7. Del Prado vs. CaballeroG.R. No.

148225, March 3, 2010

FACTS:
On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner a lot on the basis of tax declaration located at
Guba Cebu City. Petitioner registered the same under PD 1529. Petitioner claimed that the sale
was for a lump sum containing an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less.

However, when the land was registered on December 1990, the technical description states that
the lot measures 14,457 square meters, more or less.

Subsequently, petitioner filed an action in order to compel vendor to deliver all that was included
within said boundaries even if it exceeded the area specified in the contract. Petitioners, likewise,
alleged that the sale was of a lump sum.

In their defense, respondents contended that only 4,000 square meters was sold to petitioner and
the sale was not for a lump sum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the land was for a lump sum

HELD:
The Court held in negative.

In the instant case, the sale was not a unit price contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price
of Php40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 square meters, more or less.

In a contract of sale of a land mass, the specific boundaries stated therein must control over any
other statement, with respect to area contained within its boundaries.

“More or less” is defined as approximately, or which intend to cover slight or unimportant

inaccuracies in quantity. This implies both parties assume risk of ordinary discrepancy.

The Court, however, held that a discrepancy of 10,475 square meters cannot be considered a
slight difference in quantity. The difference in the area is sizeable and too substantial to be
overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or deficient that should be deemed included in the deed
of sale.

8. ORDUNA VS. FUENTABELLA

Anthony Orduña et al. v. Eduardo Fuentebella, et al.

G.R. No. 176841, June 29, 2010
Facts:
Gabriel, Sr. sold the subject lot to petitioner Antonita Orduňa, payable in installment, but no
formal deed was executed to document the sale. The installments were paid to Gabriel, Sr. and
later to Gabriel, Jr. after the former’s death. Improvements were thereafter made by petitioner.
Without the knowledge of petitioners, Gabriel, Jr. sold the property to Banta, who then sold the
same to the Cids and ultimately it was ceded to respondent Fuentebella. Petitioner, after being
demanded by Fuentebella to vacate the disputed land, then filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale, Title, Reconveyance with damages with a prayer to acquire ownership over the subject lot
upon payment of their remaining balance. The RTC dismissed the petition because the verbal
sale was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The CA affirmed this ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of the subject lot by Gabriel, Jr. to Antonita is unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds.
Ruling:

No. The Statute of Frauds expressed in Article 1403, par. 2 of the Civil Code applies only to
executory contracts, i.e. those where no performance has yet been made. Stated a bit
differently, the legal consequence of non-compliance with the Statute does not come into play
where the contract in question is completed, executed or partially consummated. The Statute
of Frauds, in context, provides that a contract for the sale of real property or of an interest
therein shall be unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in
writing and subscribed by the party or his agent. However, where the verbal contract of sale
has been partially executed through the partial payments made by one party duly received by
the vendor, as in the present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of the Statute. A
contract that infringes the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under the
contract. Evidently, Gabriel, Jr., as his father earlier, had benefited from the partial payments
made by the petitioners. Thus, neither Gabriel Jr. nor the other respondents’ successive
purchasers of subject lot could plausibly set up the Statute of Frauds to thwart petitioners’
efforts towards establishing their lawful right over the subject lot and removing any cloud in
their title. As it were, petitioners need only to pay the outstanding balance of the purchase
price and that would complete the execution of the oral sale.

9. Anthony Orduña et al. v. Eduardo Fuentebella, et al.

G.R. No. 176841, June 29, 2010

Facts:
Gabriel, Sr. sold the subject lot to petitioner Antonita Orduňa, payable in installment, but no
formal deed was executed to document the sale. The installments were paid to Gabriel, Sr. and
later to Gabriel, Jr. after the former’s death. Improvements were thereafter made by petitioner.
Without the knowledge of petitioners, Gabriel, Jr. sold the property to Banta, who then sold the
same to the Cids and ultimately it was ceded to respondent Fuentebella. Petitioner, after being
demanded by Fuentebella to vacate the disputed land, then filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale, Title, Reconveyance with damages with a prayer to acquire ownership over the subject lot
upon payment of their remaining balance. The RTC dismissed the petition because the verbal
sale was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The CA affirmed this ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of the subject lot by Gabriel, Jr. to Antonita is unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds.
Ruling:

No. The Statute of Frauds expressed in Article 1403, par. 2 of the Civil Code applies only to
executory contracts, i.e. those where no performance has yet been made. Stated a bit
differently, the legal consequence of non-compliance with the Statute does not come into play
where the contract in question is completed, executed or partially consummated. The Statute
of Frauds, in context, provides that a contract for the sale of real property or of an interest
therein shall be unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in
writing and subscribed by the party or his agent. However, where the verbal contract of sale
has been partially executed through the partial payments made by one party duly received by
the vendor, as in the present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of the Statute. A
contract that infringes the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under the
contract. Evidently, Gabriel, Jr., as his father earlier, had benefited from the partial payments
made by the petitioners. Thus, neither Gabriel Jr. nor the other respondents’ successive
purchasers of subject lot could plausibly set up the Statute of Frauds to thwart petitioners’
efforts towards establishing their lawful right over the subject lot and removing any cloud in
their title. As it were, petitioners need only to pay the outstanding balance of the purchase
price and that would complete the execution of the oral sale.

10. Hiers of Sophia Quirong vs DBP

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173441 December 3, 2009

HEIRS OF SOFIA QUIRONG, Represented by ROMEO P. QUIRONG, Petitioners,

vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
This case is about the prescriptive period of an action for rescission of a contract of sale where the
buyer is evicted from the thing sold by a subsequent judicial order in favor of a third party.

The Facts and the Case

The facts are not disputed. When the late Emilio Dalope died, he left a 589-square meter untitled
lot1 in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, to his wife, Felisa Dalope (Felisa) and their nine children, one of
whom was Rosa Dalope-Funcion.2 To enable Rosa and her husband Antonio Funcion (the Funcions)
get a loan from respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Felisa sold the whole lot to
the Funcions. With the deed of sale in their favor and the tax declaration transferred in their names,
the Funcions mortgaged the lot with the DBP.

