ATOM OF WAR

COMPETING THEORIES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT &

NON-PROLIFERATION: COMPARING QUALITATIVE &
QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES

by Eloise Roos

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of Webster University in

partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Art in International Relations
(December 2015) St. Louis, Missouri

© Copyright by Eloise Roos

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED (2004) The author hereby grants to Webster University
permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis
document in whole or in part for educational purposes.

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 WEBSTER UNIVERSITY THESIS APPROVAL

ATOMS OF WAR
COMPETING THEORIES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT & NON-
PROLIFERATION : COMPARING QUALITATIVE & QUANTITATIVE
APPROACHES

by Eloïse Roos

APPROVED:
______________________________ _________________
Committee Chair/Mentor Approval Date

______________________________ _________________
Committee Member (Second Reader) Approval Date

______________________________ _________________
Site Director/Department Chair Approval Date

______________________________ _________________
Academic Dean Approval Date

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ABSTRACT

This present study aims to emphasize the effects of international monitoring of

proliferation instead of nuclear proliferation in it. The purpose of this work is to explore the
relation between (1) the gradual increase of international cooperation in nuclear arms
control and nuclear deterrence; and (2) the actual level of global nuclear armament, that
which already exists and that which is still being pursued. This study assumes that there is a
strong correlation between the strengthening and the persistence of the non-proliferation
regime, which celebrates its seventieth anniversary this year, and the non-use of nuclear
weapons.
To explore this question, this study aims to explore the nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament regime in the frame of two methodological approaches: a qualitative and a
quantitative one. Indeed, this study assumes that the two approaches are complementary to
fully grasp the implications of the question. They can resolve an academic debate by
answering epistemological considerations on the determination of which approach is the
most accurate to investigate and evaluate the effectiveness of the non-proliferation and
disarmament regime on the improvement of international peace and security.
The qualitative approach emphasizes the context in which States are proliferating. The
quantitative approach on the other side, provides simple statistical raw data determining the
relations between proliferation, its monitoring mechanisms, and the actual level of conflict
States are facing. In the light of those explanations, this study answers its research question
with the following: international monitoring of nuclear proliferation and disarmament has an
indirect effect over the outbreak of violent conflicts. Indeed, compliance with the NPT and
IAEA safeguard agreements does not stop States from seeking nuclear weapons – such as
historical experience has shown with the cases of Iraq, or Argentina and Brazil. However,
the regime provides a legal basis to counter proliferation when it occurs. However, as shown
by the quantitative approach of this study, compliance with the non-proliferation and
disarmament regime has no direct relations with the outbreak of violent conflicts, thus
validating the null hypothesis exposed previously. Consequently, disarmament and abolition
of nuclear weapons can be achieved by a strategic control of States over vectors of
proliferation in addition of legal constraints.

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 ATOMS OF WAR
COMPETING THEORIES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT &
NON-PROLIFERATION: COMPARING QUALITATIVE &
QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES

AKNOWLEDGMENT………………………………………………………………..p. 7

LIST OF ACRONYMS……………………………………………………………….p. 8

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES……………………………………………….p. 8

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………….p. 10

PART I: LITERATURE REVIEW, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND

THEORETICAL APPROACH OF THE SUBJECT

1. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………...p. 12

2. Monitoring Compliance: the Historical Context of Disarmament and Nuclear

Non-Proliferation……………………………………………………………………...p. 17

2.1 The Origins of the Non-proliferation Regime: The Acheson-Lilienthal and

Baruch Plans of 1946………………………………………………………...p. 18

2.2 The IAEA and Its Mentoring Mechanisms…………………………………p. 19

2.2.1 Purposes and Evolutions…………………………………………………p. 19
2.2.2 Historical Background and Negotiations………………………………….p. 20
2.2.3 The Relations between the IAEA and the United Nations………………....p. 22
2.2.4 The Additional Protocol and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: a Legal
Approach of the Implementation of Safeguards Measures…………………p. 23
2.2.5 Critics of the IAEA’s Functioning………………………………………..p. 26

2.3 The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons…………………....p. 27

2.3.1 Historical Background and Negotiations………………………………….p. 27
2.3.2 The Review Conference of the Parties........................................................p. 28
2.3.3 Limits of the Legal and Moral Significance of the NPT…………………...p. 29

3. Theoretical Approach…………………………………………………………………p. 32
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 3.1 The Regime Theory and Nuclear Non-Proliferation……………………….p. 33

3.2 The Realist Theory: the Security Dilemma Dynamics and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament………...…………………………………...p. 38

PART II: THE QUALITATIVE APPROACH

1. Methodology…………………………………………………………………...………..p. 44

2. Strategic Approach of Nuclear Weapons’ Elimination………………………..p. 46

2.1 International Security Improvements………………………………………p. 46

2.2 Trade Control and Limited Access to Knowledge……………………...….p. 47

2.3 Reversals of National Policies………………………………………………..p. 50

3. Discussion on Specific Case Studies………………………………………………p. 51

3.1 Introductory Questions: The P5 Countries and International Non-
Proliferation Regimes Over Time…………………………………………...p. 52
3.1.1 Nuclear Energy within the Blocks Logic (1945-1991)…………………….p. 52
3.1.2 The Post-Cold War Period……………………………………………….p. 53

3.2 India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri Question: Nuclear Deterrence in

Developing Countries………………………………………………………...p. 54
3.2.1 Historical Context of the Relations between India and Pakistan………...….p. 55
3.2.2 The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Deterrence…………………………………..p. 57

3.3 The Middle East and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation……………………..p. 59

3.3.1 Iraq and Nuclear Proliferation Risks…………………………………..p. 60
3.3.2 Nuclear Energy in Iran: What Consequences for the Region ? …….....p. 61

4. Critics of the Qualitative Approach………………………………………………..p. 63

PART III: The Quantitative Approach

1. Methodological Overview of the Quantitative Approach………………………p. 65

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2. Research Design……………………………………………………………………….p. 67

2.1 Data Set……………………………………………………………………….p. 69

2.2 Dependent Variable…………………………………………………………..p. 70

2.3 Independent Variables……………………………………………………….p. 72

2.3.1 Economic Factors Included as Independent Variables……………………..p. 75
2.3.2 Military Factors Included as Independent Variables ……………...….........p. 77
2.3.3 Nuclear Factors Included as Independent Variables...……………………..p. 77

3. Findings………………………………………………………………………………….p. 80

4. Critics and Limits of the Quantitative Approach..................................................p. 83

CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………..p. 85

APPENDIX…………..…………………………………………………………………p. 87

REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………….p. 115

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AKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper would never have existed without the kind contribution of Dr. Franco
Algieri, my advisor; Janette Donner, the best officemate an intern can have; Thomas Skoeld,
Ahmed El-Gabely and Katherine Spence, for being amazing and truly helpful colleagues
during my time at the IAEA; and finally Zak Kilhoffer, being more than an amazing
boyfriend but who was also extremely helpful in the last days of writing this thesis.

Eloïse Roos

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABACC Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AP Additional Protocol
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CSA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
COW Correlates Of War project
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
FOA Defence Research Institute (from Swedish Försvarets forskningsanstalt)
GNP Gross National Product
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
LoC Line of Control between India and Pakistan
MEPV Major Episodes of Political Violence (Polity IV Project)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWS Nuclear Weapons-State
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
P5 Permanent five (members of the United Nations Security Council)
PTBT Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
U.N. United Nations
U.S. United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories, 2014
Figure 2: Nuclear Weapons-States
Figure 3: Variation of the GDP Growth per Relevant Country (in %), 1960-2013
Figure 4: Evolution of military expenditures (in % of GNP) 1960-2013

Table 1: Nuclear Suppliers Group

Table 2: Multilateral Export Control Regime for Dual-Use Goods
Table 3: Definitional elements of supply-side non-proliferation controls

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Table 4: Nuclear World Powers
Table 5: Independent Nuclear Variables Included in the Analysis
Table 6: Independent Military and Political Variables Included in the Analysis on the relevant
period
Table 7: Jo & Gartzke (2007)’s Nuclear Status Coding Schemes
Table 8: Nuclear Factors Included in the Analysis as Independent Variables
Table 9: Sum of Conflicts’ Magnitude 1960-2013 related to the NPT
Table 10: Sum of Conflicts’ Magnitude 1960-2013 related to the number of years of
reprocessing activities
Table 11: Relationship MEPV – Independent Variables
Table 12: Relationship Uranium Processing – Independent Variables

9
INTRODUCTION

Since the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ending the Second World War
in 1945, the phenomenon known as “nuclear proliferation” has increasingly grown in
significance for the international community. Considering the magnitude and the
assertiveness of the destruction inflicted by nuclear weapons, this subject has now reached a
point where many scholars and policy-makers advocate for an international control over the
spread of this type of weapon. Indeed the use of nuclear devices can cause vast physical
damage: alongside the blast and heat as direct effects, large amounts of radioactively
contaminated material can be released into the atmosphere, which would endanger human
health far from the “ground zero”. Furthermore nuclear strikes are studied with respect to
what they are rather, than what purpose they may serve, having witnessed the unparalleled
suffering they can inflict. From this appeared a new debate on whether nuclear weapons are
contributing to making the world safer or not.
One the one hand, realist authors such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer argue
that these weapons serve to improve peace and stability since they reduce the risk of large-
scale conflicts’ outbreak (Waltz, 1981; Mearsheimer, 1994). Others such as Scott Sagan, for
instance, propose that nuclear weapons must be eliminated because they are detrimental to
peace and security because, even if they added a form of ideology-based strategic stability
during the Cold War, they failed to curb the eruption of proxy conflicts (Sagan, 1997).
The purpose of this work is to explore the relation between (1) the gradual increase of
international cooperation in nuclear arms control and nuclear deterrence; and (2) the actual
level of global nuclear armament, that which already exists and that which is still being
pursued. This study assumes that there is a strong correlation between the strengthening and
the persistence of the non-proliferation regime, which celebrates its seventieth anniversary
this year, and the non-use of nuclear weapons. As emphasized by Nina Tannenwald, nuclear
deterrence cannot be the sole factor explaining such a long period of restraint in the use of
nuclear weapons, upon considering that it seems unique that a weapon finds its use in only
one occasion, and remain unused in others (Tannenwald, 2007). In consequence I attempt to
analyse here the main characteristics of the non-proliferation regime, which has had
surprising longevity despite being unequal for its Parties, and how this international control
could impact the outbreak of international conflicts.

10
 Do attempts to control both nuclear proliferation and armament really contribute to an
enhancement of international peace and security? To explore this question, this study aims to
explore the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime in the frame of two
methodological approaches: a qualitative and a quantitative one. Indeed, this study assumes
that the two approaches are complementary to fully grasp the implications of the question.
They can resolve an academic debate by answering epistemological considerations on the
determination of which approach is the most accurate to investigate and evaluate the
effectiveness of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime on the improvement of
international peace and security.
First, the qualitative approach to disarmament and non-proliferation relates to the
historical and political framework in which policies towards the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons and the disarmament of nuclear weapons-States have been implemented
throughout the years. Also this approach aims to evaluate, following the arms race theory
developed by Ido Oren, what are the exertions (i.e. intentions) underlying nuclear
proliferation, as an ideological aspect of the overall States’ conduct of foreign affairs (Oren,
1994)? In consequence this study focuses mainly on the legal and political bases provided by
the two main actors of the non-proliferation regime: (1) the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards agreements, and (2) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The quantitative approach on the other side is useful insofar as it provides a more
explicit demonstration of the correlation between deterrence and non-proliferation regimes,
on the one hand, and states’ nuclear proliferation strategies on the other. Indeed, the
qualitative approach is not deductive since the motives for non-compliance to non-
proliferation and disarmament are largely independent of the inherent features of deterrence
and international regimes.
The main findings of this study are that the longevity and successive improvements of
the non-proliferation and disarmament regime can be explained by a general opprobrium,
principally that the spread of nuclear weapons is a threat to the collective security system
(Tannenwald, 2007). Similarly, this study assesses how the incentives for nuclear
proliferation are generally created by a hostile environment in which the proliferating State is
living, rather by the will of the State to get involved in those conflicts. Therefore, while the
qualitative approach shows us the process by which states are deciding to pursue the nuclear
adventure, the quantitative analysis provides an extensive comprehension on how the
environment and the material capabilities of states influence their decisions.
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PART I: LITERATURE REVIEW, BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL
APPROACH OF THE SUBJECT

1. Literature review

Conventional wisdom in both academic and political worlds generally accepts that the
control of armament by both States and international organizations is one of the cornerstones
of international peace and security. This question became particularly important after 1945
and the first successful nuclear explosion in the American desert of Alamogordo. Indeed, the
humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons help to assess the legitimacy of disarmament and
non-proliferation to enhance international peace. The use of nuclear devices can cause vast
physical damage: alongside with the blast and heat as direct effects, large amounts of
radioactively contaminated material can be released into the atmosphere, which would
endanger human health far from the “ground zero”. Consequently the assuredness that
destruction- more than the very scale of destruction- will be inflicted and cannot be avoided
reinforces the position for the need of international control of nuclear weapons (Sahovic,
1965; Falk & Lifton, 1991; Kraig, 1999; Lewis, 2006; Hayashi, 2015).
The debate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament derives from the existence of
profound moral and ethical questions on the legitimacy of possessing this type of weapons,
going beyond simple legal considerations. This debate is generally viewed by assessing how
the possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons can serve the common good. Also
nuclear strikes are seen considering what they are, instead or what the purpose they are
serving is, once seen the unparalleled sufferings they can inflict (Hayashi, 2015). Therefore
the possibility for an international regime to emerge is contingent on the very nature of
nuclear weapons. If arms control agreements were chiefly measures imposed by the victors of
a conflict on the vanquished, they were rarely the result of a freely negotiated agreement. The
coming of the nuclear era, however, changed the concepts of waging war and maintaining
peace, having seen a completely new dimension of potential destructiveness. Moreover, the
end of the Cold War has generated new questions on the relevance of nuclear deterrence and
its role of ensuring the national security of the nuclear-armed states. Consequently, the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as cornerstone of the effort for non-
proliferation and disarmament, proposes a discriminating legal basis by creating distinct
categories of states, with different treatments regarding rights, responsibilities and privileges.

12
Indeed in the view of the legitimate nuclear weapons-States (China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States, recognized as such by the Non-Proliferation Treaty),
(Paul, 2003), this regime shall not only restrain their power capabilities, but also prevent the
dispersion of nuclear weapons systems.
Once a direct threat eliminated and seen the geopolitical evolutions of the armed States,
the credibility and “image” of nuclear deterrence rapidly deteriorated. In the meantime,
nuclear doctrines were left not mature enough to enter a real political debate over
disarmament (Debouzy, 1997). Consequently, in the most developed countries such as the
United States, the United Kingdom or France, the end of the confrontation with the USSR
made the acceptance of the very concept of nuclear deterrence obsolete when facing new
social or economic imperatives (Debouzy, 1997). Hence a new disconnection between the
operational constraints of nuclear weapons (delivery systems, costs etc.), left to the military
cenacle; and the political debate over the need for a control of nuclear weapons (Kaysen and
al., 1991; Bundy, 1991).
Nuclear arms control refers first of all, to the limits or restraints on nuclear weapons, and
the trade of any fissile materials or explosive devices and their delivery systems. It is
generally mutually agreed upon between States, under the auspices of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or any dedicated
international treaty. Those components form the non-proliferation regime, and in a broader
sense refer to the collective security regime embodied by the United Nations. However,
having seen the revolution of armament brought about by nuclear weapons, new methods
were required in terms of international cooperation to deal with these issues (Sahovic, 1965).
The purpose of disarmament means the realization of the goal of a world free of nuclear
weapons and any measures hereto. Nevertheless, for the purpose of understanding non-
proliferation monitoring, one must distinguish vertical from horizontal nuclear proliferation.
Horizontal proliferation refers to non-nuclear weapons-States that are acquiring or developing
nuclear arsenals, while vertical refers to nuclear weapons States that are increasing their
stockpiles, improving the technical sophistication and reliability of these, or developing new
weapons or delivery systems (Sidel & Levy, 2007).
Consequently, non-proliferation and disarmament can be seen as one of the major post-
Cold War era challenges, since the disappearance of the blocks logic (Huntley, 2006). Here
the main argument states that the development of strong ties between countries reduces the
risk of large-scale conflicts, but also creates an incentive for cooperation in disarmament and
non-proliferation, since nuclear energy no longer serves the purposes of the Cold War
13
(Keohane & Nye, 1977; Forsberg & al., 1995; Rauchhaus, 2009). The question of
disarmament and its effects on the outbreak of conflicts is nevertheless not a recent argument:
the First World War has contributed to a substantial growth of academic literature trying to
understand how the arms race in Europe on the eve of the conflict accelerated its outbreak
(Diehl, 198; Sample, 2002).
The current literature, however, does not establish a clear link between disarmament and
non-proliferation and their effects on the reduction of conflicts. Instead the literature tends to
focus exclusively on the efficacy and viability of nuclear deterrence (Kraig, 1999; Harries,
2015), and the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime (Paul, 2003; Horovitz, 2015).
Instead of focusing on what goals global disarmament could serve, the literature rather
prioritizes the impact of the possession (or pursuit) of nuclear weapons over conflicts (Payne,
2015). Assessing the causes of proliferation thus does not take into consideration the
monitoring of States' compliance to non-proliferation and disarmament treaties or any other
form of control as an enhancing factor of peace and security (Jo & Gartzke, 2007;
Montgomery & Sagan, 2009). In other words, this present study aims to emphasize the
effects of international monitoring of proliferation instead of nuclear proliferation in it. That
way, the current literature tends to ignore empirical anomalies which can be found in the
“traditional” non-use of nuclear weapons, such as the random efficiency of both deterrence
and fear of retaliation. For instance, fear of retaliation, as underlined by Nina Tannenwald,
does not explain why the United States refrained from using nuclear weapons during the
Vietnam War or the United Kingdom in the Falklands, where nuclear weapons could have
presented a decisive strategic advantage (Tannenwald, 2007, p.2).
By the same token, the literature tends to perceive disarmament and non-proliferation as
having the same implications for every nation, and do not take into consideration the political
and security situation (perceived or real) of proliferating (real or supposed) states, such as
India, Pakistan or even Iran (Sagan, 1997; Sample, 2002). Consequently, the first need is to
establish what domestic factors – added with the perception of an external threat – will lead
states in their nuclear choices (Sample, 2002). By the same token, the literature should
distinguish states with the effective capacity to follow an acquisition path and those who
cannot and have to rely on conventional arsenals during a conflict. This can help to
distinguish major states with a potential or existent nuclear capacity from the minor States, as
well as their behaviour throughout the process of conflicts.
The true impact of nuclear weapons possession on international peace and security can be
understood twofold. First, nuclear symmetry can reduce the risk of a major interstate conflict,
14
respecting the potential effects that the use of nuclear weapons involves. But on the other
hand, the possession of this kind of weapon increases the risk of lower-intensity conflicts,
especially between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, while the question of
disarmament and non-proliferation do not take into consideration the evolutions of war since
1945 (Rauchhaus, 2009). Consequently, the debate over the role of nuclear weapons can be
seen as a counterfactual discussion, hypothesis-based and incapable of a single verification
since no nuclear war ever occurred, while nuclear weapons cannot be dis-invented (Hayashi,
2015). Here relevant points concern the politico-economic preferences of the concerned
states, the popularity of non-proliferation norms, and the political leaders’ psychology
(Gerzhoy, 2015). This debate has been particularly active during the Cold War, with a focus
shifting from how arms races contribute to the outbreak of conflicts, to whether it does so
(Diehl, 1983; Sample, 2002). Indeed the development of a military nuclear program,
associated with an increase of military capacities, induces a debate on the moral ambivalence
toward nuclear weapons and the potential lawfulness of their use (Hayashi, 2015).
Another argument assumes that the security model of nuclear weapons assesses that, by
providing an extended nuclear deterrence to its allies, a nuclear state can improve peace and
security while obviating the needs for nuclear capacities (Gerzhoy, 2015). Nonetheless this
argument remains weak to the extent that client states are dependent on the credibility and
durability of their patron’s nuclear deterrence in case of military threat- hence an increasing
risk for the development of indigenous nuclear programs. Thus once again, a state’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons, or lack of which, remains related to its political conditions,
associated with what Gerzhoy describes as an alliance coercion.
Consequently, the literature must first address why states seek the acquisition of nuclear
weapons or not, with attention to their political and economic contexts, which is useful to
assess states’ intentions. Here the literature seems to reach a consensus on national security
considerations only when related to nuclear proliferation, which assumes that every actor is
perfectly rational in its choices to develop or not develop a capacity (Sagan, 1997). However,
this study assumes that rationality is a matter of perception, and is related with how a given
state will react considering a potential rival or external threat. For instance, the challenges
posed by the indigenous nuclear program of Iran and North Korea bring into question the
viability and the real non-proliferation capacity of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) of 1970, which dispositions remain precarious (Pouëzat, 2005; Huntley,
2006).

15
 Another focus must emphasize how international regimes for non-proliferation have been
established and evolved since the late 1940s. This leads to further interrogations due to the
increasing strain for changing political and technical environments, in which the adaptive
capacity of the regimes is highly challenged (Tate, 1990). The same way proliferation has
progressed horizontally, nuclear proliferation concerns also vertical evolutions, and thus the
modernization and evolution of the nuclear weapons-states’ stockpiles (Waltz, 1981).
Therefore, this study attempts to question both the changing nature of conflicts since the
Second World War, but also the evolution of international cooperation in the frame of nuclear
proliferation.
The literature must point out as well how and why states seek national security. On
the one hand, military buildup can deter a potential rival, while on the other hand, avoiding
building up is a solution so that conflicts do not get out of hand (Sample, 2002). Moreover,
the historiography and analysis of disarmament and non-proliferation does not take into
consideration the transformations of the international system. If the “Long Peace” generated
by the Cold War has not disappeared at the collapse of the Soviet Union, international
violence has mutated into other forms (e.g. terrorism and civil conflicts), mainly with the rise
of non-state actors as parties of conflicts (Rauchhaus, 2009). Indeed, in the present days the
rise of a new type of enemy seriously affect the nature of states’ defence policies, designed to
meet new threats (Lewis, 2006). In that context nuclear deterrence loses on relevance
compared to conventional forces, more adapted to respond to a new type of threat- and thus
new type of conflict emanating from rogue regimes or terrorist groups. Therefore this study
has to take into consideration the different classes of conflicts to understand nuclear
proliferation dynamics, but also the manner in which disarmament and control are monitored.
This statement leads to a new point: the efficiency of international monitoring of
disarmament and non-proliferation, mainly through the relevant international treaties. Indeed,
more than an understanding of how and why States seek nuclear arsenals, the manner in
which disarmament and non-proliferation is internationally monitored needs to be addressed
as well (Kristensen & Norris, 2014). Therefore this study aims to focus on (1) the control of
nuclear proliferation, mainly through the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) of 1970 and the safeguards mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA); and (2) the evolution of compliance toward international regimes since the explosion
of the first nuclear bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima in 1945, related to global trends
in terms on conflict and violent interstates disputes. Consequently this paper will attempt to
establish the correlation between the two concepts by asking: “is the international
16
 monitoring of disarmament and non-proliferation contributing to an enhancement of
international peace and security?”
To do so, this study aims to focus first of all on empirical evidence, based on the review
of case-studies, to test the effects of international conflicts on international regimes’
compliance. Indeed, historical records yield insights into nuances and contexts of nuclear
proliferation and non-proliferation that can escape a simpler rational model. However, to
avoid bias in the development of an answer, this study seeks to compare the results provided
by empirical studies with quantitative measurements based on statistical data sets. To do so
the first point needing to be addressed is how those issues have been historically addressed
since the end of the Second World War. Later, the qualitative approach aims to analyse first
the strategic approach of nuclear weapons’ elimination, and then some relevant case-studies.
Finally, the quantitative approach seeks a statistical understanding of nuclear proliferation
and its relationship with international conflict.

