Haney v. Scientology: CSI's Motion To Compel Arbitration

Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 12/20/2019 03:17 PM Sherri R.
Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Vargas,Deputy Clerk
1 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN (State Bar No. 150477)
2 wforman@scheperkim.com
DAVID C. SCHEPER (State Bar No. 120174)
3 dscheper@scheperkim.com
MARGARET E. DAYTON (State Bar No. 274353)
4 pdayton@scheperkim.com
800 W. Sixth Street, 18th Floor
5 Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 613-4655
6 Facsimile: (213) 613-4656
7 Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology

International
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9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
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12 VALERIE HANEY, CASE NO. 19STCV21210

Assigned for All Purposes to:
13 Plaintiff, Hon. Richard J. Burdge, Jr., Dept. 37
14 v. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO

COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION;
15 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
16 TECHNOLOGY CENTER, and DAVID
MISCAVIGE; and DOES 1-25, [Filed Concurrently with: Declarations of
17 Lynn R. Farny, Catherine Fraser, and Gary
Defendants. Soter; [Proposed] Order]
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Dept.: 37
19 Date: January 29, 2020
Time: 8:30 a.m.
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RESERVATION NO. 523728976924
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION; MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on January 29, 2020, at 8:30, a.m., or as soon thereafter as
3 counsel may be heard in Department 37 of the above entitled Court, located at 111 North Hill Street,
4 Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendant Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) will and
5 hereby does move the Court for an order compelling Plaintiff Valerie Haney, a former member of
6 the Sea Organization (“Sea Org”), the religious order of Scientology, to comply with her repeated
7 written warranties as a lifetime Sea Org member, to forego litigation with Scientology entities and to
8 pursue resolution of any and all disputes that might arise between her and any Scientology entity or
9 official according to Scientology Scripture utilizing the internal justice procedures of the Church,
10 including binding religious arbitration, and staying this matter pending final conclusion of those
11 proceedings.
12 This motion is made pursuant to the First Amendment, the Due Process and Equal Protection
13 clauses of the First Amendment, the California Constitution, the Federal Arbitration Act, and
14 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2, et seq., on the grounds that written agreements to
15 arbitrate the entire controversy exist and that Plaintiff has refused to arbitrate the controversy. The
16 constitutional right of a church to govern itself imposes severe limitations upon the power of
17 government to intrude into the relationship between a church and its ministers and members,
18 including resolution of disputes between a church and its ministers and members. Watson v. Jones,
19 80 U.S. 679, 729-31 (1871); Hosanna Tabor v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565
20 U.S. 171 (2012). Plaintiff was not only a member of the Scientology religion but also, through her
21 training and service in the Sea Org religious order, served as a “minister” within the meaning, scope,
22 and effect of the so-called “ministerial exception.” Accordingly, this Court may not impose civil
23 standards of due process or unconscionability on the arbitration agreements made as part of
24 Plaintiff’s membership in Scientology and her ministry within the Sea Org.
25 This motion will be based on all of the pleadings, records, and files in this action, the
26 accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Lynn R. Farny,
27 Catherine Fraser, and Gary S. Soter, and exhibits thereto, and upon such oral and documentary
28 evidence as may be received by the Court at the hearing on this matter.
2
1 By this Notice and Motion, CSI also joins in the Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration
2 filed this date by Defendant Religious Technology Center (“RTC”), and specifically joins in all
3 arguments and evidence presented by RTC in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support
4 of its Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration.
6 DATED: December 20, 2019 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN
7 DAVID C. SCHEPER
8 MARGARET E. DAYTON
9
By: /s/ William H. Forman
10 William H. Forman
Attorneys for Defendant, Church of Scientology
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International
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13 Of Counsel:
14 Eric M Lieberman
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C.
15 14 Wall Street, Suite 3002
New York, NY 10005
16 (212) 254-1111
17 (pro hac vice application forthcoming)
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................9
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................................9
5 A. Relevant Scientology Beliefs and Practices. .................................................................9
6 B. Plaintiff’s Sea Org Experience. ...................................................................................10
7 C. Plaintiff’s Leaves the Sea Org.. ...................................................................................13

III. THE CASE MUST BE ORDERED TO ARBITRATION .....................................................14
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A. The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Controls. .........................................................14
9
B. Standards Governing a Motion to Compel Arbitration. ..............................................14
10 C. The Arbitration Agreements Are Valid. ......................................................................15
11 D. The Dispute Falls Within Plaintiff’s Agreements to Arbitrate....................................15
E. The First Amendment Protects Scientology Ecclesiastical Dispute Resolution. ........17
12
1. The First Amendment Prohibits the Court from Abrogating the Terms
13 of Plaintiff’s Commitment to the Church. .......................................................17
14 2. Courts Routinely Enforce Religious Arbitration Agreements. .......................22
15 F. CSI Requests a Statement of Decision If the Motion Is Denied. ................................23

IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................23
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3 Federal Cases
4 Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle,

627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 20, 21
5
Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
6
320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003) .......................................................................................................... 21
7
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
8 563 U.S. 333 (2011) ....................................................................................................................... 15
9 Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin,

700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................................................... 21
10
Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater,
11 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993) .......................................................................................................... 22
12
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,
13 539 U.S. 52 (2003) ......................................................................................................................... 14
14 Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/,

USA, 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................ 21
15
Easterly v. Heritage Christian School, Inc.,
16 No. 1:08-cv-17140-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009) ............................ 23
17
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York,
18 863 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................................... 21
19 Gen. Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Evangelical Methodist Church of Dalton,

Georgia, Inc.,
20 807 F.Supp.2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2011) ............................................................................................ 23
21 Graves v. George Fox University,
No. CV-06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372 (D. Idaho, Aug. 16, 2007) ......................................... 14
22
23 Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc.,

882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................................... 21
24
Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l.,
25 No. 09-3986-DSF, 2010 WL 3157064 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010) .................................................. 22
26 Homestake Lead Co. of Mo. v. Doe Run Resources Corp.,
282 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ......................................................................................... 17
27
Hosanna Tabor v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
28
565 U.S. 171 (2012) ..................................................................................................... 18, 20, 21, 22
5
1 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94 (1952) ......................................................................................................................... 18
2
Meyer v. T-Mobile USA Inc.,
3 836 F.Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ............................................................................................ 16
4
Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
5 52 F. Supp. 3d 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ............................................................................................ 23
6 Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.,

