Awe 106 #Z=3eO C593 Ai ace op ‘CHNICAL MEMORANDUM e ORO-T-117 REGRADED, BY AUTHORITE, oF. NY OFS er, SURVEY OF ALLIED TANK CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II BY sg ALVIN D. Coox AND L. VAN LOAN NAISAWALD oi Paths eat THIS IS A WORKING PAPER presenting the considered results of study by the ORO staff members responsible for its reparation. It is subject to revision as may be required by new facts or by revision of basic assumptions. Comments and criti- ism of its contents are invited. These should be addressed to: THE DIRECTOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE FT, LESLEY J. McNAIR WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 79095 , L March 1951 Serra om naa |THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, US.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794.. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PER- SON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310 DAAGRAMRD (79095) 24 oor 130 SUBJECT: Request for Declassification of Document IAW EO 12065(U) Commandant US Army Military History Institute ATIN: Sp5 Brown Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 The attached document, which you forwarded for declassification review on 17 October 1980, has been reviewed, and is declassified and returned herewith. Sincerely, 1 Inch WR, BOARDMAN 1 copy of (ROT 117 Chiefy Declassification Opns Br Records Managenent Division- SRESTRICTED_ ‘THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE 6410 CONNecTICUT AVENUE Orenavina union CONTRAGY Sa ee Mere DEPARTHENT OF Me ARMY oliver az00 MEMORANDUM TO: Recipients of ORO-T-117 Corrigenda 1, Table I of ORO~T-117 is in error, relative to the breakdown of US and UK tank casualties in Western Europe. A corrected copy of this table has been prepared and is here with distributed to all recipients of ORO-I-117. 2, None of the data in the very important Table II are in any way invalidated by the corrections in Table I. Corncted Copy Inverted 22 Jaw 52. Ciker Aesteyed, REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER ¥O0954 iiaProject ARWOR op0-7-117 UNCLASSIFIED 31 March 1953 Technical Menorandum SAMPLING OF ALLIED TANK CASUALTIES TO ALL CAUSES - WORLD WAR 11 1 2 3 4 5 ‘ 7 8 9 10 u 2 13 “ a 6 7 8 TOTAL MUMBER | TOTAL NUMBER PERCENT OF a wuwaer | NUMBER mise OF KNOWN OF UNKNOWN | PERCENT OF NUMBER ane ‘HOLLOW CRE peer. Land NUMBER mneen misc ENEMY | MISC ENEMY Bis: NON-ENEMY dle we eine wrOTAy SAME, | casuarvon | ‘astarion | now arratn | UMMM Tinty'nrtnin | wtneo as | G0UROH | CHARGE | cunrine | cunriae as | worraneo | worraneo as |eM!S242,] ‘etran ts) | wontenear | So¥cevewr Gest came laa a (2) MY pexcenr'or | GYARGE | pest] wran | Pencenr oF | "wimmin’ | encenr of MEAPOR NITAIN) cette ‘or |yeknon wituin | EAPON AS netaearen | Ya THEATER (3) an a |e) (3) @) (3) (3) @) an wesrenn curore an as 208s sis won} 08 ms nae | ae | tia 1st 50.98 \6 os 9s wa Was Dies 7 tame a fig] ines 2 tre | tre | tae ‘a7 wn ° ore * ix teat Dio Hoa rove 6 so He ms wot se | coe a bon ? one % 2 ao lise sa * : set Mt tas win} ous | ates ms suet ° of ” A is 2 ieee % * : ten] nts 0 “ot 0 | on 0 rats ° “os 2 : weit D iovs a ae re sin | aree ” vie w | wee vat was : iM a “ ast Line x | si “ was | tae 1 task 2 | wise % sai86 : ee tie ms wonte arnick us tou n a sis | ses \ an ett] ces 23 faa ° ot \ a anes vs = toes 208 a doles | sorss 6 ak naa |e ie was ° ce 8 " irae te = leet ut ° \ooves os 10 7a ° oe 37 teres 1 oust FA ° “oe ue = ieee vas ° tooc08 o ue wn el beats ats er ' outs rH ( og ur toe a ° re ot a ait Gata M0 ree ° os ° of trite 210 i ° {0.0% of : ait : oe io peat : : ° + sey us = 1048 ss a ” seas | ss.es 2 ose 0 | oy was ° ot : . 19.08 o> tone u i ° vooces ot > aes ° ot 3 wae ° oe ' ° oe Canada = 1083 ie 0 ° toca oF : fe ca tog ‘ tocas ° ‘ot ' ‘ 20.03 Tar us = tons “s “ 4 20.05 : s so.08 ° os 1 2.8 " ts tow a wor “ ta.68 ” ue was : ory 2 oat 0 ts > toe ie ta 2 ties a te to.08 ° os i volts to ws tow ins tos i. ie % Ph soe ' ole 3 aa ¢ me > es wa a um tet iH sos seas “2 ae " ua “ ue > tone ih 2 7 teas 2 fa seat ° “oe ‘ wt ° canada = 1948 ” te ; sek i FH sas : aio 3 wet 8 Caneee = 1008 a a "3 aint n Me 2.94 : ose 2 ual oe Canede = 1085 is iH 2 re 3 3 nik ‘ tH Q ot : wuena We + inate = 1048 vor * , wis] | coe a 20.06 elects “ os : : at sag os ” racirie Geadatecanat (aswe) = 1982 : : ° ' 20.08 als os : to.08 ° ot ' 20.08 ° o* vilte (a3xe) = 1983 2 2 ° ° of ila of 2 oo ° ce ° os ‘ ot Tareee (UME) = 108 a 4 ° ° ot tie | ey : tei2e > on : en Pa eit Riper (Use) = tow a n " : ute oil ies : Tak ° of : ist tes aritain (uBne) = Ioee : : ° ' tolo © | le ° cot ° oh c “ot ‘ 0.08 Keajalein dt Solomons (U0) © 1988 : : ° ° oe sh arog ' wie ° of ¢ cet : telat ew auinen (U3MC) = Lose : ; ° ° % ‘ of ° os : of ° let : 100-88 fuen (Uwe) = 1908 a 8 : 5 wit ‘ oe 2 aelst ° of : 0 doise Tinian (Une) > tows i is ° : naa a | Males ‘ wns ° ot ‘ ° ot Pritiopine tatants (USA) = 1o0¥eas “s ue $ s we ‘ oe “ iets : io Pa u sit Teo dias (UME) = To¥s i i : % Mot On poad " atk $ vee ‘0 wo aa Gkinewe (uss) = tou | a89 28 ° 100g 8 28.04 ° ° * 98 s nas © 28.08 ‘8 rs otinace (UME) = toes | 136 ie ° 1008 f 2 olst ° ° = weit i oe 2 raise rH at okinawa (UME $ USK) = 1088 a a ° 100.08 6 ” 2.98 el enof “7 39.26 es ™ ait " sats Sie iateaerassiaciaved (alpen 1 = Estimate ** = Unknown ® wey: syst Asana TABLE 11 SAMPLING OF ALLIED TANK CASUALTIES TO ALL CAUSES - WORLD WAR 11 T 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 10 u 2 13 1 15 16 7 18 TOTAL NUMBER | TOTAL NUMBER numaer | NUMBER 4 ‘iow Imcnoanea EPEC RERENECE | nuece NUMBER Houcon | HOLLOW | NuNBER NUMBER NUMBER NuMBER — | wise enemy | NISC ENEMY mise en Fi TOTAL SAMPLE UNKNOWN MINED AS, a GUNFIRE | GUNFIRE AS | WORTARED | MORTARED AS WEAPON AS | _NON-ENEMY THEATER OF OPERATIONS CASUATION | CASUATION | KNOWN WITHIN MINED WITHIN es CHARGE AS WEAPON WITHIN WEAPON AS WITHIN: THEATER WITHIN PERCENT OF pence | WITHIN | PERCENT OF | WITHIN. | PERCENT OF PERCENT OF |WEAPON WITHIN! peacent CASUALTIES | CASUALTIES (2) a) (2) WITHIN ACE (2) ERCENT OF IN THEATER | IN THEATER (3) (2) &) (2) (3) (2) (3) (3) (2) (3) WESTERN cUROPE US = 198u—45 4,287 3,449 09 81.0% 19.0% es 7.08 wiz fines [oo 50.9% 25 0.7% 9a 516 15.0% Uk = 19usees 1685 1622 63 96.9% 37% 419 25.84 179 | 110g 57.3% 67 21 tas nada = 1902, 190N—45 as 621 a8 73.8% 26.58 n W198 4s 75 aio ‘ a1 183 29.58 consrnen rors 6,787 5,691 1,096 83.98 161% 1,107 19.9% ox | aan | 2.908 stax 4 0.7% 241 2 12.6% NORTH AFRICA us - 1os2-43 arr Ns 189 82.64 87.44 1s 6.14 ° 0.0 59 50.0% ° 0.04 ‘ 195 26 22.0% OK = 19¥t—¥3 Lie L718 ° 100.0% 0. of 260 isi ° orox | 1381 80.44 2 outs n sag ' oni France ~ 1983 39 39 ° 100.08 0.04 ‘ 23.14 ° 0.0% 30 76.9% : : ° 0108 - * comBINED TOTALS 2,034 1ars 159 92.2% rox 28 15.48 ° o.ox | 1.470 78a 2 o.1% a ams Las at | siciuy us ~ 1993 se a a7 36.26 63.9% 2 9.94 ° 0.0% 10 97.6% 0 0.05 5 ‘ 19.08 UK = 1988 31 a1 ° 100.0% 0.0% 7 22.64 ° 0.0% 23 78.24 0 0.05 1 ° ° Canada - 1903 20 20 ° 100.0% 0.04 9 45.0% ° 00% 6 30.0% a 0.05 1 ‘ 20.0% couernen rorats 103 n a 66.1% 33.9% 1" 25.0% ° 0.08 3 54.2% o 0.0% 7 9.7% 2 111% irauy Us = 1983-05 635 588 97 85.08 18.26 137 23.36 a7 6.38 228 38.18 3 0.58 7 180 25.5% UK > 198ac45 898 728 167 ass 18.64 a2 28.9% 59 aig 826 583g a Ves 0 a sat Canada = 1943-45, 79 367 182 78.98 208 98 16.94 12 2a 170 30.0% 4 0.7 15 a3 vais conprneD TOTALS ee a6 ato 181% a2 21.9% 108 5.7% 220 49.5% 20 tas 76 4.08 war 23.7% suRwa UK + Ingia = 1905 102 95 7 99.1% 6.9% 1» 20.0% ° 9.5% 64 67.48 : : 1 sant “ ” PACIFIC US Aray = 1964-45 393 388 ® 97.7% 2.34 us 29.46 ° 0.08 ay 34.94 7 Les 92 28.08 a 9.9% USNe = 1962-45 a6 388 28 93.38 6.74 101 26.0% Q 0.0% 127 32.78 ° ang 53 13.7% 99 25.5% couprNeD uswc + USA 409 772 a 95.45 4.68 a 2.7% ° 0.0% 261 39.8% 15 1.98 Mas 18.8% 137 108 ALL THEATERS US - 1982-45 6,086 4,997 hiss stat 18.76 986 19.96 suo six | 2,292 se.a4 8a 0.94 ays 7.0% e3 16.0% UK = 1941-45 wast 8198 237 9.7% Sat 387 aii 27 5.93 | 2823 67.34 2a oss sot 0x 46 nig Canada = 1982-45, Hsa8 1208 76 76.38 23.74 76 14.6t 88 sas 455 a7.7h 12 1.08 “7 2.98 860 asi France ~ 1983 39 39 ° 100.0% 0.0% 8 2k o 0.05 30 76.94 . : ° 0.04 e ss GRAND TOTAL 12,140 10,388 1,782 a5.68 144% 2,058 19.8% 754 7.9% | 5,600 