Mitchell Colbert

Pols 190H
5/25/11
Felipe Calderon's War Against Mexico's Cartels
The causes and effects of militarizing drug markets.
Abstract:
This paper will be divided into three sections. The first will focus on the past and present of

Mexico. It will begin with a brief discussion on social contract theory, to give the reader a more

nuanced understanding of how a government is democratically formed and operated. It will also

illuminate the reasons why it could be permissible to respond to the Drug Trafficking Organizations

(DTOs) with military force. The history of Mexico is divided into colonial history, and post colonial

history. Within the post colonial history there are two case studies on events where civil and military

forces reached bloody conflict: the massacres at Tlatelolco and Aguas Blancas. Finally, there will be a

discussion of Mexico's peaceful transition to full democracy at the end of the 20th century, and what has

happened since the year 2000. This will include a very brief analysis of the impacts of the People's

Revolutionary Army (EPR), the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), Kidnappers, and

government corruption.

The second section will be a brief history of the DTOs, including foreign involvement and

recent public protests against the violence. It will focus in particular on the Sinaloa cartel, Mexico's

largest DTO, and their leader, El Chapo, one of Mexico's most wanted men. It will conclude with an

analysis on whether or not some of Mexico's DTOs might be terrorist organizations. The third section

will focus on future policy options for resolving the DTO issue. The purpose will be to ascertain

whether or not Felipe Calderon's 2006 decision to involve the military in fighting the DTOs was the

proper response or not. My hypothesis is that it was not the best decision, and possibly did more harm

then it helped.

I – Founding of the Nation: Past – Present

Social contract theory is the broad umbrella of political philosophies that discuss the formation
of civil government and civil society; as opposed to the state of nature, which is how man lived before

civil society. A social contract is an agreement whereby a group of people consent to be governed and

form a set of rules they will abide by. These rules create what is known as a rule of law. This is distinct

from a despotism which is ruled by one person, the despot; a despotism is a government of men, not

laws. The despot and their confidants are above any laws that may exist to govern society. In republics,

and most other civil governments, even the rulers are bound by the rule of law.

One example of the creation of a social contract is the signing of the United States constitution

after the Revolutionary War. The American people, already governed by the articles of confederation,

wished to create a new social contract. As a representative government, their legislature drafted a

document, and submitted it to the states to be ratified. Those states then gave the consent of the people

through tacit consent. The people honored their tacit consent by obeying society's laws. Tacit consent

can be withdrawn through civil disobedience or by leaving society. If one was to leave society they

would revert to living in the state of nature.

The first known usage of the term state of nature was by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the mid 13th

century, and it became the basis of Catholic natural law (Aquinas 1256). Aquinas did not use this term

to refer to a state that preempted the formation of civil society, as virtually all future social contract

theorists would. For Aquinas, the political state was the natural state for mankind (Lisska 1996). He did

not address the formation of a formal social contract, such as a constitution or bill of rights. It wasn't

until 400 years later, with Thomas Hobbes, that the formation of the social contract was discussed.

In 1651, Thomas Hobbes published his magnum opus, Leviathan. Hobbes envisioned a state of

nature that preempted the formation of civil society. This is in stark contrast to Aquinas, who had

envisioned mankind always living in some kind of society. Hobbes, on the other hand, viewed the state

of nature as a “war of [all] against [all] (Hobbes 1651).” To suppress our inherent urges for violence he

advocated for a powerful government, strong enough to rival the Biblical Leviathan. Hobbes had a very

cynical view of human nature which later theorists largely disputed.

 John Locke had a different view of the state of nature than Hobbes. For Locke, every individual

was sovereign; meaning, they have the right “to do whatsoever [they think] fit for the preservation of

[themselves] (Locke 1689).” Locke's state of nature is less anarchistic than that of Hobbes, but he still

envisions a world unsafe for our persons and our property. This insecurity, coupled with our social

nature, were the main forces driving people to form societies. Locke felt that nothing can compel

anyone to submit to be governed by society, except their consent to obey the rule of law. Societies were

formed by the consent of all who wished to be a part of that society. Once formed, these societies were

to function with a simple majority vote. Those who did not consent to be governed became “outlaws,”

living outside the laws and protection of society. For Locke, even in the state of nature, most people

were capable of working together, but some people were naturally violent and disruptive to society.

This violence created a pressure on people to form societies, in order to defend our property rights. For

Locke, property was our “life, liberty, and estate (Locke 1689);” these are what are known as natural

rights. Though they are born in the state of nature, once mankind transitions into a civil society it is

government's primary responsibility to protect these rights. If a government fails to protect the natural

rights of its citizens it is generally considered a failure.

The issue in Mexico today is a complete breakdown of the rule of law. This has been caused by

a combination of corruption, the cartels, kidnappers, and guerrilla groups. As a result, the Mexican

government is failing to uphold its end of the social contract with the people; it has proven unable to

protect their life, liberty, and property. Recent protests against the increasing violence can be seen as a

rejection of the Calderon administration's policy and a withdrawal of tacit consent (Cardona 2011). It is

rarely, if ever, permissible for a democracy to use its military for domestic policing. Once the military

is used against the citizenry the military may begin to question its role in politics and make demands on

government. This leads to a breakdown of civilian control of the military. The DTOs and other outlaws

are not part of the citizenry, and are actively working to undermine legitimate government control and

democratic rule by the people (Associated Press 2010). In these extreme circumstances it may be
permissible to use military force in order to re-establish government control and the rule of law. That

being said, I do not believe the military is the best avenue to address this issue, as will be discussed in

the policy options section.

Colonial History 1521-1821:

Mexico has two themes that have recurred throughout its history. First, the rule by strongmen

leaders, known as caudillo. They were all-powerful within their regional domains and ruled through

patronage networks, much like tribal warlords. Second, a history of martyrdom and violent oppression,

so-called “rivers of blood (Hubert, Howe, and Bancroft 1885).” These common themes are critical for

understanding Mexican civil government, its relations with the military, and its fight with the DTOs.

Mexico was subjected to colonial rule by Spain, beginning with the conquest of Cortés in 1521

lasting until the revolution of 1821. Cortés brought more than conquistadors with him, he also brought

foreign germs which annihilated indigenous populations, most notably smallpox. Jared Diamond

claims that up to 95% of indigenous populations were lost to disease alone (Diamond 2005). Those

who were left alive were weakened by disease. Societies were plagued with crises of succession. This

set the stage for absolute military domination by the Spanish across the Americas. The Spanish brought

Catholicism with them and converted the survivors to Christianity.

Cortés was more successful than other Spanish conquerers due to a misconception by the Aztec

emperor Montezuma who thought Cortes was the reincarnation of a god. Though this initial attack was

repelled, the Aztecs ultimately fell to the Spanish guns and horses. The last Aztec emperor Cuauhtémoc

was captured in 1521, at Tlatelolco, in what is now Mexico City. This site would again become the

scene of a national tragedy 450 years later. Mexico was under Spanish rule for 300 years, enforced

through military coercion and the soft power of Catholicism. Thanks to a very successful conversion

effort, Mexico remains one of the most Catholic countries in the world, with over 80% of the

population identifying as Catholic (US Dept. of State 2006).

The Spanish also imposed a caste system based off ethnicity. At the top were peninsulares,
ethnic Spanish that were born in Spain. Next were the criollos, the Spanish born in Mexico. Below

them were the mestizos, mixed race Spanish-Mexican, and mulattos, mixed race African-Spanish.

Many people who occupied the mixed race category were also illegitimate offspring, which gave them

a much harder life in Catholic society. The lowest caste was made up of the remaining pure blood

indigenous peoples (Palfrey 2007). Racial antagonism against indigenous peoples to the point of

genocide remained a theme of mainstream society until recently. The Popular Revolution Army (EPR)

in Guerrero and the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Chiapas maintain that cultural

genocide is still being carried out against indigenous cultures.

In 1810 the catholic priest Miguel Hidalgo incited a rebellion in the his town of Dolores and

called for independence from Spain. It was Hidalgo who coined the phrase rivers of blood in a letter

responding to Jose de la Cruz, a Spanish brigadier in charge of suppressing the uprising.

“We are resolved to enter into no arrangement which has not for its basis the liberty of the
nation, and the enjoyment of those rights which the God of nature has given to all men – rights
inalienable, and which must be sustained by the shedding of rivers of blood if necessary (Hubert, Howe,
and Bancroft 1885).”
Hidalgo was caught and executed by firing squad in 1811, this physical manifestation of the rivers of

blood became a commonplace ritual in Mexico's history, replacing native blood sacrifices of years past.

In 1821, Mexico gained their independence from Spain. Bloody repression of dissent continued after

independence, as was the case with Aguas Blancas in 1995.

Post-Colonial History (1821-2011):

The period from 1821-1832 is marked by a string of coups and counter-coups, ending with the

election of López de Santa Anna as president in 1833 (PBS 2001). Santa Anna was an archetypal

caudillo, and a military general; he ruled through military force. During his first term as president he

left most of the governing to his vice president; in 1835, his vice president began ambitious reforms of

the church and army. After the attempted reforms Santa Anna led a successful military coup against his

own government to reassert control and consolidate power. This same year Santa Anna lost Texas in the

Texas revolution, which tarnished his reputation, but did little to affect his rule. Over the next twenty
years, Santa Anna was either in exile or in the upper echelons of Mexican government. He was thrown

out of power for good in 1855, after declaring himself dictator for life and selling off large swaths of

land to the United States for a small personal fortune.

There was another period of coups lasting until the election of Porfirio Diaz in 1876. His period

of near dictatorial rule lasted until he was deposed in the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Like Santa

Anna, Diaz had his start in the military and used the military for his own ends. It was Diaz who began

the trends of manipulating votes, silencing political dissent, and the hand-picking his successor, which

were to become staples of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). In 1908, Diaz announced his

retirement from the presidency, but like Santa Anna, Diaz wanted to be dictator for life and reneged on

his promise. His government was toppled in 1911 and, also like Santa Anna, he was forced into exile.

The Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917 brought an end to the dictatorial rule of Porfirio Diaz

and brought new forces to power. Some of those armed groups coalesced into the nascent PRI, at the

time called the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PRI 2011). The political party went through a few

other name changes before settling on the PRI in 1946. The PRI regime became the vanguard of the

Mexican revolution, much as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the vanguard party of the

Russian Revolution. Though opposition parties existed as early as late 1930s, including the National

Action Party (PAN), none represented a clear challenge to PRI authority until 1988. In 1997, after

multiple rounds of electoral reform, an opposition majority took control of one house of the legislature

for the first time. The new majority was led by the Catholic, conservative PAN and the socialist, leftist

Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The PRI, PAN, and PRD were to be the three parties to

dominate Mexican politics during the 20th century, and what we have seen of 21st century.

The PRI system is now widely regarded as an authoritarian regime that ruled through rigging

elections and manipulating public opinion. The system existed to perpetuate itself and enrich those

faithful to it, through nepotism and cronyism. These tendencies are rooted in the patronage networks of

the caudillos. The PRI was a unique authoritarianism. It had no consistent ideology, some presidents
were liberals, like Carlos Salinas who engineered the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Others were nationalists, or socialists, like Lázaro Cárdenas who nationalized Mexico's oil companies

to form Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). The only consistent PRI platform was that the president is

always right; this custom didn't come into question until the 1990s. This gave rise to a president with

king-like powers. One example is when president López Portillo nationalized all of Mexico's banks in

1982 without any oversight, which then helped cause an economic crash.

In addition to not having a consistent ideology the PRI was unique because it was not a military

authoritarianism, yet the military was largely compliant with the ruling party. In the current Libyan

civil war, several pilots have defected to the rebels because they were ordered to attack their fellow

citizens (Scicluna 2011). Despite numerous times when members of the Mexican military were ordered

to fire upon non-violent protesters there was no time when they refused an order to fire, as is the case

with the Libyan pilots. This happened in Tlatelolco and again in Aguas Blancas, but in both of these

cases the soldiers in question had personal ties to the PRI government officials abusing their power.

When one examines the role of the Mexican military in politics, or their role in general, one cannot

look at them as a whole. The whole of the armed services needs to be examined in smaller chunks, with

certain individuals and certain units of the military rife with corruption and official abuse.

1968 Tlatelolco Massacre:

The 60s were a historic period for the Mexican people, most notably for the rise of the student

movement and the corresponding 1968 Tlatelolco massacre. This event has been called Mexico's

Tienanmen Square or Kent State (Doyle 2011). The student movement, started in July of 1968, began

when two groups of students got into a brawl during a football game. Riot police went in to separate

them by wildly swinging their batons. The students ran into a nearby school for sanctuary; the police

followed the students, and beat anyone who got in their way, including faculty and teachers.

Repression was met with protests, which were met with further police brutality and repression.

This set off a cycle of escalating conflict lasting all summer. Mexico City was effectively shutdown
during the major protests. The climax of the summer's drama was the October 2nd rally held at the

Tlatelolco housing project. This is the same place where the last Aztec emperor was captured by

Cortes. The best estimate of turnout for the event was 8,000 protesters, a small turnout because it was

raining. Also in the crowd were 10,000 uniformed and undercover police, this included a secret military

sniper unit on nearby roofs (Aguayo 1998, Álvarez Garín 1998).

The student leaders were on a 3rd floor balcony, preparing to give speeches to the completely

passive and unarmed crowd. Around 6pm, two helicopters began to circle the square and a flare was

fired off. At this signal the military police began to move on the crowd, weapons drawn with bayonets

attached. Soon, the soldiers on the roof and the ground began to fire on the crowd while secret police

stormed into the building where the student leaders were located. In the chaos, the soldiers on the roof

shot at soldiers on the ground, who returned fire; the square didn't grow quiet until nearly 8pm.

Nearly 2,400 people were detained, including student leaders. The official death toll was first

reported as 4, and blamed the violence on terrorist snipers. It wasn't until the 1990s, after government

documents were declassified, that these snipers were identified as the President's secret police. The US

embassy in Mexico city estimated that around 150-200 people were killed. Some human rights groups

estimated that there were over 1,000 dead. Declassified reports from the Mexican and US governments

also reveal that the CIA was closely monitoring the situation of “student riots” (Doyle 2011).

Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon, two journalists with over 30 years experience in Mexico,

assert that Tlatelolco “caused the PRI system [to lose] legitimacy in the eyes of many Mexicans,

especially the middle class (Preston and Dillon 2004).” The Mexican ambassador to India, poet Octavio

Paz, was so disgusted by the massacre that he immediately resigned his post and began to organize the

intelligentsia against president Díaz Ordaz. One other notable Mexican was profoundly effected by the

protests, future president Ernesto Zedillo, the PRI president that brought true democracy to Mexico

through electoral reform. Zedillo was sixteen when Tlatelolco happened, a vocational school student

who witnessed police brutality first hand and joined the protesters. Zedillo was representative of the
average Mexican during the 60s, most of the Mexican people was agitated by the government's

repression of students seeking peaceful change.

1995 Massacre at Aguas Blancas:

Aguas Blancas is a small hamlet in a heavily impoverished area of Guerrero state, in southern

Mexico. This region of Mexico has been in some form of rebellion against the PRI for almost as long

as the PRI has existed. In the 1990s their agitation coalesced to form the South Sierra Campesino

Organization (OCSS), a peasant-farmer's rights group. They wanted livable wages, clean water, and

other amenities of modern life that Mexicans in the north took for granted. On June 28th, 1995 two

dozen OCSS farmers and about a dozen others were crammed into a truck on the way to a rally in a

neighboring town. They were ambushed by a few dozen state policemen with assault rifles. The police

ordered them out of the truck, the farmers complied and began to lay down on the ground, none of

them were armed. Without warning shots were fired and soon the soldiers opened fire on the unarmed

and vulnerable farmers. When they finished 17 lay dead and another 20 were wounded.

The police had a camera crew with them filming the whole incident, including the part where

police planted weapons on some of the farmers dead bodies to make it seem like self defense. It was

found that the governor of Guerrero ordered the attack. A cover-up was attempted, discovered, taken to

court, and thrown out by a horribly inefficient and corrupt court system. President Zedillo had the

power to intervene and ensure that real justice was meted out, but he did not. Zedillo believed that the

rule of law meant the courts needed to be independent, without executive interference; entirely true

under normal circumstances. Unfortunately, Mexico's legal system in 1995 was plagued by corruption

and bribery, and still is to a lesser degree. The Aguas Blancas incident showed the Mexican legal

system for what it really was, full of loopholes which allow for obviously guilty parties to slip away

from punishment. This will need to change for the rule of law to ever be firmly established in Mexico.

Democracy Stirs:
As early as 1986 the PRI authoritarianism was showing signs of weakness, largely because the
public had lost faith in their ability to legitimately govern. This is also an important year because it was

when the student protesters of the 1960s began to reach middle age. The 16 year old protester Ernesto

Zedillo was now a 34 year old man, who worked in the PRI government and was going to be their

president in 1994. Zedillo was an exceptional man in this regard; he was one of the few student

protesters to try to change the PRI machine from the inside. He was always regarded as an outsider by

the party faithful, he only became president because the president-elect was assassinated. Zedillo was

always regarded as a compromise choice, he was nobody's first pick but had good credentials.

Unlike former PRI Presidents, Zedillo would not completely abide the drug trade and began to

move against it. A major component of the electoral reforms he would become known for was massive

amounts of public financing to counteract the corrupting influence of DTOs. Zedillo saw the epidemic

of bribery around him and believed that public financing was a tool to combat it. While his electoral

reforms have been a major asset to the PRD and PAN, corruption remains a major problem to this day.

Some among the public are calling for a return to PRI complicity with the drug trade, this allowed

government to act as a mediator between different DTOs and to prevent violence from erupting.

Even before Zedillo was elected to office Mexico saw some electoral reforms, which brought a

few opposition candidates into the legislature and other governmental posts. All of these electoral

reforms were merely cosmetic, designed to appease political dissidents without giving them actual

power. In 1996 the PRI, PAN, and PRD began the talks that would lead to landmark electoral reform in

1997, which included: public financing, a fully autonomous Federal Electoral Institute, and the freedom

to choose one's political party. The reforms also gave Mexico City the right to elect its own mayor for

the first time. Previously, the mayor of this metropolis of 20 million was appointed by the president.

Many in the PRI thought Zedillo was mad for giving away his power as president, the concept of

democracy had yet to resonate with them. The first election where the reforms were in effect was the

vote in July 1997, which yielded the first opposition majority in the lower house of the legislature ever.

Zedillo succeeded president Carlos Salinas, a longtime party faithful. Salinas came to power in
the highly contested election of 1988, the first year the election results were computerized. The original

results that became public showed Salinas losing, but “the system crashed” and when it came back up

days later Salinas was the winner (Preston and Dillon 2004). The election was stolen from the hands of

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, an ex-PRI member and son of the much revered nationalist Lázaro Cárdenas.

Though Cárdenas was defrauded in 1988, he became the first elected mayor of Mexico City in 1997,

thanks to Zedillo's electoral reforms. The 1988 election was one of the most glaring examples of PRI

voting fraud, and the opposition minority in Congress was furious. The PRD urged Cárdenas for radical

action, but he kept the peace and refused to resort to radical tactics. The PRI was also furious at their

members who were responsible for letting the actual results slip out. This event sparked a feud between

Carlos Salinas and Vicente Fox that would end with Fox's election in 2000.

