 percent agricul-
ture laborers, 15 percent undeclared occupations.17 Except for the
agricultural sector, which by 1955 showed a higher repatriation than
immigration rate, this distribution reflects roughly the Italian immi-
grants’ occupational pattern in that period. This implies that repatria-
tions affected all sectors undistinctively, rather than referring to a par-
ticular group of discontent immigrants, as a great deal of the literature
of the time suggested. Incidentally, the same could be argued from
returnees of other nationalities. For example, the Portuguese had a
higher percentage in trade and industry (34 percent), just like in their
general occupational pattern, or Japanese who had the highest re-
turnee percentage in agriculture (40 percent).
Certainly, repatriations highly affected rural laborers and unskilled
industrial laborers who accounted for the majority of post World War

II immigrants: the former especially in the first half of the 1950s, the
latter from the second half of the 1950s onwards. Finally, they af-
fected—though to a minor degree—family reunion members whose so-
cial integration was supposedly much easier.
Peasants flee the countryside for the large cities where they try to get jobs
as unskilled laborers, but its seems that they hardly succeed. Being unskilled,
they are unable to earn enough money to support their family and constantly
change jobs, with no results. So they end up, when possible, returning to their
homeland. 18
In the second half of the 1950s, the typical officially-repatriated

Italian was described by interviewed officials as being often a male,
single, urban-based, unskilled laborer, especially of Southern Italian
origins, who had been originally unemployed in Italy. The Southern
regions of Italy generally supplied the greater part of the outflow of
emigrants and also attracted the heaviest backflow.19 In particular, a
major group of repatriates was known to be originally from the
Campania region, reflecting the general predominance of this area
among subsidized migrants of southern origins.20 ICEM reported that
47.4 of all Italian publicly-subsidized repatriates came from Southern
Italy, 14.9 percent were from Sicily and Sardinia islands, 25.2 percent
from northern regions and 12.5 from central regions.21
Spontaneous repatriations, i. e. those covered by immigrants them-
selves, seemed to be more frequent among urban laborers than among
rural immigrants, and more so among non-southern immigrants. South-
ern Italian immigrants tended to have, on the other hand, a higher
dependence on welfarism, demanding that repatriations be officially
covered by their home government.
In the 1950s, a common argument among migration supporters
and the older Italian immigrant group was that newcomers did not
have the same spirit for sacrifice, hard work and pride to contribute to
another country’s progress, a spirit that had characterized Italian eth-
nic identity in Brazil, especially in Sao Paulo. The new immigrants
were considered not determined enough to fight and overcome what
were seen as inevitable difficulties. There was, however, a deeper cul-
tural problem behind this critical attitude. Old immigrants were quite
assimilated to the host society: their habits were by then very much
influenced by local ways of life, although they maintained some sort of
identification with their original country. Indeed they did not support
the social integration of newcomers, but in fact ended up rejecting

them, considering them as alien entities.22 This also occurred, although
to a lesser degree, with new immigrants who joined relatives abroad.23
Another widespread bias referred to Southern Italians, mostly un-
skilled workers, peasants and people without a profession, portrayed
as highly unstable, while Northern Italians, mostly skilled workers and
technicians, tended to be considered as more stable and therefore less
inclined to move back to their home country.24 These feelings were
well summarized by an anthropological research, conducted by Camilo
Cecchi in January 1956 on a group of 40 Italians during their sea
journey back to Italy. He classified Italian returnees into three catego-
ries:
(a) those who returned because they could not find any real oppor-
tunity for settlement, in spite of the fact that they wished to
remain in Brazil;
(b) those who did not have the traditional immigrant’s spirit of sac-
rifice and emigrated just to improve their standards of living
(this group mostly included technicians and skilled workers who
were aware they would find a better placement in their home
country);
(c) unstable individuals, psychologically unsatisfied, lacking any pro-
fessional background (this group included mostly Southern Ital-
ians).
The author concluded that while the return of the first group repre-
sented an actual loss for Brazil, and that of the second group could be
easily replaced given the elastic Brazilian labor market, the return of
the third group was actually beneficial to the country since it involved
unproductive troublemakers “who are of no interest to any country”.25
Although a precise statistical picture of Italian returnees (both spon-
taneously and officially repatriated) is hard to reconstruct for the entire
decades of the 1950s and 1960s, owing to the lack of complete records,
it is however reasonable to argue—unlike Cecchi—that the meaning for
the high repatriations should be searched beyond that of a limited
group of unadjusted individuals: the backflow involved immigrants from
various occupational backgrounds and took place in spite of the fam-
ily-oriented emigration policy. Cecchi himself showed that skilled work-
ers and technicians accounted for 12.5 percent of his sample of Italian
returnees.
Informed Latin American scholars, such as Gino Germani, were
very much aware of the proportions of this problem and by the early