59.98 ” 0.78 seot s.axt 1,339 12.9% KEY: * = Unknown number included in gunfire sample t= fetinate Unknowna of the tank casualties; hollow charge weapons were not yet in general use, The addition of those casualties inflicted by the mltiple action of gunfire and mines, plus those in the unknown category (57 percent of the US sample alone), would raise the North African Thoater gunfire total to about 85 percents RO-T~117. Causation In Italy, the picture is affected by the fact that, of a total sample of 2300 tark casualties, 20 percent wore immobilised by causes unknown, and a further 25 percent by miscellaneous non eneny causes such as bogging, accident, and mechanical failure. Based upon a weighted sample of 1,50 tanks, gunfire accounted for at least 60 percent of tank casualties. The introduction of the Panzerfaust in large nunbors, as well as the proportiomilly greater ouploynent of mortars and land mines, combined to diminish the over-all gunfire percentage of this theater, Similar explanations hold true for Western Barope, The subtraction of the 15 percent unknown causation and the 15 porcent miscellaneous non-enemy tank casualties would weight our sample down to 5,000 tarks, instead of 6,800, Based upon the latter figure, the gunfire percentage would be at least 60 porcont, The very heavy Gorman use of lami mines (See Appendix C of this study) and the trenendous increase in the employment of the Panzorfaust and the Pangerschreck tended to reduce the toll exacted by gunfire alone. The US Army and Marine Corps records for the Pacifie fighting accord as to the percentages immobilized by gunfire: 35 percent and 33 porcent respectively. Nevertheless, this low figure can be explained by the fact that 10 percent of the Army sample and 25 percent of the Yarine senple were inmobilized by non-encay causes, such as drowning, bogging, mechanical failure, and accident, A further 20 percent were knocked out by miscellaneous eneny action, such as satchel chargo, mgnetic mine, etc, An accordingly weighted sample of 500 tank casualties would reveal @ gunfire proportion approximating 50 percent. On the basis of tho preceding computations, a trucr picture of the over-all percentage immobilized by gunfire alone in all theaters would be noarer to 6 percent of 8500 known cases, after making allowance for the 15 percent unknown and the 20 percent due to miscellaneous causes. : LAND MINES World War IT yovealed the inportance of lard minos, which increased both in number and in types, It was not, however, until the large-scale tank battles in North Africa and the Western Desert that the true value and significance of mine warfare were fully demonstrated, Large and strategically placed antitank mine fields were used by both the Germans and the British Eighth— RO-T-137- Causation deny in the fighting in the area betweon El Alanein and the Qattara Doprossion, and westward to Tripoli along tho coastal road, The first major US encounter with large-scale mino fields was in the Tunisian campaigns Tho Axis cmployed incressing numbers of land ninos as the ‘tempo of the war slowed from the rapid advances of 1939-i to ‘the defensive phases of the following four years. Gorman anti- tank mino production leaped from about 100 thousand per month in the first three years of war to ovor 3.5 million per month inlghh. Cuwmlative totals shor that the Germans produced over 72 million land mines of all types fron Septexber 1939 through Decombsr 19h» lard mine consumption by the German field armies rose from about 150 thousand anmally in 1939 and 1940 to over 1s milion in 19h, German lend mire consumption on all the fronts in World War II totalled about 25 millions, The difference between this figure and the total of land minos actually produced is largely explained by the following factors: training and demonstration uses; sales or "gifts" to co-bolligerent or friently powers; losses in land or sea transit by all causes; defective nings; non-combat use of minos for explosive purposes in the rear areas and in the zone of interior; reserve stocks. (See Appendix C). ‘Theso figures compare with a total US production of less than 28 million land nines, Excepting porbepe a doson important situations in World War Bataan; Faid—Sbeitla—Kassorine Passs El Guettars the Normandy beachhead; Strasbourg; the Ardennes; St Vith; and Mote—the US Army actually had no major requirement for sustained defensive warfare, Studies have indicated that the Germans suffered less than five percent of their tank casualties to Allied land mines, in Europe, (Soe Appondix B)s Of a sampling study of 10,388 known Allied tank casudlties in all theaters of operation in World War II, a fairly consistent over-all porcontage sooms to have becn oxctod by land minoss O«gey 20 percent. Individual theators exhibited particular conditions, especially faverable or unfavorable to the onploynont of mines, and with a consequent rango of values extending between 10 porcent, and lS percent, But, in cvery operation, Axis land mines were an ever-present "thorn in the side" of the Allied armored forces, A dotailed discussion by theaters will be found at Appendix Cy HOLLOW CHARGE WEAPONS Our first record of Allied tank casualties to Panserfaust weapons occurs in Jamary ani February 194), 1n Italy. There= after, in Italy, the role of hollow chargo woapons fluctuated at a relatively low lovel before reaching a peak of 20-25 porcontTES gost-117, Gausetion in tho spring of 1945, aftor the crossing of the river Po. The figure of 6 porcent for this thoater represents on averaging out of every phase of the Italian campaign, from Messina to the Alps. In western Burope, the tank casualty rate to hollow clan weapons averaged over 10 percent for the whole campaign, "Peaks" woro roached during the period of tho break-out from Normendy in the late sumer of 19hh; during the Ardonnes battles of Decenber 19k and Jamary 19453 and in the finel offensive east of the Rhine, in tho spring of 1945, Thoso peaks, mounting in intonsity, reached a climax after the Rhine crossing, when 25 to 35 percont of all tank casualties wore inflicted by Panzorfaust weapons. Colonel We L, Roberts, who commanded a combat command of tho 4 Ith Armored Division, said on 21 April 195+ "Panzerfaust ie the ‘Foret weapon we have encountered in this exploitation type cf war, Tt will go through any US tank, and con be hardled by cven an inoxperionced individual, It is the only woapon that is getting our tanks today," Another report, based upon Fronch Tactical Liaison, disciss~ ed the mounting German employment of "antitank fox traps: Ytantitank fox traps? have been oncountered by the US 7th 4enored Divieion in thoir wector on the south flank of the British Second Army, They are manned by bazooka teams who firo at tanke at very short ranges, The trap consists of a slit trench approximtely @ft long, lft deop, and 6-ft wide at the front, tapering to 4 narrower width at the rear, Logs and grass cover ‘the top of the trench, with the result that the trap is extremly difficult to identify, There are two openings, apparently with removable covers at the front, from which the bazookas are fireds There is also an opening at tho rear leading into an escape hatch. After firing at a tank, the bazooka team cscapes either through the opening at the rear or tho eseape hatch, Thoso traps are usually located close to roads with the escape trench running behind a noarby farn building or hodge. MG's are emplaced on wither side of the road in support of tho bazooka toams, When a column advances down tho road, the bazooka toan waits until the loading tanks are opposite the fox trap and then attempts to knock out the first two tarks, Whon the tanks have beon hit, ‘the MG's open fire on crows and other porsonnel who expose themselves, to learn what has stopped advance of the column, MMO's do not fire on loading infantry or soft-skinned vehicles but wait until a tank has been stoppedy ",..The witness reported that stress was laid on the bazooka teams escaping without revealing 7 Equipo, deny Ground Forees Report No. 89h, 30 Apr. 45, HQ, BPO, War Dopartnent Observers Board, (SECRET). eae Zyl ORO-T-117 Causation coeaoe ery aa on the MG's not opening fire