Defense & Security Analysis

ISSN: 1475-1798 (Print) 1475-1801 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdan20

“No boots on the ground”: the effectiveness of US

drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Thomas Bolland & Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen

To cite this article: Thomas Bolland & Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen (2018) “No boots on the ground”:
the effectiveness of US drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Defense & Security
Analysis, 34:2, 127-143, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2018.1478184

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1478184

Published online: 17 Jun 2018.

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DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS
2018, VOL. 34, NO. 2, 127–143
https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1478184

“No boots on the ground”: the effectiveness of US drones

against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Thomas Bollanda and Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsenb
a
School of Humanities & Social Science, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK; bDepartment of
Politics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The number of US drone strikes against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Drones; Yemen; AQAP;
Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen has increased significantly since 2010, counterterrorism; Al-Qaeda
but received limited academic attention. This article examines the
effectiveness of this drone campaign using an existing theoretical
framework. Crucially, we contribute to the framework by adding a
fourth intervening variable, namely target correspondence.
Through a single case study, it is found that drones have only
enjoyed limited success in degrading AQAP’s hierarchical structure,
qualified human resources and access to key material resources,
and in some cases – owing to our target correspondence analysis –
this limited success has come at a price. It is found that drones
have temporarily disrupted AQAP by successfully eliminating
senior leaders involved in coordinating and overseeing external
operations. Overall, AQAP’s ability to hit Western targets remains
significant.

Introduction
Following 9/11, the US government has relied heavily on drones to battle terrorists in
South Asia and the Middle East. A high number of drone strikes are apparent in
Yemen, where Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has gained strength.1 This
campaign has received limited academic attention. Within the growing literature,
studies are yet to reach a consensus on drone campaigns’ effectiveness2 – and it
remains unresolved if the Yemen-campaign has been effective, despite high numbers of
strikes. This makes the drone campaign in Yemen, targeting AQAP, a field ready for
further investigation.3
The purpose of this article is to examine the effectiveness of the drone campaign against
AQAP, and if it has effectively deprived the organisation’s ability to sustain itself and
engage in transnational terrorism against Western-Europe and the US. Therefore, we
draw upon an existing theoretical framework,4 which we add another intervening variable
to, focused on the proficiency of drone strikes and the potential for blowback.5 This allows
a more thorough qualitative analysis of drone strike “success” where strike data and first-
hand accounts are available, in order to further assess the success-rate of not only the
strike, but also potential blowback regarding in both political and radicalisation

CONTACT Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen j.a.ludvigsen@2018.ljmu.ac.uk

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
128 T. BOLLAND AND J. A. LEE LUDVIGSEN

domains, stemming from drone methodology failures. Doing so, we make a scholarly con-
tribution to literature on drones in Yemen, by assessing this campaign’s effectiveness. The
article also adds another layer to the outlined framework.
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, the theoretical framework is outlined. Sec-
ondly, we apply this to a case study on AQAP. Finally, we conclude that drones, despite
temporarily degrading AQAP’s qualified human resources, have been largely ineffective.
Additionally, it is plausible to suggest that drone strikes in Yemen have created a political
environment that is resentful towards the US and the Yemeni government.

Theoretical framework
The theoretical model advanced by Javier Jordan was proposed with the purpose of asses-
sing the effectiveness of drone campaigns. Consequently, the model is appropriate for a
similar study like this to draw upon. While the drone campaign remains the independent
variable, the dependent variable remains the terrorist organisation’s (here AQAP’s) ability
to perpetrate lethal attacks in the US and Western-Europe. Essential to the framework is
that there are three interrelated intervening variables that, if the drone campaign serves it
purposes, should be damaged by drones. Accordingly, Jordan’s intervening variables relate
to hierarchical structure, qualified human resources and key material resources; elements
that are essential for the organisations’ capacity to launch external operations and maxi-
mise the ferocity of their attacks. These three intervening variables increase the likelihood
of an organisation like AQAP in fulfilling its goal to perpetrate lethal attacks and sustain
itself.6 Furthermore, it is generally agreed upon within literature on leadership decapi-
tation and “targeted killings”7 that hierarchical structures are more prone to this strategy
than decentralised networks.8
Nonetheless, as Jordan maintains, drawing upon the work of Heger et al.,9 organis-
ations with a hierarchical structure are also more effective due to the (1) concentrated
and centralised command, (2) its ability to punish and castigate poorly incompetently per-
petrated attacks and because (3) functions within the organisation dealing with, for
instance, external operations, will ensure available resources are used reasonably.
Although low-level cells have enhanced autonomy in Al Qaeda (AQ) to execute
attacks,10 they are commonly coordinated or personally guided by entities or individuals
in the top of the AQ hierarchy.11 As Gunaratna and Oreg write, leaders play a crucial role
in planning and overseeing operations.12 This remains the case within AQAP, where a dis-
tinct hierarchical structure ensures an effective running of the organisation. The organis-
ation is compartmentalised and has distinctive political, religious, media and militarily
branches, a Shura Council, and it is known that leaders are central in administering
and coordinating external operations.13
Qualified human resources are vital for an organisation’s ability to engage in transna-
tional terrorism, particularly those speaking to “transformational leadership skills” and
“critical technical skills.” The importance of leadership for an effective running of a terror-
ist organisation is theoretically documented, and accordingly the characteristics of terror-
ist organisations; being (i) clandestine, (iii) violent and (iii) ideology-driven, amplifies the
dependency on a transformational leader.14 Transformational leaders tend to make
changes in their followers’ “behaviour and belief systems,” and endorse personal sacrifices
to attain goals that will benefit the organisation as a whole.15 Attracting and changing the
 DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 129