No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 WL 10844160 (M.D. Fla., March 13, 2015) ..................... 17, 23
7
Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2018 WL
8 3439638 (M.D. Fla., June 17, 2018) 2015) ................................................................................... 23
9 Rayburn v. Gen. Conf., Seventh Day Adventists,
10 772 F.2d 4th Cir. 1985 .............................................................................................................. 20, 21
11 Ross v. Metro. Church of God,

471 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2007) .......................................................................................... 21
12
Rweyemamu v. Cote,
13 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................................................................... 20
14 Schleicher v. Salvation Army,
15 518 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2008) .......................................................................................................... 20
16 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,

426 U.S. 696 (1976) ....................................................................................................................... 18
17
Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
18 924 F.3d (7th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................................ 21
19 Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. 679 (1871) ......................................................................................................................... 18
20
21 Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference,

377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................................................ 19
22
State Cases
23
Alla v. Moursi,
24 680 N.W. 569 (Minn. Ct. App., 2004) ........................................................................................... 23
25 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,
24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000)...................................................................................................................... 17
26
27 Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc.,

218 Cal. App. 4th 50 (2013) ..................................................................................................... 15, 17
28
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1 Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Med. Grp.,
121 Cal. App. 4th 1401 (2004) ....................................................................................................... 17
2
Dial 800 v. Fesbinder,
3 118 Cal.App.4th 32 (2004) ............................................................................................................. 23
4
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc.,
5 15 Cal. 4th 951 (1997).................................................................................................................... 15
6 Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Calif.,

71 Cal. App. 4th 649 (1999) ........................................................................................................... 15
7
Erickson, et al., v. 100 Oak Street,
8 et al., 35 Cal. 3d 312 (1983) ........................................................................................................... 15
9 Gunn v. Mariners Church,
10 167 Cal. App. 4th 206 (2008) ......................................................................................................... 19
11 Higgins v. Maher,
210 Cal. App. 3d 1168 (1989) ........................................................................................................ 19
12
Hope Int’l Univ. v. Superior Court,
13 119 Cal. App. 4th 719 (2004) ......................................................................................................... 21
14 Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club,
15 186 Cal. App. 3d 1314 (1986) ........................................................................................................ 16
16 Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church,

356 Ill.App.3d 504, 825 N.E.2d 1206 (2005) ................................................................................ 23
17
Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc.,
18 237 Cal.App.4th 651(2015) ...................................................................................................... 14, 16
19 Molecular Analytical Sys. v. Ciphergen,
186 Cal. App. 4th 696 (2010) ......................................................................................................... 16
20
21 Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp.,