On February 12, 1979, after the Funcions failed to pay their loan, the DBP foreclosed the mortgage
on the lot and consolidated ownership in its name on June 17, 1981.3

Four years later or on September 20, 1983 the DBP conditionally sold the lot to Sofia Quirong4 for
the price of P78,000.00. In their contract of sale, Sofia Quirong waived any warranty against eviction.
The contract provided that the DBP did not guarantee possession of the property and that it would
not be liable for any lien or encumbrance on the same. Quirong gave a down payment of
P14,000.00.

Two months after that sale or on November 28, 1983 Felisa and her eight children (collectively, the
Dalopes)5 filed an action for partition and declaration of nullity of documents with damages against
the DBP and the Funcions before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in
Civil Case D-7159.

On December 27, 1984, notwithstanding the suit, the DBP executed a deed of absolute sale of the
subject lot in Sofia Quirong’s favor. The deed of sale carried substantially the same waiver of
warranty against eviction and of any adverse lien or encumbrance.

On May 11, 1985, Sofia Quirong having since died, her heirs (petitioner Quirong heirs) filed an
answer in intervention6 in Civil Case D-7159 in which they asked the RTC to award the lot to them
and, should it instead be given to the Dalopes, to allow the Quirong heirs to recover the lot’s value
from the DBP. But, because the heirs failed to file a formal offer of evidence, the trial court did not
rule on the merits of their claim to the lot and, alternatively, to relief from the DBP.7

On December 16, 1992 the RTC rendered a decision, declaring the DBP’s sale to Sofia Quirong
valid only with respect to the shares of Felisa and Rosa Funcion in the property. It declared Felisa’s
sale to the Funcions, the latter’s mortgage to the DBP, and the latter’s sale to Sofia Quirong void
insofar as they prejudiced the shares of the eight other children of Emilio and Felisa who were each
entitled to a tenth share in the subject lot.

The DBP received a copy of the decision on January 13, 1993 and, therefore, it had until January
28, 1993 within which to file a motion for its reconsideration or a notice of appeal from it. But the
DBP failed to appeal supposedly because of excusable negligence and the withdrawal of its
previous counsel of record.8

When the RTC judgment became final and the court issued a writ of execution, the DBP resisted the
writ by motion to quash, claiming that the decision could not be enforced because it failed to state by
metes and bounds the particular portions of the lot that would be assigned to the different parties in
the case. The RTC denied the DBP’s motion, prompting the latter to seek recourse by special civil
action of certiorari directly with this Court in G.R. 116575, Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Fontanilla. On September 7, 1994 the Court issued a resolution, denying the petition for failure of the
DBP to pay the prescribed fees. This resolution became final and executory on January 17, 1995.9

On June 10, 1998 the Quirong heirs filed the present action10 against the DBP before the RTC of
Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case CV-98-02399-D for rescission of the contract of sale
between Sofia Quirong, their predecessor, and the DBP and praying for the reimbursement of the
price of P78,000.00 that she paid the bank plus damages. The heirs alleged that they were entitled
to the rescission of the sale because the decision in Civil Case D-7159 stripped them of nearly the
whole of the lot that Sofia Quirong, their predecessor, bought from the DBP. The DBP filed a motion
to dismiss the action on ground of prescription and res judicata but the RTC denied their motion.

On June 14, 2004, after hearing the case, the RTC rendered a decision,11 rescinding the sale
between Sofia Quirong and the DBP and ordering the latter to return to the Quirong heirs the
P78,000.00 Sofia Quirong paid the bank.12 On appeal by the DBP, the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the heirs’ action on the ground of prescription. The CA
concluded that, reckoned from the finality of the December 16, 1992 decision in Civil Case D-7159,
the complaint filed on June 10, 1998 was already barred by the four-year prescriptive period under
Article 1389 of the Civil Code.13 The Quirong heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
but the appellate court denied it,14 thus, this petition.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the Quirong heirs’ action for rescission of respondent DBP’s sale of the subject
property to Sofia Quirong was already barred by prescription; and

2. In the negative, whether or not the heirs of Quirong were entitled to the rescission of the DBP’s
sale of the subject lot to the late Sofia Quirong as a consequence of her heirs having been evicted
from it.

The Court’s Rulings

The CA held that the Quirong heirs’ action for rescission of the sale between DBP and their
predecessor, Sofia Quirong, is barred by prescription reckoned from the date of finality of the
December 16, 1992 RTC decision in Civil Case D-7159 and applying the prescriptive period of four
years set by Article 1389 of the Civil Code.

Unfortunately, the CA did not state in its decision the date when the RTC decision in Civil Case D-
7159 became final and executory, which decision resulted in the Quirong heirs’ loss of 80% of the lot
that the DBP sold to Sofia Quirong. Petitioner heirs claim that the prescriptive period should be
reckoned from January 17, 1995, the date this Court’s resolution in G.R. 116575 became final and
executory.15

But the incident before this Court in G.R. 116575 did not deal with the merit of the RTC decision in
Civil Case D-7159. That decision became final and executory on January 28, 1993 when the DBP
failed to appeal from it within the time set for such appeal. The incident before this Court in G.R.
116575 involved the issuance of the writ of execution in that case. The DBP contested such
issuance supposedly because the dispositive portion of the decision failed to specify details that
were needed for its implementation. Since this incident did not affect the finality of the decision in
Civil Case D-7159, the prescriptive period remained to be reckoned from January 28, 1993, the date
of such finality.
The next question that needs to be resolved is the applicable period of prescription. The DBP claims
that it should be four years as provided under Article 1389 of the Civil Code.16 Article 1389 provides
that "the action to claim rescission must be commenced within four years." The Quirong heirs, on the
other hand, claim that it should be 10 years as provided under Article 1144 which states that actions
"upon a written contract" must be brought "within 10 years from the date the right of action accrues."

Now, was the action of the Quirong heirs "for rescission" or "upon a written contract"? There is no
question that their action was for rescission, since their complaint in Civil Case CV-98-02399-D
asked for the rescission of the contract of sale between Sofia Quirong, their predecessor, and the
DBP and the reimbursement of the price of P78,000.00 that Sofia Quirong paid the bank plus
damages. The prescriptive period for rescission is four years.