behaviour and beliefs of new recruits is a unique skill. According to Jordan, both the
upper-echelon and middle-men managers possessing this skill-set will ensure an
effective running of the organisation. Furthermore, the overall effectiveness also
depends on critical technical skills, often possessed by a small number of members. Ter-
rorists constantly catch up with technological developments in order to refine their oper-
ations,16 which means in addition to inspirational and sustainable leadership, having
personnel with “critical skills” in intelligence and counterintelligence, organisational man-
agement, bomb-making training, document forgery, propaganda design, publication, dis-
semination, raising funds and financial management, contributes an enhanced ability to
perpetrate transnational terrorist attacks.17
The third intervening variable pointed out is key material resources. Without the fol-
lowing four resources, an organisation is less likely to be able to continue the frequency
of external operations: (1) financial resources, (2) refuge for high-level cadres, (3) training
infrastructure and (4) weapons.18 Essentially for the theoretical framework, hierarchical
structure, qualified human resources and material resources (intervening variables) are
bound to each other. Firstly, the hierarchical structure ensures qualification of members
and access to key sources. Secondly, qualified human resources facilitate the acquisitions
of key material sources and assist the exertion of leaders’ hierarchical authority. Thirdly,
Jordan holds that access to key material sources eases the preservation of the hierarchy and
the qualification of members to the organisation.19
Ultimately, the US drone campaign (independent variable), is, if effective, likely to
negatively affect the interaction between the three intervening variables, thereby depriving
the hierarchy from running AQAP effectively, limiting access to crucial and necessary
material and human resources. This again diminishes the organisation’s operational capa-
bilities with regards transnational terrorism (dependent variable). As Jordan argues, this
model aims to give a more nuanced and complete impression of reality, as drone cam-
paigns are not merely HVT.20 Arguably, the intervening variables cannot be accurately
measured relying solely on numerical data, whereas large-N research on targeted killings
and decapitation strategies commonly only provides an explanation on what to expect on
average.21
However, we thought it prudent to amend this framework and add an additional inter-
vening variable that in some way addresses the nature of targeted killings and signature
strikes, analysing the notion that drone strikes are not simply concluded once the dust
has settled; an effect that is not solely immediate, but can also be seen as latent, giving
rise to animosity, creating instability, and impacting social and cultural behaviours.22 Fur-
thermore, if, as Jordan notes,23 there are certain elements of a terror organisation that are
required to be damaged (in this instance by drone strikes) in order to hinder or halt the
operational proficiency of the organisation, then the corollary holds that there are certain
aspects of drone strikes which can serve to negate a drone-based framework for long-term
success.24
Herein, we suggest – where detailed strike data and first-hand reports from reputable
sources are available – that a fourth intervening variable should be included within this
framework, that of “target correspondence”: an analysis utilising strike data and first-
hand ground reports to consider consequences beyond that of the original three interven-
ing variables. Amongst several, the overall aim of the US’s counterterrorism (thus, drone)
policy, is to protect the American people by eliminating threats overseas – analysis for this
130 T. BOLLAND AND J. A. LEE LUDVIGSEN

is covered by the original three intervening variables – and to counter and disrupt ideol-
ogies that legitimise violence, and to eliminate safe-havens for terror networks25 –
elements that are not fully analysable in the original framework. It is here where target
correspondence fits within the framework: not only are there moral and ethical objections
to targeted killings and signature strikes that display heavy collateral damage, there also
follows numerous political and tactical hazards associated with collateral damage
arising from such strikes – the multi-faceted notion of “blowback.”
If one is to assess the “success” of aforementioned strikes then it has to be taken into
account whether the strike has damaged or removed on of the three intervening variables,
yet also, owing to target correspondence analysis, it also has to be taken into account if this
has (potentially) only created a “sticking plaster” solution. The addition of target corre-
spondence allows for a more detailed analysis of whether drone strikes were “successful”
in the short-term for immediately removing components of a terror organisation, but tac-
tically poor onwards from the short-term insomuch that the costs associated with the
strikes stimulate blowback that negates the original purpose of the strike (i.e. local hosti-
lity, reprisals, and regional vacuums and instability). It is in assessing the landscape post-
strike where target correspondence is significant in fully detailing the success or failures of
drone strikes within a case study.

AQAP and drone strikes in Yemen

AQAP has emerged as a strong insurgency in recent years, but must also be treated as a
terrorist group. The organisation, currently led by Qasim al-Raymi, is recognised by the
US Department of State as a terrorist organisation,26 and was until 2010 primarily a
terror group. The drone campaign is primarily a counterterrorism policy aimed at “pro-
tecting the homeland from this one enemy, not creating more stable areas through coun-
terinsurgency.”27 This justifies assessing the drone campaign’s effectiveness in relation to
AQAP’s abilities to carry out transnational terrorism. As the Yemeni government has
failed to maintain order and security in the post-Arab Spring Yemen, AQAP has used
this as an opportunity to exploit local grievances and chaos, and acquire popular
support,28 occasionally operating under the name Ansar al Sharia.29 AQAP was
officially announced in 2009, as a merger between AQ’s Yemen and Saudi branches,30
and similarly to fellow AQ-affiliates, the organisation has sworn an oath to, and operates
in some accordance with AQ Core (AQC).31
Drone strikes in Yemen, can be traced back to 2002. This was an isolated strike, and it
was not until 2008 that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recognised the resurgence
of the Yemeni AQ affiliate, which would prove itself as a significant transnational threat.32
It was described by then President Barack Obama as the most “dangerous and active” AQ
affiliate,33 after repeatedly showing their intentions to strike in the US. Drone strikes, after
the strike in 2002, were absent until 2011 (Figure 1). Between these years, the main focus
of the US “drone war” was AQC around FATA.34 With a declining number of drone
attacks in Pakistan since 2011, after degrading the senior-cadre located here, a simul-
taneous rapid increase in drone strikes in Yemen is evident.35 With the possibility of
deploying drones in Yemen, compatible with Obama’s intentions of placing “no U.S
boots on the ground” in order to fight AQAP,36 the number of confirmed drone
strikes in Yemen are at the time of writing in region between 154 and 176, although
 DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 131

Figure 1. Number of drone strikes Yemen per year, according to New America Foundation and the
Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

actual figures are likely to be higher, with a significant number of strikes remaining
unconfirmed.37
AQAP, following the civil war, and after learning from previous mistakes, has strength-
ened its regional position, and proved resilient. This can be seen as AQAP has survived
regional challenges from the Yemeni state and ISIS, who failed to exert influence in
Yemen.38 Further, AQC’s decline around FATA means AQAP has become increasingly
important within the AQ network.39 When the AQ recently has attempted to – or success-
fully – hit Western targets,40 AQAP, or cells sympathising with or, connected with AQAP,
have stood behind. This is another reason behind the intensified drone deployment in
Yemen. The intent and capacity to launch large-scale attacks on Western soil is illustrated
by the Fort Hood shootings (2009),41 the failed Christmas Day bombing (2009), the explo-
sive devices found inside printer cartridges in two cargo planes (2010),42 and the Charlie
Hebdo attacks in France (2015), which AQAP claimed.43
However, the extent to which drone strikes against AQAP have effectively been
degraded the organisation’s capacity to sustain itself and carry out transnational acts of
terrorism, remains unresolved, and is given surprisingly little academic attention. Conse-
quently, this study investigates this through a case study, using the outlined theoretical
framework, in addition to a fourth intervening variable, target correspondence, for an
assessment on the effectiveness of the campaign in Yemen. Thus, the next subsections
look at how drones have affected the outlined elements of AQAP – and thereby determine
to what extent the drone campaign in Yemen (independent variable) has been (in)effective
in depriving the organisation from its ability to sustain itself and launch attacks against on
US and Western-European soil (dependent variable).

