The Australian Transport Safety ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY REPORT

Bureau (ATSB) is an independent

Commonwealth Government statutory
Marine Occurrence Investigation No.280
Agency. The Bureau is governed by a MO-2010-009
Commission and is entirely separate
from transport regulators, policy Final
makers and service providers. The

Grounding of the container ship MSC Basel

ATSB's function is to improve safety
and public confidence in the aviation,
marine and rail modes of transport
through excellence in:

in Moreton Bay, Queensland

• independent investigation of
transport accidents and other
safety occurrences
• safety data recording, analysis

1 November 2010
and research
• fostering safety awareness,
knowledge and action.

The ATSB does not investigate for the

purpose of apportioning blame or to
provide a means for determining
Abstract However, inspections and tests carried out
liability. following the grounding did not identify any
The ATSB performs its functions in At about 0937 1 on 1 November 2010, the steering control system faults.
accordance with the provisions of the
Transport Safety Investigation Act
Liberian registered container ship MSC Basel
2003 and, where applicable, relevant grounded in Moreton Bay, Queensland, while The investigation also found that MSC Basel’s
international agreements.
departing the port of Brisbane. steering system had not been tested in
When the ATSB issues a safety
recommendation, the person,
accordance with SOLAS 2 requirements before the
organisation or agency must provide a MSC Basel was in the main shipping channel ship departed Brisbane.
written response within 90 days. That
response must indicate whether the when its rudder unexpectedly moved to starboard
person, organisation or agency
accepts the recommendation, any
without the application of any helm. The ship The investigation report identifies one safety issue
reasons for not accepting part or all of immediately began turning to starboard. and outlines the safety actions taken by MSC
the recommendation, and details of
any proposed safety action to give Basel’s managers to address it. The report also
effect to the recommendation. The main engine was run astern and the port issues one safety advisory notice.
© Commonwealth of Australia 2011 anchor was let go. However, these actions could
not prevent the ship from grounding on Yule
In the interests of enhancing the value
of the information contained in this
Banks, just to the north of the channel.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
publication you may download, print,
reproduce and distribute this material
acknowledging the Australian
The ATSB investigation found that the ship’s
MSC Basel
Transport Safety Bureau as the
source. However, copyright in the rudder probably moved to starboard because of a MSC Basel (IMO No. 9008615) is a 2,688 TEU 3
material obtained from other agencies,
private individuals or organisations, malfunction of the steering control system. cellular container ship (Figure 1) which was built
belongs to those agencies, individuals
or organisations. Where you want to
use their material you will need to
contact them directly.
Figure 1: MSC Basel at anchor in Moreton Bay

