Expanded Power of Judicial Review
-power to determine grave abuse
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in any branch or
Government instrumentality.
Llamas v Orbos
Issue: WON the president can grant
executive clemency.
Ruling: Yes. The SC can review
executive clemency granted by the
president.
It is well settled that the SC can
determine whether or not the president
gravely abused his discretion is covered
by the court’s expanded power of
judicial review.
Here, the power to grant executive
clemency is not absolute. It is subject to
limitations set by law just like how
executive clemency can only be granted
after the conviction of final judgment.
Thus, SC can review executive clemency
granted by the president.
Tolentino v Executive Secretary
Fact: separate versions of the VAT bill
are reconciled by the conference
committee
Arroyo v De Venecia
Fact: During deliberations the Speaker
of the House did not allow Cong Arroyo
to speak and therefore passed the bill.
Issue: WON the SC have jurisdiction to
entertain questions regarding the
enforcement of the internal rules and
regulation of the congress?
Ruling: No, the supreme court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of the
internal rules and regulations of the
congress even if there is a violation.
The SC can determine whether or not the
houses of congress gravely abused their
discretion is covered by the court’s
expanded power of judicial review.
Here, although there was a violation to
their own internal rules and regulations,
the congress did not violate any
provision constitutional in origin
because, at any time, the congress can
amend their rules.
Therefore, the supreme court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of the
internal rules and regulations of the
congress.
Bayan v Zamora
Fact: VFA
Issue: WON the president gravely
abused his discretion by ratifying the
VFA and recommending it to the Senate
for concurrence?
Ruling: Yes. The SC can review treaty
entered by the president.
It is well settled that the SC can
determine whether or not the president
gravely abused his discretion is covered
by the court’s expanded power of
judicial review.
Here, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue of a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other
contracting state. The Constitutional
provision were duly complied by the
president.
Therefore, The SC can review treaty
entered by the president.
Torrecampo v MWSS
Fact: C5 Extension project
Issue: WON the SC can review
executive policy?
Ruling: Yes, the SC can review
executive policy.
Functions of Judicial Review:
ii. To sustain validity of acts of
coordinate branches
Occena v COMELEC (also Javellana
v Executive Secretary)
Fact: The petitioners contends that such
resolution is against the constitutions in
proposing amendments.
Issue: Legitimizing Function
Ruling:
The Supreme Court can check as well as
legitimate. In declaring what the law is,
it may not only nullify the acts of
coordinate branches but may also sustain
their validity. In the latter case, there is
an affirmation that what was done
cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally
deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of
this character suffices.
iii. symbolic function of judicial to
educate the bench and bar
Salonga v. Pano
Fact:
Issue: What is the legal effect of
dropping Salonga from the case?
Ruling:
It is well-settled that the SC has the
symbolic function of educating the
bench and the bar.
Here, even if the case is moot and
academic, the SC decided to make
further pronouncement educating the
bench and bar about double jeopardy and
that there is no probable cause against
Salonga.
Alliance of Government Workers v
Minister of Labor
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling: It has no jurisdiction pertaining
to cases of preparatory relief which is for
the RTC to decide.
SC treated the petition for mandamus for
its teaching implications.
It is well-settled that the SC has the
symbolic function of educating the
bench and the bar.
Here, SC exceptionally treats the petition
as if they have jurisdiction by converting
it to another type of petition over which
they have jurisdiction and decide the
case on its merits.
Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy or
Constitutional Supremacy
Association of Small Landowners v.
Secretary of Agrarian
Even if the SC doesn’t have the power of
the purse or of the sword, it is the court
of last resort regarding constitutional
questions. Therefore, if it decides to
wield its power of judicial review, it may
over-turn, nullify or set aside the actions
of the political branches of government.
In effect, the judiciary is supreme over
the political branches over political
questions.
But the appropriate term would be the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy
because its really not the judiciary that is
supreme. It just the role of the judiciary
to determine what the law is or how the
law should be construed. The judiciary is
just imposing the supremacy of the
constitution.