Vicente Fox's Sexenio 2000-2006:

The 2000 election of the PAN candidate, Vicente Fox, marked the culmination of a silent,

democratic revolution, which had its beginnings in the student movement of the 1960s. Fox's election

represented their coming of age. The public turned on the PRI largely for economic reasons; they had

lost faith their the revolutionary party's legitimacy and ability to govern well. While Fox was a brilliant

candidate, in many ways he was a disappointment as president. Fox proved unable to fulfill many of his

campaign promises; this wasn't entirely his fault, the corruption of the PRI system had to be rooted out

before there could be a fresh start. Fox did bring a measure of economic stability; there was no major

peso crash during his sexenio and the economy did grow, albeit slowly. Above all, Fox was a symbol of

Mexico's new democracy and the hope for change, also much like Obama was for the US in 2008.

When Fox entered office in 2000, after two decades of rising crime rates, it has been a constant

fight to preserve Mexico's democracy and the human rights of the Mexican people. He tried to purge

and reorganize Mexico's federal police force and increase the government's abilities to extradite

criminals to the US (González 2009). Police reorganization helped in the short term, but the new police

officers soon succumbed to the same corrupting influences. Drug money could not be reorganized out
of the equation. Infiltration by cartel agents penetrated into the highest echelons of government; in

2005, a cartel spy was even discovered working in the president's office (González 2009).

Extradition was a better solution than reorganization, but it is only a reactive policy, and merely

acts as a deterrent to crime. Even the best Mexican prisons were riddled with corruption. A drug lord

could still operate from the inside, calling hits and getting government protection from their rivals

(Gomez 2001). Extradition meant facing real justice in the US and being cut off from your network of

cronies; fear of being extradited was what drove the Columbian Medellin and Cali cartels to wage a

war of narcoterror, and could be driving the rising violence in Mexico today. After nearly eight years in

prison with no previous attempts to escape, fear of extradition is what prompted El Chapo to escape

from his maximum security resort prison (Beith 2010).

While Vicente Fox's strategy of police crackdowns, extraditions, and police reorganization was

more effective than the strategy of his PRI predecessors, it missed the mark even by his own standards.

Indisputably, drug violence intensified and spread to new areas, beheadings became commonplace, and

cartel profits soared. These negative outcomes may not have been the result of Fox's policies, but

government efforts did little to help matters, and may have caused more harm than good. A major

problem was police corruption, which Fox did little about. Another major issue was that the DTOs had

better equipment than the police, yet very little was done to upgrade police equipment by Fox. As early

as 2005, Fox began to consider a military solution (González 2009). In the end, he was fairly successful

figthing the DTOs with only the police.

Felipe Calderon's Sexenio - End of 2006-2011:

As a candidate, Felipe Calderon had three priorities, “combating poverty, creating jobs ... and

improving public security (TIME 2006).” One month later, after being sworn into office, it became

clear that improving public safety would be his main concern. On December 11th, 2006, Felipe

Calderon sent 6,500 troops into his home state of Michoacan to crack down on escalating drug violence

in the region. By the end of December there were over 24,000 troops in the hills there, fighting DTOs
and eradicating opium poppies (MSNBC 2007). By 2010, over 50,000 soldiers had been involved, as

well as 5,000 police (González 2009 and Meyer 2010). The DTOs are also well staffed, with an

estimated 100,000 soldiers of their own, and hundreds of thousands of other workers (Armentano

2010). This escalated the war against the DTOs from a police matter to a military one. Decapitations

became common, and heads were often found in public places with messages, such as “See. Hear. Shut

Up. If you want to stay alive (Grillo 2006).” In one particularly gruesome case, cartel gunmen rolled

five heads into the middle of a crowded dance floor. This was the situation Felipe Calderon faced upon

entering office, and his response was a military crackdown.

The most visible effect of the militarization of the war against the DTOs is a demoralization of

the armed forces, reflected in unprecedented desertion rates. Since 2003, over 150,000 soldiers have

deserted (Rodriguez 2009). Many of these deserters disappear to join DTOs, such as Los Zetas, others

go into business for themselves. Calderon tried to address this issue by raising the average soldier's pay

to $1,100 per month, a drastic increase. The DTOs responded by doubling the salaries of their own

troops (Deal 2010). While this is similar to the mid-1980's, when DTOs bought government protection,

it is very troubling that masses of soldiers are actually defecting to the DTO's ranks. What was once

just a few corrupt soldiers is now an epidemic. Even the soldiers that merely desert, without defecting,

take valuable information and training with them, wasting limited government resources.

Another part of Calderon's fight against the DTOs is the creation of more army checkpoints

around the country (Meyer 2010). It was hard to find exact figures on the number of checkpoints in

Mexico. I did find that in Baja there are about half a dozen checkpoints, roughly one per every major

city (Mex Adventure 2010). Based on the distribution in Baja it is likely that there are around 100

checkpoints around the country, potentially more. Every checkpoint represents an opportunity for graft,

corruption, and human rights abuses.

Human rights abuses committed by the military are more frequent since the militarization of the

drug war (Meyer 2010). A contributing factor for this is the weakness of the National Human Rights
Commission (CNDH), the agency in charge of investigating human rights abuses in Mexico. The

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) asserts that CNDH's problems are not due to a lack of

resources, it is one of the best funded and largest ombudsman's offices in the world (Meyer 2010).

WOLA goes on to say that the problems are due to CNDH's own policies and practices. “It has

routinely failed to press state institutions to remedy the abuses it has documented, to promote reforms

needed to prevent those abuses, to challenge abusive laws, policies, and practices (Meyer 2010).” Since

2006, the CNDH has documented numerous deaths of innocents and abuses of power. Investigations by

the CNDH have also determined that military prosecutors had often engaged in unethical behavior.

Despite this, nothing was done to punish the abuse and normally cases were remanded back to the

Military Attorney General’s Office (Human Rights Watch 2008). “To date, only a single military human

rights violation committed during the Calderon government has resulted in a conviction within military

jurisdiction (Meyer 2010).”

For the past year, car bombs, also known as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices

(VBIEDs), have been a growing concern for the US Consulate General in Mexico (Stewart 2011). In

addition to the threat of VBIEDs, the threat of IEDs both inside and outside of cars is on the rise. The

difference between a car bomb, a VBIED, and a bomb in a car, an IED, is one of scale (Stewart 2011).

To be a true VBIED the explosive device must be too large to be moved without a vehicle. Currently

the IEDs that have been detonated in Mexico have all been too small to be considered VBIEDs, even

when detonated inside cars, despite what the media may claim (STRATFOR Analysis 2010). Arms

caches have been discovered in Mexico containing enough explosives to be a potential VBIED, if they

were to all be used in one bomb. The rise in instances of IEDs could be correlated to the rising number

of professionally trained soldiers who now work for the DTOs.

Some military efforts were very successful. According to General Noe Sandoval Alcazar, the

military officer in charge of Operation Sierra Madre and Joint Operation Culiacan-Navolato, “we're

winning [the drug war], little by little (Beith 2010).” The one technology that has proven invaluable to
the successes of the war against the DTOs are helicopters. Some city slums are virtually impenetrable

from the ground and pursuits need air support, helicopters also allow soldiers to get to remote rural

areas in the Sierras, even when the summer rains make roads inaccessible (Beith 2010). The Mérida

Initiative includes provisions where the US will provide helicopters to Mexico in order to combat the

DTOs. If any part of Mérida is clearly successful, it would be this portion. Despite successes, life was

hard for the soldiers. “All the soldiers are suffering ... we work 365 days a year. From the generals to

the grunts (Beith 2010).”

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation:

Emiliano Zapata was one of the leading forces in the Mexican revolution of 1910-17 and a

general in the Liberation Army of the South. His followers were known as Zapatistas. After Zapata

helped win the revolution he was lured into a trap by another general and killed on April 10th, 1919

(Brunk 1995). Ideologically, he favored land reform and a strengthening of the underclass; he has been

described as being “liberal-bourgeois.” Political scientist Robert Millon theorizes that Zapata's liberal-

bourgeois society would be one controlled by small landowners which was strictly anti-imperialist

(Millon 1969). Though Zapata was killed, his desire for agrarian reform lived on with the PRI and was

manifested by Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s (Becker 1995).

Zapata's name was revived by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), a group

based in the Chiapas region of Mexico. The EZLN's mission is to defend indigenous populations

against abuse by government officials and to achieve autonomy for them within the Chiapas region.

They are considered a Marxist inspired leftist group; true to their namesake, they seek agrarian reforms

like those of Zapata. Though the EZLN is not formally designated as a terrorist organization by the US

Department of State an internal report refers to them as one (Wrighte 2002). Additionally, many

Mexicans consider them a terrorist organization, but the issue is up for debate (Mahan and Griset

2007). Their founding in 1994 was marked by violence, but since then the Zapatistas have largely

shunned violence. Instead they have focused on gaining media attention through protest actions and
influencing the public through propaganda efforts. This has not attracted very much military attention,

but the Chiapas and Guerrero regions are plagued with military checkpoints, but so is the rest of

Mexico.

Rebel Groups - The Popular Revolution Army and Others:

The Popular Revolution Army (EPR) was formed in 1996 on the one year anniversary of the

Aguas Blancas massacre. The EPR operates primarily in the Guerrero region, where Aguas Blancas is

located. They are the product of numerous small peasant groups banding together in armed resistance

against the government, who perpetrated the massacre. Like the EZLN, the EPR is a Marxist inspired

leftist group, and they have a penchant for Maoist guerrilla warfare. Most of their targets have been

military or police, whom they attack with AK-47s and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Despite

rumors that they are linked to drug traffickers, the EPR receives most of their funding from robberies

and kidnappings (Chipres 1996).

Despite a fiery beginning, the EPR was starting to die off by the late 1990s, largely due to a split

between two factions of the group. One faction broke off from the EPR and formed the Insurgent

People's Revolutionary Army (EPRI), they took much of the groups talent and resources with them.

Terrorist violence continued through the 1990s, but began to diminish as group leadership was killed or

arrested. At the end of 1999, the Mexican Federal Preventive Police released a report identifying 81

different rebel groups that had been created in Mexico during the second half of the 1990s alone

(Reforma 1999). Most of these groups lasted less than a year, the constant fracturing of groups and the

division of resources was a major reason for their demise. Despite a major army crackdown, attacks

continue and new groups are being formed to replace the old ones.