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

PO Box 967, Civic Square ACT 2608
Australia

1800 020 616

+61 2 6257 4150 from overseas

www.atsb.gov.au

ISBN 978-1-74251-134-4
2 The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea,
Publication Date: April 2011 1974, as amended.
ATSB-JAN11/ATSB06
1 All times referred to in this report are local time, 3 The nominal size of a ship in TEU refers to the number of
Released in accordance with section
25 of the Transport Safety Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) + 10 hours. containers (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units) it can carry.
Investigation Act 2003
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in 1992 by Thyssen Nordseewerke, Germany. It United Kingdom in 1974. In 1984, he gained his
has an overall length of 216.19 m, a beam of Australian class one master’s certificate of
32.20 m and a deadweight of 45,696 tonnes at competency. In 1989, he started working as a
its summer draught of 12.52 m. pilot in Cairns, Queensland, and in 1991, he
joined Brisbane Marine Pilots. At the time of the
Propulsive power is provided by a Sulzer 6RTA-72 grounding, he held an unrestricted pilotage
two-stroke, single acting diesel engine that licence for the port of Brisbane.
delivers 16,440 kW at 94 rpm. The main engine
drives a single, fixed pitch propeller which gives The steering gear
the ship a service speed of about 18 knots 4 .
MSC Basel was fitted with a Schweriner
The ship’s navigation bridge was equipped with Maschinenbau hydraulically operated ram type
navigational equipment consistent with SOLAS steering gear. The unit consisted of a tiller,
requirements. Its layout included a steering stand mounted directly onto the upper section of the
located near the centreline and an integrated rudder stock. The tiller was positioned by two
bridge console offset to starboard. The ship was pairs of hydraulic rams (Figure 2).
also equipped with a bridge mounted remote
control of the anchor windlass brakes. For redundancy purposes, the steering gear had
two identical and independent hydraulic control
At the time of the incident, MSC Basel was systems which supplied oil to all four hydraulic
registered in Liberia and classed with rams. Two hydraulic units, each incorporating an
Germanischer Lloyd (GL). The ship was owned by electric motor, a pump, an oil cooler, a hydraulic
MS Paradip and Co, managed by Reederei F. oil tank and a set of solenoid control valves, were
Laeisz, both of Germany, and on charter to the mounted directly forward of the steering gear
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), assembly.
Switzerland.
At sea, the ship’s steering was generally
The ship had a crew of 22, comprising 13 Kiribati, controlled by one hydraulic system, with the other
five Russian, two German, one Ukrainian and one placed in standby mode. During pilotage, both
Estonian national. All of the crew were systems were normally run, providing faster
appropriately qualified to hold their positions on steering response and increased system
board the ship. reliability.

The master had 18 years of seagoing experience.
He held a Russian masters certificate of
competency that was issued in 2006. He had
sailed as master for about 3 years and had visited
Brisbane many times before. He had been
employed by the ship’s managers for about 12
years and rejoined MSC Basel on 12 September
2010 for his second 4 month contract on board
the ship.
The third mate started his seagoing career in
2005 as an apprentice ship’s mechanic. In 2007,
he started training as a navigating officer and in
August 2010, gained his German watch keeping
officer’s licence. He joined MSC Basel on 26
September for his first contract as a third mate.
The pilot on board MSC Basel for its departure
from Brisbane started his seagoing career in the
4 One knot, or one nautical mile per hour equals 1.852 relevant hydraulic system solenoid valves. As a
km/hr.
For remote bridge control purposes, the steering
gear was fitted with an Anschutz electronic control
system. The system provided control in any one of
six remote modes: auto-pilot, bridge centreline
steering stand ‘helm’ (steering wheel); integrated
bridge console ‘helm’; integrated bridge console
‘lever’; port bridge wing ‘lever’ and starboard
bridge wing ‘lever’. If, at any time, the control
system in use failed, the operator could change
over to one of the standby systems.
When either ‘helm’ position was selected, the
operator controlled the ship’s steering by turning
the control stand mounted helm to a desired
rudder position. In this mode, the control system
constantly compared the electronic input signal
from the helm with the signal received from a
rudder position transmitter (follow-up control). If
the signals did not match (i.e. the rudder was in a
different position to the helm), the control system
applied an output signal that energised the

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Figure 2: Steering gear assembly

result, the rudder moved in the desired direction. Tauranga, New Zealand. The ship was scheduled
When the helm signal matched the output from to remain in port for about 36 hours while the
the rudder position transmitter, the solenoid loading and unloading of its containerised cargo
valves de-energised and the rudder stopped was carried out.
moving and remained in the desired position.
At 0730 on 1 November, a Brisbane harbour pilot
When any of the three ‘lever’ controls was boarded MSC Basel for its departure. The pilot
selected, the operator controlled the ship’s was taken to the bridge where he met the ship’s
steering by moving the lever. This system master. The two men completed their pilot/master
operated the solenoid valves directly, independent information exchange. The pilot was informed that
of the feedback signal from the rudder position all of the ship’s equipment had been tested and
transmitter (non follow-up control). When the lever found to be in good working order.
was moved to port, the control system energised
the relevant solenoids and the rudder moved to The bridge team for the ship’s departure included
port. When released, the lever returned to its the master, the pilot, the chief mate and two able
bodied seamen. The two seamen would act as
central position and the solenoid valves de-
energised. The rudder would then stop moving. either a lookout or a helmsman on half hourly
Similarly, when the lever was moved to starboard, rotations. The ship’s departure draughts were
11.15 m forward and 11.5 m aft.
the control system energised the relevant
solenoid valves and the rudder moved to At 0740, the main engine was test run both ahead
starboard. and astern. Shortly afterwards, the helmsman
came to the bridge and took up his position at the
The steering could be operated from the steering
centreline steering console. He moved the helm to
compartment by removing the fuses from the
remote electronic control system and manually port, then to starboard and then returned it to
operating the solenoid valves if required in midships. The steering operated satisfactorily.
emergency situations. Once the crew had made tugs fast forward and
The incident aft, they were asked to single up the mooring
lines. At 0755, the pilot ordered ‘let go forward
At 1824 on 30 October 2010, MSC Basel berthed and aft’. He then used a combination of main
at the Fisherman Islands container terminal in engine, bow thruster and tugs to manoeuvre the
Brisbane, Queensland, following a voyage from ship off the berth.