until a tank kas eon hit! Tho fectors affecting the increased importance of Pamerfaust weapons include: a decrease in the number of German tanks and antitank guns available; terrain nore favorable for launching the ground rockets; increased numbers of Panzerfaust weapons available, despite the interesting fact that miny were thrown away before being used, Tho over-all figure cf sevon percent for tanks inmobilized by hollow charge weapons in all theaters, based on a known sample of 10,500, is somewhat misleading, for there were no such casualties in Africa, Sicily, or the Pacific. An adjusted sample, to include only Italy and Europe, wuld give us a more accurate percentage for over-all hollow charge casualties: 10 percent of a sample of 7700 tank casualties, The addition of that fraction bazcoka'd in the mltiple-weapon category, or in the unknown listing, would further raise the over-all percentage to about 15 percent cf the sample usede MORTAR FIRE Of the total known sample of 10,500 Allied tank casualties, it was found that only 80 tanks were mortared, This represented a fairly constant casualty rate of about one percent in every theater. Indeed, the highest proportion was in the Pacific, where two percent were mortared, The Italian theater was the noxt highest proportionally, closely followed by Western Europe. In Nerth Africa, the open terrain and the emphasis upon flat- trajectory woapons largely explain tho nogligible role of the high-angle mortars MISCELLANEOUS (PLUS MULTIPLE), ENEMY WEAPON To have included a tank knocked out, say, by "tank plus antitank plus bazooka" under each separate weapon category would have resulted in a record of incidence of hit rather than of tank casualty integers. Consequently, an attempt has becn nade to circunvent this problem by including under one separate catogory all tanks inncbilized by nore than one woapone Also included in this tabulation was that mumerically unimportant proportion of tanks knocked out by a wide variety of emmy weapons: rifle grenades, thermite, aerial borbs, hand grenades, demolitions, capture, tank traps, small arms fire, etc. A fairly consistent proportion of tanks was knocked out by miltiple or miscellansous enemy weapons in every theater of operations, i.ce, five percent.’ Two major exceptions must be noted: in the Pacific fighting, the Japanese, lacking armor 27 Remored Report Noe hk, HQ, 12th Army Group, 2b Oct. bile 10 —_mil, ROW-T-217 Causation and massvd artillery, used a very considerable ancunt of satchel charges, "Molotov cocktails," gromades, ani expensive, improvised nines, aerial bombs, sca mines, etc, This fact explains tho figure of 20 porcent for tank casualties suffered due to miscellaneous or miltiple enemy action, The figure of 12 percont for the US forees! tank casualties to these causes in North Africa is largely attributable to such causation as: captured, aerial bombed, small arms, ote.; but the sample involved (1h tanks) is deemed to be too small to be statistically significant. MISCELLANEOUS, NON-ENEMY WEAPON The over-all average of 13 percent for iLliod tanks imobilized by non-enemy causation is obviously much too low @ representation of that factor, The most soricus source of error is the general nature of tho British data available for detailed amlysis, These records were concerned solely with weapon damge, and hence were deficient in the type of data needed to round out the over-all picture. Of a total sample cf 4500 British tanks, only one percent could be listed in the Ror-enemy weapon catogory. The records cf the Canadian Army + and of the US Marine Corps furnished the most detailed information, and are believed to be much more representative than their theater counterparts, The US Army porcentages of nomonony immobilization are believed to be minimin figures, duo to the fact that much of our data were concerned mainly with tactical oporationss In the European theater, tho Canadians suffered 30 percent of their tank casualties from swamping, accident, mechanical failure, bogging, otc, The larger US forces’ sample, whose records wore far less complete, indicated a minimm figuro of 15 percent, There is independent evidence which loads us to belicve that the Canadian percentage is a. much closer: approximation ofthe-true US figure. Thus, a US Third Army study of 107 US My tank casualties indicated that 30 tanks, or 28 percent, "ne: 39 destroyed by terrain obstacles or mechanical deficiencies’! Similarly, there is good reason to believe that tank casualties due to mechamical failure rise vory sharply during periods of exploitation and pursuit, often at a ratio four to one over tank casualties due to enemy action alone, Thus, one fairly complete British sample of nechanical failures, for the period of 28 august to 7 Septembcr, 19, indicated the following relationships? Pe Examination of Causes for Rendering Tanks Inoperative, HQ, hird US army, O00, RD/rie, 19 March 1915, submitted to Chief of Staff, Third US Army. paneer rape ro! BRITISH SAMPLIG-OF MECHANICAL FATLORES, WESTERN EUROPE ORO~P—1L7 Number of Tank Casualties Duo Tot 2 chanical Causes Eni Action Tot vrit?/ E Guards Armored Div, (Brit.) 7 x ay 8th Armored Brigade (Brit.) 57 7.0 20 7 Ith Armored Div. (Brit.) Ub 8 6 50 7th Armored Div, (Brit.) 38 1601 12 50 ist Polish Armored Div, 50 6245 30 80 th Canadian Armored Dive 9 62 Total 3 7 33 Average per Armored Brigade 52 1967 a3 oy Average per Days in Pursuit Sabb 79 ob Leh 6.8 Average per 100 miles 16 7906 4b 20.1 7 Based ups upon Tables I, II, III, of 0.R.S. Report No. 18, "fank iasualties During the Exploitation Phase af inter Orsasing t ‘the Seine." 2/ All units equipped with Shermans, exeept the 7th Armored vision (Crommelis), These figures reflect a very constant ratio of imnbilisation to the two causes, and are largely explicable by the fact that very little maintenance work can be performed during such operational phases, because of the distances involved, tho tines travelled, and tho nocd to be ready for instant action. Excluding ‘these data, tho combined minim proportion for the European theater was 13 percont of the total tank casualty samplo, ‘The combined over-all figure for non-eneny weapon immobilization in the Italian theater would give a much fairer ropresontation if tho incomplete British data wore excluded. A percentage of 35 percent, based upon a sample of 1200 Canadian and US tank casualties, is believed to be more typical than ‘the figure of 2h porcent givon in Table II, Column 18. The data for tho Pacific fighting are considered to be quite representative, although the US Army figure of 10 percent is judged to te minimal, An average percontage of 18 is obtained from the combined Army and Marino Corps (25 percent) totals seeaetRO-T-117 Causation Ones agains the over-ull percentage of 13 is "slanted" by the inadequate British and French data, By excluding the latter records, 4 mich more accurate over-all percentage 1s obtained from the US and Canadian sample, totalling 6200 tank casualties; iseay 21 porcont, This figuro, a5 we have seen, included tanks imobilized by drowning, accident, bogging, and mechanical failure.Di SABLEO incor Fine OTMER THAN SAL, szcons rele TALE IY BATTLE VeMicuLAR casuALTiES ~ REPAIRABLE ARTILAERY 4 ORR wines For Period 18 vely oy = 6 way 108DESTROYED naar Ty NOT REPAIRASLE rises woerin] ws wea ofereT [ave fap uno raperael TABLE V BATTLE VENICULAR CASUALTIES ~ For Faroe (4 Joly 66 = 6 hey 1085a. | VEHICLES DESTROYED (449) OTHER MEANS 2% —~ (ORO (3-3 APRS! VEHICLES DISABLED (588) FIGURE 9.