The EPR was thought to have completely dissolved by the year 2000, but attacks have been

carried out in their name since then, so it is up for debate. As of 2002, “the EPR has primarily targeted

Mexican police HQ, military barracks, and troop convoys (Wrighte 2002).” Mexican officials contend

that the EPR was a part of mass protests in Oaxaca state in 2006 (START 2011). They are also said to
be responsible for the bombing of the Election Tribunal in Mexico City, and several banks, later that

year (Tobar 2007, US Dept. of State, Mexican Embassy 2006, and The Economist 2007). Throughout

summer and fall of 2007 groups claiming to be the EPR bombed oil and natural gas pipelines belonging

to Petroleos Mexicanos (STRATFOR 2007). There has been no military action against the EPR since

before the militarization of the war against the DTOs.

Kidnappers:
The third group contributing to the destabilization of Mexico are the kidnappers. Some have

connections to DTOs but are working a side business, others are kidnapping on behalf of their DTO. It

is known that kidnappings are one of the major funding sources for the terrorist organization the EPR.

Some are government employees who abuse their privileges to conduct or aid in kidnappings for extra

revenue. Finally, some kidnappers are freelancers, working alone or with accomplices. Kidnapping has

become a multi-million dollar industry in Mexico, and affects the majority of the country. Though it is

a major problem, and a DTO related problem, kidnappings are still handled as a police issue. It will be

addressed here primarily because many DTOs are diversifying their activities and have begun to kidnap

for extra money.

Kidnapping became a very popular crime during the 1990s with the rise of the drug cartels and

the anarchy they brought with them. A 1998 study by the World Bank found that criminals tend to use a

risk-benefit analysis in determining whether or not a crime is worth committing. This same report

found that, in Mexico in the 1990s, there were far more benefits than risks in committing robberies,

kidnappings, and other crime (Ayres 1998). A 2011 article by Reuters highlights the issue of drug

cartels diversifying into the kidnapping business to supplement lost revenue from the drug trade. The

Zetas cartel, a group made up primarily of army deserters, is one of the first to get heavily into the

kidnapping industry (Segura and Mica 2011).

Kidnapping in Mexico has two primary forms, express or kidnapping for ransom (US Dept. of

State, Travel Information 2010). A common form of the express kidnapping is a person getting held
hostage by a cab driver who will drive them around to different ATMs to empty their bank accounts.

Foreigners are more likely to be at risk for this kind of kidnapping. Ransom kidnappings are not limited

to the rich, even working class people will get abducted, but they are worth less money. Both Mexican

citizens and foreigners are at risk for this sort of kidnapping. In one of the most brazen abductions ever,

kidnappers abducted a former PAN Presidential candidate, holding him for $30 million in ransom

(BBC 12/20/2010). Originally the EZLN was blamed for the abduction, but a congressional

investigation found that the EZLN was not involved (SIPAZ 2011). There is no evidence as to which

type of kidnapping DTOs engage in more frequently, this could use further research.

In 2008, Time Magazine reported that, “the [Mexican] secretary for public security has revealed

that [2008s] figures ... show an 80% increase [in kidnappings] ... Mexico's Human Rights Commission

believes that fewer than one in three kidnappings are ever reported to the authorities.” The main reason

kidnappings go unreported is general lack of faith in the police and judicial system (Mascareñas 2010).

According to Max Morales, a lawyer with 20 years of experience as a kidnapping and security expert,

“85 or 90 percent of kidnap gangs in Mexico are led by a police officer or an ex-police officer ... they

are known because once they are discovered their bosses automatically fire them (CNN World 2008).”

The first half of that statement, that most gangs are run by the police, is quite unsettling. The second

half, that they do get discovered and fired, does inspire some hope in the system.

Unfortunately, firing bad cops doesn't solve the problem of them becoming criminals, all it does

is remove them from the direct oversight of their superiors. One notable example of this is Daniel

Arizmendi. He was a cop who learned extortion and torture techniques in the police academy, then used

that knowledge to go into the kidnapping business as a freelancer (Zamarripa 1998). Daniel is just one

of example out of thousands. Even after the fall of the PRI, police corruption and abuse of power are

commonplace. This is a major threat to Mexican democracy and the stability of civil government.

Police and Military Corruption:

In the 1980s, political scientist Samuel Del Villar was the anti-corruption czar for President
Miguel De La Madrid. Del Villar found that the Federal Security Directorate (DFS), a secret police

formed with CIA help, had provided security for drug cartels on numerous occasions (Preston and

Dillon 2005). In 1985, the DFS was dissolved after a major scandal; their agents had provided

protection to cartel hitmen during the kidnap, torture, and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena.

Though nearly all of the DFS agents had connections to organized crime, the 1,500 members of the

DFS were allowed to fade into obscurity (Aguayo 2001). The murder was orchestrated by associates of

Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, also known as 'El Padrino;' he is the Godfather of the Mexican drug trade

and a former police officer. Due to years of PRI patronage, in many parts of the country corruption and

graft were the only ways to make a livable wage for many Mexicans.

A 1998 study by sociologists Nelson Arteaga Botello and Adrián López Rivera found that

members of law enforcement were taught extortion techniques in police academy (Botello and López

Rivera 1998). This same year Mexican newspapers reported on numerous crimes committed by law

enforcement, including car theft and human trafficking. By no means was this behavior typical of all

police, but it is the natural result of police being paid non-livable wages and trained in methods of

extortion (Botello and López Rivera 1998).

Though the army was the most disciplined security force in Mexico, it was not incorruptible.

Throughout the 1980s Defense Secretary General Juan Arévalo Gardoqui took numerous bribes from

traffickers. After significant evidence came forward, and significant pressure from the US, General

Arévalo was allowed to retire (Washington Post 1989). One of the General's last acts in the army was to

promote another soldier to General, a man named Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, who in 1996 would become

the head of Mexico's anti-drug agency, the Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas. Only nine

weeks after his appointment, General Gutiérrez Rebollo was arrested by military police and charged

with racketeering. More specifically he was charged with abusing his official powers to protect the

Juárez Cartel/Carillo Fuentes Organization (Marín 1997). General Rebollo also gave them information,

which led to the deaths of half a dozen DEA agents in the spring of 1997 (Preston and Dillon 2005).
Despite corruption, “the percentage of Mexicans expressing a great deal or quite a lot confidence in the

armed forces increased from 47% in 1990 to 54% in 2000 (Levy and Bruhn 2006).” The army is one of

the few government institutions that gained confidence in this period. Despite the positives, there is

evidence that some soldiers and officers in military are still aiding DTOs (Alis 2011).

In 1998, Professor Rafael Ruiz Harrell, at the National Autonomous University of Mexico

(UNAM), found that the crime rate rose in response to peso devaluations (Ruiz Harrell 1998). This

means there is a correlation between a bad economy and higher rates of crime. While correlation might

not be causation, there is still good reason for the Mexican government to avoid economic distress. The

next year a national public policy survey found that 75% of adults had little or no trust in their judicial

system (Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública 2000). They had more faith in judges, but police

were viewed as a major source of problems. The same survey found that, in mid-1998, insecurity

became the number one concern of the Mexican people, topping economic concerns for the first time.

This shift from a primary concern from the economy to security is of major importance. It

shows a downgrading of needs from economic security to personal security. Psychologist Abraham

Maslow's hierarchy of needs created a tiered framework ranking the various needs and motivations of

people. The most basic needs were survival needs, such as food and water. Next came security needs,

like having shelter and being secure from violence. Then there were higher needs like a sense of

belonging and self-actualization. Within the hierarchy of needs the lower needs must be met before

moving on to higher needs (Maslow 1987). Security needs are a more basic need than the economy,

without having personal safety you cannot begin to have a stable economy. For Mexico, this represents

a stall in the march to an open democratic system. Rather than focusing on higher needs like electoral

reform or reforming NAFTA, the Mexican government must now focus on the DTO issue above all

others. The reason the government must prioritize the cartels is that they represent a real threat to

public safety, and that is a threat to the legitimacy of the Mexican government. If a government cannot

protect their citizens then those citizens have little reason to support that government.
 II – Rise of the Drug Trafficking Organizations

The drug cartels we know today didn't come to prominence until the 1990s, but organized crime

dates back to the end of the 19th century in Mexico. These proto-cartels were small smuggling and

trafficking operations, regionally based, with very little power. The 1970-80s greatly accelerated the

growth of cartels because of three major inter-related factors: higher demand for cocaine in the US, the

DEA shutting down the Caribbean drug trafficking corridor, and networking between Colombian and

Mexican cartels (Baker 2008). Higher demand for cocaine is what first influenced President Reagan to

militarize the war on drugs, which led to the DEA's 'Operation Kingpin.' The DEA's actions, disrupting

the flow of drugs in the Caribbean, caused Colombian drug lords to seek a new shipping route through

Mexico. These three factors directly led to the formation of the brutal DTOs we see today.

The Sinaloa region of Mexico, home to the DTO that bears its name, has long been a marijuana

and opium growing region. In some rural regions nearly everyone was involved with some part of the

drug trade. This is where El Padrino, and later El Chapo, would get their start. El Padrino is the man

responsible for networking with the Colombian cartels and creating the modern Mexican drug trade.

For years Sinaloa was violence free, but violence has increased as the area has become militarized.

The Colombian Medellin and Cali cartels remained dominant until they were obliterated by the

DEA in the 1990s (US DEA 2005). After the DEA's 'Operation Kingpin' eliminated the Colombian

leadership they created a vacuum of power which every drug dealer was hoping to fill. This DEA

policy served to increase violence and spread DTO influence to new areas of Latin America. It also

created the circumstances needed for the Mexican DTOs to gain dominance in the US drug market,

replacing the Medellin and Cali cartels. In 1990, the DEA paid bounty hunters to abduct a Mexican

doctor suspected of aiding criminals. In 1992, After the kidnapping was ruled to be legal under US law,

the Mexican government “imposed the first written regulations that the DEA had faced anywhere in the

world (US DEA 2005).” The most restrictive of the regualtions forbid agents to have weapons; this has
made it exceptionally difficult for the DEA to operate in Mexico.