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By 0807, the tugs had been let go and the main each of these helm commands but the rudder did
engine was running at slow ahead. The pilot slowly not respond.
built up the ship’s speed as he manoeuvred it into
the centre of the channel. At 0831½, he ordered At 0935½, the pilot called out ‘it’s stuck, get the
harbour full ahead on the main engine. emergency steering on’. The master responded,
changing the steering control over to the bridge
At 0832, MSC Basel passed the Brisbane River control console lever. He also noted that the
entrance beacons. Shortly afterwards, the chief rudder was stuck at starboard 20°.
mate was relieved by the third mate. The chief
mate then left the bridge. At 0935¾, the pilot ordered full astern and told
the master to use the lever. However, the rudder
At 0836½, the pilot ordered starboard 10° helm was still not responding.
and by 0838½, the ship had been steadied on a
heading 5 of 062° towards the East Channel. At 0936, the master proposed letting go the
anchor. The pilot agreed and at 0936½, the
At 0902, the pilot ordered port 10° helm as he master let go the port anchor. The ship’s speed
started the turn into the East Channel. By 0905¼, was now 11.6 knots.
he had steadied the ship on a heading of 014°.
By 0936¾, the main engine had been stopped
The tide was nearing the end of the ebb. A low and started in the astern direction.
tide of 0.4 m was predicted to occur at beacon
M2 in the Main Channel at 0959. Meanwhile, the third mate telephoned the engine
room and reported the steering malfunction to the
At 0925½, the pilot ordered port 10° helm and at chief engineer. The chief engineer sent the
0926¼, he instructed the helmsman to steady second engineer to the steering compartment to
the ship on a heading of 342°. At 0927, the check the steering gear and then told the third
helmsman reported that the ship was steady on mate to stop one of the steering motors.
342° (Figure 3).
The rudder started to return to midships and the
At 0928¼, the pilot ordered port 10°. At 0929, he ship’s rate of turn started to decrease. At 0937¼,
ordered midships and at 0929¼, he ordered the the master informed the pilot that the rudder was
ship steadied on a heading of 318°. By 0929¾, now at midships.
the helmsman had steadied the ship on 318°.
The ship’s speed was steadily decreasing and at
At 0931¾, the pilot instructed the helmsman to 0937½, the pilot stated aloud ‘aground now’. The
steer 317°. The helmsman steadied the ship on ship had grounded on Yule Banks on a heading of
this new heading and, over the next few minutes, 054°. The ship’s GPS position was 27° 5.85’S
only used small helm variations of a couple of 153° 19.47’E.
degrees to port or starboard to keep the ship on a
steady heading. The ship’s speed 6 was now 15.6 At 0940, the pilot reported the grounding to the
Brisbane vessel traffic service and requested tug
knots.
assistance. Shortly afterwards, the harbour
At 0935, the pilot noticed the ship’s head starting master telephoned the pilot for a more detailed
to move to starboard. He checked the rudder report. At about the same time, the master
angle indicator and saw that the rudder was at reported the grounding, and the actions taken
starboard 20°. At 0935¼, he ordered midships since, to the ship’s managers.
and called out ‘what’s happening here’. He then
The main engine was still running at full astern
ordered port 20°, followed by midships almost
but the ship remained hard aground. At 0947, the
immediately afterwards. The helmsman applied
pilot ordered the main engine stopped.

