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The Evolution of Parliaments and Societies in Europe

Challenges and Prospects
Article in European Journal of Social Theory · January 2007
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European Journal of Social Theory 2(2): 167–194 EJST

Copyright © 1999 Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi
The Evolution of Parliaments and

Societies in Europe
Challenges and Prospects
Tom R. Burns
UNIVERSITY OF UPPSALA
Abstract
This article argues that parliamentary institutions have increasing difficulty
in addressing and dealing with the growing complexity, highly technical
character and rapidity of many developments in modern societies. Deficits
in representation, in knowledge and competence, and in engagement or
commitment effectively erode the authority and status of parliamentary
government. Major rule- and policy-making activities are being substantially
displaced from parliamentary bodies and central governments to global,
regional and local agents as well as agents operating in the many sectors of
a highly differentiated, modern society. Governance – and sovereignty – are
increasingly diffused upward, downward and outward beyond parliament
and its government. The author identifies problems, practical as well as
normative, with this general development and discusses the possibilities and
limitations of reform.
Key words
■ civil society ■ democracy ■ expertise ■ governance ■ parliament
Modern society is undergoing several major transformations: globalization,

technological revolution in the life and medical sciences, explosion of media and
communication, multiplication of organizations and authorities, and societal
democratization, among others. These transformations have profound impli-
cations for parliamentary government, its capabilities, its authority and its legit-
imacy. Today in Western Europe, parliaments and elective assemblies on all levels
have substantial difficulties in dealing with the growing complexity, highly tech-
nical character and the rapidity of many developments in modern society. There
is a structural deficit between societal conditions and forces, on the one hand, and
government institutions and capabilities, on the other.
1368-4310[199905]2:2;167–194;007896
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 168
168 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)
In this article I identify a number of serious problems which parliamentary

governments and parliamentarism face today. Nevertheless, I want to stress from
the outset that parliament has a vital and new role to play in the evolution of
democracy in our turbulent times. Most of the developments pointed out here
are found in one form or another throughout Western Europe.1 This calls for a
profound reflection on the forces and transformations of which we are not only
witnesses but participants to varying degrees.
General Trends in Modern Society
Complexity
Modern society is characterized by increasing complexity on all levels (global,
national, regional and local): the differentiation and complexity of markets and
market agents; administrative complexity; technical and scientific complexity;
complexity of social values and life styles; complexity of civil society; complexity
of governance. One aspect of growing complexity and knowledge expansion is
increased specialization and differentiation, whether in types of organizations,
variety of services, types of knowledge and expertise that must be taken into
account; or in types of laws and regulations, etc. An underlying principle of
modern life is to specialize – to develop knowledge and skill in a particular area
of activity. Decentralization of government is an illustration of this – one acquires
familiarity and skill at dealing with the concrete problems at hand in effective
ways. Moreover, such decentralization and specialization is defined – and recog-
nized – as highly appropriate and legitimate, even as ‘democratic’. The ‘subsidiar-
ity principle’ is one expression of this.
Technical and Scientific Development

Everywhere we see the exponential expansion of new technologies and system-
atic knowledge – driven through research, conceptual and technical innovations,
experiments and the elaboration of investigations. A further related trend is the
development of expertocracy. Here I am referring to the large number and variety
of experts and their pervasive role and influence in most affairs of modern society,
in particular law- and policy-making. I mean by an expert someone who has
specialized training and knowledge and is socially defined or recognized as
‘expert’. Such an agent may or may not have political ties. Specialized experts play
a central role in all areas of modern life: money and banking, market and market-
ing developments, energy (including oil and gas, nuclear, geothermal and alterna-
tive forms of energy); other natural resources such as the water we drink or the
air we breathe; health and medicine; education of various types and on different
levels; scientific research and new technical developments, for example in medi-
cine and bio-technology generally; law and government. Systematic knowledge
– professional, scientific and technical – is applied to a wide range of activities
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 169
Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 169
and human endeavors including the formulation of laws and policies, and the
development of programs. This is apparent on all levels of governance, including
the level of the European Union.
A World of Organizations
The modern world is characterized by the great numbers and varieties of organiz-
ations. There are not only hundreds if not thousands of inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs), but many tens of thousands of international non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs). And within many modern societies there are as
many as hundreds of thousands of economic and business organizations and
government agencies as well as an untold number of NGOs, interest groups, and
self-help and voluntary associations. The last include public interest or ‘citizen
groups’ that deal with a wide range of problems and issues, for example, the
environment and natural resources; the problems of pensioners, handicapped
persons, those suffering from AIDS, or kidney patients depending on dialysis;
the world of sports, entertainment, etc. In general, numerous and varying types
of groups and organizations are much more visible and engaged than individual
citizens. They mobilize resources, knowledge and commitments; they articulate
values, goals, programs of action. These collective actors that I refer to as ‘organiz-
ational citizens’ carry on a significant part of the business of politics and govern-
ance in the modern world.
This relates to a very distinct trend: there is a substantial outward diffusion of
collective authority and policy-making2 and rule-making into specialized sectors
in civil society. There is also a parallel, related trend, namely the reduced powers
of central governments and parliaments. What is this civil society? It is the web
of countless groups, organizations and movements.3 These networks are not
controlled by the state, although they may be influenced or regulated to a greater
or lesser extent by the state and, therefore, interface with state agencies.4 Obvi-
ously, civil society is not reducible to market or capitalist relationships. It also
concerns family, religious communities, professional groups and academies,
among others. Civil society is complex, dynamic, organic – not simply an un-
equivocal source of good (or evil).
I want to especially emphasize this point: that civil society is neither a source
of unambiguous good nor unambiguous evil. At its best, civil society agents and
processes can be benign in character, because they generate creative solutions to
collective problems. They resolve conflicts and develop self-governance. In its
interface with, and interpenetration of, the modern democratic state, civil society
processes may facilitate more efficient regulation, reduce unintended conse-
quences of legislation and policies, and increase public legitimacy. Some parts and
developments of civil society may contribute greatly to people’s welfare, to the
moral basis of social life and to the evolution of democratic norms and practices.
However, in the worse cases, civil society agents may block, erode or divert these
developments. We may find highly perverse practices such as state clientism,
corruption, criminality, and erosion of democratic principles and forms of
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 170
government. Inequalities within civil society distort participation in and influ-

ence over policy-making and regulation (such inequalities as is well known are
based on differential ownership of capital resources as well as on substantial
regional, ethnic, educational and sexual inequalities). Precisely because of this, I
argue that many of the forms of organic governance call for some minimum
degree of monitoring, assessment and regulation; and that parliament is a key
agent to play this role. In the past, parliament has had a minor role, if any, in
scrutinizing or legitimizing the vast array of autonomous or semi-autonomous
agents engaged in determining collective rules (‘laws’) and regulating important
areas of social life. These agents, their decisions and actions require a minimum
degree of monitoring and accountability, because of the overall magnitude of
their operations, and the substantial public risks involved in some areas in which
they operate. Thus far, there has been little effective regulation of civil power
centers and their deliberations and practices. This should be a major concern and
responsibility for parliament, a responsibility which is in large part new, namely
to act as a meta-sovereign, a concept to which I shall return later. In sum, in the
context of contemporary societal transformations, I explore the potential for
reconceptualizing and restructuring the role of modern parliament, identifying
the possibilities of renewing and re-establishing its leading role as a collective
representative and authority in modern, rapidly changing societies.
Implications of Societal Trends for Legislative Functions

and the Role of Parliaments5
What do contemporary societal trends imply for law-making and policy-making,

or for public regulation and service functions? In general, there is a structural
deficit between government institutions and capabilities and the concrete
conditions of modern society. First, there are cognitive and knowledge limi-
tations: parliament and its government are not – and cannot be expected to be –
an academic institution or a research organization. Nor are political parties any
more accomplished in this respect. Second, there are regulative limitations.
Reflect for a moment on the problems of centrally steering the multifarious
processes of modern society relating to, among other things, commerce, indus-
try, financial and monetary institutions, government service production,
research, education, gender relations, public health care, bio-technologies and life
science developments, globalization, etc. One could continue listing. The point
is clear. Central detailed regulation – through laws and government policies – of
such diversity is not an enterprise for mere mortals. Undertaking from the ‘center’
of society such tasks as monitoring, judging and steering a significant part of the
multitude of key processes, decisions and new developments is utopian, and
destined to fail.
Parliament should, in principle, be concerned about and engaged in several
key issues in each and all of these areas as well as many others. In general, parlia-
mentary government was never designed to deal with such a complex array of
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 171
problems, processes and new developments. Most members of parliament (and

