Consti2Digest – Heirs of Alberto Suguitan Vs City og Mandaluyong, GR 135087 (14 March

2000)

STATUTE IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS

Petitioner: Heirs of Alberto Suguitan
Respondent: City of Mandaluyong

Facts:
The respondent issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Banjamin Abalos to institute
expropriation proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan for the expansion of
Mandaluyong Medical Center. Alberto Suguitan refused the offer Mayor Abalos in buying his
property. City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasig.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss filled by Alberto Suguitan and allowed the
expropriation of the subject property.

The petitioner asserted that the respondent may only exercise its delegated power of eminent
domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 and not by
means of a mere resolution.

Petition for review for reversal of the Order by the RTC of Pasig.

Issue:
Whether a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filling of expropriation proceedings with
the RTC.

Held:
No. Petition is granted and the decision of RTC of Pasig is reversed and set aside. An
examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing
of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent
domain is already being exercised.
“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” The due process
and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this
governmental power. Since exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual’s
right to private property, a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty the
need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized.

The exercise of the rights of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is
that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right,
and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent,
the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.

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The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most
delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny.
Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all free
constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of
substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as mode of the exercise of the power,
and to protect it from abuse....

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however,
that such power may validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and
public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower
than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the
terms of the delegating law. The basis of the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units is Section 19 of RA 7160:

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.

 The City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners’
property by means of resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law is clear and
free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not resolution, for
exercise of the power of eminent domain.

 1st requisite: An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular property.

 An ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive
to exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the
complaint with the proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of
just compensation to which the defendant is entitled.

In inconsistency between the Code (Section 19 of RA 7160) and the IRR (Article 36, Rule VI):
The law itself surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is automatic
that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by mere administrative rule
issued for its implementing. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight
in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in
exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an
ordinance.

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While we remain conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, we cannot
grant judicial sanction to local government unit’s exercise of its delegated power of eminent
domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.

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