The master and the pilot discussed the situation

and agreed to wait for the ship to refloat on the
flooding tide. They also decided to de-ballast the
5 Unless otherwise stated, all headings are by degrees gyro
ship’s number one water ballast tank in order to
compass with negligible error.
reduce its forward draught.
6 All speeds referred to in this report are made good, or
‘over the ground’.

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Figure 3: Section of navigational chart Aus 236 showing MSC Basel’s track in blue

- 5 -
There was no sign of pollution in the water around While MSC Basel was at anchor, representatives
the ship and tank soundings indicated that the from AMSA, ATSB, and GL attended the ship. Its
hull had not been breached. The steering was hull was internally inspected and an underwater
tested and it appeared to be operating normally. survey was carried out. Neither inspection
identified any significant damage.
At 1032, the main engine was started and run
astern in an attempt to refloat the ship. However, The steering gear was also inspected and while it
it did not move and at 1033, the main engine was appeared that one of the ram/tiller pins had
stopped. After the engine had stopped, the ship seized, the manufacturer reported that the
settled on a heading of about 080°. steering gear could be safely operated without
replacing the pin. An inspection of the steering
The tide started to flood and both the master and control systems noted no abnormalities.
the pilot noticed that the ship’s stern was being
pushed to starboard. By 1130, its heading had At 1330 on 5 November, AMSA removed the
come to about 070°. detention order after the authority was provided
with a declaration of seaworthiness by GL. Later
By this time, there was a tug en route to assist that day, MSC Basel departed Brisbane bound for
with refloating MSC Basel. However, it appeared Singapore.
to the pilot that the ship would refloat before the
tug arrived, so he decided to refloat it under its
own power. ANALYSIS
At 1136, the main engine was started and run at The grounding
dead slow astern. At 1138, the ship started to
MSC Basel’s transit out of the port of Brisbane on
move astern. The anchor was recovered and the
1 November 2010 was going as planned until the
pilot used the main engine and the bow thruster
ship’s rudder unexpectedly moved to starboard.
to manoeuvre the ship back into the channel.
When interviewed, the pilot stated that he did not
Once the ship was safely in the channel, the pilot
experience any difficulties with the ship’s steering
set a course back to the Brisbane inner
prior to the incident. He also stated that the ship
anchorage. He increased the main engine speed
was steady when set on a heading and that the
to slow ahead in order to maintain a speed of
helmsmen were ‘excellent’.
about 9 knots.
The master and chief engineer stated that they
Only one steering motor was running, but the
were not aware of any problems with the steering
steering appeared to be working satisfactorily.
gear and the ship’s maintenance records provided
At 1218, the tug Daintree was made fast to MSC no indication of any pre-existing issues.
Basel’s centre lead aft. The tug then escorted the
Before the incident, the ship had been making
ship to the anchorage.
good a speed of 15.6 knots in an area of the main
At 1323, representatives from Maritime Safety channel that was about 5½ cables 7 wide. The
Queensland (MSQ) and the ship owner’s nearest danger, Yule Banks, was located about
protection and indemnity (P&I) club boarded MSC 1½ cables to the north of the channel toe line 8 .
Basel by launch. Hence, there was little sea room for a deviation
from the passage plan.
At 1324, MSC Basel’s port anchor was let go in
position 27° 14.9’S 153° 20.3’E in the inner A few seconds before 0935, MSC Basel’s rudder
anchorage. At 1330, after the ship had brought up unexpectedly moved to starboard and at 0935,
to the anchor, Daintree was let go. the pilot detected a change in the ship’s heading.
He immediately reacted to this change and
As a result of the grounding, MSC Basel was alerted the other members of the bridge team.
detained by the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority (AMSA) pending a declaration from
Germanischer Lloyd (GL) that the ship was
7 One cable equals one tenth of a nautical mile or 185.2 m
seaworthy.
8 The transition line between the charted depth of a channel
and the bank.