But it is not that simple. The remedy of "rescission" is not confined to the rescissible contracts
enumerated under Article 1381.17 Article 1191 of the Civil Code gives the injured party in reciprocal
obligations, such as what contracts are about, the option to choose between fulfillment and
"rescission." Arturo M. Tolentino, a well-known authority in civil law, is quick to note, however, that
the equivalent of Article 1191 in the old code actually uses the term "resolution" rather than the
present "rescission."18 The calibrated meanings of these terms are distinct.

"Rescission" is a subsidiary action based on injury to the plaintiff’s economic interests as described
in Articles 1380 and 1381. "Resolution," the action referred to in Article 1191, on the other hand, is
based on the defendant’s breach of faith, a violation of the reciprocity between the parties. As an
action based on the binding force of a written contract, therefore, rescission (resolution) under Article
1191 prescribes in 10 years. Ten years is the period of prescription of actions based on a written
contract under Article 1144.

The distinction makes sense. Article 1191 gives the injured party an option to choose between, first,
fulfillment of the contract and, second, its rescission. An action to enforce a written contract
(fulfillment) is definitely an "action upon a written contract," which prescribes in 10 years (Article
1144). It will not be logical to make the remedy of fulfillment prescribe in 10 years while the
alternative remedy of rescission (or resolution) is made to prescribe after only four years as provided
in Article 1389 when the injury from which the two kinds of actions derive is the same.

Here, the Quirong heirs alleged in their complaint that they were entitled to the rescission of the
contract of sale of the lot between the DBP and Sofia Quirong because the decision in Civil Case D-
7159 deprived her heirs of nearly the whole of that lot. But what was the status of that contract at the
time of the filing of the action for rescission? Apparently, that contract of sale had already been fully
performed when Sofia Quirong paid the full price for the lot and when, in exchange, the DBP
executed the deed of absolute sale in her favor. There was a turnover of control of the property from
DBP to Sofia Quirong since she assumed under their contract, "the ejectment of squatters and/or
occupants" on the lot, at her own expense.19

Actually, the cause of action of the Quirong heirs stems from their having been ousted by final
judgment from the ownership of the lot that the DBP sold to Sofia Quirong, their predecessor, in
violation of the warranty against eviction that comes with every sale of property or thing. Article 1548
of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1548. Eviction shall take place whenever by a final judgment based on a right prior to the sale
or an act imputable to the vendor, the vendee is deprived of the whole or of a part of thing
purchased.

xxxx
With the loss of 80% of the subject lot to the Dalopes by reason of the judgment of the RTC in Civil
Case D-7159, the Quirong heirs had the right to file an action for rescission against the DBP
pursuant to the provision of Article 1556 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 1556. Should the vendee lose, by reason of the eviction, a part of the thing sold of such
importance, in relation to the whole, that he would not have bought it without said part, he may
demand the rescission of the contract; but with the obligation to return the thing without other
encumbrances than those which it had when he acquired it. x x x

And that action for rescission, which is based on a subsequent economic loss suffered by the buyer,
was precisely the action that the Quirong heirs took against the DBP. Consequently, it prescribed as
Article 1389 provides in four years from the time the action accrued. Since it accrued on January 28,
1993 when the decision in Civil Case D-7159 became final and executory and ousted the heirs from
a substantial portion of the lot, the latter had only until January 28, 1997 within which to file their
action for rescission. Given that they filed their action on June 10, 1998, they did so beyond the four-
year period.

With the conclusion that the Court has reached respecting the first issue presented in this case, it
would serve no useful purpose for it to further consider the issue of whether or not the heirs of
Quirong would have been entitled to the rescission of the DBP’s sale of the subject lot to Sofia
Quirong as a consequence of her heirs having been evicted from it. As the Court has ruled above,
their action was barred by prescription. The CA acted correctly in reversing the RTC decision and
dismissing their action.

Parenthetically, the Quirong heirs were allowed by the RTC to intervene in the original action for
annulment of sale in Civil Case D-7159 that the Dalopes filed against the DBP and the Funcions. Not
only did the heirs intervene in defense of the sale, they likewise filed a cross claim against the DBP.
And they were apparently heard on their defense and cross claim but the RTC did not adjudicate
their claim for the reason that they failed to make a formal offer of their documentary exhibits. Yet,
they did not appeal from this omission or from the judgment of the RTC, annulling the DBP’s sale of
the subject lot to Sofia Quirong. This point is of course entirely academic but it shows that the
Quirong heirs have themselves to blame for the loss of whatever right they may have in the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the November 30, 2005 decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 83897.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Vs. Heirs of Gavina Ijordan, et al.
G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:
A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others is
unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller.

Facts:
On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale (Deed)
covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of
the Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA).

In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the
subject lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of
Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents' predecessors-in-interest,
namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina, Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto,
Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all surnamed Cuison. The respondents' ownership of the subject
lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject
lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.

The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted MCIAA to
sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC, alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title
conferred no right in favor of the respondents because the lot had already been sold to the Government in
1957; that the subject lot had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00387
in the name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal obligation
to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation to enable the issuance of a new one in its name.

After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
Demurrer to Evidence dated February 3, 1997, contending that the Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387
had no probative value to support MCIAA's cause of action and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself." They argued that
what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed; that even assuming that the Deed was a true
reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable against them because it was only Julian who had
executed the same without obtaining their consent or authority as his co-heirs; and that the tax
declaration had no probative value by virtue of its having been derived from the unenforceable sale.

In its order dated September 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it pertained to the
shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian.

The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner.
2. Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches.
3. Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve prescription.

Rulings:
1. No, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the
subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of
the authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no
reason to overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian.
Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents
for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares
in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in the name of
another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him; the
contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who
has acted beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person
on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share of 1/22
of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of
property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:

x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition
of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

2. No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of
their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who
were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest. Moreover, the respondents could
not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there
was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of
the respondents in the subject lot.

3. No. MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the absence of the
satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could
arise in view of the indefeasibility of the respondents' Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse
possession could deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription. The real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting
on the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on February 22, 2006.