1960s tried to explain why the more recent immigration turned into a
failure both in economic and cultural terms.26
The fact that the recent immigration is considered, relatively speaking, a fail-
ure . . . points to the fact that there were some clear expectations as to its
success. . . . the new immigrants were inspired by the “American myth” of
rapid upward mobility; on the other hand their aspirations were measured
with those of a developed society, experiencing relatively high wages, as well
as more adequate social legislation and consumption levels. There was there-
fore a clash between the reality and the original expectations . . . which pre-
vented their assimilation, from the point of view of both their personal adjust-
ment and their participation in the local society . . . In many instances the
conditions met by the immigrants were unbearable . . . It is true that their
predecessors bore equal or even greater sufferings half a century before. But,
aside from the fact that many returns also occurred then, the average lifestyle
was very different.27
Emigrants clearly met a series of unexpected economic difficulties

which they were not prepared to face and that prompted them to leave
Brazil, such as the saturation of the labor market, the inability to send
remittances back to Italy, to adapt to the host society and even to be
wholly accepted within the earlier settled Italian community, as well as
the deep disappointment with the official institutions who had subsi-
dized their expatriations. On the other, the steady economic expan-
sion of Italy from the second half of the 1950s on, attracted them
back.
In addition to these economic and contingent factors, the failure of
post World War II Italian subsidized emigration to Brazil and the pat-
tern of this return movement was strongly influenced by cultural fac-
tors. First, Italians experienced a low identification with the host coun-
try, a sense of estrangement even shared by those who remained in
Brazil. It may be argued—similarly as Germani did for Argentina- that
this feeling very much resulted from “a clash between the reality and
the original expectations”, ultimately from a broken illusion. It is not
difficult to imagine how Brazil must have been advertised by Italian
official migration propaganda in its most glittering aspects, thus being
perceived as a tropical El Dorado, a land of unlimited plenty, beauty
and happiness.
This broken hope, at a time of more advanced and accessible com-
munication links between countries, allowed the recent flow of immi-
grants to Brazil to resume an old time custom in Italian migration, i. e.
a temporary settlement. The restless character of immigrants, their
high personal unsatisfaction, so well pictured in the third oral history

in Chapter IV, often coupled with their deep difficulties in relating
with close relatives and friends within their original primary group
back in Italy. This was often a primary force behind their migration
and, ultimately, behind their state of “transilience”.28
Notes
1 Robert Foerster, The Italian Emigration of Our Times, cited in Dino Cinel,
From Italy to San Francisco. The Immigrant Experience, (Stanford, Califor-
nia: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 49.
2 Cinel, p. 49
3 Ibid., p. 1, 48.
4 Ibid., p. 48.
5 Alvim, Zuleika, Brava Gente! Os Italianos em Sao Paulo, 1870– 1920, (Sao
Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986), p.116; Elena Saraceno, “L’Emigrazione fallita: rientri
e carriere professionali dei friulani in Argentina”, in Fernando J. Devoto and
Gianfausto Rosoli, eds., L’Italia nella societa’ argentina, (Rome: Centro Studi
Emigrazione, 1988); Gino Germani, “La asimilacion de los inmigrantes en la
Argentina y el fenomeno del regreso en la inmigracion reciente”, Revista
Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. I (1), 1961, p. 22.
6 Alvim, p. 126.
7 By “rate of settlement” it is meant the percentage of Italians who remained in
the immigration country, calculated on the net balance of immigrants who
remained (subtracting those who returned home from the total number of
immigrant entrances).
8 Alvim, p. 122–124. Similar estimates can be found in Giorgio Mortara, “A
imigracao italiana no Brasil e algumas caracteristicas do grupo italiano em
Sao Paulo’, Revista Brasileira de Estatistica, Rio de Janeiro, N. 41, March
1950, pp. 324–325.
9 Plinio Cavalcanti, “A imigracao como fator de desenvolvimento economico e
demografico de uma nacao”, Revista de Imigracao e Colonizacao, IX (4),
10 In some cases, there were reports on repatriations occuring only a few weeks
after arrival.
11 A statistical comparison between Brazilian and Italian figures was possible
only for the second half of the 1950s. Brazilian sources are taken as the main
reference for calculating settlement rates, since they are more accurate than
Italian ones, including all departures.
12 Interview with Ermenegildo Favaron, Rome, March 5, 1987.
13 ICEM, Rimpatri Italiani dai Paesi d’Oltremare: Indagine Statistica Triennio
1958– 1960, (Rome, 1962), pp. 30–31.
14 Ibid., Table 1, n. pag.