2. Monitoring Compliance: The Historical Context of Disarmament and

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Due to the unprecedented dangers that might arise from the misuse of nuclear energy and
considering its technological character, new methods of cooperation among states were
needed. Also some countries, for the interest of the international community, consented to
establishing monitoring bodies and the application of international control on their territories.
Before addressing how disarmament and non-proliferation are impacting the breakout of
conflicts, one needs to examine the different international attempts to regulate nuclear
weapons proliferation. Several propositions have been made world wide to monitor, at an
international level, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: those propositions once
implemented forming the non-proliferation regime. The most significant ones are the origins
of non-proliferation and disarmament regimes throughout the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and
Baruch Plan of 1946, the creation in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and finally the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its
additional protocols of 1970.

17
 2.1 The origins of the non-proliferation regime: the Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch
Plans of 1946

The United Nations Charter was signed on June 26th, 1945; on August 6th, a nuclear
weapon exploded over Hiroshima. The magnitude of its power immediately shattered all
concepts of war and weaponry, hence imposing new urgencies and perspectives for an
international control of armaments. The need to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons became
evident at the first stages of the nuclear era. Thus, in November 1945, the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom proposed the establishment of a U.N. Atomic Energy
Commission entrusted with the sole purpose of eliminating the use of nuclear energy for
destructive purposes. This first commission contained a package of primary measures-
proposed by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, which included a
commitment neither to transfer nuclear weapons out of the concerned state’s control, nor to
accept this transfer except in the cases of self-defence.
Shortly after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United Nations were
perceived by the United States as the logical forum for the control of nuclear energy. Indeed,
the Truman Administration, at the early stages of nuclear energy development, preferred to
use the newly created international body, instead of entering into a direct dialogue with the
Soviet Union on the potential civil and military applications of nuclear energy (Burns &
Coyle, 2015, pp.25). Moreover, the Truman Administration, despite warnings from the
United Kingdom, mistakenly believed that the secret of the bomb could remain under control,
and Washington expected to offer broad suggestions for international control.
In 1946, the American Department of State started a public debate- the so-called
Acheson-Lilienthal Report- related to the questions that had arisen after 1945 with regards to
a possible denaturing of materials used in atomic explosives. This report was issued due to
two schools of thoughts toward nuclear energy after the war. The first, supported by the
Secretary of War Henri Stimson, believed in the scientific nature of nuclear energy and
advocated the diffusion of this knowledge. The second one, on the contrary, advocated that
the scientific progresses of the United States should not be questioned, and that the Soviet
Union was only sensitive to coercion. The same year, the U.S. Representative to the U.N.
Atomic Energy Commission, Bernard Baruch, proposed a plan calling for placing all nuclear
resources under the authority of an international independent body. This body would have
exclusive authority over all the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to reprocessing,
to the eventual destruction of all nuclear weapons. Additionally, if that plan were adopted, the
United States, as sole nuclear weapons-state, would give up its arsenal.

18
 However early post-war efforts to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation failed, and
the Soviet Union objected to most of the provisions, opting for national control of nuclear
weapons. Meanwhile, nuclear proliferation brought new dangers and complexities: the Soviet
Union in 1949; the United Kingdom and France, with the support of the United States,
respectively in 1952 and 1960, and the People’s Republic of China in 1964, became nuclear
weapons-states. Therefore, it became increasingly evident that assumptions on the scarcity of
nuclear weapons and the difficulty of mastering nuclear technology were inaccurate, and thus
required further international monitoring mechanisms.

2.2 The IAEA and its mentoring mechanisms

In theory, the functioning of the International Atomic Energy Agency is relatively

straightforward. The role of the IAEA is to monitor and verify compliance of its member-
States to the non-proliferation regime, and if needed to report to its governing body, which
takes the appropriate measures, including reporting to the U.N. Security Council and thereby
enacting sanctions (Findlay, 2015).

2.2.1 Purpose and evolutions

The explosion of the first nuclear bomb – and its use on civil populations – have created
increasing concerns toward a possible proliferation of nuclear material for military purposes.
Indeed, the United States, conscious that its monopoly over nuclear energy would not last,
pledged for the creation of an international atomic energy agency in order to create a much
freer environment for the diffusion of nuclear knowledge (Tate, 1990). From its formation in
1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter IAEA) has been entrusted with the
task of establishing and operating safeguards verifications that States are not diverting their
nuclear program for military purposes. The safeguards system thus focuses on the assessment
of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations of their nuclear materials and
nuclear-related activities to the Agency, in accordance with its status. To do so, the IAEA
working framework relies on three pillars: (1) nuclear non-proliferation; (2) peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, which includes a trade element in the work of the IAEA, and (3) disarmament
of the nuclear weapon-states. The Statute of the IAEA in its Article II defines the objectives
of the Agency as follows:

19
 “The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace,
health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance
provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such way as to
further any military purpose.”

Therefore the IAEA can be seen as a platform that aims to improve cooperation
among states for several reasons. First of all, this kind of institution can change the
calculations with which states seek to maximize their gains in the nuclear field. Moreover, an
increase of the number of transactions, through mainly the Nuclear Suppliers Group (see
Table 1.), raises the costs of noncompliance, both economically and politically speaking
(Mearsheimer, 1995). Also the IAEA is an independent and intergovernmental organization
within the United Nations system, and nowadays, 164 States are parties to its Statute.

Table 1: Nuclear Suppliers Group

Argentina Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Brazil Bulgaria

Czech
Canada China Croatia Cyprus Denmark Estonia
Republic
Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland
Republic
Italy Japan Kazakhstan Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg
of Korea
New
Malta Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal
Zealand
Russian South
Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Spain
Federation Africa
United United
Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine
Kingdom States
Source: Nuclear Suppliers Groups http://nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/

2.2.2 Historical background and negotiations

With a certain acknowledgement for the inevitable diffusion of atomic energy, the
creation of the IAEA finds its roots in the speech given by the American president Dwight D.
Eisenhower on December 8, 1953 in front of the General Assembly of the United Nations,
advocating the peaceful utilization of the atom and addressing the potential dangers of
nuclear proliferation.

20
 “[…] The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be
reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed in a great boon, for the benefit
of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power for atomic energy is no dream
of the future. […] I therefore make the following proposal. The governments principally
involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to
make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials
and international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set
up under the aegis of the United Nations. […]”

This speech would thus outline a new approach for the international monitoring of nuclear
energy, the U.S. nuclear weapons monopoly being ended with the nuclear tests conducted by
the USSR in 1949 and the United Kingdom in 1952. This first real movement toward an
international monitoring of the use of nuclear energy thus intervened in a specific context,
with a clear shift away from the emphasis on secrecy and the stringent need for management
due to uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons (Tate, 1990). Therefore, the suggested agency
presented in Eisenhower's speech would be responsible for the impounding, storage and
protection of any fissile material, as well as for the supervision of uses whereby nuclear
energy could be allocated to pursue peaceful purposes for the development of mankind
(Fedchenko, 2009). But beyond the creation of an international atomic energy agency, the
inevitable character of nuclear energy development led the United States to change their
nuclear policy in the early 1950s since their monopoly over the control of the atom was not
aimed to last. Also the Atomic Energy Act, used as the base for the finale Statute of the IAEA
and adopted in 1954, states that:

“Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as military purposes. It is

therefore declared to be the policy of the United States that: the development, use and control
of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general
welfare, subject at all times to the paramount of making the maximum contribution to the
common defence and security; and the development use and control of atomic energy shall be
directed so as promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of
living, and strengthen free competition in private enterprise.”

Once its Statute adopted in 1957, the IAEA's main role is the establishment and
administration of safeguards to avoid diversion of nuclear material. However, the role of the
agency is not limited to the sole purpose of safeguards. Indeed, the Statute includes a
technical assistance provided by the IAEA through bi- or multilateral agreements agreed with
member-states for those who seek the development of a peaceful nuclear program. That way
the IAEA is mainly a technical organization with a limited political influence since its
activities are not self-executing but operate only at the request of states.

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 2.2.3 The Additional Protocol and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements: a
legal approach to the implementation of safeguards measures

Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides that each non-nuclear
weapon state party to the treaty shall conclude an agreement with the IAEA, so-called
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). This agreement encompasses the application
of its safeguards measures on every source of fissionable material within the states' territories
or under its jurisdiction. This strict control of nuclear energy thus reveals that legal rules
regulating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy have always been heavily linked to the military
origins of nuclear power. Indeed, many of the technologies currently used in the nuclear fuel
process were originally developed in the military context of the Second World War, hence
virtually no forms of control or considerations regarding further development and
proliferation were enacted (Fedchenko, 2009). To that purpose, the Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement states that:

“The Agreement should contain, in accordance with the Article III.1 of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out
under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

Under the authority of the IAEA, the implementation of safeguards in any member-
state signatory of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is informed by an analysis of all
plausible ways by which the state could develop or acquire materials for a nuclear explosive
device. To do so, the IAEA proceeds following the so-called State-level concept, which refers
to a holistic approach of the implementation of safeguards. This concept approaches
safeguards in a manner that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities as a
whole, within the scope of the CSA. Safeguards’ implementation is thus based on a
comprehensive State evaluation, which plays a vital role in the understanding of a State’s
nuclear fuel cycle (IAEA INFCIRC/153, 1972).
By the same token, the Additional Protocol of the IAEA was issued due to the need
for the Agency to increase its focus on completeness and correctness after the discovery of a
clandestine uranium enrichment program in Iraq in the early 1990s. Those necessities
conducted in 1992 to the creation of a new system of special inspections to more accurately
detect undeclared activities. Also, this document, signed as a complement to a

22
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and States, was made in order to
strengthen the efficiency of the safeguards system as a new contribution to nuclear non-
proliferation. Indeed under the Additional Protocol, the IAEA is granted extended rights of
access to information and sites. Therefore it aims to fill the gaps in the information provided
by a previous Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Indeed, because each case of nuclear
proliferation is different and follow singular dynamics, the IAEA had to be more flexible and
innovative to monitor with accuracy and effectiveness States’ compliance with the non-
proliferation regime (Findlay, 2015).
However, although the Additional Protocol now encompasses reports on research and
development, verifications need the agreement of the concerned State to become effective
and thus limit the scope and the relevance of the IAEA's inspections. Moreover, Additional
Protocols are negotiated case by case, as a reflection of the willingness of the State concerned
to extend the IAEA’s authority over its sovereign territory. Indeed the IAEA’s experience of
diverted nuclear programs in Iraq and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
in the early 1990s demonstrated that the Agency is not always well-equipped to detect
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in States parties to the NPT or a Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement.

2.2.4 The relations between the IAEA and the United Nations

The U.N. Security Council is a conservative body, generally loath to add cases to its
workload. Consequently, the respective actions of the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Council have to be carefully coordinated, firstly due to the fact that the five
permanent members of the Council are also prominent members of the IAEA Board of
Governors.
The relations of the U.N. Security Council with the IAEA are inseparable from its
relation with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), each being a
part of the responsibilities invoked by the other. Indeed in any reported non-compliance case,
both bodies are jointly responsible for the event, even if the Security Council has decided to
take a coercive action, under chapter VI or VII of the U.N. Charter (Findlay, 2015). However,
due to the perceived political aspects of the IAEA's work during the draft of its Statute, the
IAEA is not a U.N. specialized body but enjoys a special status, which conditions the
relations between the two organizations. Also the relations between the Agency and the

23
Security Council are organized around 3 axes: (1) the Agency’s Statute; (2) the guarantees
agreement concluded in application of the NPT and (3) the agreement managing the relations
between the United Nations and the Agency.
The relations between the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council are first of all defined
by the Statute of the Agency, and particularly its articles III.B.4 and XII.C. Article III.B.4
recognized the prevailing role of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security and states as follows:

“In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall […] submit reports on its activities annually to
the General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council, if
in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the
competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the
organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Historically, this article was invoked by the Agency in front of the Security Council for the
first time in 2005, due to the lack of compliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its
obligations under the NPT and the IAEA Additional Protocol (GOV/2005/77 of September
24, 2005). Indeed, facing the refusal of Iran to give access to its nuclear facilities, the IAEA
reported in front of the Security Council, recognizing that peace and security were of the
responsibility of this organ.
Furthermore the obligations of the Agency toward the Security Council and vice versa
are defined by the “Structure and content of agreements between the Agency and States
required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, such
as presented by the IAEA Board of Governors of 1972 (INFCIRC/153, corrected), and
especially its paragraph 19, which explicitly links the activities of the Agency to the NPT,
defined as follows:

The Agreement should provide that if the Board upon examination of relevant information
reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has
been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in
paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute[.]

Moreover, the U.N. Security Council is at the roots of the negotiations which have led to
the signature of the NPT in 1968, mainly under the influence of the United States and the
Soviet Union, which sought to ban transfer and development. Consequently, the NPT was
signed in 1968 but aimed in the meantime to preserve the nuclear weapon-State status of the

24
permanent members of the Security Council. However, in order to be accepted by the non-
nuclear weapon-States, the Security Council had to endorse security guarantees, first through
Resolution 255 of 1968, thus making this resolution inseparable from the NPT, but also part
of its context. Indeed, the resolution 255 states the following:

The Security Council, […] taking into consideration the concern of certain of these [non-
nuclear weapon] States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the [NPT], appropriate
measures be undertaken to safeguard their security, […] recognizes that aggression with
nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear weapon-State would
create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear weapon-State
permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under
the United Nations Charter[.]

That way, the Security Council recognizes that it is its duty to intervene when a non-armed
State is subjected to a threat of the use or the use of a nuclear device against him, hence a
position which can be interpreted as a renunciation of the veto right of the permanent
members. This will to ensure security guarantees has been later reaffirmed with Resolution
984 of 1995, stating such as follows:

The Security Council, […] recognizing the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon-States
Parties to the [NPT] to receive security assurances, […] taking into consideration the
legitimate concern of non-nuclear weapon-States that, in conjunction with their adherence to
the [NPT], further appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security, […]
recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon-States Parties to the [NPT] to receive
assurances that the Security Council, and above all its nuclear weapon-State permanent
members, will act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the
[U.N.], in the event that such States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of,
aggression in which nuclear weapons are used; […] and recognizes also that the nuclear
weapon-States permanent members […] will […] seek Council action to provide, in
accordance with the Charter, the necessary assistance to the State victim[.]

The U.N. Security Council thus has seen its role progressively evolving, by shifting from
a turndown position during the Cold War, in order to protect its permanent members from the
global disarmament movement initiated by the NPT, to an increasing involvement of States in
control regime, due to the limits of the conventional control mechanisms (NPT and IAEA
safeguards measures). This implication in the management of the nuclear proliferation risk
can be associated with four major events: (1) the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT in
2003, seen as complete questioning of an order, which aims to be universal; (2) the resolution
1540 on vertical proliferation, voted after the discovery of a traffic network of nuclear
technology from Pakistan; (3) the management of the Iranian crisis after the discovery of the
sites of Natanz, Parchin and Fordow; and (4) the resolution issued by the Council in 1991

25
against Iraq- legitimized by the invasion of Kuwait- in order to put an end to its nuclear
program (Weckel, 2006; Findlay, 2015).
Consequently one can consider that the Security Council became an auxiliary body to the
non-proliferation and disarmament regime by engaging directly its responsibility in case of
use or threat of use.

2.2.5 Critics of its functioning

Critics on the functioning of the IAEA safeguards measures, as part of the non-
proliferation regime as a whole, can question its very existence due to the refusal of some
members to cooperate. Also the main criticism concerns the manner in which safeguards
should be implemented, with regards to two dissonant points of view: on the one hand
supplying countries emphasize the necessity of nuclear trade control; recipient countries on
the other hand invoke national sovereign prerogatives to develop a nuclear program. Indeed
sometimes the non-proliferation regimes are perceived as unfair by developing States, with
claims that their access to nuclear material and technical assistance is curtailed or their
requests ignored (Tate, 1990).
Furthermore, compliance or not to the safeguards measures of the IAEA emphasizes the
manner States perceive the agency and its legal constraints: one the one hand, noncompliance
can be perceived as a lack of recognition of the legal significance of the IAEA and the NPT,
while on the other hand, States that have chosen to remain out of the NPT can indicate that
they view the latter as a meaningful constraints (Furhmann & Berejikian, 2012). In 1994, Etel
Soligen identified four types of behaviours toward the safeguards measures of the IAEA: (1)
overt deterrence; (2) opaqueness; (3) controlled proliferation; and (4) the implementation of
nuclear weapons-free zones, the two latest as part of non-proliferation and disarmament
regimes (Soligen, 1994). For the cases of noncompliance, Matthew Furhmann and Jeffrey D.
Berejikian in their study, identify two different type of behaviours: predation and abstention.
In that context, in a 2004 report of the Secretary-General’s high-level panel on threats,
challenges, and changes entitled “A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility”, the
United Nations stressed the precarious nature of the non-proliferation regime and thus the
need to reinforce the links between the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council (U.N. Report of
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Fear, 2004). Those recommendations would
then invite closer work between the two organs, based on the model provided by the

26
management of the Iraqi case in 1991 (Pouëzat, 2005). Indeed, the disarmament of Iraq
quickly had to face a very successful dissimulation system despite the destruction of the
Osirak reactor, which had eventually led to the unilateral decision of the United States to
conduct a military intervention in Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait. Also, Iraqi crisis
management had an impact on the struggle against nuclear proliferation in three domains: (1)
the efficiency of the safeguard mechanisms and control measures facing recalcitrant States;
(2) the potential utility of mass destruction weapons by regional powers seeking dissuasion
means, and (3) the aptitude of the Security Council to secure those weapons after a conflict
(Saint-Mleux, 2004).

2.3 The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

2.3.1 Historical background and negotiations

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter NPT) has emerged from
convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and the United States, in the context of an
emerging détente, and entered into force in 1970. Celebrated as the cornerstone of
international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT is the result of a
mandate provided by the United Nations in 1961. This mandate envisioned an arrangement
between nuclear weapons-States and non-nuclear-armed States made in order to reach a full
worldwide nuclear disarmament (Harries, 2015). Moreover, further developments
underscored the threat of nuclear proliferation, and especially the advances in the technology
of nuclear reactors. Indeed, nuclear reactors could not only produce power, but also
plutonium, which could be potentially diverted for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In
consequence if the diversion of nuclear materials was not prevented by an international
regime, and thereby if a growing number of nations could access nuclear weapon arsenals, it
was believed that the risk of a nuclear war as the result of an accident, miscalculation or
escalation of a regional conflict would exponentially increase.
Therefore, this very short Treaty of only eleven articles aims to prevent nuclear
proliferation. To do so a comprehensive system of international arrangements has been
established to verify States’ compliance with the treaty under the safeguards system of the
IAEA. Indeed article III of the NPT states:

27
 “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set
forth in an agreement to be negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency in
accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Agency’s
safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

Similarly, the NPT provides a legal framework which encourages cooperation among States
for the development of civil nuclear energy such as defined by its Article IV. Thus, here
cooperation is perceived and understood as the best manner to curtail nuclear proliferation for
military purposes, regarding which Article IV states the following:

"All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technologic information
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall
cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to
the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially
in the territories of non-nuclear weapon-States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for
the needs of the developing areas of the world."

Consequently the NPT is the political result of the international debate over how to
manage and constrain the spread of nuclear energy, without suffocating its peaceful civil
potential in the extent that the technologies used to produce nuclear fuel can directly have a
military application (Grotto, 1999). Also in 2015, 185 non-nuclear weapons-States parties to
the Treaty, included those with significant nuclear infrastructures have conducted safeguards
agreements authorizing the IAEA to conduct inspection in order to verify that they are not
producing or diverting fissile materials for weapons (Hibbs, 2015).

2.3.2 The Review Conference of the Parties

The article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) states:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measured relations to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.”

Also since its signature and implementation in 1970, every State Party to the NPT gather in
New York every five year for a review conference, in order to review the operation of the

28
treaty and to what extent the obligations provided by the article VI are respected. This
Review Conference was decided under article VIII of the NPT, which states:

“Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of the Parties to the Treaty
shall be held […] in order to review the operation of this Treaty will a view to assuring that
the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals
of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties of the Treaty may obtain […] the convening
of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.”

2.3.3 Limits and successes of the legal and moral significance of the NPT

Despite few successes such as the permanent extension of the treaty signed at the Review
Conference of 1995, the NPT and its provisions remain weak for several reasons. First of all,
the NPT in itself is highly political; hence some of the provisions negotiated are unclear
regarding their content and scope. For instance, Article VI does not impose in clear terms any
legally binding mechanisms against nuclear proliferation, nor set a timeframe for complete
disarmament (Harries, 2015). In the meantime article II of the treaty does not specifically ban
what can be referred as “preparation for manufacture” of nuclear weapons. That way the NPT
can be interpreted on the basis that, with exception for activities involving the undeclared, or
clandestine production of diversion of uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, any other
research and development pursuits can be considered as peaceful, and then permissible
(Hibbs, 2015).
Moreover States can legally withdraw from the Treaty in the name of a superior national
interest. Here the only case recorded was the withdrawal of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) on January 10, 2003, following American allegations that the
country started to illegally enrich uranium for military purposes. Critics of the NPT might
thus assert that noncompliance is not surprising since States do not view international legal
commitments as real constraints (Fuhrmann & Berejikian, 2012).
Secondly the provisions provided by the NPT make it such that other countries are
expected to develop latent nuclear weapons capacities. Indeed, over sixty States are now
operating or constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and a part of this is the
necessary infrastructures and scientific expertise for the potential militarization of their
nuclear program (Sagan, 1997). Also the relevance of the NPT provisions is based on their
capacity to overcome the unequal bargain they are issued from. Indeed while the nuclear
States agree to grant assistance to exploit the benefits of nuclear energy, the non-nuclear

29
States must accept to have their nuclear freedom – and by extension their sovereign
prerogatives – circumscribed (Tate, 1990). Nonetheless the NPT and its content have to be
put in perspective with the very specific context in which the treaty was signed. The NPT
having many political implications for the signatory States, the very content and its
interpretations are most likely to evolve following the overall international context in terms
of peace and security.
Furthermore one can notice a significant slowing of the post-Cold War stockpiles
reductions. To the contrary, nuclear weapons-States have constantly undertaken their arsenal
modernization that prolongs for an undetermined period the nuclear era, notwithstanding the
fact that the NPT does not place explicit restrictions on modernization. Indeed the complexity
of the development of a nuclear military program implies that short-term candidates for the
“nuclear club” are not numerous. Thus horizontal proliferation progresses slower than
vertical proliferation since the country with a nuclear latency are not necessary willing to rush
into nuclear military affairs (Waltz, 1981). By the same token the treaty in itself has not been
implemented yet and no additional protocol advocating either significant decrease, broader
control or the creation of a Mass Destruction Weapons-free zone in the Middle East have
emerged (Kristensen & Norris, 2014). Consequently many nuclear weapons-States are now
slowing their disarmament process and tend to reject any further reduction for the next five
years.
The P5 – i.e. the five nuclear weapons-States party to the NPT, possess around 98% of
the world’s nuclear weapons (see Figure 1.), therefore despite supposed growing stock in
India, Pakistan and Israel, as well as the conduct of nuclear test in DPRK, the P5 have to
undertake the responsibility to decrease the global number of warheads. Moreover most of
the remaining stockpiles belong to just the United States and the Russian Federation, with
inventories roughly 25 times larger than that of the third largest nuclear weapons-State –
France. Also the overwhelming size of the Russian and American arsenal indicates that they
are predominantly shaped by each other instead of the dispositions of the NPT’s article VI.