Suntay vs. Suntay

G.R. No. 208462 December 10, 2014

SPOUSES CARLOS J. SUNTAY and ROSARIO R. SUNTAY, Petitioners,

vs.
KEYSER MERCANTILE, INC., Respondent.

On October 20, 1989, Eugenia Gocolay, chairperson and president of respondent Keyser Mercantile, Inc.
(Keyser), entered into a contract to sell with Bayfront Development Corporation (Baxfront) for the
purchase on installment basis of a condominium unit in Bayfront Tower Condominium located at A.
Mabini Street, Malate, Manila. The subject of the sale was Unit G of the said condominium project
consisting of 163.59 square meters with the privilege to use two (2) parking slots covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT)No. 15802. This Contract to Sell was not registered with the
Register of Deeds of Manila. Thus, the subject unit remained in the name of Bayfront with a clean title.

On July 7, 1990, petitioner spouses Carlos and Rosario Suntay (Spouses Suntay) also purchased several
condominium units on the 4th floor of Bayfront Tower Condominium through another contract to sell.
Despite payment of the full purchase price, however, Bayfront failed to deliver the condominium units.
When Bayfront failed to reimburse the full purchase price, Spouses Suntay filed an action against it
 before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for violation of P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No.
1344, rescission of contract, sum of money, and damages.

In its decision, dated April 23 1994, the HLURB rescinded the Contract to Sell between Bayfront and
Spouses Suntay and ordered Bayfront to pay Spouses Suntay the total amount of 2,752,068.60 as
purchase price with interest. Consequently, on November 16, 1994, the HLURB issued a writ of
execution.

Upon the application of Spouses Suntay, the Sheriffs of the RTC of Manila levied Bayfront’s titled
properties, including the subject condominium Unit G and the two parking slots. Considering that CCT No.
15802 was still registered under Bayfront with a clean title, the sheriffs deemed it proper to be levied. The
levy on execution in favor of Spouses Suntay was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds of Manila on
January 18, 1995.

The auction sale was conducted on February 23, 1995, and Spouses Suntay were the highest bidder.
Consequently, on March 1, 1995, the Certificate of Sale in favor of Spouses Suntay was issued. This was
duly annotated at the back of CCT No. 15802 on April 7, 1995. Meanwhile, the Deed of Absolute
Sale between Bayfront and Keyser involving the subject property was finally executed on November 9,
1995. The latter allegedly paid the full purchase price sometime in 1991. When Keyser was about to
register the said deed of absolute sale in February 1996, it discovered the Notice of Levy and the
Certificate of Sale annotated at the back of CCT No. 15802 in favor of Spouses Suntay. Nevertheless, on
March 12, 1996, the Register of Deeds cancelled the title of Bayfront and issued CCT No. 26474 in the
name of Keyser but carried over the annotation of the Suntays.

Issue: 1. WON the case has prescribed?

2. WON the sale was valid?

Held:

1. The defense of prescription is unavailing. In Fulton Insurance Company v. Manila Railroad Company, this
Court ruled that the filing of the first action interrupted the running of the period, and then declared that, at
any rate, the second action was filed within the balance of the remaining period. Applying Article 1155 of
the New Civil Code in that case, the interruption took place when the first action was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. The interruption lasted during the pendency of the action until the order of
dismissal for alleged lack of jurisdiction became final.
 In the present case, the prescriptive period was interrupted when HLURB Case No. REM-032196-9152
was filed on March 21, 1996. The interruption lasted during the pendency of the action and until the
judgment of dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction was rendered on the September 23, 2005. Thus, the filing
of Civil Case No. 06-114716 on March 24, 2006 was squarely within the prescriptive period of four (4)
years.

2. In this case, the contract to sell between Keyser and Bayfront was executed on October 20, 1989, but the
deed of absolute sale was only made on November 9, 1995 and registered on March 12, 1996. The
Notice of Levy in favor of Spouses Suntay was registered on January 18, 1995, while the Certificate of
Sale on April 7, 1995, both dates clearly ahead of Keyser’s registration of its Deed of Absolute Sale.
Evidently, applying the doctrine of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right), Spouses
Suntay have a better right than Keyser.

In the case of Uy v. Spouses Medina which dealt with essentially the same issues, the Court wrote:

Considering that the sale was not registered earlier, the right of petitioner over the land became
subordinate and subject to the preference created over the earlier annotated levy in favor of Swift. The
levy of execution registered and annotated on September 1, 1998 takes precedence over the sale of the
land to petitioner on February 16, 1997, despite the subsequent registration on September 14, 1998 of
the prior sale. Such preference in favor of the levy on execution retracts to the date of levy for to hold
otherwise will render the preference nugatory and meaningless.

The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered
sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered by
the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act
which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. The preference created by the levy on
attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so because an
attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in
effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the
owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner
provided by law.

rroyo vs. bocago

GR. No. 167880 14 November 2012
JACK ARROYO, Petitioner, vs. BOCAGO INLAND DEV'T. CORP. (BIDECO), represented by
CARLITO BOCAGO and/or the HEIRS OF THE DECEASED RAMON BOCAGO, namely, BASILISA
VDA. DE BOCAGO, CARLITO BOCAGO, SANNIE BOCAGO ARRENGO, and INDAY
BUENO, Respondents.

The case commenced on February 28, 1997 when herein plaintiff-appellee Jack Arroyo filed with the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 56) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages against herein defendants-appellants, Bocago Inland Development Corporation (BIDECO),
represented by its President and General Manager Carlito Bocago, Basilisa Vda. de Bocago, Sammy
Bocago Arringo and Inday Bueno.

In his complaint, plaintiff-appellee averred that he is the owner of the three (3) parcels of land located at
Del Gallego, Camarines Sur, which are now covered by TCT No. RT-854 (14007), TCT No. RT-853
(10065) and RT-855 (19085), all under his name. Plaintiff-appellee claimed that since his acquisition
thereof in 1972, he has been paying the taxes for the said lands. He likewise claimed that when he
bought the properties from the Development Bank of the Philippines, the same were already 60%
developed, which was the reason for the purchase and, in addition, the said properties are natural
breeding grounds for crabs and prawns.