15 "Migration and Economic Development”, International Labor Review, LXII
(2), August 1950, p. 95.
16 A low repatriation rate for women between 15 and 44 years old is reported in
ICEM, Rimpatri Italiani dai Paesi d’Oltremare, p. 23. The majority of re-
turnees in that age group were indeed either unmarried young men or hus-
bands who had left their family in Italy. On the other hand, women between
45 and 64 years old, were reported to account for 57.5 percent of Italian
returnees in that older age group.
17 Instito Nacional de Imigracao e Colonizacao. Departamento de Estudos e
Planejamento. Divisao de Estatistica. Informacoes Estatisticas: Saidas, N. 9,
1956.
18 Camilo Cecchi, “O fluxo migratorio e o problema do ‘retorno’”, Sociologia,
Vol. XXII (3), 1957, p. 271.
19 Magda Talamo, “Italy: The backflow of emigrants in the context of migratory
movements”, OECD paper presented at the International Management Semi-
nar on Emigrant Workers returning to the Home Country, Athens, 18–21st
October 1966, p. 7.
21 These general statistics may also apply to Brazil. ICEM, Rimpatri Italiani dai
Paesi d’Oltremare, p. 25.
22 Alberto Cimenti, “Immigrants Tell the Story of their Integration”, Migration
News, VII (3), May–June 1958, pp. 5–6.
23 These observations were made by Gino Germani in his analysis of Argentina
but they are applicable to Brazil as well. Gino Germani, “La asimilacion de los
inmigrantes en la Argentina y el fenomeno del regreso en la inmigracion
reciente”, p. 24.
24 Cecchi, p. 273.
25 Ibid., p. 275.
26 The average rate of settlement for all immigrant groups in Argentina between
1952 and 1957 was calculated to be as low as 27 percent, but the statistics
presented by Germani do not allow for a calculation of the Italian rate.
27 Germani, pp. 22–24.
28 On this respect, Fortunata Piselli study of emigration from Cosentino, Calabria
Region, has shown how migrants did not leave so much for economic reasons
as for personal reasons. The “transilient” mode of adaptation as a dominant
pattern in migration in advanced industrial and post-industrial societies has
been explained by Antony Richmond, “Explaining Return Migration”, in Daniel
Kubat, ed., The Politics of Return: International Return Migration in Eu-
rope, (Rome: Centro Studi Emigrazione, 1984), p. 275.

Conclusion
By looking at the history of post World War II Italian subsidized emi-

gration to Brazil, this study has attempted to show how different the
reality was from the hopes of Italian immigrants and from what Brazil-
ian supporters of Italian immigration expected. Most immigrants did
not have the skills expected and Brazil was not the tropical El Dorado
depicted by official migration propaganda in Italy.
For Latin America as a whole, the peak emigration period was
1946–51, while thereafter there is a constant drop. This downward
trend can be interpreted as the workers’ resistance to leave for unat-
tractive destinations, in spite of official facilities to migrate. By the
late 1940s, the economic conditions Brazil offered immigrants were
rather unfavourable: practically no subsidies, low wages in the coun-
tryside and jobs available only to skilled workers in urban centers given
the excess supply of unskilled internal migrants.
Yet Italy’s establishment continued to perceive emigration as “an
essential element of economic, social and political balance” that could
offset the excessively high unemployment rate. It thus tended to en-
courage mainly the emigration of the unemployed and the unskilled.
In 1952 Brazil was the major receiving country of internationally sub-
sidized schemes and Italians accounted for 82 percent of the total
European ICEM migration. In the following years, the ambitious Ital-
ian migration targets were never met by ICEM, while the Italian immi-
grants’ difficulties to integrate became increasingly evident.
This resulted in a failure of post World War II subsidized emigra-
tion and in massive repatriations. Unlike the relatively high settlement
rates as well as the cultural and economic adjustment claimed for a
large number of earlier Italian immigrants and their children, this study
shows that the opposite occured after WW II. Italians had the highest
162 Conclusion