30
 Figure 1: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories, 2014

Source: Kristensen H. M. & Norris R. S. (2014). Slowing Nuclear Weapon Reductions and
Endless Nuclear Weapon Modernizations: A Challenge to the NPT. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol.
70(4), 94-107

On the same movement, the NPT can enter in contradiction with the dispositions
provided by an anterior treaty, and here particularly with NATO. Indeed, five non-nuclear
weapons-States are heavily involved in nuclear planning and are equipped to deliver
American nuclear weapons. Although all of those countries have ratified the NPT, neither
their national administration nor NATO have addressed this contradiction, which oppose
directly the article II of the NPT that states the following:

“Each non-nuclear weapons-State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of
control over such weapons or explosives devices directly, or indirectly […].”

Another factor to take into consideration in the analysis of the NPT dispositions is the
presence and influence of the so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group. In that case Matthew
Fuhrmann argues that governments, despite security concerns, have regularly shared with
other countries nuclear materials or expertise for peaceful purposes. Therefore the
membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group can be used by its members as a tool of
economic statecraft to force compliance or limit proliferation by limiting the flow of means.
(Fuhrmann, 2012). Created at the initiative of the United States, the United Kingdom and the
USSR to enforce the NPT, this informal group had the effect that many non-nuclear States
exporting nuclear material embraced the nuclear weapons-States preferences, thus blurring

31
 the lines between roles (Verdier, 2008). Indeed that way members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group are exercising a form of control over the implementation of the NPT through three
incentives: (1) easy access to scientific nuclear technology, explicitly mentioned in Article IV
of the NPT; (2) possible retaliation by the blockade of access to relevant materials and
technologies, and (3) the capacity of the P5, all members of the U.N. Security Council, to
detect cheating and act in response, despite the presence of a true link between the non-
proliferation regime and the United Nations.
The potential of survival of the NPT is underlying the nuclear debate as a whole
(Wilson, 2015). The failure of the Review Conference of the Parties to reach an Agreement in
May 2015 thus provides a good illustration of both the inconsistency of the measures
provided by the Treaty, but also how the international community theoretically approaches
the question of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. However, one needs to envisage as
well the persistence of the non-proliferation regime throughout the years. Indeed this regime,
despite being unequal between its Parties, has persisted for over forty years while increasing
membership during that period (Paul, 2003). Hence there is a need to approach the whole
concept of non-proliferation as an international regime through opposed theories to provide a
better understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of the regime.

3. Theoretical Approach

The study of nuclear weapons control raises the need to address the political demand for
nuclear weapons in the context of increasing international instability, rather than a global
effort to establish safeguards mechanisms and limitations of the existing stockpiles. However,
the literature suggests that international relations theories are contradictory in the way they
approaching or avoid nuclear proliferation and restraints, as enhancers or detractors of
international peace and security. Indeed one can assert a general academic and political
ambivalence toward nuclear weapons, forming together the nuclear debate. On one side, the
pros are estimating that nuclear weapons are serving the greater good in the sense that they
are ensuring international peace and stability. The main argument is the following; since the
Second World War there has been no war between nuclear weapons-States, then nuclear
weapons are decreasing the risk of large-scale conflicts. A widespread view for instance,

32
estimates that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki hastened the end of the Second World
War (Stowell, 1945).
However on the other side, scholars and policy-makers see unilateral drive for nuclear
weapons as destabilizing for international relations. Consequently the core theoretical
approach provided by the academic literature is useful to determine when international
commitments of the non-proliferation regime are credible, and how domestic considerations
can shape foreign policy decisions. Also this study aims to emphasize States as principal
actors of international relations in the context of nuclear proliferation, which are here
considered as rational and unitary actors and which interests are not necessarily conflictual
(Jervis, 1982; Graham & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 20). In the case of nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament, the point is to assess whether the very concept of international regime can be
efficiently applied to issues of national security, and what States see as a threat for their
existence (Jervis, 1982).
Also this study focuses on two different theories, both providing a different answer to the
question of whether non-proliferation regimes have a positive impact on international peace
and security. First of all, the arguments favourable to disarmament and non-proliferation are
embodied by the Regime theory of international relations, which emphasizes the need for
international cooperation to achieve security. Later, arguments stating that international
nuclear regimes are counterproductive find their roots in the Security Dilemma and as sub-
category of the realist approach of international relations, which advocates individualist
positions to build positions of greater strength.
Therefore this study focuses on the mentioned academic approaches because they narrow
the scope in which nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are envisaged by both nuclear
weapons and non-nuclear weapons-States. Indeed the Regime theory first of all provides a
socially constructed approach of the very concept of international regimes and how States
envisage cooperation in the context of their own domestic concerns. Meanwhile, the Security
Dilemma contemplates how States gauge their national security and place in the international
system of States, with regards to their perceived need for weapons of mass destruction.

3.1 The Regime Theory and nuclear non-proliferation

Prior to the main focus dedicated to non-proliferation and disarmament, this section aims
to establish how the mechanisms are constructed in the concept of international regimes. Put

33
simply, the idea of international regimes finds its way in the dichotomy between the realist
theory of international relations where States, living in a constant state of anarchy, pursue
their interests by self-help: and the liberal assumptions pushing toward international
governance (Tate, 1990; Brzoska, 1992). Here then States remain legally sovereign but still
agree on some international standards, associated with the international law concept of
custom. Stephen D. Krasner thus defines international regimes as “implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1982). In the same manner,
John J. Mearsheimer defines regimes and institutions as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways
in which the States should cooperate and compete with each other” (Mearsheimer, 1995).
Therefore, the concept of international regimes seeks to explain the occurrences of
cooperation among States and how this cooperation can mitigate international anarchy, with
an emphasis on addressing and collectively overcoming various issues. Contrary to the main
realist assumption, regime theory emphasizes that States’ interests can be broadly shared
(Bradford, 2007; Hasenclever & al. 1996). Trevor McMorris Tate describes regimes as social
institutions created and used by States to regularize their expectations towards each other by
introducing behaviour norms (Tate, 1990). Hence cooperation in an anarchic world is
possible if, by doing so, shared outcomes are better than unilateralism, as in the belief that
joint action can avoid political failure. In the case of security regimes – such as nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament – cooperation permits nations to restrain aggression, with the
belief that others will reciprocate. Indeed common security is perceived as a greater goal to
achieve because it constitutes a prerequisite for many other things less valuable for the
survival of a State. Consequently an international regime for the regulation of nuclear
weapons is valuable for States since individualistic behaviours are both costly and dangerous.
Therefore, Robert Jervis identified four systemic conditions accounting for the emergence of
an international regime: (1) major powers are willing to establish a regime, which was the
case with the détente during the Cold War; (2) States have to believe that others share the
value of cooperation in the field of security; (3) no State should believe that security can be
achieved better by unilateralism or expansion, and (4) individualistic pursuits must be seen
are too costly (Jervis, 1982).
A good example would be the bombing of Iraqi clandestine facilities in 1991 by the
Israeli air force, followed by the decision of the George Bush’s administration to destroy
Iraq’s nuclear infrastructures during the first Gulf War (Albright & Hibbs, 1991), legitimized
also by the invasion of Kuwait and Iraq’s known interest in acquiring nuclear weapons
34
(Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 294). In the same way, the taken for granted unacceptability of
nuclear weapons can be seen in light of the fact that a majority of States are not living – and
never lived – under a nuclear dilemma, with a question as to whether the weapon shall remain
operational or not. Indeed the vertical development of nuclear weapons and their delivery
means – now able to strike accurately on the intercontinental level – opened an new gap
between what was technically feasible and what was politically usable (Kaysen and al.,
1991), but nuclear proliferation presents several historical anomalies. The most evident is that
a very small number of countries have pursued a military nuclear program before 1968
despite the technical capacities to do so. Take for instance the case of Sweden, which
voluntarily gave up its nuclear program, and this without any new security guarantees or
coercive threats in case of achievement.
Moreover, Daniel Verdier argues that the dyadic interactions at the roots of the non-
proliferation regime are not necessarily incompatible with the build-up of a multilateral
instrument. Indeed the universal scope embodied by non-proliferation and disarmament
allowed the design of an optimal mix of bribes and threats to obtain compliance. Also the
flexibility of the regime permits the customization of its provisions regarding each situation
(with for instance the Additional Protocol of the IAEA), with different degrees of compliance
costs for each State. States with high compliance costs are thus left out of the system but also
punished for non-adherence (Verdier, 2008; Furhmann & Berejikian, 2012; Gerzhoy, 2015).
Besides, powerful States within the security regime (in this case the nuclear weapons-Sates)
shall be reasonably satisfied with the perpetuation of the status quo in terms of nuclear
proliferation, and thus prefer a regulated environment (Jervis, 1982). As Nina Tannenwald
argues, the non-proliferation regime could have been institutionalized since the nuclear
weapons States cannot rely solely on their deterrence capacities (Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 3).
For instance, deterrence does not explain the circumstances under which some non-nuclear
weapon-States have attacked nuclear weapons-States, such as Argentina against England
during the Falklands war in 1982, or China against the United States during the Korean War
(1950-1953). The same way, fear of retaliation cannot be taken into account because no
nuclear weapons have been used since 1945, even when the opponent did not have the
capacity to retaliate – such as the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, or the
invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003.
The increasing loss of legitimacy of wars as a political instrument and their failure to
settle conflicts also questions the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. As
Kaysen, McNamara and Rathjens argued, it became – especially after 1991 – difficult to see
35
any near-term need for such weapons (Kaysen and al., 1991). Indeed these weapons were
developed and deployed firstly in response of the Soviet Union achieving the capacity to
launch an attack against the United States. Therefore the conflicts which have erupted after
1991 hardly posed a serious threat to the security of the recognized nuclear weapons-States
and their allies. In that context self-help, in terms of security matters, lost relevance while
seeing its political costs increasing.
Consequently cooperation can operate in the field of nuclear energy in that extent that
States – seeking for absolute gains of cooperation – can find mutual understanding in the
non-proliferation regime. This was made possible since States have entailed the mutual
acceptance of higher norms as standards of behaviour, due to the potential threats for
international peace and security induced by nuclear proliferation. Also evidence of these
developments towards a comprehensive perception of non-proliferation and disarmament has
to be put in perspective with the historical context in which regimes have been developed to
ensure cooperation and obedience. Indeed major developments in the institutionalization of
regimes occurred during the Cold War, as a manner for the United States and the Soviet
Union to (1) ensure their absolute hegemony in terms of nuclear arsenals and (2) avoid the
spread of weapons which could lead in some cases to more extreme positions. Hence each
side, i.e. nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons-States, has incentives to cooperate.
Consequently the prisoner’s dilemma can be resolved through non-proliferation regimes
insofar as compliance ensures absolute gains, defined by a full access to civil nuclear
technologies and new security guarantees. Indeed contrary to the traditional theoretical
assumption that States choose cooperation in accordance with their preferences, this model
assumes that cooperation could be obtained by shifting the focus of analysis to constraints
(Powell, 1991). A relevant case here concerns the decision of the Swedish Premier Tage F.
Erlander in 1963 to renounce the nuclear option despite the possibilities of his country to
develop its own weapons rather quickly and with low technical constraints. By the same
token, Sweden was the first country to explicitly link its renunciation to the NPT: while
already being at peace with its neighbours and not pursuing any ambition in the nuclear field,
signing the treaty would open the access to foreign fuel or other peaceful applications of atom
fission (Cole, 1997; Verdier 2008).
Furthermore, the whole concept of international monitoring of non-proliferation and
disarmament finds its roots in the signature of normative instruments such as the IAEA’s
Statute, the NPT and all comprehensive agreements signed later on. Indeed, first and
foremost the IAEA carries a mission that cannot be supported by any States: the conduct of
36
intrusive safeguards inspections in the national territory of sovereign States, in accordance
with an international treaty (Tate, 1990). The need for a broader control by an independent
body came from a widely accepted idea that clandestine nuclear programs – such as the one
discovered in Iraq in the early 1990s – were major threats for both neighbouring States
(especially Iran and Israel) and other non-proliferating States.
However one must establish a formal distinction between international regimes and
international organizations. Indeed regimes must be distinguished from international
organizations since they can consist of a broader set of norms and principles that shape
States’ behaviour by introducing a moral element (Bradford, 2007). In that context, the IAEA
is an international organization finding its place in the regime of non-proliferation and
disarmament, itself integrated in the broader collective security regime. By the same token,
the normative content of non-proliferation regime is not only limited to the provisions of the
NPT but encompasses also the IAEA Statute, the CTBT, the Antarctic, Tlatelolco and
Rarotonga Treaties, and so on (Hasenclever & al. 1996).
Therefore the main strength of the non-proliferation regime – through the NPT – is the
willingness of States which have created it to establish an independent organ, deriving both
from States and the U.N. Security Council. It is becoming possible to assume that
international regimes for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are made to design an
optimal regime – of generally commonly accepted principles – with low compliance costs
(Verdier, 2008). Moreover, the functioning of the NPT lies on a comprehensive relations
between the two groups composing the Parties to the treaty: the cartel of recognized nuclear
weapons-States (United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia and France) and the non-
nuclear weapons-States. This technical dichotomy thus involves for the NPT a
complementary approach in the way States envisage it. Here bilateral and multilateral
obligations coexist since they combine nuclear weapons-States’ influence with greater
performance in bargaining processes and coordination (Verdier, 2008; Gerzhoy, 2015). The
same way, nuclear power is uniquely placed in social and economic developments. The
increasing partnerships and interconnectedness between States and firms requires the
availability of resources transcending national borders and competition for the greater good,
according to Sergey Kirienko, director general of the Russian firm Rosatom during the forum
Atomexpo hold in Moscow in June 2015.
The efficiency in the creation of international regimes for nuclear weapons control lies
thus on a balance between retaliation and participation in the treaties – a widespread
normative opprobrium strengthening the tradition of non-use (Tannenwald, 2007, p.5). This
37
balance is important to the extent that it can elicit the participation of individual States with a
high level of compliance due to the sensitive nature of this area of international relations.
Therefore the construction of the NPT can be modelled as a form of bilateral agreement
between nuclear weapons-States (the P5 countries, forming the nuclear cartel) and non-
nuclear weapons-States, taking the form of a combination of three instruments: (1) a
multilateral treaty, (2) bilateral incentives embodied by how nuclear-weapons States face
compliance with their allies or rivals and (3) an international condemnation of
nonparticipation (Verdier, 2008). Consequently States tend to believe that international
regimes are worth preserving, in accordance with their national best interests, because of the
unforgiving nature of the issues involved (Tate, 1990).
Regime theory questions nations’ behaviours in potential conflict generated situations.
This theory can easily argue that, beyond technical matters such as scientific expertise (in
terms of nuclear physics, uranium chemistry etc.) and relevant infrastructures, the political
costs of developing a military nuclear program are too high and thus deter countries from
doing so (Wallace, 1979; Diehl, 1983). Consequently States may choose abstention in their
will to develop a military nuclear program due to international moral constraints over their
executive authority. Consequently, I derive the following hypothesis from Regime theory
concerning the role and effectiveness of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes:

H1: “Nuclear weapons are introducing such a moral hazard that they mainly account
for the emergence of rule-based cooperation institutions in the international system.”

However unilateral actions are preferred in the realist perspective, since they allow building
stronger positions whilst regimes call for mutual restraints and political limitations, which
can be easily diverted.

3.2 The Realist theory: Security Dilemma dynamics and nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament

The realist theory, in a broad sense, describes international relations as an anarchic

system in which States employ self-help to maximize their gains and security. Also this
section aims to focus on the realist approach of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
by narrowing the emphasis around one sub-concept of realism: the Security Dilemma. Indeed

38
in the scope of the study of regimes’ efficiency, it seems necessary to focus on more precise
concepts related to nuclear capabilities instead of a broad approach of States’ security.
The study of the Security Dilemma requires first of all defining security as an
international relations concept. To do so, this study relies on the definition provided by
Steven Stampson in his chapter From Kanun to Capacity-building, the “Internationals”,
Civil Society Development and Security in the Balkans. Security is the perception of
capacities and threats linked to the factors which cause a person, a group or a State to see
their environment as insecure (Stampson, 2003). Also this idea of perceived threat is
particularly relevant in the case of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the
Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Israel) and South Asia (China, Pakistan, India). The Security
Dilemma thus addresses here the persistence of regional conflicts and the sources of
insecurity (who is threatening whom?), and how nuclear weapons are seen as being able to
improve peace and security.
After 1945, the fear of a new World War was compounded only by the development of
nuclear technology and the spread of nuclear weapons (Rauchhaus, 2009). Also the
appearance of nuclear weapons and the potential of destruction they encompass was
accompanied with a new form of dilemma: peace could apparently be imposed and
maintained by the possession, and the threat to use, weapons which could produce thousands
of casualties in an instant (Lewis, 2006). Indeed, although the Cold War produced many
proxy conflicts, especially in the developing world, it never managed to escalate to a Third
World War. Since nuclear weapons raise the possibility of complete annihilation of one's
population and resources, gains of a nuclear conflict cannot be high enough to risk it (Waltz,
1981).
Therefore a general tempering effect emerged progressively due to the very existence of
grossly destructive arsenals, which could discourage some particularly unpleasant action
taken by a potential opponent. In consequence, nuclear weapons find their utility, not in the
“ordinary sense of the word”, but because it can moderate the behaviour of States in conflict.
There is thus still a strong appeal in the idea that the bomb should weight whenever it can
help (Bundy, 1991).
The Security Dilemma, in the frame of nuclear proliferation, is a term associated with the
neorealist approach of international relations, which explains that States are living in a
constant state of anarchy. Therefore the regimes provided by the IAEA and the NPT showed
little efficiency in the extent that States’ interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither
side thinks it has much to gain from compliance (Mearsheimer, 1995). From that perspective,
39
the model emphasizes the existence of a dangerous relation between an increased weapons
arsenal (of whatever nature) and war. Nevertheless in the case of the development of nuclear
capacities, both civil and military can be seen whether as deterrence, factor of peace; or
provocation, thus enhancing the risk of the outbreak of a violent conflict (Diehl, 1983). The
Security Dilemma thus assumes that proliferation is inevitable considering the perpetual state
of defiance countries have toward each other. Therefore international regimes monitoring
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament show little efficiency for several reasons. First,
from the realist perspective, unilateral actions are preferred since they allow building stronger
positions without any political restraints. Moreover, the formation of regimes is intrinsically
linked to States’ beliefs and preferences with regards to their security. That way States may
decide not to comply because of the fear that another would violate what is considered a
common understanding (Jervis, 1982). For instance, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East
occurred due to a perpetual defiance of each actor toward another.
Nevertheless understanding the root causes of nuclear proliferation help to provide a
better interpretation of both subjective (for instance Shia-Sunni conflict as theological
philosophical concept in the Middle East) and objective (nuclear triad in South Asia
embodied by India, Pakistan and China) factors, but also the perceptions of an external threat
(why this neighbour, this State can be a threat for another?). Also this section aims to address
the need for an increase of attention on why some States decide to develop nuclear weapons
or not rather than technical and legal constraints (Sagan & al, 2010, pp.84). In the case of
conventional arms proliferation, the quest for nuclear weapons can be motivated by its role as
an “equalizer” (for instance the overwhelming superiority of India over Pakistan in terms of
conventional forces) (Forsberg and al. 1995, pp. 100; Stampson 2003). Therefore
proliferation can be characterized as the result of a broad Prisoner’s Dilemma, played out
between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons States engaged in localized rivalries (Verdier,
2008).
States rely on self-help to enhance their national security, especially in the case where a
rival is developing a nuclear weapons capacity. This position, according to Scott Sagan, thus
leads to two policies: (1) strong States will do what they can. In other words, they will pursue
a policy of developing their own nuclear weapons despite the economic and political costs of
such decisions. (2) Weak States will, in a general way, do what they must by entering in
alliances to enjoy an extended deterrence (Sagan, 1997). This policy is found for instance in
Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, due to the nuclearization and the aggressive rhetoric of
its neighbour the DPRK, but also in the case of Taiwan, against the People’s Republic of
40
China. Indeed the three countries not having the capacity (Taiwan) or incentive (Japan, South
Korea) to develop their own nuclear arsenal, they rely on the protection offered by the United
States. Similarly the non-proliferation regime, embodied by the IAEA and the NPT, are
raising the question of security guarantees for non-nuclear weapons-States. Indeed this is
despite some negative security guarantees formulated for instance by the United States in
1978 (ACDA, 1978b) such as the following:

“The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons-State party
to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear
explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed
forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapons State or associated with a
nuclear-weapons State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.”

Some non-nuclear weapons-States will still seek to ensure their own security and reduce
their vulnerability to nuclear threats (Tate, 1990). Therefore, the Security Dilemma raises the
simple explanation that proliferation begets proliferation. For instance, peaceful nuclear
cooperation can create incentives for State to proliferate, since it reduces the expected costs
of such technological development, especially when the concerned countries are engaged in
military disputes with others. Hence once can easily assume that nuclear assistance increases
the likelihood that countries will develop nuclear weapons as their security environment
worsens (Furhmann, 2009).
Consequently the theory assumes that international regimes provide very little comfort to
non-nuclear weapons-States, which are pointing out the permeability of the NPT and the
difficulties the U.N. Security Council have to reach a consensus in terms of disarmament.
This feeling is also reinforced by a tacit acknowledgement that no nuclear weapons-States
would risk an escalation by aiding another country threatened by a nuclear weapon-States
(Tate, 1990). The same way, the non-proliferation regime does not transcend national
particularities but reflects egoistic interests and strategic calculations of States, which seek
their own security through compliance. Here the Ukrainian conflict – initiated in November
2013, is particularly evocative of the difficult relations between the deterrence of three of
NATO member-States and the Russian arsenal. Indeed in May 2015, several newspapers
alleged that Russia was installing nuclear weapons in Crimea, while the United States were
accused of transporting weapons in the United Kingdom and Eastern Europe (Interfax Russia
and CIS Military Newswire, 2015; Sputnik News Service, 2015; ITAR-TASS World Service,
2015; Schmitt & Lee Myers, The New York Times, 2015).

41
 The security dilemma also assumes that regimes do not provide a sound basis for
promoting international peace and security, and cooperation is often jeopardized by the
confrontation of relative gains issued by cooperation. International cooperation thus in the
security and nuclear realm shows a very limited utility due to distributive issues between
nuclear weapons-States and non-nuclear weapons-States (Mearsheimer, 1995). That way the
IAEA and the NPT cannot address nuclear proliferation with real efficiency due the unequal
balance of costs and gains of compliance for each State to ensure its security. This statement
can thus be verified because, contrary to the assumption of institutionalism theories, States’
interests do not concord when related to nuclear capacities due to difference in States’ utility
(Powell, 1991). A good illustration can be provided by the acceleration of nuclear programs
in North Korea and Iran after withdrawal of the security guarantees provided by the Russian
government in 1991 (Huntley, 2006; Verdier, 2008).
In addition, due to the enormous potential of destruction of nuclear weapons, a balancing
of capacities can potentially reduce the risk of conflicts. This approach is valid for instance in
the case of the dispute between India and Pakistan since 1947 over the Indian provinces of
Kashmir and Jammu. Indeed, every time a State develops nuclear capacities to balance
against the conventional arsenal of another, it creates an incentive for the aforesaid rival to
initiate its own program to maintain its own security. Hence decision-makers find themselves
in a situation of self-deterrence, bearing in mind the costs of initiating a nuclear exchange,
especially if the conflict starts by a conventional attack (Kraig, 1999).
Therefore decision-makers need to consider the consequences of potential retaliation,
which implies two possibilities: (1) to avoid further escalation, the conflict opposing the main
parties is diverted toward a peripheral region. It is for instance the case of the Korean War
(1950-1953) underlying in the roots of the installation of the East-West divide. And (2)
nuclear symmetry will contribute to the preservation of the status quo stability, since an
escalation would be perceived as an irrational choice. In other words, nuclear weapons
following the precepts developed by the Nuclear Peace theory are used only for deterrence
and even a small nuclear component can ensure its successful implementation. Therefore the
nuclear balance is neither delicate nor unstable, which implies that proliferation by additional
countries does not necessarily represent a danger for international peace and security (Kraig,
1999).