—BATTLE CASUALTIES 6th ARMORED DIVISION JULY 18, 1944 ~ MAY 8, 1995 ‘SECRETsuorsezedo ous 1 tr04 SHOT AYR O-¥P6T “Bny I = asy SA pstys 340491 woE}20 4033¥ *Z0¥n0S AWNY QUTHL sn ‘TaIYILVH JO $38801 - SLYVHD 3ALLVYVdNOD-— "Or gunDTE SXNVL WNIG3N JO S3SS07 Is¥dv 21 ovo 8 oh 001 92 60% 808i a er cry ure] SUNVL LHOIT 40 Sassi now 07 TT “Saw 4S 09 ‘oo | 8 0001 4 AWOIT “SHNYL 7 cos 1 Pt aae eos] t eva | aon T x00 | yeog | ony “WLOL ATHLNOW‘RANGE GUNFIRE A study of 800 US, British, and Canadian tank casualtics in Western Burope, the Moditerrancan Theater, and North Africa, Gisclosed that the average range at which tanks were inmobiligod by gunfire was umior 800 yards, A sample of 100 tank casualtics in North Africa showed an average range of 900 yards; 60 tank cesualties in Sicily and Italy—350 yards; 650 tank casualties in Western Burope—over 800 yards, Those figures are explicable by tho fact that in the western desort of North Africay where the terrain favored ranges to the limits of visibility, tank Sighting often resembled naval battles which boiled down to "slug fests" whore light vessels (“light tanks and armored cars) were involved, 4 figure of 900 yards represents the averaging out of engagenents at 1500 to 2000 yards as woll.as those at hub~ ‘towhub range, esg., Knightsbridge; Roumel's brilliant tank traps allowed his antitank guns to effect kills at short rango, Mertel4/ has explaincd the reasons far the Germans! electing to fight arnor at longor ranges in the dosert as follows: The German armoured forces often attacked British urarnoured troops if they found thom insufficiently protected by artillery and antitank guns, but they always avoided closing with our tanks ins running fight, When necting British tanks in strongth thoy preferred to take up a position which was woll protected by artillery fire and with antitank guns on the flanks, and used the superior gunfire from stationary tanks to shoot at the British tanks at Jong range.” The figure of 350 yards for Sicily and Italy reflects tho effect of terrain in channolizing armor and restricting its mobility. Rivers, defiles, ravines, cities, narrow roads, vineyards: ali conspired to reduce the scalo of armored warfare, and to favor close-range fire of both antitank and tank weapons, In Western Europe, howover, the opportunities for pursuit and for exploitation helped to raise the average range fcr closing hit to about 800 yards. For a discussion of tho scalo of Germn arnored opposition in Western Burope, consult Aprendix Ds It should be stressed that tho data on range are almost always derived fron "subjective" estimates given in after-action reports or "third-hand" summaries. Tho only exception is a portion of the British ETO sanple, wherein operations research ¥ Té. Gon. Sir G. 10Q, Martel, Our Armoured Forces, London, 19)5, 143 (UNCLASSIFIED).oRO-TLI Range teams from the 21st Army Group actually examined tanks inmobilized after the Rhine crossing, The over-all average of 800 yards range is also probably highor than the actual figure, if it wore known, for a much larger sample, inasmuch as a further 75 tonk casualties to gunfire wore Listed mercly as "close," "fairly close,” "point blank," "various," otey HOLLOW CHARGE WEAPONS The sample of, tanks knocked out by hollow charge weapons included 150 US, Eritish, and Canadian machines, The average closing range of hit was $0 yards, Tho samplo for Italy was too smill to justify firm conclusions, although the ranges involved were of tho same order of mgnitude as their Buropean counter parts, The British tank easualtics to Parmerfaust woapons wore suffered at ranges of about 35 yards, while the US casualties were recorded at about 55 yards, The nature of much of tho British armored fighting, in close, built-up, or inundated country, my explain part of this slight variance, but it is believed that there is a more valid oxplamtion! ‘the British gata wore derivod fron better and more carefully kept records than their US counterparts, which were largely estimtes mde after-the-fact and at third-hand, Consequently it is considered that the figure of 35 yards nore nearly approximates the average range for the Hurcpean Theatere Naturally, there are no data for the North African Theater, where the Panzorfaust was not yot in goneral use, The figure of 35 yards is probably oven somewhat higher than the actual range to be derived fron a much largor samplo, for at least another dozen "subjective" estimates could not be quantified; e680, "close," "very close," point-blank," etc. This contention is borne out by the results of British Operational Research Report No, 33, which concerned itself with The Use of Panserfaust tho North West European Campaign, The study, based upon Alliod Eanke imicbilized east of the Tikins, found that Panaorfoueto scored hits at rarges from 10 to 100 yards, although the frequency of hit fell off rapidly beyond ho yards, Based upon a sample of 80 hits, the following table was constructed by British 0.R,S TABLE VI HOLLOW CHARGE HITS AGAINST AFV'S (RANGE IN YARDS) Qr2O 21s 6) BO BLO 100 Frequency} 35 22 B L 3 3 of hits)RO-T-117 Fange TABLE VIT HOLLOW CHARGE MISSES AQKINST APV'S (RANOB IN YARDS) O20 21-hO 6-80 BL 200, Froquency) Br ib B 5 4 7 of fisses)~ The preceding data thus accord well with the findings of the present studyy 16oe RO-T-117 Range, TABLE VIET AVERAGE RANGES AT WHICH TANKS WERE IMMOBILIZED (Sampling) Gunfire Hollow Charge Weapons Sample | Range (Ya) | Sanpte | kange (Yds) US: ET0-Firet Army 330 796.4 sz | 53.6 fTO-Third, Seventh, Ninth | 119 712.7 at 9a. Araies tau 3 758.3 ' 50.0 us: Total $52 7.8 oe 63.4 uR: eT0 190 886.3 89 33.2 Tay st He. 2 75.0 siciy 6 300.0 5 a Areca 96 800.1 = 7 uk: Total 343 797.1 6 386 CANADA: ETO 5 422.0 ' 50.0 ETO: US) UK, CANADA ous sou.e 143 at AML Theaters: US, UK, CANADA ane 782.0 138 51.3 zz *Penetration in Inches a. GERMAN GUNS: aE Figure 11. CHARACTERISTICS OF US, UNITED KINGDOM, AND GERNAN GUNS = rs y a8-am Flak 41 Pak 42 75mm awk $2 (Panther) Sa 75/35 Pak 81 a8-mn Flak 37 Tenn 76.2 AP 40 76.2 482/28 (Conical bore) So-mn Pak 38 50-nn (Short Gun) 500 1000 Range In Yards 1500 Source: 2000 b. US AND UNITED KINGDOM GUNS. 3220 ffs IN Ww 9500 f/s | 17H (Britian) OF wv 9128 f/9 Mv 2600 t/s ww 2280 f/s s0-nn APC Toon APC wv 2800 f/ Penetration in Inches ww 2200 f/ Ww 4600 #/ 57-00 ww 2700 f/ Ww 3080 f/ 75am APC HOt 37-0 British 500 ooo 1500 Range In Yards Pata on US Tanks Knocked out by Eneay Action, Ha, Third US Army 8 April 1985 (DECLASSIFIED) allie 72000 Figure 11 WW 3000 f/s Wy 2600 #/s wv 2600 f/s wv 2705 fs Wy 2080 f/s Hv 2000 f/SITE OF HITS GUNFIRE Three US samples cf tanks innobilized by gunfiro showed that, of a total of 1100 vehicles, a consistent average of 31 percent of the hits were on the turret, 52 percent on tho hull, and 17 porcent of the suspension system, Jn this connection, a subjective amlysis by a US technical officer’/ of tho sites of hits on ovor 100 US tanks rendered inoperative by onceny gunfire, my sorve to amplify the above datas "The German gunners did not scen to havo any porticular aining point, unless it was the fiml drive, and this was just 2 matter of picking a spot that allowed for a wide nargin of error ani still asearod a hit. Due to the wide disporsal of the hits on dinerican tanks, I an of the opinion that the Gormn gunror fircd at whatever part of the American tank that he could soc, Most of tho Amcrican tanks were destroyed by penetrations of the frontal armor, with the hits being woll distributed betwoen the front slope plates, final érivo, front of turret, and tho gun mantlet.! A fins} note on this subject was provided by a Third army roport, which stated that "cn the side shots, tho Gornan ise. shooting at the spot on the fogyard sponson in which ammunition was stored in carly M4 tanks," Tabulations of the data concerning US gunfirc casualties in the European Theater will be found in Table X and Figures 12 and 13, British data, based upon a sample of 375 tark casualties ue to gunfire, showed a vory close correlation with the Americans in Burope: 33 percont of hits on tho turret, 52 percent on the bull, and 16 percent on the susponsion. The relationships for North Africa and Italy indicated that fron 0 to $0 percent of all hits wore on tho turrot, but it is considered that the excessively meager sample available that gave sites of hits (only 55 tanks, or two percent, of a total sample of 2600 in the two Theaters) pormits no firm conclusions. Accordingly the combined British and US data for all theaters, a sample of 1500 tanks, differ little from tho findings in Paes r from Ur, Taylor S, Oldham to ORO, dated 23 Aug. 1950 UNCLASSIFIED). 6/ Examination of Causes for Renjoring Tanks Inoporative, HQ, Third US irny, 00, KRD/rfo, 19 War 195, submitted to C/S, Third ‘US Army. (CONFIDENTIAL). 