Later on, plaintiff-appellee discovered that defendants-appellants had been occupying the above-
mentioned parcels of land since 1974. Plaintiff-appellee, through counsel, sent demand letters to
defendants-appellants to return the peaceful possession of the parcels of land. But despite such
demands, defendants-appellants never bothered to make a reply. Thus, because of the unlawful
occupation by the defendants-appellants of the properties of plaintiff-appellee, the latter was forced to
litigate.

On the other hand, defendants-appellants in their Answer maintained that plaintiff-appellee has no cause
of action for he does not possess the said parcels of land nor manage the cultivation of the alleged
fishpond. That the truth of the matter remains that the late Ramon Bocago was in possession of the said
fishpond as early as 1967 when it was merely a swampy area and was not yet converted into a fishpond.
In fact, it was Ramon Bocago, with the assistance of some of his sons, who personally introduced
improvements in the area after the original applicant of the land, Mr. Anselmo Delantar, transferred his
rights to the deceased Ramon Bocago. And after the death of Ramon Bocago in 1984, it was his heirs
who continued the occupation, possession and development of the fishpond.

Issue: whether petitioner's complaint should be deemed barred by laches.

Held:
The Court cannot agree with the appellate court that the principle of laches is applicable in this case.

The established rule, as reiterated in Heirs of Tomas Dolleton vs. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., is that “the
elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings x x x.”7 Evidence is of utmost importance in establishing
the existence of laches because, as stated in Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate, 'there
is “no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.” x x x Verily, the application of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its application is controlled by equitable
considerations.

In this case, respondents (defendants-appellants below) did not present any evidence in support of their
defense, as they failed to take advantage of all the opportunities they had to do so. The Court stressed
in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto vs. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, that:

laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The following elements must be
present in order to constitute laches:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not
held to be barred.

In this case, there is no evidence on record to prove the concurrence of all the aforementioned elements
of laches. The first element may indeed be established by the admissions of both parties in the Complaint
and Answer – i.e., that petitioner is the registered owner of the subject property, but respondents had
been occupying it for some time and refuse to vacate the same – but the crucial circumstances of delay in
asserting petitioner's right, lack of knowledge on the part of defendant that complainant would assert
his right, and the injury or prejudice that defendant would suffer if the suit is not held to be barred, have
not been proven. Therefore, in the absence of positive proof, it is impossible to determine if petitioner is
guilty of laches.

At this juncture, it is best to emphasize the Court's ruling in Labrador vs. Per/as, to wit:

as a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property.
This right is imprescriptible and can never be banned by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held,
thus: As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they
were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

Social justice and equity cannot be used to justify the court's grant of property to one at the expense of
another who may have a better right thereto under the law. These principles are not intended to favor the
underprivileged while purposely denying another of his right under the law.

To rule that herein petitioner is guilty of laches even in the absence of evidence to that effect would truly
run afoul of the principle of justice and equity.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED.

SUPAPO v. SPS. ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS, GR No. 198356, 2015-04-20

Facts:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint[5] for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de
Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them
(collectively, the respondents), with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches,
Quezon City... egistered and... titled under the Spouses Supapo's names.
land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as
shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the
City Assessor
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot.
they made sure to visit at least twice a year.
During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses
were built... without their knowledge and permission.
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot
by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa
Lupon issued
(certificate to file action) for... failure of the parties to settle amicably.[10]
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case... for violation of
.
the Anti-Squatting Law.
nts
The trial court convicted the respondents... pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.
While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known
as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the
criminal... case.
Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter
vacate the subject lot.
(RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.
The respondents moved for the... quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also
denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the
Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.[... the CA
noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.
respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing... argued that... there
is another action pending between the same parties;... accion... publiciana is barred by statute of
limitations
;
Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing
MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for... reconsideration.
respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.
RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds... action has prescribed... accion
publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
In their motion for reconsideration
Spouses Supapo emphasized that the court's jurisdiction over an action involving title to or
possession of land is determined by its assessed value;
RTC does not have an exclusive jurisdiction on all... complaints for accion publiciana; and that
the assessed value of the subject lot falls within MeTC's jurisdiction.
The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the subject lot, the
Spouses Supapos' cause of action had already prescribed, the action having been filed beyond the
ten (l0)-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code.
RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit should have been filed is
counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate to file action was...
issued on November 25, 1992, while the complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on
March 7, 2008, or more than ten (10) years thereafter.
Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA.
The CA dismissed the appeal... held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been
lodged before the RTC... period to file the action had prescribed.
Spouses Supapo moved... but failed... to secure a reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, they
came to us through the present petition.
Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:
MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the assessed value
of the property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00... prescription had not yet set in
because their cause of action is imprescriptible under the Torrens system.
respondents argue... accion publiciana was... filed in the wrong court;... barred by prescription;...
barred by res judicata.
Issues:
Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
;
Whether the cause of action has prescribed;
Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not
prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the
subject lot... based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.
while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the subject property, we will
only do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right of possession.
we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
law in effect when the action is filed... pouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the
subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that
the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
The cause of action... has not prescribed... respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed
the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the
certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992.
TCT over the subject property, and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible,
they posit that the latter have lost their right to recover possession because of laches.
On their part, the Spouses Supapo... argue that their cause of action is imprescriptible since the
subject property is... registered and titled under the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
The respondents contend that they built their houses on the... subject lot in good faith. Having
possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be
disturbed in their possession.[48]
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents' contentions have no legal
basis.
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens
system. The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529
which states:... the lawful owners have a right to demand... the return of their property at any
time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court
merely recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate
transactions and integrity of land registration.
With respect to the respondents' defense[59] of laches, suffice it to say that the same is
evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses
Supapo's petition
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to recover possession
of the subject lot is not barred by prescription.
The action is not barred... by prior judgment
They contend that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of the
action publiciana.
CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to challenge the
RTC's issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability
The CA granted the petition and permanently enjoined the execution of the respondents'
conviction because their criminal liability had been extinguished by the repeal
Res judicata is not present in this case.
it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action between
the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery
of the subject... property.
criminal complaint,... was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines... accion
publiciana... was filed by and in the name of the
Spouses Supapo... criminal case... prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law... accion
publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.
Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests... there is no
identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil
action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone, "collusiveness of judgment" does not apply.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of
judgment" still does not apply because there is no identity of issues
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.
e stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between the
parties has a better right to possession
This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership.
we GRANT the petition
REVERSE and SET ASIDE... resolution of the Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
Accion Publiciana and... the Jurisdiction of the
MeTC
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from
the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of... possession of the realty.
the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to... possess the property
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose
of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being... provisional, is not a bar
to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is
not conclusive on the issue of ownership... jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value.
The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment... level.
synonymous to taxable value.[41]
The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed
by the CA that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial
courts regardless of the value of the property no longer... holds true. As tilings now stand, a
distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession.
. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is
a registered land because of
Article 1126... of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also
entitled to the possession thereof.[52] The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and
a logical consequence of ownership.[53] Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the
Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is
imprescriptible.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
Res judicata embraces two concepts:
(1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
2
(2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the
merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an... absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action
The requisites[64] for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:... former
judgment or order must be final;... judgment on the merits;... must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties... identity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of
action... provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment... therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.