Limitations of the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction
of courts
1. Congress may not deprive the
SC of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated
Vargas v. Rilloraza
Facts: People’s Court Act - RTC can
substitute SC judges over treason cases
during Japanese occupation. SC
sustained the challenge.
Ruling:
It is well settled that the Congress has
the power to define, prescribe and
apportion jurisdiction of courts as long
as it doesn’t deprive SC of its original
and appellate jurisdiction or increase the
SC’s appellate jurisdiction without the
latter’s advice and concurrence.
The People’s Court act deprived the SC
of its jurisdiction because it created a
distinct court composed of RTC judges
and few associate justices.
COMELEC v. Noynay &
COMELEC v. Aguirre
Facts: Ominibus election code violation
filed before the RTC of Samar. RTC said
it doesn’t have jurisdiction because the
penalty is 6 years and 1 day or higher.
Ruling:
It is well settled that the Congress has
the power to define, prescribe and
apportion jurisdiction of courts as long
as it doesn’t deprive SC of its original
and appellate jurisdiction or increase the
SC’s appellate jurisdiction without the
latter’s advice and concurrence.
Here, the Ominibus election code
enacted by congress gives jurisdiction to
the RTC to try election cases.
2. No law shall be passed
reorganizing the judiciary the
when it undermines the security
of tenure of the members of the
judiciary.
Zandueta v. De la Costa & De la
Llana v. Alba
Ruling:
It is well settled that no law shall
be passed reorganizing the
judiciary the when it undermines
the security of tenure of the
members of the judiciary.
Here, the security of tenure
means the incumbent to an office
may not be disciplined or
suspended without cause and
 without due processes.
(Zandueta)
Here, the reorganization resulting
in an abolition of courts will not
amount to undermining the
security of tenure of the judiciary
as long as the reorganization is
made in good faith. There is no
security of tenure to an office
that has been abolished because
it is not tantamount to removal.
(De la Llana)
Appointments to the Judiciary
Qualifications
Villanueva v. JBC
Ruling: the JBC is mandated to
recommend appointees to the judiciary
and only those nominated by the JBC in
a list officially transmitted to the
President may be appointed by the latter
as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus,
the JBC is burdened with a great
responsibility that is imbued with public
interest as it determines the men and
women who will sit on the judicial
bench. While the 1987 Constitution has
provided the qualifications of members
of the judiciary, this does not preclude
the JBC from having its own set of rules
and procedures and providing policies to
effectively ensure its mandate.
Judicial and Bar Council is under the
supervision of the SC
Villanueva v. JBC
Issue#1: W/N JBC committed grave
abuse of discretion in laying down such
policy
Ruling#1: No. The functions of
searching, screening, and selecting are
necessary and incidental to the JBC’s
principal function of choosing and
recommending nominees for vacancies
in the judiciary for appointment by the
President. However, the Constitution did
not lay down in precise terms the
process that the JBC shall follow in
determining applicants’ qualifications. In
carrying out its main function, the JBC
has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its
nominees for every vacancy in the
judiciary, subject only to the minimum
qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position.
The search for these long held qualities
necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is
most fit among the applicants. Thus, the
JBC has sufficient but not unbridled
license to act in performing its duties.
Issue#2: W/N the violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
Ruling#2: No. The equal protection
clause is not violated because the
classification created by the challenged
policy satisfies the rational basis test.
Substantial distinctions do exist between
lower court judges with five year
experience and those with less than five
years of experience, like the petitioner,
and the classification enshrined in the
assailed policy is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose. The
assailed criterion or consideration for
promotion to a second-level court, which
is five years experience as judge of a
first-level court, is a direct adherence to
the qualities prescribed by the
Constitution. Placing a premium on
many years of judicial experience, the
JBC is merely applying one of the
stringent constitutional standards
requiring that a member of the judiciary
be of “proven competence.” In
determining competence, the JBC
considers, among other qualifications,
experience and performance.
Jardaleza v. Sereno
Ruling: Under Sec 8, Art VIII of the
Constitution, the JBC shall function
under the supervision of the SC. It
follows that such supervisory authority
covers the overseeing of whether the
JBC complies with its own rules or not.
Here, although the JBC is a
constitutional body, the SC has the