18OT) Site of Hits Buropo alono; o.g, 32 percent of all hits wore on the turret, 51 percent on the hull, and 17 percent on the suspension system. A British Army Oporations Rosearch Group analysis of 139 tanks Sgnobiliaod by gunfire in the period afjor tho Rhino crossing disclosed the following tank "aspects,"4 TABLE IX DISTRIBUTION OF TANK BUTS BY GUNFIRE Aspect of the Tank Front Side __Rear __ Roof Percentage of total hits 37% cog 3 ° 7 Average 30 porcent per side surface, 4 more complete discussion of the employment of flat~trajectory weapons is to be found in those sections dealing with gunfire elsewhere in this study, HOLLOW CHARGE WEAPONS The numerically most important data concerning the site of hits on Allied tanks immobilized by hollow charge weapons are available only for the European Theater (sample of 320 tanks); the Italian campaign furnished a negligible sample (only 5 tanks). The cver-oll combined findings showed that US and British tanks suffored ll percent of hollow charge hits on the turret, 48 percent on the hull, and only 8 percent on the suspension systems The US samples showed an average of 37 porcont of hollow charge hits on the turret, 56 percent on the hull, and 8 percent on the suspension systene Tho British sample showed a higher ineidence of hits on the turret-52 percent, an? a lowor incidonse of hits on the hul1--39 porcent, mhile the suspension system hits romained the sazo—8 percont. 4 British AORG aralysis of ‘tho "aspects" of 106 hits on British tanks imobilized by Pan- zorfaust weapons Cisclosed the following relationships: Z Tho_Use_of Panzorfaust in tho Northwest Furopean Campaign, O.R.Se port No, 33 (SUCHET), Also sed WOR, Stuly Ts hone Noe 19, 4 Survoy of Tonk Casualties, Merch 1947 (SECRET). seteae RO-T=117 Site of Hits oases xf DISTRIBUTION OF TANK HITS FROM PANZERFAUST Aspect of the Tanks Front Side Rear __ Roof Percentage of Total Hits: 31% sie 9.5% 8.5% 7 The Use of Panzorfaust in tho Northwest Buropoan Campaign, Se Report No. 33. (SECRET). ee 2/ tvorage 25.5 percent por side. 4 more complete discussion of the cmployment of hollow charge weapon usage in Western Europe is to be found in those sections pertaining to hollow charge weapons found elsewhere in this studyeRO-P=127 Site of Hits ~ | TABLE X SITE OF HITS FROM GUNFIRE ~ BY THEATER (Sampt ing) | toa | wumaer {of wits | Tunger ULL SUSPENSION Wo. | PERCENT WO. | PERCENT | WO. [PERCENT US: ETO-FIRST ARMY rev | as7| ais [vos] s2.0 | 129 16.5 ETO-THIRO, SEVENTH, MIMTH 284 88 | 31.0 145 | 51.0 St] 18.0 ARMIES irate wm | rise | oo} aer | 7] soe US: Total toot 3u2 | 31.4 562 | 51.5 ‘187 | 17.4 UK: ETO 320 | 106] 92.5 | 166 | si.9 | 0] 15.6 ITALY 4 Wo} 4.7 12} 50.0 2) 8.3 AFRICA ai | as] yas | 8] 19 | 12] 38.7 WK: Total 37s | i29| auu. | is2] vs | 64] 17.1 | ETo: us + uk | i388 | a9] ais | 79] sta | 230] 16.6 ETO + ITALY + AFRICAS | us + ux [ives fart] er frm) soe fast] is | \a. ore) Site of Hits TABLE XII ! SITE OF HITS FROM HOLLOW CHARGE WEAPONS = BY THEATER (Samp! ing) Tova NUMBER or nits |__uaser uur___|_ suseenstox Wr [PERC [Wo PEROT Woy PERCENT US: ETO“FIRST ARMY tig 45 | 37.8 67 56.3 7 5.9 ETO-THIRD, SEVENTH, NINTH 52 18 | 34.6 8 53.8 6] 1g es ITALY 1 oO o i] 10.0 oO oO ‘US: Total 72 63 | 36.6 96 ‘55.8 cc] 7.6 we eto 15 | 76] 528 | s7| as | 2] as may a | 2fsn0 | af 250 | a| 0 UK: Total 149 78 | 52.3 ‘58 1s 8.7 ETO: US + UK a6 139) 44.0, 182, 48,1 Ey 79 rositars ussux | sr [isi| sao | su] wo | | on 227 ams emcees 20 DESTROYED BY THEN TM ERENT ACTION LUE: P= Feetration; f= Rlsehet igre 18. SME OF MNCS ow 9S Ss ‘SECRET— CALIBER OF ENEMY GUNFIRE As may be seen from Tables XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI, data as to the caliber ofenomy gunfire responsible for Allied tank casualties is extremely sparse. Of the total sample of 5,600 tanks shown under colum 11, Teble II, es gunfire casualties, caliber is given for only some 1,000 tanks, 4 majority of the gunfire samples came from "third-hand" reports, ise., var diaries, and after-action reports, in which such specific details are largely omitted, There has been incorporated within the totel only one sample which is considered to be a technical analysis—a US First Army sampling of 373 tanks, A second technical sampling is referred to in Table XV, but because of the impossibility of climinating possible dupli- cation, is omitted from the grand total. Of a total sample of 1,000 tarks, 90 porcent becams casualties to modiun-caliber gunfire, 3 percent to heavy-caliber fire, and 6 percent to light-caliber fire; 532 tanks were listed as victims of the 68-mm, or 50 percent of the total, while the 75mm gun was second with 378, or 36 percent, These two weapons together thus accounted for 86 percent of the total casualties. NORTH AFRICA The sample of 150 tanks for North Africa, 19ij1-19h3, re- flects the mager data available for analytical purposos. Here the 88-mn gun oxacted a toll of 7k porcent. The 50-m weapon was responsible for 10,7 percent of the total sample and the 75—nm trailed with 8 percent. The romaining sample was distributed among the L7-m, 105-mm, and 210—nm guris, It is believed that the percentage for the 5O-mm gun should be higher for the over-all North African sample, General Martel stated that the principal Gcrman tank gun in the three battles of Libya was the 50-nm gun, As for the 75mm gun, at that tine it was a Jorrolocity gun and "did not do mich harm to our Gritish] tanks..." 4s to antitank guns, the General stated that in the first two battles of Libya the principal weapons were the 37—mm and 50m guns. It was not until late 19k1, in the third Libyan battle, that the eromy came up with considorable mmbers of dual-purpose 88-mn guns. Wartel, op.cite, pp ish, 1:8, 179.RO-T-217 Caliber of Enemy Gunfire SICILY AND ITALY Of a total Allied gunfire sample of 860 tanks for these areas only 7.3 percent gave the caliber of the onemy weapon. The US gunfire sanplo of 234 listed the caliber in only three instances, Thus, tho over-all totale and porcentages largely refloct tho British and Canadian rocords. Hero the 75-mm gun wes given the largest score—32 percent of the total sample. Its companion in destruction, tac 88mm gun, received credit for 35 percent. The highor percentage to the ‘75-mm gun cen porhaps be explained by the fact that the fortified Lines in Italy constructed by the Gormans, were studded with dug in turrets of Panther tanks mounting the long-barrol 75m guns BUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS Of o total samplo of 61 tanks in this theater, lO percent were KO'd by 88—um gunfire, The over-all total for the 75-mn gun credited it with O porcent, Thus, together these two guns accounted for 88 percent of the sample. The US sample of 600 tarks for the European Theater is composed’ of two smaller samples, one of 373 from the US First Jamy, and a second sample of 226 from other US units, It was found in analyzing the two samples separately that the percentage of casualties to 88—m fire ran 30 percent in the First Army sample as against 55 percent to 75—mm fire. However, in the sccond sample the percentage to 68~ma firo was k9 percent and 36 percent for 75-mn fire, It is believed that the US First Army sample presents a more correct picture. This sample was taken from detailed monthly tank casualty roports maintained by Headquarters, First Arye The second sample of 226 was compiled from casualties reported by other units in their after-action reports or Journals. In this type of roport there oxists e margin of error in accurately reporting details such as caliber of encny weapons, even wbon such detail is included. To the average US soldior evory heavy~caliber flat~trajectory woapon that fired at hin wes an "86", which fooling is reflected in this type of report. A forner US tank officer, who madé a detailed inspection in 19Wj-L5 of approximtely 100 US tanks has stated that the mjcrity of ‘those machinss tygt he inspected were locked out by the German 75mm KWUKY2 guns: oT rer fron Mr, Taylor S, Oldham to ORO, dated 23 iug 1950 .SSIFIED). 