ALFONSO QUIJADA et al vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, REGALADO MONDEJAR et al

G.R. No. 126444 December 4, 1998
Digest by: D. Kerol (?)

Facts:
Trinidad was one of the heirs of the late Pedro Corvera and inherited from the latter the two-hectare
parcel of land subject of the case, situated in the barrio of San Agustin, Talacogon, Agusan del
Sur. On April 5, 1956, Trinidad Quijada together with her sisters Leonila Corvera Vda. de
Sequeña and Paz Corvera Cabiltes and brother Epapiadito Corvera executed a conditional
deed of donation of the two-hectare parcel of land subject of the case in favor of the
Municipality of Talacogon, the condition being that the parcel of land shall be used solely
and exclusively as part of the campus of the proposed provincial high school in Talacogon.
Apparently, Trinidad remained in possession of the parcel of land despite the donation.

On July 29, 1962, Trinidad sold one (1) hectare of the subject parcel of land to defendant-
appellant Regalado Mondejar. Subsequently, Trinidad verbally sold the remaining one (1)
hectare to defendant-appellant (respondent) Regalado Mondejar without the benefit of a
written deed of sale and evidenced solely by receipts of payment.

In 1980, the heirs of Trinidad, who at that time was already dead, filed a complaint for forcible
entry against defendant-appellant (respondent) Regalado Mondejar, which complaint was,
however, dismissed for failure to prosecute . In 1987, the proposed provincial high school having
failed to materialize, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Talacogon enacted a resolution
reverting the two (2) hectares of land donated back to the donors. In the meantime, defendant-
appellant (respondent) Regalado Mondejar sold portions of the land to defendants-appellants
(respondents) Fernando Bautista, Rodolfo Goloran, Efren Guden and Ernesto Goloran.
On July 5, 1988, plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners) filed this action against defendants-appellants
(respondents). In the complaint, plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners) alleged that their deceased
mother never sold, conveyed, transferred or disposed of the property in question to any person or
entity much less to Regalado Mondejar save the donation made to the Municipality of Talacogon
in 1956; that at the time of the alleged sale to Regalado Mondejar by Trinidad Quijada, the land
still belongs to the Municipality of Talacogon, hence, the supposed sale is null and void.

Defendants-appellants (respondents), on the other hand, in their answer claimed that the land in
dispute was sold to Regalado Mondejar, the one (1) hectare on July 29, 1962, and the remaining
one (1) hectare on installment basis until fully paid. As affirmative and/or special defense,
defendants-appellants (respondents) alleged that plaintiffs action is barred by laches or has
prescribed.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by Trinidad Quijada to respondent Mondejar was valid, considering
at the time of the alleged sale, the land still belongs to the Municipality of Talacogon. YES.

RTC Ruling:
The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners): firstly because
"Trinidad Quijada had no legal title or right to sell the land to defendant Mondejar in 1962, 1966,
1967 and 1968, the same not being hers to dispose of because ownership belongs to the
Municipality of Talacogon (Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 39) and, secondly, that the deed of sale
executed by Trinidad Quijada in favor of Mondejar did not carry with it the conformity and
acquiescence of her children, more so that she was already 63 years old at the time, and a widow.

CA Ruling:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the judgment a quo ruling that the sale
made by Trinidad Quijada to respondent Mondejar was valid as the former retained an inchoate
interest on the lots by virtue of the automatic reversion clause in the deed of donation.

SC Ruling:
The donation made on April 5, 1956 by Trinidad Quijada and her brother and sisters was subject
to the condition that the donated property shall be "used solely and exclusively as a part of the
campus of the proposed Provincial High School in Talacogon." The donation further provides that
should "the proposed Provincial High School be discontinued or if the same shall be opened but
for some reason or another, the same may in the future be closed" the donated property shall
automatically revert to the donor. Such condition, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy was validly imposed in the donation.