power to review its exercise of its
functions and to set aside or nullify if it
violates its own rules.
Members of the Judicial and Bar
Council
1. Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman
2. Secretary of Justice
3. Representative of Congress
4. Representative of the IBP
5. Professor of Law
6. Retired Member of the SC
7. Representative of the private
sector
Chavez v. JBC
Ruling: Yes. The practice is
unconstitutional; the court held that the
phrase “a representative of congress”
should be construed as to having only
one representative that would come from
either house, not both. That the framers
of the constitution only intended for one
seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative. It is evident that the
definition of “Congress” as a bicameral
body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage
of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the
distinction of the role of each house in
the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these
powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of
JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The
Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.
Rule-Making Power of the Judicial
and Bar Council
Villanueva v. JBC
Issue: rule-making power – sui generis,
quasi-legislative, plenary in nature
Ruling: the Constitution did not lay
down in precise terms the process that
the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants’ qualifications. In carrying
out its main function, the JBC has the
authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy
in the judiciary, subject only to the
minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position.
The search for these long held qualities
necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is
most fit among the applicants. Thus, the
JBC has sufficient but not unbridled
license to act in performing its duties.
Presidential appointment from JBC
list
Clustering of nominees vs. President’s
power to appoint
Aguinaldo v. Aquino
Ruling: The practice of the JBC of
clustering appointees is unconstitutional.
It is well settled that the president has
plenary powers to appoint subject to
requirements stated in the constitution.
Here, the only requirement is that the
president must appoint from the shortlist
recommended by the JBC.
Thus, the practice of the JBC of
clustering appointees is unconstitutional.
Fiscal Autonomy
Appropriation for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous
year, and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Bengzon v. Drilon
Issue: Fiscal Autonomy
Ruling: Pursuant to constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Here, the veto of these specific
provisions in the General Appropriations
Act is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary of its funds should be utilized,
which is clearly repugnant to fiscal
autonomy.
When are the vacancies in the SC
filled up?
De Castro v. JBC
Issue: Midnight appointments ban
Ruling: No, the appointment of the SC
Chief justice is not covered by the
midnight appointments ban.
Section 4 (1), Article VIII states that the
Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained under the midnight
appointment ban of the Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so.
Cases raising novel questions of law
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. CA
Issue: Why did the division refuse to
refer the case to the en banc?
Ruling: We reject petitioner’s argument
that the present case may be considered
under the Supreme Court Resolution
dated February 23, 1984 which included
among en banc cases those involving a
novel question of law and those where a
doctrine or principle laid down by the
court en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed. The case was
resolved based on basic principles of the
right of first refusal in commercial law
and estoppel in civil law. Contractual
obligations arising from rights of first
refusal are not new in this jurisdiction
and have been recognized in numerous
cases.18 Estoppel is too known a civil
law concept to require an elongated
discussion. Fundamental principles on
public bidding were likewise used to
resolve the issues raised by the
petitioner. To be sure, petitioner leans on
the right to top in a public bidding in
arguing that the case at bar involves a
novel issue. We are not swayed. The
right to top was merely a condition or a
reservation made in the bidding rules
which was fully disclosed to all bidding
parties.
Laurel v. Arbogar
Issue: Novel Question of Law
Ruling: Laurel further cited the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice in
Piltel v. Mendoza,25 where it was ruled
that the Revised Penal Code, legislated
as it was before present technological
advances were even conceived, is not
adequate to address the novel means of
"stealing" airwaves or airtime. In said
resolution, it was noted that the
inadequacy prompted the filing of
Senate Bill 2379 (sic) entitled "The
Anti-Telecommunications Fraud of
1997" to deter cloning of cellular phones
and other forms of communications