2h—_- ROT 1.7 Caliber of Eneny Gunfire 4 similar situation prevails in the British and Canadian samples for tho European Theater. The sample of 120 British tanks used in Table XITI was taken fron war diaries ani indicates @ preponderance of tank casualties to 68m fire. 4 second sample of 9 tanks teken froma British Army Operational Research Reporjyindicates an even heavior weighting in favor of the 75—m gun—/ Again it is believed that the sample based on close personal oxamination of the tanks by technical personnel is the nore accurate one, The preponderance of the damge done by the 86—-m gun was undoubtedly caused when this gun was on its antitank or dual- purpose mount, Gernan productdon figures clearly indicate that only @ limited aunber of tanks mounting the 88-m gun, or 8,0 percent of the total,were being produced in the sumer of 19hh. Sco Appendix Dy yy Capt. Hab, Wright and Capt, R.D. Harkness, i Survey of fasualtios st frmoured Units in Northwest firope, Medical Research Team, iF ‘sh 21 Aray Group (No. 2 ORS) dan = 19h6, (SHORE). 28,Gunfire Caliber of O-T=11j 1 0-001 e501 | snl 0-001 | ase | he z z | mone s er * | eorz ow z ze | aavay z Z| ron Seth aca + a | wosr |. gre a Le 1 “ z e_|| wusor | "08 zs 0°69 001 68 20% sez || wn89 #708 7 z a pt z zoe | ese we first a ale +9 ace p22 ie 2 | wuss _ ee % re é “9 % z_|| eos e9 8 8 ste) S anor = e ej son FI a or oF zi) wee | ea a ~ e |) wor | ingouad } svaWvs aarti] atanvs|) vovao awio1| vovavo | xn quo. | xn |} sn en | sn |} wzerwo ‘Wack f wwao 40 | asta]! 40 ana0u3e | TWLOL | 40 anzousa| rwu0L|| Jo .Nzowae | TwL0L. ANIOUSd Wien I SUBLV3HL VV - Y381TV9 AG S3ILTVNSVD AVL O3ITT¥ 40 ONT TdHYS WIIX T1ayL2 i Terrvesiadeg Jo Serniqieved oy vp preigees og touseo #ad¥" Ap OAT WL, Li _ 1 5 sxe |] ovoos | ex jj oroor | ott | oroar| ort | ooo] 6 || ovoor | 665 | oroor | sez | oroor | cue - 2 é z fe z wmone ies + ou t ¥ + uno 5 7 7 peer = z 2 wor # é zune | a [lost e 7 |e vy [oer | ot foe * oz [uncon our | ofl ea | se we | ore [wf sel 2 | wu ror [wr err ures r 7 z 1 ce + wean = a Ca ee ee 6 "82 ne ez 1 za 89 wen 62 | T'6e se aens R0z [arse 3 - os |» fe 2 fe Te fee] og sie [sr fee Te Te Teta [ls Ie tf i fuamos € * € e ne ab z = e fe |e jam ow fon fo € z 5 2 ane = fo fe = ele se 2 mor sone] zwaws|| asa | smal! rics [jaws] 2 on | 2 son sams [sums fsrans | saws! zon [2 -ov | saws [ows ferme 012 40 | sovowl] an | xn | aranvs | srewvs| cuow 40] ouor |! sn | sn | snames | zane] vsns a0 | vend wion |] anaoeze 42 | win) v9 40 | xn ev | avaoe3a| sama |] wuon | wie] sn ao | sn wi | anazeae | 40 on sns0i8a | anaouay | same oon] ao | anaouze} sxe | _| i 40 ou janaoasa | 40 tow ‘Ss Wi0L VavHva || WOGONIA Q3LTHN S31VA8_ G3LINO qd | W39ITVO AG O19 HL WI S31LIVNSYD ANVL GIITIV 30 ONITEYS e t AIX 314¥LCaliber of Snemy Gunfire ORO~T-117 0°001 eh "001 ont "001 6 jj wo a | a_i] ee h Wwu-O12, Le t wu=g01 way) om ooe8 ee 1 wane |e or z__|[ use £01 st ss 1 || aos [we 4 9°58 = | wan awion idhvs views | sav. | avanvs | suv || aartvo 40 Lw3uad | O2171Y WLOL |] 40 LNa0¥3d| 40 ‘ON || 40 Anz0use | 40 “ON |] woaowiy oaliwn | s3ivis o34iNn ¥3GITVD AS St-1hG) VOIUSY HLYON'SIILTVNSVO NNVL C3171 JO ONI TENS TAK 318vL H 89 "001 zz 0001 8 "001 el won L 2h 4 wg n gee a _ 4 oh n ‘wu-s0t Ane Ed ze th 3 ere 1 | mres. eS ee 46S | 97s” + 08 oumSe rl z _. eee | wees s8 f 1 z es z ‘au-08 Two, stanvs ||. srgwws | sxva || stuns | synve |] atanys | sxwva |] wamit¥9 40 ansouad | 3171 WWLoL | 40 ANzOWBd | 40 ‘OW |! 40 1NIOWIe| 40 ‘OM | 40 LN3O¥ad | 40 “ON vavnvo WOGoWIN G3LiWA |) S3LvAS O3LiNn YIIVD AS Sh EKG1 ATVLI ONY ATIDIS‘SHTVNSYO NAVE GaITIY 40 ONITENYS AX J19YL 28FIRE DAMAGE AND REPAIRABILITY OF TANK CASUALTIES The weakest of all the data available concerns the status of the burning and repairability of tanks, Ambiguities, innumer— able omissions ani patent errors cripple the bistorical records in almost every operation, Loose terminology frequently compounds ‘the problems thus, "K,Otd," "damaged," "hit, "lost," otc,, nay— or may not—indicate a tank's ropairability, The echelon of repair, if any, is often found to be quite obscure, In addition, "burned" does not necessarily mean "unropairable," Systenatic evaluations, on the spot, were all too few, but provide a welcome Jeaven to the discouraging raw data, Subject to these very important reservations, it is bolicved that Tables XVII and XVIII give a general order of magnitude that my be of value in dotermining relationshipse Based upon differing samples, the over-all combined total for US, British and Canadian tank casualties showed by percentago of total known sample: burnod--gunfire, 6 percent; mine, 21 percent; hollow charge, G1 percents repairable—gunfire, 51 percent; mine, 78 percents hollow charge, 71 Berea The detailed tabulations are broken down in Tables XVII ani XVIII, The groat variances and discropaneies therein are largely oxplatineg, the factors discussed in the first paragraph of this section: We Ts Shecested that Tables XVII, XVIII, and XIX bo studied Ti conjunction with the brief findings of M.0,R, Stucy No. 62, Roport No, 19, Section VII, 17, and Appondix la, Tables h & 5, 27-28, (SHORET). 29ORO-T=117 Fire Damage and Repsirabilit; | TABLE XVIT “| TANK CASUALTIES WHICH BURNED - BY THEATER (Sampling) — wuwaer [penceit | wuneer | PERCENT CAUSE ‘SAMPLE ‘BURNED: BURNED | NOT BURNED | NOT BURNED ORTH AFRICA UK: Gunfire zoe | 125 | 600] ea Mine at 8 16,4 26 ‘SECILY & ITALY UK: Gunfire 153, 123 80.4 30 19.6 Hollow cha, 12 40 83.3 2 16.7 Mine 28 a | wea] os 53.6 Mortar 6 6 100.0 o 9.0 | US: Gunfire cry 39 81.3 9 18.7 Hotow cha. 3 3 | 100.0 0.0 Mine 4 4 | 10020 0.0 Mortar 1 1 100.0 9.0 Canada: Gunfire 60 56 93.3 + 6.7 Hollow chg. 2 2 100.0 0 0.0 Mine 5 3 60.0 2 40.0 Mortar” - = -_ TOTAL ~ SICILY @ ITALY Gunfire wi | 2g | eas | ug 16.5, Hollow chg. 7 15 88,2 2 18 Hine 37 a Suet 7 Nortar 7 7 | 100.0 ° | €% UK: Gunfire 235 | 190 | 80.9) 5 four Hollow chg. 43 38 88.4 5 16 Mine 19 7 36.8 12 63.2 Mortar 8 1 16.7 5 83,3 TS! eintfire Fig | sa | 8a. | $6.8 Hollow chg. 492, 7 N72 75 52.8 Mine 190, 25 13,2 165, 86.8 Mortar. to 2 20.0 8 80.1 Canada? Gunfire a 48 88.9 6 Wt Hol iow cha. 13 " 84.6 2 15.4 Mine 2 ' 0.0 t 50.0 Nortar [= = 2 TOTAL = ETO Gunfire bozo 632, 61.4 397 38.6 Hollow cha. 198 ne 58.6 82 ah Mine 2 aa | ise | 178 aia Nortar 16 a | wel is aie ° jal:SRE Fire Damage and Repairebilit; TABLE XVIII TANK CASUALTIES WHICH BURNED - ALL THEATERS huweer | PERCENT | NuMBER PERCENT CAUSE | SAMPLE | BURNED | BURNED [NOT BURNED | NOT BURNED UK GF 596 438 73.5 158 26.5 Us oF 788 433 54.9 355 45.1 Canada 6F ne 104 912 0 8.8 TOTAL GF 1498 975 65.1 523 34.9 UK fie 8 48 87.8 7 12.7 Us He i38, 70 48.5 75 51.7 Canada Ho 15 13 2 TOTAL He 216 tat | 60.9 4 39.1 UK Hine 6 26 32.1 83 67.9 US Hine 138 29 19 165 85.1 Canada Nine 7 ¥ 87.1 3 42.9 1 TOTAL Hine 279 58 20.8 22h 79.2(kO-7-11 Hire Damage ani Repairatilit; TABLE XIX REPAIRABILITY OF TANK CASUALTIES - ALL THEATERS (Sampt ing) NuwBER | PERCENT | NUMBER NOK- [PERCENT NON- SAMPLE | REPAIRABLE |REPAIRABLE | REPAJRABLE | REPAIRABLE TOTALS BY THEATER ust Italy 32 8 2.1 2 a] 66.7 8 1 ° 00 1 Hallow cha. 3 2 66.7 1 £10 - Gunfire 7 | sar ¥6.7 385 Mine 210 | 150 76.7 $I Nortar 7 7 100.0 ° Wotlow eng. | 152 | 105 68.1 w Wks We Africa = Gunfire | 202) 19 ve Mine we | 3 ous ” Italy Gunfire a} ost 54.3 43 48.7 Mine vw] 90 78 2 28.6 Wortar 2 1 50.0 i 50.0 Hollow cha. 10 7 70.0 a 30.0 ETO. = Gunfire 192 | 128 ou8 6 35.4 Hine iy | 105 92.1 9 79 Hortar 6 6 400 ° o°0 Hollow cho. | 95 | 28 80.0 7 20.0 | TOTALS a COUNTRY US: Gunfire 736 | ae 45.9 408 Mine 238 | 175 m8 39 Wortar 3 7 87.5 1 Hol low cho. 185 | 107 69:0 “8 Wh Gunfire se | 300 57.6 228 Mine zoe | 7 e212 7 Hortar 3 7 87.5 1 Hollow cha. | 78 10 | ‘RAND TOTALS GY CAUSE Gunfire 1282 | 660 622 49.3 Nine a2 | oe 96 207 Nortar ie | tw 2 2.8, Hol lon chge ro | wuz 8_, x= PERSONNEL CASUALTIES ‘Two samples of casualties to tank crews were studieds Tho first sample is composed of sone 275 medium and 50 light tank crews from the US First Army. The second ani larger sample is composed of data’on British crew casualties in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, emi Northwest Burope. The US sample, though tho smaller, lenis itself to greater analysis, Sufficiont data wore available to make a causative breakdown of the casualties for both medium and light tanks by crew positions The records for the UK sample failed to give the casualties by position, thereby reducing that sample to