Drone strikes effect on AQAP

AQAP’s hierarchical structure
AQAP possess a hierarchical structure similar to the one outlined by Gunaratna and Oreg
in their account of AQC,44 including a Shura Council.45 Indeed, lone-cells enjoy some
autonomy with regards to attacks, but AQAP leaders have been centrally involved in
132 T. BOLLAND AND J. A. LEE LUDVIGSEN

decision-making and supervision prior to attacks. Further, the ability to perpetrate “spec-
taculars,” as AQAP has attempted to, relies on a coherent hierarchical structure.46 AQAP
has distinctive political, military, propaganda and religious branches, which ensure a stra-
tegically effective running of the group, and new recruits must be approved by leaders.47
Attacks such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting and attempted Christmas Day attack illustrate
how AQAP-tops are directly involved in external operations, encouraging lone-cells to
attack and kept informed by lower-cells about operations.48 As decentralised as AQAP
may seem – its hierarchical structure is arguably directly involved in coordination of exter-
nal operations. Although AQC also have, or had, a say in AQAP’s external operations,
AQAP has acted on its own initiative occasionally.49
High-profile AQAP leaders have been continuously killed by drones since 2011, yet,
evidence suggests that leaders have been able to lead the organisation effectively. When
AQAP-leader Nasir al-Wahayshi was killed in a “signature strike,” June 2015, Qasim al-
Raymi was announced as the new leader within days.50 Such rapid succession contrast
the situation after Osama Bin Laden’s death, when it took over a month before Ayman
al-Zawahiri was announced as the new leader. AQAP possess a clear succession-plan
they adhere to, and al-Raymi reportedly had good experience with running the organis-
ation already, whilst described as talented and innovative.51 Al-Raymi quickly delivered
a communiqué, following al-Wahayshi’s death. He accepted al-Wahayshi’s gradual
approach towards tribes,52 and has occasionally encouraged attacks against the West.53
AQAP’s strengthened position within the AQ-network and the “comeback” of its insur-
gency indicates that AQAP’s hierarchy, despite strikes against leaders, has managed to
exert stable leadership and maintain a well-working, effective strategy. Had the hierarch-
ical structure suffered significantly, it is unlikely that AQAP would stand so strongly
within the AQ-network. Certain AQAP-leaders are even central within AQ’s senior lea-
dership54 and has taken over the role as AQ’s global messenger, delivering communiqués
to a worldwide audience – a role traditionally held by AQC in FATA.55 Further, AQAP
remains the organisation posing the biggest threat among AQ affiliates to the US56 –
while its insurgency-wing has operated effectively throughout the Yemeni civil war.
Although a small number of successful external operations may suggest the opposite –
AQAP’s hierarchical structure remains operational in a day-to-day setting and in terms
of providing guidance for operations outside Yemen.

Qualified human resources

Johnsen noted that Nasir al-Wahayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi and Ibrahim Asiri
were crucial to AQAP’s future in 2012.57 Five years later, drones have killed two of these,
while two remain alive. Deputy leader, al-Shihiri, a key man behind external operations,
was killed in July 2013; al-Wahayshi in June 2015.58 The current leader, Qasim al-
Raymi and bomb-maker Asiri – AQAP’s biggest threat59 – remain at large. Moreover
AQAP’s international propaganda-spokesman Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed in September
2011, together with Samir Khan, founder and editor of Inspire, AQAP’s English-language
e-magazine.60 Al-Awlaki and Khan grew up, and were educated in America, and were
central in maintaining contact with Western radicals, encouraging them to attack.61
Both were considered key men for AQAP’s ability to launch attacks against the West,62
and the killings are likely to have degraded AQAP’s capacity to launch external operations
 DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 133

and reach out to the English-speaking audience in the short-term. The publication-rate of
Inspire was lowered, but AQAP’s ability to spread its English-language content has not
been ended.63
In 2013, it was claimed drones had killed nine commanders involved in external oper-
ations.64 Other data suggests that the US has eliminated 23 senior or mid-level comman-
ders.65 The drones have particularly targeted those leaders playing on a “global scale,”66 as
the objective behind the deployment of drones first and foremost has been to prevent
AQAP’s engagement in transnational terrorism. Although accurate numbers on strikes
are hard to obtain, it is apparent that drones have continued to target leaders involved
with AQAP’s external operations, including Nasr al-Ansi, Jalal Bala’idi and Ibrahim al-
Rubaish.67
Undeniably, AQAP has lost important leaders with inspirational and technical abil-
ities. This is likely to have impaired the organisation. Terror organisations are typically
more error-prone following leaders’ deaths,68 while up to 1333 militants have been killed
by drones overall in Yemen.69 It would be misguided to claim drones have not tempor-
arily weakened AQAP. Yet, some indicators suggest to preserved its ability to maintain
its capacity to recruit personnel through propaganda – and provide them tactical train-
ing. AQAP continue their propaganda efforts, where actions and attacks are justified
with the aim of attracting and radicalising recruits.70 AQAP has utilised the media to
praise attacks carried out by the ISIS, while the publication of Inspire continues.71
Inspire still appeals to its readership even after al-Awlaki’s death. Syed Farook, the
man behind the San Bernardino-shootings, December 2015, was allegedly influenced
by Inspire, and had expressed interest of joining AQAP, which further underlines
this.72 AQAP’s strength is also illustrated by its 4000 members in 2015.73 Reportedly,
it “only” had around 1000 members two years earlier,74 with the international com-
ponent of AQAP composing less than a third of the organisation.75 Moreover, footage
from a video posted in July 2016 suggested that AQAP’s human resources receive
advanced tactical and weaponry training.76 Additionally, Ibrahim Asiri remains at
large – which means it retains access to critical technical skills. Asiri possess the skill-
set to construct highly sophisticated bombs that airport security cannot detect, and
overall, AQAP seemingly remain capable of striking transnationally – despite the fact
that drones have taken out numerous high-profile leaders and lower-level militants,
which has only caused temporary setbacks for AQAP.