those in government) – as well as most citizens – lack the education, training and
experience in dealing with most of such a world with its many specialties, tech-
nicalities and scientification. These are not learnable or overseeable either by
parliament or by the central government, no matter how sophisticated and well-
staffed.
In sum, neither parliament nor its government is capable of effectively
performing a number of key functions, given today’s constitutional and insti-
tutional arrangements and the great complexity, rapid change, and scientification
of modern society.
1 This means that in many instances parliamentary government cannot effec-
tively take into account or represent the diversity and complexity of the
modern world: its variety of values, perspectives, organizations, groups, and
movements. Consequently, there is a representation deficit.
2 There is also a knowledge and competence deficit in that parliamentary repre-
sentatives (its political parties as well as committees) lack sufficient diversi-
fied and technical knowledge in the face of a progressively high-tech,
scientized world.
3 Finally, there is a deficit of commitment or engagement in that parliamentary
representatives are typically ‘general representatives’, not particularly engaged
or interested in many of the issues and problems that are part of the modern
political and policy-making agenda (this characterization also applies to
political parties). Indeed, as discussed below, many agents of civil society
prefer to represent themselves or to select directly their own representatives
(‘lobbyists’). They also recruit their own expertise and try to engage directly
in relevant policy and rule-making. A parliament lacking sufficient capabili-
ties of representation, knowledge and engagement is unable to effectively
monitor, judge and regulate the array of contemporary developments, many
of which cry out for at least some degree of regulation. This increasing deficit
leads to public frustration and vulnerability to ready criticism and skepti-
cism.
In the face of growing complexity and dynamism – and the limitations or fail-
ings of parliamentary forms – new forms of regulation and governance have been
emerging. On the sectorial level, one finds various stable policy networks or
communities, sub-governments6 and private interest governments involving
interest groups engaged in sectorial or particular policy issues and problems
(Andersen and Burns, 1992, 1996; Bogason and Toonen, 1998; Burns and
Andersen, 1998; Heclo, 1978; Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Kooiman, 1993;
Rhodes, 1991; Wright, 1988). I have referred to a complex of these forms as
organic governance.7 Such governance develops parallel to and in interaction with
– at times in cooperation with, at times in competition with – parliamentary
government. Organic governance in its variety of forms is largely based in, and
involves agents of, civil society, but they interface and interpenetrate with state
agencies in many instances. The agents of civil society are not only market agents
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 172
and economic interest groups, but public interest groups, social movements,
self-help organizations and associations of many kinds. These agents are moti-
vated by diverse goals and interests (economic, political, professional, idealistic,
etc.) and engage themselves selectively in specialized public issue and policy
settings ranging widely: money and banking, industrial and labor market
conditions, the environment, natural resources, consumer interests, public
services, the handicapped, pensioners, women, genetic screening and biotech-
nologies generally, etc.
A common denominator in the current development of non-parliamentary
systems of governance is the introduction and engagement of private and semi-
private actors in ‘public’ policy-making, that is the ‘reconquest of political auth-
ority by societal actors’, agents grounded in or emerging from civil society. Non-
parliamentary and non-governmental forms of ‘legislative’ function and regu-
lation are increasingly common and penetrate most policy areas of modern
society. They may also interface with government in a variety of patterns.
Examples are many and varied, and in some cases well-known, especially when
it comes to the involvement of economic interests. I will mention four cases.
1 National and international financial communities obviously wield great
power today, fully capable of influencing or shaping national economic
policy-making. The weight of the judgements and reactions of financial
communities to the decisions and policies of governments – or even to
discussions and preparations for voting in parliament – are such that the
latter are compelled to be cautious and to take into account the opinions and
judgements of that financial community, lest it dump the national currency,
reduce public credit ratings for public bonds, or, in general, wreak economic
chaos for the country. Thus, economic and related policies of parliamentary
government are seriously constrained in many cases, and even directed in
some, by the anticipated reactions and judgements of international financial
interests.
2 In a number of European countries, business interests and government (or
business, labor and government) participate in discussions and deliberations
about economic policies, including macro-economic policy, labor market
policy, pension and social security policies, inflation and unemployment
tradeoffs, etc. (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979). In many cases, parlia-
ment’s function is limited to tacitly or formally accepting such policy agree-
ments or covenants.
3 Environmental public interest organizations engage and exercise influence
successfully in a variety of policy sectors without engaging in electoral poli-
tics. Such organizations as Greenpeace as well as many other environmental
organizations, including local ones, to a large extent ignore electoral politics.
They influence policy and law-making through direct action and engage-
ment in concrete negotiations and policymaking processes (see note 14
on Greenpeace). It might appear paradoxical that the environmental move-
ment is much more influential and effective in civil society and in sectorial
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 173
policy-making than in electoral or party politics (their proportion in Euro-

pean parliaments remains quite low even in countries such as Sweden where
they have been influential in a national referendum on nuclear energy and
in many sectorial policy processes). The women’s movements and the animal
rights’ movement in northern Europe also typically ignore electoral politics
and engage directly and often successfully in a variety of relevant policy
sector arenas.8 All of these are examples of civil society agents that more or
less bypass many of the channels of parliamentary government.
4 A growing number and variety of public interest organizations concern
themselves with the policies, production and quality of public services. A
typical strategy is to directly engage with the responsible administrative
units, whether on the national, regional or local levels. For instance, they
may monitor performance, collect complaints, organize public meetings,
formulate charters and policy proposals, ultimately negotiating directly with
public administrators at different levels with respect to changing policy,
procedures or particular practices and programs. This type of ‘citizen activity’
varies widely. For example in Italy, it ranges from dealing with agencies
responsible for natural catastrophes (earthquakes and floods) to traffic safety
or to hospital functioning, among other areas. In the case of hospitals, for
instance, such public interest engagement may concern policies about family
visitation to patients, about routine procedures in caring for patients, or
about improved or new treatments, etc. In general, we find government
agencies and services are directly confronted and in many instances influ-
enced by such movements engaging in cooperative ventures and problem-
solving. Changes in policy and practices may even be formalized through
charters and a sustained involvement of associations of various types with
government agencies.
Further examples could be provided from a wide range of policy areas: monetary
policy and banking, bio-technology, pharmaceuticals, information technology,
property rights developments and many other important arenas, each with a
variety of highly specialized, focused policy groups which negotiate and make
decisions. In general, many of the most strategic arenas of argument, negotiation,
conflict resolution and rule-making bypass or transcend the domain of the parlia-
mentary framework. The key agents are groups, organizations and networks of
various types in civil society.
Each form of organic governance, whether a specialized network or sub-
government or neo-corporatist arrangement, brings together relevant interests as
well as experts who are able and motivated to deal purposively and technically
with specific problems and issues in the policy sector. The representation is
specialized. Groups and organizations represent themselves or directly select their
representatives. They meet, negotiate and often solve problems. Solutions
are found in part because the sub-governments or policy communities have es-
tablished institutionalized strategies to deal with problems and to resolve
conflicts, but also because issues are highly focused and circumscribed within
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 174
these arrangements. In general, direct specialized self-representation is combined