Laches; elements. The elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a
fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. Evidence is of utmost
importance in establishing the existence of laches because there is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to the particular
circumstances. Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court as
its application is controlled by equitable considerations.
Laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The following elements must be present in
order to constitute laches: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. Jack Arroyo v. Bocago Inland Dev’t Corp.
(BIDECO), G.R. No. 167880

arroyo vs. bocago

GR. No. 167880 14 November 2012

JACK ARROYO, Petitioner, vs. BOCAGO INLAND DEV'T. CORP. (BIDECO), represented by
CARLITO BOCAGO and/or the HEIRS OF THE DECEASED RAMON BOCAGO, namely, BASILISA
VDA. DE BOCAGO, CARLITO BOCAGO, SANNIE BOCAGO ARRENGO, and INDAY
BUENO, Respondents.

The case commenced on February 28, 1997 when herein plaintiff-appellee Jack Arroyo filed with the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 56) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages against herein defendants-appellants, Bocago Inland Development Corporation (BIDECO),
represented by its President and General Manager Carlito Bocago, Basilisa Vda. de Bocago, Sammy
Bocago Arringo and Inday Bueno.
In his complaint, plaintiff-appellee averred that he is the owner of the three (3) parcels of land located at
Del Gallego, Camarines Sur, which are now covered by TCT No. RT-854 (14007), TCT No. RT-853
(10065) and RT-855 (19085), all under his name. Plaintiff-appellee claimed that since his acquisition
thereof in 1972, he has been paying the taxes for the said lands. He likewise claimed that when he
bought the properties from the Development Bank of the Philippines, the same were already 60%
developed, which was the reason for the purchase and, in addition, the said properties are natural
breeding grounds for crabs and prawns.

Later on, plaintiff-appellee discovered that defendants-appellants had been occupying the above-
mentioned parcels of land since 1974. Plaintiff-appellee, through counsel, sent demand letters to
defendants-appellants to return the peaceful possession of the parcels of land. But despite such
demands, defendants-appellants never bothered to make a reply. Thus, because of the unlawful
occupation by the defendants-appellants of the properties of plaintiff-appellee, the latter was forced to
litigate.

On the other hand, defendants-appellants in their Answer maintained that plaintiff-appellee has no cause
of action for he does not possess the said parcels of land nor manage the cultivation of the alleged
fishpond. That the truth of the matter remains that the late Ramon Bocago was in possession of the said
fishpond as early as 1967 when it was merely a swampy area and was not yet converted into a fishpond.
In fact, it was Ramon Bocago, with the assistance of some of his sons, who personally introduced
improvements in the area after the original applicant of the land, Mr. Anselmo Delantar, transferred his
rights to the deceased Ramon Bocago. And after the death of Ramon Bocago in 1984, it was his heirs
who continued the occupation, possession and development of the fishpond.

Issue: whether petitioner's complaint should be deemed barred by laches.

Held:

The Court cannot agree with the appellate court that the principle of laches is applicable in this case.

The established rule, as reiterated in Heirs of Tomas Dolleton vs. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., is that “the
elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings x x x.”7 Evidence is of utmost importance in establishing
the existence of laches because, as stated in Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate, 'there
is “no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.” x x x Verily, the application of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its application is controlled by equitable
considerations.
In this case, respondents (defendants-appellants below) did not present any evidence in support of their
defense, as they failed to take advantage of all the opportunities they had to do so. The Court stressed
in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto vs. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, that:

laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The following elements must be
present in order to constitute laches:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not
held to be barred.

In this case, there is no evidence on record to prove the concurrence of all the aforementioned elements
of laches. The first element may indeed be established by the admissions of both parties in the Complaint
and Answer – i.e., that petitioner is the registered owner of the subject property, but respondents had
been occupying it for some time and refuse to vacate the same – but the crucial circumstances of delay in
asserting petitioner's right, lack of knowledge on the part of defendant that complainant would assert
his right, and the injury or prejudice that defendant would suffer if the suit is not held to be barred, have
not been proven. Therefore, in the absence of positive proof, it is impossible to determine if petitioner is
guilty of laches.

At this juncture, it is best to emphasize the Court's ruling in Labrador vs. Per/as, to wit:

as a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property.
This right is imprescriptible and can never be banned by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held,
thus: As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they
were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
Social justice and equity cannot be used to justify the court's grant of property to one at the expense of
another who may have a better right thereto under the law. These principles are not intended to favor the
underprivileged while purposely denying another of his right under the law.

To rule that herein petitioner is guilty of laches even in the absence of evidence to that effect would truly
run afoul of the principle of justice and equity.

ASE DIGEST: GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, REPRESENTED BY LULU

LABRADOR USON, AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. SPS.
ILDEFONSO PERLAS AND PACENCIA PERLAS AND SPS. ROGELIO
POBRE AND MELINDA FOGATA POBRE, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No.
173900, August 08, 2010. 641 Phil. 388].

FACTS: There are two different versions of the facts of this case.