DTO violence intensified in frequency and viciousness throughout the 90s and after the turn of

the millennium. It also spread into new regions of the country as government efforts toppled leadership

and opened up new territory to bloody turf battles. Roughly half of Mexico, is considered disputed

territory right now. These areas are locked in constant turf wars. New DTOs are also rising up to

replace the old ones that fall. Looking at maps which show the spread of cartels over the past three

years shows a steady growth of the Sinaloa cartel, and a waning of most other DTOs (Appendix 1).

The violence doesn't just threaten Mexican citizens, it also threatens American citizens and has

threatened to spillover directly into the United States (Galen Carpenter 2009). Finding the number of

Americans killed in Mexico has been difficult. The State Department website says that, “more than half

of all Americans killed in Mexico in FY 2009 ... were killed in the border cities of Ciudad Juarez and

Tijuana (US Dept. of State 2010).” MSNBC reports that, “At least 106 US residents were victims of

'executions' or 'homicides' directly related to drug battles in Mexico in 2010, compared to 79 in 2009

and 35 in 2007, according to the State Department figures (Omer 2011).” This makes Mexico the most

dangerous foreign country in the world for Americans, other than combat zones and America itself.

DTOs have also issued threats to US law enforcement. In Nogales, Arizona, several off-duty

officers discovered a smuggling operation and confiscated several hundred pounds of marijuana. Since

then officers have been receiving death threats (Valencia 2010). It is not just violence that has spilled

over into America, but also corruption. According to Thomas Frost, US Dept. of Homeland Security

assistant inspector general for investigations, since 2003, “we have made 129 arrests of corrupt

Customs and Border Protection Officers and Border Patrol Agents (Frost 2010).” The glory days of the

AFO, as well as the Juarez Cartel, are largely in the past, as a result of leadership being killed or

arrested, leaving the cartels weakened and susceptible to crises of succession (Baker 2008). Though

they are weakened, they survive, and violence along the border has increased.

The UK Telegraph reports that San Diego, California, has seen increase in drug-related crimes
and violence. This is largely due to DTO members moving their families to America to avoid the

worsening violence in Mexico (Good 2010). Another reason for increased violence in San Diego is a

result of DTO franchising. In 2010, after a lengthy investigation, the FBI brought a RICO suit against

the Fernando Sanchez Organization (FSO). The FSO was an offshoot of the Arellano-Felix

Organization (AFO) that was operating out of an apartment in San Diego (Federal Bureau of

Investigation 2010).

The AFO was a DTO formed by the seven Arellano Felix Brothers. They are the nephews of the

druglord Angel Félix Gallardo, an ex-cop and one of the first druglords to connect with Colombian

cocaine cartels. The Arellano Felix brothers grew up in a world of cartel violence, and rose to dominate

one of the most coveted areas of the drug trade through brutality. In addition to revenue from drug

sales, they also charge other cartels fees for using their territory to smuggle drugs to the US (Padgett

and Shannon 2001). These “transaction fees” led to a conflict with the leader of the Sinaloa cartel,

Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, which escalated into multiple shootouts and led to the accidental

death of Catholic Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo in 1993 (Constantine 1996). The AFO's hitmen

had meant to kill El Chapo.

After the botched assassination, the AFO was public enemy number one. Soon after, police

arrested Francisco Rafael Arellano Felix, the leader of the AFO (Klatell 2006). After his fall, control

passed to his brothers Ramón and Benjamín. In 2002, Ramón was killed during a shootout with police

(Deal 2010). Soon after, authorities managed to capture Benjamín as well; he was recently extradited to

the US to stand trial (BBC Latin America 4/29/2011). After the fall of Benjamín and Ramón, “Edgardo

Leyva Escandon and Arellano siblings Javier, Eduardo, and sister Enedina resumed control of the cartel

(Deal 2010).” The AFO was dealt further damage in 2006, when Javier Arellano was captured by

members of the US Coast Guard, then sentenced to life in a US prison. This caused the cartel to split

into two factions; one faction headed by members of the Arellano family, and the other headed by

Teodoro García, a lieutenant with the cartel. Both factions have been at war for control of Tijuana's
lucrative smuggling corridor ever since. In 2008, Eduardo Arellano was arrested, weakening the

Arellano faction. Two years later, Teodoro Garcia was also arrested (Marosi 2010). Since then, Tijuana

has been largely a free-for-all turf war. Other DTOs kept have lower profiles than the AFO and faired

better through the Fox years.

The Gulf Cartel was founded in the 1970s, by Juan Garcia Abrego in Tamaulipas state (Beith

2010). Before his arrest in 1996 he was considered one of Mexico's most formidable kingpins, and was

the first drug lord placed on the FBI's most wanted list (Fitzpatrick 2010). Abrego is an American

citizen which resulted in him being deported to stand trial in the US; he is now serving eleven life

sentences in prison in the United States (Fitzpatrick 2010). After Abrego's arrest, Osiel Cárdenas

Guillén took over control of the cartel. He would lead for seven years before being arrested in 2003, to

be replaced by Oscar Malherbe de Leon (Public Broadcasting Company 2011).

Changes in leadership did not come without bloodshed, there were massive turf wars, with

every drug dealer trying to prove their worth by being the most ruthless. The changing balance of

power also led to new alliances being formed (González 2009). The fall of Osiel Cárdenas Guillén in

2003 created an opportunity for the Gulf Cartel's enforcers, Los Zetas, to take on a bigger role in

trafficking. Los Zetas was originally formed by Cárdenas Guillén in 1997, the initial recruits were

poached from Mexican special forces and army deserters. By paying soldiers higher wages to work as

mercenaries, Cárdenas Guillén created one of the most feared death squads in all of Mexico. Los Zetas

raised the status of the Gulf Cartel from just a DTO to a full-fledged paramilitary (Ware 2009).

Though Los Zetas was part of the Gulf Cartel, they freelanced for other DTOs, and had an

alliance with the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel. In 2009, the head of the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel, Arturo Beltrán

Leyva, was killed during a two hour long shootout with Navy Marines (MacLean 2009). His brother,

Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, was arrested the year before; this has created a crisis of succession. The small

Beltrán-Leyva Cartel has been locked in a blood feud with the massive Sinaloa Cartel for a few years;

this has been a cause for increased violence in Mexico. Martin Beltrán Coronel, the leader of the
Beltrán-Leyva Cartel, was recently captured by soldiers, dealing another major blow to the tiny DTO

(BBC Latin America 5/13/2011).

Since 2010, Los Zetas have formally broken with the Gulf Cartel. Their alliance with the

Beltrán-Leyva Cartel has become a major DTO bloc. The other bloc, called the New Federation, is the

Gulf Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel, and La Familia Michoacan (NPR 2010). The AFO has been largely

obliterated. The Juarez Cartel has also been effectively negated, due to protracted conflicts with the

Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, and Tijuana-based DTOs. Their head financier Vicente Carrillo Leyva was

arrested in 2009, but was acquitted a year later (El Universal 2010). The head of the Juarez Cartel,

Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, remains free and wanted by both the DEA and FBI (DEA 2011 and FBI

2011). In early 2011 a new DTO emerged, the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, but their leader Jose

Lozano Martinez was arrested only a couple of weeks after their first massacres. It is believed that the

Independent Cartel of Acapulco may have ties to the Sinaloa Cartel (BBC Latin America 1/23/2011).

The dominant force in Mexico's drug trade today is El Chapo's Sinaloa Cartel and the New

Federation alliance backing them up (Beith 2010). The Sinaloa Cartel survived El Chapo being sent to

prison for eight years from 1993-2001. El Chapo is a cunning leader and the cartel has grown only

more prominent after his escape from Puente Grande maximum security prison in 2001. It was El

Chapo who pioneered the novel tactic of using massive tunnels under the border to transport drugs, as

early as the 1990s (Beith 2010). El Chapo, like the old-guard capos that mentored him, sought to

cultivate a positive image with the public by creating a patronage network, like a caudillo.

El Chapo was also able to adapt to a changed war on drugs; what once was a war in name only

now had tens of thousands of soldiers on the ground, for both the government and the DTOs. He saw

the Gulf Cartel creating Los Zetas and he wanted a paramilitary of his own, so he created Los Negros.

Los Negros were the formal enforcers for the Sinaloa cartel, a paramilitary used to carry out

executions. There is some evidence that they could be connected to the American street gangs MS-13

and the Latin Kings (Vinson 2009). Los Negros was headed by Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal, a
petty dealer from middle-class Texas with a penchant for violence who rose up the ranks of the Sinaloa

Cartel (Stevenson and Weber 2010). Since La Barbie was arrested in 2010, the Sinaloa Cartel has been

weakened and his capture provides a potential security breach (Stevenson and Weber 2010). La Barbie

is a high value suspect for the information he knows, who could led to the capture of El Chapo.

It is obvious that these are a new breed of DTOs, who do not conduct business in the same style

as the old-guard drug capos. What once would have been handled discreetly is now handled through

violence and it is increasingly spilling over into public life. As a result, there is debate over whether or

not DTOs are terrorist groups. This depends on which definition of terrorism one is using, and which

DTO one is referring to. Black's Law dictionary defines terrorism as, “the use or threat of violence to

intimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of affecting political conduct (Black 1999).” Drug cartels

target ordinary civilians, the police, the military, and any other target that stands between them and a

profit. They use violence, and threats of violence, to accomplish their goals. They influence politics

through intimidation, assassination, and bribes. Though the Mexican DTOs have not used car bombs,

or airplane bombs, like Colombian traffickers, nor IEDs like the EPR, they would clearly fall within

Black's definition of terrorism (Bell 2008 and Stewart 2009).

Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the Homeland Security Oversight and

Investigations Subcommittee, introduced the bill HR 1270 on March 28th. This bill would require the

Secretary of State to place six DTOs on the state department's Foreign Terrorist Organization list

(McCaul 2011): the Arellano Feliz Organization, Los Zetas, the Beltran Leyva Organization, La

Familia Michoacana, the Sinaloa Cartel, and the Gulf Cartel. This would allow the US government to

limit DTO's access to resources, hinder their abilities to travel, and to impose harsher penalties on those

to aid the cartels. This designation as FTOs would give the US a bigger role in confronting the drug

cartels, potentially through military force.

The stipulations in HR 1270 would strengthen the concepts of hemispheric security contained in

the 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas (Organization of American States 2003). A 2005
report by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) found that this declaration, “broadens the

traditional definition of national defense to incorporate new threats ... to such an extent that almost any

problem can now be considered a security threat (Freeman and Chillier 2005).” According to WOLA

this policy will lead to greater “securitization” of regional problems. Securitization is a process

whereby non-military problems are addressed though military means, such as the US military being

used for reconstruction in Iraq. WOLA identified four key risk factors with this policy, the first is a

historic, regional tendency for the armed forced to intervene in civil government. The second is the US

War on Drugs and its incentives to drive the military into domestic policing. Third is the general

inability of regional police forces to cope with increased crime. Finally, the US War on Terror,

“particularly its expansive and nebulous definition of terrorism (Freeman and Chillier 2005).”

Foreign Involvement, The United States and Colombia:

The United States has been helping Mexico combat the DTOs since before there were any

formal DTOs, since the 1970s. The US has been aiding the militarized drug war since 2008's Mérida

Initiative, which pledged $1.4 billion in aid to Mexico over the next three years. Only $204 million

went to the military, and none of the funds were appropriated for weapons. Some of the money was

earmarked speicifcally for judicial reform and strengthening rule of law (US Dept. of State 2009). The

Mérida Initiative has since been expanded to include Central American and Caribbean countries and its

funding has been extended, seemingly indefinitely, despite massive cutbacks in US domestic spending.

The Obama Administration has set four goals for Mérida in FY2011, “(1) disrupting organized

criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st century border; and (4)

building strong and resilient communities (Seelke and Finklea 2011).” Earlier this year, a senior Obama

administration official has confirmed a desire to speed up the implementation of the Mérida Initiative

and finish paying out nearly $1 billion in aid (Pace 2011). This comes only two years after the border

situation was so dire that President Obama considered calling out the National Guard to resume

securing the border, after Operation Jump Start ended in 2008 (Miles 2009). It is too early to tell if any
of the four Mérida Initiative goals will be met, this will require future research.

The United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is also working to combat the

DTOs. Since 2010, the ATF has engaged in a covert operation, called Fast and Furious, also known as

Project Gunrunner (Attkisson 2011). This was a DoJ directed policy which required ATF agents to led

thousands of guns be purchased by known DTO members (Senator Grassley 2011). The Department of

Homeland Security has also been implicated. “The idea was to see where the guns ended up, build a big

case, and take down a major cartel. And it was all kept secret from Mexico (Attkisson 2011).” No

major court case has been launched against the DTOs as a result of the ATF's operation.

As expected, the weapons were used to commit murders, including that of Border Patrol Agent

Brian Terry. Numerous agents voiced their concern about the operation, even before Terry's death, but

they were largely ignored. The only reason the public knows about this policy is because agents leaked

information to the press (Attkisson 2011). The ATF has denounced these agents and their statements

and their website lists an entirely different description for Project Gunrunner (US ATF 2011). The

ATF's website actually states, that Project Gunrunner is intended to “[prevent DTOs] from unlawfully

acquiring and trafficking firearms and explosives (US ATF 2011).” In the eyes of the ATF agents who

have spoken out, there was a correlation between the amount of guns they allowed into Mexico and the

increase in gun violence. This makes sense considering that an estimated 90% of weapons confiscated

from DTOs come from American gun stores located along the border (González 2009).

Colombia is now also offering assistance to Mexico to combat the DTOs (Mexico.vg 2011).

Colombia has already survived a war against drug cartels, turned narco-terrorists. The Colombian

government has experience which they can impart to the Mexican government; they locked in a

protracted war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to this day (Carroll 2010).

The FARC is a Marxist, agrarian, rebel group, considered by some to be a terrorist group. They do not

engage directly in the drug trade but they tax it to the tune of $300 million per year (BBC 2003).
Citizen Backlash to Militarization of Drug War:
Since the March 28th torture and slaying of Juan Francisco Sicilia and six of his friends, Mexico

has erupted in protests against the rising tide of violence (Grillo 2011). Juan was last seen in a bar with

friends, they were last heard having a loud discussion about the drug war. Days later, they were found

dead with a note bearing a warning to others. Juan, like most of the victims of the drug war, had no

connections to drug cartels. Juan was the son of Mexican poet Javier Sicilia, since the death his father

has become the voice of a revolution. Even before Juan's death Javier was fed up with the violence, his

son's death was the catalyst for change. On April 4th, he authored an open letter to Mexico's politicians

and criminals on behalf of the dead:

“We have had it up to here with you, politicians ... because the corruption of the judicial
institutions ... [because] each citizen of this country has been reduced to ... an unprotected life, the life of
an animal, of a being that can be violated, kidnapped, molested and assassinated with impunity ... As for
you, the criminals ... In days of old you had codes of honor. You were not so cruel in your paybacks and
you did not touch the citizens nor their families. Now you do not distinguish (Sicilia 2011).”
Javier had equally strong words for both the politicians and the criminals, but the blame for the current

uptick in violence was squarely on the politicians, for declaring a war against the DTOs. His letter was

a call to arms, which ended by announcing a nationwide march against drug violence on April 6th. This

nationwide march would build on marches that had been held locally since the bodies were found. With

only two day's notice, the nationwide march drew over 10,000 protesters across the country (Cardona

2011). The same day a mass grave was discovered in Tamaulipas state, in north-east Mexico, the 145

bodies are believed to have been largely people abducted from buses, a recruitment tactic (Epatko

2011). The mass grave is being blamed on Los Zetas. On April 16th, the local leader of Los Zetas, Omar

Martin Estrada and five others were arrested in connection to the murders, and possible involvement in

the murders of another mass grave found in the area, holding 72 bodies (BBC 2011). Sixteen police

officers have also been detained for allegedly providing protection to the narcos, bringing up the total

arrests to date to 55 (Pardo 2011).

Javier Sicilia has called for a nationwide, silent march to Mexico City to protest the continued

violence, and the continued mismanagement of the government; this march is set to take place on May
8th (Giordano 2011). Some protesters want the military and police to protect them, some want the

government to make peace with the DTOs, and some call for the government to legalize drugs (Epatko

2011). The message is mixed, but underlying theme is the same, “ya basta,” enough. The slogan “ya

basta” appeared once before in Mexico's recent history. Vicente Fox used it in opposition to the

authoritarianism of the PRI in the 2000 election. DTOs killed two PRI candidates during the 2010

election, but despite that and low turn out the PRI did well in the election, and has a chance to take

back the presidency in 2012 (BBC 7/5/2010). Drug violence was a major voting issue in 2006, and it is

expected to be a major issue again in the 2012 election.

Mexicans protesting against violence is nothing new. There have been massive protests against

kidnapping and cartel violence since the late 1990's (Althaus 2008). In one protest in 2004, a quarter

million people marched through Mexico City protesting the ongoing violence (Althaus 2008). These

protests continued into the Calderon presidency, with one 2008 protest drawing 200,000 people to

Mexico City, with other smaller efforts around the country (Althaus 2008). What is different is the

perceived cause of, and solutions to, the violence. While people once protested for the government to

end violence through a police and military crack down they are now protesting for the exact opposite.

The reason the people no longer support a militarized drug war is that they realize it leads to increased

violence. The causal relationship between increased policing and increased violence was recently

discovered by a study in the International Journal of Drug Policy (Kerr, Werb, and Wood et al. 2011).

“From an evidence-based public policy perspective and based on several decades of available
data, the existing scientific evidence suggests drug law enforcement contributes to gun violence and high
homicide rates and that increasingly sophisticated methods of disrupting organizations involved in drug
distribution could paradoxically increase violence (Easton 2011).”
In sum, the last five years of a militarized war on drugs have seen a massive increase in violence.

Nearly all of the major kingpins have been toppled, only to have less well known and potentially more

violent petty thugs come up to replace them. Much of this has been thanks to intra and inter-DTO

rivalry and efforts of police, some has been the result of military efforts. As long as the focus remains

solely on combating the DTOs, and there is no effort to increase education, health, and other public
services in rural areas, rural youth will continue to keep the narco culture alive. The Mérida Initiative

has been helpful, especially the helicopters, but it has not been enough to stop the violent onslaught of

the cartels. Long term success will depend on a different strategy, one that prioritizes investing in

human capital over militarization. Other domestic and foreign policy options might also be helpful in

mitigating the cash flow and power of DTOs.

America's Monsters in the Basement:

Mexican Attorney General Medina Mora has referred to America gang members working with

the DTOs as the 'sleeping monster in the US basement (Beith 2010).' These gangs provide a real

possibly for escalating violence in the US to levels currently seen in Mexico, especially as they are

exposed to increased policing. The DTOs have long incorporated local Mexican street gangs in their

distribution networks, such as Los Aztecas in Ciudad Juarez, who work with the Juarez Cartel. It's a

more recent phenomenon for them to be partnering with gangs north of the border, such as the Flores

brothers operation in Chicago, and hundreds like it around the US. The 2010 National Drug Threat

Assessment made clear that the DTO's influence has spread to every region of the US and nearly all

states (US Dept. of Justice 2010).