42
H2: “Nuclear deterrence provides such security guarantees for their possessors that
international control can be counter-productive for an enhancement of international
peace and security.”

The theoretical approach of the relations between disarmament, non-proliferation, and

violent conflicts provides competing interpretations of the role of the limitation of weapons
of mass destruction. Consequently opposing the previous mentioned hypothesis, the null
hypothesis would be the following:

H0: “It is impossible to assess the credibility of nuclear deterrence, thus disarmament
and non-proliferation have no effect on the breakout of violent conflicts since 1945.”

43
PART II: THE QUALITATIVE APPROACH

1. Methodology

The methodology applied in this part is based on the Rational Actor Model and realist
approach of international relations, following the model provided in 1999 by Michael R.
Kraig, which sees nation-States as unitary actors, with clear preferences and choices that
follow the optimal alternative through elementary strategic calculations (Kraig, 1999).
According to Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, rationality can then be summarized such
as follows:

“[Rationality] assumes nothing about the content of the actor’s objectives, only that whatever
those objectives, the actor has reviewed all the alternatives and accurately assesses all
consequences in making the value-maximizing choice.” (Graham & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 20)

Therefore this study tends toward using States and their domestic organization as the
relevant unit of analysis. Also here States are perceived as unified, with a coherent utility
function, which acts in relations to threats and opportunities in order to maximize the value of
a potential outcome. Indeed since nuclear weapons assuredly involve a high level of
destructions, their existence pertains to their deterrence capacity and a potential utilization of
the level of rationality of decision-makers. Thus the qualitative analysis of this study can be
based on a game-theoretical approach to assert the efficiency of non-proliferation and
disarmament regimes over conflict regulation, but also the strategic interactions underlying
nuclear proliferation in specific case-studies.
Also this methodology is useful here since it provides a framework to answer the
following questions: what threats and opportunities arise for the actors (e.g. the balance of
conventional or strategic nuclear forces)? What is the utility function of both non-
proliferation regimes and nuclear proliferation (survival in a hostile environment, power
maximization etc.)? And finally what are the best choices to maximize the influence of non-
proliferation regimes against actors’ objectives (Graham & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 27)?
The matter is to analyse the nuclear policy of specific dyads, in their overall conduct of
foreign affairs, instead of a singular development. Indeed, this study assumes that nuclear
proliferation should not be analysed as an epiphenomenon of the post-war period but as a
component of an overall conduct of political and military affairs, which have known several
44
revolutions in terms of arms systems. That way, defiance regarding the nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament regime should not be separated from the manner States
comprehend their environment, and especially their security. Consequently, this study takes
the side to ignore the role of non-State actors – such as terrorist groups – in its analysis of
nuclear weapons control. In relations to nuclear non-proliferation, the role of non-State actors
might indeed lack relevance due to the complexity of the acquisition process, compared to the
use of guerrilla means, having the same psychological effect over populations and
governments. Indeed one can consider that it is not the magnitude of the potential destruction
that generates fear but the uncertainty of an attack. Consequently the link that can be
established between nuclear proliferation and terrorism is not the risk that a group can
potentially have access to nuclear devices, but rather the support offered by some States to
terrorist groups that can enhance proliferation.
Therefore the search for development or acquisition of nuclear weapons must be put
in perspective not only with the level of coercion States are facing, but also with how States
are managing their conventional forces. For instance Pakistan and India are in parallel
expending their tactical nuclear forces since both countries are imprisoned since the late
1940s in a conflict which conditions their foreign policy. The same way, the recurrent
political and ideological crises known over the years by the Middle East countries have
created an incentive to enhance military capacities, not only limited to seeking nuclear
weapons, since most of those countries are both part of the NPT and members of the IAEA.
Moreover, this section – in order to understand the political implications of both nuclear
proliferation and non-proliferation - aims to focus on (1) the current academic literature on
the matter and (2) Open Sources resources, based mainly on stories covered by the press.
Here the interest of Open Sources relies on the diversity of sources available worldwide,
providing a singular variety of opinions, sometimes helpful to identity evolutions in the non-
proliferation regime over time.
Consequently, the qualitative section of this study aims to establish whether a
strategic control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons has affected (1) the decision-
making process leading to proliferation (2) the outbreak of violent conflict in nuclear
weapons-States out of the NPT and in States with a true latent capability to develop a military
program. Therefore the qualitative analysis is useful to the extent that it allows to study
intentions through past historical events. Indeed, this analysis can assess the political choices
that have led or not to the development of nuclear weapons, and how the environment of the
relevant States influences compliance with the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.
45
2. Strategic approach of nuclear weapons’ elimination

A predominant tendency in the study of nuclear proliferation is assuming that

international factors, such as external threats to a State’s security, drive efforts to reach the
nuclear threshold. Therefore one can presume that values and ideas derived from the non-
proliferation and disarmament regime are merely derivative of main actors’ capabilities and
political interests. Therefore the normative content of the non-proliferation and disarmament
regime can be seen as of merely rhetorical consequence (Barletta, 1997), and the elimination
of nuclear weapons can be achieved through a strategic approach of the main aspects creating
an incentive for proliferation.

2.1 International security improvements

The post-Cold War era opened the way for new types of conflicts, which were very
unlikely to occur in the context of the bipolar world. Therefore in the interest on the
preservation of the non-proliferation regime, States must continue the path of delegitimizing
war and unilateral use of force. This would thus require the nuclear weapons-States to do
better than they have done so far to stabilize the situation in the Middle East or elsewhere, not
only with the conflicts in themselves and their aftermaths, but also with underlying causes
(Kayen and al., 1991). Also one can consider that nuclear non-proliferation regimes have
emerged in the aftermaths of major upheavals (such as the military dictatorships in South
America) or in order to avoid the escalation of a conflict (such as the signature of the NPT
and the SALT agreements between the United States and the USSR) (Soligen, 1994).
Consequently one approach toward a complete elimination of nuclear weapons needs to
apprehend proliferation not as a cause of conflict but rather as a consequence of instability.
To deter States from a weapons’ acquisition path, scholars and practitioners should focus
on the manner in which the development of a program is politically justified. Indeed a certain
number of demand-side considerations are relevant to explain nuclear proliferation. They
may include States’ security environments, international and domestic policies, or any other
intangible and symbolic motivations (Furhmann, 2009). In his article Alliance Coercion and
Nuclear Restraint, How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions
(2015), Gene Gerzhoy emphasizes the importance of security guarantees as an inhibiting

46
effect over proliferation. In countries facing a risk for their national security, Gerzhoy
explains that military dependence would spur “client States” to seek nuclear weapons. Hence
the need for the “Patron State” to (1) provide promises of protection, but also (2) employ
coercive threats of abandonment for nuclear restraints. In his article, Gerzhoy focuses on the
case of West Germany facing the Soviet threat, however the same logic can be applied to
every military threatened State with the material resources to build nuclear weapons
(Gerzhoy, 2015).
In the case of the Middle East, the development of an Iranian or Iraqi nuclear program
answers to the volatility of the region. For Iran, the Arab Spring has presented new
opportunities but also new challenges, which in the long term could threaten its security. In a
general way, the deterioration of the situation in Syria and neighbouring Iraq and the
incubation of terrorism have brought a growing Shia-Sunni sectarian tinge to regional
conflict, and Iran finds itself on the “wrong side” of that fight in many countries (Kagan and
al., 2012). Hence a growing will to secure its national territory through its nuclear program.
Therefore international negotiations over the nuclear program should avoid imagining Iranian
nuclear activities as isolated from Iran’s undertakings in other arenas.
However one can notice major historical variations in the manner States understood their
security (especially NATO members under the American umbrella, and Japan and the ROK,
facing China and the DPRK), since the United States was generally committed equally on
both sides. Therefore coercion, when the pressure leverage is low, cannot be the sole tool to
deter proliferation – hence the need for an improvement of mediation efforts in conflicts and
restrained access to the relevant technologies.

2.2 Trade Control and Limited Access to Knowledge

Since the “Atoms for Peace” speech, the level of nuclear cooperation has significantly
increased with around 3000 agreements signed under the provisions of the NPT since 1970,
according to James F. Keeley (Keeley, 2009). However even if the intentions are peaceful,
nuclear cooperation can partially explain nuclear weapons acquisition attempts and programs
onset. Indeed, while historically nuclear weapons program were based on national
capabilities to produce fissile material, this material may also be imported (Carlson, 2015).
Also the efforts of the international community to promote peace and security by the spread
of civil nuclear technology have largely backfired. Indeed legal nuclear trade conducted

47
under the auspices of the NPT can facilitate the development of weapons by reducing the
costs of development or improving confidence of the decision-makers, hence the need for a
strengthening of the treaties’ dispositions (Furhmann, 2009).
The objective of this effort is thus to emphasize interdicting overtly or covertly transfers
of equipment and know-how to countries presenting a risk of proliferation, which would
directly enhance their weapon production capability (Perkovich, 2003).
Also Scott D. Sagan emphasizes the necessity to focus on what he calls the ‘diffusion
effect’, as an attempt to understand whether knowledge of how to construct nuclear explosive
devices has spread over time and influenced nuclear proliferation (Sagan & al, 2010, pp. 89).
In the meantime, some multinational initiatives have been taken to restrain the transfer of
nuclear technology or nuclear-related materials to aspiring nuclear-weapons States. It is the
case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, founded in 1974 after the first Indian nuclear test, or
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which aims to control the spread of delivery
systems capable of projecting weapons of mass destruction.

Table 2: Multilateral Export Control Regime for Dual-Use Goods

Export Control Date of
Primary Purpose
Regime Foundation
Zangger Seeks to interpret the article III.2 of the NPT 1971
Committee
Nuclear Suppliers Seeks the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through 1974
Group control on sensitive nuclear-related materials
Australia Group Seeks to stop spread of chemical and biological 1985
weapons through controls on certain chemicals,
biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological
manufacturing facilities and equipment.
Missile Seeks to control the proliferation of complete rocket 1987
Technology systems and unmanned air vehicle systems (such as
Control Regime cruise missiles, drones etc.) able to deliver weapons of
mass-destruction
Wassenaar Seeks to control transfers of conventional arms and 1995
Arrangement dual-use goods and technologies, by promoting
transparency and responsibility
Source: Dill C. B. & Stewart I. J. (2015). The Strategic Trade Review
MTCR Website – http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html
Wassenaar Arrangement Website – http://www.wassenaar.org/links/index.html

However, Catherine B. Dill and Ian J. Stewart, in an article for the Strategic Trade
Review, emphasize the importance of distinguishing the different components of supply-side

48
non-proliferation controls, namely Strategic Export Controls, Strategic Trade Controls, and
Export Controls Regimes. Indeed, those definitions are aimed to change some perceptions
that export controls are made to limit access to technological growth or other benefits of
nuclear energy in other countries (Dill & Stewart, 2015). Similarly, one needs to assess the
legal regime provided by both the United Nations – especially in its Resolution 1540 – and
the NPT in its Article III. 2, in terms of international legal basis for trade regulation. Indeed,
in order to avoid any disruption of legitimate trade, practitioners had to provide an extensive
definition of international controls, while encompassing as many elements as possible.
Therefore the term “strategic” can be understood to refer to single and dual-use items or their
means of production intended for or with utility for nuclear proliferation, and the three phases
of non-proliferation controls can be summarized as such in the following table:

Table 3: Definitional elements of supply-side non-proliferation controls

Strategic Trade Strategic Trade
Export Controls
Controls Management
Export   
Import 
Transit/Trans-
 
shipment
Extraterritorial  
Trade promotion 
Finance
Shipping
Industry
  
Outreach/Engagement
Source: Dill C. B. & Stewart I. J. (2015). The Strategic Trade Review

However, in another article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Stewart
discusses broader implications of nuclear export control regimes related to their governance.
Indeed among many issues raised by export controls, a new challenge emerges: the question
of globalization. On the one hand, the globalization process has not substantially resulted in a
spread of the manufacturing base for proliferation-sensitive and dual-use goods, but on the
other, the volume of goods shipped – and transhipped – has increasing significantly over the
two last decades. Online platforms and others factors are transforming the trading landscape
and the very nature of supply chains by making it possible for anyone to serve as a
middleman in proliferation transactions. Therefore those new challenges exacerbate the need
to tackle illicit trade by non-State actors (Stewart, 2015).

49
 2.3 Reversals of National Policies

If the dispositions of the NPT and the safeguards mechanisms of the IAEA are useful to
deter countries to proliferate upstream of the creation of a nuclear program, some countries
have decided to give up on their nuclear weapons programs without any external constraints.
Also recent rollbacks in their nuclear weapons program occurred in Argentina, Brazil, South
Africa, Iraq (albeit involuntarily), which follow decisions in earlier decades by Sweden,
South Korea, and Taiwan to halt the militarization of their nuclear program. Such reversals
do not have however an absolute value and are themselves reversible, as exemplified by the
case of the DPRK, which has acceded the NPT in 1985 but never came into compliance, to
eventually withdraw in 2003 (Forsberg and al, 1995, pp. 98).
The same way, some States or groups of States may decide on their own initiative to ban
the presence of nuclear weapons on their territory. An historical example is the case of
Central Asian territories after their independence from Russia between 1994 and 1996. Later
on in 2006, Kazakhstan and several other Central Asian countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) will join into a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty banning
the use, development, or deployment of such weapons in their territories. The decision of
those countries to forsake their claims on nuclear weapons finds its roots in extended
deterrence provided by Russia: the same way as membership to NATO has incited States to
abandon their nuclear programs. A significant case is Sweden, which has developed
considerable nuclear expertise in the 1950-60s by the construction of nuclear power plants,
while conducting substantial efforts for weapon design and manufacture (Cole, 1997).
In the case of Sweden, the protection granted by the NATO nuclear weapon-States has
influenced the country on whether it should pursue its own military program (Tsukamoto &
al, 2009). The same way, others like Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, or Japan have seen their
security concerns addressed better by alliance with the United States. In the case of a country
like Brazil, a sudden reversal in its military nuclear program occurred for two main reasons:
(1) the return to democracy in 1985 and (2) in a more limited way, the severe economic
conditions that made the 1980s a lost decade for Latin American countries (Barletta, 1997).
Indeed the Brazilian experience shows that more than an external influence, domestic
political struggles at the end of the military junta shaped the reversal of this policy, and
demonstrated the different political choice in yielding the nuclear option.
To those extents, nuclear deterrence worked. Nevertheless, even though countries like
Sweden or even Japan clearly have the technical capability to acquire weapons, the

50
 improvement of the non-proliferation regime happened in a way that possible advantages of
possession were outweighed by the political costs (Kaysen and al., 1991).

3. Discussion of historical case studies

The theoretical approach and its associated hypothesis can be easily be confirmed or
refuted by the study of significant cases at different time periods. Consequently, if the
empirical analysis of those cases is useful to understand the international relations underlying
disarmament and non-proliferation, the focus is too narrow to establish a real correlation
between disarmament and non-proliferation and international peace and security. Therefore
the qualitative approach of disarmament and non-proliferation related to conflict provides an
historical and political framework in which policies towards the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons – as factor of international peace and security – have been implemented
through the years.
Three specific cases will be discussed here, having seen their relevance in the analysis
of every aspect of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: (1) the P5 countries, as
recognized nuclear weapons-States, which are raising concerns over the efficiency of
disarmament; (2) India and Pakistan, whose nuclear vertical proliferation increases instability
in South Asia; and (3) the Middle East, in which the relations between Israel, Saudi Arabia
and Iran added to the overall instability of the region – provide the political conditions for
horizontal proliferation. This study in its totality assumes that an historical contextualization
of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament over time provides more nuances in the
analysis than a simple quantitative data analysis. Also in the study of non-proliferation
regimes reported to peace and security, multiple case studies are useful to the extent that they
help to determine what is unique to a case and what is common in the class of events, in order
to avoid historical generalization (Achen & Snidal, 1989).
Therefore this section – by comparing how nuclear non-proliferation regimes were
implemented or not in different regions – approaches the conditions in which a regime has
emerged. Indeed, proliferation should be not seen only as a single end (Montgomery &
Sagan, 2009), hence a focus in this section over the process by which countries have moved
closer to or away from developing the bomb. In that sense the qualitative study is valuable

51
since it allows highlighting different forms of States’ behaviours toward the non-proliferation
regime, and whether it can be institutionalized in different situations (Soligen, 1994).

3.1 The P5 countries and international non-proliferation regimes over time

3.1.1 Nuclear energy within the block logic (1945-1991)

The post-war balance of power reflects the level of a nation’s scientific development, and
can be slightly threatened by entirely domestic developments. Indeed, nothing could have
revitalized Soviet military capacities more than the breaking of the U.S. nuclear monopoly in
1949 (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 160). The relations between the United States, the Soviet Union,
and their respective allies between 1945 and 1991 are thus used here to understand the
concept and impacts of a nuclear arms race. According to Paul F. Diehl, an arms race of
whatever nature (conventional or weapons of mass destruction) is commonly defined as a
process involving competing interactions between two or more actors and manifested by a
rapid increase of military expenses and weaponry (Diehl, 1983).
Moreover, this part aims to assert why and how the United States and the Soviet Union
have apprehended deterrence, in the frame of both the East-West divide, but also having seen
the relations sustained with their respective blocks. Indeed, if the question in the Soviet
Union was relatively simple due to the domination of Moscow, the extended deterrence of
Washington over its NATO allies did not prevent France and the United Kingdom from
developing an independent nuclear capacity, and this before the signature of the NPT
(Gerzhoy, 2015).
The mastering of the atom allows a certain strategic independence and the insurance of a
dominating position in international relations. The case of France and the development of its
nuclear doctrine is particularly revealing of that position. Indeed the governments of both the
4th and the 5th Republic, being conscious of the rout of the Second World War, have strove to
restore the position of France as a great power through its nuclear capacities. At first glance,
the will of France to develop its nuclear program came also from the perceived necessity of
overcome any rearmament of Germany, though it was still divided (Cesari, 2013, pp. 179).
On the other hand, the traditional European balance of power being seriously questioned
due to the two world wars and the development of NATO – nuclear weapons were used to
some extent as a psychological element against the military domination of the United States.

52
Therefore the establishment of non-proliferation regimes in the late 1950s reflects two sets of
power balancing: the nuclear balance between the United States and the USSR and the
internal balance within NATO (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 90).

3.1.2 The post-Cold War period

At the end of the Cold War, Communism lost all its appeal and the Soviet State, despite
possessing a formidable arsenal of nuclear and conventional forces, lost the political
coherence to risk an external conflict. In that context, the positions of the P5 countries had to
evolve again.
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus on one hand have returned their stockpile to Russia,
while NATO on the other has modified its strategic concept in 2010 and 2012, reaffirming
the Alliance as a nuclear alliance, which will continue to rely on its nuclear weapons as long
as they exist (Kristensen & Norris, 2014). Also as seen previously, about half of the bombs
present in Europe are meant to be delivered by the national aircrafts of five non-nuclear
weapons-States: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, all parties to the
NPT. Hence a progressive shift from a bilateral hegemonic regime, with compartmentalized
dyadic relations submitted to very specific obligations, toward a multilateral regime,
characterized by its universality (Verdier, 2008).
In the long run, the United States and the Russian Federation will have to choose between
having a large nuclear arsenal and preventing others from developing or acquire their own.
The imperatives of the Cold War becoming irrelevant, the disintegration of the Soviet Union
has fostered a new level of cooperation between the nuclear weapons-States, and in a more
precise way between the United States and Russia (Forsberg and al. 1995, pp. 97). Nuclear
energy has found new utilization with a greater shift from military to civil applications at the
end of the Cold War. Also the Megatons to Megawatts program – completed successfully
between 1993 and 2013 – provide the best example of the peaceful development of the
nuclear industry. Indeed this program, as an agreement between the United States and Russia,
permitted the conversion of Soviet-era military warheads into fuel for U.S. nuclear power
plants. Since the disintegration of the USSR, nuclear materials declared as surplus by the
United States and Russia are now converted into fuel for civil and commercial purposes, as a
major development for the two countries in their approach to nuclear energy (World Nuclear
Association, 2014).

53
 Nevertheless the academic study of non-proliferation and disarmament needs to
emphasize great shifts in the balance of power, from bipolarity to multipolarity, with strong
effects on the international regimes. Indeed once deprived from the authority of the Soviet
Union and, to a lesser extent, the United States, proliferation regimes lose in reliability facing
a widely proliferated world. In consequence it becomes more and more difficult to establish
who is deterring whom and by which calculations (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 160). The same ways,
after the Cold War, the nuclear threat has changed in its very own nature. Indeed, it does not
concern the ideological stakes of the two superpowers, but rather seeks to avoid the diffusion
of nuclear weapons to non-State actors or warlike nations (Debouzy, 1997).
Therefore, with regards to the manner the United States and the Russian Federation are
approaching nuclear dissuasion, the main question is how to formulate a theory of deterrence,
having seen the transformations of the international system, both organizational and
operational. Indeed, in the context of the post-Cold War era, nuclear weapons can be seen as
remains of a historically past situation. Moreover, once need to consider the maintenance
costs of nuclear weapons, often too expensive for armies that need a complete restructuring to
adapt to new geostrategic realities. Therefore the impact of nuclear dissuasion – as a
relatively recent political concept – held principally because it had conditioned the relations
East/West for half a century. Also the military dimension of the relations between Moscow
and Washington is now residual, having seen the transformations of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact after the German reunification (Debouzy, 1997). Thus one needs to establish, in a widely
proliferating world, if nuclear dissuasion was only circumstantial, or to the contrary, might
have a deeper meaning than an answer to an immediate and geographically circumscribed
threat.

3.2 India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri question: Nuclear Deterrence in Developing
Countries

The Cold War defined the current management of the non-proliferation and disarmament
regimes in light of the explosive nature of the relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Indeed those relations were characterized by a mixture of strong political
antagonism and massive nuclear stockpiles. Therefore, even though hostility in countries less
affected by the block logic could be as virulent, it never or hardly involved the prospect a
nuclear attack. The first nuclear bomb test carried out by India in 1974 under the code name
Smiling Buddha changed that precisely because the animosity between India and Pakistan

54
was not inherent to the Cold War (although it had a significant impact), but rather by the
manner those States constructed themselves as independent political entities around the
Kashmiri question after their decolonization (Oren, 1994), and more recently due to the
conflict in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the matter is to defend its duty to integrate a
majoritarian Muslim population to the geographical area it is “supposed” to belong to; while
for India, it is about showing that membership to the India Union cannot be based on
religious considerations (Cordonnier, 2002).