with relevant specialized expertise. Focused, organized discussions, negotiations
and policy-making are maintained over time and space. This type of process is
typically accomplished in much more flexible and systematic ways than is poss-
ible within parliamentary/central governmental forms. As I point out elsewhere
(Burns, 1994), the flexibility and freedom of organic forms of governance make
up one face of a coin whose other face may be abuse of power, corruption and
non-accountability.
Today, the national democracy of individual citizens and their parliamentary
representatives tends to be bypassed and surpassed by a de facto direct democ-
racy of organized interests, citizen groups and movements that engage themselves
directly in issues that particularly concern them. Direct participation9 in problem-
solving and rule-making has never been so widespread and so far-reaching as
today. However, this is the participation of groups and organizations, not so
much that of autonomous, individual citizens. This system of ‘governance’ is
largely one of organizations, by organizations and for organizations. The develop-
ment of a complex of such governance processes entails significant changes in key
components of political order: sovereignty, representation, responsibility and
accountability, in the very character of laws and regulation, as discussed below.
Let us briefly discuss, on the one hand, limitations of parliamentary forms
and, on the other, ways in which organic forms of governance – developing in or
in connection with civil society – partially overcome such limitations.
1 Representation Parliaments and political parties are typically built up on terri-

torial representation. In the complex, dynamic modern world, this is not enough.
Parliamentary democratic forms based on territorial and general representation
fail to represent effectively the diverse interests, value communities, organizations
and social movements that are engaged in or concerned about a wide spectrum
of special issues and programs. In general, a great variety of perspectives, values
and interests cannot be effectively represented by parliamentary members, most
of whom are ‘generalists’ (and are expected to be ‘general representatives’ of their
constituencies).10 Contemporary realities are all too complex. Other types and
forms of representation gain voice and engage themselves in governance processes
(Hirst, 1995). These agents often want to be directly involved themselves in criti-
cal policy- or rule-making, or if not directly involved to be represented by those
with suitable orientations and with specialized knowledge and concerns relevant
in their view to the problem or issue at hand, whether Shell International,
Greenpeace, the environmental movement, or, in Italy Confindustria (General
Confederation of Italian Industry), Fiat, a feminist association, or an association
of dialysis patients.
In a hyper-differentiated modern society, there is a wide spectrum of special
interests, organizations and value-committed groups that engage themselves in or
are drawn into governance processes. The organizations and interest groups are
capable of articulating their concerns and needs and participating themselves
rather than trying to exercise influence through parliament’s general representatives
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 175
and party configurations. They have the possibility in sector or specialized policy
networks and sub-governments to engage directly and forcefully in what they
consider policy- and law-making processes relevant to their concerns. Some refer
to a radical ‘new pluralism’: the explosion in number and variety of interest
groups, NGOs, public interest groups and movements that take initiatives and
engage themselves in a wide range of governance as well as service activities.
Elected representatives and political parties are no longer the only or the main
way to define and act to realize one’s expectations or needs. Many of the organiz-
ations and interest groups have only weak ideological ties or commitments to
political parties, or lack them altogether. Typically they do not fit easily on to a
left–right dimension. They make specific demands relating to particular areas of
social life (regardless of political affiliation): the elderly or their spokespersons
concerned with pensions or the availability and quality of health care; or single-
parent families, or women, or handicapped; consumer advocates concerned with,
among other things, consumer protection; local citizen groups concerned with
public services or with the environment.
Today manifold discussions, negotiations, policy-making and implementation
take place in many thousands of specialized policy settings or sub-governments,
mostly outside parliamentary contexts. Each specific policy process requires tech-
nical as well as scientific expertise and engages multiple interests and groups with
special concern or interest in the area. They represent themselves, that is, it is a
system of self-representation, contrasting sharply with the territorial representation
in parliamentary democracy. In sum, there is a great diversity of types and forms
of representation. The concept of parliamentary and political party represen-
tation must be critically assessed in light of this representational complex in the
modern world, for instance:
1 specific national agencies, possibly with considerable autonomy, that repre-

sent areas or sectors such as energy, education, health or social welfare depart-
ments;
2 international government (for instance, the European Union) as well as
inter-governmental or non-government organizations such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank, Greenpeace, the Red Cross, etc.;
3 local and regional bodies that deal with complex and diverse local and
regional problems and the problems of delivering public services such as
education and health care;
4 non-government representatives – special interest and other group associ-
ations involved in self-representation;
5 parliamentary representation of territorial populations as well as local and
regional councils representing populations defined within defined areas;
6 parties representing their constituencies and themselves;
7 representatives of expertise, science and systematic knowledge recruited to
participate in particular discourses, negotiations and policy-making pro-
cesses.
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 176
In general, representation in modern governance is then highly heterogeneous, special-

ized and distributed. It is only to a limited extent territorial, and the territories
may be local, regional, national and global, but not necessarily following the usual
divisions on these levels. In this sense, parliaments and political parties have
limited capabilities to ‘represent’ these particularities as well as diversity (regard-
less of the number of members of parliament or the number of political parties).
2 Sovereignty and authority11 Sovereignty entails the idea that a political auth-
ority or community has undisputed right to determine the framework of rules,
regulations and policies in a given territory and to govern accordingly. A politi-
cal center – for instance parliament or its government – exercises a type of
‘supreme command’ over a particular society. Government, however it is defined
and operates, is supposed to enjoy the final and ultimate authority within that
territory; in principle there is no final and absolute authority above and beyond
the sovereign state (in our consideration here, a democratic one) (Held, 1989:
215).
Today there is emerging a new dispersed sovereignty. It is layered, segmented
and diffused, and is increasingly non-territorial. An agent or a complex of agents
may have a part but not the whole. While parliament as a general representative
has an important part of sovereignty, it is not undivided sovereignty. It is absol-
utely not absolute either in Italy or elsewhere in the modern world. Sovereignty
in practice has become more and more differentiated and diffused, horizontally
as well as vertically. There is a decentralization of political engagement and auth-
ority downwards into regions and municipalities and a centralization upwards
into international networks and institutions; there is also an outward diffusion
into numerous sectors of civil society. This obviously entails a complexification
of sovereignty in Europe today. In practice, and in the developing arrangements
of authority and governance, we discover a particular complex of sovereignty
which is in part, due to sectoral governance within societies and, in part, due to
the diffusion of authority and control into regions and localities as well as into
transnational collectivities (EU and IGOs) but also into NGOs and various
agents and associations in global civil society. The sovereignty complex in each
European society tends to be specialized, distributed and to a significant degree
increasingly non-territorial (or especially difficult to map to specific territories).
Finally, a key element in European political culture is the tendency to limit
formal political authority (parliament and government) by the rule of law.12 In
sum, the hegemony of the modern democratic state in the West is arguably more
an illusion than a reality; it is less and less centralized and non-territorial and
increasingly diffused into society as well as into global arrangements. Yet, in
written constitutions and in much political mythology, the matter of sovereignty
remains relatively clear-cut.
3 Responsibility Responsibility – and accountability for law-making, policy-

making and regulation formally resides in the system of parliamentary democ-
racy. In practice, other agents and their arrangements have assumed a great deal
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 177
of this responsibility and power; only in a few cases is it formally delegated, for
instance, to special regulative public agencies. Often, however, there are no such
formal arrangements. In the public mythology, the institutions of representative
democracy and its leaders retain a high degree of responsibility. The problem areas
and issues for which parliament (and the central government) are considered
responsible have increased substantially, and continue to expand. At the same
time, central regulative capacities and influence are declining, partly because of
the exponential growth of highly complex problems, issues and questions which
defy ready-made regulative solutions, partly because of a lack of expertise and
other resources (at least internal to the government), and partly because of the
diffusion of sovereignty and powers of regulation. In a word, their practical auth-
ority, their possibilities of monitoring and governing, are substantially reduced.
Most of those actually engaged in, and exercising influence over, the policy-
making and governance of modern society are not accountable to the larger
public; they are accountable to their specialized organizations and interests as well
as to themselves. These discrepancies or contradictions between responsibility
and power are the source of major misunderstandings, public frustration and
disillusionment with contemporary politicians, their parties and parliamentary
democracy in general. Public expectations about responsibility and power or
control are misplaced.
4 The transformation of law and public policy-making In the past, one distin-
guished between laws which were legislated or determined through governmental
processes and norms and contracts emerging through organic processes in civil
society. Today we have a wide variety of collectively determined rules and regu-
lations as well as regulative forms. The rules and policies formulated within policy
networks and sub-governments may be combined with more legal forms. For
instance, in some cases, informal rules and policies are validated or legitimized
by official acts of parliament or government. Thus, a medical policy may be
worked out by professional and administrative actors along with public-interest
associations in the health care sector. This formulation may be eventually sanc-
tioned not only by the department of health but possibly by parliament.
However, there are many policies, regulations and governance practices that are
not validated in any such formal way, and may even be opposed by some parlia-
mentarians.
Laws today not only increasingly require a variety of informational and tech-
nical inputs (fact-finding, analyses); but, paradoxically, must be viewed as increas-
ingly tentative, uncertain as to their effects and tenure in a complex, dynamic
world. In general, laws are crude devices for regulation under such conditions.
For instance:
(a) Technical changes may make a law quickly obsolete.