repatriation rates of any immigrant group in Brazil. Their return rate,
according to available Brazilian statistics, averaged 83 percent in the
second half of the 1950s, one of the highest in the entire history of
Italian immigration in the Americas. Therefore these findings chal-
lenge the assumption that (a) Italian immigrants were inherently as-
similable to Brazilian society, (b) assimilation and cultural integration
in Latin America was easier for immigrants proceeding from countries
in Europe.
How can this difficulty to integrate, both from a cultural and eco-
nomic point of view, be explained, especially considering the fact that
Italians were always well received in Brazil? This study illustrated how
emigrants clearly met a series of unexpected economic difficulties they
were not prepared to face, which prompted them to leave Brazil. Im-
portant factors were the saturation of the labor market, the inability to
send remittances back to Italy, to adapt to the host society and even to
be wholly accepted within the earlier settled Italian community, as
well as the deep disappointment with the official institutions who had
subsidized their expatriations. On the other hand, the steady economic
expansion of Italy from the second half of the 1950s on, attracted
them back.
In addition to these economic and contingent factors, this study
indicated how the failure of post World War II Italian subsidized emi-
gration to Brazil and the pattern of this return movement was strongly
influenced by cultural factors. First, Italians experienced a low identifi-
cation with the host country, a sense of estrangement even shared by
those who remained in Brazil. It may be argued that this feeling very
much resulted from “a clash between the reality and the original ex-
pectations”, ultimately from a broken illusion. At a time of more ad-
vanced and accessible communication links between countries, this
pushed the recent Italian immigrants to Brazil to resume an old time
custom, i. e. a temporary settlement.
On the other hand, the study also aimed at showing the underlying
racial and ethnic prejudices of Brazilian immigration policies. In so
doing this work challenged the official discourse on racial democracy,
as reflected on a relatively privileged immigrant group.
Italians accounted for the majority of subsidized European immi-
grants—although not of the overall European flow—who entered Bra-
zil in the 1950s and 1960s. When one compares the experience of
Italian immigration with that of “less desirable” ethnic groups, it seems
clear that racial and ethnic prejudice continued to affect immigration
Conclusion 163

policies following World War II. For the less desirable groups of immi-
grants or refugees, Brazil applied rigorous professional and technical
criteria, while for Italians these requirements were by no means rigid:
as a matter of fact, most Italians who arrived in Brazil through official
subsidies had no industrial skills at all.
At the same time, it is argued here that there was a continuity in
assimilationist policies of foreign groups from the 1930s on, as part
of a larger modernizing project. The post World War II resumption of
European migration—a smaller flow compared to that entering at the
turn of the century—was not perceived by Federal and State immigra-
tion policy-makers as contradicting the nationalist modernization project
of the country. Both in official documents and publications, as well as
in contemporary social studies, the European immigrant is portrayed
as an agent of modernization, a technically and culturally superior
worker who would be necessary for the industrial development of the
country. To be sure there was a more nationalist modernization project
—exemplified by the Sao Paulo entrepreneurs’ support of technical
training programs aimed at raising the local labor skills. This position,
certainly more sensible and practical than that of bringing foreign la-
borers, became with time predominant in Brazil.
The funding for the more recent flow of European immigrants came
from sources different from those in the turn of the century. The Inter-
governmental Committee for European Migrations, founded in late
1951 by a group of Western governments including Brazil, was en-
trusted with sponsoring, selecting and transporting immigrants. At
the same time, the State of Sao Paulo, which had previously subsi-
dized most Italian passages, lost its financial autonomy, becoming in-
creasingly subordinate to the Federal government. This shift in the
power balance between Federal and State administrations also resulted
in a tension over Italian immigrants’ selection: while Federal agencies
responsible for immigration policies pursued an ethnic improvement
orientation, the State of Sao Paulo agencies pursued a more rational,
economic orientation unsuccessfully demanding that immigrants be
rigorously selected according to their technical skills.
At least three general lessons can be drawned from this experience
for policy makers in both emigration and immigration countries as the
year 2,000 approaches. First, the failure of adequate migration poli-
cies in the post-Wold War period suggests what negative impact the
lack of informed policy may bring about. If Governments are to be
involved, they should be doing so in a way that potential immigrants
164 Conclusion