Petitioner Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson as attorney-

in-fact, alleges that he is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
Bangan-Alalang, Barrio Amungan, Iba, Zambales, consisting of 53,358 square
meters, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-3030 issued on
16 January 1973. Sometime between 1957 and 1958, Melecio Labrador (Melecio),
petitioner's father and predecessor-in-interest, was requested by respondent
spouses Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas (Spouses Perlas) to be allowed to
live temporarily in a portion of the said parcel of land. Ildefonso Perlas was a
relative of Casiana Aquino, the wife of Melecio. Melecio acceded to the request,
on the condition that Spouses Perlas would vacate the occupied portion of land
upon demand by Melecio or by any of his heirs or representatives. Later, Spouses
Perlas requested Melecio to allow them to occupy another portion of the land to
be used as vegetable plantation. Again, Melecio acceded to their request.

In 1979, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Spouses Perlas sold the
portions of land they were occupying to respondent spouses Rogelio Pobre and
Melinda Fogata Pobre (Spouses Pobre). Upon knowledge of the sale sometime in
1992, petitioner instructed his representative to demand that Spouses Perlas
vacate the occupied portions of land, but the latter refused to do so.

On 20 October 1994, petitioner filed with the RTC of Iba, Zambales, a Petition for
Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership,
with Application for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-
1081-I.
Respondents, on the other hand, allege that since 1957, Ildefonso Perlas and his
family had been living in a parcel of land situated in Sitio Bolintabog, Barangay
Amungan, Iba, Zambales. Ildefonso improved and developed said land without
the intervention of Melecio Labrador whose land is separate and distinct from
that occupied by Ildefonso and his family. The subject land occupied by Ildefonso
and his family was declared as alienable and disposable public land in a
Certification dated 20 January 1983 issued by the Provincial Officer of the
Bureau of Lands in Iba, Zambales. Respondents now claim that Spouses Perlas
are the absolute owners of the subject land measuring 2,903.6 square meters and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 001-1390 issued in 1994.

On 23 June 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision, declaring Spouses Ildefonso

Perlas and Pacencia Perlas to be the lawful owners of lot covered by Tax
Declaration No. 001-1390 and declaring Spouses Rogelio Pobre and Melinda
Fogata Pobre the lawful owners of lot covered by Exhibit F (Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by defendant Ildefonso Perlas in favor of defendant Spouses Pobre on 6
March 1979).

The CA agreed with the RTC.

ISSUE: The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the RTC Decision.

HELD: The Supreme Court found the appeal meritorious. The petition
was GRANTED.

In its Decision dated 23 June 1998,[8] the trial court recognized the validity of the
issuance of OCT No. P-3030 dated 16 January 1973 in the name of petitioner.

Nonetheless, the trial court ruled that the lot occupied by respondents Ildefonso
and Pacencia Perlas, which petitioner claimed to be covered by OCT No. P-3030,
was lawfully owned by said respondents and hence, validly sold to their co-
respondents Rogelio Pobre and Melinda Fogata Pobre. The trial court
ratiocinated that the testimony of petitioner's representative and attorney-in fact,
Lulu Uson, stating that Spouses Perlas had been residing on the subject land
since Uson was eight years old, or sometime in 1957, corroborated by the
testimony of petitioner's witness, Engineer Regino L. Sobrevinas that the subject
land was already occupied and possessed by Spouses Perlas "even before he
[Sobrevinas] surveyed it since these are planned to be donated to the defendants
[Spouses Perlas]," showed that petitioner "recognized the possession and the
ownership" by Spouses Perlas of the subject land. The trial court ruled further
that petitioner's inaction and delay in asserting his rights over the subject land
constituted laches which barred him from recovering said land. Meanwhile,
Spouses Perlas were in possession of the subject land, introduced valuable and
permanent improvements thereon, and were issued a tax declaration and several
certifications by government surveyors. These, according to the trial court,
proved Spouses Perlas' possession and occupation of the subject land in the
concept of an owner. Finally, the trial court ruled that "the area of 2,903.6 square
meters being occupied by the defendants [Spouses Perlas] is a very meager
portion of the 53,358 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
3030. Social justice and equity will be well served if this meager portion be
awarded to the defendants."

The Supreme Court had to disagree.

First, petitioner has a valid claim over the property covered by OCT No. P-3030
issued in his name. OCT No. P-3030 was declared valid by the trial court,
and respondents do not question the title's validity. Also, under the Torrens
System of registration, an OCT becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible one
year after its final decree. It is a fundamental principle in land registration
that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to a property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.

Second, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the testimonies of petitioner's
witnesses, Lulu Uson and Engineer Sobrevinas, to the effect that Spouses Perlas
were occupying the subject land since 1957, do not prove ownership or adverse
possession by the spouses, especially in the light of petitioner's claim that
occupation of the subject land by Spouses Perlas was merely tolerated by
petitioner and his predecessor-in-interest, Melecio Labrador. The trial court also
failed to consider the portion of Engineer Sobrevinas' testimony stating that the
subject land was "segregated" since it was "originally planned to be donated to
[Spouses] Perlas." If petitioner recognized the adverse possession and
ownership of the subject land by Spouses Perlas, why would
petitioner plan to donate the same to the latter?

Third, the trial court's ruling that petitioner had a long and unexplained inaction
in asserting his claim over the subject property, and hence, is barred by laches
from recovering his property, is without basis. Petitioner has a valid title over his
property (i.e., the land covered by OCT P-3030). As a registered owner,
petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his
property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches.

Finally, the trial court cannot hold "social justice and equity" as bases for
granting the subject land to respondents Spouses Perlas. Social justice and equity
cannot be used to justify the court's grant of property to one at the expense of
another who may have a better right thereto under the law. These principles are
not intended to favor the underprivileged while purposely denying another of his
rights under the law. In the words of Justice Perfecto, "The magic words "social
justice" are not a shibboleth which courts may readily avail of as a shield for
shirking their responsibility in the application of law."