The recent economic downturn has led to less government revenues and cutbacks to public

services; while many police forces have been insulated from cuts, some have seen substantial losses in

resources and personnel. This has caused a spike in gang activity in many parts of the US, perhaps

under guidance from foreign drug lords who want them to cause a ruckus to influence policy. Attorney

General Mora and others have given numerous warnings about America's inability to confront the gang

issue and its impact on the war with the DTOs. The root causes of why people join gangs are much the

same as to why they join drug cartels or sell drugs in general, economic marginalization and a lack of

opportunities for advancement other than the drug market (Valdez and Kaplan 2007). America needs to

help its underclass just the same as Mexico must help their poorest citizens. By giving people economic

opportunities and public services, such as education, they are given an alternative to crime.
 III - Possibilities for the Future, Combating a Growing Threat

The 2006 militarization of Mexico's war against the DTOs is a constantly evolving issue. As a

result of their diverse nature and adaptability no one strategy can be said to fully resolve all DTO

related problems. Militarization has had some successes, but it has also had numerous failures. While

some kingpins have been felled, new petty criminals have risen to replace them, requiring more

resources to investigate and apprehend. While some cartels have been dismantled, others have come in

to take their place. This section of the paper will discuss various strategies that could be used to combat

the DTOs, and their likelihood of success. In this writer's opinion, it will take a combination of

solutions: strengthening the rule of law in Mexico, combating corruption in Mexico and the US, and

increased foreign policy cooperation between NAFTA members on drug policy issues. Any one on its

own may have some success, but the combination would likely see symbiotic benefits.

If action is not taken, the violence that has engulfed Mexico will continue to spread across the

border into the US and intensify. We are already seeing alliances between Mexican DTOs and

American street gangs; most notably the former alliance between The Flores Brothers' Operation in

Chicago, with the Sinaloa Cartel and the Beltrán Leyva Organization (Fainaru and Booth 2009).

Though the Flores Brothers were arrested, they are just one of numerous street gangs working with

Mexican DTOs to spread their influence to every region of the US, according to the 2010 National

Drug Threat Assessment (US Dept. of Justice 2010). These alliances are strengthening, and the ranks of

American street gangs are growing by the day, recently surging to an estimated 1 million across the

United States.

Return to Using the Police:

Given the recent study in the International Journal of Drug Policy, which found that increased

policing of drug markets increases violence, this would be a very bad idea (Kerr, Werb, and Wood et al.

2011). Further, given the rampant corruption of the Mexican police force, in many cases, the military is

fighting the cartels as well as police on the DTO's payroll (Beith 2010). Returning to using only the
police would be the worst policy option, given these primary factors, and the complex web of other

direct and indirect factors. Few in a position of power are openly calling for a return to policing the

drug war, rather than militarization. Many among the public want a return to policing, as evidenced in

recent public protests against the militarization of the drug war (Epatko 2011). The public is far from

united in this view, and this view is likely expressed by a minority of the public. This view is likely

birthed from a lack of knowledge about the realities of policing drug markets.

Continue Using the Military:

According to Manuel Piqueras, an international expert on public safety and criminal justice, the

use of the military “involves the heavy use of force that is difficult to limit and, therefore, is inadequate

to deal with internal conflicts. In contrast, the agencies responsible for public safety [deal with] the

prevention and prosecution of crime, so require a different mode of action, respectful of individual

rights” (Piqueras 2006). Kerr, Werb, and Wood did not investigate the effects of increased militarization

of the drug war, very little is known on the subject and further research is needed. The author's findings

about increased policing increasing violence leads one to believe that increased militarization would

dramatically increase violence. Yet, the militarization of the drug war in Mexico has had mixed results.

Since its beginning in late 2006 the amount of deaths per year have gone up significantly. The rising

death toll may not be a result of the militarization, but it is likely that increased militarization has been

a contributing factor. Most of the major drug capos have been taken down, to be replaced by obscure,

petty thugs who have risen to positions of prominence they aren't prepared to handle with subtlety, like

the old guard capos.

The only three left are El Chapo, and his associates El Mayo and El Azul (Beith 2010). All are

from Sinaloa and it is believed the three are traveling together to avoid detection. A 2009 military raid

on a 240 hectare property in the Durango hills found 22 meth labs, and a massive living dormitory with

quarters for around a hundred people. The dormitory also contained several rooms for very high

ranking members of the Sinaloa cartel, it is believed that El Chapo, El Mayo, and El Azul had been
there until just before the raid. It is believed that they remain in the Durango and Sinaloa regions of

Mexico. It is not known if someone in the military leaked the raid to El Chapo, or if their look outs saw

it coming, given past experiences either is likely.

Clearly, the military has had more success than the woefully corrupt police in taking down

major kingpins, but the Sinaloa cartel and El Chapo remain omnipotent (Beith 2010). These successes

have come at the cost of increased human rights abuses, including rapes, kidnapping, and murder

(Meyer 2010). It is also known that the military has been involved with drug smuggling since at least

the year 2000 (O'Day 2001). The military, like the police, has many corrupt elements, but is believed to

be less corrupt. Despite that, the United Nations feels that the negatives outweigh the positives in

militarization and have called for a return to barracks for the Mexican military, as one of many policy

options in an investigation released this year (Dulitzky, Dzumhur, and Mr. Osman El Hajjé et al. 2011).

It is unclear as to whether or not a return to barracks will happen, or even can happen at this point. The

PRI seem to be the likely winner of the 2012 election, but there are no guarantees in Mexican politics

and the PAN are still strong contenders. Regardless of which party wins, there is no telling whether the

next President will favor militarization or a return to barracks.

Private Military/Security Companies:

We live in an age of increased privatization, including the privatization of war. This is not a new

phenomenon but it has reached new proportions since the second Iraq War (Kinsey 2006). Most private

contractors involved with the Iraq War were non-combat operatives, performing services like cooking,

cleaning, and rebuilding. Some were armed and provided security for the non-combat contractors. The

most notorious private military contractor (PMC) in Iraq was Blackwater, now renamed XE Services.

Mexico saw an explosion in the number of private security companies operating there during the 1990s,

reaching nearly 10,000 firms in 1999, the majority of which were ad hoc (Bailey and Chabat 1999).

It is likely that the number of PSCs and potentially PMCs has increased dramatically since the

year 2000 as violence and governmental instability have increased. Despite this increase in PSC/PMCs
they are not being contracted by the government, as was the case in the Sierra Leone civil war during

the 1990s (Kinsey 2006). Also, it is largely PSCs being contracted in Mexico, not the heavily armed

PMCs of the past, which resemble mercenary armies. Aside from not being a formal company, Los

Zetas is the closest Mexico has seen to a PMC or mercenary outfit; the Zetas are contracted killers for

numerous groups and individuals, as well as working for their own gain. It would be very ill-advised

for the Mexican government to use PMCs to respond to heavily armed cartels, like the Zetas.

A major reason to not use PMCs is the government being exposed to scandal from human rights

abuses, which is already a problem in Mexico, due to the military. Recently, former Blackwater

employees were brought back into court, in regards to their involvement in the 2007 massacre of 17

innocent Iraqi civilians, in Nisour Square, Baghdad (Risen 2011). If these guards are convicted it will

reflect very negatively on their former employer, and ultimately on the US government as the primary

contracting party. If Mexico was to use PMCs, such as XE Services, it would open them up to similar

human rights abuses and negative impacts. Presently, there is nobody in Mexico advocating that the

government use PSC/PMCs to confront the DTOs. This could change as circumstances change, but

Kinsey found PMCs to be on the decline after the scandal over the Sierra Leone civil war and Sandline

International (Kinsey 2006). Thus, it is highly unlikely to see a return to government contracted PMCs.

Create a Mexican National Guard:

Retired Major General Roberto Martinez Badillo, a PRI member of the Defense Committee of

the House of Representatives, advocates activating the Mexican national guard. General Badillo warns

against a full deescalation and would prefer the military to stay involved helping manage the national

guard (Medellín 2008). The general envisions the national guard taking on all narco-combat duties

from the military. These efforts would be coordinated with the Attorney General's Office. As a retired

military general he is an expert on the Mexican military's combat abilities, which may give him some

sway in Congress. His proposal moved forward in 2009, but doesn't seem to have gone anywhere since

then (Notimex 2009). Other than General Badillo, no one appears to be advocating for the creation and
use of the national guard.

Strengthen Existing Paramilitarys:

The Special Forces Airborne Group (GAFE) is a paramilitary group created during the 1990s.

They were trained, with help the US, in counternarcotics and other special operations. Many of the

military related successes are the result of elite paramilitary groups, like the GAFE. These groups are

operated as a part of the Mexican army, but not a distinct branch; similar to how US marines are part of

the Navy, not a separate branch of the armed service. Paramilitaries offer a way to use nearly military

grade force in a much more controlled fashion. While an army uses heavy artillery, such as bombs and

tanks, a paramilitary does not. Thus, they can better avoid collateral damage to the civilian populace.

Even if an army is not using artillery, they are not trained in counternarcotics or investigating crimes.

Criminal investigation is not their function, the military's function is defending the public from external

threats. The police exist to investigate crimes, and the judicial system exists to finish the criminal

process. The military should not be involved in judicial decisions under ideal circumstances.

Mexico is far from ideal circumstances, and calls for new thinking. That was the mentality that

drove Felipe Calderon to militarize the war against the DTOs in the first place, and it is the mentality

that will, likely, lead to a new change in policy in 2012. Some have said Mexico is bordering on being a

failed state, which may just be alarmist, but the truth is that the government has lost control of some

parts of the country. Mexico's dire position, as a country at the breaking point of losing their democracy

to instability, justifies more than just police action. No one appears to be calling for a strengthening of

state paramilitaries, though this would be a logical escalation due to Los Zetas and other DTOs

upgrading to newer and better weaponry. Similarly, no one appears to be advocating for creating any

new paramilitaries, other than perhaps the national guard.