When the Municipality's acceptance of the donation was made known to the donor, the
former became the new owner of the donated property — donation being a mode of
acquiring and transmitting ownership — notwithstanding the condition imposed by the
donee. The donation is perfected once the acceptance by the donee is made known to the
donor. According, ownership is immediately transferred to the latter and that ownership will
only revert to the donor if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled.

In this case, that resolutory condition is the construction of the school. It has been ruled that when
a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school,
the condition imposed is not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.
Thus, at the time of the sales made in 1962 towards 1968, the alleged seller (Trinidad) could not
have sold the lots since she had earlier transferred ownership thereof by virtue of the deed of
donation. So long as the resolutory condition subsists and is capable of fulfillment, the donation
remains effective and the donee continues to be the owner subject only to the rights of the donor
or his successors-in-interest under the deed of donation. Since no period was imposed by the donor
on when must the donee comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has
tried to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Such period, however, became
irrelevant herein when the donee-Municipality manifested through a resolution that it cannot
comply with the condition of building a school and the same was made known to the donor. Only
then — when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the donor's knowledge
— that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic
reversion clause of the deed of donation.

The donor may have an inchoate interest in the donated property during the time that ownership
of the land has not reverted to her. Such inchoate interest may be the subject of contracts including
a contract of sale. In this case, however, what the donor sold was the land itself which she no
longer owns. It would have been different if the donor-seller sold her interests over the property
under the deed of donation which is subject to the possibility of reversion of ownership arising
from the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition.

As to laches, petitioners' action is not yet barred thereby. Laches presupposes failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; "it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it." Its essential elements of:
a) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation complained of;
b) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct
and after he has an opportunity to sue;
c) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and,
d) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.

Are absent in this case. Petioners' cause of action to quiet title commenced only when the property
reverted to the donor and/or his successors-in-interest in 1987. Certainly, when the suit was
initiated the following year, it cannot be said that petioners had slept on their rights for a long time.
The 1960's sales made by Trinidad Quijada cannot be the reckoning point as to when petitioners'
cause of action arose. They had no interest over the property at that time except under the deed of
donation to which private respondents were not privy. Moreover, petitioners had previously filed
an ejectment suit against private respondents only that it did not prosper on a technicality.

Be that at it may, there is one thing which militates against the claim of petitioners. Sale, being a
consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent, which is manifested the moment there is
a meeting of the minds as to the offer and acceptance thereof on three (3) elements: subject
matter, price and terms of payment of the price. Ownership by the seller on the thing sold at
the time of the perfection of the contract of sale is not an element for its perfection. What the
law requires is that the seller has the right to transfer ownership at the time the thing sold is
delivered. Perfection per se does not transfer ownership which occurs upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold. A perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on
the ground of non-ownership on the part of the seller at the time of its perfection; hence, the
sale is still valid.

The consummation, however, of the perfected contract is another matter. It occurs upon the
constructive or actual delivery of the subject matter to the buyer when the seller or her successors-
in-interest subsequently acquires ownership thereof. Such circumstance happened in this case
when petitioners — who are Trinidad Quijada's heirs and successors-in-interest — became
the owners of the subject property upon the reversion of the ownership of the land to them.
Consequently, ownership is transferred to respondent Mondejar and those who claim their
right from him. Article 1434 of the New Civil Code supports the ruling that the seller's "title
passes by operation of law to the buyer." This rule applies not only when the subject matter of the
contract of sale is goods, but also to other kinds of property, including real property.