are supported, rather than mislead into doing something detrimental
for them.
Connected to this is the second lesson which relates to the value of
fair information. As millions of people presently uproot themselves
without the least idea of what they will encounter in the country of
their destination, the dissemination of truthful information becomes
not only a moral obligation for policy makers but above all an issue of
efficiency. Purely market mechanisms, both legal and illegal, which
presently dominate migration flows, cannot of course perform this
function.
The third lesson, well understood among practitioners of sustain-
able development, is the importance of promoting adequate labor op-
portunities and peaceful environments in less developed countries. In
the past, the interdependence between the socio-economic upheavals,
including massive unemployment, experienced in distant countries and
more advanced societies was less obvious. Now it is increasingly diffi-
cult to ignore it, even for those not particularly interested in equity
issues. As an increasing number of development economists are ac-
knowledging the constraints of mere market mechanisms, the greater
emphasis on the social, political and institutional underpinnings of
development may in some years contribute to a more equitable and
sustainable growth. Meanwhile, we should bear in mind that escaping
distress at home by means of migrating may not be the most desirable
solution neither for the migrants nor for the hosting countries.

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Studies in Modern European History

The Post-World War II Experience

Die Deutsche Bibliothek-CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

© 1999 Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York

All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

To the memory of my parents

I am indebted to many people and institutions for the completion of

This study focuses on the failure of Italian immigration to Latin America.

Acknowledgements ........................................................................ vii

I. Immigration Policies in Historical Perspective ......................... 1

II. Italian Post World War II Subsidized Emigration

III. Immigration Historiography, Ethnic Theories

IV. The Immigrants’ Experience:

V. Immigrants’ Repatriations .................................................. 149

Conclusion .................................................................................. 161

Fig. 1 Brazilian Federal Immigration Agencies, 1883–1962 .. 16

Tab. 1 Brazil: Immigration Expenditures over

CGE Commissariato Generale dell’Emigrazione (General Emi-

The historiography on European migrations to Brazil is rich in refer-

The policy of settling European immigrants on the land was one of

4 Immigration Policies in Historical Perspective

first, there is a chain of recently established immigrants including some padroni

On the other hand public-oriented migration is defined as a “move-

In addition, referring to Brazil, the author noted that remittances

The fact that Italians (most numerous in relation to the Portuguese

Immigration and the Racial National Project in Brazil

Nevertheless, several studies published since the late 1960s reinter-

Thomas Skidmore’s study traced the ideological foundations of white

While many academics have challenged Brazil’s “racial democracy” by point-

The following pages will attempt to show how Brazilian immigra-

State action is therefore meant as part of the social process result-

elites increasingly voiced concerns about a perceived failure of early republi-

So that it is possible to identify an essential tension in Brazilian immi-

We all considered the extreme south as a marvellous field of foreigners’ as-

It is interesting to note that Vianna’s concern for the assimilation of

This analysis of race ultimately brought him to harshly criticize the

Brazil: The Politics of Subsidies

In Brazil, the political continuity in the transition from the Colony to

Figure 1 Brazilian Federal Immigration Agencies, 1883–1962

Immigration Policies in Historical Perspective 19

encouraged the first xenophobic attitudes. At the peak of the great

Brazil did apply very rigorous social and professional criteria to

24 Immigration Policies in Historical Perspective

The eugenic requirement appeared candidly listed before any occu-

• to provide the country with electrical power;

The Simonsen report anticipated the immigration policy of

3 Tulio Halperin Donghi, “Para que la inmigracion? Ideologia y politica

5 Angelo Trento, Do outro lado do Atlantico: Um seculo de imigracao italiana

6 Emilio Franzina, La Grande Emigrazione. L’esodo dei rurali dal Veneto

7 Emilio Franzina, Merica, Merica. Emigrazione e colonizzazione nelle lettere

8 Piselli, Fortunata, Parentela ed Emigrazione. Mutamenti e continuita’ in

9 John S. MacDonald and Leatrice MacDonald, “Chain Migration, Ethnic Neigh-

11 Franzina, La Grande Emigrazione.

12 Franzina, Merica Merica.

13 Dean, Warren, “Remittances of Italian Immigrants: from Brazil, Argentina,

33 A sample of immigrants entered in Rio de Janeiro between 1873 and 1932,

35 Just before abolition, Joaquim Nabuco declared as to Chinese immigration:

37 Maria Luiza Tucci Carneiro, O Anti-Semitismo na Era Vargas, (Sao Paulo:

38 Nancy L. Stepan, “Eugenesia, Genetica y Salud Publica: El Movimiento

39 Stepan, ibid., p. 361.

40 Francisco de Oliveira Vianna, Raca e Assimilacao, (Sao Paulo: Companhia