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Within 2½ minutes, the main engine had been The technician noted in his service report that:
stopped and run astern, the anchor had been let
AII of the checks, tests and inspections did not
go and steering control had been restored.
give any indication of a cause of the initial
However, at 0937½, the ship grounded on Yule
reported steering failure...
Banks, just to the north of the channel (Figure 3).
While the only explanation for MSC Basel’s rudder
The master changing over the steering control to
moving to starboard without the application of
the backup lever and the chief engineer
helm is a control or hydraulic system malfunction,
suggesting that one of the steering motors should
preliminary inspections and tests did not identify
be stopped were the appropriate steps to follow.
any steering system faults.
By doing so, they were changing the steering
control system configuration in an attempt to Seized ram/tiller pin
regain control in an emergency situation.
When the ATSB investigators inspected MSC
Together, the bridge team and the engineers did Basel’s steering gear, they found that one of the
all that could be expected of them. However, in port side ram/tiller pins had seized (Figure 4).
the circumstances, there was nothing that could
The chief engineer stated that the pin was new
prevent the grounding.
and had been fitted when the ship was dry docked
Steering malfunction about 5 weeks before the grounding. He also
reported that the engineers had not noticed the
There are only two probable explanations for MSC seized pin before the ship’s departure from
Basel’s rudder moving to starboard 20° on the Brisbane.
morning of 1 November 2010: the application of
starboard helm or a fault in the steering control or While it is possible that the pin had seized some
hydraulic systems. time before the ship departed Brisbane on
1 November and that it had not been noticed by
None of the accounts of the incident provided by the ship’s crew, it is more likely that it occurred
the bridge team members suggests that starboard when the ship grounded later that day.
helm was applied by the helmsman. Therefore,
the only explanation as to why the rudder moved The rudder was not damaged as a result of the
to starboard is a malfunction of either the grounding and the underwater inspections carried
hydraulic or electronic steering control systems. out following the grounding indicate that the
rudder did not touch the sea bed.
On 2 November, MSC Basel’s steering gear was
tested by the ship’s crew in the presence of the Therefore, the pin probably seized at a time of
ATSB investigators and the AMSA and GL high rudder loading 9 before the ship grounded,
surveyors. The steering gear was operated locally possibly when the rudder moved to starboard 20°
in emergency control with No.1 pump running. while the ship was making good 15.6 knots.
Throughout the test, the steering gear operated
The pin should not have seized in the ram
without fault. The test was then repeated with
spherical bearing under these normal operating
No.2 pump running. Once again, the steering gear
conditions. The fact that it did indicates that the
operated without fault.
dimensions of the pin were incorrect or that it, or
On 3 November, a technician from AWA Marine, the bearing, were not correctly fitted.
the Australian agent for Anschutz, attended MSC
While this failure is of concern, it is not likely to
Basel to inspect the electronic remote control
have been the initiator of the steering malfunction
system. He found the system to be in generally
but, more than likely, a result of it.
good condition and could not identify any faults.

On 4 November, the technician returned to the

ship to check the remote control system while the
hydraulic system was being tested. The steering
was tested in all modes and, again, no problems
were identified.
9 The forces acting on a rudder increase as the applied
rudder angle increases. They also increase with the
square of the velocity of water flow over the rudder’s
surface.

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Figure 4: Ram/tiller bush

Steering gear testing handed over to the chief mate before going to the
forecastle for the ship’s departure, he had
With reference to the pre-departure testing of a prepared/tested all of the equipment except for
ship’s steering gear, SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation the main engine and the steering. However, both
26.1 states: steering motors had been started.
Within 12 hours before departure, the ship’s
steering gear shall be checked and tested by the At about 0740, when the engineers were ready,
ship’s crew. The test procedure shall include, the chief mate tested the main engine, both
where applicable, the operation of the following: ahead and astern. The helmsman then took up
his position at the steering stand and, at the
1. the main steering gear; request of the master, checked the steering by
2. the auxiliary steering gear; moving the helm in both directions.
3. the remote steering gear control systems; While this check of the steering was being carried
4. the steering positions located on the out, the duty engineer stood-by in the steering
navigation bridge; compartment and observed the operation of the
5. the emergency power supply; steering gear.