(b) Laws, regulations and programs are in complex settings always experiments
and have to be adjusted and adapted in the face of complex, dynamic
developments.
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 178
(c) Situations to which laws are to be applied vary considerably, in part because
of increased complexity, in part because actors simply know more and are
aware of or alerted to variation and difference (whereas in the past more
attention was given to standardization and simplification).
Formal laws are not the only, or always the best, means for structuring and regu-
lating social life. Community and organizational norms and relationships,
professional and occupational identities and engagements, rituals and patterns of
discourse, competition and a variety of other social control mechanisms operate
in any society, maintaining and changing social order. It follows that increased
numbers – and even quality – of laws do not necessarily lead to greater or more
effective regulation. Laws may clash with strong community or professional
norms, or with established social relationships and practices. They may contra-
dict one another. One of the common effects of an elaborate legal development
– particularly in the complex, dynamic modern world – is, ironically, a loss of
regulative power. In other words, a democratic state may attempt to do too much,
to exceed its capacity, or to use its capacities in ineffective or inappropriate ways,
so that the net result is less than what could have been accomplished (that is, sub-
optimal) with less direct ambitions. International, regional and local as well as
sectorial agreements on rules and regulations are discussed, negotiated and deter-
mined in the manifold forums and arenas of organic governance, taking place
outside of, or at the interface with, formal parliamentary government. Such agree-
ments are enforced through a complex of social control processes most often
having little to do with coercion or administrative power in any strict sense.
5 Governance of, by, and for organizations (rather than by citizens or by their
particular representative organs) Agents of diverse forms of governance are not
to any great extent individual citizens (although citizens are, of course involved)
but groups, organizations, associations, parties, factions and a variety of other
collectives including numerous hybrids.13 While political parties have been key
agents of democratic orders for some time, they are particular types of organiz-
ations, among many others. In contrast to the central government, parliament
and party configurations, many large multinational corporations such as Shell or
Fiat and international NGOs such as WTO, IMF, Greenpeace and Amnesty
International not only are often better organized, have access to greater expertise,
have more precisely formulated goals, policies and programs, but also in general
exercise substantial influence in the policy arenas in which they engage them-
selves, whether at the global level or on the national as well as local levels (where
in the last case they would be concerned about their facilities and the conditions
of their employees).14 Public-interest and citizen groups have greatly expanded
the issue agenda, for instance in the agricultural domain where the introduction
of food safety and nutrition concerns (and other methods and quality controls)
challenge the values and approaches of many high-tech agricultural methods
(Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 576). Major processes of governance escape the
reach of the nation-state. Its parliament, parties and government, therefore, by
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 179
no means determine what is right and appropriate exclusively for their own citi-
zens (Held, 1993: 25–6; Offe and Schmitter, 1995). The increasing number of
organizations and groups that define their interests and values (with respect to
the economy, community, status, religion, ethnicity, gender, etc.) constitute a
significant part of the power relations in a modern society. In this context govern-
ment, the sovereign in the traditional sense of the word – and as such supposed
to be placed super partes – is one power elite among others and not always the
strongest one (Bobbio, 1987: 127).
6 The powers of science and expertise Today we are witnessing an exponential

expansion of technical, scientific and other forms of systematic knowledge. Exper-
tise developed in highly specialized areas typically plays a key role in the formation
of particular laws, policies, regulations and programs as well as in their implemen-
tation and follow-up analysis. Various types of regulations are shaped and influ-
enced by, as well as legitimized by, expert knowledge (as opposed to popular,
commonsensical, everyday knowledge). Parliaments and their members lack, in
general, the legal, technical and specialized knowledge and skills essential to
judging, applying and expanding the use of such knowledge. Contemporary
governance and regulation is so much more diverse and technically and proce-
durally more demanding than even the most educated politician or representative
can know about or deal with. As a result, effective monitoring, overview, delib-
eration and decision-making about many, if not most policy areas today is far
beyond the capacity of a typical parliament (or its parties and its general member-
ship), no matter how large, how capable, how well organized or how specialized.
At the same time, elected representatives find it impossible, or very costly, to
acquire the minimal technical knowledge entailed in the variety of problem areas
or issues with which they deal, or might be expected to deal. For any given issue,
such as money and banking, bio-technology, environment, nuclear energy, tele-
communications, or pharmaceuticals, the necessary technical knowledge as well
as possible normative or policy positions vary enormously. In much contempor-
ary law- and policy-making as well as implementation, experts from such fields
as engineering, natural science, economics, management, jurisprudence – enjoy
a type of sovereignty. The sovereignty of experts complements as well as competes
with parliamentary or popular sovereignty.
A new not yet clearly defined political order is emerging (Anderson, 1976;
Andersen and Burns, 1996; Burns, 1994; Dahl, 1993; Held, 1995; Kohler-Koch,
1995). Modern governance, increasingly divided into semi-autonomous, special-
ized sectors, is multi-level and multi-polar. There is a de facto diffusion of auth-
ority and decision-making into specialized policy sectors in civil society as well
as a decentralization downwards into regions and municipalities and a central-
ization upwards into international institutions and networks. In other words,
there is no longer a single center. It becomes increasingly difficult to maintain
the public image of the centrality of parliamentary democracy in the face of
growing democratic deficits and substantial gaps between acknowledged
responsibilities and actual capabilities of governing.
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 180
Explaining Organic Governance: An Alternative