4 Cal. App. 5th 232 (2016) ............................................................................................................. 14
22
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,
23 131 Cal. App. 4th 417 (2005) ......................................................................................................... 19
24 Schmoll v. Chapman University,
70 Cal. App. 4th ............................................................................................................................. 21
25
Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc.,
26
148 Cal.App.4th 1092 (2007) ......................................................................................................... 14
27
Silo v. CHW Med. Found.,
28 27 Cal. 4th 1097 (2002).................................................................................................................. 19
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2 Federal Statutes
3 9 U.S.C. § 2 .................................................................................................................................. 14, 15
4 9 U.S.C.A. § 16 .................................................................................................................................. 23
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State Statutes
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C.C.P. § 1281.2 (b) ............................................................................................................................. 13
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Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1291 ......................................................................................................... 23
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Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1294(a) ...................................................................................................... 23
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Treatises
10
U.S. Department of Labor, Field Operations Handbook § 10b03 (b) .................................................20
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1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiff served for over 20 years as a member of the Sea Organization (“Sea Org”), an
3 unincorporated religious order composed of clergypersons who have committed their lives to
4 advancing Scientology. Sea Org members form the dedicated core of the Scientology religion and
5 dedicate themselves to the Sea Org for a billion years. This term reflects both their dedication to
6 their religion and their awareness of themselves as immortal spiritual beings who have lived
7 countless lives and who will live again and again. As required by Scientology religious doctrine, she
8 agreed in multiple written agreements to resolve through ecclesiastical justice procedures disputes
9 that might arise between her and any Church of Scientology or official. When Plaintiff resigned from
10 the Sea Org in 2017, she signed a departure agreement, by which she again relinquished right to
11 bring suit against the Church in civil courts and affirmed that disputes, whether existing or in the
12 future, were subject to religious justice arbitration procedures. The Church gave her a check for
13 $4,500 as consideration for the departure agreement. A week later, Plaintiff cashed it.
14 Plaintiff then became a professional critic of Scientology, working as a paid assistant on an
15 anti-Scientology cable show. She now sues the Church over the subject matter covered by her
16 agreements with the Church—her 20-year service in the Sea Org. But Plaintiff’s repeated
17 agreements prohibit her from proceeding with this lawsuit. She chose to serve the Church and agreed
18 to be bound by Church law. No civil court may unbind her from these commitments or interpret the
19 applicable ecclesiastical law.
20 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or the California Arbitration Act (CAA), the
21 existence of agreements to arbitrate makes arbitration compulsory. Even more importantly, under the
22 Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions, the Church may
23 establish its own rules governing its relationship with religious workers or “ministers” (as defined in
24 the case law), exempt from civil law. The Church’s ecclesiastical arbitration is a condition of service
25 in the Sea Org. This Court may not interfere with this condition by imposing civil rules for
26 arbitration. The Church arbitration agreements, as written and agreed to, must be enforced.
27 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
28 A. Relevant Scientology Beliefs and Practices.
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1 The Scientology religion was founded by L. Ron Hubbard. A central tenet of the Scientology
2 religion is that both parishioners and Scientology churches must raise and resolve all disputes
3 between each other exclusively through the Scientology internal Ethics and Justice system
4 developed by Mr. Hubbard. Declaration of Lynn R. Farny (“Farny Dec.”), ¶ 23. Mr. Hubbard wrote,
5 “All Scientologists and staff members in accepting posts or membership agree to abide by…
6 [Scientology religious] Justice Codes.” Id., ¶ 19, Ex. 4, Policy Letter of 17 March 1965, “Rights of a
7 Staff Member, Students and Preclears to Justice.” As Mr. Hubbard wrote, “This system is for use in
8 all matters of justice in Scientology.” Id., ¶ 24, Ex. 6, Policy Letter of 7 September 1963,
9 “Committees of Evidence – Scientology Jurisprudence, Administration Of.” Many of the issues that
10 may arise in disputes between Scientology members, or between members and the Church, will
11 require application of Scientology doctrine, including the Church’s ethical code of conduct. Only
12 Scientologists would have the background in Scientology necessary to understand and apply those
13 doctrines. Id. ¶¶ 23 and 25. Accordingly, Mr. Hubbard demanded that “we must use Scientology …
14 justice in all our affairs.” Id. ¶ 23, Ex. 5.
15 B. Plaintiff’s Sea Org Experience.
16 Plaintiff was born into a family of Scientologists. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 44.
17 In 1994, she joined the Sea Org religious order. Id., Complaint ¶ 84. The Sea Org order is composed
18 of the most dedicated Scientologists—individuals who have committed their lives to the volunteer
19 service of their religion. As Plaintiff repeatedly attested, “The Sea Org is not an entity, it is a
20 religious commitment. Sea Org members form the dedicated core of the Scientology religion and are
21 the only individuals on the planet qualified to serve on the staff of the most senior churches in the
22 Scientology ecclesiastical hierarchy.” Farny Dec., ¶ 40, Ex. 10, Pledge of Religious Commitment,
23 June 7, 2012, at ¶ 4, page 2. As befits a religious order1, Plaintiff agreed to submit to Church
24 discipline, serve without pay, and live communally. Id., at pages 2-5. In repeated commitments to
25 the Sea Org, Plaintiff affirmed that she would be required to work long hours, subject to lifestyle and
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The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has determined that the Sea Org qualifies as a
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religious order under federal guidelines. https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/err/C1%20-
28 %20Immigrant%20Religious%20Workers/Decisions_Issued_in_2006/Nov022006_03C1101.pdf
10
1 disciplinary restrictions on her movements and contacts, and that she could be assigned anywhere in
2 the world to further the goals of the religion. Farny Dec., ¶ 31, and Ex. 10.
3 Plaintiff served at different times on the staff of the Church of Scientology Flag Service
4 Organization (“FSO”) (1995-2002), RTC (2002-2005) and CSI (2005-2017). Farny Dec., ¶ 36. Only
5 Sea Org members serve as staff for CSI, RTC or FSO. Id., ¶ 37. Plaintiff’s assignments involved
6 extensive training in religious scripture and avowedly promoted the advancement of the Scientology
7 religion. Id., ¶¶ 36-37. Plaintiff held posts over the Ethics and Justice Department and, for a time,
8 held the position of Chaplain. These positions involve training in the Scientology religion system of
9 ethics, and required her to administer the Scientology system of ethics and justice to Sea Org
10 members. Id. Plaintiff read and implemented the Scientology justice materials cited above, such as
11 the Committees of Evidence policy letter. Id., ¶ 37. Another example of religious ministry inhering in
12 Plaintiff’s work was her position with Golden Era Productions (“Gold”), a division of CSI. From
13 2006 until her departure, Plaintiff served in a production and casting role for Gold’s religious
14 instructional films, for which she undertook extensive religious training. Plaintiff described her work