one of over-all killed, wounded, and missing in action, by cause, for cach theater. As my be seen fron Table XX, the First Army sample of 27 nediun tanks revealed that the tank commander suffered the heaviest casualty rate, 57 percent, The drivor had the lowest Percentage for this sample, 7 percent, The romaining thrce crew positions all hovered near the 50 porcent mark, The higher casualty tate among the commanders is no doubt duo in part to the fact that it was frequently nocessary for then to expose thonselves, either partially or wholly, in fighting their vehicles, In so doing they becone oxtrencly vulnerable to the Germans! two nain casualty-producing weapons—gunfire and bazooka attacks This sample also shows that the casualty rate for theso 27h, nodiun tanks was 51 percent cf all the crewmen involved. The First Army light tark sample as shown by Table XKI did not reveal any appreciable difference in casualty rates for their four crew positions, is may be oxpocted, however, the rates for each position ran about 15 percent higher than their medium tank counterparts, Tho over-all casualty rete for the crews of those 50 light tanks approximated 65 percent, It should be recognized that these figures are based on data takon from reports on tank damage, and that porsonnel casualty data therein were incidontal and subject to inaccuracies. Further— more, the casualties studied here were inflicted only by tho najor weapons, of which gunfire caused 69 percent, in the mediun tank sample, Therefore, the figure of 51 percent indicates that in thie sample about 2.5 men per medium tank becano casualties, This ratio is accordingly higher than various unofficial ostimstes which average about 1.5 to 2,0 por tank. For further studies on ‘US tank crew casualtios sce First US Report of Operations, 23 February to 8 May 1945, Annex 6, Appendix hy pages Reise Also sce Tables XXII and XXII, Due to insufficient data, an amlysis by crew position for ‘the British samplo was inpossible. Howover, as may be seon fron ceeGRO-T=13.7 Personns] Casualties Table Xx1V, porcentages for tho various types of causative agents were worked out for three theaters, The casualty rates for the Ttalian and Sicilian campaigns ran approximately three percent higher per category. A possible explanation of this may be the clesor ranges involved, Fer additional information on Britisk tank crow casualty data, see the Harkmess and Wright study.le/ The sample studies previcusly mentioned dealt with casualties to personnel while engaged in fighting thoir vohicles, One report, based ona sample of 333 British tanks, included a stuly of crew casualties occurring cutside the vehicles, This investigation concluded that 10 percent of the casualties incurred by crownon wore sustained outside their tanks, Of this figure, 30 percent became casualties when escaping from knocked-out. tanks, This amounted to 11 percent of the totel casualty sample. It was furthor fougd that a high proportion of this type of camualty was fatal Table XXV contains a small US sample of tank crew casualties, in and out of their tanks, though not by position or cause, A total of some 300 personnel casualties are involved. As may bo seen, 6 percent became casualties while outside of tanks, Ono US report contained observations by tank personnel of the effect of artillery fire, antitank fire, Panerfaust weapons, and antitank mines, on crewmen, Sone of the observetions, taken from "Tank Porsomnol Casualty Reports," follows 7 1, Effect_of Antitank Mines on Tank Personnel. Commanders have stated that the offoct of AT mincs on personnel riding in tarks has been very small. It 1s only in exceptional cases that any monber of a tank is injured by a miro, Thore is considerable shock effect caused by the explosion of single AT nines, but it 1s not disabling for crow merbers. There bave been a few cases whore roinforeod minos have been used that were the cause of casualtics but apparently the preparation of such increased charges takes considerable time ani effort ani is not a common practice, Ina few cases the explosion of AT mines has been delayed and has occurred under the rear part of the tracks, In two cases, these oxplosions are credited with causing fires in the ay tert TB. Wright and Capt. R.D. Harkness, & Survey of asualtios Amongst irmoured Units in Northwest Europe, Medical Research Team, British 21 Army Group (No. 2, ORS) on 196 (SECRET), 13/ Ibid. 3h 7RO-T-117 ae engine compartment which caused evacuation of tho crew. No merbers of the crow wero injured. Personnel Casualties Where tanks have encountered AT mines that were protected by eneny fire, casualties have occurred in crews cue to sniper or mg. fire whon the vehicle had to be evacuated, Whenever possible, the enomy brings fire on stalled tanks and attempts to destroy them by burning. Even when tanks are disabled cut of rarge of flat- trajectory woapons, the enemy, when it is possible, will try to bring artillory fire on vehicles and attempt to burn thom up, cause casualties anong grow, or renor,fycovory very difficult during the daylight hours.’ 2, Effeot of Artillery Fire on Tank Crows, Comanders all agrec that the offect of artillery fire on tanks is very slight, Direct hits are the exception and mear-misses apparently have but Little effect, other than sone blast effect, on crews, Tark CO's, when riding with their heads and shoulders out of the turrets—which is norml— ere sonetines wounded by shell fragments and Jarred up considerably by the concussion, but uriless actually hit, are able to proceed with little ill effect. (760th Tank Battalion, CO): I was parked alongside of a stone wall ani giving orders by radio to one of the cormanding officers, A shell hit wall on far side and knocked out a big scction of walle Iwas in turret of tank with my head out, Tho concussion kmockod me down to bottom of turret, but ina fow momonts I was all right even though jarred up a bits Enemy artillery fire has not done us any harn evon at times when we got direct hits on /our7 tanks, The concussion is heavy on near hits, and sometimes knocks the men out, but very seldom causes any injury. (Observer's Note}s An enemy artillery concentration of not loss than 30 rounds, estimated Gi. 6, Bs Devore, Armored Command, AGF Board Roport Noy ade (DECLASSIFIED). » Nato, 5 July 191i to be about 1OSmam caliber, was cbserved falling on an area where 10 medium tanks wero dispersed for a temporary bivouace Shells fell very close to a mumber of the tanks, which had all hatches fastened and crews inside. No diroct hits were observed and no casualties were suffered either at that time or later on when a similar concentration was fired on samo group of tankss Personnel Casualties 3. Use of Tine Fire. There has beon little use made of time fire supporting attacks of tanks, CO!s state that it is better to have vision and take their chances on injury from shelling than it is to "button up" and be blind, Eneny has made little use of tine fire against tanks, 4, Effoct of intitank Fire on Personnel. Ponetrations of the tank by A/T projectiles usually result in... about two casualties, one killed and one wounded. When tanks have been penetrated by A/T fire, membors of crew who have not been killed or wounded or knocked unconscious usually mmge to escape even though tank is set on fire. Where complete crews are lost, unit CO's attribute casualties to flash ammmition fires which spring up so rapidly that wounded or shocked members cannot evacuate themselves or be evacuated before overcone by the flames. Also it is belicved that ina number of cases exits ray have been blocked by wounded members of crew and this prevented escape of other monberse (Cronk): Crews usually get out when a tank burns unless thoy have been injured. (Brusse): Penetrations uswlly kill or injure one or two crem menbers and rest escape even if tank burns, (Davis): Usually one or two men injured or killed when tank is penstrated, I have not had any men burned to death ard have been lucky 36 el_ ROTA? Personnel Casualties in not having very many men killed or voriously injured. Sovoral mon havo boon burned out but not badly. We havo had a mumber of tank CO's wounded in shoulders and neck