1

Lawrence Dewan, Joseph Owens, and the Role of Esse1

Philip Neri Reese, O.P. (Providence College)

“It belongs to the wise man to order.”2 Father Lawrence Dewan was one of the wisest men

I have had the privilege of knowing, and so I find nothing surprising in the fact that he paid careful

attention to questions of order over the course of his scholarly career. His article on “The Number

and Order of St. Thomas’s Five Ways” immediately comes to mind, as do his numerous articles

on the birth of metaphysics and the seeds of wisdom (concerned, as they are, with the order of our

concepts and the order of the sciences).3 In this paper, however, I would like to turn our attention

to another article of his concerned with questions of order.

In his 1989 essay “St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause” Fr.

Lawrence Dewan challenged Fr. Joseph Owens’s claim that esse functions as a principle in

Thomistic metaphysics. As an alternative, Fr. Dewan proposed that esse’s role is more like that of

a property. Though this aspect of his thought has largely been neglected, I would like to suggest

that Fr. Dewan’s interpretation of esse’s place within the scientific structure of metaphysics

actually entails a difference in the very “shape” of Thomistic metaphysics itself—at least as it is

commonly presented.4

1
A version of this paper was delivered in Ottawa on November 7th, 2015, at a symposium hosted by the Dominican
College in memorial of the life and work of Fr. Dewan. The symposium was titled “The Philosophy of Lawrence
Dewan: Metaphysics and Ethics” and its proceedings are due to be published.
2
Aristotle, Metaphysics I.2 (982a18)
3
For just a few of Fr. Dewan’s publications that deal with questions of order, see Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “The
Number and Order of St. Thomas’s Five Ways,” The Downside Review 92 (1974): 1–18; Lawrence Dewan, O.P.,
“Being Per Se, Being Per Accidens and St. Thomas’ Metaphysics,” Science et Esprit 30, no. 2 (1978): 169–84;
Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “St. Thomas, Metaphysics, and Formal Causality,” Laval Théologique et Philosophique 36,
no. 3 (1980): 285–316; Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “St. Thomas Aquinas against Metaphysical Materialism,” in Atti
del’VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale, ed. A. Piolanti (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 412–
34; Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “First Known Being and the Birth of Metaphysics,” in Distinctions of Being:
Philosophical Approaches to Reality (Washington, D.C.: American Maritain Association, 2013), 36–60.
4
For Fr. Dewan’s use of the word “shape” with regard to metaphysical science, see Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “St.
Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause,” in Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics,
Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 45 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
2006), 168.
 2

In order to make my case, this paper will proceed in three parts. First, I will explain how

Fr. Owens and Fr. Dewan differ in their interpretation of esse’s methodological role in

metaphysics. Second, I will contextualize the issue by considering some of St. Thomas’s

comments on the structure and procedure of scientific knowledge. Lastly, I will raise some

methodological puzzles for either account of esse’s role and show that Fr. Dewan’s approach is

better equipped to solve the problem it faces. Though the spirit of this paper is more aporetic than

demonstrative, I would like to suggest the following as a conditional conclusion: Fr. Dewan’s

thought offers us a more coherent account of the structure of metaphysical science than Fr.

Owens’s, but the account it gives is one according to which both the task and the method of the

Thomistic metaphysician must assume a far more essentialist—or formal—character than is

typically acknowledged.

I – The Debate

The question is this: what do we do, methodologically, with esse? What role does esse play

within the scientific structure of metaphysics, and what work does it do for the metaphysician?

Fr. Dewan attributes to Fr. Owens the claim that “[j]ust as the Aristotelian philosophy of

nature has as principles of its subject the matter and the form in the order of substance, so the

subject of metaphysics, beings as beings, would have as principles essence and existence.” 5 But

how accurate is this depiction of Fr. Owens’s approach to esse?

In the epilogue of his book An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, Fr. Owens distinguishes

between the way that subsistent being, on the one hand, and created essence and esse, on the other

hand, relate to the subject of metaphysics. He says, “[subsistent being] is par excellence the

principle of the subject, since it produces in its entirety the two finite principles involved, limited

5
Ibid., 167–168.
 3

existential act and essence.”6 So Fr. Owens does identify esse and essence as principles of a being,

albeit ones of secondary importance.

But does he think of essence and esse as principles according to the model of matter and

form? In an article entitled “Elucidation and Causal Knowledge” Fr. Owens says that

As an entitative component of created things, being is a cause or principle in the sense in

which any component is a cause or principle of the whole. In the case of being, the exercise
of the causality is the actuating of essence, corresponding to the way in which form actuates
matter. . . . Moreover, for the transcendental property of oneness you have to have being,
because essence in its absolute consideration has no actual unity at all.7

I would like to draw our attention to two aspects of this passage: the first is that Fr. Owens

compares essence/esse composition to matter/form composition in the context of discussing esse’s

role as a principle;8 the second is that it gives us an example of how he sees esse functioning as a

principle: esse (and not essence) is the principle through which the transcendental property of

oneness is demonstrated. Every being is one, but it is so only through the causality of esse. He

extends the scope of this claim in a later article entitled “The ‘Analytics’ and Thomistic

Metaphysical Procedure.” There he says,

Besides dependence, which is a disjunctive transcendental, a number of fully

transcendental properties are shown by Thomistic metaphysical procedure to follow upon
the subject genus of being. The very nature of being, even when participated as an act other
than finite nature, makes its subject one, true, good, beautiful. The subject genus is here
the cause from which these characteristics are demonstrated as its proper attributes. The