15 for Gold thus: “I am a member of . . . Gold, which is a dissemination org[anization] for the
16 Scientology religion. It produces religious training films for Scientology auditors and ministers
17 which are Scripture of the religion. It also produces films, videos and other materials about the
18 Scientology religion to further the dissemination and spreading of the religion.” Farny Dec., Ex. 10
19 (Pledge of Religious Commitment, June 7, 2012, at 3); Declaration of Catherine Fraser (“Fraser
20 Dec.”), ¶¶ 13-15, 17, 19-22. Plaintiff worked on dozens of religious and humanitarian films that
21 were produced and disseminated to Scientology churches. Fraser Dec., ¶ 21. To perform these
22 functions, plaintiff was required to engage in further intense study of Scientology Scripture and
23 policy. During this time, from 2013 to 2016, Plaintiff ministered Scientology religious services to
24 her fellow Sea Org members at Gold as part of her spiritual progress and to assist them to spiritually
25 advance through Scientology. Id., ¶ 26.
26 Plaintiff executed enrollment applications expressing her commitment to Scientology, as a
27 condition for participating in Scientology religious services. Farny Dec., ¶¶ 26, 40, Exs. 7 and 9.
28 Plaintiff also executed “Staff Covenants,” (Exs. 8, 10 and 11) expressing her vows of obedience as a
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1 Sea Org member to serve the Church with FSO, RTC and CSI (Staff Covenants and Relgious
2 Services Enrollment Applications collectively are “Church Agreements”). Most importantly for this
3 motion, she promised to resolve disputes with the Church, related entities, and officers, directors, or
4 staff of such entities exclusively through ecclesiastical arbitration by use of the Scientology Ethics
5 and Justice system, and waived any right to bring suit in civil courts. Id., ¶¶ 26, 40, 45-46; Exs. 7-11.
6 An example of one such agreement is the “Religious Services Enrollment Application” of
7 June 7, 2012, by which she agreed that “any dispute between [Plaintiff] and the Church, any other
8 Scientology church or related organization or any person serving as an officer, director, trustee or
9 staff member of any such entity concerning my participation, in the past, the present or the future, in
10 any Scientology Religious Service or with respect to the discipline, faith, internal organization
11 and/or rules of Scientology, . . . will and must be resolved solely and exclusively by the
12 ecclesiastical authorities and religious procedures of Scientology.” Farny Dec., ¶ 26, 40, Ex. 9, ¶ 5.a.
13 Plaintiff agreed that ecclesiastical dispute resolution applied because “any such dispute by its very
14 nature is a matter of religious doctrine.” The dispute resolution procedure begins with attempts at
15 resolution through “direct communication.” Ex. 9, ¶ 5.b. If direct communication steps are
16 unsuccessful, the parties proceed with other steps, ultimately leading to final binding religious
17 arbitration:
18 Both parties to the dispute shall attempt to agree upon a single arbitrator to hear
the dispute. If they are unable to do so, each party shall select a separate
19 arbitrator and the two arbitrators so selected shall choose a third arbitrator. Each
arbitrator shall be a Scientology minister and current staff of the Church. Each
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such arbitrator shall also be familiar with the Scientology Scripture and in
21 particular, that part of the Scientology Scripture that pertains to the Scientology
Ethics and Justice system. All such arbitration shall be conducted in accordance
22 with the Scientology Ethics and Justice system, and shall apply the rules, policies,
doctrine, faith, customs and procedures of the Scientology religion, and the
23 decision of the arbitrator or arbitrators shall be final in all respects, and not
subject to review in a civil court. Ex. 9, ¶ 5.b.
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25 Other agreements have similar provisions. For example, the Religious Services Enrollment
26 Application of September 10, 2010, provides that “should any dispute” arise between her and the
27 Church (and related entities or persons), Plaintiff “will pursue resolution of that dispute, claim or
28 controversy solely and exclusively through Scientology’s internal Ethics, Justice and binding
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1 religious arbitration. . .” Farny Dec., ¶ 45, and Ex. 7, ¶ 6.d. See also Staff Commitment and General
2 Release, March 17, 2013, Ex. 11, ¶ 2 (agreeing to use “exclusively” Scientology procedures for “any
3 dispute . . . concerning [] service as a CSI staff member”).
4 C. Plaintiff Leaves the Sea Org.
5 The FAC alleges Plaintiff “escaped” in November 2016 (¶ 60) – only to voluntarily return a
6 few days later so that she could formally terminate her service with CSI and the Sea Org and remain
7 a Scientologist in good standing, id., ¶¶ 61-64. Plaintiff executed a “Staff Departure Release
8 Agreement” (“Departure Agreement”), reaffirming her prior assent to ecclesiastic dispute resolution.
9 CSI provided Plaintiff with a $4,500 staff departure transitional support allowance and other support.
10 Declaration of Gary Soter (“Soter Dec.”), ¶ 6, Ex. 2, ¶ 1, at 1-2. Plaintiff reaffirmed that disputes
11 between her and the Church were to be handled through established religious justice and arbitration
12 procedures, not the civil courts. Id., Ex. 2 at ¶ 8, at 10-12.
13 The Departure Agreement lays out the steps of the ecclesiastical justice dispute resolution
14 system. If the dispute is not resolved through preliminary steps of “direct communication,” Plaintiff
15 may submit “a written request” for the convening of religious arbitration (including, if applicable, a
16 Committee of Evidence) to the International Justice Chief, Church of Scientology International. Id.,
17 Ex. 2, ¶ 8.B.iv, ¶ 8.C, at 11. The procedures for convening arbitration are in previous Church
18 Agreements that Plaintiff signed, and which she reaffirmed in the Departure Agreement. Farny Dec.,
19 Ex. 9, June 7, 2012 “Religious Services Enrollment Application,” at ¶ 5.c., at 5, and Ex. 7; Soter
20 Dec., Ex. 2, Departure Agreement, ¶ 2.H, at 4. In Plaintiff’s posts in the Sea Org, she was
21 experienced in the application of Scientology justice procedures. Farny Dec., ¶¶ 36-37.
22 Plaintiff discussed the Departure Agreement with Gary Soter, General Counsel for CSI,
23 before signing it. Soter Dec., ¶¶ 4-5. Mr. Soter pointed out that the Departure Agreement reaffirmed
24 Plaintiff’s multiple prior Church Agreements, which included Plaintiff’s promises to resolve past,
25 present, and future disputes in accordance with Scientology law, including religious arbitration.
26 Plaintiff responded, “Ok, great.” Id., ¶ 6; Ex. 1, at 2. Plaintiff expressed her understanding of what
27 she was signing. “That means no court case,” Mr. Soter said. Plaintiff responded, “That’s correct.”
28 Soter Dec., ¶ 7; Ex. 1, at 19. After Plaintiff requested her own revision to the Departure Agreement,
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1 she signed it, collected her check, and left. Plaintiff cashed her $4,500 departure check a few days
2 later. Soter Dec., ¶ 13. Over a year later, Mr. Soter informed Plaintiff that she was violating the
3 confidentiality and non-disparagement terms of her agreements. Id., ¶ 14. Plaintiff responded by
4 falsely reporting to the State Bar that Mr. Soter had told her that he was her attorney. Id., ¶ 16. The
5 State Bar closed the investigation after receiving Mr. Soter’s response. Id. On June 18, 2019,
6 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit (after publicizing it on the internet).
7 III. THE CASE MUST BE ORDERED TO ARBITRATION
8 A. The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Controls.
9 The FAA applies to any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” that
10 contains an arbitration provision. 9 U.S.C. § 2; Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle, Inc., 237
11 Cal.App.4th 651, 657(2015). “[T]he phrase ‘involving commerce’ in the FAA is the functional
12 equivalent of the term ‘affecting commerce,’ which is a term of art that ordinarily signals the
13 broadest permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce clause power.” Shepard v. Edward Mackay
14 Enterprises, Inc., 148 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1097 (2007), citing Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539
15 U.S. 52, 55 (2003). There is no requirement that all parties to an agreement be involved in conduct
16 “affecting commerce.” Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp., 4 Cal. App. 5th 232, 246 (2016)
17 (sufficient nexus with interstate commerce where defendant distributed surgical products worldwide,
18 and plaintiff worked on production line for those products). See Graves v. George Fox University,