3.2.1 Historical context of the relations between India and Pakistan

The conflict opposing India and Pakistan over the Indian regions of Kashmir and
Punjab since 1947 – following the situation created by the Cold War – emphasizes the role of
nuclear symmetry as a factor of relative stability. Here the strength of this argument lays on
the certainty of mutual destruction, which nuclear weapons guarantee (Lewis, 2006), and
which has led to the signature of several bilateral agreements. Consequently the question of
nuclear proliferation in South Asia – and noncompliance to the non-proliferation and
disarmament regimes – must be understand in the frame of the dynamic of international
violence between the two States. The starting point of nuclear proliferation in South Asia can
be found as the result of a large-scale prisoner’s dilemma played out between two countries
engaged in local dyadic rivalries (Verdier, 2008). Indeed the positions of India and Pakistan
remain intransigent over the question of Kashmir and Punjab, and could eventually escalate
into a new large scale confrontation, after the wars of 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999.
Also the nuclearization of the conflict between India and Pakistan starts with three
determinant factors that have brought the risk of a nuclear war in South East Asia and have
embodied the relations between the two countries since 1945: (1) the creation of the United
Nations in 1945 as a recasting of nations and relations between nations; (2) the demonstration
of the destruction of which nuclear weapons are capable after the bombing of Japan, and
finally (3) the disastrous partition of British India into the modern States of India and
Pakistan, thus splitting apart a region that had been united for centuries. Therefore repeated
clashes between the two countries, as well as the unresolved question of Kashmir, led to
several full-scale wars, followed by ceasefires and repeated skirmishes despite any
diplomatic or military initiatives.
However, contrary to the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union,
which resulted in proxy wars, several factors may tip the balance to a risk of nuclear war

55
 between India and Pakistan. These factors are the following: (1) the contiguity of territories
between the two countries and their associated territorial dispute over the region of Kashmir
and Punjab; (2) terrorism, both nationalist and Islamic and the relative political instability of
Pakistan; (3) the nuclear doctrines of both countries pledging for massive retaliation in case
of attack, and finally (4) the strategic and technologic developments of each country in terms
of delivery systems, which can be analysed as an arm race, or vertical proliferation. The
conflict over Kashmir, thus, impeaches any impassionate and pragmatic relation between the
two nations. Also each State uses its position as proof of its nation’s culmination: the way it
was constructed after its independence. However in the case of Pakistan, the Kashmir
question assumes a very particular aspect in the political life of the country. Indeed, any
Pakistani leader cannot take the risk of forsaking this cause without taking the risk of being
immediately dismissed (Cordonnier, 2002).
The nuclearization of the conflict between India and Pakistan started historically with
the last full-scale war between the two countries in 1971, and which ended with the
independence of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Despite the signature in the following year
of an agreement between Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto – the so-called Shimla
Agreement – the situation never de-escalated and eventually led to the first nuclear test of
India in 1974. Moreover this agreement established the Line of Control (LoC) as a
militarized de facto border between the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of Kashmir, but
also drew the lines to some extent for a potential normalization of the countries’ relations. In
point of fact, the Shimla Agreement states that:

“The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries
put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work
for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable
peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and
energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people. In order to achieve this
objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:
[…] Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border; in
Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971,
shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized positions of either side.”

However this first attempt to reach an agreement was short lived after the controverted
execution of Bhutto in 1979 and the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. Also since 1986, five
majors crises with a potential nuclear dimension occurred in the sub-continent, with each time a
greater risk of escalation as Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities became overt status (Fitzpatrick,
2014, pp. 51).

56
 The first event recorded here is the Brasstacks Crisis, which took place between 1986 and
1987, and which refers to a military exercise conducted by India in Rajasthan, in the midst of
India’s growing concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear capacities and alleged support of the
insurrection in Kashmir. Also this exercise was the largest military manoeuvre operated in South
East Asia since the Second World War, and was similar to those conducted by NATO in Europe
at the peak of the Cold War. Therefore this exercise led to a response by the Pakistani military
and the deployment of massive numbers of troops along the LoC. Therefore to avoid further
escalation, U.S. mediation help to diffuse the crisis, but for the first time, Pakistan conveyed
willingness to resort to nuclear weapons if necessary (Fitzpatrick, 2014, pp. 53). Indeed, while
developing their nuclear program, the common belief among the Pakistani leaders was that
nuclear weapons could serve insurrection purposes by neutralizing India’s conventional military
superiority in Kashmir and Punjab. Therefore, if at any time India would attempt to threaten
Pakistan’s sovereign and territorial integrity, the country would be able to retaliate with massive
damage. Consequently violence along the LoC reflects the general state of relations between
India and Pakistan, but also their willingness to resort to more extreme positions.
A second major event occurred in 1990 with a new crisis in Kashmir whereas growing
discontent with the political status quo increasing the level of insurgency, which turned into
violent clashes between the Indian army and the population. Hence, the increase of military
presence by the Indian government to prevent military or terrorist infiltration from Pakistan.
These developments thus demonstrate that tensions in the sub-continent are generally embodied
by the multiplication of military exercises as shows of force, which could escalate into nuclear
confrontation due to the magnitude of the mobilization of each side. However the risks have to
some extent been mitigated, as seen by the apprehensions of India and Pakistan and the rapidity
with which every crisis was diffused thanks to, among others things, the diplomatic intervention
of the United States (Fitzpatrick, 2014, pp. 56).
The case of India and Pakistan is particularly evocative in the sense that despite the signature
of several agreements, military tensions and threats to international peace and security are
constantly enhanced by the nuclear factor. Despite the signature of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty in 1963, both countries conducted nuclear tests in 1998, leading to the Kargil Crisis of
1999. Consequently the Lahore Declaration was signed the same year, intending to defuse the
risks associated with the demonstration of their respective nuclear capabilities and stating as
follows:

57
 “The Lahore Declaration signed by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on February 21
1999, inter alia: recognizes that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two
countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between them; […] reiterates the
determination of both countries to implement the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit; commits
both countries to the objectives of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation […]”

Consequently the Lahore Declaration embodies the difficult question of confidence building in
the Indian subcontinent, having seen the repeated incursions on the LoC by both sides, until a re-
enhancing of tensions after the Mumbai attacks in 2008.

3.2.2 The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Deterrence

Having discussed the historical and political contexts, this section aims to provide a
theoretical model of the implications of the introduction of nuclear weapons in the conflict
between India and Pakistan. This especially concerns the recent deployment of short range
nuclear weapons (hereafter referred to as tactical nuclear weapons). Indeed the nuclearization
of India and Pakistan is embodied by the outbreak of full scale wars between the two
countries between 1947 and 1999 - the Cold War legacy - but also, in the case of India, of the
growing power of China, which had its own war with India in 1962. Therefore the perpetual
sense of insecurity felt by both nations created ample incentives to develop nuclear weapons
in order to gain advantage over – or restore balance with – the other. But by the same token,
in the case of India some historical considerations have to be included in its development of a
military nuclear program. Indeed by a kind of accident of history, India was not an
independent country when membership to the U.N. Security Council was negotiated, which
resulted in a seat being given to China, similar to India in terms of size and population.
In Pakistan, the re-election of the Bharatiya Janata Party in India in 1998 marked a
turning point in the nuclear policy of the country since India decided to carry out its first
nuclear test in twenty-four years. Hence the creation of an untenable political situation for
then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who, for several reasons, had to prove similar prowess in
the matter. Consequently, and as remains today, Pakistan always assumed the worst about its
neighbor’s intentions, and spared no efforts in preparing a nuclear counterpunch (Fitzpatrick,
2014, pp.153). Moreover, Pakistan is an unstable and porous country in terms of geography,
population and external pressures, hence the dominant role given to the military institution in
order to guarantee the stability of the country.
The legacy of the Cold War has shaped two antonymous behaviors with regards to the
national security of both India and Pakistan. Therefore Pakistan has – in a general way –

58
conducted its foreign policy by being centered around its relations with India, while India
never entered a military alliance but to the contrary took the lead of the Non-Aligned
Movement (Cordonnier, 2002). By the same token the progressive militarization of Pakistan
– which has been under a military rule four times since its independence – has congealed its
relation with India under a pretext of national security, and following a logic of perpetual
confrontation, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently the budget allocated
to the defense of geographical and ideological aspects of Pakistan largely weighs a lot on
national resources; for instance, the defense budget reaches an average of 6% of GNP since
the 1970s (see Figure 4.), and was used recently for the development of nuclear tactical
weapons. The obsessive behavior of Pakistan toward its neighbor thus jeopardizes the
development of institutions which would allow the sustainable implementation of a moderate
government (Cordonnier, 2002). The introduction later of tactical weapons may indeed have
a dual effect that can be adapted to the game theory: in the mind of the participants, the
deployment of such weapons in a short timeframe could change the battlefield dynamics by
potentially bringing premature employment choices. However, it is to be acknowledged that
delaying the deployment of tactical weapons could dilute the desired deterrent effect over
conventional weapons. Consequently the Indo-Pakistani nuclear doctrine attempts to resolve
the problem of the operational conditions created by battlefield nuclear weapons, even though
neither side seems to have learned crisis management lessons from their previous conflicts
(Fitzpatrick, 2014, pp.65).

3.3 The Middle East and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

In the Middle East, the questions of peace and nuclear proliferation are intrinsically
linked and depend on the power rivalries at stake in the region. Indeed despite the indefinite
prolongation of the NPT decided at the Review Conference of 1995, threats of both conflict
and nuclear proliferation persist in the region. Also the question of peace in the Middle East
with regards to international non-proliferation regimes has recently focused on the highly
sensitive subject of nuclear weapons in Iraq and Iran. However, this concern cannot be
analysed as having a dominating value in itself, but need to be put in perspective with Iran’s
relations with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel, which foster the perceived need of States for
nuclear deterrence to ensure their survival. In the acquisition path of a deployable military
nuclear capacity, three complications have to be overcome: (1) the procurement of delivery

59
systems, (2) the construction of warheads and (3) the production of fissile material. If the first
two factors can be easily overcome, the best way to prevent the emergence of new nuclear
weapons-States, according to Henri Kissinger, would be the international inhibition of
uranium-enrichment process (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 161).

3.3.1 Iraq and the Nuclear Proliferation Risks

The question of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East was first embodied by two
singular events. First the discovery of a clandestine uranium enrichment program in Iraq,
which has led to a redefinition of the attributes of the IAEA in terms of safeguards and
inspections. And second, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, triggering the formation of a
coalition against Saddam Hussein’s regime, led by the United States. In the case of the first
Gulf War (1990-1991), nuclear weapons played a central role, firstly because the war was
partly legitimized with the goal of destroying Iraq’s potential nuclear capabilities
(Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 295; Braut-Hegghammer, 2011), but also because, although the
question was never debated at the political and operational level, the United States never
excluded the possibility of using nuclear weapons in case of unconscionable act such as the
use of chemical weapons (Bundy, 1991).
By the same token, Iraq represented the first challenge for the non-proliferation and
disarmament regime at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the Iraqi regime was perceived as a
sort of text book post-Cold War adversary for the following reasons: (1) an extensive
conventional capacity (at this time Iraq was wielding the world’s fourth largest conventional
army); (2) a past history of chemical weapons use; (3) a known interest in acquiring nuclear
weapons, and (4) revisionist ambitions, once the threat opposed by the Soviet Union
evaporated (Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 294). Consequently, the nuclear question in Iraq opened
the debate over the future of the non-proliferation regime. It raised mainly the question of
what could explain the non-use of nuclear weapons by the United States, even of small
capacities, regardless of their perceived military utility in this conflict. Indeed, the Gulf War
presented optimal conditions for the use of tactical weapons, due to the desert situation, no
lack of targets or warheads, and a relatively low risk of further escalation.
The decision of the Bush Administration to rule out the use of tactical nuclear weapons in
Iraq, thus emphasizes nuclear weapons’ unacceptability, more and more taken as granted
since the 1970s. Therefore this refusal implies a sort of hierarchy between the different
categories of weapons, although modern conventional arsenals have comparable devastating

60
potential as a small nuclear warhead. In consequence, the Gulf – instead of weakening the
non-proliferation regime, reaffirmed its importance and mechanisms, upon taking into
account the availability and modernization of conventional armament.
Following the Gulf War, the application of the IAEA safeguards in Iraq was then made
possible by Resolution 687 of the U.N. Security Council, implementing unprecedented
control and destruction measures to dismantle Iraq’s program and ensure compliance with the
NPT. Resolution 687 adopted by the Security Council on April 1991 states:

“The Security Council, […] concerned by the reports in the hands of Member-States that
Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons program contrary to its
obligations under the [NPT] of 1 July 1968; recalling the objective of the establishment of a
nuclear weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East; conscious of the threat that all
weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area […] decides that Iraq shall
unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-usable
material […]; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency […] a declaration of the location, amounts, and types of all items […]
to place all of its nuclear weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody
and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

The case of Iraq is unique to the extent that the country was submitted to a systematic
destruction procedure of any infrastructures linked to the development of a nuclear potential,
and this without an unconditional surrender after the first Gulf War. Consequently one can
consider that the true ability of the U.N. to impose these sanctions over Baghdad was the
result of the influence of the Bush administration in the region. Therefore, although the value
of multilateralism offers some legitimacy to non-proliferation and disarmament, nothing can
substitute for the will of the great powers to act unilaterally (Feldman, 1995).
By the same token, the Iraqi case can underline the efforts of the international community
to avoid the development of military nuclear potential in Iran. The nuclear program in Iran
can be related to a perceived feeling of isolation and threat by the country, considering the
clandestine Iraqi program, the progress of Sunni jihadists along Iranian borders (in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq), but also due to the acquisition of the bomb by Israel,
presumably in the early 1980s (Feldman, 1995).

3.3.2 Nuclear energy in Iran: what consequences for the region ?

The nuclear program of Iran was initiated under the ruling of the Shah Mohamed Reza
Pahlavi with the assistance of the United States and encompassed the construction of two

61
nuclear power plants in the site of Bushehr. The Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979 managed
since 1984 to develop a robust nuclear program thanks to the assistance of China in 1990 and
Russia in 1992. Iran developed strong enrichment capacity, potentially able to serve military
purposes. Indeed Iran managed a shift from 130 centrifuges when the negotiations supposed
to brake enrichment capacities started in 2003 after a first inspection of the Natanz facility,
to around 19,000 in 2014 (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 162; Zetter, 2014, pp. 69). Also the dubious
intentions of Iran tend to touch raw nerves in a very volatile region, but challenge as well the
viability of the NPT (Huntley, 2006). In point of fact, even though the negotiations made to
curb Iran’s nuclear capabilities were presented in terms of technical and scientific issues, the
matter encompasses the overall ability of the international community to enforce its demands
when facing a very sophisticated form of predation (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 159-161).
If from the beginning the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities did not violate its NPT
commitment or IAEA safeguards obligations, its claims over the peaceful nature of its
activities remained suspect for both the United States and Israel. Consequently the future of
the relations between the United States and Iran will largely depend on the resolution of a
technical military issue (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 159). Moreover, despite some effort to meet its
obligations under the auspices of the IAEA, the election in June 2005 of the populist
conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad introduced a more volatile and aggressive policy. In the
context of these developments, Iran suspended its adherence to the inspections regime of the
IAEA Additional Protocol and then refused any cooperation with the Agency (Huntley,
2006). Therefore, more than avoiding an increase of tensions in the Middle East, the potential
conclusion of a deal with Iran emphasises the ability of the international community to
enforce non-proliferation and gradual disarmament against repetitive rejections and the
permeability of the NPT regime.
The recent intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemen with the so-called operation “Decisive
Storm” has shown that the Kingdom is now ready to use force to maintain security in its
neighbourhood. These recent development intervene as well in a context of international
negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries (the permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council and Germany) over the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic. That way
Saudi Arabia, which is now developing a civil nuclear program with the support of Argentina
– according to World Nuclear News, shows that it would leave no space for Iranian influence
over other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially Yemen and Bahrain
(Kumar Pradhan, 2015). Consequently even if the deal reached with Iran put an end to
Iranian military nuclear ambitions, the country can still be seen as having achieved the
62
 highest level of defiance toward one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes ever
imposed. In that context, geostrategic rivals such as Turkey, Egypt or Saudi Arabia – all
currently developing civil nuclear capacities – could be tempted to purchase or develop
weapons to match Iran’s capacities in the name of self-help for security (Kissinger, 2014, pp.
165).
Consequently States – with awareness of the volatile nature of the region and their
relations with their neighbours – tend to challenge any form of non-proliferation regime since
(1) the region itself lacks organizational cohesion which could ensure the implementation of
treaties and (2) successive crises (in Iraq since 2003; Syria since 2013 etc.) increased
incentives to development nuclear weapons as a way to ensure national security.
A nuclear-armed Iran would indeed aggravate tensions, especially after its successful test
of the medium-range ballistic missile Shahab-3 in 2003, sufficient to reach Saudi Arabia,
Israel, Pakistan or even Turkey. This potential situation would hence trigger nuclear
proliferation in both directions, while non-armed States would seek for additional security
guarantees from the United States, if not nuclear deterrence of their own. Therefore nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East would further erode the security climate between Iran and its
neighbours, first on religious and ideological lines, but also considering Israel’s role on the
region, which would by extension affect the global oil economics of the Persian Gulf.
Consequently, as international relations in the region are more unstable than those in South
East Asia, long-term effects of proliferation might be more unpredictable (Huntley, 2006).
The case of Iran – and by extension the Middle East – shows that, despite the IAEA
agreements and the signature by all the countries (except Israel) of the NPT, as a program
approaches completion, a country’s ability to wield threats can erode the attractiveness of a
negotiated solution, while neutralizing external coercion. However in the meantime, Iran’s
relative openness since the election of the moderate Hassan Rouhani in 2013 and the
signature of an agreement in July 2015 with the P5+1 offers new opportunities for countering
countries’ nuclear ambitions.

4. Critics of the Qualitative Approach

The qualitative approach, which is principally developed through the analysis of

empirical evidence may lack objectivity since it is submitted to the non-proliferation regime’s

63
perceptions of (1) proliferating countries, (2) nuclear weapons-States and (3) the literature in
itself. Indeed according to Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, deviances in the results
of the qualitative analysis derives from intellectual developments over time rather than the
general objective features of both nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation regimes. Thus the
qualitative approach limits the study of empirical evidence and historical cases (Achen &
Snidal, 1989).
Moreover, scholars and decision-makers are facing a certain moral ambivalence towards
nuclear weapons: on the one hand, many countries are advocating non-proliferation and
disarmament as a corollary of peace and security, while on the other, NPT provisions remain
weak. Hence the pro and con arguments about the very existence of nuclear weapons cannot
refute each other since they rely on alternative stories and perceptions that are ultimately
unverifiable (Hayashi, 2015). The qualitative approach defines the political conditions in
which the decision to produce nuclear weapons has been taken. However, it cannot measure
the magnitude of conflict a State is facing and its actual technical and economic capacities
allowing it to complete a nuclear military program. For instance, the termination of the
uranium enrichment program of Argentina and Brazil is linked to the return of those
countries to democracy, but also has to be put in perspective with the context of the general
economic recession striking Latin America in the late 1980s.
Therefore this study assumes that the qualitative approach in itself is not sufficient to
assert the role and efficacy of the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes on international
peace and security. Indeed each case being unique, any single theory pros or cons the control
of nuclear weapons can be refuted by the empirical analysis of historical records.
Consequently, the qualitative approach has to be put in perspective with a quantitative
analysis of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation in order to assess the true efficacy of
the regime over the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

64
 PART III: THE QUANTITATIVE APPROACH

1. Methodology overview of the quantitative approach

The quantitative approach of the subject is useful to the extent that it provides a more
explicit explanation of the role of deterrence and non-proliferation regimes on States’ nuclear
proliferation. Indeed the qualitative approach is not deductive since the motives for non-
compliance to non-proliferation and disarmament are largely independent of the inherent
features of deterrence (Achen & Snidal, 1989). Consequently this section aims to assess the
patterns and risks for proliferation from national nuclear programs in States within and
without of the NPT. Indeed a quantitative approach allows one to observe data on national
programs in uranium enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, which can potentially result in
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This study aims to quantitatively approach the relations between disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation in the frame of the conflicts list provided by both the Correlates Of
War (COW) and the Systemic Peace projects in order to establish a correlation between the
trends of disarmament and non-proliferation, and international violence. However in the
interest of accuracy of the subjects and to limit the scope of the conflicts analysed, this study
will focus only on conflicts involving at least two State actors, with one of them being in
possession of (1) a nuclear arsenal, or (2) a nuclear energy or research reactors and (3) the
scientific expertise and relevant infrastructures for the development of nuclear weapons.
Consequently the conflicts studied will be referred hereafter as the following: “symmetric
conflict” when only nuclear States are involved, and “mixed conflict” when a party does not
possess any nuclear capacities, in terms of energy generation or weaponisation.
The list of the relevant countries in terms of nuclear energy (see Table 4.) has been
established by the World Nuclear Association and includes countries with future reactors
envisaged in specific plans and proposals, and expected to be operational by 2030. Moreover,
one needs to assess the spread of nuclear weapons over time, from 1945 to present day (see
Figure 2.)

65
 Table 4: World nuclear powers

Armenia Argentina Bangladesh Belarus Belgium Brazil

Czech
Bulgaria Canada Chile China* Egypt
Republic
Finland France* Germany Hungary India* Indonesia
Iran Israel* Italy Japan Jordan Kazakhstan
North Korea* South Korea Lithuania Malaysia Mexico Netherlands
Pakistan* Poland Romania Russia* Saudi Arabia Slovakia
Slovenia/Croatia** South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Thailand
United
United United
Turkey Ukraine Arabic Vietnam
Kingdom* States*
Emirates
* Recognized Nuclear Weapons-States
In bold: Nuclear Weapons-States recognized by the NPT
** The Krsko Nuclear Power Plant, located in Slovenia, is generating power for both countries

Source:
World Nuclear Association
IAEA for nuclear electricity production & percentage of electricity (% e) April 2015.

Figure 2: Nuclear Weapons States

Source: Robert Rauchhaus. (2009). Journal of Conflict Resolution

66
2. Research Design

To assess the effects of nuclear proliferation over international peace and security,
this study aims first of all to identify why some States chose to proliferate, and by which
potential paths, despite the IAEA’s safeguards measures developed earlier. Contrary to the
qualitative approach which evaluates motivation, as a subjective political aspect of
proliferation, the quantitative approach assesses capability on an objective basis, and its
consequences over the security of the States involved. A first test of the quantitative approach
is based on retrieving data from countries known as having a true nuclear latency and
proliferating, after the creation of the IAEA in 1957 and the implementation of the NPT in
1970. Nuclear latency, according to a definition provided by Stephen Meyer, refers to the
capabilities of a State to develop nuclear weapons including its technical, industrial, and
economic capacities.

“A country is said to have a latent capacity when it has sufficient technical, industrial, material
and financial resources to support a wholly indigenous nuclear program. Even though a State
may have a latent capacity, it must still make an explicit decision to develop the particular
facilities necessary to create weapons. However once a State has a latent capacity, it is very
difficult – perhaps impossible – to deny it nuclear weapons, since it is in itself self-sufficient.
It may still be possible to alter the motivations of the State so as to persuade not to proceed.”
(Meyer, 1984).

Also according to the World Proliferation of Latent Nuclear Capacity project, in 1992
forty-eight nations had the capacity, if they so desired, to build nuclear weapons. However,
only few countries have actually attempted – with more or less success – to build such
weapons, each on a very specific time line and for different political reasons. However an
important insight, demonstrated by Montgomery and Sagan in 2009, exists in the analysis of
nuclear proliferation. The status of a State cannot indeed be reduced to simply being a nuclear
or a non-nuclear weapons State. The same way, due to the ambiguous nature of nuclear
weapons, scholars do not agree on dates of programming and completion of nuclear
programs. Therefore this study focuses mainly on the coding provided by Jo and Gartzke,
which distinguish each country according to the countries’ political decisions (Jo & Gartzke,
2007). Those countries are the following: Argentina and Brazil from 1980 to the signature of
the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1995; the DPRK since 1990; India from the late 1970s onwards; Iran
and Iraq since the early 1970s, with an interruption of the Iraqi program in 1991; Pakistan

67
since 1972; South Africa, which terminated its weapons program in the early 1990s; and
Sweden until the complete shutdown of its program in 1972. Indeed, over the mentioned time
period, each State here developed capabilities which aroused international concerns that they
were seeking to develop or acquire – with more or less external support – nuclear weapons
(see Table 7).