Key material resources

AQAP is funded through drugs trade, illegal taxing, robberies, fake charities and hostage
ransoms. The group earned $30 million from ransoms from 2011 to 2013,77 and also
receive substantial monetary support from donors in Saudi Arabia,78 and armoury from
fellow AQ-affiliates.79 The organisation has also adopted the ISIS’s strategy of seizing
larger territories, including cities, such as the city of Makulla in 2015, which AQAP
held for a year.80 Here, the organisation allegedly stole 13 billion Yemeni rials and $1.5
million from the central bank and 20 million Yemeni rials from an agricultural bank.81
Thus, despite losing key leaders and other operatives to drone strikes, AQAP remains
“well-funded”82 and is likely to remain so in the coming years, despite having lost
port-city Mukalla.83
134 T. BOLLAND AND J. A. LEE LUDVIGSEN

The mentioned video surfacing in 2016 suggests that AQAP has access to indoor and
outdoor training areas. In light of a US airstrike against an AQAP training camp in
Western-Yemen, April 2016, it was claimed that the strike would deny safe havens for
AQAP.84 However, due the AQAP insurgency’s strength, and access to safe havens in
Southern-Yemen, AQAP’s access to shelter is unlikely to have been negatively
affected.85 This also emerged in a US Intelligence Community’s assessment, where it is
stated that AQAP, despite pressure caused by US counterterrorism efforts in Yemen,
has “preserved the resources, manpower, safe haven, local influence, and operational capa-
bilities to continue to pose a threat.”86
Furthermore, AQAP’s ties to al-Shabaab and the wider network facilitate access to
weaponry.87 On several occasions, AQAP has attacked Yemeni government forces and
seised substantial amounts of arms. In one of these attacks, AQAP managed to get
away with dozens of tanks, rocket launchers and small arms.88 This, in addition to the
highly capable bomb maker Ibrahim Asiri still featured in AQAP’s roster, suggests that
that the group has sustained their access to weapons that can maximise damage transna-
tionally, as well as domestically – and that drone strikes have not had a substantial effect
on AQAP’s key material resources nor its access to these.

Target correspondence to analyse drone blowback

The implementation of drones as a weapon to destabilise and destroy a terror organis-
ation’s main functional practices is, however, a separate notion from how the strikes
affect those living within their range, and consequently the long-term strategic successes
or failures of the strikes. As Hudson et al. observe, there are varying levels of acceptance
within Yemen regarding the use of drone strikes: “as some reports from Yemen note, the
populace is not opposed to the use of drones when they target and hit known AQAP
members.”89 Yet this is an idealistic scenario in which the promise of accuracy is a
reliable one, and not a system based upon the methodological flaws inherent to drone
strikes,90 in particular surgical strikes – the common modus operandi in US-Yemen
counter-terror operations. Furthermore, it opens up a linguistic debate around who con-
stitutes an “AQAP member.” As the US administration defines it, “all military-age males
in a strike zone count as combatants […] unless there is explicit intelligence posthu-
mously proving them innocent.”91 If (or in many cases, when) a Yemeni family
member – who was not a member of AQAP, but was designated by the US as a militant
– was injured or killed, one can only suspect that these opinions may change; for many a
government-sanctioned payment may not be enough to compensate for the loss of
family.92
Nevertheless, as previously stated, drone strikes have contributed towards the
killing of several high-profile AQAP targets within Yemen. Yet at the same time,
according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, since 2011, US drone strikes –
in the hunt for AQAP targets – killed between 68 and a maximum of 129 civilians,
with a maximum of 16 of those being children.93 Many of these insecurities faced by
civilians have nonetheless transitioned from fear into hatred.94 Indeed, as the ex-head
of the CIA’s counter-terrorism centre, Robert Grenier, recognises, one form of blow-
back from drone strikes in Yemen is one that expedites borderline threats. He
suggests that:95
 DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 135

Young men, who are typically armed, are in the same area and hold these militants in a
certain form of high regard. If you strike them indiscriminately you are running the risk
of creating a terrific amount of popular anger. They have tribes and clans and large families.
Now all of a sudden you have a big problem … I am very concerned about the creation of a
larger terrorist safe haven in Yemen.

As Mothana states, instead of “winning hearts and minds,” the US – through its wide tar-
geting net – is estranging civilians living in the tribal areas of Yemen, creating a siege men-
tality by killing those close to them and consequently inviting enemies upon themselves
which before may have been seen as allies.96 For AQAP, the US drone programme is
viewed as assistive in its recruitment narratives, owing to the previous failings of drone
strikes in Yemen. Farea al-Muslimi, a 22-year-old Yemeni, living in Wessab, Yemen,
where a drone strike had recently killed five people, giving a testimony to a US senate com-
mittee, relayed that the US drone programme had made his attempts to support America
“almost impossible.”97 Al-Muslimi was previously the recipient of an American education
scholarship and self-confessed “pro-American Yemeni.” He recounts a story of a man he
met whose 4-year-old son and 6-year-old daughter died in his arms on the way to a hos-
pital after one drone strike, saying the man’s house was “targeted by mistake”98 by the US.
Al-Muslimi’s summary is one of confliction: he rejects AQAP, their ideology and methods,
and the way they have turned his religion – to him – into something unrecognisable, yet he
says:
I fear that these air strikes undermine the United States’ effort to defeat AQAP and win the
hearts and minds of the Yemeni people […] the killing of innocent civilians by U.S. missiles
in Yemen is helping to destabilise my country and create an environment from which AQAP
benefits99