Development Emerging from Civil Society
In spite of the evidence relating to the developments identified here, it is still largely
assumed in Western Europe that the core of modern governance is – and must be
– the parliamentary institutions as well as the citizenry, and that political parties
mediate between citizens and parliamentary government. All of this takes place
within an established political mythology and set of cultural assumptions relating
to the symbolic center of authority, the locus for deliberation, policy-making and
legislation.15 Democratic rituals and myths contribute to a certain sense that parlia-
mentary democracy ‘functions’ in a ‘business-as-usual sense’. In their roles as citi-
zens, people vote for parties, electing representatives to parliament as well as to
regional and local assemblies. Parliament ‘decides’ a number of issues, the respons-
ible government appears to govern, and governments replace one another regularly,
even frequently in some countries such as Italy. In most Western democracies, if
there are serious public troubles or a crisis develops, parliamentary government is
expected to intervene. Transparency and accountability are expected.
Parliament (and its central government) fail to encompass sufficient expertise
or to represent a broad enough spectrum of publics or interests to deal effectively
with many of the contemporary problems or issues identified above. They cannot
effectively represent each and all relevant interests – or the intensity of the inter-
ests – of those who are or would be concerned about any given issue, and there
are an increasing number and variety. Indeed, many representatives in a parlia-
ment may be unconcerned or have extraneous interests with respect to any given
policy area or issue. Indeed, they may complicate the decision and policy-setting;
they may be pressured to vote according to party dictates or strategy or may
arrange to trade their vote, but neither they nor most of their constituents have
a profound interest (or expertise) in each and every issue or problem. But the
issue will be of genuine and deep concern to many of those directly or indirectly
affected by a policy (or lack of policy) and its ramifications. Finally, parliamentary
representatives are insufficiently specialized and knowledgeable to effectively
address many of the issues.
Organic forms of governance work in part because the agents who participate
in governance tend to be highly motivated and competent agents; they find and
exploit opportunities to shape and maintain new appropriate law and policy-
making arrangements, utilizing their rights and privileges as well as private
resources. They have access to and mobilize resources and expertise (scientific,
technical, legal, managerial). These arrangements are especially effective for
focused problem identification, negotiation, conflict resolution and policy-
making. In general, the many informal networks and sub-governments and
related forms of governance provide effective alternatives to territorial, parlia-
mentary representation. The robustness of the organic forms of governance is
based not only on their specialized effectiveness but on their democratic legiti-
macy. This legitimacy is weaker or more open to criticism than that of popular
sovereignty/representation, which is part of a sacred core of Western civilization
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 181
(Burns, 1994). But, nonetheless, these forms also realize, in a certain sense,
general cultural notions of democracy, namely the right to form groups or
organizations in order to advance or protect interests, the right to be informed
or to know, and the right to voice an opinion and to influence policies or laws
that affect one’s interests or values.16
Centralized, formalized law-making within a parliamentary framework is, in
general, organizationally and technically inferior to the organic forms of govern-
ance and is displaced, sometimes openly, sometimes covertly through selective
processes (Burns and Dietz, 1992). The superiority of the organic forms rests on
factors pointed out earlier:
1 They bring together many of the actors most directly interested in a given
area or issue, in defining problems, in finding solutions, and in policy-
making and regulation.
2 Moreover, they allow for the direct mobilization and participation of a
variety of experts in the process of formulating ‘laws’ and policies, that is,
readily draw in and engage agents with specialized expertise essential to
identifying problems and solving them in the area in question. They provide
a flexible basis, with a variety of forms and procedures for organizing partici-
pation and representation.
3 Relevant knowledge and knowledge production can be brought to bear on
the sectoral problems or issues. Through their collective activities, the actors
involved in a particular policy network or sub-government build up or
develop specific norms and practices relevant and practically useful to the
governance processes. In part, the organic forms provide a creative context of
flexible rules and procedures, for instance, for identifying commonalities and
mediating conflicts, mobilizing technical knowledge and expertise. They are
less constrained than the formalized modes that in most instances must take
into account and satisfy strict, uniform definitions and realizations of legally
defined concepts such as ‘due process’, ‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘law’,
‘compliance’, ‘accountability’.
4 ‘Policies’ and ‘laws’ agreed to in policy networks and sub-governments are
interpreted and implemented in large part through these same arrangements.
This increases the likelihood of effective ‘forward integration’, linking the
organic forms of policy-making to implementation (whereas in the usual
parliamentary/administrative arrangement, law- and policy-making are sepa-
rated from implementation).
5 The organic forms can be considered democratic in character in several
respects, at least in the sense that one finds self-representation and direct
group participation in, and exercise of influence over, specialized rule and
policy-making. In general, there is an extraordinary variety of alternative
governance arrangements operating today: parliamentary government,
various forms of organic governance as well as transnational powers, regional
and municipal governments. There are also hybrids and patterns of inter-
penetration of state agencies and agents of civil society.
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 182
Although parliamentary institutions are considered the core of Western political

systems, systematic erosion of their authority and prestige is a universal problem.
Major rule- and policy-making activities are being substantially displaced from
parliamentary bodies to other parts: global, regional and local levels as well as
those in numerous sectors of modern society. Modern governance, as pointed out
earlier, is multi-polar. In such a characterization, one can distinguish between
government based on representative democracy, on the one hand, and govern-
ance based on a complex of different regulative, representative and authority
processes, on the other (Hirst and Thompson, 1995).
The current arrangements of parliamentary government lack the structural
capacity or competence to deal with the myriad of differentiated processes and
governance problems of modern societies. Even where representative government
is incapable of effectively monitoring, holding accountable, and assuring the
systematic overview and regulation of a vast array of major societal activities and
developments, parliamentary institutions and representatives remain, neverthe-
less, accountable in everyday popular culture as well as in normative theory. Their
responsibility has an open-ended character. Without an effective redefinition of
representative democracy’s role or function, its profound incapacity and margin-
alization are not only likely to continue, but to contribute to loss of faith in and
support for democratic institutions. It will become increasingly difficult to main-
tain the public image of the centrality of parliamentary democracy in the face of
growing democratic deficits and substantial gaps between presumed responsi-
bilities and actual capabilities of governing.
The development of new levels and forms of governance need not imply that
parliamentary democracy has become superfluous or has no future role to play.
It still remains the major basis for legitimizing political authority and regulation
in Western societies. Parliament is defined and understood as the symbol and
agent of the nation, as ultimately responsible to ‘the people’ for laws and policy-
making. However, the opportunities for popular representatives and their insti-
tutions to play their ‘proper roles’ are very limited, unless new conceptions and
institutional arrangements are tried and developed.
Challenges and Future Prospects
Limitations
Having argued here the inadequacy of parliamentary democracy to deal with the
complexity, dynamics, and scientification of the modern world, I want to point
out that, nonetheless, organic forms of governance have several limitations.
1 Abuse of power and elaboration of forms of corruption In this type of governance,

economically well-endowed groups as well as highly organized groups and impas-
sioned movements with focused interests can concentrate on policy areas of
particular concern to them. They are not only motivated but can mobilize the
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 183
resources to ‘pay’ for participation and for the ‘transaction costs’ of policy-making.
They can co-opt, buy off or in innumerable ways pervert the policy-making process
to their advantage. Their engagements may take perverse forms such as corrup-
tion, state-business ‘enterprises’ and irresponsible private governments and, finally,
the erosion of democratic principles and forms of governance.17
In the specialized forms of non-parliamentary governance, large, unwieldy
citizen populations and groups with broad collective interests are at an obvious
disadvantage, whereas in parliamentary democracy their votes count in express-
ing dissatisfaction or in bringing about the circulation of political elites.18 The
powerlessness of large citizen populations is especially the case in the many tech-
nical areas where specialized groups and organizations can mobilize essential
expertise and other resources and can conduct focused discourses, negotiations
and policy-making. The problem is not only that citizens lack comparable
resources to compete in different arenas or a particular sector, with for instance
multinational corporations or with environmental or other movements, but also
that many populations and groups of people lack the capabilities and resources
to mobilize themselves, to articulate their goals or demands and to negotiate
changes in policy (Held, 1989: 45). In general, there are substantial risks of abuses
of power.
2 Non-transparency There are serious and growing problems of a lack of trans-

parency. Organic forms, by their informal or non-public character, are less visible
or accessible. The hidden hands of power are not always clean – a point that I
need not stress in the Italian context.
3 Weak or non-existent normative regulation and accountability The organic

forms of governance maximize flexibility; hence the variety of forms ranging from
policy networks and communities to sub-governments, to neo-corporatist
arrangements. These forms provide openings for the abuse of power, the avoid-
ance of or outright violation of laws, concealment from public scrutiny and
non-accountability generally. These and related conditions contradict a funda-
mental principle of democratic culture that the ‘governors’, those making major
consequential decisions that affect people’s lives, should be accountable to the
governed (Held, 1989).
4 Integration and over-arching problems Although the organic forms of govern-

ance tend to bypass or crowd out parliamentary influence in specialized areas of
policy-making, particularly those involving the application of specialized exper-
tise, they are not readily applied or effective in dealing with many global societal
problems such as those relating to radical new technological developments, for
example the revolutions in the life sciences, bio-technology and medicine.
Another problem area is the exclusion of large numbers of people from access to
education, or access to computers and other information technologies, or access
to jobs (which are today a scarce resource). The national parliamentary govern-
ments, the governments of the regions and cities and the EU have not yet found
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 184
solutions to such problems. The organic forms are not especially capable of
dealing with the current fragmentation of policy-making, where the multitude
of piecemeal but interrelated developments may lead – unintentionally or unex-
pectedly – to serious, even catastrophic economic, social or ecological conse-
quences.
5 Legitimization problems A further weakness is that the specialized organic