Table 7: Jo & Gartzke (2007)’s Nuclear Status Coding

Schemes
Programs Possession
Acquisition
India (1) 1964-1965
India (2) 1972- 1988-
South Africa 1971-1990 1979-1991
Pakistan 1972- 1987-
Pursuit
Argentina 1976-1990
Brazil 1978-1990
DPRK 1982-
Iran (1) 1974-1978
Iran (2) 1984-
Iraq 1973-
Explore
Japan 1943-1945
Sweden 1946-1972

To those countries, this study aims to oppose them the same variables for countries
that have explicitly decided to renounce developing a nuclear military program, and this
despite having the technical capacity to pursue it. The countries selected for the purpose of
this section are the following: Japan, South Africa and Sweden. Nevertheless, if Japan and
Sweden, despite preliminary work, have renounced to develop a military nuclear program,
South Africa did produce a bomb, but decided unilaterally to dismantle its arsenal in 1989.
Similarly, Japan is a relevant case to the extent that it is the only country having ever
experienced a nuclear attack.
By comparing the previously mentioned independent variables over time in those nine
countries, this study seeks to define a general pattern of nuclear proliferation which could be
applicable to any other country with a nuclear potential. The objective here is to provide a
model for the so-called nuclear latency, let the assessment of how quickly and following

68
which paths individual governments can develop a nuclear weapon when they chose to do so
(Sagan & al, 2010, pp.80; Anzelon & al, 2014; Carlson, 2015). This section thus addresses
major underlying factors, directly or indirectly linked to nuclear proliferation, in particular in
the boundaries established by the NPT. Consequently this study voluntarily eliminates
recognised nuclear-weapons States from its quantitative data– first because they developed
nuclear capacities before the implementation of the NPT, but also because of their prevalence
in international affairs, all of them being permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

2.1 Data Set

The study uses cross-section, time series-data. The level of analysis is the State, as a
unitary actor. The data set provided here is generated on indicators provided by the World
Bank, the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, the Systemic Peace (Marshall & Cole,
2014) and the Correlates of War data (Palmer, Glenn, Vito d’Orazio, Kenwick & Lane,
2015), the Latent Capacity Proliferation model (Meyer, 1984; Stoll, 1992), the physical
model, developed by the IAEA, and finally the CIA World Factbook. However in the case of
North Korea, because the central government does not release reliable national income
accounts (the country ceased publishing economic performance statistics in 1965), the data
shown here are derived from estimations defined by Angus Maddison, in a study conducted
for the OECD. Moreover, due to the absence of reliable data, some estimations of the GDP
start after 1960, usually in the early 1970s. In the case of nuclear latency and reprocessing
capabilities, this study uses the dataset provided by Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach
in their article “Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset” (Furhmann &
Tkach, 2015). Finally concerning the development and possession of nuclear weapons, this
study – due to the lack of concordance in the academic literature – takes into consideration
the data provided by Jo and Gartzke in 2007.
The point of the research design is not to define the political motivations that have led
those countries to the path of proliferation, but to spot common variations related to (1) the
rise of international tensions or conflict and (2) attempts of proliferation. For instance, a
sudden rise of military expenditures, associated with a defence burden, could mean an
attempt to develop a nuclear arsenal or any other weapon of mass destruction.

69
 2.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this study is ‘conflict’. However in the international

relations literature, there is no commonly accepted definition for conflict (or even for peace),
which can encompass a large range of situations, from policy disagreement on fishing quotas
to thermonuclear war. Consequently, in order to narrow its scope, this study aims to retrieve
every conflict, at every level of intensity, supported by one or several States on their relevant
time period. To do so this section will use the conflict barometer provided by the Armed
Conflicts and Intervention (ACI) datasets, of the Centre for Systemic Peace, such as defined
in the MEPV 2014 Codebook. This barometer is divided in ten categories, ranking the
magnitude of hostilities and their impact on society’s dynamics, from the technologies used
to the average number of casualties.
The number listed represents a scaled indicator of the destructive impact on the
directly-concerned societies on a scale from 1 to 10. Those scores encompass multiple
variables, including States’ technological capabilities, targets, and means as interactive
intensity, area and scope of destruction and casualties, population displacement, and episode
duration. Here to assess the impact of nuclear proliferation on conflict, the scale-values are
considered to be comparable across time, place, and typologies of conflict (e.g. international
disputes, civil war, war of independence, etc.) such as it was defined in the qualitative
analysis of this study. Those categories are the following:
1. Sporadic or expressive political violence, where political violence is often rhetoric
and the objectives diffuse and poorly defined. Violent actions occur mainly as an
expression of a general discontentment and/or social control is achieved by small
groups and limited to a very specific target. Contemporary examples include the
relations opposing Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982.
2. Limited political violence, where the objectives are limited and clearly defined, which
allow warfare to remain confined and/or the opposition may be weak or resistant to
provocation. Moreover, violent episodes are confined to short time-periods and very
specific areas. A recent case of limited political violence can be illustrated by the case
of the pro-Greece Cypriot coup d’état of 1974, responding to the Turkish invasion in
1963.
3. Serious political violence, where the use of technologies of destruction is limited, the
objectives are focused on strategic authority (control of a territory, a population or
material resources) and violent episodes are targeting armed factions or symbol of
70
 State’s authority defiance. Contemporary cases include Kurdish repression by the
Turkish authorities, from 1984 to present days, or the overthrowing of the Allende
government by general Pinochet in 1973 in Chile.
4. Serious warfare, where in this case the applications of technologies of destruction
remain limited, while groups’ authority, discipline and objectives are often diffuse or
indistinct. Also warfare is confined to distinct challenging areas and periods of time
with sporadic operations, punctuated with long periods of dormancy. The period
following the Six-Day War in Israel and covering the years 1967-1970 is an example
of a serious situation of warfare.
5. Substantial and prolonged warfare, where technologies of destruction are used at a
high level despite the fact that goals are limited and often not clearly defined and
warfare – while intense – remains confined. Also the impetus to warfare is usually so
complex as to make compromise difficult. The civil war which has agitated the North
of Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009 provides a contemporary example of this
category of warfare.
6. Extensive warfare, where, although the use of technologies of destruction is
extensive, it remains limited. However its effects are persistent over the concerned
populations, which see their development arrested over the medium-term. Moreover
extensive warfare implies a large social mobilization of resources but crucial strategic
areas are fairly secure. Also issues of contention are perceived as vital but terms are
negotiable as neither party has the capacity to unilaterally impose and enforce a
settlement, like it was the case during the Bosnian war, from 1992 to the signature of
the Dayton agreements in 1995.
7. Pervasive warfare, where the technologies of destruction are extensive but the
resources and productive capacities are limited, hence the continuation of the war
effort is often conditioned by supplemental resources from external suppliers. Over
the populations, social mobilization is entirely determined by the culture of warfare
and their development is arrested over the medium-long term, while core issues of the
conflict are considered non-negotiable. An historical example includes the successive
wars in Afghanistan since 1978.
8. Technological warfare, which implies massive and mechanized destruction of human
resources and physical infrastructures in a war of attrition with medium-term effects
over the concerned territories’ development. In this case adversaries are of similar
strength and military capabilities are the target for destruction, therefore non-
71
 combatants are not systematically targeted although a great number are directly
affected. Historical examples include Europe during the First World War between
1914 and 1918.
9. Total warfare, involving a massive, mechanized destruction of human resources and
infrastructures in a war of attrition, with an intentional targeting of both combatants
and non-combatants, which results in widespread destruction and long-term effects
over a population’s development. In this case the destruction of a society as a whole is
the objective, adversaries are of comparable size and strength, and compromise or
negotiations are perceived as unacceptable. Historical examples are few and include
Germany between 1941 and 1945 or the Soviet Union during the same period.
10. Extermination and annihilation, which includes an extensive, systematic and
indiscriminate destruction of human resources and physical infrastructures with
persistent adverse effects. Here the goal is to destroy the social identity of the targeted
population, with generally disparate power and weapons’ technology. Historical
events which can be associated with this category of warfare are Japan for a period
after the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 or the German
territories during the Holocaust.

To this listing is added one of the features of the Correlates of War project. To assess the
security environment of a State, one needs indeed not to focus exclusively on the conflicts the
State is engaged in, but also the conflicts surrounding the relevant States, and thus indirectly
affecting their security.

2.3 Independent Variables

The relation between conflict and compliance or not to the non-proliferation and disarmament
regime is deduced in this analysis through descriptive statistics of different variables affecting
each selected country. The main idea is thus to isolate the number and magnitude of conflict
each State has experienced over a period of 53 years (1960-2013) and how they can be
related to the initiation and evolutions of a nuclear program. This section’s main concern is
related to the manner a testing sample can be defined, in order to find evidence of a link
between international monitoring of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and
international peace and security. Indeed this sample must be based on empirical evidence
72
rather than historical, theoretical or political considerations. Therefore the model of arms race
provided by Michael D. Wallace and Paul F. Diehl, respectively in 1979 and 1983, propose a
basis for the measurement of nuclear proliferation and the outbreak of conflicts. However
several modifications are made: the temporal period is extended until 2014 to reflect the most
recent listing of COW disputes, and the conflicts studied must involve at least one of the
listed nuclear countries (see Table 2.). Once the relevant countries are listed, this study aims
to identify the independent variables related to nuclear capabilities, which define a potential
proliferator (see Table 5.). Moreover, still following the datasets provided by the COW
Project, this study focuses only on disputes which occurred between 1945 and 2014, with a
minimum of 250 casualties but regardless of the outcome of the dispute.

Table 5: Independent Nuclear Variables Included in the Analysis

1. Membership at the IAEA (year)
2. Signature or Ratification of the NPT (1-agreed; 2-ratified; 0-none)
3. First Nuclear Test Conducted (year)
4. Uranium and plutonium reprocessing activities
5. Possession of Nuclear Weapons over the years

Once those factors associated with the conflicts listed by the COW Project, this study
aims to compare the results with the rest of conflicts which erupted between other State
members of the IAEA and Parties to the NPT, this time taking into consideration political and
military factors based on the criteria defined by Susan Sample (see Table 4.).

Table 6: Independent Military and Political Variables Included in the Analysis

on the relevant time period
1. Regime Type
2. Military Expenditures (in % of GNP, from 1960 to 2013)
3. Military Personnel
4. Territorial Issue
5. Contiguity
6. Proximity of other conflicts

Those variables can be asserted by the utilization of the data set on Global Conflicts
Trends, developed by the Center for Systemic Peace and edited every year. This study will
emphasize the 1946-2014 period, especially the Global Trends on Armed Conflicts, Global

73
Trends in Governance, Social Capacities and Warfare (with an emphasis on the wealthiest
countries), and some regional trends to assess the qualities of systemic peace.
Furthermore even if those variables concern mainly military issues, one needs to
consider as well economic and social variables, useful to determine potential proliferators
(horizontal or vertical) and their likeliness to enter into violent dispute with other States (see
Table 5.). Indeed, considering the estimated costs of the development of a nuclear program,
economic factors can become primarily relevant in the States’ willingness to proliferate,
based on the statistics provided by the Correlates of War Project, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Those data are thus useful in the sense that, in relations to the breakout of violent
disputes, economic factors tend to prove that countries with an active nuclear program, civil
or military, are generally wealthier and more peaceful than others (such as the members of
the G20+). Indeed one can notice that, among all the countries listed in the Table 2., every
member of the G20 (except Australia) and the G7 are represented, thus accounting for around
85% of the Gross World Product (GWP) and 80% of world trade.
However the influence of nuclear energy in these calculations has to be mitigated, not
as a real aggregate responsible for peace and security in those countries, but on the contrary, a
consequence of the development capacities of those countries. Consequently another variable
needs to be added in order to include the nuclear factor in trade and economic considerations:
the membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The current participating governments are,
in alphabetic order: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic Of
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
Therefore with regards to nuclear capacities, more than general economic strength and
the possession of natural resources, this study has to take into consideration the ability to
supply nuclear items considering technical expertise, which limits the possibilities of
diversion, since one can consider that, considering their economic weight, the concerned
countries tend to embrace the same vision of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
Indeed this multilateral group has been created in order to control the export of materials with
a potential use for the production of nuclear weapons. Also the members of the Nuclear
74
Suppliers Group are required to accept the safeguards mechanisms of the IAEA on the whole
program of potential importers, not only on the dedicated facilities, but also over any
imported technology (Forsberg and al, 1995, pp. 98).

2.3.1 Economic Factors Included as Independent Variables

Economic variation in the relevant countries is first of all useful to spot windows of
opportunities for States willing to develop a military nuclear program. Favourable conditions
in a given time period can provide a clue on whether a potential proliferator is financially
capable to sustain such an adventure. That way this section aims to illuminate internal
variables necessary for the development of a military nuclear program. However, due to the
absence of data concerning public opinion, this section had to eliminate opinion polls from
the analysis.
Also this section will first analyse variations on the GDP of the countries used to
define a general pattern (see Figure 3.), especially on the mentioned relevant period, where it
has been proved that those States were seeking – or are still seeking – to develop a nuclear
capacity.

Figure 3: Variation of the GDP Growth Per Relevant Country (in %), 1960-2013

75
 Source:
World Development Indicators – World Bank
Wolrd Wide Military Expenditures and Related Data – U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

76
 North Korean Economy Watch

2.3.2 Nuclear Factors Included as Independent Variables

This section examines the relations of the States in terms of statistics selected with the
non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Consequently this section has voluntarily
eliminated variables related to the use of nuclear energy for civil purposes, such as electricity
generation or scientific research. Nevertheless due to the difficulty to code initiation and
completion of nuclear programs, this study takes into consideration the data provided by
Matthew Furhmann, especially for the listing of countries that operated uranium enrichment
and plutonium reprocessing from 1939 to 2013.

Table 8: Nuclear Factors Included in the Analysis as Independent Variables

IAEA
NPT Nuclear 1st Nuclear Operational Former
membershi
membership Weapon test Stockpile NWS
p
Argentina 1 (1957) 1 0 / 0 0
Brazil 1 (1957) 1 0 / 0 0
DPRK / 0 1 2006 >10 0
India 1 (1957) 0 1 1974 110 0
Iran 1 (1958) 2 0 / 0 0
Iraq 1 (1959) 2 0 / 0 0
Japan 1 (1957) 2 0 / 0 0
Pakistan 1 (1957) 0 1 1998 120 0
South Africa 1 (1957) 1 0 1976 0 1
Sweden 1 (1957) 2 0 / 0 0
Source:
International Atomic Energy Agency

2.3.3 Military Factors Included as Independent Variables

For the purpose of this section, each independent variable will be analysed in the
context of the ten countries selected and compared with the results obtained by the others.
That way this section attempts to establish a pattern, illuminating variations in the military

77
behaviour of States, which can be thus be related to their nuclear program and its evolutions
over the years.
This table also includes some variables from the widely-used Composite Index of
National Capability (CINC) to evaluate the military capabilities of the relevant States. These
variables are the following: (1) military expenditure (in % of the GNP and in thousands of
current US$), and (2) military personnel (in thousands of people). The asset presented here
is defined by the median evolution of military expenditures on the relevant period, compared
to the average evolution since 1960. Therefore an increase of military expenditures on the
period the State is suspected to proliferate can indicate the accuracy of this statement.

Figure 4: Evolution of military expenditures (in % of GNP) 1960-2013

Source:
Singer D. J., Bremer S., & Stuckey J. (1972). Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power
War, 1820-1965. In Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.
World Wide Military Expenditures and Related Data – U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CIA World Factbook
World Bank Datasets

In this analysis, the code indicated next to the State’s name refers to the coding
developed by the Correlates of War Project, which provides abbreviations for the name of the
States listed and their relations with others. This being said, the regime type is calculated
through composite indices, developed by the Polity IV Project. In order to facilitate the
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empirical analysis of historical trends through the selected countries, the Polity IV Project
included annual constructed measures for both democracies (DEMOC) and autocracy
(AUTOC), as many countries exhibit characteristics of both of these distinct authority
patterns. Therefore this section includes indicators derived from the subtraction of the
AUTOC value from the DEMOC value. This procedure provides a single score (POLITY),
ranging from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy).
According to the Polity IV Project, territorial fragmentation here refers to the
“existence of separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population
within the recognized borders of the State and over which the polity exercises no effective
authority”. Historical examples of separation comprise the Nagorno-Karabakh region in
Azerbaijan, under Armenian occupation, or in the case of a nuclear weapons-State, the
limited control of Russia over Chechnya between 1996 and 1999. Territorial fragmentation is
presented such as following:
(0)- No overt fragmentation
(1)- Slight fragmentation: less than 10% of the territory is under local authority and
actively separated from the central authority of the regime
(2)- Moderate fragmentation: 10% to 25% of the territory is under local authority and
actively separated from the central authority of the regime
(3)- Serious fragmentation: over 25% (and up to 50%) of the territory is under local
authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime
Major episodes of political violence are here calculated by referring to two composite
indices provides by the MEPV 2014 dataset of the Centre for Systemic Peace. Those indices
comprise thus: (1) the total summed magnitude of all interstate episodes of political violence
(INTOT), and (2) the total summed magnitude of all societal episodes of political violence
(CIVTOT).
Contiguity is here defined according to the COW Project and comprises two
categories: (1) land contiguity and (2) water contiguity. Land contiguity, following the
definition provided by the COW Project, is defined as “the intersection of the homeland
territory of the two States in the dyad, either through a land boundary or a river. […] Water
contiguity is based on whether a straight line of no more than a certain distance can be
drawn between a point on the border of one State, across open water (uninterrupted by the
territory of a third State), to the closest point on the homeland territory of another State. […]
The coding for each dyad is always the closest form of contiguity for that year.” For the

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purpose of this study, contiguity in the following table will be presented such as follows:
land/water.
Proximity of other conflicts is defined according to the Polity IV Project and is
classified in two categories: (1) the number of bordering States with any type of episodes of
political violence (nAC) and (2) the sum of all societal and interstate MEPV for all
neighbouring States (TOTALAC). These scores thus allow estimating the hostility level
every State is experiencing.
Nuclear latency, which refers to State’s latent capabilities, is defined according to a
composite indices, including membership to the non-proliferation regime (accession to the
NPT defined as +1 or ratification as +2), and reprocessing capabilities, meaning the
capacities to extract uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel in order to reuse it.
Uranium reprocessing is calculated following binary values, with 0 defining years without
reprocessing activities, and +1 the years with. Nevertheless due to the difficulty to code
initiation and completion of nuclear programs, this study takes into consideration the data
provided by Matthew Furhmann, especially for the listing of countries that operated uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing from 1939 to 2013.

3. Findings
According to the first result obtained with the selected data (see Table 1. In Appendix), the
first finding of this study is that there are no substantial relations between compliance with
the non-proliferation regime and an improvement of peace and security. Indeed an overall
view of the magnitude of conflicts affecting the relevant conflict show a significant decrease
of conflicts over the year in countries having signed or ratified the NPT (see Table 10.).
Similarly, the eruption or not of violent conflicts does not seem to affect in anyway the
reprocessing capabilities of States, which are pursuing or resuming their activities despite
compliance to the NPT (see Table 11.). Therefore, if a certain increase of military activities
(personnel and expenditures) is noticeable, nuclear activities have statistically no effects on
the outbreak and resolution of conflict.

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 Table 9: Sum of Conflicts’ Magnitude 1960-2013 related to the NPT

Sum of
Sum of Civil
International NPT
Countries Violence’s
Conflicts’ compliance
Score
Score
Argentina 1 15 1 (1995)
Brazil 0 1 1 (1998)
1 (1985-
DPRK 0 0 2003)
India 8 280 0
Iran 56 86 2 (1968)
Iraq 119 237 2 (1969)
Japan 0 0 2 (1970)
Pakistan 7 96 0
South
Africa 0 43 1 (1991)
Sweden 0 0 2 (1970)

Table 10: Sum of Conflicts’ Magnitude 1960-2013 related to the number of years of
reprocessing activities

Reprocessing
Sum of
Sum of Civil (sum of years
International
Countries Violence’s of activities
Conflicts’
Score between 1960
Score
and 2013)
Argentina 1 15 15
Brazil 0 1 35
DPRK 0 0 30
India 8 280 47
Iran 56 86 35
Iraq 119 237 9
Japan 0 0 46
Pakistan 7 96 41
South
0 43 47
Africa
Sweden 0 0 13

However given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, the most appropriate
statistical model is a logistic regression. Table 12 presents a statistical representation of the
relationship between MEPV reciprocation and the nuclear activities submitted or not to
international controls. If the adhesion to the NPT actually shows a correlation with the
breakout of violent conflicts, the uranium reprocessing capabilities of a State do not seem to
be directly related to it. However, such as seen in table 13, conflicts are influencing the

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decision of a State to reprocess uranium, sometimes at a weapon-grade. Therefore the logical
conclusion is that nuclear activities of whatever nature do not affect the breakout of conflicts,
but conflicts, especially if they are erupting in neighbouring States, influence the decision-
making process by which countries are embarking in nuclear military activities. Indeed,
deterrence provides a sense of security to the possessing countries, and thus more and more
countries seem attracted to this form of protection.

Table 11: Relationship MEPV – Independent Variables

(DepVar) International
Conflicts 14.350898 6.226269 2.305 0.02156 *
Time Period -0.007413 0.003154 -2.351 0.01911 *
Regime -0.044947 0.003326 -13.513 < 2e-16 ***
Uranium Reprocessing
activities 0.055831 0.100883 0.553 0.58020
Adhesion to the NPT 0.455344 0.053686 8.482 < 2e-16 ***
Sum of all societal and
interstate MEPV for all 0.050054 0.008878 5.638 2.79e-08 ***
neighbouring States
Number of bordering States
with any type of episodes of -0.108249 0.038195 -2.834 0.00477 **
political violence
Civil Violence 0.168391 0.019305 8.723 < 2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.9778 on 532 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.4743, Adjusted R-squared: 0.4674
F-statistic: 68.56 on 7 and 532 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Table 12: Relationship Uranium Processing – Independent Variables

(DepVar) Uranium
Reprocessing activities -21.103602 2.527323 -8.350 5.91e-16 ***

Regime 0.010065 0.001596 6.308 5.93e-10 ***

NPT Compliance -0.099378 0.024193 -4.108 4.63e-05 ***
Number of bordering
States with any type of
episodes of political 0.098070 0.012142 8.077 4.46e-15 ***
violence
Civil Violence -0.016236 0.008800 -1.845 0.0656 .
Time Period 0.010892 0.001277 8.527 < 2e-16 ***
International Conflicts 0.015789 0.018090 0.873 0.3832
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

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 Residual standard error: 0.4203 on 533 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.2798, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2717
F-statistic: 34.52 on 6 and 533 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

However, one can notice the low exactitude score for both Tables 11 and 12 (0.4676
and 0.2717). This indicates that the coefficient of probability for those indices to be correct is
equal to 47% and 27%, and thus does not provide a significant proof of the relationship
between international conflict and compliance to the non-proliferation regime. Consequently,
one can suggest that a quantitative analysis cannot be sufficient alone to assess the impact of
the non-proliferation and disarmament regime on the outbreak of violent conflict.

4. Critics And Limits Of The Quantitative Approach

The quantitative approach implies a selection bias since the list of countries studies
shows particularities in every country with a nuclear program. Indeed, the relevant countries
are for the most part members of the G20 and G7 as major world economies, or groups such
as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Hence the need to extend the
analysis to uranium-producing countries and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (as an informal
association of countries exporting nuclear materials, under the supervision of the IAEA, as
opposed to those that are not). Indeed the membership of none of these groups by India and
Pakistan adds an element of uncertainty concerning the accuracy of the whole study.
Moreover, the quantitative analysis in its goal to determine potential nuclear
proliferators, evaluates only technical factors with regards to the nuclear fuel cycle but fails
to take into consideration the political conditions in which individual governments develop
an acquisition path. Indeed, while the quantitative approach provides all the technical
information which can be related to nuclear expertise and militarization, this method does not
explain why some States – such as South Africa or Sweden – with nuclear latency have
decided to renounce to their nuclear weapons program due to the lack of threat from
surrounding countries .
The same way, the quantitative approach assumes that every proliferating State will
follow the same pathways, with the same degree of bureaucratic and technical expertise as
nuclear weapons States, and the same degree of urgency than those who developed weapons
during the Cold War. Therefore the quantitative method does not encompass the political

83
impact of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament treaties to deter States from
proliferation. Furthermore this approach does not explain why the nuclear weapons-States
opted not to use nuclear weapons – even of small size – since 1945, in conflicts where their
use could have been decisive. Indeed, quantitative data do not explain why the United States
did not use those weapons during the Vietnam War (1955-1975) or in Iraq (1990-1991), nor
why Russia abstained in the Afghanistan war (1979-1989) or in its internal conflict with
Chechen separatists.