19 No. CV-06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372 (D. Idaho, Aug. 16, 2007) (FAA agreement that applies
20 Christian Conciliation Procedures).
21 Plaintiff’s agreements with CSI affected interstate commerce. Plaintiff’s chief responsibility
22 as a staff member of CSI was the production of religious films for CSI, which were disseminated
23 throughout the United States and the world as instructional Scripture. “Pledge of Religious
24 Commitment,” Farny Dec., Ex. 10 at page 3. The religious films that Plaintiff worked on have aired
25 on The Scientology Network, telecast through DirecTV to all 50 states and streamed live over the
26 internet at Scientology.tv. Fraser Dec., ¶ 21.
27 B. Standards Governing a Motion to Compel Arbitration.
28 The FAA provides that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute is “valid, irrevocable, and
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1 enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
2 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA reflects an “emphatic” and “liberal” federal policy in favor of arbitration.
3 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). Any “doubts concerning the scope of
4 arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Erickson, et al., v. 100 Oak Street et al.,
5 35 Cal. 3d 312, 320 (1983) (applying FAA).
6 The California Arbitration Act (“CAA”) is similar, requiring that arbitration provisions
7 “shall” be enforced, unless certain limited exceptions apply, which include where “grounds exist for
8 the revocation of the agreement.” C.C.P. § 1281.2 (b). “California law incorporates many of the
9 basic policy objectives contained in the FAA, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability.”
10 Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Calif., 71 Cal. App. 4th 649, 655 (1999). “Thus, even in non-FAA
11 cases, courts ‘are guided by the rule that, contractual arbitration being a favored method of resolving
12 disputes, every intendment will be indulged to give effect to such proceedings.’” Id.
13 A party seeking to compel arbitration meets its burden by “proving the existence of a valid
14 arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence[.]” Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp.,
15 Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 972 (1997); see also Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc., 218 Cal.
16 App. 4th 50, 59 (2013) (analyzing issue under both the FAA and CAA).
17 C. The Arbitration Agreements Are Valid.
18 CSI has met its burden of establishing that there are valid arbitration agreements with
19 Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s signature is authenticated on Church Agreements. Farny Dec., ¶ 40, Exs. 7-11.
20 CSI General Counsel witnessed Plaintiff sign the Departure Agreement. Soter Dec., ¶ 12, Ex. 2.
21 D. The Dispute Falls Within Plaintiff’s Agreements to Arbitrate.
22 Plaintiff agreed in at least one of her Church Agreements to arbitrate “any dispute between
23 [Plaintiff] and the Church, any other Scientology church” and related entities or persons. Farny Dec.,
24 ¶ 45, Ex. 7, ¶ 6.d. “Any” means just that (“used to indicate one selected without restriction,” merriam-
25 webster.com), and thus all her claims against the Church are to be arbitrated. It does not matter that
26 Plaintiff’s claims sound in torts or statute. Agreements to arbitrate “all” or “any” claims cover such
27 claims. Such “[b]road arbitration clauses” “are consistently interpreted as applying to extra-
28 contractual disputes between the contracting parties.” Khalatian, 237 Cal. App. 4th at 660. Similarly,
15
1 “contractual arbitration agreements are equally applicable to statutory claims as to other types of
2 common law claims.” Meyer v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 836 F.Supp. 2d 994, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
3 In addition, Plaintiff agreed in her Departure Agreement to arbitrate “any” dispute
4 “concerning” her experiences in the Sea Org or any matter of church governance or policy, without
5 limitation to party. Soter Dec., Ex. 2, at 10-11. An agreement providing for arbitration of any
6 controversy arising out of the subject matter of a contract applies to tort claims that “have roots in
7 the relationship between the parties which was created by the contract.” Izzi v. Mesquite Country
8 Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1314, 1315-1316 (1986); Molecular Analytical Sys. v. Ciphergen, 186 Cal.
9 App. 4th 696,713 (2010). Most of Plaintiff’s claims deal with her life in the Sea Org: claims 1-3
10 (Deceit and False Promise as to Sea Org), 4 (Imprisonment), 5 (Kidnapping), 9 (Invasion of Privacy,
11 while in Sea Org), 11 (Trafficking) and 12 (Labor Code violation related to her work as a Sea Org
12 member). Other causes of action concern events that allegedly occurred after Plaintiff left the Sea
13 Org, but they “have roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by contract.”
14 Plaintiff asserts CSI called her a “documented liar” in an online video. FAC ¶ 73. The video
15 compares statements Plaintiff made on television critical of her Sea Org experience with statements
16 she made while in the Sea Org praising the Church, and forms the basis of claims 7 and 8
17 (defamation), and 10 (intentional infliction of emotional distress). Plaintiff also asserts a claim for
18 “stalking” based on CSI’s service on her of a letter notifying her that she was violating the terms of
19 her agreements. FAC ¶ 80; Soter Dec., ¶ 15. As these claims thus involve the Church’s responses to
20 Plaintiff’s false statements about her Sea Org experiences, the claims bear directly on the relation
21 created by Plaintiff’s agreements with CSI. (Departure Agreement covers “any” dispute “concerning
22 [Plaintiff’s] experiences as a Sea Org worker,” Soter Dec., Ex. 2, ¶ 8.A, at 10; ¶¶ 8.B and 8.C, at 11).
23 Furthermore, it does not matter that some of Plaintiff’s causes of action arose after she left the
24 Church. She agreed to arbitrate “future” disputes with the Church, and is bound by that agreement.
25 Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Med. Grp., 121 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1407 (2004) (reversing denial of
26 petition to arbitrate where agreement provided for arbitration and plaintiff’s claims for defamation
27 were based on events occurring after termination of agreement: “Here, [plaintiff’s] temporal test
28 misconstrues the applicable standard. The issue turns on whether the tort claims are ‘rooted’ in the
16
1 contractual relationship between the parties, not when they occurred.”); Homestake Lead Co. of Mo.
2 v. Doe Run Resources Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that where an
3 arbitration clause “fixes no temporal boundaries to its application,” it covers disputes that arose from
4 events occurring after termination of agreement). Thus, all of Plaintiff’s claims must be arbitrated
5 under the Departure Agreement because they concern either her experiences with the Sea Org or an
6 alleged CSI policy of retribution against her for violating the terms of the Departure Agreement.
7 E. The First Amendment Protects Scientology Ecclesiastical Dispute Resolution.
8 Plaintiff has the burden of raising any defense to enforcement of the Church Agreements and
9 the Departure Agreement. Avery, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 59. CSI incorporates RTC’s discussion of
10 unconscionability in anticipation of Plaintiff raising that defense, and notes that a federal district
11 court has rejected an unconscionability challenge to arbitration provisions which were the same
12 and/or very similar to which Plaintiff agreed. Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org.,
13 Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 WL 10844160, at *2, *12 (M.D. Fla., March 13, 2015)
14 (“Garcia I”).
15 This case thus is much stronger than Garcia because Plaintiff here was a Sea Org member
16 whose functions and training come squarely within the protections of the ministerial exception.
17 Garcia was not Sea Org clergy, but a parishioner. As shown below, more than a century of Supreme
18 Court precedent bars this Court from imposing civil standards of “unconscionability” on the terms
19 the Church requires of clergypersons who join the Sea Org religious order.2
20 1. The First Amendment Prohibits the Court from Abrogating the Terms of
Plaintiff’s Commitment to the Church.
21
22 A religion’s right to determine who may join it, and on what terms, is the heart of its creed.
23 The Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729-31 (1871) explained that civil courts may
24 not exercise supervision over how a church chooses to admit and govern its relations with members:
25 All who unite themselves to [a church] do so with an implied consent to [its]