There is also no merit in petitioners' contention that since the lots were owned by the municipality
at the time of the sale, they were outside the commerce of men under Article 1409 (4) of the NCC;
thus, the contract involving the same is inexistent and void from the beginning. However, nowhere
in Article 1409 (4) is it provided that the properties of a municipality, whether it be those for public
use or its patrimonial property are outside the commerce of men. Besides, the lots in this case were
conditionally owned by the municipality. To rule that the donated properties are outside the
commerce of men would render nugatory the unchallenged reasonableness and justness of the
condition which the donor has the right to impose as owner thereof. Moreover, the objects referred
to as outside the commerce of man are those which cannot be appropriated, such as the open seas
and the heavenly bodies.
 LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA
G.R. No. 13755 June 16, 2000
Digest by: F. Lumacad
FACTS:
On August 2, 1988, defendant Lea Zulueta-Laforteza and Michael Z. Laforteza executed a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of defendants Roberto Z. Laforteza and Gonzalo Z. Laforteza, Jr.,
appointing both as her Attorney-in-fact authorizing them jointly to sell the subject property and
sign any document for the settlement of the estate of the late Francisco Q. Laforteza. Both agency
instruments contained a provision that in any document or paper to exercise authority granted, the
signature of both attorneys- in-fact must be affixed.1â In the exercise of the above authority, on
January 20, 1989, the heirs of the late Francisco Q. Laforteza represented by Roberto Z. Laforteza
and Gonzalo Z. Laforteza, Jr. entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Machuca over
the subject property for the sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS. P30,000.00
as earnest money, to be forfeited in favor of the defendants if the sale is not effected due to the
fault of Machuca; P600,000.00 upon issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of the late
Francisco Q. Laforteza and upon execution of an extra-judicial settlement of the decedent's estate
with sale in favor of the Machuca.

Significantly, the fourth paragraph of the Memorandum of Agreement dated January 20, 1989
contained a provision as follows:

Upon issuance by the proper Court of the new title, the BUYER-LESSEE (Machuca) shall be
notified in writing and said BUYER-LESSEE shall have thirty (30) days to produce the balance
of P600,000.00 which shall be paid to the SELLER-LESSORS(Robert&Gonzalo Laforteza) upon
the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement with sale.

Machuca paid the earnest money but upon demand of the remaining obligation the Machuca
requested for extension of the 30 day period. Defendant Roberto Z. Laforteza, assisted by his
counsel Atty. Romeo L. Gutierrez, signed his conformity to Machuca’s letter request. The
extension, however, does not appear to have been approved by Gonzalo Z. Laforteza, the second
attorney-in-fact as his conformity does not appear to have been secured. On a later date the
Machuca had the balance needed to pay the transaction in conformity with their agreement on the
extension but the Lafortezas refused the payment and said that the land is no longer for sale because
of the failure of the Machuca’s to comply with his obligation.

ISSUE:
Won the failure to pay the balance on time is fatal to the enforcement of the agreement.

HELD:
RTC
The lower court rendered judgment on July 6, 1994 in favor of the Machuca, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Alonzo Machuca and against the
defendant heirs of the late Francisco Q. Laforteza, ordering the said defendants.
a) To accept the balance of P600,000.00 as full payment of the consideration for the purchase
of the house and lot located at No. 7757 Sherwood Street, Marcelo Green Village,
Parañaque, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (220656) 8941 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal Parañaque, Branch;
b) To execute a registrable deed of absolute sale over the subject property in favor of the
plaintiff;
c) Jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees plus cost
of suit.

CA
Hiers of Laforteza appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision
of the lower court; the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that defendant heirs Lea Zulueta-Laforteza, Michael Z. Laforteza, Dennis Z.
Laforteza and Roberto Z. Laforteza including Gonzalo Z. Laforteza, Jr. are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages.

SC
We rule in the negative. A perusal of the Memorandum Agreement shows that the transaction
between the Machuca and the heirs Lafortezas was one of sale and lease.

A contract of sale is a consensual contract and is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment the
parties may reciprocally demand performance subject to the provisions of the law governing the
form of contracts. The elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code
are (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain money
or its equivalent.