forms are generally unable to fully and effectively legitimize themselves through,
for example, public ceremonies and rituals. Typically, the formal democratic
arrangements, in any particular parliament, continue to be essential in this
respect.
New Directions
A revitalization and reform of democracy in Western Europe calls for bringing to
public attention and discussion several of the developments identified here. Who,
or what agents, will take the initiative, assume responsibility and organize for this
purpose? Failure to do so entails a genuine risk of a progressive, invisible erosion
of representative democracy. Many ordinary citizens will continue to become
disillusioned with the doctrine that they (or their representatives) can exercise
influence over government, or with the belief that they can hold political leaders
accountable for policies and developments – exactly when democratically elected
rulers can, in practice, do embarrassingly little.
Is there hope? Yes, but with some reservations. First, there is in Western Europe
a widely shared set of core democratic principles, a vital political culture. There
is also considerable social discipline, rationalized actors and well-established and
functioning governance processes. Important here also is the diffuse network of
social controls that enables all of us to participate in modern experiments in
various forms of ‘disciplined anarchy’ (but which is certainly not chaos). This
modern anarchy actually works. Of course, the order operates within certain
limits, as is the case with any social order. One important pre-condition here is
the firmly established principle of excluding the use of armed force as a means to
resolve conflicts. A related condition is the fact that most (although not all) agents
in Western Europe, whether in Italy, Germany or Sweden, operate within the
framework of a more or less common political and institutional culture which
encompasses the rule of law, property rights, equality, rationality and democratic
procedure. Western Europe enjoys a great advantage in that, thus far, many of its
institutions work more or less effectively. Also, on some levels and in some areas
Western European societies have developed and have considerable experience of
institutionalized arrangements for reflective processes (journalism, mass media,
centers of social science research and investigation) to identify and critically
examine failings, traps, dead-ends, vicious circles and the like (Burns and
Engdahl, 1998). This complex of arrangements is a very substantial asset and is
essential to the future of democratic development. There is a solid foundation on
which to launch reform.
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 185
A major conclusion of the analysis here is that modern societies are faced with
two major governance challenges, which must be confronted in dealing with the
threat of a growing democratic deficit. First, we need to develop normative prin-
ciples and guidelines that define and effectively regulate and hold accountable
agents engaged in organic governance; and second, we need to reconsider and
redefine the role of parliamentary bodies in relation to these and other contem-
porary societal developments.
The moral basis of a new order There is an obvious gap between the explicit
normative theory of democracy and the contemporary practice of organic govern-
ance. A normative theory of democracy orients us to representative parliamen-
tarism based on popular sovereignty. Organic governance involves diverse
interests, associations, lobbies and organizations often representing themselves
and directly engaging in various forms of policy-making and regulation. This gap,
as well as other problems, concerns many political leaders and citizen groups as
well as segments of the general public. For some there is a sense of institutional
and moral crisis.
What is to be done? What is required to accomplish a minimum regulation
of the agents and processes of organic governance? Several steps can and should
be taken towards publicly regulating the organic forms and their agents and estab-
lishing standards and organizing principles and procedures for doing so. One
normative principle that could serve as a legitimate point of departure for reform
is the following. Parliament should regulate and hold accountable as well as secure
greater legitimacy for the organic forms and their agents. More specific measures
might be as follows. First, parliament, or its agents, could give explicit authoriz-
ation, or empowerment, in the form of charters, mandates, or other general delega-
tive instruments, to specialized or sector policy-making groups or communities,
as one has done in the past for cities, private universities, or other incorporated
entities. Second, it should explicate the concept of a citizenship of organizations,
and define constitutionally the role, rights and obligations of organizations in
contemporary governance. Explicit or public laws regulating their access,
behavior and accountability should be articulated. This would put them in the
broader context of public law. This entails establishing basic norms and organiz-
ing principles for them, without restricting unnecessarily freedom and self-
governance. Third, the role of expertise must be defined and regulated (Burns and
Ueberhorst, 1988). This implies formulating explicitly in a new constitution the
role, the duties, responsibilities and accountability of expertise and scientists in
democratic politics. At present, the status of such participants and their exercise
of influence in policy- and law-making, whether direct or indirect, is highly
ambiguous. Indeed, one claim for the involvement of experts in governance
processes is that they contribute to making ‘right’ decisions, laws, or policies
(although these may be incompatible with the wishes of citizens or of parlia-
ment). Moreover, their role is not grounded in a normative theory of democracy,
but in principles of rationality (key components of modernity).19 Democratic
constitutions typically say little or nothing about the role of experts, their powers,
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 186
responsibilities and accountability, in either government or governance processes.

This gap should be filled.
These considerations imply the architecture of a legitimate new political order,
combining parliamentary and organic forms of governance and their inter-
relationships. An appropriate modern constitution should then not only refer to
parliament, formal government and citizens but also to organizations, agents of
civil society and experts. It would also articulate and legitimize particular stan-
dards or ideal forms of organic governance. This would entail defining, among
other things, rights, limits, responsibilities, means of transparency and account-
ability (as discussed below). Thus, the forms of organic governance would be
constitutionally defined, regulated and more securely legitimated in a new demo-
cratic political order (partially already operating).
Parliament as a meta-sovereign in the realm of dispersed sovereignty Precisely what

role can parliament play in a new political order with differentiated, diffused
sovereignty, representation and rule-making and a wide variety and number of
organic forms of governance? One major potential role for parliament would be
that of holding accountable and monitoring key organic forms of governance and
their agents (as argued earlier). Thus, it would concern itself less with the in-
numerable detailed, practical governance issues and policy-making in highly
specialized or technical policy areas. These can often be more effectively handled
in sectoral governance as well as regional and local governments with widespread,
direct participation of relevant agents (as argued earlier).20 Parliament’s role in
the context of a great diversity of organic governance can be reconceptualized
according to the following principles (this is only a sketch, presented here for the
purposes of further reflection and discussion).
1 First, parliament’s overall integrative function should be stressed: its role as

representative of the people of an area, addressing all-encompassing societal
issues and developments as well as those of long duration.
2 It should act as a meta-sovereign, the generative source of sovereignty and
the authority to empower, authorize or delegate to agents in key areas of
self-governance and self-regulation. It would do this in part by defining the
general ground rules and principles for participating and playing a part in
organic governance processes. This meta-sovereignty would be exercised
both on the national as well as the local levels. On the international level,
it could negotiate bilaterally and multilaterally with its counterparts to
perform these functions in strategic areas. The general ground rules and
principles would include guidelines and norms for organizing discourse and
negotiation and for establishing public accountability. It would also
monitor compliance with and sanction the breach of key rules and prin-
ciples, such as those concerning openness, access and public accounting. In
key technical areas, it could establish special authorities or independent
agencies responsible for monitoring and ensuring that governance processes
operate according to certain general ground rules and parameters decided
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 187
by parliament, and make them accountable to parliament for operating

within the frame of a defined mandate.
3 Moreover, parliament would formulate rules and procedures for public
accountability, in part for reporting and accounting about governance
arrangements, participating agents, types and levels of participation, and key
decisions and overall developments (just as today public corporations and
many voluntary organizations are required to give public financial accounts
of themselves). Periodic accounts (for example, yearly) could be demanded
from any sector which is of sufficient public significance to impose such
public accountability. In some critical or problematic areas, parliament
might conduct public hearings and other investigations, especially in those
areas that are either of great long-term significance or of critical public
concern. These include, of course, areas of environmental problems or those
of major technological developments, relating, for instance, to bio-tech-
nologies, medicine and communications. Other important areas are those
that concern large numbers of citizens such as welfare provisions, employ-
ment conditions and the place of women in society. In such ways parliament
would reaffirm itself as a major general representative and voice of peoples –
and they do need a voice.
In sum, parliament would assume a higher authority and responsibility in a