fraud. The said bill "aims to protect in
number (ESN) (sic) or Capcode, mobile
identification number (MIN), electronic-
international mobile equipment identity
(EMEI/IMEI), or subscriber identity
module" and "any attempt to duplicate
the data on another cellular phone
without the consent of a public
telecommunications entity would be
punishable by law."26 Thus, Laurel
concluded, "there is no crime if there is
no law punishing the crime."
Cases where a doctrine or principle
laid down by the Court en banc or by
a division maybe modified or reversed
Cases involving conflicting decisions
of two or more divisions
Cases where three votes in a Division
cannot be obtained
Vote Requirements for decision/
resolution
1. En banc – concurrence of
majority who actually took
part in the deliberations on the
issues and voted thereon
2. In resolution of an Motion for
Reconsideration to a decision –
decision sustained
Importance of the change in
composition of SC in instances where
one case is capable to be decided one
way or the other.
MRs in a Division case
In Re: Letters of Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza
Issue: Error in re-raffling compositions
in judiciary
Requisites of Judicial Review
A. Actual case or controversy
- GR: there should be an actual
conflict of legally important
and demandable human
rights.
- if the issue has been mooted
by supervening events, the
SC will no longer decide the
case on the merits. Instead, it
will dismiss the case.
- ER: If the issue is very
important, the SC will decide
the issue based on the merits
because of the issue’s
transcendental importance to
the public and is capable of
repetition evading review.
B. Legal Standing
- there must be direct injury.
 - GR: The one who assails the
constitutionality or
unconstitionality of an act
must show that he or she has
incurred direct injury.
- Without injury, the case is
dismissible on the ground of
lack of merit.
- ER: SC may still decide the
case on the merits if the
issues may be of
transcendental use of the
public interest.
C. Earliest Opportunity
An unconstitutional law doesn’t
become constitutional after so
many years. Issues of
unconstitutionality should be
raised at the earliest time
possible.
D. Necessity of Deciding (Lis
Moda)
When questions of constitutional
significance are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following
requisites are present: (1) the
existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) the
existence of personal and
substantial interest on the part of
the party raising the
constitutional question; (3)
recourse to judicial review is
made at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the
case.
Both parties dwelt lengthily on
the issue of constitutionality of
the respondents’ appointments in
light of E.O. No. 2 and the
subsequent filing before the
Court of several petitions
questioning this Executive Order.
The parties, however, appear to
have overlooked the basic
principle in constitutional
adjudication that enjoins the
Court from passing upon a
constitutional question, although
properly presented, if the case
can be disposed of on some other
ground.[31] In constitutional law
terms, this means that we ought
to refrain from resolving any
constitutional issue “unless the
constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.”
Lis mota literally means “the
cause of the suit or action.” This
last requisite of judicial review is
simply an offshoot of the
presumption of validity accorded
the executive and legislative acts
of our co-equal branches of the
government. Ultimately, it is
rooted in the principle of
separation of powers. Given the
presumed validity of an
executive act, the petitioner who
claims otherwise has the burden
of showing first that the case
cannot be resolved unless the
constitutional question he raised
is determined by the Court.[32]
In the present case, the
constitutionality of the
respondents’ appointments is not
the lis mota of the case. From the
submitted pleadings, what is
decisive is the determination of
whether the petitioner has a
cause of action to institute and
maintain this present petition – a
quo warranto against respondent
Urro. If the petitioner fails to
establish his cause of action for
quo warranto, a discussion of the
 constitutionality of the
appointments of the respondents
is rendered completely
unnecessary. The inclusion of the
grounds for certiorari and/or
prohibition does not alter the
essential character of the
petitioner’s action since he does
not even allege that he has a
personal and substantial interest
in raising the constitutional issue
insofar as the other respondents
are concerned.
ER: When the SC sees the need to
decide on the constitutional challenge
even if it was not raised it will disregard
the technicalities and procedure and
proceed to decide on the controversy.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Orthodox view: When the SC declares a
statute unconstitutional, there are two
possible effects. An unconstitutional act
is void ab initio. It is as if it wasn’t
enacted at all.
