Bart Mak AR519

Bart Mak
Owner and Principal Consultant at

Mak Aircraft Engineering Services
info@mak-aviation.com
www.mak-aviation.com
Welcome!
1
Aircraft Technical Records Dublin 2019
1.Technical records are more than maintenance records
2.Why Technical Records?
3.Who views for what reason?
4.What are the problems/pitfalls and how to
prevent/control
2
Why technical records??
• Value retention….
• It’s in the regulations…. (that’s too easy..)
• Traceability of the aircraft
• Documenting the configuration of the aircraft
• Demonstrating Airworthiness!
• Accident investigation!!
3
Value retention….
Exposure will be at:
• Sale
• Lease transitions
• Part out
In not meeting commercial agreements or worse:
not meeting airworthiness requirements
4
It’s in the regulations……..
EASA FAA
Part 145 FAR 145

145.A42 145.219
MRO 145.A.45 FAR 43
145.A.50 43.10 thru 42.12
145.A.55 Appendix B
FAR 121(scheduled)
121.380
Part-M (commercial) FAR 135 (on-demand)
Operator M.A. 305 135.439
NPA 2014-04 135.441
FAR 91 (GA)
91.417 thru 91.421
5
Traceability of the aircraft…..
6
Demonstrating airworthiness!!
What is the definition of airworthiness??
1.In conformance with type design
2.In a condition fit to fly

FAR 3.5(a)
Record means any writing, drawing, map, recording, tape, film, photograph or other
documentary material by which information is preserved or conveyed in any format, including,
but not limited to, paper, microfilm, identification plates, stamped marks, bar codes or electronic
format, and can either be separate from, attached to or inscribed on any product, part,
appliance or material
EASA FAA
FAR 25 (large transport)
CS-25 (Large transport > 19 Seats)
FAR 23 (Normal category)
CS-23 (regional transport)
FAR 26 (Cont. Airworthiness. for TCH)
CS-E (engines)
FAR 33 (engines)
7
What is type design?
Type Certificate Data Sheet

•Certification basis and ELOS and exemptions
•Approved weights
•Max seating capacity (for the type)
•Approved engine types
•Approved engine power in combination with weight
•Fuel capacity and approved fuels
•Operating limitations
•ICA!!! Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
8
Was that Airworthiness?

Uhm,…NO!
There are many alterations from type design on most aircraft
• Modifications
• SB’s
• STC’s
• Repairs
These have to comply with the latest Airworthiness Standards
CS-25, CS-E, CS-APU (EASA)
FAR 25 (FAA)
FAR 26 FAA (continuing Airworthiness for TCH)
Part 21 responsibility is to substantiate this
But there’s more…
9
Commercial operators have additional Airworthiness

requirements to comply with
EASA FAA
FAR 121 (scheduled)

Subparts J, K, L
(scheduled operations)
Part CAT Subpart D (equipment)
Part 26 (interior)
FAR 135 (on demand)
Subparts C, J, App A
Part TCO.. (Third country Ops)
Subpart L for helicopter medivac
FAR 129… (Foreign Air Carriers)
10
What are Airworthiness Records?
Airworthiness codes
Certification docs Design/Write

Part 21 Part 21
Approved methods and designs
Embodiment records Modify/Maintain

Part 145 Part 145
Embodiment on aircraft
11
What if this happens…?
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Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

DC-10-10. 19-Jul-1989
• Main contributory factor was the failure of the

airworthiness system
• This was established by the review of technical records of
both operator and manufacturer
• Investigation resulted in number of safety
recommendations and Airworthiness Directives
• Investigation resulted in the direct mitigation of
potentially catastrophical failures of the same nature
13

DC-10-10. 19-Jul-1989
• During cruise; Loud bang from #2 engine and failure

• Loss of ALL hydraulic power and ALL Flight Controls
• Crew was able to control the aircraft only by modulating
power on the remaining engines #1 and #3
• Crew was able to navigate the aircraft to Sioux city and
position for a runway
• Crashed on the airport with 111 fatalities, 185 survivors
14

DC-10-10. 19-Jul-1989 Source NTSB report NTSB/AAR-90/06
15

16

There was the crack initiation

From a metallurgical cavity
17

ENGINE records investigation revealed:

1. ESN 451-243 (accident engine) was first installed on N1814U #3 position
June 20, 1972
2. Fan module 51406 contained fan disc S/N MPO0385 (accident disk) was
installed on ESN 451-243 during a shop visit in July 1988 with TSN 40266
and CSN 16139
3. ESN 451-243 was installed on N1807U September 1988 and removed for
convenience 8 days later
4. And was subsequently installed on N1819U (accident aircraft)
5. The engine had TSN 42436 and CSN 16899 at time of the accident
6. Examination of service records, defects, trend data, corrective action entries
revealed no anomalies
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FAN DISK records reveal:

1. S/N MPO00385 was produced between Sep 3 and Dec 11, 1971 and
installed on new engine ESN 451251
2. In the 17 years after birth, the disk was inspected by FPI 6 (six) times and
accepted after each inspection
3. Last inspection before the accident, was done 760 cycles before the
accident and accepted
4. Manufacturing records showed 2 (two) disks with the same part number
and serial number were routed through manufacture
5. One of which failed the ultrasonic immersion test during manufacture and
was sent to an independent inspection facility and was later cut up for
investigation
6. The investigators established the (different) producers and heat numbers of
the raw material from which the two same serial number disks were
manufactured
7. Established 6 (six)“sister disks” made from the same batch new material
which were withdrawn from service and tested. One disk failed this
inspection with the same type of flaw. (Ref AD 89-20-01)
19