For a Yemeni citizen, and an ardent supporter of the US, to state this, it can only be
assumed that despite the killing of several HVT’s, the seemingly indiscriminate nature
of signature strikes – to the Yemeni population – are a continuous source of insecurity,
and anger. Whereas in Wessab, a “small village, which doesn’t even register on Google
Maps,”100 it can be understood how a small populations’ “first experience of America
coming from the terror of a drone strike” would cement a position of ardent animosity,
however, evidence of a broadening radicalisation within wider Yemen populations was
rearing its head as far back as 2012. As shown in a series of 20 interviews with tribal
leaders, victims’ relatives, human rights activists and officials from the four provinces in
southern Yemen, there was a perceptible “shift in sentiment toward militants affiliated
with the transnational network’s most active wing, AQAP.”101 Many locals who do not
wish to stay in areas heavily targeted by drone strikes have since moved away voluntarily,
or have been forced to move after having their homes and farmland destroyed,102 creating
a vacuum of space for AQAP militants to freely operate without resistance.
Moreover, drone strikes in Yemen have not only damaged local populations, but have
also aided in creating “resistance communities,” aiming to push back at a “delegitimised”
Yemeni state apparatus.103 As Hudson et al. note,104 the merging of technological asym-
metry, the “might-makes-right” doctrine, and vacuums created by the US has resulted in
both an increase in AQAP recruitment and a flourishing of similarly related Taliban
groups in the region such as the AQAP-backed Ansar al-Sharia. Ansar al-Sharia, aside
from their militancy, aim to capitalise on the vacuums left in regions following attacks
136 T. BOLLAND AND J. A. LEE LUDVIGSEN

and capitalise on the Yemeni government’s “lack of capacity to provide social services in
contested provinces [and] popularise its struggle by demonstrating its viability as an
alternative to the current regime.”105 The growth of these AQAP branches has left
Yemen in a continuous state of recurrence. Members of hardened terror organisations
such as AQAP do not – and indeed cannot – live in isolation;106 in scenarios where
many AQAP militants can “blend into the local population,”107 the combination of signa-
ture strikes in the vicinity of numerous civilians often places the locals between a rock and
a hard place: potentially stay and be caught in a strike – perpetuating a system of rigid anti-
US resentment – or leave and, albeit unintentionally, create a vacuum for AQAP militants
to populate, militarise and control.108
From this, it would appear that the continuous use of drone strikes has, over several
years, been instrumental in losing the hearts and minds of the Yemeni population. Fur-
thermore, they have also created ungoverned spaces for AQAP and AQAP-backed organ-
isations to sprout and flourish, using their de facto authority to delegitimise the Yemeni
government and recruit new members. In these specific instances, the use of drone
strikes to combat AQAP in Yemen has not only seemingly made their recruitment
methods easier, but has also widened their sphere of influence and the social spaces in
which they can function.109 Although it must be acknowledged that locals’ distress over
drones does not automatically translate to endorsement of, or recruitment into a terrorist
group, while vacuums not automatically add to AQAP’s capabilities, this is an established
feature of drone strikes.110 Thus a variable – still in its early stages – yet crucial to recognise
and develop further, in future, similar qualitative analyses, despite inherent obstacles
associated with access to data and establishing “tangible” causal links.

Regional priorities
Despite successfully eliminating several high-profile AQAP leaders and lower-level
fighters, drones have only enjoyed limited success in degrading AQAP’s hierarchical struc-
ture, qualified human resources and access to key material resources, and in some cases –
owing to our target correspondence analysis – this limited success seem to have come at a
price. Indeed, it may be argued that the lack of successful transnational attacks perpetrated
by AQAP suggest otherwise. The small number of attacks must also be seen in context of
AQAP’s main priorities, and the recent, wider shift in strategy of the AQ-network as a
whole. Nonetheless, AQAP undeniably remains an international threat – and the AQ
affiliate most likely to carry out an attack on Western soil.111 AQAP’s alleged involvement
in the Charlie Hebdo attack, recent calls for attacks and approval of ISIS activity in Europe,
reinforce this. As late as in December 2015, al-Raymi referred to the US as the “real”
enemy,112 while the edition of Inspire published in August 2017 called for supporters to
strike in the US and Europe. Thus, external operations still exist on AQAP’s agenda,
and AQAP’s “absence” from the headlines is arguably deliberate, and not assignable to
organisational weakness.113
In accordance with a wider AQ strategy in recent years, of embedding itself into local
insurgencies and exploiting the opportunistic landscape after the Arab Spring, AQAP has
attempted the same, at times aided by vacuums following the Saudi-led military interven-
tion against the rebellious Houthi movement and Saleh loyalists.114 Further, AQAP
experienced a temporary defeat in May 2012, following an offensive launched by
 DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 137

Yemeni Armed Forces. Before this, AQAP had an unsuccessful period of governance in
Yemen, where Yemeni-tribes turned against AQAP, after failing to meet the population’s
needs. Following this, AQAP leadership took a more gradual approach towards tribes-
men,115 engaged in population-centric projects, and appeared less brutal, and more mod-
erate than its rival ISIS.116 It should not be neglected, however, that AQAP’s activities are
likely to have been directly affected by an Emirati-led offensive in 2016, which meant
AQAP lost territory, in addition to frequent clashes with the Houthis – with its stronghold
in Northern Yemen – and, of course, the emergence of ISIS.117 ISIS gained some followers
from the AQ-network in its formative stages,118 but overall failed to win Yemenis’ broad
support. Thus, by operating more “low-key,” with a regional concentration, AQAP has
reinforced its strength, depth and resilience. This suggests that the organisations, if – or
when – it starts prioritising external operations again, will pose a greater threat.

Conclusion
Drawing upon Jordan’s framework in order to measure the effectiveness of drone cam-
paigns, with the inclusion of a fourth intervening variable – targeted correspondence –
this article has assessed the effectiveness of the Yemen drone campaign. This campaign
has, broadly, received limited academic attention and suffers from a limited availability
of information regarding this campaign, in contrast to data on drone activity in AfPak,
despite the increased prevalence of strikes in Yemen since 2010. By investigating drone
strikes in Yemen, and their relation to four intervening and interacting variables, accord-
ingly essential for AQAP’s abilities to perpetrate transnational terrorism campaigns –
AQAP’s hierarchical structure, qualified human resources, access to key material resources,
and the target correspondence of strikes – it is argued that the drone campaign, although
periodically degrading and disrupting AQAP’s qualified human resources, has so far failed
to weaken the organisation’s operational capacity with regards to attacks in the US and
Western-Europe.
Furthermore, the strikes themselves have seemingly worked against the US’s counter-
terror objectives. As previously shown, drone strikes in Yemen have created an atmos-
phere of hostility towards the US, whilst also undermining the legitimacy of the
Yemeni government. This, combined with the spatial openings left by those who have
fled their homes, has allowed AQAP to control and militarise wider locations in
Yemen. These vacuums have allowed AQAP to create offshoot organisations, designed
primarily to bolster support and demonstrate legitimacy against the Yemeni government
by providing locals with much needed social services. Whilst drone strikes by the US have
eliminated several high-value targets within Yemen, it should be recognised that the
approach utilised to accomplish this has facilitated the methods and means of AQAP
attaining further human, spatial and financial resources, translating into further oper-
ational capabilities to conduct transnational terror operations.
When applying the theoretical model to what is known about AQAP’s operational
capacities post-strikes, it first emerged that AQAP has preserved its hierarchical structure,
ensuring effective running of the organisation. Secondly, despite targeted killings, AQAP
has sustained propaganda and recruitment efforts. Thirdly, AQAP remains well-funded,
and enjoys access to safe-havens. Although it may be argued that the relative absence of
successful external operations suggest a degradation of AQAP’s operational capabilities
138 T. BOLLAND AND J. A. LEE LUDVIGSEN