We note, however, that Spouses Perlas alleged that the subject land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 001-1390, which they claim to have occupied since 1957,
is separate and distinct from the land covered by OCT No. P-3030 issued in
the name of petitioner. Unfortunately, the trial court neglected to determine
whether there is truth to this allegation. Such determination is crucial in this case
since if the subject land covered by Tax Declaration No. 001-1390 is separate and
distinct from petitioner's land covered by OCT No. P-3030, then petitioner may
have no basis for his claim on the subject land.

The Court was NOT convinced that the pieces of evidence are sufficient to prove
that the subject property claimed and sold by Spouses Perlas is separate and
distinct from the land covered by OCT No. P-3030 issued in the name of
petitioner.

In view of the foregoing, and considering that it is not a function of the Court to
try facts, or to review, examine, evaluate and weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented, it was deemed necessary to remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings to determine whether the subject land occupied by
Spouses Perlas since 1957 and covered by Tax Declaration No. 001-1390 is
included in the land covered by OCT No. P-3030 issued in the name of petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul and set
aside the November 16, 2011 Decision[1] and the September 26, 2012
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497, which
affirmed the February 28, 2008 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 42, Dumaguete City (RTC-42), in an action for revival of judgment.
The Facts:
Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo
Delicta, and Adriano Alabata (petitioners) and respondent Lourdes Alabata
(respondent) were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of
declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dumaguete City (RTC-43). Docketed as
Civil Case No. 10153, the case was decided in favor of petitioner. In its
October 31, 1995 Decision, the RTC-43 (1) voided the "Declaration of
Heirship and Sale;" (2) ordered respondent to reconvey the entire subject
property to petitioners; (3) dismissed respondent's counterclaim; and (4)
ordered her to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit.[3]
Not in conformity, respondent elevated the RTC-43 case to the CA. She,
however, later withdrew her appeal which paved the way for the RTC-43
Decision to lapse into finality. The CA resolution granting respondent's
motion to withdraw became final and executory on June 20, 1997. On
August 20, 1997, the Entry of Judgment[4] was issued and recorded in the
CA Book of Entries of Judgments.
Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed. Petitioners claim that their
counsel at the Public Attorney's Office, Dumaguete City (PAO-Dumaguete),
was never informed that the entry of judgment had already been
issued.[5] They pointed out that, initially, their case was handled by the
PAO-Dumaguete, but when the RTC-43 decision was appealed to the CA by
respondent, their case was handed over to the Special Appealed Cases
Division (SAC-PAO) at the PAO Central Office in Manila. They explained
that although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma.
Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, she failed to
inform petitioners of the issued entry of judgment before she resigned from
PAO sometime in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAO-
Dumaguete of the said development. When petitioners followed up with
PAO-Dumaguete, it was of the belief that the appeal of respondent was still
pending.[6]
In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from the date when the
RTC-43 decision was entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments,
petitioners found out that the said decision had become final and executory
when their nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment.
On December 5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an
action for revival of judgment which was raffled to RTC-42. On February
28, 2008, after respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses,
RTC-42 granted her Motion to Dismiss and ordered petitioners' case for
revival of judgment dismissed on the ground of prescription. Petitioners
sought reconsideration, but RTC-42 denied the motion on April 4, 2008.[7]
Petitioners then interposed an appeal before the CA. The latter, on
November 16, 2011, rendered its assailed decision denying petitioners'
appeal and affirming the dismissal by the RTC-42 of their case for revival of
judgment. On September 26, 2012, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
LONE ISSUE
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN STRICTLY APPLYING THE
PROCEDURAL RULES ON PRESCRIPTION AND DISMISSING
THE CASE BASED ON THE SAID GROUND, INSPITE [OF] THE
FACT THAT PETITIONERS WILL SUFFER MANIFEST
INJUSTICE AND DEPRIVATION OF THEIR PROPERTY, DUE TO
A FAULT NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THEM.[8]
The Court resolves to grant the petition.
This case falls under Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which states:
SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.
The prior case before the RTC-43 involved a reconveyance of a parcel of
land in favor of the rightful owners, the heirs of one Agapito Alagadmo.
Petitioners, in instituting the case against respondent, showed their desire
and resolve to pursue and take back what was rightfully theirs. Eventually,
they succeeded in obtaining justice and won back what was theirs. For their
sufferings, the trial court saw it fit to also assess moral damages and
exemplary damages against respondent.[9]
When the case was elevated by respondent to the CA, the PAO continued to
represent petitioners' cause. As it was an appealed case, the matter was
referred to, and handled by, SAC-PAO in Manila.
For reasons known only to her, the respondent withdrew her appeal, which
resulted in the RTC-43 Decision becoming final and executory. The
petitioners, however, never knew of this because when they followed up the
case with PAO-Dumaguete, they were informed that the appeal was still
pending.[10]
It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent
to Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who
had resigned. Unfortunately, she failed to inform petitioners of the said
entry of judgment before her resignation in November 1997. She also failed
to inform PAO-Dumaguete of such development.
It was only in November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that
their victory was already final after their nephew secured a copy of the entry
of judgment from RTC-43.
Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the
rules and jurisprudence when they dismissed the action for revival of
judgment. Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere
motion within five (5) years from the date of entry of judgment. If the
prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the
lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action
which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court
within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final.[11]
An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article
1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
xxxx
(3) Upon a judgment
Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment
of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the
judgment became final.
To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an
injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to
contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault
could be attributed to petitioners.
Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and
so were represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the
records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never
informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or of the
entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they could not be faulted for
their subsequent actions. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were told
that the case was still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and
unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules, they could not be
expected to bypass PAO-Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the
case with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer and wait.
No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal.
Withdrawing her appeal means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision,
which voided the "Declaration of Heirship and Sale," dismissed
respondent's counterclaim, and ordered her to reconvey the entire subject
property to petitioners and to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the
cost of suit. Since the decision became final and executory, she has been in
possession of the property which rightfully belongs to petitioners. She will
continue to hold on to the property just because of a technicality.
Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival
of judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden
duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its soundest
discretion to prevent a wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules of
procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a
strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it
is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided
or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when
to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.[12] Thus:
"x x x procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive
of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel
bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would
result in the outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where
the interest of justice so requires.[13]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 16, 2011
Decision and the September 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 02497 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.