Foreign Cooperation - A New Mérida Initiative:

The Mérida Initiative was a fairly successful use of $1.5 billion by the United States, but it

ended this year and there has been no discussion of renewing it. It went largely to training the Mexican

military and police, helping establish a rule of law, and it provided five helicopters for use in
apprehending fugitives. The US insatiable appetite for drugs provides an endless market for Mexican

drugs. American's desire for drugs is the driving force behind the cartels profits and power. American

gun shops provide a large amount of weapons to the cartels. The main reason for the symbiotic

relationship between the US and Mexico is the fact that they are next door neighbors:

“The stakes for the United States in Mexico, thus, are much higher than they could ever be in
Colombia. ... Without seriously denting the demand for illegal drugs and preventing the southbound flow
of weapons, cash, and drug-making chemicals, the United States will keep feeding the flames that
threaten to consume the basis for civilized life in Mexico (Gonzalez 2009).”
Since the US is a primary force driving the Mexico drug trade, they have an obligation to help solve the

problems they are causing. Other important factors that have been found to increase involvement in the

drug market are economic marginalization and the opportunity to raise ones' economic status (Valdez

and Kaplan 2007). Helping to establish a rule of law in the anarchistic regions of Mexico that have

been lost to the DTOs is crucial to ending this crisis. Additionally, the Mexican government needs to

invest in social services and infrastructure development in rural areas like the Sierras, Chiapas, and

most of southern Mexico. Until people are given a legal economic alternative to the drug trade they will

be forced into that illegal work. This will be critical to end the illicit drug trade in the long term.

Strengthen Mexican Civil Institutions and Inter-Governmental Communcation:

Tied in to the concept of creating a new Mérida Initiative is the strengthening of Mexico's civil

institutions, such as the court and the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH). The Washington

Office on Latin America (WOLA), a non-profit research firm, found the CNDH to be lacking in its

abilities to actually bring human rights abuses to justice (Meyer 2010). It can discover abuses, but very

few cases ever go anywhere, which is largely a result of problems with the judicial system. One factor

serving to damper the government's entire position is a lack of intergovernmental communication. The

United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) special

investigation of Mexico found this to be a major issue (Dulitzky, Dzumhur, and Mr. Osman El Hajjé et

al. 2011). The WGEID investigation also discussed a chance for hope in the future:

“The newly established Executive Secretary of Public Security and the National Security
System, intended to harmonize and integrate the federal, state and municipal police and security system
could prove to be very valuable in the prevention, eradication and punishment of enforced disappearances
 (Dulitzky, Dzumhur, and Mr. Osman El Hajjé et al. 2011).”
The Executive Secretary of Public Security (SSP), was originally created in the year 2000. It has the

stated goals of preserving liberty, public order, safeguarding the rights of individuals, preventing

crimes, managing the prison system, and helping develop the executive branch public security policy.

The Public Security and the National Security System, was created in January 2009 when Felipe

Calderon signed the General Act on the National Public Security System into law. The act aims to

create new “mechanisms of coordination between the federal and state governments in combating

crime (Gutierrez 2009).” It created the National Council of Public Security and the National Public

Security Information System, as well as the the Unique System of Crime Information, a nationwide

database of believed criminals. These new public agencies should greatly improve the Mexican

government's position against the DTOs, but it is too early to tell and this area needs further research.

Legalize Drugs:
The black market is what led to the creation the DTOs. Improper responses to DTO violence

have allowed them to grow and diversify their markets. They now engage in human trafficking, sex

slavery, arms dealing, counterfeiting software, extortion, and kidnapping. Before marijuana, heroin and

other opiate derivatives were made illegal they had been commonly prescribed medicines for decades

without major issues (Maisto, Galizio, and Connors 2008). They were government regulated, and

quality controlled like all other products of the day. Once they became illegal they lost what little

regulations and quality controls there were at the time. This policy option is a non-military solution to a

problem that is arguably not a military problem.

Legalizing drugs, namely marijuana, would deal a significant blow to potential sources of DTO

revenue, but it may not be enough to topple them anymore. It is estimated that marijuana sales make up

over 60% of DTO revenues. Marijuana sales provides the money needed to fund other endeavors, such

as the counterfeiting of software; it also is used for bribes (Fainaru and Booth 2009). Since DTOs have

been allowed to grow and diversify to new markets, legalizing marijuana, or even all drugs would

likely not be enough to stop the steady onslaught of the DTOs. No one money-making endeavor can
yield as much money as marijuana sales. The most likely outcome of legalization would be for DTOs

to counterfeit more software, traffic more people, and engage in more kidnappings to compensate, or

find totally new revenue sources. Mexico legalizing drugs would help to an extent, but the major

consumer of Mexican drugs is the US. For there to be a major impact, the United States would need to

re-examine its drug laws and legalize marijuana, and potentially other drugs. In 2010, the RAND

Corporation studied what would happen if California legalizing marijuana, via the ballot proposition

Proposition 19. They found that, “legalizing marijuana in California would effectively eliminate

Mexican DTOs’ revenues from supplying Mexican-grown marijuana to the California market (Kilmer,

Caulkins, Bond, and Reuter 2010).”

If this approach was taken, clearly there would need to be controls to make sure that the same

violent DTOs weren't running businesses in a legal market. This will require a strengthening of the rule

of law in Mexico, and very likely changes to the rules for issuing writs of amparo. Amparo is the

process for filing for habeas corpus, appeals, injunctions, or challenge a law's constitutionality. Many

analysts regard Mexico's procedure to get a writ of amparo is effectively a get out of jail free card,

because it can allow a wealthy individual to get legal shielding from arrest (Preston and Dillon 2005).

While that might be an overstatement, it clearly alludes to a need for reform. Corruption within the

police and judicial system would also need to be rooted out.

A century after drug prohibition began in the United States, America has managed to spread it to

180 United Nations (UN) member states, via the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This is a

binding UN treaty which requests the member nations to maintain drug prohibition, or face the wrath of

the general assembly. No one government can unilaterally change its policy without checking with the

appropriate UN body. This creates a major constraint on the policy option of legalizing drugs, even

though it may be the best option. Though it was amended in 1972 to have a bigger focus on

rehabilitation programs, it is still a very restrictive treaty. Without any changes to the convention,

Amsterdam's decriminalization and America's medical marijuana programs are likely as close to
legalization as any country can legally get (Reinarman and Levine 1997).

Conclusion:
My initial hypothesis, that the use of the military for domestic policing was likely an improper

approach has proven to be correct. The evidence shows that is has served to increase violence and

spread violence to new regions of Mexico. Militarization has not addressed the underlying civil issues

which are the root causes of why people enter the drug trade, namely economic marginalization and the

need to compensate for this marginalization. If individuals are given economic and educational

opportunities then they will not be compelled to join the drug trade. Unfortunately, raising military and

police wages is not enough to prevent defecting, as the DTOs have shown they will just raise their

wages and charge more for products. I have given numerous potential policy options, many I would

advise against, but some I would strongly advocate. As the DTO issue is constantly changing, with new

groups emerging at all times engaging in new industries, often masked behind legal businesses, it is

very difficult to offer solutions that will be correct in all occasions. It would be best to create a

framework that allows for flexibility to match the changing tactics of the DTOs, this would likely

involve strengthening existing paramilitaries.

Freedom House, an index that measures a country's freedom found that, as of 2010, Mexico was

a “not free” country (Freedom House 2011). Some have questioned whether or not Mexico is a failed

state, I do not feel that it is a failed state. According to Foreign Policy Magazine's failed state index,

Mexico (#96) is doing better than both Russia (#80) and China (#62) (Foreign Policy 2010). Yet, no

one is calling Russia or China a failed state, as some are with Mexico. Russia and China are both

permanent members on the UN security council, they are both nuclear powers, and they are both

arguably more modernized than Mexico. But despite that, they are technically closer to becoming failed

states. Mexico is not doing well; there are large regions of the country where the government does not

have control and the law is made by drug lords. It is not remotely close in magnitude to the failure of

Afghanistan, which is the sixth worst failed state in the world. While an index is just an arbitrary
measure, it gives you a baseline to compare across countries. It is too soon to call Mexico a failed state.

The Mexican people have proven very resilient in the face of oppression throughout history. They are

already beginning to speak out against this violence, and it is only a matter of time before change

happens. It is very likely the the election of 2012 will be that change.

A Note about Sources:

I draw from numerous sources: books, journal articles, governmental studies, newspapers,

interviews, and websites. One book I cite from heavily for information about recent DTO activity,

namely the Sinaloa cartel, is The Last Narco, by Malcom Beith. This book is a biography of El Chapo,

the leader of the Sinaloa cartel, and it discusses the overall war against the DTOs. Beith is an

internationally published freelance journalist with significant experience writing on Latin America.

After spending years in Mexico, Beith has realized that Mexico's leading newspapers often have

divergent sets of facts. Similarly, government figures can be blatant lies, and can be different

dramatically from one agency to the next, and potentially even contradictory (Beith 2010). For Beith,

this often had to do with the political agenda of a given agency/newspaper. This problem isn't exclusive

to Mexico. Finding exact figures on the amount of Americans killed in Mexico proved difficult, and

seemed to change from one US newspaper or government agency to the next. An additional difficulty

one comes across when researching illegal behavior is the legitimacy of sources. I used all secondary

sources, which means I must rely on the authenticity of the publications I have read, and their sources.

The only interviews I conducted were for personal testimony, such as experiences with military

checkpoints and opinions on the issue of whether or not Mexico is a failed state.
Appendix 1:

Source: Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR). 2009. “Mexico Cartel Map.” Apr. Downloaded: 5/24/11
[http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45604000/gif/_45604033_mexico_cartels_lab466map.gif]

Source: Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR). 2009. “Mexico Cartel Map.” Dec. Downloaded: 5/24/11
[http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/46939000/gif/_46939024_mexico_cartels_466map2.gif]
Source: Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR). 2010. “Mexico Cartel Map.” Sept. Downloaded: 5/24/11
[http://www.limitstogrowth.org/WEB-Graphics/MexicoCartelMap.gif]

Source: Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR). 2011. “Mexico Cartel Map.” May. Downloaded: 5/24/11
[http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/52488000/gif/_52488567_mexico_cartels_2011_464map.gif]
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