– this must be seen in light of a wider, and more regional-focused, AQ strategy in recent
years. AQAP has arguably preserved the needed abilities to carry out attacks in the West,
despite being regularly harassed by drones. Moreover, there is some suggestion that
Yemeni locals are now more sympathetic towards AQAP following US-Yemeni
counter-terror operations. Essentially, AQAP is still considered the most dangerous AQ
affiliate.119
However, there are limitations to this study. Particularly those difficulties involved
when isolating the independent variable from other independent variables, such as
other counterterrorism or law-enforcement operations,120 including Saudi or Yemeni-
led offensives, but also clashes with the Houthis; likely to have affected the dependent vari-
able. Furthermore, the strikes in Yemen are covert, and the majority of details – that have
not been leaked – remain classified. Evaluating intelligence performances, naturally, is
inherently difficult for outsiders of the intelligence community,121 since an assessment
only can be made on what is publicly known and available data. This obstacle also persists
when conducting research on terrorism and counterterrorism generally.122 Yet, despite the
clandestine nature of drone campaigns, the effects are not necessarily covert, which adds to
the reliability and validity of drawing from open-sources. Nonetheless, this article arguably
makes a scholarly contribution to the literature on drones in Yemen, and delivers an
assessment of the effectiveness of this campaign. Indeed, it also advances an additional
layer of analysis to Jordan’s analytical framework regarding drone strikes. It is suggested
that this further addition is important in attempting qualitatively to assess “success” of
counter-terror drone operations by looking beyond the initial three intervening variables,
and assessing how drone strikes may have further helped or hampered their initial objec-
tives, due to the significance of the consequences manifested after strikes are underway.
This subsequently remains crucial in future, similar research.

Notes
1. J. Boyle, ‘The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare’, International Affairs 89, no. 1
(2013): 1–29.
2. See for instance: J.P Lehrke and R. Schomaker, ‘Kill, Capture, or Defend? The Effectiveness of
Specific and General Counterterrorism Tactics Against the Global Threats of the Post-9/11
Era’, Security Studies 25, no. 4 (2016): 729–62; J. Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll: Assessing the
Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation’, Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719–55;
B. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’, International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 9–46;
J. Carson, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of High-Profile Targeted Killings in the “War on
Terror” – A Quasi-Experiment’, Criminology & Public Policy 16, no. 1 (2017): 191–220;
J. Jordan, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign Against Al Qaeda Central: A Case
Study’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (2014): 4–29.
3. C. Hellmich, ‘Fighting Al Qaeda in Yemen? Rethinking the Nature of the Islamist Threat and
the Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 9
(2012): 618–33, 619.
4. Jordan, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign’.
5. C. Johnson, Blowback (New York: Owl Books, 2000), 8.
6. Jordan, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign’, 7.
7. Targeted killing here refers to

the intentional killing of a specific civilian or unlawful combatant who cannot reason-
ably be apprehended, who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at the
 DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 139

direction of the state, in the context of an international or non-international armed

conflict. (See: S. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 528).
8. M. Morehouse, ‘It’s Easier to Decapitate a Snake than It Is a Hydra: An Analysis of Colom-
bia’s Targeted Killing Program’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 7 (2014): 541–66;
M. Freeman, ‘A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (And Its Consequences for Leadership Tar-
geting), Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014): 666–87.
9. L. Heger, D. Jung and W.H. Wung, ‘Organising for Resistance: How Group Structure
Impacts the Character of Violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 5 (2012): 743–68.
10. B. Mendelsohn, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Franchising Strategy’, Survival 53, no. 3 (2011): 29–50, 30;
M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and C. Jones, ‘Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why Al-
Qaeda May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think’, International Security 33, no. 2
(2008): 7–44, 36.
11. Jordan, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign’.
12. R. Gunaratna and A. Oreg, ‘Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and Its Evolution’, Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 12 (2010): 1043–78, 1044.
13. A. Harris, ‘The Uncertainties of Change’, RUSI Journal 156, no. 4 (2011): 72–9, 73; S. Kardeli,
‘An Old Threat Left in the Shadows of ISIS-Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’, Inter-
national Conference RCIC (2017): 180–6, 181; Hellmich, ‘Fighting Al Qaeda in Yemen?’, 619.
14. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’.
15. Ibid., 18.
16. A. Wagner, ‘Intelligence for Counter-Terrorism: Technology and Methods’, Journal of Poli-
cing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 2, no. 2 (2007): 48–61.
17. Jordan, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign’, 9.
18. Ibid., 10.
19. Ibid., 10, 11.
20. Ibid., 11.
21. Freeman, ‘A Theory of Terrorist Leadership’, 667.
22. Stanford Law School/ NYU School of Law ‘Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma
to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan’ (2012), pp. 73–101. http://chrgj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf.
23. Jordan, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign’.
24. A. Cronin, ‘Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July-August
(2013), 44–54; J.A. Sluka, ‘Death from Above: UAVs and Losing Hearts and Minds’, Military
Review, May–June (2011), 70–6.
25. Whitehouse.gov, ‘United States’ National Strategy for Counterterrorism’ (2012), pp. 8–10.
26. US Department of State, ‘State Department Amendments to the Terrorist Designations of
Hizballah and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’ (2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2017/06/272090.htm.
27. L. Hudson, C. Owens, and D. Callen, ‘Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates through
Counterterrorism’, Middle East Policy XIX, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 142–56, 148.
28. W.A. Terrill, ‘The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penin-
sula’, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press (2013), 35; B. Hoffman, ‘Al
Qaeda’s Uncertain Future’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 8 (2013): 635–53, 643.
29. J. Turner, ‘Strategic Differences: Al Qaeda’s Split with the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham’,
Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 2 (2015): 208–25, 217.
30. B. Loidolt, ‘Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 2 (2011): 102–23, 103; K. Zimmerman,
“Testimony: AQAP’s Role in the al Qaeda Network,” statement before the House Committee
on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, September 18,
2013, p. 2, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/testimony-aqaps-role-in-the-al-qaeda-net
work.
31. K. Lee, ‘Does Al Qaeda Central Still Matter?’, UNISCI Discussion Papers#37 (January), 15–48.
140 T. BOLLAND AND J. A. LEE LUDVIGSEN