6
Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Houston, TX: The Center for Thomistic Studies,
1985), 369. Fr. Owens reaffirms this point when talking about being as first known: “The ambiguities that follow from
the consideration of being, therefore, cannot be done away with by human cognition. They are too fundamentally
rooted in the first notion of being that is directly attained by the human intellect and to which all other conceptions
have to be reduced, even the notions of the principles of created beings, essence and existence. If either side of the
equivocity is left out of consideration, the doctrine of St. Thomas will be misunderstood and will be ranged with some
other metaphysical tradition.” Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being,” in St.
Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1980), 95.
7
Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., “Elucidation and Causal Knowledge,” New Scholasticism 37 (1963): 68.
8
Reinforcing this reading is the way that Fr. Owens insists that the priority of esse over essence is like the priority
that form has over matter. Fr. Owens says, “[F]rom a metaphysical viewpoint, one has to start with the act of being
that the primary efficient cause gives by participation, and consider that in being participated it has to be limited and
thereby gives rise to the essence that determines it. The act of being is accordingly not a thing that is produced, but is
the constituent that exercises the most fundamental priority in the thing that is produced.” Owens, “The accidental and
Essential Character of Being.” Owens, C.Ss.R., “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being,” 94.
 4

reasoning conforms entirely with the Aristotelian requirements for completely

demonstrative science.9

Here we find Fr. Owens aligning fully transcendental properties with the causality of esse, and

distinguishing such properties from disjunctively transcendental properties, like dependence. This

would seem to indicate that for Fr. Owens dependence and similar disjunctive transcendentals

would follow upon the other intrinsic principle of being: essence. But regardless of how the

causality of essence actually plays out, it is clear that for Fr. Owens esse does play the role of a

principle, for in composition with essence it constitutes the subject of metaphysical science (ens)

and through it certain properties of that subject, namely, the fully transcendental properties, are

demonstrated. Fr. Owens’s principle-model of esse can be visually displayed as follows in Figure

1:

Figure 1

A A Being
Changeable
Being (ens)

Matter Form Essence Esse

This account of esse’s role is certainly reasonable. It is also not unique to Fr. Owens.10 So

why should we call this interpretation into question?

9
Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., “The ‘Analytics’ and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure,” Medieval Studies 20 (1964): 97.
10
Numerous Thomists of Fr. Owens’s generation (though not all of his “existentialist” school of Thomism) have held
a similar position. See, for example, William A. Wallace, O.P., The Elements of Philosophy: A Compendium for
Philosophers and Theologians (New York: Alba House, 1977), 95–96; Leo Elders, S.V.D., The Metaphysics of Being
of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective, Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1993), 180–182; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to
Uncreated Being, Monographs of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, no. 1 (Washington, D.C: The
Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 175–175; W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The One and the Many: A
Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 150–153;
 5

Enter, stage left, Fr. Dewan.11 Though he in no way wants to deny the importance of esse,

Fr. Dewan does insist that we should shift its position within the ambit of our metaphysical

attention.12 “It is no accident,” he says, “that the focus of St. Thomas’s treatise De ente et essentia

is essence. . . . It studies and presents essence, because essence is the principle of the science of

beings as beings.”13 According to Fr. Dewan, then, there are not two intrinsic principles of being-

Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., The Way toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to
Metaphysics (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 141. This same position also appears in
the Thomism of earlier generations. The first and third of the twenty-four thomistic theses enumerated in Pope St.
Pius X’s decree Postquam sanctissimus is notable in this regard. The first reads “potentia et actus ita dividunt ens, ut
quidquid est, vel sit actus purus, vel ex potentia et actu tamquam primis atque intrinsecis principiis necessario
coalescat.” This general description of potency and act as intrinsic principles finds specific application to the case of
essence and esse in the third thesis, which reads “quapropter in absoluta ipsius esse ratione unus subsistit Deus, unus
est simplicissimus, cetera cuncta quae ipsum esse participant, naturam habent quae esse coarctatur, ac tamquam
distinctis realiter principiis, essentia et esse constant.” Of similar interest are the commentaries of Hugon and
Garrigou-Lagrange on these theses. See Édouard Hugon, O.P., “Les Vingt-Quatre Thèses Thomistes,” Revue Thomiste
25 (1920): 116–42; Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, trans. Patrick
Cummins, O.S.B. (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1950), 36–43. Finally, there is also commentatorial precedent
for holding that esse, and not just essence, is an intrinsic principle of ens. Dominic of Flanders, for example, who one
of the most widely respected Thomists of the 15 th century and beyond, held precisely this position: “Primum enim
formale essendi principium est esse, per quod quaelibet forma dicitur causare esse; unde forma non dat esse suae
materiae, quod dicitur actus, nisi ipsum esse quod est etiam actus ipsius formae, quod tamen dicitur sequi formam.”
See Dominicus de Flandria, O.P., In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis, Secundum Expositionem Eiusdem
Angelici Doctoris, Lucidissimae Atque Utilis (Coloniae Agrippinae: Cosmas Morrelles, 1621), IV, q. 3, a. 5, corpus
(p. 175, col. 2c).
11
Despite the preponderance of precedence for the alternative position, Fr. Dewan is neither the only 20th century
interpreter of Aquinas to reject the model in which esse is a principle nor the only one to embrace a model in which
esse functions like a property. Joseph Bobik held both positions: “But esse exercises no causality at all in relation to
the created existent. It is the esse of the creature which is to be explained; esse in the creature is the effect to be
accounted for. One of the basic questions of metaphysics is: what accounts for the existence of essence-existence
composites?” Joseph Bobik, “Some Remarks on Owens’ ‘St. Thomas and Elucidation,’” New Scholasticism 37 (1963):
62.
There are, however, marked differences between Fr. Dewan’s account and Bobik’s, for Bobik was willing to
maintain that esse functions as an explanatory principle even if it is not a causal principle (i.e., it is a cause of knowing
in metaphysics, though not a cause of being). He says, “Although esse is not a cause explaining the existence of created
things (for this would be to say that a creature exists because it has esse, i. e., because it exists, which is to explain
nothing), esse can function in scientific procedures, in propter quid proofs in which properties can be shown either of
esse itself or of being, in the ratio of which esse enters, for ens means id quod habet esse. Esse has the property of
being related to no principle within a creature as potency to act, but to all of them as act to potency; this property
belongs to esse because of its ratio as esse. Ens has the property of being unum, because whatever has esse has essence
(what hasn’t an essence cannot exist); and whatever has essence is undivided in se, either both actually and potentially,
like the simple substances, or at least actually (though potentially divisible), like physical substances. And to be
undivided in se is to be unum. Thus, esse is an explanatory principle in St. Thomas' metaphysics, but not a principle
explaining the existence of created things.” Ibid.
12
“I have no wish to underplay the necessity of exploring both these targets of metaphysical attention, existence and
essence. My concern is more about the ‘shape,’ so to speak, that the exploration should take.” Dewan, O.P., “St.
Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause,” 168.
13
Ibid.
 6

as-being, but one: it is essence—not esse—that plays the crucial causal role in the optic of created

being.14

To understand why Fr. Dewan is so insistent on this point, we should turn to his critique of