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CONCLUSION

To the question “is the international monitoring of disarmament and non-proliferation

contributing to an enhancement of international peace and security?”, this study assessed that
the non-proliferation and disarmament regime has no significant impact on the outbreak of
violent conflicts. In order to be able to answer that question, the methodology engaged was
essential. Indeed, comparing two academic approaches to the non-proliferation and
disarmament regimes has presented a major interest in understanding the impact of regime on
international conflicts. The qualitative approach emphasizes the context in which States are
proliferating. The quantitative approach on the other side, provides simple statistical raw data
determining the relations between proliferation, its monitoring mechanisms, and the actual
level of conflict States are facing.
In the light of those explanations, this study answers its research question with the
following: international monitoring of nuclear proliferation and disarmament has an indirect
effect over the outbreak of violent conflicts. Indeed, compliance with the NPT and IAEA
safeguard agreements does not stop States from seeking nuclear weapons – such as historical
experience has shown with the cases of Iraq, or Argentina and Brazil. However, the regime
provides a legal basis to counter proliferation when it occurs. However, as shown by the
quantitative approach of this study, compliance with the non-proliferation and disarmament
regime has no direct relations with the outbreak of violent conflicts, thus validating the null
hypothesis exposed previously. Consequently, disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons
can be achieved by a strategic control of States over vectors of proliferation in addition of
legal constraints.
However, the lack of background information makes the study of nuclear proliferation
difficult. This for the reason that (1) only two nuclear weapons have been used for military
purposes in the history of humanity, and (2) the subject remains sensitive and relatively
opaque. Therefore, on the one hand, the qualitative approach is essential to understand the
political motives underlying proliferation. On the other, a quantitative approach allows the
development of a general model in which proliferation happens. In other words, the
qualitative approach defines the intentions and context, while the quantitative methodology
shows recurrences in the different cases of nuclear proliferation, and thus allows the
definition of a general pattern. Hence, the quantitative analysis helps to avoid bias in the
interpretation of data or historical facts, since it depersonalises the information. Thus, it helps

85
to helps eliminating the tendency to ignore or discount information that does not “fit” the
interpretation given by the qualitative approach.
The whole purpose of this study was to examine how the regime monitoring nuclear
energy and its applications has been developed through the years, and how States are actually
implementing it. Hence the necessity to analyse the non-proliferation and disarmament
regime from a legal perspective, followed by an empirical study of historical facts. In that
extent, the case of Sweden and Japan are particularly relevant to be compared with Iran or
Pakistan since those states are experimenting different security concerns. Moreover, the path
taken by States toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons must be envisaged in its totality,
and not when a test is actually conducted. Concerning the actual use of nuclear weapons in
another hand, moral standards do not seem to have changed from one period to another.
Engaging in a nuclear attack is still considered taboo, and the actual mechanisms of the non-
proliferation and disarmament regime have strengthened through the years. Indeed, of the 193
State-members of the United Nations, only a small number have engaged in the development
of nuclear weapons, and a smaller number have completed their programs.

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APPENDIX

1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures
to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of
nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy

Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable
materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology,
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States
from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes
to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute
alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear
arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to
continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between
States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the
liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of

87
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and
security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and
economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce
any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the
safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear
facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied
on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use
or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards
required by this Article.

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3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to
comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological
development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear
activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the
processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with
the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the
Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days
from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of
ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not
later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do
so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with
due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of
nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty
on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices
used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a
special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with
adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall
commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear

89
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed
amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to
the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall
invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and
all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force
for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit
of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments
of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on
the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party
upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty
shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a
view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may
obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening
of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to
it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification

and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of
which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this
Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a
nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

90
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the
entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of
the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any
requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened
to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an
additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to
the Treaty.1

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments
of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July,
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

2. “Atom for Peace” speech

Addressed by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the
470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Tuesday, 8 December
1953.
Madam President and Members of the General Assembly,
When Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation to address the General Assembly
reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the prime Ministers
and Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France. Our subject was some of the

91
problems that beset our world. During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had
constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honour. That honour is mine today as I stand
here, privileged to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.
At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of
exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly. Never before in history has so much hope for so
many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and
decisions during these sombre years have already realized part of those hopes.
But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident
expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold,
to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of
this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the
wisdom, of the courage and of the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all
nations, and happiness and well-being for all men.
Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present to you a unilateral
American report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I assure you that in our deliberations on that
lovely island we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human
dignity which are so clearly etched in your Charter. Neither would it be a measure of this
great opportunity to recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes. I therefore decided that this
occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and
hearts of my legislative and executive associates, and on mine, for a great many months:
thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people.
I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is
a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope
should be shared by all. Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease
even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience
could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new, one which I, who have
spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That
new language is the language of atomic warfare.
The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have
some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the
utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an
intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's existence.
My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these
are the only incontrovertible facts that I know, I need hardly point out to this Assembly,
however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.
On 16 July 1945, the United States set off the world's biggest atomic explosion. Since that
date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic
bombs are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age
dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.
Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily,
exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came
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from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of the Second World
War. A single air group whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable
target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all the
Second World War.
In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The
development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status
within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the
Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.
But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone.
In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, the United Kingdom and
Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries
and the designs of atomic bombs.
The secret is also known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has informed us that, over
recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period the
Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one involving
thermo-nuclear reactions.
If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic
power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start
has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic
realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance. First, the knowledge
now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others.
Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of
devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll
of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.
The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large
programme of warning and defence systems. That programme will be accelerated and
extended. But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of
defence can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful
arithmetic of the atomic bomb doesn't permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most
powerful defence, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic
bombs fora surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the
chosen targets to cause hideous damage.
Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United States, our reactions would be
swift and resolute. But for me to say that the defence capabilities of the United States are
such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor, for me to say that the
retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor's land would
be laid waste, all this, while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hopes of
the United States.
To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi
are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop
there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed, the annihilation
of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us from generation to generation,
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and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from
savagery towards decency, and right, and justice. Surely no sane member of the human race
could discover victory in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by
history with such human degradation and destruction ? Occasional pages of history do
record the faces of the "great destroyers", but the whole book of history reveals mankind's
never-ending quest for peace and mankind's God-given capacity to build.
It is with the book of history, and not with isolated pages, that the United States will ever
wish to be identified. My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants
agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants itself to live in freedom and in the confidence
that the peoples of every other nation enjoy equally the right of choosing their own way of
life.
So my country's purpose is to help us to move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the
light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men
everywhere, can move forward towards peace and happiness and well-being.
In this quest, I know that we must not lack patience. I know that in a world divided, such as
ours today, salvation cannot be attained by one dramatic act. I know that many steps will
have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly
realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world. But I know,
above all else, that we must start to take these steps - now.
The United States and its allies, the United Kingdom and France, have over the past months
tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table. On the
record has long stood the request of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to
negotiate with the Soviet Union the problems of a divided Germany. On that record has long
stood the request of the same three nations to negotiate an Austrian peace treaty. On the
same record still stands the request of the United Nations to negotiate the problems of Korea.
Most recently we have received from the Soviet Union what is in effect an expression of
willingness to hold a four-Power meeting. Along with our allies, the United Kingdom and
France, we were pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable pre-conditions
previously put forward. As you already know from our joint Bermuda communique, the
United States, the United Kingdom and France have agreed promptly to meet with the Soviet
Union.
The Government of the United States approaches this conference with hopeful sincerity. We
will bend every effort of our minds to the single purpose of emerging from that conference
with tangible results towards peace, the only true way of lessening international tension.
We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what
rightly belongs to it. We will never say that the peoples of the USSR are an enemy with whom
we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.
On the contrary, we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the
Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a freer mingling of the peoples of the East
and of the West - the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for
confident and peaceful relations.

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Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Germany, occupied Austria and
the countries of Eastern Europe, we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with
none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of the USSR. Beyond the
turmoil and strife and misery of Asis, we seek peaceful opportunity for these peoples to
develop their natural resources and to elevate their lot.
These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies a story of nations lately come
to independence, not as a result of war, but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There
is a record already written of assistance gladly given by nations of the West to needy peoples
and to those suffering the temporary effects of famine, drought and natural disaster. These
are deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations of peaceful intent.
But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past proposals or the restatement of
past deeds. The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how
dimly discernible, should be explored.
There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been well explored -an avenue now
laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
In its resolution of 28 November 1953 (resolution 715 (VIII)) this General Assembly
suggested: "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-
committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek
in private an acceptable solution and report...on such a solution to the General Assembly and
to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954.
The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is
instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be "principally
involved", to seek "an acceptable solution" to the atomic armaments race which overshadows
not only the peace, but the very life, of the world.
We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception. The United States
would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military
purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put
into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts
of peace.
The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed,
this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all
mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the
future. The capability, already proved, is here today. Who can doubt that, if the entire body of
the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which
to test and develop their ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal,
efficient and economic usage?
To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds the people
and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now.
I therefore make the following proposal.
The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence,
should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal

95
uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would
expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The ratios
of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the
"private conversations" I referred to earlier.
The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of
the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable
or ungenerous associate.
Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity.
However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations
and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of
world-wide inspection and control.
The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage and
protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists
will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be
made essentially immune to surprise seizure.
The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods
whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of
mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture,
medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant
electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world.
Thus the contributing Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs
rather than the fears of mankind.
The United States would be more than willing - it would be proud to take up with others
"principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy
would be expedited.
Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.
I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every
expectation of approval, any such plan that would, first, encourage world-wide investigation
into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that the
investigators had all the material needed for the conducting of all experiments that were
appropriate; second, begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic
stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great
Powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations
first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth, open up a new channel for
peaceful discussion and initiative at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that
must be solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia
imposed by fear and is to make positive progress towards peace.
Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to
present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace. The coming months will be
fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly, in the capitals and military headquarters of
the world, in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governed or governors, may they be the
decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace.
96
To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you, and therefore
before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma - to devote its
entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall
not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.
I again thank representatives for the great honour they have done me in inviting me to appear
before them and in listening to me so gracious.

3. Timeline of Nuclear weapon program-related events in the relevant

countries (1945-2015)
1950: Creation of the National Atomic Energy Commission (in Spanish: Comisión
Nacional de Energía Atómica)
1957: Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
1974: Completion of the Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant
1978: Beginning of nuclear weapons program
1983: Return to Democracy and abolition of nuclear weapons
1986: Signature of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty
Argentina 1990: Signature of the Argentina-Brazil Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy
by the President Carlos Sal Menem
1991: Creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC)
Signature of an Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the
IAEA for the application of Safeguards
1994: Ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty
1995: Signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
1951: Establishment of the Brazilian National Commission for Nuclear
Energy (in Portuguese: Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear)
1957: Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
1965: Ratification of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty
1971: The Brazilian National Commission for Nuclear Energy signs an
agreement with the American firm Westinghouse to develop a first power
generation reactor
1978: Brazil begins a secret program to acquire nuclear weapons code-
Brazil
named “Solimoes” under the influence of the Army, Air Force and Navy
1982: Completion of the Angra I Nuclear Power Plant
1987: Brazilian President Sarney announce that Brazil had enriched
uranium to 20% under the military dictatorship
Signature of the Argentina-Brazil Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy by
the President Fernando Collor
1988: Brazil constitutionally renounces to nuclear weapons
1990: Closing of the Cachimbo Test Site, in Pará

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 1991: Creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC)
Signature of an Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the
IAEA for the application of Safeguards
2006: Opening of the Resende enrichment plant
1998: Signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive
Test-Ban Treaty
1957: Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
1963: Signature of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty
1974: India conducts its first nuclear test at Pokhran Test range under the
India code name “Smiling Buddha”, then becoming the first nation becoming
officially nuclear capable outside of the five permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council
1998: India conducts a new nuclear test at Pokhran Test Range
1958: Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
1963: Iran signs the PTBT
Iran 1968: Iran signs and ratifies the NPT
2003: Iran voluntarily signs an AP with the IAEA
2015: Signature of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and
the P5+1
1959: Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
1969: Ratification of the NPT
1980: Operation Scorch Sword, the Iran air force conducts an unsuccessful
Iraq raid on the nuclear reactor of Osiraq
1981: The Israeli air force strikes and destroy the nuclear reactor of Osiraq
1991: The U.N. Security Council votes the resolution 687, allowing the
IAEA to conduct inspection and destroy nuclear-related materials
1957: Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
Japan 1976: Ratification of the NPT
2011: Partial fusion of three units of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power
plant after an earthquake followed by a tsunami
2003: Withdrawal from the NPT
2006: The DPRK conducts its first nuclear test on the Punggye-ri Nuclear
Test site, Kilju County
North Korea
2009: Launch and failure of the Unha-2 space booster, first North Korean
ICBM
2015: The DPRK conducts a nuclear test from a submarine
1956: Establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
Pakistan 1957: Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
1963: Signature of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty
1972: The President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto approves a crash program for the

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 development of an atomic bomb
Completion of the KANUPP I nuclear power plant, near Karachi
1998: Pakistan conducts its first nuclear tests
1957: Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
1971: Beginning of a nuclear military program in response to a potential
Soviet aggression in Africa
South Africa 1991: Signature of the Non Proliferation Treaty
1993: President F. W. De Klerk announced that South Africa had produced
nuclear weapons, but had destroyed its arsenal before 1991
1998: Ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty
1945: An atomic commission is founded and the Defense Research Institute
(FOA, from Swedish Försvarets forskningsanstalt) is assigned to collect
data on the nuclear issue
1948: The FOA is assigned to explore the possibilities for nuclear weapons
acquisition in Sweden
1954: The first Swedish research reactor R1 is set in operation
Contemplations are made on whether to purchase nuclear weapons from the
United States
1955: The first draft on Swedish nuclear warheads is completed, but the
Sweden Social Democratic ruling party proves to be divided on the matter
1957: Public debate over nuclear weapons takes off
Accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency
1966: Sweden abandons the freedom of act doctrine and starts pushing for a
non-proliferation agreement
1967: Beginning of the phase-out of nuclear weapons research
1970: Ratification of the NPT
1972: Termination of the nuclear program completed as the plutonium
laboratory is permanently shut down
1980: Referendum on nuclear power
Source:
Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (National Atomic Energy Commission, Argentina)
Centre d’Etudes de Sécurité Internationale et de Maitrise des Armements (CESIM)
Nuclear Weapons Archives
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs – United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. Vol. 15(1990);
IAEA – Information Circular INFCIRC/435 (1991)
Global Security – Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nuclear Threat Initiative
Wilson Center for International History Declassified

4. Timeline of Political Violence Events in the Relevant Countries

(1945-2013)

99
 1955: Military Rebellion
1976-1979: “Dirty War”, as the repression of political dissidents
Argentina 1982: Falklands War (with the United Kingdom), marking the end of the
military dictatorship after the resignation of the Gen. Galtieri
1985: The main leaders of the military junta are prosecuted (so called Juicio
a las Juntas)
1964: Military Coup led by the Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castelo
Branco
Brazil
1966-1975: Araguaia Guerrilla War
1985: Return to democracy
1947-1948: First Indo-Pakistani War
1971: Bangladesh Liberation War supported by the Indian Forces against
Pakistan
1972: Signature of the Shimla Agreement between Indira Gandhi and
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, establishing a Line of Control (LoC) as de facto border
with Pakistan in Kashmir
India 1984: Assassination of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
1986: Brasstacks crisis with Pakistan
1990: Growing discontent with the political status in Kashmir and Jammu,
violent clashes between insurgents and the army
1999: Kargil Crisis with Pakistan
2008: Simultaneous terrorist attacks conducted by Muslim insurgents in
Mumbai
1979: The Government of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi collapses
Iran 1979-1981: Iran hostage crisis
1980-1988: Iran-Iraq War
1980-1988: Iran-Iraq War
1990-1991: First Gulf War, after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq
Iraq 2003: U.S. and British Forces invade the country and oust the Ba’athist
regime of Saddam Hussein
2006: Saddam Hussein is executed

Japan 1945: Capitulation of Japan in the Second World War after the nuclear
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
1950-1953: Korean War
1994: Death of Kim Il-Sung, he is replaced as supreme leader by his son
North Korea Kim Jong-Il
2011: Death of Kim Jong-Il, he is replaced as supreme leader by his son
Kim Jong-Un
Pakistan 1947-1948: First Indo-Pakistani War
1965: Pakistan conducts the Operation Gibraltar, designated to infiltrate

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 forces in Kashmir and Jammu, Second Indo-Pakistani War
1969: Resignation of the President Ayub, General Yahya Khan declares the
martial law
1971: Bangladesh Liberation War supported by the Indian Forces, Yahya
Khan resigned, the executive authority is transferred to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
1972: Signature of the Shimla Agreement between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and
Indira Gandhi, establishing a Line of Control (LoC) as de facto border with
India in Kashmir
1979: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is executed
1986: Brasstacks crisis with India
1999: Kargil Crisis with India
1966: Assassination of the Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd
South Africa
1994: End of the Apartheid
Sweden Sweden had not experienced conflict since the 2nd World War.
Source:
Center For Systemic Peace – Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2014
Center for Systemic Peace – Coup d’état Events, 1946-2014
Fitzpatrick M. (2014). Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers. New York, The International
Institute for Strategic Studies

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 Table 13: DATASET INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
Country Ccode Year Regime MilPers INTOT CIVTOT Frag Contig nAC TOTALAC NPT UrRepro
Argentina 160 1960 -1 130 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1961 -1 127 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1962 -1 129 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1963 -1 155 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1964 -1 155 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1965 -1 155 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1966 -9 160 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1967 -9 160 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1968 -9 160 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1969 -9 160 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1970 -9 140 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1971 -9 140 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1972 -9 140 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1973 6 160 0 0 0 5 1 2 0 1
Argentina 160 1974 6 150 0 0 0 5 1 3 0 0
Argentina 160 1975 6 160 0 0 0 5 1 3 0 0
Argentina 160 1976 -9 155 0 3 0 5 1 3 0 0
Argentina 160 1977 -9 155 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1978 -9 155 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1979 -9 155 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1980 -9 155 0 3 0 5 1 1 0 0
Argentina 160 1981 -8 155 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1982 -8 175 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1983 8 175 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1984 8 174 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1985 8 129 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1986 8 104 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1987 8 118 0 0 0 5 1 2 0 1
Argentina 160 1988 8 95 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1989 7 95 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1990 7 85 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1991 7 70 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1992 7 65 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Argentina 160 1993 7 65 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1994 7 69 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
Argentina 160 1995 7 65 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 1996 7 65 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 1997 7 65 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 1998 7 73 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 1999 8 73 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2000 8 71 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2001 8 70 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2002 8 69 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2003 8 71 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2004 8 71 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2005 8 71 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0

102
Argentina 160 2006 8 71 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2007 8 72 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2008 8 -99 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2009 8 -99 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2010 8 -99 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2011 8 -99 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2012 8 -99 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Argentina 160 2013 8 -99 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0
Brazil 140 1960 6 241 0 0 0 7 1 5 0 0
Brazil 140 1961 5 180 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1962 5 185 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1963 3 305 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1964 -88 315 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1965 -9 320 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1966 -9 325 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1967 -9 330 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1968 -9 340 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1969 -9 360 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1970 -9 375 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1971 -9 375 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1972 -9 410 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1973 -9 420 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1974 -4 435 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Brazil 140 1975 -4 455 0 0 0 9 1 4 0 0
Brazil 140 1976 -4 450 0 0 0 9 2 7 0 0
Brazil 140 1977 -4 450 0 0 0 9 2 7 0 0
Brazil 140 1978 -4 450 0 0 0 9 2 7 0 0
Brazil 140 1979 -4 450 0 0 0 9 2 7 0 1
Brazil 140 1980 -4 450 0 1 0 9 2 7 0 1
Brazil 140 1981 -4 450 0 0 0 9 1 4 0 1
Brazil 140 1982 -3 460 0 0 0 9 3 8 0 1
Brazil 140 1983 -3 460 0 0 0 9 2 7 0 1
Brazil 140 1984 -3 459 0 0 0 9 2 7 0 1
Brazil 140 1985 7 496 0 0 0 9 2 7 1 1
Brazil 140 1986 7 527 0 0 0 9 3 8 1 1
Brazil 140 1987 7 541 0 0 0 9 3 8 1 1
Brazil 140 1988 8 319 0 0 0 9 3 8 1 1
Brazil 140 1989 8 319 0 0 0 9 3 8 1 1
Brazil 140 1990 8 295 0 0 0 9 2 7 1 1
Brazil 140 1991 8 295 0 0 0 9 2 7 1 1
Brazil 140 1992 8 296 0 0 0 9 2 7 1 1
Brazil 140 1993 8 296 0 0 0 9 2 7 1 1
Brazil 140 1994 8 296 0 0 0 9 2 7 1 1
Brazil 140 1995 8 296 0 0 0 9 2 8 1 1

103
Brazil 140 1996 8 296 0 0 0 9 2 7 1 1
Brazil 140 1997 8 296 0 0 0 9 2 7 1 1
Brazil 140 1998 8 296 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 1999 8 300 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2000 8 288 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2001 8 288 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2002 8 288 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2003 8 288 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2004 8 295 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2005 8 302 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2006 8 287 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2007 8 288 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2008 8 -99 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2009 8 -99 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2010 8 -99 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2011 8 -99 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2012 8 -99 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
Brazil 140 2013 8 -99 0 0 0 9 1 4 1 1
DPRK 731 1960 -8 400 0 0 0 3 1 4 0 0
DPRK 731 1961 -8 390 0 0 0 3 1 4 0 0
DPRK 731 1962 -8 380 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 0
DPRK 731 1963 -8 352 0 0 0 3 1 4 0 0
DPRK 731 1964 -8 362 0 0 0 3 1 4 0 0
DPRK 731 1965 -8 378 0 0 0 3 1 4 0 0
DPRK 731 1966 -9 383 0 0 0 3 1 9 0 0
DPRK 731 1967 -9 383 0 0 0 3 1 9 0 0
DPRK 731 1968 -9 410 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 0
DPRK 731 1969 -9 410 0 0 0 3 2 7 0 0
DPRK 731 1970 -9 438 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 0
DPRK 731 1971 -9 450 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 0
DPRK 731 1972 -9 460 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 0
DPRK 731 1973 -9 470 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 0
DPRK 731 1974 -9 470 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 0
DPRK 731 1975 -9 470 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 1
DPRK 731 1976 -9 500 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1
DPRK 731 1977 -9 520 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1
DPRK 731 1978 -9 632 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1
DPRK 731 1979 -9 692 0 0 0 3 2 5 0 1
DPRK 731 1980 -9 700 0 0 0 3 3 6 0 1
DPRK 731 1981 -9 768 0 0 0 3 2 5 0 1
DPRK 731 1982 -9 782 0 0 0 3 2 5 0 1
DPRK 731 1983 -9 784 0 0 0 3 2 7 0 1
DPRK 731 1984 -9 784 0 0 0 3 2 7 0 1
DPRK 731 1985 -9 784 0 0 0 3 2 7 1 1