complex, differentiated world with multiple, diffuse sovereignties. In its role as
meta-sovereign it would contribute to defining and enforcing general standards
of governance and procedures for registering (or obtaining a charter or delega-
tion) and giving accounts. Such strategic reforms would increase transparency
and contribute to reinforcing general public trust in these and related arrange-
ments. Such trust in key institutions and in diverse and distant processes and
decisions is essential to any modern society. Parliament would, in this way, re-
affirm itself as a general representative and voice of the people by, for instance,
holding the participants in key areas of organic governance accountable. This
would entail, in part, determining if particular actors should be allowed to
continue to operate as sovereign agents (just as corporations and many voluntary
organizations are required to give accounts of themselves; they may be sanctioned
or even de-accredited as organizations if they break key rules, including those of
providing proper accounts). Of course, independent courts could serve as forums
to determine, on appeal from groups or agents excluded or sanctioned, whether
parliament has acted correctly and responsibly in its determinations.
In the face of the complexity and dynamism of modern society, parliament
could – and should – assume an active, far-reaching constitutional role. As a repre-
sentative of a general collective sovereignty, it could confront and deliberate on the
long-term and far-reaching transformations in society, including changes in
sovereignty, representativity and accountability that characterize organic forms of
self-governance. In this context – where we are subject to several major trans-
formations simultaneously – the consequences of our ignorance, or of our failure
to act, or of our irresponsible actions are much greater than they were 100 years
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 188
ago, or even 50 years ago. We run the risk of increasing fragmentation, non-
accountability and disorder. This opens up opportunities for all types of extremes,
a risk that we dare not take, especially given modern powers of undesirable and
destructive transformations. We must continue to face and grapple with the new
challenges – and prepare ourselves properly for the next century, institutionally,
democratically and also morally.21
Notes
This article was prepared on the basis of an address to the Italian Parliament, 8 May 1998,
on the future of parliamentary democracy. The occasion was a Commemoration in honor
of Aldo Moro, former Italian prime minister and president of the Christian Democratic
Party, who was kidnapped and assassinated 20 years ago. The article was completed while
I was a Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy, and revised
while a Fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences. In
the preparation of this address, I am particularly grateful to Alfonso Alfonsi, Luciano
D’Andrea, Ron Eyerman, Mark Jacobs, Jim Kemeny, Nora Machado, Patrick McCarthy,
Philippe Schmitter, Carlo Trigilia and Nina Witoszek for their suggestions and advice. I
want to also thank Agnese Moro, Alessandro Pizzorno, Gianfranco Poggi and Bo Strath
as well as participants in the seminar at the European University Institute, 29 April 1998,
for their comments. The article is based on earlier work with Svein Andersen and Reinhart
Ueberhorst.
1 Consideration of the former communist countries in Europe would take me beyond

the scope of this article, as would consideration of the evolution of democracy in other
parts of the world.
2 Policy-making refers to the explicit making of collective rules and regulations as well
as programs of action addressing and regulating a particular issue, problem area or
process. Actors involved in governance processes, including formal government,
decide policy (whatever the ways the decisions are reached).
3 Civil society consists of complexes of social actors, interaction settings and social rule
systems by means of which a group or network of actors constitute and regulate their
interactions, to some degree autonomously of the state (Alexander, 1995; Calhoun,
1993; Eisenstadt, 1993; Fine and Rai, 1997; Hall, 1995; Held, 1989, 1995; Kamali,
1998; Seligman, 1992). The concept of ‘civil society’ has been interpreted in a variety
of different ways (see Held, 1989: 180). Some would insist that civil society can never
be ‘separate’ from the state; the latter, by providing an overall legal framework of
society, constitutes the former to a significant degree (Held, 1989: 180), but this is
an extreme view and arguably unsustainable. Civil society consists of a number of
areas of social life: the world of family and friendship and other networks, much of
the economic sphere, and a great variety of cultural activities, which are organized and
regulated by moral and private or voluntary arrangements between agents outside the
direct control of the state (Eisenstadt, 1993; Held, 1989; Kamali, 1998).
4 Among other things, these networks include spheres of production, exchange and
consumption as well as of creation and protection of normative principles and values,
orders of morality and meaning, whether these are universal in character or particu-
laristic, or, possibly even criminal.
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 189
5 There is obviously great variation among European democracies: political arrange-