32. J. Jordan, ‘Drone Attacks Campaign in Yemen’, Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios
Estratégicos Núm 1 (2013), 234–65, 245.
33. Terrill, ‘The Struggle for Yemen’, 1.
34. TBIJ, ‘Drone Strikes in Yemen’, 2017. Available at https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
projects/drone-war/yemen.
35. TBIJ, ‘Yemen Datasheet’, 2017. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/
yemen.
36. ‘Obama says no plan for U.S. troops in Yemen, Somalia’, Reuters, January 10, 2010. http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-usa-troops-idUSTRE6091T820100110.
37. TBIJ, ‘Yemen Datasheet’.
38. K. Zimmerman, ‘AQAP Post–Arab Spring and the Islamic State’, in How Al-Qaeda Survived
Drones, Uprisings and the Islamic State, ed. A. Zelin (Washington: The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 2017).
39. Zimmerman, ‘AQAP Post–Arab Spring’; B. Hoffman, ‘Al Qaeda’s Uncertain Future’, 646.
40. Jordan, ‘Drone Attacks Campaign in Yemen’; Zimmerman, ‘AQAP Post–Arab Spring’.
41. Jordan, ‘Drone Attacks Campaign in Yemen’.
42. Zimmermann, ‘Testimony: AQAP’s Role in the al Qaeda Network’.
43. M. Morell, ‘Fourteen Years and Counting: The Evolving Terrorist Threat’, CTC Sentinel 8,
no. 9 (2015): 1–5, 2.
44. ‘Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, START, April 2015. http://www.start.umd.
edu/baad/narratives/al-qaida-arabian-peninsula-aqap; Gunaratna and Oreg, ‘Al Qaeda’s
Organizational Structure’, 1055.
45. Harris, ‘The Uncertainties of Change’, 73.
46. Gunaratna and Oreg, ‘Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure’, 1045.
47. Harris, ‘The Uncertainties of Change’, 74.
48. C. Hellmich, ‘Fighting Al Qaeda in Yemen? Rethinking the Nature of the Islamist Threat and
the Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 9
(2012): 618–33; Morell, ‘Fourteen Years and Counting’, 2.
49. L. Farrall, ‘How Al Qaeda Works: What the Organisation’s Subsidiaries Say about Its
Strength’, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 128–38, 135.
50. T. Joscelyn, ‘AQAP Confirms Death of Senior Leader’, The Long War Journal, June 16, 2015.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/aqap-confirms-death-of-senior-leader.
php; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Drone war report, January – June 2015: contro-
versial ‘signature strikes’ hit Yemen and Pakistan’, July 1, 2015. https://www.thebureauin
vestigates.com/stories/2015-07-01/drone-war-report-january-june-2015-controversial-sign
ature-strikes-hit-yemen-and-pakistan.
51. G. Johnsen, ‘Al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State Benefit as Yemen War Drags On’, CTC Sentinel
9, no. 1 (2016), 14–18, 14.
52. M. Horton, ‘Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’,
CTC Sentinel 10, no. 1 (2017): 17–23, 17.
53. T. Joscelyn, ‘AQAP Leader Calls for ‘Simple’ Attacks in the West’, The Long War Journal,
May 8, 2017. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/aqap-leader-calls-for-simpl
e-attacks-in-the-west.php.
54. Zimmerman, ‘AQAP Post–Arab Spring’.
55. Ibid., 51.
56. D.R. Coats, ‘Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community’, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, May 11, 2017. https://www.intellige
nce.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-coats-051117.pdf.
57. G. Johnsen, ‘A Profile of AQAP’s Upper Echelon’, CTC Sentinel 5, no. 7 (2012): 6–9, 8.
58. A. Stenersen, ‘Al-Qàida’s Comeback in Afghanistan and its Implications’, CTC Sentinel 9, no.
9 (2016): 21–8, 25.
59. Johnsen, ‘A Profile of AQAP’s Upper Echelon’, 8.
 DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 141

60. Jordan, ‘Drone Attacks Campaign in Yemen’; O. Adaki, ‘AQAP Publishes Biography of
American Jihadist Samir Khan’, The Long War Journal, November 25, 2014. http://www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/aqap_releases_biogra_1.php.
61. See: M. Storm, P. Cruickshank, and T. Lister, Agent Storm: My life Inside Al Qaeda and the
CIA (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2014).
62. Jordan, ‘Drone Attacks Campaign in Yemen’, 258; O. Adaki, ‘AQAP Publishes Biography of
American Jihadist Samir Khan’, The Long War Journal, November 25, 2014.
63. Zimmerman, ‘Al Qaeda in Yemen: Countering the Threat from the Arabian Peninsula’, Criti-
cal Threats (2012): 1–19. https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Zimm
erman_Countering_the_Threat_Yemen-1.pdf.
64. Jordan, ‘Drone Attacks Campaign in Yemen’.
65. Ibid., 23; New America Foundation, ‘Yemen Analysis’, 2017, http://securitydata.newamerica.
net/drones/yemen-analysis.html. It is unclear however exactly how many of these strikes that
were carried out by drones.
66. Zimmerman, ‘AQAP Post–Arab Spring’.
67. M. Titus and D. Grey, ‘Suppressing the Growth of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: An
Examination of the Resurgence of AQAP in Yemen and Policies the United States Can
Employ to Mitigate the Threat’, Global Security Studies 6, no. 3 (2015): 19–28; T. Joscelyn,
‘Osama Bin Laden’s Files: Al Qaeda’s Deputy General Manager in Yemen’, The Long War
Journal, March 1, 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/03/osama-bin-laden
s-files-al-qaedas-deputy-general-manager-in-yemen.php.
68. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’.
69. New America Foundation, ‘Drone Wars Yemen’.
70. M. Page, L. Challita, and A. Harris, ‘Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives
and Prescriptions’, Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 2 (2011): 150–72.
71. Zimmerman, ‘AQAP Post–Arab Spring’, 51; Johnsen, ‘A Profile of AQAP’s Upper Echelon’, 8.
72. ‘California Man Charged with Conspiring to Provide Material Support to Terrorism and
Being “Straw Purchaser” of Assault Rifles Ultimately Used in San Bernardino’, US Depart-
ment of Justice, December 17, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-man-charge
d-conspiring-provide-material-support-terrorism-and-being-straw.
73. US Department of State, ‘Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organisations’. https://www.state.gov/
j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm.
74. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, START April 2015. http://www.start.umd.edu/
baad/narratives/al-qaida-arabian-peninsula-aqap.
75. Jordan, ‘Drone Attacks Campaign in Yemen’, 250.
76. B. Roggio and C. Weiss, ‘AQAP Details “Special Forces” Training Camp’, The Long War
Journal, July 14, 2016. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/07/aqap-details-speci
al-forces-training-camp.php.
77. Y. Fanusie and A. Entz, ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-Financial Assessment’, Center on
Sanctions and Illicit Finance (July 2017), 2–20; T. Joscelyn, ‘US Treasury Continues to Target
AQAP’s Financial Network’, The Long War Journal, December 7, 2016. http://www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/12/us-treasury-continues-to-target-aqaps-financial-network.
php.
78. Titus and Grey, ‘Suppressing the Growth of Al Qaeda’.
79. Fanusie and Entz, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-Financial Assessment.
80. H.J. Schindler, ‘The United Nations View on al-Qaeda’s Financing Today’, chapter in How
Al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings and the Islamic State, ed. A. Zelin (Washington: The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2017), 88.
81. Schindler, ‘The United Nations View on Al-Qaeda’s Financing Today’.
82. Morell, ‘Fourteen Years and Counting’, 2.
83. Fanusie and Entz, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-Financial Assessment’, 2.
84. B. Roggio, ‘US Military Strikes AQAP Training Camp in Yemen’, The Long War Journal,
March 23, 2016. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/us-military-strikes-aqap-
training-camp-in-yemen.php.
142 T. BOLLAND AND J. A. LEE LUDVIGSEN