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DPRK 731 1986 -9 838 0 0 0 3 2 7 1 1
DPRK 731 1987 -9 838 0 0 0 3 2 8 1 1
DPRK 731 1988 -9 842 0 0 0 3 2 5 1 1
DPRK 731 1989 -9 1040 0 0 0 3 1 3 1 1
DPRK 731 1990 -9 1200 0 0 0 3 2 5 1 1
DPRK 731 1991 -9 1200 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 1
DPRK 731 1992 -9 1200 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 1
DPRK 731 1993 -9 1100 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 1
DPRK 731 1994 -10 1100 0 0 0 3 2 6 1 0
DPRK 731 1995 -10 1100 0 0 0 3 2 6 1 0
DPRK 731 1996 -10 1100 0 0 0 3 2 6 1 0
DPRK 731 1997 -10 1100 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 0
DPRK 731 1998 -10 1000 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 0
DPRK 731 1999 -10 1000 0 0 0 3 1 4 1 0
DPRK 731 2000 -10 1055 0 0 0 3 1 4 1 0
DPRK 731 2001 -10 1082 0 0 0 3 1 4 1 0
DPRK 731 2002 -10 1082 0 0 0 3 1 4 1 0
DPRK 731 2003 -10 1082 0 0 0 3 1 4 1 1
DPRK 731 2004 -10 1094 0 0 0 3 1 4 0 1
DPRK 731 2005 -10 1106 0 0 0 3 1 4 0 1
DPRK 731 2006 -10 1106 0 0 0 3 1 4 0 1
DPRK 731 2007 -10 1106 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1
DPRK 731 2008 -10 -99 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 1
DPRK 731 2009 -10 -99 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1
DPRK 731 2010 -10 -99 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1
DPRK 731 2011 -10 -99 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1
DPRK 731 2012 -10 -99 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1
DPRK 731 2013 -10 -99 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1
India 750 1960 9 535 0 2 0 5 2 8 0 0
India 750 1961 9 775 0 2 0 6 2 9 0 0
India 750 1962 9 800 1 2 0 5 2 10 0 0
India 750 1963 9 1083 0 2 0 5 3 8 0 0
India 750 1964 9 1215 0 2 0 5 3 8 0 1
India 750 1965 9 1220 3 2 0 5 2 11 0 1
India 750 1966 9 1400 0 2 0 5 2 13 0 1
India 750 1967 9 1420 0 2 0 5 3 13 0 1
India 750 1968 9 1480 0 3 0 5 2 9 0 1
India 750 1969 9 1510 0 3 0 5 2 10 0 1
India 750 1970 9 1550 0 3 0 5 2 9 0 1
India 750 1971 9 1560 3 3 0 4 2 9 0 1
India 750 1972 9 1590 0 3 0 6 2 9 0 1
India 750 1973 9 1620 0 3 0 6 2 11 0 1
India 750 1974 9 1620 0 3 0 6 2 11 0 0
India 750 1975 7 1670 0 3 0 6 3 13 0 0

105
India 750 1976 7 1440 0 3 0 6 3 8 0 0
India 750 1977 8 1270 0 3 0 6 4 8 0 1
India 750 1978 8 1300 0 3 0 6 3 6 0 1
India 750 1979 8 1286 0 3 0 6 3 10 0 1
India 750 1980 8 1104 0 3 0 6 2 8 0 1
India 750 1981 8 1104 0 3 0 6 3 8 0 1
India 750 1982 8 1120 0 3 0 6 3 8 0 1
India 750 1983 8 1104 0 7 0 6 3 11 0 1
India 750 1984 8 1120 0 5 0 6 3 11 0 1
India 750 1985 8 1260 0 5 0 6 4 11 0 1
India 750 1986 8 1260 0 5 0 6 4 11 0 1
India 750 1987 8 1260 0 5 0 6 4 12 0 1
India 750 1988 8 1360 0 5 0 6 4 10 0 1
India 750 1989 8 1260 0 5 0 6 4 10 0 1
India 750 1990 8 1260 0 8 0 6 4 10 0 1
India 750 1991 8 1260 0 10 0 6 4 11 0 1
India 750 1992 8 1260 0 10 0 6 4 11 0 1
India 750 1993 8 1260 0 10 0 6 5 9 0 1
India 750 1994 8 1260 0 7 0 6 5 7 0 1
India 750 1995 9 1260 0 7 0 6 4 7 0 1
India 750 1996 9 1260 0 7 0 6 3 9 0 1
India 750 1997 9 1260 0 7 0 6 3 9 0 1
India 750 1998 9 1300 0 7 0 6 4 9 0 1
India 750 1999 9 1300 1 7 0 6 4 7 0 1
India 750 2000 9 1303 0 7 0 6 4 6 0 1
India 750 2001 9 1263 0 9 0 6 3 7 0 1
India 750 2002 9 1298 0 9 0 6 2 7 0 1
India 750 2003 9 1325 0 7 0 6 3 7 0 1
India 750 2004 9 1325 0 7 0 6 3 11 0 1
India 750 2005 9 1325 0 7 0 6 3 12 0 1
India 750 2006 9 1325 0 7 0 6 3 12 0 1
India 750 2007 9 1316 0 7 0 6 3 10 0 1
India 750 2008 9 -99 0 7 0 6 3 10 0 1
India 750 2009 9 -99 0 7 0 6 2 10 0 1
India 750 2010 9 -99 0 7 0 6 2 10 0 1
India 750 2011 9 -99 0 7 0 6 2 10 0 1
India 750 2012 9 -99 0 7 0 6 2 10 0 1
India 750 2013 9 -99 0 7 0 6 2 10 0 1
Iran 630 1960 -10 207 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Iran 630 1961 -10 208 0 0 0 5 2 6 0 0
Iran 630 1962 -10 185 0 0 0 5 2 6 0 0
Iran 630 1963 -10 200 0 1 0 5 1 5 0 0
Iran 630 1964 -10 200 0 0 0 5 1 5 0 0
Iran 630 1965 -10 200 0 0 0 5 2 8 0 0

106
Iran 630 1966 -10 205 0 0 0 5 1 5 0 0
Iran 630 1967 -10 210 0 0 0 5 1 5 0 0
Iran 630 1968 -10 210 0 0 0 5 1 5 2 0
Iran 630 1969 -10 210 0 0 0 5 2 6 2 0
Iran 630 1970 -10 225 0 0 0 5 1 5 2 0
Iran 630 1971 -10 245 0 0 0 4 1 5 2 0
Iran 630 1972 -10 255 0 0 0 5 1 5 2 0
Iran 630 1973 -10 265 0 0 0 5 2 7 2 0
Iran 630 1974 -10 285 1 0 0 5 3 10 2 1
Iran 630 1975 -10 310 1 0 0 5 3 10 2 1
Iran 630 1976 -10 385 0 0 0 5 3 9 2 1
Iran 630 1977 -10 420 0 0 0 5 3 11 2 1
Iran 630 1978 -10 350 0 4 0 5 3 16 2 1
Iran 630 1979 0 350 0 7 0 5 3 19 2 1
Iran 630 1980 -2 415 6 7 0 5 4 28 2 0
Iran 630 1981 -4 305 6 7 0 5 4 26 2 0
Iran 630 1982 -6 260 6 7 0 5 4 26 2 0
Iran 630 1983 -6 240 6 7 0 5 5 27 2 0
Iran 630 1984 -6 240 6 7 0 5 5 30 2 0
Iran 630 1985 -6 335 6 7 0 5 5 30 2 1
Iran 630 1986 -6 345 6 4 0 5 5 28 2 1
Iran 630 1987 -6 345 6 4 0 5 5 28 2 1
Iran 630 1988 -6 350 6 4 0 5 5 28 2 1
Iran 630 1989 -6 654 0 4 0 5 4 19 2 1
Iran 630 1990 -6 604 0 4 0 5 5 26 2 1
Iran 630 1991 -6 440 0 4 0 4 4 24 2 1
Iran 630 1992 -6 465 0 4 0 7 6 28 2 1
Iran 630 1993 -6 528 0 4 0 7 6 28 2 1
Iran 630 1994 -6 528 0 0 0 7 6 23 2 1
Iran 630 1995 -6 528 0 0 0 7 5 17 2 1
Iran 630 1996 -6 530 0 0 0 7 5 18 2 1
Iran 630 1997 3 540 0 0 0 7 5 18 2 1
Iran 630 1998 3 575 0 0 0 7 4 16 2 1
Iran 630 1999 3 460 0 0 0 7 4 12 2 1
Iran 630 2000 3 460 0 0 0 7 2 8 2 1
Iran 630 2001 3 513 0 0 0 7 3 12 2 1
Iran 630 2002 3 513 0 0 0 7 3 5 2 1
Iran 630 2003 3 520 0 0 0 7 3 10 2 1
Iran 630 2004 -6 540 0 0 0 7 4 15 2 1
Iran 630 2005 -6 480 0 0 0 7 4 16 2 1
Iran 630 2006 -6 420 0 0 0 7 4 16 2 1
Iran 630 2007 -6 545 0 0 0 7 4 16 2 1
Iran 630 2008 -6 545 0 0 0 7 4 16 2 1
Iran 630 2009 -7 -99 0 0 0 7 4 16 2 1

107
Iran 630 2010 -7 -99 0 0 0 7 4 16 2 1
Iran 630 2011 -7 -99 0 0 0 7 4 13 2 1
Iran 630 2012 -7 -99 0 0 0 7 4 13 2 1
Iran 630 2013 -7 -99 0 0 0 7 0 13 2 1
Iraq 645 1960 -5 -99 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
Iraq 645 1961 -5 90 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0
Iraq 645 1962 -5 91 0 5 0 5 1 0 0 0
Iraq 645 1963 -5 80 0 5 0 6 0 1 0 0
Iraq 645 1964 -5 80 0 5 0 6 0 0 0 0
Iraq 645 1965 -5 90 0 5 0 6 0 0 0 0
Iraq 645 1966 -5 90 0 5 0 6 2 0 0 0
Iraq 645 1967 -5 90 0 5 0 6 2 8 0 0
Iraq 645 1968 -7 90 0 5 0 6 2 8 1 0
Iraq 645 1969 -7 90 0 5 0 6 2 8 2 0
Iraq 645 1970 -7 95 0 5 0 6 0 11 2 0
Iraq 645 1971 -7 105 0 5 0 6 0 0 2 0
Iraq 645 1972 -7 105 0 5 0 6 1 0 2 0
Iraq 645 1973 -7 105 0 5 0 6 2 3 2 0
Iraq 645 1974 -7 110 1 5 0 6 2 3 2 0
Iraq 645 1975 -7 155 1 5 0 6 1 3 2 0
Iraq 645 1976 -7 190 0 5 0 6 1 2 2 0
Iraq 645 1977 -7 140 0 5 0 6 2 4 2 0
Iraq 645 1978 -7 362 0 5 0 6 3 8 2 0
Iraq 645 1979 -9 444 0 8 0 6 3 14 2 0
Iraq 645 1980 -9 430 6 8 0 6 3 20 2 0
Iraq 645 1981 -9 392 6 8 0 6 3 19 2 0
Iraq 645 1982 -9 404 6 8 0 6 2 18 2 0
Iraq 645 1983 -9 434 6 8 0 6 2 15 2 1
Iraq 645 1984 -9 788 6 8 0 6 2 18 2 1
Iraq 645 1985 -9 788 6 8 0 6 2 18 2 1
Iraq 645 1986 -9 800 6 8 0 6 2 13 2 1
Iraq 645 1987 -9 900 6 8 0 6 2 13 2 1
Iraq 645 1988 -9 1000 6 8 0 6 2 13 2 1
Iraq 645 1989 -9 1000 0 8 0 6 3 7 2 1
Iraq 645 1990 -9 1390 5 8 0 6 3 12 2 1
Iraq 645 1991 -9 475 5 8 0 6 2 12 2 1
Iraq 645 1992 -9 407 0 8 0 6 2 7 2 0
Iraq 645 1993 -9 407 0 8 0 6 1 7 2 0
Iraq 645 1994 -9 425 0 3 0 6 1 3 2 0
Iraq 645 1995 -9 450 0 3 0 6 1 3 2 0
Iraq 645 1996 -9 450 0 4 0 6 1 3 2 0
Iraq 645 1997 -9 400 0 4 0 6 1 3 2 0
Iraq 645 1998 -9 420 1 4 0 6 1 3 2 0
Iraq 645 1999 -9 420 1 0 0 6 0 3 2 0

108
Iraq 645 2000 -9 429 1 0 0 6 0 0 2 0
Iraq 645 2001 -9 424 1 0 2 6 0 0 2 0
Iraq 645 2002 -9 389 1 0 2 6 1 0 2 0
Iraq 645 2003 -88 389 6 0 2 6 2 1 2 0
Iraq 645 2004 -88 284 6 0 3 6 2 2 2 0
Iraq 645 2005 -88 179 6 0 3 6 2 2 2 0
Iraq 645 2006 -88 227 6 0 3 6 2 2 2 0
Iraq 645 2007 -88 227 6 0 3 6 1 2 2 0
Iraq 645 2008 -88 -99 6 0 3 6 1 1 2 0
Iraq 645 2009 -88 -99 6 0 3 6 1 1 2 0
Iraq 645 2010 3 -99 6 0 3 6 2 1 2 0
Iraq 645 2011 3 -99 0 3 0 6 2 6 2 0
Iraq 645 2012 3 -99 0 3 0 6 2 6 2 0
Iraq 645 2013 3 -99 0 3 0 6 2 6 2 0
Japan 740 1960 10 263 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 740 1961 10 230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 740 1962 10 235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 740 1963 10 243 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 740 1964 10 244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 740 1965 10 246 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 740 1966 10 227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 740 1967 10 231 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 740 1968 10 235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Japan 740 1969 10 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Japan 740 1970 10 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Japan 740 1971 10 234 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Japan 740 1972 10 233 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Japan 740 1973 10 233 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Japan 740 1974 10 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Japan 740 1975 10 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Japan 740 1976 10 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1977 10 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1978 10 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1979 10 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1980 10 242 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1981 10 241 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1982 10 243 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1983 10 241 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1984 10 241 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1985 10 241 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1986 10 245 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1987 10 244 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1988 10 245 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1989 10 247 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1

109
Japan 740 1990 10 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1991 10 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1992 10 242 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1993 10 242 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1994 10 233 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1995 10 240 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1996 10 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1997 10 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1998 10 255 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 1999 10 240 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2000 10 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2001 10 240 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2002 10 240 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2003 10 240 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2004 10 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2005 10 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2006 10 260 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2007 10 240 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2008 10 -99 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2009 10 -99 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2010 10 -99 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2011 10 -99 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2012 10 -99 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Japan 740 2013 10 -99 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Pakistan 769 1960 -7 223 0 0 0 5 3 10 0 0
Pakistan 769 1961 -7 243 0 1 0 5 3 10 0 0
Pakistan 769 1962 1 249 0 1 0 5 3 12 0 0
Pakistan 769 1963 1 270 0 0 0 5 4 11 0 0
Pakistan 769 1964 1 275 0 0 0 5 3 10 0 0
Pakistan 769 1965 1 277 3 0 0 5 3 13 0 0
Pakistan 769 1966 1 300 0 0 0 5 3 15 0 0
Pakistan 769 1967 1 351 0 0 0 5 3 15 0 0
Pakistan 769 1968 1 357 0 0 0 5 3 12 0 0
Pakistan 769 1969 1 390 0 0 0 5 3 13 0 0
Pakistan 769 1970 0 390 0 0 0 5 3 12 0 0
Pakistan 769 1971 0 404 3 6 0 5 3 15 0 0
Pakistan 770 1972 4 350 0 0 0 4 2 8 0 0
Pakistan 770 1973 8 466 0 2 0 4 2 8 0 1
Pakistan 770 1974 8 395 0 2 0 4 3 9 0 1
Pakistan 770 1975 8 502 0 2 0 4 3 9 0 1
Pakistan 770 1976 8 604 0 2 0 4 1 3 0 1
Pakistan 770 1977 -7 588 0 2 0 4 1 3 0 1
Pakistan 770 1978 -7 518 0 0 0 4 3 14 0 1
Pakistan 770 1979 -7 544 0 0 0 4 4 21 0 1

110
Pakistan 770 1980 -7 467 0 0 0 4 4 25 0 1
Pakistan 770 1981 -7 560 0 0 0 4 4 25 0 1
Pakistan 770 1982 -7 588 0 0 0 4 4 25 0 1
Pakistan 770 1983 -7 479 0 1 0 4 4 31 0 1
Pakistan 770 1984 -7 479 0 1 0 4 4 29 0 1
Pakistan 770 1985 -4 483 0 1 0 4 4 29 0 1
Pakistan 770 1986 -4 483 0 1 0 4 4 26 0 1
Pakistan 770 1987 -4 481 0 1 0 4 4 27 0 1
Pakistan 770 1988 8 481 0 1 0 4 4 24 0 1
Pakistan 770 1989 8 520 0 1 0 4 4 19 0 1
Pakistan 770 1990 8 550 0 1 0 4 4 22 0 1
Pakistan 770 1991 8 565 0 1 0 4 4 23 0 1
Pakistan 770 1992 8 580 0 1 0 4 4 23 0 1
Pakistan 770 1993 8 580 0 1 0 4 4 23 0 1
Pakistan 770 1994 8 580 0 1 0 4 3 16 0 1
Pakistan 770 1995 8 580 0 1 0 4 3 16 0 1
Pakistan 770 1996 8 580 0 1 0 4 3 16 0 1
Pakistan 770 1997 7 610 0 1 0 4 3 16 0 1
Pakistan 770 1998 7 590 0 1 0 4 3 16 0 1
Pakistan 770 1999 -6 590 1 0 0 4 2 15 0 1
Pakistan 770 2000 -6 612 0 0 0 4 2 14 0 1
Pakistan 770 2001 -6 620 0 1 0 4 2 19 0 1
Pakistan 770 2002 -5 620 0 1 0 4 2 12 0 1
Pakistan 770 2003 -5 620 0 1 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2004 -5 619 0 5 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2005 -5 619 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2006 -5 619 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2007 2 619 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2008 5 -99 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2009 5 -99 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2010 6 -99 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2011 6 -99 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2012 6 -99 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
Pakistan 770 2013 7 -99 0 6 0 4 2 10 0 1
South Africa 560 1960 4 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 560 1961 4 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 560 1962 4 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 560 1963 4 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 560 1964 4 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 560 1965 4 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 560 1966 4 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 560 1967 4 50 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
South Africa 560 1968 4 55 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
South Africa 560 1969 4 55 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1

111
South Africa 560 1970 4 40 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1
South Africa 560 1971 4 60 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1
South Africa 560 1972 4 75 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 1
South Africa 560 1973 4 40 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 1
South Africa 560 1974 4 45 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 1
South Africa 560 1975 4 50 0 0 0 5 5 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1976 4 59 0 1 0 5 5 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1977 4 67 0 0 0 5 4 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1978 4 78 0 0 0 5 4 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1979 4 70 0 0 0 5 4 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1980 4 70 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1
South Africa 560 1981 4 78 0 0 0 5 7 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1982 4 78 0 0 0 5 7 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1983 4 77 0 3 0 5 7 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1984 4 97 0 3 0 5 7 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1985 4 95 0 3 0 5 7 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1986 4 90 0 3 0 5 7 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1987 4 102 0 3 0 5 7 2 0 1
South Africa 560 1988 4 100 0 3 0 5 6 1 0 1
South Africa 560 1989 4 100 0 3 0 5 6 1 0 1
South Africa 560 1990 5 85 0 3 0 6 6 1 0 1
South Africa 560 1991 5 80 0 3 0 6 6 1 1 1
South Africa 560 1992 6 75 0 3 0 6 6 1 1 1
South Africa 560 1993 8 75 0 3 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 1994 9 75 0 3 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 1995 9 75 0 3 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 1996 9 75 0 3 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 1997 9 75 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 1998 9 75 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 1999 9 68 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2000 9 63 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2001 9 62 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2002 9 60 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2003 9 56 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2004 9 55 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2005 9 55 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2006 9 56 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2007 9 56 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2008 9 -99 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2009 9 -99 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2010 9 -99 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2011 9 -99 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2012 9 -99 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1
South Africa 560 2013 9 -99 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1

112
Sweden 380 1960 10 29 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
Sweden 380 1961 10 80 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
Sweden 380 1962 10 80 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
Sweden 380 1963 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
Sweden 380 1964 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
Sweden 380 1965 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
Sweden 380 1966 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
Sweden 380 1967 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
Sweden 380 1968 10 75 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1
Sweden 380 1969 10 75 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1
Sweden 380 1970 10 75 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1
Sweden 380 1971 10 75 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1
Sweden 380 1972 10 75 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1
Sweden 380 1973 10 75 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1974 10 75 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1975 10 75 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1976 10 66 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1977 10 69 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1978 10 69 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1979 10 68 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1980 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1981 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1982 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1983 10 68 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1984 10 69 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1985 10 69 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1986 10 66 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1987 10 66 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1988 10 65 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1989 10 62 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1990 10 65 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1991 10 63 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1992 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1993 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1994 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1995 10 70 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1996 10 60 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1997 10 60 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1998 10 55 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 1999 10 52 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2000 10 53 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2001 10 34 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2002 10 34 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2003 10 28 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0

113
Sweden 380 2004 10 27 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2005 10 27 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2006 10 28 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2007 10 28 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2008 10 -99 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2009 10 -99 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2010 10 -99 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2011 10 -99 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2012 10 -99 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Sweden 380 2013 10 -99 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0

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International Agreements

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (signed in 1968,

implemented in 1970)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (May 26, 1972)
Shimla Agreement, between PMs Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (July 2,
1972)
Lahore Declaration, between India and Pakistan (February 21, 1999)
United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation
Enhancement Act (October 8, 2008)

IAEA Issued Documents

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (July 29, 1957) and its
Additional Protocol – INFRCIRC/540 (September 1, 1997)
IAEA’s Safeguards System, issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency –
INFCIRC/66 (September 28, 1965)
Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in
connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, issued by the
International Atomic Energy Agency – INFCIRC/153 (June 1972)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, issued by the IAEA Board of Governors – GOV/2005/77 (September 24, 2005)
Model Protocol additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards, issued by the
International Atomic Energy Agency – INFCIRC/540 (September 1997)
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, between the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran – GOV/INF/2015/14 (July 14, 2015)

United Nations Issued Documents

Resolution 255 of the United Nations Security Council (June 19, 1968), on the
question relating to measures to safeguard non-nuclear weapon-States parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons

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 Resolution 687 of the United Nations Security Council (April 3, 1991) on the conflict
between Iraq and Kuwait
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
(October 10, 1996)
Resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council (April 11, 1995) on the use of
nuclear weapons
Resolution 1172 of the United Nations Security Council (June 6, 1998) on
international peace and security
Resolution 1540 of the United Nations Security Council (April 28, 2004) on the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Others

Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (March

16, 1946)
Atomic Energy Act, as amended (1954). 79th U.S. Congress
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, (22 U.S.C. § 3201) as amended (1978). 95th U.S.
Congress
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Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. United Nations
NATO Briefing. (2012). Tackling New Security Challenges
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Texts and Histories of the
Negotiations. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1996 Edition)

Oral sources
Atom for Peace Speech, addressed by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the
United States, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,
December 8, 1953
Interview with Rose Gottemoeller, US State Department’s under Secretary for arms
control and international security – Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 14, 2015

Press Articles
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World Nuclear News. Saudi Arabia and Argentina Form Research and Development
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28, 2015
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 Russia Today. U.K. Could Host U.S. Nukes to Counter Increased “Russian Activity”
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The Australian. Rethinking the Jihadist Threat. June 8, 2015
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Proliferation Treaty. June 11, 2015
Interfax: Russia and CIS Military Newswire. Russia Urges U.S. not to Destroy INF
Treaty. June 11, 2015
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Virtually No Manufacturing Capacity Suggests that Somehow it Could Build the Bomb. The
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June 15, 2015
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June 22, 2015
Mark Hibbs. How to Stop States From “Weaponizing” Nuclear Programs. National
Interest, June 30, 2015

Online Resources
Nuclear Threat Initiative
International Atomic Energy Agency
Correlates of War Project
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Arms Control Wonk
International Monetary Fund
World Bank
United Nations
United States’ Department of State

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