Admittedly, the failure of Machuca to pay the balance of the purchase price was a breach of the
contract and was a ground for rescission thereof. The extension of thirty (30) days allegedly
granted to the respondent by Roberto Z. Laforteza (assisted by his counsel Attorney Romeo
Gutierrez) was correctly found by the Court of Appeals to be ineffective inasmuch as the signature
of Gonzalo Z. Laforteza did not appear thereon as required by the Special Powers of Attorney.
However, the evidence reveals that after the expiration of the six-month period provided for in the
contract, the petitioners were not ready to comply with what was incumbent upon them, i.e. the
delivery of the reconstituted title of the house and lot. It was only on September 18, 1989 or nearly
eight months after the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement when the R&G Laforteza
informed the Machuca that they already had a copy of the reconstituted title and demanded the
payment of the balance of the purchase price. The Machuc could not therefore be considered in
delay for in reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply
or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what was incumbent upon him.
 ANTONIO R. CORTES VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VILLA ESPERANZA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 126083 12 July 2006
Dugested by: G. Montejo

FACTS:
Cortes entered into a contract of sale with the Corporation for the sale of several lots
worth p3,700,000 and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. The Corporation advanced payment of
p1,213,000 but Cortes retained the Deed for notarization. Upon the Corporation’s demand for
specific performance, Cortes refused to deliver the Deed alleging that the balance was yet to be
paid resulting in his failure to pay his lessees the disturbance fees causing the latter’s refusal to
pay their rent. He thus prayed that the Corporation to pay the outstanding balance plus
interest otherwise to cancel the sale. The trial court rendered a decision rescinding the sale but the
Court of Appeals reversed its decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is delay in the performance of the parties’ obligation that would justify the
rescission of the contract.

HELD:
Yes.

Both parties were in delay. Considering that their obligation was reciprocal, performance
thereof must be simultaneous. The mutual inaction of the parties gave rise to compensatio
morae because neither completed their part in their reciprocal obligation. This mutual delay
of the parties cancels out the effects of default, such that it is as if no one is guilty of delay.

Wherefore the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
 GAITE vs FONACIER
G.R. No. L-11827
Digested by: J. Pagantian

FACTS:
Fonacier, owner of mining claims, constituted Gaite as his attorney-in-fact. Gaite was authorized
to enter into a contract with other persons with respect to the mining claims.
Gaite then entered into a contract with Larap Iron Mines, a company Gaite solely owned, to
develop the mining claims. Later, Fonacier abruptly decided to revoke Gaite’s authority as
attorney-in-fact.

Afterwards, Gaite sold the developments his company made in the mining claims areas and the
ore already mined for a sum of money to Fonacier. Fonacier secured the sale with a surety
company. Part of the money was paid upon sale while the other part was payable out of the first
loan of credit covering the first shipment of iron ore and the first amount derived from the local
sale of the iron ore.

After the surety expired, Gaite demanded payment of the remainder of the purchase price but
Fonacier refused arguing no sale of iron ore had yet taken place.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the selling of the iron ores is a suspensive condition for paying Gaite?

HELD:
NO.
The sale isn’t a suspensive condition but is only a suspensive period or term.

This interpretation is supported by:

The contract expresses no contingency in the buyer’s obligation to pay. The contract recognizes
the existence of an obligation to pay and only the maturity is deferred Gaite never desired or
assumed to run the risk of losing his right over the ore without getting paid for it as shown by his
insistence on a surety Treating the condition as a suspensive condition would leave payment at the
debtor’s discretion because the ore will be sold only when the debtor wants it to be sold.

In onerous contracts the rules of interpretation favor the greater reciprocity of interest and because
sale is onerous this rule applies. Greater reciprocity is obtained if the buyer’s obligation to pay is
deemed existing compared to such obligation non-existing until the ore was sold.
 BUENAVENTURA vs. CA
G.R. No. 126376 November 20, 2003
Digest by: J. Saniel

FACTS:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita,
Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this
action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds
of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued
in their names. In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates
of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the
result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs
(plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

They alleged that certain deed of sale were null and void ab initio beacause they are simulated.