Conclusions:
• The main causal factor of the accident could only be
determined by technical records
• The technical records required for the causal factor
determination included operational AND manufacture records
• The reviewed and available records spanned way beyond the
legal retention period
• Due to the available records, similar failures, were directly
prevented
• Without the available records, most likely, most broader
industrial actions would have been required
20
Case #2 Swissair 111, Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia

2 Sept 1998 Source TSBC report A98H003
• During cruise an unusual smell was detected in the flight

deck
• Smoke assessed a visible on the flight deck
• “Pan Pan” call and crew planned to divert to Boston
• After suggestion of ATC decided to divert to Halifax
• Fuel dumping
• Cabin bus switched to OFF (part of Smoke checklist)
• A/P #2 switched off
• Emergency call
• ATC receives last comms
• Recorders stop recording
• Flight impacts the water
Time span of 20 minutes……
21

2 Sept 1998
Wiring damage from recovered wreckage Source TSBC report A98H003
22

2 Sept 1998
Structural heat damage in recovered wreckage Source TSBC report A98H003
23

A very long and complex investigation followed and concluded an in flight

fire was the primary contributing factor to this accident
• Most likely the fire started at the wiring of a retrofitted In Flight
Entertainment Network (IFEN) system by STC # ST00236LA-D
• MD-11 design philosophy is that all non essential cabin
equipment is powered by one of eight cabin buses
• One item on the [smoke/fumes unknown origin] check list is to
isolate all non-essential cabin power
• however the IFEN system was connected to aircraft power and
incompatible with the aircraft electrical load shedding system
• Design documents showed that initially, the intention was to
power the IFEN from the cabin buses, but these buses were
unable to provide sufficient power for the full configuration
system
• For that reason, it was decided to power the system from AC bus
#2, which circumvented the smoke/fumes mitigation from the
checklist
24

A very long and complex investigation followed and concluded an in flight

fire was the primary contributing factor to this accident
• The design change mentioned in the previous slide was never

submitted to the FAA
• FAR 25.1309 and CS25.1309 requires any systems modification
to be subjected to system safety analysis, which would include
qualitative failure mode and effect analysis and quantitative
assessment using probability ratio’s
• This assessment was carried out and concluded to be “non-
essential” implying that no adverse effect would be imposed on
flight safety and cockpit work load in case of a failure
• 55 findings pertinent to contributory factors, risk and other were
published in the report, resulting in the development of the EWIS
program, several AD’s, among which the general retrofit
requirement to switch off power to EFI systems, increase CVR
recording time and oversight of STC developments by authorities
25

Conclusions:
• After the initial charting and reconstructing of the heat damage to

the structure of the wreckage, the technical records investigation
provided context to the investigation
• Not only technical embodiment records, but also certification
material was available and reviewed and revealed essential
deficiencies in the certification process
• Without the availability of the design data and reconstruction of
the certification process, the very extensive safety
recommendations and amendment of certification codes would
not have been possible
26
Pitfalls
• Component airframe mixup (repairs, mods, shop reports

alterations)
• Substantiation data for alterations (certification material, ELA
effects, MDL’s, test and substantiation reports, flammability
reports etc.)
• Back to birth data on gears and engines
• Historic statements
27
Mitigation
• Use common sense!

• Pay attention to detail
• Use the facilities of your existing system!
• Train people sufficiently in system knowledge and regulations
alike
• Establish a clear records management policy and do not leave it
unchecked to entities not carrying direct responsibility. Take
control and take responsibility
• Avoid sweep up actions!
28
Thank You !
Happy to take questions
29

Bart Mak AR519

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Bart Mak

Owner and Principal Consultant at

1.Technical records are more than maintenance records

2.Why Technical Records?

3.Who views for what reason?

4.What are the problems/pitfalls and how to

Why technical records??

It’s in the regulations……..

Part 145 FAR 145

Traceability of the aircraft…..

1.In conformance with type design

2.In a condition fit to fly

What is type design?

Type Certificate Data Sheet

Was that Airworthiness?

Commercial operators have additional Airworthiness

FAR 121 (scheduled)

FAR 129… (Foreign Air Carriers)

What are Airworthiness Records?

Certification docs Design/Write

Approved methods and designs

Embodiment records Modify/Maintain

What if this happens…?

Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

• Main contributory factor was the failure of the

Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

• During cruise; Loud bang from #2 engine and failure

Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

There was the crack initiation

Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

ENGINE records investigation revealed:

Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

FAN DISK records reveal:

Case #1 United Airlines Flight 232

Case #2 Swissair 111, Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia

• During cruise an unusual smell was detected in the flight

Time span of 20 minutes……

Case #2 Swissair 111, Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia

Case #2 Swissair 111, Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia

Case #2 Swissair 111, Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia

A very long and complex investigation followed and concluded an in flight

Case #2 Swissair 111, Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia

A very long and complex investigation followed and concluded an in flight

• The design change mentioned in the previous slide was never

Case #2 Swissair 111, Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia

• After the initial charting and reconstructing of the heat damage to

• Component airframe mixup (repairs, mods, shop reports

• Use common sense!

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