6. the rudder angle indicators in relation to The chief mate and the duty engineer then filled
the actual position of the rudder; out and signed their respective departure
7. the remote steering gear control system checklist, noting that all the equipment, including
power failure alarms; the steering, had been checked.
8. the steering gear power unit failure alarms; The helmsman’s steering check probably provided
and him, and the master, with some reassurance that
9. automatic isolating arrangements and he had steering control. However, it was not an
other automatic equipment. appropriate SOLAS compliant pre-departure test
of the steering system.
On the morning of 1 November, the third mate
prepared MSC Basel’s bridge equipment for the At interview, the chief engineer stated that it was
impending voyage. By about 0730, when he usual practice on board MSC Basel for the

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engineers not to test the steering locally because Checklists can be effective risk mitigation tools.
doing so involved removing the control system However, for this to be the case, each section of
fuses. Hence, their normal practice was to the checklist should only be marked complete
observe the check that the bridge carried out once when the crew member has satisfactorily carried
the main engine had been readied for sea. out the task or confirmed that the task has been
satisfactorily carried out.
When the chief mate was interviewed, he stated
that he thought the third mate had tested the The third mate should have been ticking off each
steering gear before he relieved him on the bridge box of the departure check list as he completed
that when he completed and signed the checklist, the tasks. Alternatively, when he handed over to
he was recording that test. the chief mate, he should have advised him of the
tasks that had, and had not, been completed.
On 2 November, when MSC Basel departed its
berth in Brisbane, the ship’s steering gear had not Similarly, the duty engineer should not have noted
been tested in accordance with SOLAS that the steering was tested in accordance with
requirements. However, the task had been SOLAS requirements when it was not.
marked as complete in both the bridge and
The bridge and engine room checklists on board
engine room checklists. As a result, when the pilot
MSC Basel were not being used effectively to
took control of the ship, he believed that the
ensure that defined tasks were being satisfactorily
steering had been tested and found to operate
completed and, as a result, the steering gear was
satisfactorily when, in fact, it had not.
not tested before the ship departed port on
It cannot be concluded that the steering gear 1 November 2010.
malfunctioned because it was not tested before
MSC Basel departed Brisbane on 1 November FINDINGS
2011. However, by routinely not appropriately
testing the steering system, the crew were Context
depriving themselves of their only opportunity to
check that the system was operating correctly At 0937½ on 1 November, MSC Basel grounded
before the ship departed port. just to the north of the main shipping channel in
Moreton Bay, Queensland, while the ship was
Checklists departing the port of Brisbane.

At 0730 on 1 November, when the chief mate From the evidence available, the following
relieved the third mate on the bridge prior to the findings are made with respect to MSC Basel’s
ship’s departure from Brisbane, they did not grounding. They should not be read as
discuss what equipment had or had not been apportioning blame or liability to any particular
tested. The chief mate knew that he would have to organisation or individual.
test the main engine when the crew were on
stations forward and aft and he assumed that all Contributing safety factors
of the other equipment, including the steering, • A few seconds before 0935 on 1 November
had been tested. 2010, MSC Basel’s rudder unexpectedly
moved to starboard. At the time, the ship was
After the chief mate tested the main engine, he
in the Moreton Bay main shipping channel
filled out the departure checklist and signed it.
between beacons M4 and M6.
However, he did not confirm with the third mate
that each of the tasks listed on the checklist had • It is likely that an intermittent fault in MSC
been satisfactorily completed. Basel’s steering control system resulted in the
rudder moving to starboard.
At about the same time, the duty engineer
completed the engine room departure checklist, Other safety factors
noting that the steering had been tested in
• MSC Basel’s steering was not tested in
accordance with SOLAS and in agreement with the
accordance with SOLAS requirements before
bridge. However, the test that was carried out did
the ship departed Brisbane.
not meet these requirements.