They said that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy
designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

Defendants on the other hand aver that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual
and legal basis.
After trial, the Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint, since the
plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action against defendants since there can be no legitime to
speak of prior to the death of their parents. The court finds this contention tenable. In determining
the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered ( Art. 908
of NCC).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The appellate court ruled that
plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or subsidiarily bound
thereby; hence, they have no legal legal capacity to challenge their validity.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale

RULING:
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the
appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests
only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of
their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that
theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate.
While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from
the estate.
 San Lorenzo Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124242 January 21, 2005
Digest by: J. Hermino
Facts:
On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold the two parcels of land to respondent Pablo
Babasanta. The latter made a downpayment of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as evidenced by
a memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu of the same date. Several other payments totaling two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) were made by Babasanta. He demanded the execution of a
Final Deed of Sale in his favor so he may effect full payment of the purchase price; however, the
spouses declined to push through with the sale. They claimed that when he requested for a discount
and they refused, he rescinded the agreement. Thus, Babasanta filed a case for Specific
Performance.

On the other hand, San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) alleged that on 3 May 1989,
the two parcels of land involved, namely Lot 1764-A and 1764-B, had been sold to it in a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it was a buyer in good faith and for value and therefore
it had a better right over the property in litigation.

Issue: Is there a contract of sale between Babasanta and Spouses Lu?

Ruling:

RTC:
RTC rendered its Decision on 30 July 1993 upholding the sale of the property to SLDC. It ordered
the Spouses Lu to pay Babasanta the sum of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

CA:
It declared that the sale between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu was valid and subsisting and
ordered the spouses to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of Babasanta, and the
latter to pay the balance of the purchase price in the amount of two hundred sixty thousand pesos
(P260,000.00). The appellate court ruled that the Absolute Deed of Sale with Mortgage in favor
of SLDC was null and void on the ground that SLDC was a purchaser in bad faith.

SC:
No. It is a contract to sell. There was no double sale.
The distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale is quite germane. In a contract of
sale, title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a contract to sell, by
agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the
price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the
contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until
the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition and failure of
which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
becoming effective.
 EQUATORIAL V. MAYFAIR THEATER
SALE OF LAND – 370 SCRA 56 – GR No. 133879, Nov. 21, 2001
Digested by: K. Mamaril

RATIONALE:
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery
of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is nullified by
the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

FACTS:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two 2-storey buildings at Claro M. Recto
Avenue, Manila, and covered by TCT No. 18529.

On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. fpr 20 years.
The lease covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey building with about
1,610 square meters of floor area, which respondent used as Maxim Theater.

Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a second Lease with Carmelo for another
portion of the latter’s property this time, a part of the second floor of the two-storey building, and
two store spaces on the ground floor. In that space, Mayfair put up another movie house known as
Miramar Theater. The Contract of Lease was likewise for a period of 20 years.

Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject
properties. Sadly, on July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject properties were
sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. for eleven million smackers, without their
first being offered to Mayfair.

As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo
and Equatorial, specific performance, and damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and Equatorial. Tsk
tsk.
CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a petition questioning the CA decision. What
happened is that the contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money back and asserted that
Mayfair have the right to purchase the lots for 11 million bucks.

Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited with the clerk the 11M (less 847grand
withholding) payment for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after Mayfair submitted its Motion for
Execution, Equatorial demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable compensation for the
Mayfair’s continued use of the subject premises after its lease contracts expired. Remember that
Mayfair was still occupying the premises during all this hullabaloo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Equatorial was the owner of the subject property and could thus enjoy the fruits
and rentals.

HELD:
NO. Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial since there was failure to
deliver the property to the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was even rescinded.

The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that belonged to the owner of the property
producing it by right of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection
of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the
property during that period.

We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, “one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay therefor a
price certain in money or its equivalent.”

Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the
thing to him “in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner
signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.” This
right is transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. There is delivery if and when
the thing sold “is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.”

While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery
of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is nullified by
the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery of property or title, and transfer of
control or custody to the buyer.

Possession was never acquired by the petitioner. It therefore had no rights to rent.