Étienne Gilson on the real distinction of essence and esse in created things. Gilson maintained that

such a distinction had never been demonstrated and in fact cannot be demonstrated from the mere

notion of caused substance.15 According to Fr. Dewan, where Gilson went wrong was in thinking

of esse as something other than the actual existence of an essence.16 For Gilson, esse is an act that

brings essence to a state of actual existence. The state is intimately bound up with the essence—

indeed, is identical to it—but the same cannot be said of the act, that is, of esse.17

Fr. Dewan thinks that Gilson’s account—and he levels the same charge against Fr.

Owens—inclines us to view esse as a sort of agent that does something to the essence to bring it

into actual existence.18 But esse does not stand to essence as agent to effect. Gilson has driven a

14
“I would call the role of essence the causal role. Esse has the causal role only in God (I mean, of course, God’s
being causal with respect to other things), and there it has that role because it has the status of essence. ‘Essence’
expresses an ineluctable ontological contribution which in creatures cannot be that of esse. Such a contribution is
conceivable only because both essence and esse in creatures presuppose divine causality.” Ibid.
This account of the methodological relationship between esse, causality, and God is strikingly different from
that of Fr. Owens, who appears to give esse a kind of causal role even within the divine nature itself, and not just vis-
à-vis creatures. He says, “the attributes of God are demonstrated from his being. Subsistent being is such that infinity
in all unmixed perfections, like intelligence, love, omnipotence, wisdom, and justice, follows in necessary sequence
upon its nature. These attributes are demonstrated from their proper cause. They are reached therefore by a process
that is completely demonstrative in the sense of the Analytics” [emphasis added]. Owens, C.Ss.R., “The ‘Analytics’
and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure,” 97.
15
“The way of remotion therefore leads to the notion of a God Whose essence is his very act of existing; but it does
so only if it sets out from a world of concrete substances endowed with individual acts of existing. And this does not
seem philosophically demonstrable from the notion of substance alone. It can be demonstrated that no essence is the
cause of its own existence, from which it follows that whatever has an essence, and exists, must exist in virtue of an
external cause; but no one has ever been able to demonstrate the conclusion that, in a caused substance, existence is a
distinct element, other than essence, and its act.” Étienne Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 128.
16
See Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “Étienne Gilson and the Actus Essendi,” Maritain Studies/Études Maritainiennes 15
(1999): 85.
17
For Gilson’s account, see the critique he gives of Cardinal Cajetan’s understanding of esse in Étienne Gilson,
“Cajétan et L’existence,” Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 15, no. 2 (1953): 267–86. For Fr. Dewan’s critique of Gilson, see
Dewan, O.P., “Étienne Gilson and the Actus Essendi,” 85–86. Also of interest on this topic is Lawrence Dewan, O.P.,
“A Text from Cajetan Touching on Existence,” Acta Philosophica 2, no. 16 (2007): 295–306.
18
“I believe that Owens’s use of the word ‘exercise’ provides us with a clue to what I take to be his difference from
St. Thomas. If formal causality were something a form or nature exercised, then one would have to envision the form
 7

wedge between the state and the act of existence, and it is this faulty distinction, that gives Gilson

such trouble with demonstrating the real distinction.19

As a corrective, Fr. Dewan quotes with approval John Capreolus’s claim that

esse ought not to be conceived in the role of something having reality or esse, nor in the
role of a principle of esse or of a being, but in the role of the disposition and the act of a
being inasmuch as it is a being.20

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this point, for as long as we think of esse as a

principle, we think of it as that whence existence comes.21 But for Aquinas esse is not a whence,

but a hither. It is the terminus of every change, the bloom of every being, the act of all acts, and

the perfection of all perfections.22 If anything counts as a principle, it isn’t esse, it’s form. For as

St. Thomas says, “Substance—that is, form, which is the principle pertaining to esse—is spoken

of as an intrinsic principle of a thing because it is according to [form] that a thing is in esse.”23

And again, “the esse [that pertains to the nature] is indeed in the thing, and is the act of the being

resulting from the principles of the thing, just as illuminating is the act of the luminous thing.”24

or nature as having esse in order to perform the exercise. Exercise, i.e., actions and efficient causality, presuppose
subsisting things, things having esse, as agents. Formal causality, however, consists in a specification, not an exercise.
Form and esse are given together, by virtue of another thing, the efficient cause.” Dewan, O.P., “St. Thomas,
Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause,” 169.
19
“If Gilson is attempting to look beyond the actual existence of the substance or essence, to something else called
‘esse,’ might that not have something to do with his judgment that no one has ever proved the distinction between a
caused substance and its esse?” Dewan, O.P., “Étienne Gilson and the Actus Essendi,” 89.
20
“Esse enim non debet concipi per modum alicujus habentis realitatem vel esse, nec per modum principii essendi vel
entis, sed per modum dispositionis et actus entis in quantum ens.” Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae
Aquinatis, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 7 vols. [Turin: A. Cattier, 1900-1908; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva GmbH, 1967)],
1:328a. For reasons of consistency, I have used Fr. Dewan’s translation of the text. See Ibid., 85.
21
“[Capreolus] is working hard to bring out the idea that we are speaking of existence itself. Thus, he wishes us to
cleanse the conception of esse of its being, in things other than God, a subsistent thing, but moreover to eliminate the
idea of it as a principle of being. The word ‘principle’ suggests a factor or element having the role of ‘whence comes’
existence.” Ibid., 88.
22
Explaining the passage from Metaphysics V.1 (1013a17) that says “all causes are somehow principles,” Aquinas
notes that “change begins from the cause [and proceeds] unto the esse of the thing” (“Nam omnes causae sunt quaedam
principia”: Ex causa enim incipit motus ad esse rei). See CM 5.1, no. 760.
23
“Et iterum quasi intrinsecum dicitur principium ‘substantia’ rei, idest forma quae est principium essendo, cumm
secundum eam res sit in esse.” CM 5.1, no. 762. It is interesting to note the conceptual similarity between Aquinas’s
use of sit in esse and Gilson’s “state” of actual existence.
24
“Alio modo dicitur esse, quod pertinet ad naturam rei, secundum quod dividitur secundum decem genera; et hoc
quidem esse est in re, et est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis.” In III Sent., d. 6, q.
 8