85. Ibid.
86. Coats, ‘Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community’.
87. Fanusie and Entz, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-Financial Assessment’.
88. Ibid., 8.
89. Hudson et al., ‘Drone Warfare in Yemen’, 151.
90. The NSA’s Secret Role in the U.S Assassination Program’, The Interccept, February 10, 2014.
https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/.
91. ‘Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’, The New York Times, May 29,
2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.
html?_r=0.
92. ‘Yemeni Victims of U.S. Military Drone Strike Get More Than $1 Million in Compensation’,
The Washington Post, August 18, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/yemeni-victims-of-us-military-drone-strike-get-more-than-1million-in-
compensation/2014/08/18/670926f0-26e4-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html?utm_
term=.1456043cdc2a.
93. TBIJ, 2017. ‘Yem110’. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-rep
orted-us-covert-action-2012#YEM110; TBIJ, 2017, ‘Yemen: Reported US Covert Actions
2013’. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-
actions-2013; TBIJ, 2017. ‘Yemen: Reported US Covert Actions 2014’. https://www.
thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2014; TBIJ,
2017. ‘Yemen: Reported US Covert Actions 2015’. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2015; TBIJ, 2017. ‘Yemen: Reported US
Covert Actions 2016’. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-repo
rted-us-covert-actions-2016; TBIJ, 2017. ‘Yemen: Reported US Covert Actions 2017’.
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-
2017.
94. I. Mothana, ‘How Drones Help Al-Qaeda’, June 13, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/
14/opinion/how-drones-help-al-qaeda.html.
95. ‘Drone attacks create terrorist safe havens, warns former CIA official’, The Guardian, June 5,
2012. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/05/al-qaida-drone-attacks-too-broad.
96. Mothana, ‘How Drones Help Al-Qaeda’.
97. ‘This Yemeni Man Loves America, Hates Al-Qaeda, and Says Drone Strikes Make Them
Stronger’, The Atlantic, April 24, 2013. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/
04/this-yemeni-man-loves-america-hates-al-qaeda-and-says-drone-strikes-make-them-
stronger/275248/.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. ‘In Yemen, U.S Airstrikes Breed Anger Sympathy for Al-Qaeda’, The Washington Post, May
29, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-bree
d-anger-and-sympathy-for-al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_print.html.
102. ‘In Yemen, U.S Airstrikes Breed Anger Sympathy for Al-Qaeda’.
103. Hudson et al., ‘Drone Warfare in Yemen’, 151.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. M. Ahmad, ‘The Use of Drones in Pakistan: An Inquiry into the Ethical and Legal Issues’, The
Political Quarterly 85, no. 1 (2014): 65–74, 70.
107. ‘Where Terrorists Have Tanks: A Ride Through Al-Qaeda Country’, Time, July 25, 2012.
http://world.time.com/2012/07/25/where-terrorists-have-tanks-a-ride-through-al-qaeda-
country/
108. ‘Where Terrorists Have Tanks’.
109. J. Schwedler, ‘Is the U.S. Drone Program in Yemen Working?’, Lawfare, September 27, 2015.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-drone-program-yemen-working.
 DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 143

110. Boyle, ‘The Costs and Consequences’; Cronin, ‘Why Drones Fail’.
111. Zimmerman, ‘AQAP Post–Arab Spring’.
112. T. Joscelyn, ‘AQAP Leader Says America is the “Primary Enemy”’, The Long War Journal,
December 24, 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/aqap-leader-says-am
erica-is-the-primaryenemy.php.
113. Ibid.
114. Reuters, How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger – and richer. http://
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap/
115. Horton, ‘Fighting the Long War’.
116. Kardeli, ‘An Old Threat Left in the Shadows of ISIS’, 183.
117. Zimmerman, ‘AQAP Post–Arab Spring’, 47–9.
118. Ibid.
119. Morell, ‘Fourteen Years and Counting’, 2.
120. Jordan, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign’, 23.
121. R. Kerr, ‘The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950 to 2000’, in Analyzing Intelligence
Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, ed. R.Z. George and I.B. Bruce (Washington, DC: Geor-
getown University Press, 2008), 35.
122. Lehrke and Schomaker, ‘Kill, Capture, or Defend?’, 744.

Acknowledgements
A special thanks to Dr Ulrich Petersohn (University of Liverpool) for comments on an early draft of
this article. Acknowledgements are also due to the Editor-in-Chief and reviewers for their feedback.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.