government, and are bound to submit to it. We cannot decide who ought to be
26 members of the church. [W]hen they became members they did so upon the
27
2
Thus, this Court may not apply factors in Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24
28 Cal. 4th 83, 113 (2000) for unconscionability in commercial employment arbitration agreements.
17
1 condition of continuing or not as they and their churches might determine, and
they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical power and cannot now invoke the
2 supervisory power of the civil tribunals.
3
Watson, as the Supreme Court put it later, “radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious
4
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation – in short, power to decide for
5
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as issues of faith and
6
doctrine.” Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94,
7
116 (1952). In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Court
8
articulated that the First Amendment affords a church nearly unreviewable latitude in deciding
9
internal disputes among factions or members. The Court dismissed an action brought by a bishop
10
challenging his removal because the church failed to comply with church laws and regulations. The
11
First Amendment “permit[s] hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and
12
regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes
13
over these matters.” 426 U.S. at 724. “Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular
14
notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are . . . hardly relevant to such matters
15
of ecclesiastical cognizance.” Id., at 715.
16
The ministerial exception derives from the long-established doctrine prohibiting civil
17
authorities from interfering with matters of church internal organization, self-rule, custom, or law.
18
Hosanna Tabor v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) recognized a
19
“ministerial exception,” derived from the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First
20
Amendment, holding that civil laws could not govern the relations between a church and its
21
“ministers,” i.e., those who serve a church by “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its
22
mission.” 565 U.S. at 192. In Hosanna Tabor, the Court dismissed a suit by a teacher in a Lutheran
23
school who challenged her termination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Even
24
though the teacher spent most of her workday teaching secular subjects, with just 45 minutes per
25
day set aside for religious duties, the Supreme Court cautioned that determining whether the teacher
26
was a minister could not “be resolved by a stopwatch.” Id., at 193-94. Rather, the Court held that the
27
“ministerial exception” barred the teacher’s action to challenge the church’s decision to terminate
28
because her suit “interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of
18
1 control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.” Id., at 188 (emphasis added).
2 “[T]he ministerial exception doctrine is based on the notion a church’s appointment of its
3 clergy, along with such closely related issues as clerical salaries, assignments, working conditions
4 and termination of employment, is an inherently religious function because clergy are such an
5 integral part of a church’s functioning as a religious institution.” Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los
6 Angeles v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 4th 417, 433 (2005) (emphasis added) (citing Werft v.
7 Desert Sw. Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004)). Allowing the state to intrude
8 into such matters “results in excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the establishment
9 clause,” and “violate[s] the free exercise clause” because “‘churches . . . must have power to decide
10 for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith
11 and doctrine.’” Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 27 Cal. 4th 1097, 1106 (2002). “A minister’s working
12 conditions . . . are part of the minister’s employment relationship with the church.” Werft, 377 F.3d
13 at 1101 (emphasis in original); Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l., No. 09-3986-DSF, 2010 WL
14 3157064 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010). California state courts have recognized in the strongest of
15 terms that the ministerial exception broadly bars judicial interference with administration by
16 churches of their clergy.
17 The teaching of this line of authority is that secular courts will not attempt to right
wrongs related to the . . . discipline or administration of clergy. Implicit in this
18 statement of the rule is the acknowledgement that such wrongs may exist, that they may
be severe, and that the administration of the church itself may be inadequate to provide
19
a remedy. The preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a
20 principle as to overshadow the inequities which may result from its liberal application.
In our society, jealous as it is of separation of church and state, one who enters the
21 clergy forfeits the protection of the civil authorities in terms of job rights.
22 Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1175 (1989); accord Gunn v. Mariners Church, 167 Cal.
23 App. 4th 206, 217 (2008). Here, CSI required all members of the Sea Org religious order to agree to
24 Scientology’s religious arbitration. As such, this Court must enforce such an agreement.
25 The core principles that underlie the ministerial exception doctrine are not unique to the
26 understanding of the term “minister”; many religious workers perform important religious duties,
27 and/or must meet specific religious qualifications or criteria to hold their positions. Hosanna-Tabor
28 and other courts eschewed adopting a bright line definition of a “minister.” 565 U.S. at 190 (holding
19
1 the “ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation” and declining “to
2 adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”) In Alcazar, for
3 instance, the Ninth Circuit en banc resisted providing a single definition, holding that a seminarian
4 for the priesthood who spent most of his one year performing secular tasks such as cleaning dishes
5 nevertheless fell within the ministerial exception, thus barring his wage and hour claim. “A church
6 may well assign secular duties to an aspiring member of the clergy, either to promote a spiritual
7 value (such as diligence, obedience, or compassion) or to promote its religious mission in some
8 material way. The ministerial exception applies notwithstanding the assignment of some secular
9 responsibilities.” Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir.
10 2010).3 As the concept of “minister” is elastic, so too is the application of the doctrine. Many
11 religious workers perform important religious duties, and/or must meet specific religious
12 qualifications or criteria to hold their positions. Principles of governmental and judicial non-
13 interference in matters of ecclesiastical administration applies to the relationship of churches with
14 such religious workers to the same extent as it does with the more traditional concept of “ministers.”
15 “The ministerial exception protects more than just ‘ministers’ . . . .” Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d
16 198, 206 (2d Cir. 2008). “Congress does not want courts to interfere in the internal affairs of
17 churches, . . . That is why the ‘minister’s exception’ is better termed the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine.”
18 Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008).
19 The most commonly articulated test was first stated by the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn and
20 adopted by other courts, including California courts: whether the worker’s “primary duties consist of
21 teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or
22 participation in religious ritual and worship,” or “is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of
23 the church.” Rayburn v. Gen. Conf., Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d at 1168-69 (emphasis added);
24 Hope Int’l Univ. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th 719, 734 (2004) (same language, quoting Schmoll
25
26 3
The U.S. Government recognizes that members of religious orders are exempt from employment
law. U.S. Department of Labor, Field Operations Handbook § 10b03 (b)(“[M]embers of religious
27
orders who serve pursuant to their religious obligations in the schools, hospitals, and other
28 institutions operated by their church or religious order shall not be considered to be ‘employees.’”)
20
1 v. Chapman University, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1439); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
2 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying exception to non-ordained press secretary whose duties
3 included outreach to community).
4 As the Court emphasized in Hosanna Tabor, any test cannot focus on a mechanical
5 calculation of how much of a minister’s time is devoted to his religious duties. Hosanna-Tabor, 565
6 U.S. at 193. See also Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1292 (minister in training spent most of his time
7 performing manual labor). The ultimate question is whether the employee’s work “is important to
8 the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.” Hope Int’l Univ., 119 Cal. App. 4th at 734.4
9 Plaintiff’s service for the Church fell within the exception. The Church Agreements contain the
10 terms that she must accept to enroll in the Sea Org and serve on Church Staff. She understood that
11 she was being selected to “personify [Scientology’s] beliefs.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. As
12 she affirmed many times, “Sea Org members form the dedicated core of the Scientology religion,