And again, “although the esse of a thing is other than its essence, it must not be understood as

something over-and-above [the essence] like an accident, but rather as semi-constituted by the

principles of the essence.”25

The point is this: on Fr. Dewan’s reading, we should not think of essence and esse as co-

principles of ens along the model of matter and form; rather, we should think of esse as the proper

activity of an essence and of ens as essence-in-activity.26 I have modeled Fr. Dewan’s approach in

Figure 2:

Figure 2

Being Luminous Being (esse)

What is A Being (ens)

The Luminous Essence
Luminous as such
as such

By putting essence in the center, we see clearly that esse is that with follows upon, or flows from

essence. Essence is the principle, esse the activity. As such, the science of ens, the science of

essence-in-activity, has but one intrinsic principle, essence, and esse will be a property thereof.

Now how should we adjudicate between these two divergent models of esse? While not

proposing a definitive solution, I would like to suggest a method that strikes me as helpful way

2, a. 2, corpus. Aquinas begins this response by pointing out that we speak of esse in two ways. The first of these is
the way in which esse signifies the truth of a proposition. The second is what we have quoted here.
25
“Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad
modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae.” In IV Met., lect. 2, no. 558.
26
This is why ens and res signify the same thing (essence-in-activity), but from different perspectives or with different
emphases. Res names essence-in-activity, while ens names essence-in-activity. See De Veritate q.1, a. 1, corpus. For
a deeper explanation of Aquinas’s understanding of this point and its historical roots in Avicenna, see Daniel D. De
Haan, “A Mereological Construal of the Primary Notions ‘Being’ and ‘Thing’ in Avicenna and Aquinas,” American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88, no. 2 (2014): 335–60.
 9

forward: testing each model against a shared standard. For both Frs. Owens and Dewan, Thomistic

metaphysics is a science in the strict sense, and so it must conform to the methodological

requirements of the Posterior Analytics, albeit with some qualifications.27 If one model is more

successful in this regard than the other, that would offer a strong point in its favor. So, which one

best fits the “shape” of a science?

II – St. Thomas Aquinas on the Structure and Procedure of Scientia

At the beginning of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle notes that learning requires

preexistent knowledge. As Aquinas reads the text, chapter 1 is divided into two basic parts: first,

Aristotle shows that preexistent knowledge is required; second, he shows how it is required.28 The

latter is what gives scientific inquiry its basic shape and order of procedure.

St. Thomas begins his commentary on this section of the text with a lengthy sciendum est.

He says,

27
Both Fr. Owens and Fr. Dewan recognize that metaphysics will not perfectly fit the mold of the Posterior Analytics.
Part of the reason for this is that it is the common, or universal, science and not one among many particular sciences.
Fr. Owens says, for example, “Viewed from [the angle of God’s freedom to create], St. Thomas' metaphysics does not
conform to the requirements of the Posterior Analytics. From another angle, however, being for St. Thomas is essential
to every nature, even though it belongs to an order other than the essential. Every nature is essentially a being. Being
is prior to nature, for without being you could not have a nature. From this angle being is a necessary characteristic of
every finite nature. It necessarily demonstrates an efficient cause when any such nature is actually found. It grounds
necessary demonstration that ultimately reaches subsistent being. In this way it satisfies to the full the requirements
of the strictest type of science, while leaving intact the freedom of the first efficient cause. . . . [S]tarting from an
already existent world, the world of creatures, one can demonstrate according to the most stringent necessity attainable
by reasoning, that such a world was produced by subsistent being, and that subsistent being necessarily exists.” Joseph
Owens, C.Ss.R., “St. Thomas and Elucidation,” New Scholasticism 35 (1961): 439–440. He makes the same point
again just a short time later, saying, “The norms of the Posterior Analytics, accordingly, have to be transferred from
a strictly formal to an existential realm, when they are confronted with the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas. But
functioning respectively according to the differences of the two realms, they hold in all their stringence for the type
of reasoning found in St. Thomas' existential treatment of beings.” Ibid., 440.
Fr. Dewan also acknowledges that the Posterior Analytics model will somehow limp: “Clearly, esse is too
intimately united to the thing to be even a predicamental accident, let alone a predicable accident, i.e., a per se accidens
associate. If it were an accident in the predicamental sense, it would have to be a property. However, its mode of unity
with the thing is greater than that. It is the act of the essence. If the Aristotelian demonstrative schema limps at all as
regards form and esse, it is that esse is too intimate to form to be a mere property.” Dewan, O.P., “St. Thomas,
Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause,” 174.
28
“Ad ostendendum igitur necessitatem demonstratiui sillogismi, premittit Aristoteles quod cognitio in nobis
acquiritur ex aliqua cognitione praeexistenti. Duo igitur facit : primo namque ostendit propositum ; secundo docet
modum precognitionis, ibi : Dupliciter autem etc.” In I Post., lect. 1, ll. 61-66.
 10

In scientific knowledge, what we seek out by means of a demonstration is a conclusion—

inferred from principles—in which a proper attribute is predicated of a subject. And since
knowledge of simple things precedes knowledge of composite things, we need to know the
subject and the attribute before we have knowledge of the conclusion. Similarly, we need
to know beforehand the principle from which the conclusion is inferred, since the
conclusion becomes known from the knowledge of the principle.29

So there are three basic prerequisites for scientific knowledge: (1) the subject-genus about which

a demonstration is made, (2) the proper attribute which is demonstrated of that subject, and (3) the

principles from which that demonstration proceeds.

Now we need to complicate things. According to Aquinas these three prerequisites are not

all pre-known in the same way, for it is one thing to know that something is and it is another thing

to know what something is.30 We cannot know what principles are, since propositions and

enunciations do not have definitions, but we can—and indeed must—know that they are, for if we

do not know that our premises are true, then our demonstrations will not yield scientific

knowledge.31 With properties, however, the case is reversed. We must know what they are

beforehand (otherwise we will not know what we are demonstrating), but we cannot know that

they are, since the whole point of a demonstration is to prove that the property belongs necessarily

to its subject.32 In the case of the subject, we split the difference: we need to know both that it is

29
“Circa primum sciendum est quod id cuius scientia per demonstrationem quaeritur est conclusio aliqua in qua
propria passio de subiecto aliquo praedicatur: quae quidem conclusio ex aliquibus principiis infertur. Et quia cognitio
simplicium praecedit cognitionem compositorum, necesse est quod, antequam habeatur cognitio conclusionis,
cognoscatur aliquo modo subiectum et passio. Et similiter oportet quod praecognoscatur principium, ex quo conclusio
infertur, cum ex cognitione principii conclusio innotescat.” In I Post., lect. 2, ll. 21-27.
30
“Horum autem trium, scilicet principia, subiecti et passionis, est duplex modus praecognitionis, <quia duo sunt que
precognoscuntur>, scilicet quia est et quid est.” In I Post., lect. 2, ll. 27-30.
31
“Ostensum est autem <in> VII Methaphisice quod complexa non diffiniuntur : hominis enim albi non est aliqua
diffinitio, et multo minus enunciationis alicuius ; unde, cum principium sit enunciation quedam, non potest de ipso
precognosci quid est, set solum quia uerum est.” In I Post., lect. 2, ll. 31-36.
32
“De passione autem potest quidem sciri quid est, quia, ut in eodem libro ostenditur, accidencia quodam modo
diffinitionem habent ; passionis autem esse, et cuiuslibet accidentis, est inesse subiecto, quod quidem demonstration
concluditur ; non ergo passione precognoscitur quia est, set quid est solum.” In I Post., lect. 2, ll. 37-43.
 11

(for there is no science of a non-existent thing) and what it is (because the definition of the subject

provides the middle-term of the demonstration).33

But more must be said. In the course of explaining how properties are presupposed, St.

Thomas nuances Aristotle’s text. He points out that there are two different ways in which we can

know what something is. On the one hand, we can know what is signified by the name, and on the

other hand, we can know what the thing really is (i.e., we can know it through its proper definition

and causes).34 Neither of the two can be demonstrated, but it is the quid nominis, not the quid rei,

that we have to know in order to get a science up-and-running.35 From the quid nominis we can

produce demonstrations quia,36 but if we want to demonstrate propter quid we need to know the

33
“Subiectum autem et diffinitionem habet et eius esse proprium preintelligitur ipsi esse passionis in eo ; et ideo de
subiecto oportet precognoscere et quid est et quia est, presertim cum ex diffinitione subiecti et passionis sumatur
medium demonstrationis.” In I Post., lect. 2, ll. 43-49.
34
This is just as true for knowledge of the subject as it is for knowledge of its attributes, despite the fact that Aquinas’s
application of the distinction occurs in the context of how properties are known beforehand and that, while discussing
our pre-knowledge of the subject later in the same lesson, he does not bring to bear the same level of precision as he
had in the earlier discussion. Perhaps he assumes that it is fresh in reader’s mind. Nevertheless, it is clear from the
context that St. Thomas is speaking as much of the quid rei of the subject as of the properties.
35
“Alia vero sunt, de quibus oportet praeintelligere quid est quod dicitur, idest quid significatur per nomen, scilicet
de passionibus. Et non dicit quid est simpliciter, sed quid est quod dicitur, quia antequam sciatur de aliquo an sit, non
potest sciri proprie de eo quid est: non entium enim non sunt definitiones. Unde quaestio, an est, praecedit
quaestionem, quid est. Sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen.” In
I Post., lect. 2, ll. 58-69. Aquinas makes the same point much later, in his commentary on book II. There he says “Si
autem non posset haberi aliqua alia ratio rei quam definitio, impossibile esset quod sciremus aliquam rem esse, quin
sciremus de ea quid est; quia impossibile est quod sciamus rem aliquam esse, nisi per aliquam illius rei rationem. De
eo enim quod est nobis penitus ignotum, non possumus scire si est aut non. Invenitur autem aliqua alia ratio rei praeter
definitionem: quae quidem vel est ratio expositiva significationis nominis, vel est ratio ipsius rei nominatae, altera
tamen a definitione, quia non significat quid est, sicut definitio, sed forte aliquod accidens.” In II Post., lect. 8, ll. 92-
104. The indemonstrability of the quid nominis is obvious from the fact that it is a precondition for any scientific
knowledge whatsoever.
On the indemonstrability of the quod quid rei, see St. Thomas’s 7th and 8th lectures on book II. Of particular
note is the following passage: “Et dicit dictum esse quomodo accipiatur et innotescat ‘quod quid est’, scilicet per hoc
quod accipitur ‘propter quid.’ Dictum est etiam quod non est syllogismus neque demonstratio ipsius quid est, ut scilicet
proprie syllogizetur vel demonstretur quod quid est; et tamen manifestatur quod quid est per syllogismum et per
demonstrationem, in quantum scilicet medium demonstrationis propter quid est quod quid est. Unde manifestum est
quod neque sine demonstratione potest cognosci quod quid est, cuius est altera causa; nec tamen est demonstratio
ipsius quod quid est, sicut probabatur in obiiciendo, et secundum hoc obiectiones inducte sunt vere.” In II Post., lect.
7, ll. 255-268.
36
This is not to say that every demonstration quia proceeds from a quid nominis, but rather than every demonstration
proceeding from a quid nominis is a demonstration quia. Demonstrations that use mediated (as opposed to immediate)
principles also yield quia demonstrations. Aquinas’s 23rd lecture on book I is illuminating in this regard.
 12

quid rei beforehand, since the real principles and causes of the subject are the ultimately reason

why it has the properties that it does.

With these preliminary points in place, we can now sketch, generally and broadly, the shape

of a science and its order of procedure. From the beginning we must know that our principles are

true, what our property-terms mean, what our subject-term means, and that our subject-term names

something in reality. From this starting-point, we can go on to (1) prove that certain properties

belong to a subject, and (2) inquire into what that subject and its properties really are. Once we

have arrived at the quid rei—and here I reiterate that this is not subject to demonstration—we will

then finally be in a position to (3) prove why the principles of the subject necessitate that it have

the properties that it does. So if metaphysics is truly a science, as both Frs. Owens and Dewan

claim that it is, then it must take this sort of shape.37

III – Methodological Puzzles & Tentative Solutions

I would now like to raise two methodological puzzles, one for Fr. Owens and one for Fr.

Dewan. We can start with the puzzle that arises on Fr. Owens’s account:

As we have seen, Fr. Owens maintains that esse and essence are the two finite, intrinsic

principles of being-as-being, while God is its infinite, extrinsic principle. As an intrinsic principle,

esse provides the reason why fully transcendental properties such as oneness and goodness, truth

37
It is worthwhile to reiterate the point made in note 27 above: it is one thing to claim that metaphysics must take the
general shape of a science as articulated in the Posterior Analytics. It is another thing to say that it must do so with
unbending rigidity. The former, not the latter, is the claim of Frs. Owens and Dewan. Since ens is not a genus in the
strict sense (see, for example, In I Sent. d. 8, q. 4, a. 2; De Potentia q. 7, a. 3; SCG I, ch. 25), it cannot rigidly be
identified as the subject-genus of a science. Nevertheless, Aquinas does refer to it as a genus in the prooemium to his
commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and this usage is not a mere slip-of-the-tongue. Rather, it is a necessary
element of St. Thomas’s argumentation for why metaphysics is a single science. He says: “Haec autem triplex
consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui debet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et
primae causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum:
sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare
substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales
causae.” If, then, ens is not a genus in the strict sense, it is nevertheless genus-like in some meaningful sense. This
quasi-generic character of being is just one example of how Thomistic metaphysics will bend but not break Aristotelian
methodology.
 13

and beauty, belong to every being (ens) insofar as it is a being. It is this principle, esse, and not

essence, through which we demonstrate such features propter quid. As such, the real distinction

between essence and esse will be important not only ontologically, but also methodologically, for

it allows us to differentiate between really distinct lines of causality employed in our metaphysical

demonstrations.

So far, so good. Fr. Owens’s metaphysician will start off knowing what he means by words

like “being” and “one,” knowing that there are beings, and knowing certain basic premises from

which he can begin to argue.38 Next he will proceed to investigate what being really is, and

discover that it is a real composition of essence and esse caused by God, from which point he can

then proceed to demonstrate its disjunctive and fully transcendental properties according to lines

of causality that correspond to those distinct principles.

But we should back up: what exactly does that “investigation” into the quid rei of being-

as-being look like? If essence and esse are the intrinsic principles and causes of being as being,

and the real definition of a subject-genus is given in terms of its intrinsic principles and causes,39

then being-as-being must be defined—or at least quasi-defined, for ens is not a genus—in terms

of the real composition of essence and esse, just as the real definition of changeable being must

38
Regarding the first part of this sentence, it is important to note how emphatically Fr. Owens insisted that metaphysics
is not primarily concerned with the meanings of words, but rather with the realities signified by those words. This was
one of the key elements of dispute in an exchange he had with Joseph Bobik regarding Thomistic metaphysical
procedure. For the full debate, see Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics (Milwaukee,
WI: Marquette University Press, 1957); Joseph Bobik, “Some Remarks on Father Owens’ ‘St. Thomas and the Future
of Metaphysics,’” New Scholasticism 33 (1959): 68–85; Owens, C.Ss.R., “St. Thomas and Elucidation”; Bobik, “Some
Remarks on Owens’ ‘St. Thomas and Elucidation’”; Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., “Elucidation and Causal Knowledge”;
Joseph Bobik, “Some Disputable Points Apropos of St. Thomas and Metaphysics,” New Scholasticism 37 (1963):
411–30.
39
Cite passage where Aquinas says that real definition is through intrinsic principles.
 14

appeal to the real composition of matter and form.40 Essence/esse composition, then, is part of the

quid rei of metaphysics’s subject.

But we have already seen that the quid rei of a subject is not something that can be

demonstrated, for a causal definition of the subject is what provides the appropriate middle-term

for demonstration in the first place. It would seem, then, that Fr. Owens’s principle-model of esse

has as its consequence the indemonstrability of the real composition of essence and esse. And if

their real composition is indemonstrable, so too will be their real distinction. That is a puzzle.

This problem does not arise on Fr. Dewan’s model. If esse is a property, rather than a

principle, then the various modes of esse (e.g., complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent,

universal/particular,41 etc.) and the various ways in which esse enters into composition with other

metaphysical items, will be exactly the sorts of things that the Thomistic metaphysician ought to

be striving to prove. Far from presenting a methodological conundrum, the demonstration of the

real distinction between essence and esse will be, on Fr. Dewan’s model, a straightforward part of

metaphysical procedure and an uncontroversial task for the metaphysician.42 Nevertheless, Fr.

Dewan’s property-model of esse is not without its own difficulties, and so we turn now to our

second aporia.

40
The subject-matter of metaphysics does not, of course, admit of a definition in the strict sense, since ens is not a
genus in the strict sense, and every definition properly-so-called must be given by contracting a genus through a
specific difference. Nevertheless, Aquinas does refer to ens as a genus in a looser sense (see note 37 above), and so
there is no reason for us to shy away from the notion of a corresponding quasi-definition.
41
For the universal and particular, see Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “The Individual as a Mode of Being,” in Form and
Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 45 (Washington, D.C.:
The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 229–47. For both complete/incomplete and whole/part, see
Aquinas’s division textus at the beginning of Metaphysics ∆, where he aligns these terms with the passiones entis. For
necessary/contingent, see Dewan, O.P., “St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause,” 173–174.
42
I mean, of course, “uncontroversial” from a methodological standpoint (i.e., there would be nothing controversial
in principle about the attempt to demonstrate the real distinction). The validity, force, and structure of the
demonstration itself, however, is certainly controversial.
 15

As we have seen, Fr. Dewan replaces Fr. Owens’s dual-principle approach to metaphysics

with an approach in which essence serves as the one and only intrinsic principle of being. This

means that once the metaphysician turns from the quid nominis of his subject and begins that

second task of investigating into its quid rei, Fr. Dewan’s metaphysician will be engaged in an

inquiry into the varieties of essences and the principles that constitute such essences. Moreover,

when he demonstrates why certain properties must belong to a being, he will do so by appealing

to its essence, not its esse. Esse will indeed serve as a target of metaphysical attention, but in the

form of a conclusion drawn rather than a principle invoked. Like the Owensian metaphysician, the

Dewanian metaphysician will also arrive at knowledge of God as the extrinsic cause of being, but

with this difference: what God efficiently causes is not an ens that is composed of two prior

principles, but rather an ens that is an essence-in-activity, an essence principle-ing its existence, an

essence specifying and formally mediating its own actualization, in short, an essence which—

granting divine efficiency—necessitates its proper esse.

Now I see nothing troubling or problematic, methodologically, with what has just been

said. What is troubling, however, is what has been left unsaid, for the account just given did not

begin at the beginning. Recall that every science must presuppose three things: a subject-genus,

its properties, and its principles, though in different ways. We must presuppose that the principles

expressed in the premises are true, we must presuppose what the names of the properties mean,

and we must presuppose both what the name of the subject means and that such a name

corresponds to something in reality.

Let that point deserves reflection. When we say that a subject-term names something real,

what are we saying? We are saying that the subject exists. And that means that the existence of the

subject is something presupposed in every science, including metaphysics. But on Fr. Dewan’s
 16

account, esse, existence, is a property of the essence, and properties are what stand in need of

scientific proof. So on the one hand, the esse of ens must be presupposed, and on the other hand,

the esse of ens must be proved. That, too, is a puzzle.

Fr. Owens’s model is impervious to this dilemma. On his account, the metaphysician

should have no difficulty whatsoever in first acknowledging the existence of his subject matter

and then going on to deepen that insight by recognizing that the cause of the existent subject is a

really distinct, intrinsic principle thereof. Moreover, when it comes to offering metaphysical

demonstrations propter quid, such demonstrations will only ever presuppose esse as their middle

term; they will never attempt to prove it.

Thus each account of esse’s role in the scientific structure of metaphysics confronts a

unique methodological problem. Fr. Owens’s approach appears unable in principle to prove that

there is a real distinction between essence and esse, while Fr. Dewan’s approach appears to both

presuppose and prove the existence of its subject. So where can we go from here?

In the case of Fr. Owens’s dilemma, I see two possible avenues for avoiding the problem:

First, we can bite the bullet and affirm that the real distinction is indemonstrable. Maybe all we

can do is discuss it dialectically in the hopes of giving intellectus the opportunity to do what it

does and grasp the proposition as immediately true—per se nota to the wise.43 Second, someone

might affirm the real distinction as indemonstrable propter quid, but demonstrable quia. For this

line of argument to work, the Thomistic metaphysician would have to identify certain effects that

43
This is R. E. Houser’s approach. See, for example, R. E. Houser, “The Real Distinction and the Principles of
Metaphysics: Avicenna and Aquinas,” in Laudemus Viros Gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB, ed.
R. E. Houser (Notre Dame: Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 75–108. See also R. E. Houser, “Why
the Christian Magistri Turned to Arabic and Jewish Falāsifa: Aquinas and Avicenna,” Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association 86 (2012): 33–51.
 17

follow immediately and directly upon the real distinction, and which could therefore serve to lead

us back to it as their cause.44

Unfortunately, Fr. Owens takes neither approach. Instead, he maintains that the

metaphysician demonstrates the real distinction propter quid. How? In two stages. First he moves

by quia demonstration upward from the conceptual distinction between creaturely essence and

esse to God as the first cause of the creature.45 Second, he moves downward from subsistent being

back to creatures, demonstrating propter quid the real distinction of what was formerly recognized

as only conceptually distinct.46 A great deal more could be said about this, but for our purposes

one thing is clear: for Fr. Owens there is a real dilemma. On the one hand, he insists that the

metaphysician can provide a propter quid demonstration of the real distinction. On the other hand,

his identification of essence and esse as the intrinsic principles of metaphysics’s subject precludes

such a demonstration.

44
There is a further difficulty, however, with this way of answering the problem. According to Aquinas the principles
of a science are known per se nota, either to all or to the wise. In either case, the propositions are known immediately
through intellectus, not—as they would be if they were scientifically demonstrated—through the mediation of a
middle-term. Illuminating in this regard is the discussion of principles found at the beginning of St. Thomas’s
commentary on Boethius’s de hebdomadibus.
45
“The entitative composition of a finite thing is not known before the demonstration of subsistent being, and so does
not enter into that proof. The distinction used in the proof is the distinction that emerges from knowing what a thing
like a man or a phoenix is without knowing whether the thing exists in reality. This is a conceptual distinction, freely
admitted for instance by Suarez. It shows that a sensible thing's being is accidental to the thing's essence, insofar as
the thing does not exist of itself. But it does not as yet show that the sensible thing is really distinct from its own being.
The sensible thing's being appears however through the conceptual distinction as an aspect that is prior to the aspect
of essence. It could not be subsequent (like risibility in human nature) without presupposing that the essence already
had being. The combined accidentality and priority of the aspect of being in a sensible thing show real dependence of
the thing upon an efficient cause, and ultimately upon subsistent being. Being is accordingly established as a real
nature that when participated cannot coalesce in reality with any other nature. When received by a potency in the real
order, it is therefore an act that remains really other than the potency. The distinction between the aspects of essence
and being emerges in this way as grounded upon a real distinction. But that can be known only after the demonstration
of subsistent being has been achieved.” Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., “Elucidation and Causal Knowledge,” 67–68.
46
“The first efficient cause of being, that is, the principle of the subject of metaphysics, is reached by quia
demonstration, just as primary matter and substantial form, the principles of the subject of natural philosophy, are
reached from effects. So known, however, they furnish propter quid understanding of their subject matter. In this way
metaphysics gives a propter quid explanation of its subject. Accordingly it satisfies the requirements of the strictest
type of science.” Ibid., 69.
 18

And what of Fr. Dewan? Is he, too, stuck in a methodological bind? I must confess that for

a while I thought so. Gilson’s distinction between esse and the state of actual existence could have

given him a way out, for it would have let him say that the metaphysician presupposes the existence

of his subject vis-à-vis the state of existence and yet proves it as a property vis-à-vis the act of

existence. But Fr. Dewan rejected this distinction, and I knew it, so it was back to square-one.

Then I had one of those moments that justifies why we are here at this symposium: it was

the moment I realized that Fr. Dewan had already written an article answering my question. In

2002 he published a fascinating piece entitled, “Which Esse Gives the Answer to the Question: ‘Is

It?” for St. Thomas.”47 It tackles precisely that question. Fr. Dewan’s conclusion is that being-as-

truth, not being-as-existential-act, is what answers the an sit question.48 So to get an Aristotelian

science off the ground, all we need is an affirmation that the name of the subject truly names

something. We need to know about the correspondence of our terms and propositions to reality,

but we need not know the inner, metaphysical depths of that reality. That comes later.

Unlike Fr. Owens, then, Fr. Dewan can avoid the methodological conundrum attendant on

his account of esse. As such he seems to offer us a more coherent account of the methodology of

metaphysics. So I would like to close this paper by sketching, in outline, this Dewanian account.

The metaphysician must begin in a logico-metaphysical mode.49 He must presuppose (1)

the quid nominis of ens, (2) the quid nominis of its properties (including esse), (3) the truth of

47
Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “Which Esse Give the Answer to the Question: ‘Is It?’ For St. Thomas,” Doctor Communis
3 (2002): 80–97.
48
“My general conclusion is that the doctrine that the reply to the question ‘is it’ is from the ‘is’ meaning truth rather
than the ‘is’ meaning the act of being is the primary doctrine, and that other texts are more merely ‘logical’ approaches,
finding their justification in the fact that the esse of things is the cause of truth.” Ibid., 97. Over the course of the
article, Fr. Dewan supplies ample evidence from St. Thomas’s texts to support this conclusion. See, for example, In
Sent., II.34.1.1, corpus; SCG I.12; Quodl. 9.2.2; and ST I.48.2, ad 2.
49
For more on Fr. Dewan’s understanding of the relationship of logic and metaphysics, see Lawrence Dewan, O.P.,
“St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician,” in Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic
Metaphysics, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 45 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
 19

certain basic metaphysical premises, and (4) the truth of the existence of his subject. Then the

metaphysician will engage in a deeper consideration of being-as-being. This consideration will

take the form of an inquiry into essence and the diverse grades of essence. It begins with sensible

essences and slowly works its way up to essences that are simple and immaterial.50 Observing that

diverse grades of esse follow upon diverse grades of essence, the metaphysician will need to

account for why this is so. The first part of this account will look to the principles of essence—and

particularly to form—as that to which it is proper to give esse. The second part of this account will

look through the intimacy of form and esse to God as efficient cause of the ens, that is, of the

essence-in-activity. Then the real distinction between form and esse will come to light, for the

metaphysician will recognize in form the divine instrument51 at the heart of every substance,

through which God causes created esse in all its various modes. This is why Fr. Dewan insists that

the premier mode of demonstration in metaphysics is formal causality.52 It may also give us some

further insight into why and how form is truly something divine in things.

Thank you.

America Press, 2006), 82–87. It is also interesting to note the consonance between this approach and the first chapter
of the De ente et essentia.
50
“Substantiarum uero quedam sunt simplices et quedam composite, et in utrisque est essentia ; sed in simplicibus
ueriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius habent : sunt enim causa eorum que composita sunt, ad
minus substantia prima simplex que Deius est. Sed quia illarum substantiarum essentie sunt nobis magis occulte, ideo
ab essentiis substantiarum compositarum incipiendum est, ut a facilioribus conuenientior fiat disciplina.” De ente et
essentia, chap. 1, ll. 58-67.
51
How does essence act as an instrument of esse? One account would imagine God as the sun, esse as the light, and
essence as the window. On this image, the role of essence is that of a mere limit: it determines where and how the
light of the sun can pass through. Another account would imagine God as a light-switch, esse as the light, and essence
as the light-bulb. On this image, essence makes a positive contribution in causing the light, and it is clear that esse
flows from the essence, just as light flows from the bulb. Fr. Dewan’s approach is certainly more akin to the latter
than the former.
52
For an extended treatment of the priority of formal causality in the method of metaphysics, see Lawrence Dewan,
O.P., “St. Thomas, Metaphysics, and Formal Causality,” in Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics,
Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 45 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
2006), 131–66.