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• Preliminary inspections and tests of MSC ATSB assessment of action
Basel’s steering system did not identify any
faults. However, more thorough examinations The ATSB has no evidence that a detailed
of the entire steering systems may identify any inspection of the ship’s steering system has been
intermittent defects. [Minor safety issue] undertaken and remains concerned that the
intermittent steering fault has not been found and
• It is likely that one of MSC Basel’s port side rectified.
steering gear ram/tiller pins seized during the
grounding. ATSB safety advisory notice
MO-2010-009-SAN-011

SAFETY ACTION The ATSB advises that Reederei F. Laeisz should

consider taking further action to address this
The safety issues identified during this safety issue.
investigation are listed in the Findings and Safety
Actions sections of this report. The ATSB expects Other safety actions
that all safety issues identified by the Reederei F. Laeisz has also:
investigation should be addressed by the relevant
organisations. In addressing those issues, the • advised all ship’s crews of the communication
ATSB prefers to encourage relevant organisations that is required between deck officers during
to proactively initiate safety action, rather than to the hand-over of duties and the tasks the
issue formal safety recommendations or safety officer in charge is responsible for when
advisory notices. preparing the bridge equipment prior to
departure or arrival;
All of the responsible organisations for the safety
• advised all ship’s crews that the pre-departure
issues identified during this investigation were
testing of the steering gear has to take place
given a draft report and invited to provide
within 12 hours of departure in accordance
submissions. As part of that process, each
with SOLAS Chapter V Reg. 26.1;
organisation was asked to communicate what
safety actions, if any, they had carried out or were • advised all ship’s crews that checklists have to
planning to carry out in relation to each safety be filled out (truthfully and correctly) by the
issue relevant to their organisation. person who actually tests the bridge
equipment prior to arrival and/or departure;
Reederei F. Laeisz
• issued a standing order to all ships requiring
Steering gear testing the provision of additional watch positions in
Minor safety Issue the steering gear room during manoeuvring in
confined waters;
Preliminary inspections and tests of MSC Basel’s
• identified the steering gear as ‘Critical
steering system did not identify any faults.
Equipment’ in the planned maintenance
However, more thorough examinations of the
system of all ships and noted that all
entire steering systems may identify any
maintenance works must have high priority
intermittent defects.
and necessary spare parts orders have to be
Action taken by Reederei F. Laeisz marked as ‘Urgent Orders’; and

Reederei F. Laeisz has advised the ATSB that the • prepared a report for distribution to all ships,
spherical bearing and pin which were found describing MSC Basel’s grounding and
seized during the investigation were replaced by reporting the lessons learned.
the manufacturer in Singapore on 15 November
2010 with genuine spare parts. Following the SOURCES AND SUBMISSIONS
repairs, the steering gear was tested and found to
operate satisfactorily. Sources of Information
MSC Basel’s master and crew
Reederei F. Laeisz

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Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ)
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
Germanischer Lloyd (GL)
AWA Marine

References
International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS) 1974, consolidated edition 2009

Submissions
Under Part 4, Division 2 (Investigation Reports),
Section 26 of the Transport Safety Investigation
Act 2003, the ATSB may provide a draft report, on
a confidential basis, to any person whom the
ATSB considers appropriate. Section 26 (1) (a) of
the Act allows a person receiving a draft report to
make submissions to the ATSB about the draft
report.

A draft of this report was provided to MSC Basel’s

master, chief mate, third mate and chief engineer,
Reederei F. Laeisz, the pilot, Brisbane Marine
Pilots, AWA Marine, Germanischer Lloyd (GL),
Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ), the Australian
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and the Liberian
Safety Authority.

Submissions were received from MSC Basel’s

master, chief mate, third mate and chief engineer,
Reederei F. Laeisz, the pilot, Brisbane Marine
Pilots, AWA Marine, GL, MSQ, AMSA and the
Liberian Safety Authority. The submissions were
reviewed and where considered appropriate, the
text of the report was amended accordingly.

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