ments, culture and practices. The rules of political games differ but also the agents
and configurations of agents vary considerably. Nonetheless, the trends pointed out
above apply to all; the problems these developments pose for governance and regula-
tive processes are shared in common. While there are important differences in the
institutional and policy responses to contemporary problems observable in Scandi-
navia as compared to the UK, France, or Italy, there are commonalities of the sort I
identify here.
6 Sub-governments are groups of actors, outside the formal government, specializing in
policy-making and regulation with respect to specific issues or spheres. They involve
non-governmental agents but also possibly government agents and, of course, experts
in relatively well-defined organized arrangements. Representatives of government are
typically officials but may include politicians and ministers (see Jordan and Maloney,
1997).
7 Observers of Italian politics need no introduction to the notions of organic govern-
ance and the interpenetration of state and civil society. As in many other countries,
including those of Scandinavia, Italy has many such arrangements, legal and illegal,
non-corrupt as well as corrupt. While such arrangements are highly effective in
dealing with a wide range of contemporary problems, as I have argued elsewhere, they
are not without risks, for instance the risks of illegality and corruption as well as abuse
of power (see later discussion).
8 The animal rights movement has yet to make its mark in Italy, but it is likely to come.
Already Rome has an office for the rights of animals which apparently has played a
role in changing the zoo into a ‘biopark’, eliminating cages. If developments in
northern Europe are any indication, one can expect to see a movement emerging to
influence the policies of research laboratories in the use of animals in experimentation,
or in agricultural policies concerning livestock, etc. All such influence on law and
policy-making is initiated and carried through largely outside electoral politics.
9 Held (1989: 26) points out that John Stuart Mill emphasized that participation in
political life (voting, involvement in local administration and jury service) was vital
to creating a direct interest in government and, consequently, a basis for a morally
involved, informed and developing citizenry. In this sense, democratic politics was to
be a prime mechanism of moral self development. This paper stresses the importance
of organizations, although individuals play a part, of course, in all of this.
10 The problems of representation have been major concerns, recognized by practitioners
as well as social scientists.
11 A major principle underlying my argument here as well as in other works is that
contemporary sovereignty is distributed and relatively fluid. There is not only a
concept but established practices where multiple agents enjoy (and expect to enjoy)
rights and obligations in participating in existing and potential governance processes
in so far as they accept the rules, or, if rejecting them, doing so in ways consistent
with more general democratic principles and practices. This pattern is a direct result
of the development of democratic culture and practices extending far beyond citizens’
voting and parliamentary arrangements. This culture in the context of an increasingly
complex, differentiated, dynamic society is increasingly articulated in the organic
forms of representation and direct participation in policy-making discussed in this
paper.
12 Included here are not only constitutional regulations and restrictions on the state, but
international declaration of rights such as the United Nations’ Universal Declaration
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 190
of Human Rights (1947), the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the EU provisions. They potentially con-
strain a state from treating its own citizens as it judges fit. For instance, determinations
by the European Court of Justice have led to changes in British law as far-reaching as
sexual discrimination and equal pay (Held, 1989: 235).
13 A wide variety of organizations and public-interest groups are involved in, for
instance, contemporary ‘public services’ (see, for instance, Alter and Hage, 1993;
Hood and Schrippert, 1988: 7): national ministries, government bureaux as well as
municipal bureaux at the local level; independent public agencies including a national
drug administration, a telecommunication agency, or a central bank; public utilities;
private or independent enterprises, for example a national aid-to-handicapped associ-
ation; a local public service contractor, among others. In other words, services
provided publicly to some constituency or public on the basis of the government’s
legal authority are not provided only by public-sector bureaucracies in a uniform ‘civil
service’ mould.
14 The confrontation between Shell, the largest multinational company in Western
Europe, and Greenpeace in 1995 concerning the proposed deep-sea disposal (sinking)
of a large oil-loading buoy called Brent Spar illustrates the way in which policy
processes and negotiations take place outside parliamentary or central government
control (Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 577–8; the following presentation draws largely
on their account). Shell obtained permission to dump the structure in deep water in
the North Atlantic after policy community negotiations involving the Department of
Trade and Industry, the Scottish Office, representatives of fisherman and of environ-
mental groups in Britain. One Shell document refers to the fact that Scottish Office
scientists selected the disposal site, suggesting the close co-operation in this particular
policy community. Greenpeace, representing an international environmental
movement, challenged the decision, in part by engaging in a high-profile occupation
of the Brent Spar platform. After an effective consumer boycott in Germany and
elsewhere in Europe, Shell UK was forced by other parts of the Shell conglomerate to
shift its policy. Shell UK’s volte-face announcement came at the exact moment that the
British prime minister, John Major, was defending before the House of Commons
Shell’s policy of deep-sea dumping (the government policy remained one of approval
of the deep-sea disposal as the best environmental option). In a critical reflection of the
incident, a Shell vice-president (personal communication) blamed the UK division’s
arrogance (expert lawyers and scientists had provided major inputs) and neglect of the
international dimensions of the policy; as a result, a new philosophy and approach
emerged at Shell, which led to a reshaping of the policy community (see below).
Shell claimed that the decisions were neither made suddenly nor in secret.
According to a Shell assessment, material was available to the public and the media,
but no one showed any interest (at least in Britain). Approval of the license to sink
the Brent Spar was covered in the press but in only a few lines because the media
decided that the story was boring. Greenpeace entered from outside the established
policy community in Britain and through gaining media attention effectively defined
the issue publicly as one of pollution and multinational selfishness. In the following
year, after top management reflection and re-assessment, a series of direct, personal,
high-level discussions between Shell and Greenpeace took place with both sides
organizing conferences at which the other participated. Greenpeace expressed willing-
ness to participate in Shell’s Way Forward program through which policy was recon-
sidered. Greenpeace expressed views about talking with industry, while Shell conceded
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 191
that ‘technological arrogance’ had led to faulty assessments. The chairman and chief
executive of Shell stated that ‘bodies like Greenpeace clearly have the right to argue
that offshore disposal is wrong in principle. We should remember the debt that we
owe to environmentalists for awakening society to the environmental challenges we
face.’ (quoted in Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 578). Thus, a reshaped policy
community, with a new agent, new relationships, and new general understandings
and orientations emerged. Also, we see in such a case the different roles and degrees
of involvement of interest groups, and the central role of those with a strong commit-
ment and readiness to invest attention and resources. We also see the relative periph-
erality of parliament and the Conservative Party then in power.
15 Precisely because the nation-state has been to a greater or lesser extent a key agent, a
symbolic center, it is difficult to recognize to what extent real power and authority
have rapidly shifted elsewhere. The real powers are increasingly appropriated and
exercised by economic interests, experts, public-issue groups, social movements and
the multitudes of organizations. These are part of the new dispersed sovereignty.
16 Other ‘principles of democracy’ make more sense, or are easier to realize. There is self-
representation of interest groups and social movements, that is, the principle of direct
participation and ‘direct democracy’ of affected interests in specialized policy arenas.
At the same time, expert representation is a central feature and can be combined
readily with global, national, regional and local as well as interest group forms of
representation indicated above.
17 Clientism is one example of an organic form of governance, which of course operates
in a world where the distinction between public and private is blurred. It involves, in
part, the private expropriation of public resources and the use of state agencies to
expropriate private resources – and various combinations of these. Thus, a public
official may allocate resources or provide grants for private companies, business
leaders, etc. At the same time, the official may take bribes from companies in return
for contracts, subsidies or certification of their products, etc. It is different from
ordinary corruption precisely in its elaborate interplay between the public and private
spheres. Simple corruption is merely a by-product of wielding public power
(McCarthy, 1995: 62).
18 The specialized forms of governance also have very limited capability to address broad
constitutional questions such as the choice between a unitary state or a federal state,
or the choice between a model of society as a market as opposed to a state-centered
institutional arrangement or a mixed institutional arrangement. Underlying these
alternative visions or models of society are different core values, such as freedom and
liberty as opposed to collective responsibility and constraint.
19 Obviously, the principle of rationality is not particularly consistent with a principle
of citizen sovereignty. The Western cultural frame is characterized by a contradiction
between the core value of democracy and that of rationality realized in, for instance,
professional expertise (Burns, 1994).
20 A major problem here is the short-time of office of parliamentary representatives
(Philippe Schmitter has pointed out this problem to me). Of course, with any re-
definition of the role of parliament, especially in connection with substantial decen-
tralization of powers to regions and municipalities and centralization to the EU level,
major consideration should be given to the term of office essential to new roles and
responsibilities and to redefine the constituencies or bases for electing representatives
to parliament (possibly moving away from, at least partially, a territorial basis of
representation towards a more diversified and complex set of constituencies).
03 Burns (jr/d) 30/3/99 11:14 am Page 192
21 The new parliamentary role implies more than systematic consideration of major,
long-term societal developments, including those of governance. It implies a moral
engagement in confronting and grappling with critical contemporary issues. The state
is not beyond morality, regardless of its democratic credentials. It should not only be
morally accountable but, as a collective symbol, it should be morally exemplary. In
other words, the new prince, even a democratic one, must be a moral prince. Clearly,
from this perspective, the concept of the state articulated by Niccolo Machiavelli was
in a number of ways misleading and unfortunate. Of course, some cynics will react
immediately to the very suggestion that politics or government can or should be moral
or that politicians should or might be people of virtue and exercise moral leadership
(although there were polities in the past where they were expected to do so). The
cynics might refer to historical patterns claiming that things are the same as always,
or that one can do little about a particularly negative state of affairs or development,
or perhaps that a critical situation is not so negative after all. They provide arguments
for doing nothing, for continuing with ‘business as usual’. However, the dangers and
risks from such passivity are all too great in the modern world.
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■ Tom R. Burns is Professor in the Department of Sociology, University of Uppsala,

Sweden. He is the author of a number of books and articles in the areas of insti-
tutions and organizations, the sociology of technology and environment, economic
sociology, and social theory and methodology. His current research (together with
others in the Uppsala Theory Circle) deals with evolutionary institutionalism, the
general theory of games and the sociology of morality and ethics. Address: Uppsala
Theory Circle, Department of Sociology, Box 821, S-75108 Uppsala, Sweden. [email:
tom. burns@soc. uu. se]
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The Evolution of Parliaments and Societies in Europe

Article in European Journal of Social Theory · January 2007

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European Journal of Social Theory 2(2): 167–194 EJST

The Evolution of Parliaments and

Modern society is undergoing several major transformations: globalization,

168 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

In this article I identify a number of serious problems which parliamentary

General Trends in Modern Society

Technical and Scientific Development

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 169

170 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

government. Inequalities within civil society distort participation in and influ-

Implications of Societal Trends for Legislative Functions

What do contemporary societal trends imply for law-making and policy-making,

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 171

problems, processes and new developments. Most members of parliament (and

172 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 173

policy-making than in electoral or party politics (their proportion in Euro-

174 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

these arrangements. In general, direct specialized self-representation is combined

1 Representation Parliaments and political parties are typically built up on terri-

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 175

1 specific national agencies, possibly with considerable autonomy, that repre-

176 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

In general, representation in modern governance is then highly heterogeneous, special-

3 Responsibility Responsibility – and accountability for law-making, policy-

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 177

(a) Technical changes may make a law quickly obsolete.

178 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 179

6 The powers of science and expertise Today we are witnessing an exponential

180 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

Explaining Organic Governance: An Alternative

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 181

182 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

Although parliamentary institutions are considered the core of Western political

Challenges and Future Prospects

1 Abuse of power and elaboration of forms of corruption In this type of governance,

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 183

2 Non-transparency There are serious and growing problems of a lack of trans-

3 Weak or non-existent normative regulation and accountability The organic

4 Integration and over-arching problems Although the organic forms of govern-

184 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

5 Legitimization problems A further weakness is that the specialized organic

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 185

186 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

responsibilities and accountability, in either government or governance processes.

Parliament as a meta-sovereign in the realm of dispersed sovereignty Precisely what

1 First, parliament’s overall integrative function should be stressed: its role as

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 187

by parliament, and make them accountable to parliament for operating

In sum, parliament would assume a higher authority and responsibility in a

188 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

1 Consideration of the former communist countries in Europe would take me beyond

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 189

5 There is obviously great variation among European democracies: political arrange-

190 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

Tom R. Burns The Evolution of Parliaments 191