Operative Fact Doctrine: Prior to the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of
a statute, its existence is an operative
fact. We don’t ignore that prior to the
decision of the SC, the law was enacted,
passed, approved, and implemented. It
may have consequences that cannot be
ignored. The underlying justification is
fairness and equity. (Prevailing
Principle)//
The doctrine of operative fact
recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the declaration of
its unconstitutionality as an operative
fact that produced effects that cannot
always be erased, ignored or
disregarded.//
This is the exception to the general rule
that a law declared by the Supreme
Court as unconstitutional is void. What
the doctrine implies is that a law remains
to be operative and constitutional until
the same has been declared void. Thus,
the law that has been declared as
unconstitutional remains to be operative
prior to the declaration of the Supreme
Court on its unconstitutionality.
The doctrine does not stem from any
statute but is based on fair play and
equity. It operates when the declaration
of a law's unconstitutionality will result
in undue burden to those who rely on the
law that is presumed to be legal and
constitutional until declared otherwise.
It must be noted, however, that the
doctrine of operative fact does not make
an unconstitutional law valid and
constitutional. It merely erases the
effects of its unconstitutionality before it
is judicially declared as void.//
GR: Partial Unconstitutionality
If any provision of law is deemed
unconstitutional, the others remain good
and valid.
In Re Cunanan
Fact: Bar Flunkers Act
Salazar v Achacosoo
Fact: Warrants of Arrest
ER: Significance of Separability
Clause
They SC may strike all the provisions of
law even if one of the provision is
unconstitutional.
Tatad v. Secretary
Fact: Tariff Differential
Relative Constitutionality
A statute valid when enacted may
become invalid by change in the
conditions to which it is applied.
Rule Making Power of the Supreme
Court
In Re: Petition for Recognition of the
Exemption of the GSIS from Payment
of Legal Fees
Ruling: The Rules of Court are
promulgated by the SC pursuant of its
rule-making power under the
Constitution. Part of the rules of court is
the payment of legal fees. Congress
cannot regulate legal fees.
In Re Edillion
Facts: Didn’t want to pay IBP dues
Ruling: The SC has the constitutional
power to integrate the bar.
Primicias v. Ocampo
Ruling: The right to a trial in the aid of
commissioners is a substantive right
given in a statute. It cannot be repealed
by the rules of court promulgated by the
SC.
De Guzman v. People
Ruling: Until such time that the SC
disapproves, the Rules of Sandiganbayan
will prevail. The SC affirmed the
decision of the Sandiganbayan of the
petitioner in this case for malversation.
GR: SC has administrative
supervision over all courts and
personnel thereof
ER:
Ampong v. CSC
Facts: Administrative case against a
teacher who became a court interpreter.
She submitted to the jurisdiction of the
CSC.
Ruling:
GR is the CSC cannot assume
jurisdiction over court personnel even
for administrative disciplinary cases
for actions even before working in the
judiciary.
ER the petitioner was estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction exercised
by the CSC and the finding of guilty
by the CSC because teacher
participated voluntarily, waived your
right to council, and admitted to the
said act.
CSC v Andal
Ruling: SC exercised the GR. It should
be the SC who exercise the
administrative disciplinary authority
over all courts and the personnel thereof.
In Re: Request for Guidance/
Clarification on Sec 7 Rule III of RA
10154
Ruling: Only clearance of the SC is
required for retiring employees of the
judiciary consistent with the GR.
Tenure of Judges
Mandatory retirement at 70 years old.
Even there is a pending case, he cannot
hear or decide.
Decision shall express the factual and
legal basis
GR
Bernabe v Geraldez
Ruling: No form as long as there is
factual/legal basis.
 Judges cannot be designated in any other
ER tribunal or committee.
University of the Philippines v. Dizon
Ruling: Final decision is void because it
did not contain factual and legal basis
even if it became final and executory.

Petition for review and MR shall not

be denied due course without stating
the legal basis

Mendoza v CFI
Issues: Unsigned resolutions
Ruling: This is not an invalid dismissal
because this is an unsigned resolution.

Borromeo v CA
Issues: clerk of court signed the minute
of resolution
Rulings: We have to dispose the bulk of
these cases by unsigned minute
resolutions.

Unsigned minute resolutions are valid.

Salaries of Judges
We are all subjects to the income tax by
the BIR.

Periods of Decision
SC – 24 months
Lower Appellate Courts – 12 months
First and Second Level Trial Courts – 90
days

If judges decide the case the periods

specified, he does not lose jurisdiction
over the case. He will just be sanctioned
administratively by the SC.

Non-designation of SC Members to
quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies