FR actin FB Cher K SUteee DISCIPLINE IN THE U.S. NAVY CONDENSATION OF A STUDY BY RADM ARLEIGH BURKE, USN Bureau of Naval Personnel NAVPERS 91195FOREORD Rear Adnirel Arleigh Durke's study in its original form vas reproduced and distributed to all Comanders in Chief, Fleet Commanders, and Type Commnders, The study appeured in its condensed form in the October 1950 issue of the Nava) Training Pulletin. The tinely importance of the subject vas mediately proved ty the nunerous requests for additional, copies. Aside fron this, hovever, the decision to reprint the article in this booklet fora is in keeping with the policy or the Bureau of Waval Peraonnel-the dissenination of training information to as many naval peracnnel as possible, Rear Admiral Burke's study carries a message which is as important to the top level connand as it ie to the petty officer. If you are looking for the ansvere to the questions of viet discipline is, vhat the factors are vhich contribute to the break-down of discipline, and what methods can be used to combat these breakdowns, then the following pages vill be of interest to yous J. W, ROPER Vice Adnirel, USN Chief of Naval FersonnelPART I--General Discipline in the Navy #11 disciplined organization is one whose members work vith enthusiasm, willingness, and 2est as individuals and as a group to fulfill the mission of the organization with expectation of success. Fffect of Lack of Discipline Lack of discipline results in loss of snooth, determined operating action and combat efficiency. Fxamples of the results of lack of discipline may be seen in the Italians at Adova, the Spanish fleet in ‘the Spanish-Anerican War, the Russian army in World War I, and, with Jess disastrous outcome, the peace-tine disaffections of the British Navy at Invergordon after World war I, the recent unrest in the Royal Canadian Navy, and the strikes to co home in the U, S, Army after World War II,’ The underlying cause in each case was the deterioration of the whole organization to such a degree that the local authorities could not, or would not because of their own degeneration, correct the Jocal sitintion early enough to prevent widespread loss of authority. ‘The United States Navy has never had an instance of this kind at any time in its history, Measures of Discipline ess tte’ Top igs echt erion, ats seonetya puny see conc lee Lessor criteria, which in the aggregate Bosone important neesures of discipline: (1) A dignified pride and self-respect--pride in the Navy, in the unit, and in oneself; (2) A willing 33 to work for and to make personel sacrifices to the group good; (3) A saart appesrence-—a slopry, Ship or a slovenly san vidi be so"in actions (4) A respect for fellow nen exemplified in courtesy and consideration; (5) Optiaistic cheer- Pilnoos, liveliness, and exhilarationg Discipline and Comand Discipline is a function of command. Juniors as vell as seniors mist be made responsible for an be cognizant of their responsibility. Conrmnders cannot delegate or reassign their om responsibility. Morale problens cannot be tured over to the chaplain or the dispensing of Justice to the legal expert. Specialists must be naval officers firat and specialists second, and vork for the comanding officer rather than function separately. Command mst have the authority necessary for the exercise of its resronsitility. Factors Affecting Discipline or Morale "In every case of breakdown of discipline the following four major factors have been present: (1) Lack of information—subordinates vere not kept, informed of problems or of reasons why the organization vas required to take the action it did take. (2) Lack of interest—seniors had Little interest in or knowledge of the problems of their juniors or if they did the juniors vere left mavare that they did; (3) Slackness in command; (4) Instability. Senseless transfers of personnel, changes in operating schedules or in daily routine, The organization as a whole and as individuals felt insecure and uncertain of the future. ‘There were other important factora such ns operating conditions, food, Living conditions; all of which had an effect on discipline, but ‘ench’of the above four najor factors were defective in all major Giseffections. It is vorth while to examine these and other factors in detail to determine their status in this Navy of ours. =Information to the Navy. There are two incentives which cause any young nan to choose a certain profession as a lifetine career, and the: ‘sane incentive: muse of his satisfaction with his choice as his career develops. The first is his belief thet the profession has honor anda future. The other incentive is that a man mst feel that if he does his duty vell and honorably, snd denonstrates his ability, he can progress to a reasonable degree of success vithin the organization. in the British Navy there vas @ general letdown an anticlinax following the first world var. The British government needed to save money to stay solvent. The British Fleet was sent on dangerous, un— pleasant duty around Russia, British seamen were paid too little in proportion to the civilian rates of pay. ‘There were rumblings of @losatiafaction before, bat vhen a pay cut vas wuddenly announced, the British Fleet et Invergordon mutinied, ‘The British Admiralty had never bothered to explain to the Navy the problens vhich confronted the government and the Navy. The bluejackets mow only vhet they read in the neva, and the neve vae full of doubt to the need of a Navy at all in the future, There was comment that 1¢ Navy would be prectically disbanded. Uncertainty developed in the lover decks-end uncertainty 1s the most fruitful cause of unrest. Factual tinely information issued by the Adniralty might have prevented the trouble from developing, but nobody put out the information, and even the senior officers did not knov the facts, Thore 48 great need in our own Navy now for factual information. Our officers and nen get detailed and excellent information on how to make the next rate, but they get very little assurance (or didn't until recently) as to the future of the Nevy, They reed, absorb, and some- times believe the stories that Nevies are no longer needed, that the Navy 4s on the second team, etc. They have not hed made available to then the basic facts vhich would disprove the specious argunents against their srvice, and as a result they have otarted to be less proud of their Navy. Information must be fed continuously to be effective; it mst be given by every nediun available; and it mat be given by each senior to his subordinates, All should mow in general thet there is an honorable place—a necessary place—in the national security structure for a Navy, ané that without an effective, herd fighting Navy, no var can be won. It is the job of all officers in’top billets in the Nevy to explain in general the plans and the future of the Navy to their service. Later, when the situation permits, it would be desirable if the senior officers vere assisted in this duty by a very fev qualified personnel, but there is danger in establishing an office for this purpose too soon. For the @Lssenination of such information can be effective only if it is ac- complished ty many people, As an example, every issue of every Navy publication should have sone article in 1% about the future of the Navy as @ vhole organization. Many do now. They should be encouraged. There is © converse to this lack of informtion being passed down. Unless there is dope coming dovn, 1ittle goes up. Information mst be exchanged. If seniors do not inform their juniors of items of interest, juniors vill not feel a strong compulsion to inform their seniors of itens of possible interest. %o commander oan connand even a éiviston well unless he is informed of what is going on vithin his comand, He must have the feel of the pulse of his crev-—vhich he can get only if his people confide in hin, Interest of Sentors in Subordinates. The case history of the recent ‘inetdents" in ships of the Royal Canadien Nevy will serve as an exanple of apparent lack of interest of seniors in the work and the problens of their juniors. There was a noticeable lack of huxan understanding between officers and enlisted men. en vere reprinended for vork badly done but rarely comended for work well done, Captains vithdrev from their officers, and flag officers hed 1ittle knowledge of vhat was happening in the ships. ‘There vas little instruction of young officers in practical leedership. ‘There vas no recognizes process for the airing of grievances. There vas lack of cooperation, of frankness and of communications among leadinghands, petty officers, officers end thetr superiors. An absence of confidence between officers and leading petty officers, between petty officers and nonreted men and between junior end senior officers existed. Officers did not exercise close supervision over the cut of their divisions. The seniors did not know what vas going on in the lover decks end consequently took no renediel steps which would have prevented a serious situation fron occurring. In short, the officers did not know what was going on and apperently didn't care. The men lost feith and confidence and a series of Nineidents" resulted. Our Navy has alvaya been free of this type of éisorder and one of the reasons is thet all navel officers know that their most important, duty 19 the handling of men. A successful Navy requires « unique and close relationship between officer and nan. The officers have been “thoroughly conversant in that relationship and vere therefore well prepared to fulfill their responsibilities to their subordinates. But officers are not paying quite the attention to this peranount uty they did before and during the ver. The results showed up in a survey made by BuPers of the opinions of separatecs about’ the Navy and vere confirmed ty the lence mnber of people who wented to get out as a result of AlNav 117 (27 December 1949). A surprisingly large muster, both petty officers and nonreted men, felt that the officers and, to a lesser extent, their senior petty officers, vere not interested in their personal protiens or welfere. They #150 felt that their jobs vere not very important and thet their seniors éié not recognize their qualifications—-or for that matter their minor shorteoning: ‘These men leaving the lavy have complained that their officers dic not make adequate use of their skills and training. Officers were not avare of the nen's capebilities ané potentialities, what contributions ‘they could make to the Navy or to their ship. They felt that the officers nade no effort to Sdentify their men with their ship or with the Navy. That 1o an indictment whether the men were right or not. ‘That's the vay they felt—and that's wrong. The cause for this difficulty sterts at the top with the very senior officers. These officers are commencing to lose the personal touch with their juniors. There is n good reason for it. Few of then can be assigned to duty at sea these days, Those that are are svanped vith nasses of paper work and conferences, so that there is little tine left over for that important function of keeping acquainted with vhat their sutordinates are doing and how they are doing it, The nore responsible the position that an officer holds the more inportant it is thet he direct and supervise the vork of his subordinates, and seeningly the less tine he has available to accomplish this priority task. If the situation is not corrected there will be a gradual lovering of effectiveness as juniors rise to more inportant positions under the tutelage of too busy seniors. There 1s much connent that the younger officers and the petty officers are inexperienced and lack ability in their divisional duties. This 1s true, But they will get thet experience only under the direction of their seniors, and ve are tack at the starting point again--that the seniors don't have the time to exercise proper supervision. Seniors could well devote nore effort to delineating to juniors, expecially the "J.0's," exactly what is required of then, Too often these enthusiastic young men are sinply-told to comply vith the mss of diréctives fron the multiple "higher authorities" without adequate guidance or counsel. The lads end up confused, frustrated, overvorked, and disheartened. Fron that position it is @ gentle downhill slide to lack of pride and loss of anbition. The situation 4s preduslly improving, but st vill not improve at @ high enourh rate until more enphasis is placed on the handling of nen end less on the volune of paper scenned. Junior officers and petty officers have a tendency to be too soft, too lenient vith minor infrections of discipline end therety penalize theEEE good nan while favoring the poor ones, This eventually becomes aprerent to the officers who then are apt to becone uncertain of thenselves end becone too arbitrary. In either ease they lose the confidence of their Inexperienced officers also apparently have a tendency not to follow through on reports and orders, This allows the poor man "to cet avay with it" and is discouraging to the good men. There is not enough checking. ‘There are far too nany inexperienced commanders of stations and ships (some of them rather senior) vho use courts martial to correct defects which should have been corrected by direct personal action of the division officers or the captain hinself. Direct personal action early in the pane will’ save rany a court and will greatly increase the effectiveness of any command; but it doos require knowledge of incipient trouble before it occurs, and it doos necossitate a lot of time spent with cubordinates. ‘There is a small minority of youngsters who take undue advantage of their rank and this quite naturally causes resentment, No man takes advantage of his rank unless he is unsure of hinself and uncertein as to the respect he would command without his artificiel means. Of course the leadership supervision and guidance the junior officers and petty officers give, day in and day out, are the most important factors in achieving a high esprit de corps. The division officer is the core of the Navy's spirit, This is the key to mich of the disciplinary trouble of the present Navy, Much of the eriticion of present morale, or lack of it, 4s leveled at the division officer, and rightly 90, and most of it is’based on this officer's lack of understanding of his men. He must know then as individuals and make thea realize and appreciate that he knows them, All this has been said frequently and in many weys, but it is believed that one elenent of this protlea is frequently overlooked. Hias the division officer the means and tine available to adequately supervise, guide, and counsel his men in the manner required to develop that feeling of mtual respect and understanding so important in the foundation of a high esprit de corps (and high standard of discipline)? Most of the present mass of directives, orders, instructions, ete. from the nany offices and bureaus in the Navy Departnent, fleet, tire, and unit commanders, and other sources, ultimately fall upon this one Andividual (the division officer) for execution, If he is conscientiously carrying out. each and every such order and directive, standing his vetches, supervising his maintenance and upkeep work, making the required inspections, and otherwise carrying out his prescribed duties and responsibilities, he finds that the 24-hour day is just not long enough, ‘The result is that some of his duties have to be performed hurriedly or not at all if he is to cover the essentials. The averege division officer, under these conditions, directs most of his attenticn and efforts to those tasks who results are most innediately apparent to his seniors, or, in other words, to those tasks which, if onitted or neglected, would cause innediute repercussions. In this process the supervision, guidance, knowledge, and underatanding of the men of his division are often neglected. The solution to this problem lies in a more proper understanding of the relative importance of the division officer's various duties, both by his seniors in his or command and by hinself, It requires proper aypreciation on the part of the many officers responsible for issuance of orders, directives, instructions, ete., regarding how and by vhom they ultimately will be carried out, with respect to their effect on the over- all workload of the individuals and units affected. This would confirm the necessity for a reduction, in "paper work" and nonessential directives. Correction of the tendency to neglect interest in subordinates 18 not something that can be accomplished overnight. It is being effected gradually by many people who are cognizant of the defect, A larger number of people working at the job would speed up the proces Tt is Anportant to emphasize that only by knowing subordinates 1s At poasitle to evaluste their talents and limitations, Only by knowing men ean they be properly placed. There mist be continuous concern aboutnen, and not concern just when they get into trouble or are-stout to ship over or go out. ‘The ataosphere of a Navy or a ship is created ty the attitude of the officers. Officers are obligated to insure that each of thelr subordinates knows that the senior officers, and the Wavy, do care about men as individuels, Fach person in the Navy must have assurance thet his progr his training, his career, and his performance of duty are uf concern to tthe Naw. Slackness in Comand. 411 najor catastrophtes in the loss of discipline in all organizations have been preceded by general slackness in the conmand, The old saying that a taut ship fs achajpy ship 4s stil] true, The resson ia that on a taut ship the officers and the men know where they stand and vhat is expected of then, There can be complete dependence on one's associates, for lack of relinbility will be broucht up with e round tua, On such ships, all men do a day's work, not just the conscientious ones. There are no soft billets ina taut outfit. The officers and the men are on the Job and require othera to be on the Job. Cniselers snd transgressors are promptly punished while their offenses are stil) minor. Sure nnd everbody knovs that's true too, tut the majority of the seperatees in the sane survey by BuFere stated that the little things, the seoningly minor details that go to make @ happy ship or an efficient, one were apparently a haphazard matter. There vas a lot of "nade york.” The men complained that ships were slack; they felt thet the Navy vas a losy man's way of Living and working. They felt that their work had little significance, and they gotno satisfaction of acconplishnent. Sone of this 19 due to ack of information, to lack of explanation, but ¢ great deal of it mist be due to generel slackness also. ‘There are a nunber of contributory causes for slackness in connand— Anexperience or lack of interest on the part of officers, the indifference of cldtiners, both officer and enlisted, who are nerely passing the tine until retirenent, Iasiness on the part of young men uho vant to ride and produce as little as possible in the precess, All can be corrected by ‘tautening up the units. Tautness requires absolute feirness above all else, Comnders mst be distinguish between good and bad men and take action accordingly. This means that, men vho fail mist be punished promptly at mast and that each man's record mst reflect his conduct and ability. Tt means that com manding officers mist tackle the onerous problen of the relative fine: of officers, so that officer's fitness reports reflect faithfylly the worth of the officer. There must be a clear differentiation between the excellent and the poor, or again the conscientious man is penaliged and ‘the poor nan 4s favored. Slackness is command alvays requires eventual drastic action, . Instability is always @ contributing factor in’ serious cases of inck of @iscipline, The personnel instability in our fleets after the var vas therefore a serious concern to the-Navy. If command attention had not been exercised carefully the discipline of the Nevy would have suffered mich more than it did, ‘There are many tines vhen transfers are most desirable or are unavoidable, The Navy, especially BuPers, has done well in reducing unnecessary transfers, but there are still too many men—and officers— being shifted, It takes tine for a man to becoue acquainted with his Job and tine for « unit to shake dovm after receiving nev nen. Uni ‘through foresight and careful planning, the Navy: can get. sone reasonable permanency of personnel on its ships and stations it will alvays be in @ state of turmoil, The man hours lost to the Navy by men in transit 4s appalling. Here aguin, BuFers is making valiant efforts to reduce tine in receiving stations, time énroute; and tine vaiting for ships. Unt] all commanders and all ships and stations do their best, there will be this great loss in man- pover utilization, There should be great inprovenente due to long enlistments, Short enlistments preclude permanency of personnel--and seen to discouragefen fron selecting the Navy as career. EuPers in trying to put through @ flan for scheduled s rotation which will reduce the fustitied complaints of unfairness and favorition, That Bureau is having difficulty in resisting the continual Freasure, mostly fron senior officers, to give special and unjust con- Sideration to their ow people, especially Stewards, Yeonen, and sinilar ratings. A definite schedule of ship-shore rotation vould be advantarcous to the liavy and permit its personnel to make sone sort of personal plans The present high rate of reenlistnents vill do much to eliminate the instability and rapid turnover due to the necessary training and schooling of neu recruits, A high percentage of the manpower in the Navy is being used to train nev nen. The reduction in the nunber of trainees as Well as in the nunber of instructors and adzinistrators necessary for elonentary training will relieve sone of the instability due to transfer One of the basic causes in both the British mtiny st Invergordon fand the "incidenta” in the Canadian Navy was instability in the operating schedules. Ships either had no schedule or the schedules that they did have wore changed frequently and without tine to permit the officers and nen to edjust their personal plans vithout ineonventence. Frequent sudden changes in the operating schedules of ships after the var in the United States Navy was also one of the major sources of @iscontent. Fven though the necessity of such changes was explained, the operating personnel could not understand vhy adequate planning and fore- sight could not have nade nost of the changes unnecessary. Naturally, the exigencies of the service preclude the maintenance of a rigid schedule, Changes vill frequently be necessary snd unavoidable, On the other hand there is still insufficient realisation anong the shore based planners of the great inconvenience eased to many people vhen schedules are abruptly changed. It speaks vell for the discipline and Joyalty of naval personnel that these changes are accepted without serious Nevertheless unnecessnry changes are an additional strein to discipline and usually result in sone men being AOL becuse they are not big enough to change their ovm plans to fit those of their units. ‘Stability of promption and advancement has also been @ cross under Which the discipline of organizations has broken. The Buresu of Fersonnel is busily engaged in preparing careor guidance plans for all Navy people. Heretofore written advancement. examinations have been the most important factor in evaluating the relative vorth of individuals, vith sone attention being given to the evaluation of the mants vork on the job. Written tests, hovever, are only ono measure of a man's effectiveness. They do not necessarily give a man's true aptitudes, qualifications, or achlevenents, BuFers ie evalusting the performance of Chief Musicians and Musicians First Clase with ten years! service in the opring, a vork Which will asalet in the determination of the relative fitness of men for promotion. If this project is successful, evaluation centers will be established for all rates, These centers, it is hoped, vill fulfil] the need for obtaining accuracy end comprehensiveness in ail of the qualifications, The record of capabilities of the men who are evalusted in these evaluation centers will also be of considerable assistance in the proper detailing of personnel and in the selection of personnel for commissions in the event of snother energency. This situational testing to determine actual Gualifications will do mich to insure that the best nen availeble are Promoted and thereby give to all personnel the necessary confidence that true worth will determine advancenent. Baers has also recently instituted systen of fitness reports for chiet petty officers and petty officers first class in order that a continuous and comprehensive Fecord nay be obtained on performance of duty of each of these key people. These, like any other system in which men ark other men, will be valuable in’proportion to the conscientiousne: vith vhich the marking seniors act. Here again, it is necessary that rigid adherence to high standards be maintained to assure that the men who actually reach those high standards are not discrininated against by Less qualified men receiving high marks vhich they do not justly deserve. In a peacetine Navy it is important for each man in each rate to havesone prospect of promotion even though that prospect may involve tough competition, BuFers has arranged for a steady flov of pronotions for each rate. With so many reenlistnents and vith more and more people naking the Navy their career it ie essential that each nan be confident that as hie qualifications increase he vill be advanced accordingly. The officer rronotion systen vas ell established before the var. Since the var it has not been possible to reinstitute the entire aysten vith the nme degree of efficiency thet previously existed, due to the much larger number of officers and the vide variation in their educational qualifications and experience, Nevertheless mch progress has been made in the attenpts tc insure fair competition and adequate opportunity for advancenent, In addition, the personnel acts prescribe the procedures required for promotion in’ considerable detail. Officers mist have confidence in the promotion system or discipline will be jeopardized, Unless the best officers are promoted, faith of other officers end enlisted men in the integrity of the systen will be shaken, It is essential thet officers be promoted vho vill be best qualified to lead in battle. They mst have other qualifications, such fas good administrative and technical ability and a wide array of Imowledge nlso, but the rest of the Navy must have absolute confidence in those selected. Should the less qualified personnel be selected there will cone # time in battle in which the Navy vill fail because of its leadership, Like begets 1ike, and inadequate personnel, once they have moved up sufficiently to be on a selection board, vill then selves te apt to select other indecuate personnel. Stendards must be very high, they must be attainable, they must be equitable, they mst be well-knovn, end they mst be maintained vith integrity, Otherwise the officer corps will decay and decay rapidly, end there will be no effective conbat Navy if this happens. OtheyPactors Inrortant to Discipline Jn addition to the four factors discussed above, there are others vhich, although they lack the critical nature of these four, are never- theless irportent to discipline, Five factors of this sort ere touched upon triefly below, Increase in Navy Ashore. Insteed of the 65 percent of naval personnel serving at ea, as was the situation before the var, 65 percent are nctually billeted ashore now, Before the var there vere very fev aml shore stations as compared to the mutitude in existence nov. These two changes have resulted in « relatively larpe nusber of lese experienced comunding officers adninistering nen. hile there ia nothing that can be done atout the changes nentioned aiove, @ great deal can and should be done in the vay of stressing to officers ashore the fact that they have a most difficult job and a primary responsilility to insure that the @sseipline, spirit, and effectiveness of their comands meet the high standards which the Novy must maintain, Shore Patrol. Untrained shore fatrolnen cannot handle minor infractions satisfactorily. Personnel assigned to shore patrol cuty should be specially trained. Elgct Amploment. It nay be that ve have too mich concentration on grand exercises and not encuch on training of individual ships end unites ‘and too mich emphasis on reporting exercises end too little on inproving performance. Harriage ond Discipline. Early marriages in the case of navel personnel sonetines result in worry, frustration, and despondeney. They cause a divided loyalty between family and the Navy vhich often leads to serious derelictions, Assistance vith personel problens of this sort is the responsibility of the division officer, whose duty 4t 1e to inspire ‘the trust. and confidence thet lead his men to consult hime Creative Confort. This 1s not a Tureau prollen but ® command responsibility. It 1s not as satisfactorily handled as is commonly believed, Mach more van be done by many comands to provide good food, messing fecilities, living quarters, and general environnent.PART I1—Disciplinary Cases Uniform Code of Military Justice It has alvays been highly desiratle to reduce the number of courts martial for a nunber of obvious reasons. Upon the placing in effect of the Uniform Code of Military Justice what was formerly desirable Decones a matter of absolute necessity. One of the effects of the nev Code will be a formidable increase in the anount of time and paper work Involved in connection with courts martial. Without a decrease in the nunber of cases, the vorkload will become prohibitive. Reason for Delinquency The major reason for the increase in the nunber of courts martial over prevar days is the decrease in the anount of "connand attention” being exercised as compared with those days. Commanding officers are using courts martial as @ corrective device more frequently then in prevar days, They apparently fail to realize that large number of courts being given is actually a reflection upon the officers' command ability. What: Can Be Done (2) Discipline can be tautened. When this is correctly done, less puntshnent vill be required. (2) Studies shouldbe conducted on a Continuing basis to determine the types of individuals vho get into trouble, Results of such studies would be used by recruiting officers to sereen out troublesome types before they get into the service. (3) ‘he provisions of Alay 89 should be used far nore than is now the ces to rid the Navy of those undesirables and miafits who succeed in getting into the Navy in spite of the best efforts of the recruiting officer