13 symbolically dedicate themselves to the Sea Org for a billion years and are the only individuals on
14 the planet qualified to serve on the staff of the most senior churches in the Scientology ecclesiastical
15 hierarchy.” Farny Dec., Ex. 10, Pledge of Religious Commitment, June 7, 2012, ¶ 4, at 2 (emphasis
16 added). This pledge reflected the reality of Plaintiff’s service to advance her religion. Plaintiff’s staff
17 assignments since 1994 involved training in religious Scripture and avowedly promoted the
18 advancement of the Scientology religion. Farny Dec., ¶¶ 36-37. She held posts over the Ethics and
19 Justice Department, and for a time, served as “Chaplain” at FSO, with the role of enforcing
20
4
See Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 924 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming that church
21
organist was subject to ministerial exception); Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc., 882
22 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2018) (Hebrew school teacher’s claims barred by ministerial exception);
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, 863 F.3d 190, 203 (2d Cir. 2017) (principal of parochial
23 school’s claim barred by ministerial exception); Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA,
777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2014) (although defendant was not a “church,” it was a Christian
24 organization and the ministerial exception applied to organization and its supervisors); Cannata v.
Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2012) (former music director’s claim
25
barred by the ministerial exception; “by playing the piano during services, [plaintiff] furthered the
26 mission of the church and helped convey its message to the congregants”); Ross v. Metro. Church of
God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (collecting cases applying exception to musical
27 director, organist, choir director, resident in hospital program, religion teacher, nun, kosher food
supervisor, and director of religious education).
28
21
1 adherence to Scientology Scripture among fellow Sea Org members. Id. Plaintiff spent her last
2 decade in the Sea Org contributing to the production of religious training films which are part of the
3 Scripture for Scientology ministers in training. Farny Dec., Ex. 10, Pledge of Religious
4 Commitment, June 7, 2012, ¶ 3 at 3; Fraser Dec., ¶¶ 13-15, 17, 19-22. A federal district court
5 dismissed claims of a Sea Org member who worked in the same film production facility as Ms.
6 Haney because adjudicating a Sea Org member's claims “would also require the Court to analyze the
7 criteria Defendant uses to choose ministers and the reasonableness of the methods used to enforce
8 church policy. . . .” Headley, 2010 WL 3157064, *7. And Plaintiff ministered another individual to
9 guide her spiritual journey as a Scientologist. Fraser Dec., ¶ 26. In sum, a condition of Plaintiff’s
10 service, of “personifying” the Church, were the Church Agreements that contained pledges to be
11 bound by Scientology dispute resolution procedures. Re-writing those procedures constitutes an
12 impermissible state intrusion on the Church’s selection of persons “conveying the Church’s message
13 and carrying out its mission.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.
14 The same analysis applies to the Departure Agreement. The Agreement contained the
15 Church’s terms for how Plaintiff properly could leave the Sea Org and remain a Church parishioner.
16 As the FAC states, Plaintiff chose to return to the Sea Org briefly to complete the formal departure
17 process known as “routing out” so that she could remain in association with her Scientology
18 relatives. FAC ¶¶ 61-62; Soter Dec., ¶ 12. Plaintiff acknowledged as she executed the Departure
19 Agreement that her “plan is to remain a Scientologist.” Id., Ex. 1, p. 26. Watson and its progeny
20 prohibit review of the terms of church membership as potentially “unconscionable” under civil
21 standards. Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (“We cannot decide who ought to be members of the church.”);
22 Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff executed
23 the Departure Agreement to receive Church sanction to leave the Sea Org yet remain on good terms
24 with the Church. Abrogating any part of that Agreement is an impermissible intrusion on the
25 Church’s procedures and doctrines for the discharge of members of its religious order.
26 2. Courts Routinely Enforce Religious Arbitration Agreements.
27 Whether viewed under “the ministerial exception” or the broader principle articulated first in
28 Watson that courts may not dictate to churches the terms upon which they accept members, the
22
1 upshot is that religious arbitration agreements routinely are upheld as enforceable, regardless of
2 conformity with notions of civil due process. In Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org.,
3 Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2018 WL 3439638 (M.D. Fla., June 17, 2018) (“Garcia II”), a
4 federal district court denied a challenge to an arbitration conducted under the same arbitration clause
5 contained in Plaintiff’s agreements. The Garcia plaintiffs’ due process objections to Scientology
6 procedures could not trump the Church’s First Amendment right to internal governance. Id. (“While
7 [plaintiffs] disagree with how the arbitration was conducted their arguments raise secular notions of
8 due process. And the Free Exercise Clause prohibits this Court from resolving their disputes
9 concerning the interpretation or application of Scientology doctrine.”)5
10 F. CSI Requests a Statement of Decision If the Motion Is Denied.
11 Consistent with the strong public policy favoring arbitration, denial of a petition to compel
12 arbitration is immediately appealable. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1294(a); 9 U.S.C.A. § 16. Section
13 1291 of the Civil Procedure Code requires the trial court to issue a statement of decision if
14 requested pursuant to Section 632, “whenever an order . . . is made that is appealable under this
15 title.” CSI respectfully requests a statement of decision if the Court denies the instant petition.
16 IV. CONCLUSION
17 CSI respectfully requests the Court stay this case and order Plaintiff to pursue her claims
18 through Scientology’s internal Ethics, Justice and binding religious arbitration procedures.
19 5
The following are just a few other examples of courts that have permitted arbitration in
20 ecclesiastical courts under faith-based procedures and rules that would not be allowed in a civil
proceeding. See Dial 800 v. Fesbinder, 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 50 (2004) (affirming enforceability of
21 judgment to be rendered in religious arbitration where arbitrators were rabbis and decision would be
based on Jewish law); Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
22 (enforcing employer/employee arbitration under the Institute for Christian Conciliation’s Rules of
Procedure for Christian Conciliation); Gen. Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v.
23
Evangelical Methodist Church of Dalton, Georgia, Inc., 807 F.Supp.2d 1291, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
24 (enforcing church rules that “believers should resolve disputes among themselves or within the
Church wherever possible,” and “by means of Christian conciliation, mediation or arbitration”);
25 Easterly v. Heritage Christian School, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-17140-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099, at
*1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009) (Teachers at Christian school agreed to resolution of differences by
26 “following the biblical pattern of Matthew 18: 15-17,” and waived right to file lawsuit); Jenkins v.
Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 356 Ill.App.3d 504, 825 N.E.2d 1206, 1212-13 (2005)
27
(enforcing Lutheran Church doctrine mandating church-based arbitration of disputes); Alla v.
28 Moursi, 680 N.W. 569 (Minn. Ct. App., 2004) (confirming arbitration award under Islamic law).
23
1 DATED: December 20, 2019 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
WILLIAM H. FORMAN
2 DAVID C. SCHEPER
3 MARGARET E. DAYTON
5
By: /s/ William H. Forman
6
William H. Forman
7 Attorneys for Defendant, Church of Scientology
International
8
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1 SERVICE LIST
Jane Doe (Valerie Haney) v. Church of Scientology, et al.
2 LASC Case No. 19STCV21210
3
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL
4
Robert W. Thompson Attorneys for Plaintiff VALERIE HANEY
5 Kristen A. Vierhaus
THOMPSON LAW OFFICES
6 700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
Burlingame, CA 94010
7 Telephone: 650-513-6111
Facsimile: 650-513-6071
8 Emails: bobby@tlopc.com
kris@tlopc.com
9
ATTORNEYS NOT ADMITTED TO THE
10 CALIFORNIA BAR – SERVED VIA MAIL
ONLY AS A COURTESY
11
Brian D. Kent
12 Gaetano D’Andrea
M. Stewart Ryan
13 Hele L. Fitzpatrick
Lauren Stram
14 LAFFEY BUCCI & KENT LLP
1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
15 Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: 215-399-9255
16 Facsimile: 215-241-8700
17 Jeffrey P. Fritz
SOLOFF & ZERVANOS P C
18 1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
19 Telephone: 215-732-2260
Facsimile: 215-732-2289
20
MARCI HAMILTON
21 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Fox-Fels Building
22 3814 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
23 Telephone: 215-353-8984
Facsimile: 215-493-1094
24
Ricardo M. Martinez-CID
25 Lea P. Bucciero
PODHURST ORSECK P A
26 One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300
Miami, FL 33131
27 Telephone: 305-358-2800
Facsimile: 301-358-2382
28
26
1 SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL
2 Robert E. Mangels Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS

Matthew D. Hinks TECHNOLOGY CENTER
3 Iman G. Wilson
JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER
4 & MITCHELL LLP
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
5 Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
Telephone: 310-203-8080
6 Facsimile: 310-203-0567
Emails: rmangels@jmbm.com
7 mhinks@jmbm.com
iwilson@jmbm.com
8
9 SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL
10 Jeffrey K. Riffer Specially Appearing for Defendant DAVID

ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN MISCAVIGE
11 GARTSIDE LLP
10345 West Olympic Boulevard
12 Los Angeles, CA 90064
Telephone: 310-746-4400
13 Facsimile: 310-746-4499
Email: jriffer@elkinskalt.com
14
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Haney v. Scientology: CSI's Motion To Compel Arbitration

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Haney v. Scientology: CSI's Motion To Compel Arbitration

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Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 12/20/2019 03:17 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Vargas,Deputy Clerk

1 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

7 Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology

9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

12 VALERIE HANEY, CASE NO. 19STCV21210

14 v. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO

23 standards of due process or unconscionability on the arbitration agreements made as part of

26 accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Lynn R. Farny,

28 evidence as may be received by the Court at the hearing on this matter.

4 of its Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration.

6 DATED: December 20, 2019 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

17 (pro hac vice application forthcoming)

7 C. Plaintiff’s Leaves the Sea Org.. ...................................................................................13

15 F. CSI Requests a Statement of Decision If the Motion Is Denied. ................................23

4 Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle,

9 Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin,

14 Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/,

19 Gen. Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Evangelical Methodist Church of Dalton,

23 Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc.,

6 Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.,

10 772 F.2d 4th Cir. 1985 .............................................................................................................. 20, 21

11 Ross v. Metro. Church of God,

15 518 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2008) .......................................................................................................... 20

16 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,

21 Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference,

27 Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc.,

6 Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Calif.,

10 167 Cal. App. 4th 206 (2008) ......................................................................................................... 19

15 186 Cal. App. 3d 1314 (1986) ........................................................................................................ 16

16 Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church,

21 Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp.,

3 9 U.S.C. § 2 .................................................................................................................................. 14, 15

14 Plaintiff then became a professional critic of Scientology, working as a paid assistant on an

19 applicable ecclesiastical law.

27 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

28 A. Relevant Scientology Beliefs and Practices.

14 justice in all our affairs.” Id. ¶ 23, Ex. 5.

15 B. Plaintiff’s Sea Org Experience.

25 advance through Scientology. Id., ¶ 26.

26 Plaintiff executed enrollment applications expressing her commitment to Scientology, as a

6 An example of one such agreement is the “Religious Services Enrollment Application” of

3 dispute . . . concerning [] service as a CSI staff member”).

4 C. Plaintiff Leaves the Sea Org.

12 procedures, not the civil courts. Id., Ex. 2 at ¶ 8, at 10-12.

21 experienced in the application of Scientology justice procedures. Farny Dec., ¶¶ 36-37.

6 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit (after publicizing it on the internet).

7 III. THE CASE MUST BE ORDERED TO ARBITRATION

8 A. The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Controls.

20 Christian Conciliation Procedures).

26 internet at Scientology.tv. Fraser Dec., ¶ 21.

27 B. Standards Governing a Motion to Compel Arbitration.

5 35 Cal. 3d 312, 320 (1983) (applying FAA).

17 C. The Arbitration Agreements Are Valid.

21 D. The Dispute Falls Within Plaintiff’s Agreements to Arbitrate.

3 In addition, Plaintiff agreed in her Departure Agreement to arbitrate “any” dispute

7 E. The First Amendment Protects Scientology Ecclesiastical Dispute Resolution.

25 All who unite themselves to [a church] do so with an implied consent to [its]

16 churches of their clergy.

13 interference in matters of ecclesiastical administration applies to the relationship of churches with

3 included outreach to community).

11 bound by Scientology dispute resolution procedures. Re-writing those procedures constitutes an