from various causose Thoy all ride with their heads out of the turrets.25/ 5» Rhine to Elbo 3 Panzerfaust, Toopond, “Hosistanse cheommeased Was was mainly at defended road blocks and in towns. Bazookas and Pangersausts caused most of the troubles Most of the casualties suffered by the 736th {fank Battalion occurred outside the tanks. Gormans would disable tank by Panserfaust or Bazooka fire, forcing the crews to abandon tho tanks, When the crews attempted to abandon the tanks they would be shot with machine pistols or Mi's.s. If crews are well drilled in abandoning tark, losses inside tarks will be vory low. Need for pistols and shoulder holsters for whole crews Teid. TY Quotation from letter, Subject: Visit of Col, Black to 736th Tank Battalion, HQ, 9th US Army, CC armored Section, Bae. IIS. (DECLASSTFIZD) 37 aPersonnel Casualties 1 iT] rT ers 969 jjsre 165] 6°99 foon | ovne | ter} m9, ‘STLOL are eon | ace fs [o [orsn|ee [eve [ve [em fol s| fol of ofo| [ol e]ex[o fo er] el | v5] o|pmmre ony &e coeff ae ove [ee [er ow [eve [ve [owe fe |e] ofa] af alolo| ol o] eels [ofa] efor os] ene eo || eee fl one fever [ax fone [oe [ave foe [oer ol Lol |ol of of ofoll«|ee]e foe |e fer] uo] ce | sou eon fais [Pom love [exer foo [rue foe [oer ole] efe[ of ool sol |ce|s llofa | olor so] ec ona weit o'9s got flere jer peros foot | tree foe Jars it} e}z iio} t] ool +s fol ojec)s lols | olor) tz} sz |) sepveuog| ro ines fw [aso Px Tans [x offal al ofa] fv wae xP Pe] mp 9 nwa | |owaa | | ww TL LI Il (over) sz. sTL0L won|] wxoozve |] BNIW |} UYAuOW |) YNOOZa |) 3NIW pwtanno |} KoiISo4 sowao [Swcinton ra “als | ‘mist | soon a0 | avi01 aera fa ssaaaa | ea | | Sauveers I] i [ (uaumas9 0281) SXNVL WOIG3N AZZ NO O3SvE 3SNVO GNY NOILISOd AB - S3ILIVNSVO MIYD ANY LSHI4 SN 4O ONITdHYS xX 31avL RO-T-247 382 3 i 3| g i 8 4 ® r j 7— ¥s9 eu +| sves| zz) sem les |} co Ison son _ || ere 2¢ loro] o|z-ss| er] oven [rtf 9+ Ho ofoflo| zfoffol rl rflo| ¢|z}ols|s{/o| s | orfsewn aoe va | oe ze florof of nes | er] oor fer || ot lof ofofolsfofolo| eo] s{«folele|o|or lel ses0 98 orks te Jere] a | tres | er] cree fer} cr |fo] rfolfofo}r jojo) sijolz|ziir|z|oljo| ere} sewuno| got | se v¢ Horo] o| eres] zx] cree fer ff or |/ 0] ofoflofz| ofolo| rio} »|ziolz|oljo| 6 | o¥| serve EDIE fivao} w [ amao| | ana0 | a wmf aly fw fal allel [x flo fall «Fo read] | eae "uae i { vvvea29 |fyortsoe a8 f[sa10¥ stot jxane{| vvoozve ani | wvinow ll vxcozve || swim |f aetanno || woiaisoa avsot | stwnaraton: || neva sal + + awaos34 |} a0 von 40 |} wot 3utznno 3412409 an3ouze s¥ i sain i i i (N3WNIYD 261) SHNVL LHBIT Bh NO dasve BSN GNY HOILISOd Ad ~ STILIVASVD M3YO ANYY LSYI4 SM 40 ONITdHYS XX 318¥LPersonnel Casualties oRo-T-127 ssquoy, unTDoK PLz PUB IUPPT gp 40 eTduDE vodn poseg sereTOnse0 woUy Ze, " 6 | orzo | sss] srer [esi] cz | 9 Wool z oj ee [ej ee fo jor |r H1P¥OL ang H of ez vo [1 Joo | o aeauouveg 0 0 ete ooo. L 9 a0 et 0 ° oro fo {00 }-0 0 ° so Tt | 00 ]-0 Z + we] eoc fen] ove | as T1890} ang, 0 9. veouowsey | z Teiiung Rog 9 rn ouun| z 2 aear40 € 1 TapURENO 30nnom z s | zee | zor oh or AOL ang 0 ol re | ez $ z asovouvey | 0 Ces ee Zz € FauuhS nog] i tee Ton Z o eau r [9s Tie o $ aontag_| ° a oF ° aepuPueD any 1ngouad | ‘ow | anzouaa! ow | anaoyga! son! angowze! cow] anaouas! ow] anzouaa | on | awaouza | “on ‘WwOOTWE NW ‘WL8or 81sND ‘VAOOZVE Hin ? 7 aus anne aurawng L 1(6u} jdueg) S3ILIvNSvo M3YI - ANYY LSY14 SM JO NMOGYVaYE IIXX Fev uoPersonnel, Casualties *syuny wnTDON ¥£¢ PUD IYPTT BP J0 aTduvs Wodn posey sozTenseD UROUY T2e, ORO-T-17 ] oroor faze} ore |sz | act fur | i | 6 | oreo | ass] ever jas] ae feo stw0L ore * [oro | o| sree | eor| oroz [se | oe |r | se0vouey 0% 8 z e | so | sorf ear [oe | wer | zz | souung nog 8°07 f z z {oro | en} eve fee jn [a gounp | si for} ie fs & | sea | eorf ast fez | sar [oz 40ntia ea fsefoe fe e fot |e] ee [scr] one [ee [ors [or | sepueoy naouad | “ow Tawsowse [ow | ansovaa| ‘on | anazusa -on| angousal ow | ansoeae| -on | ayaou3e| “ow “Wine ) | wrOOzE aN WL4OH auianta | Wioozve ai wink ’ 2 auiamo | 381aNn0 1(6u) ,dweg) (sque, wn} pen pue 34617) STV1OL 03N18H09 - S31LTVNSYD MBYD ANY LS¥Id sn TEX FIVEPersonnel Casualtios RO-T~12 zon | aes 9h 698 zu ese | onus ues sero a 8 : 6 : 6 e1dues yey e P E E ° : a 9788 . 2 : i : 2 watt i ors, : 9°98 * se | pepunoy oe : wn : “h y 49,408 te e ee : 6e 9 yéues Ue, : : "3 - 95 nd roe | 8% p * ae - ore vIW 9°81 “ $*07 - s'0z | pepuncy et : Brn - sent | peLtix excozeg 860 3 86 € 96 a1dues Aue, { = 5 5 - - na erar zt oz : : 6's #81 ane eres | ovr sre et a9 ee a8 oun seh 298 6 es7 odes ue z0 wo : 0 Na se ah en ten | et viW eer gree ih Z'et | popunoy ser | gel 9°3h eer | erst | porte oarsung a queo4e4 queos0g ywuooreg | qusoveg | quooveg ‘(stnte) sabeiony | O1a Auois 3 sieve | Atits Aiea (s) (e) (z) a) (60 |dweg) AIXX ST@VL NMON} 3YV SJLLTVASVD JSOHM SHNVL 3SOHL NI SMIYD TWLOL JO LNZOUId SV S3ILIVNSY) XNORO-T-117_ Personnel Casualties TABLE XXV_ US CREW CASUALTIES - IN AND OUT OF TANKS (Samp! ing) 753d Tk 8n 756th Tk Bn 760th Tk Bn Tanks Lost: Medius 3 aa y Cioht 3 — TOTAL 9 26 a | | Personnel 4 tanks Killed 7 " 2 20 Wounded tf 7 23 60 Missing in Action a 5 26 TOTAL at 49 36 106 OUTSIDE tanks Killed 13 2 + 29 Wounded Ezy rvs a 143 Dead of Wounds 5 4 9 Missing in Acti 2 12 TOTAL 102 60 3 193,eae TANK TARGET ANALYSIS Table XVI was furnished by US émy Ficld Forces Board No. 2, Fort Knox, Ky., and represents a weighted series of percentages based upon the subjective roparts of 100 officer an] non-commissioned tank commanders as to the targots they engaged in all theaters, The figure is solf-explamatory, but wo should note that US armor, in World War II, seems never to have devoted itself to fighting’ enemy armor in more than one out of four tines of engagement, The over-all percentage of tank ve, tank battlos, as a ratio of total targets, averaged about 15 percent, Building, fortifications, and personnel each seems to have attracted the greater attention of the tank. It mst be stressed that the seale of armored opposition never approached that of the Eastern Front, as appendix D suggests, TABLE XXXVI. ‘TANK TARGET ANALYSIS = WORLD WAR IT Type Target Highest Percentaga kvorage ALL Per Theater (f Theaters (f. TEs Personnel 2349 (POA) 15.5 Tanke 2a (Na) Uy2 A/T Guns & Artillery 18.8 (I-s) 12.8 Fortifications & Caves 360b (SPA) 2162 Wheeled Vehicles 12.6 (ETO) 8.2 ALL Other (Snoke,Flashy Brush,15.6 (Ni) Od Trees,etc, 100.0% —=>APPENDIX A OPERATIONAL CEARTSAPPENDIX A OPERATIONAL CHARTS Figures 14 and 16 represent graphically a sampling of 18, British, and Canadian tank casualties to all know causes in the Buropean, Ttelien, and North African Theaters of Operations. Figure 14 indiostes « numerical breskdown of the US, British, and Canadien samples in the Europesn Theater of Operations, Fig- ure 16 represents the same semples charted by cause in percentages per month. Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19 treet graphically the Italian and North African samples. When sufficient data were availeble, representations of mis- cellensous enemy causes, end of non-eneny causes were also included.——— Figure 14, SAMPLING OF ALLIED TANK CASUALTIES (Causation by Numbers of Tanks) 70 gue ress Wo. i meh e in key 290 3 gi : - ae 5 causarion = 230s ie al Sunfire: : 3 2 Sessa é . = 2300 ee Pe 0 i gosta i PoasGi cael 322 i: ie : 7 hpii ¢ zai I i i s PHEGg is p23 i g 20,390 1 4¢:? ; ae 2 eat ,gs 3 Eanes i 3 3 are z oe. s eae anal » neny Action é i i + 58) 2 came > gid? faery te 200 — | —1—_ 3 $33 he 2 Bai iid Bi i fii ee ee: e334 fry 2 160 10] fReinetone campaign t %0 bay ° venth dd ASO Ca a a a a 48 tos su 4, to ro Note: due to type of record uted for computing Mote: Data as to misc-eneny causstion wis too sald to chart. janpling it war impossible to obtain ite sete niec, nenemaycareal ties,Us TAN CASUALTIES causaTion Guntice Pursuit across France Figure 15. SAMPLING OF ALLIED TANK CASUALTIES (Causation Expressed in Monthly Percentages) ETO 19uu-19u5 UNITED KINGDOM TANG CASUALTIES i 3 CCAMADIAN TANK. CASUALTIES Figure 15SAMPLING OF ALLIED TANK CASUALTIES Figure 16. (Causation by Numbers of Tanks) Figure 16 Italy 1943-1945 CANADIAN TANK CASUALTIES: UNITED KINGDOM TANK CASUALTIES US TANK CASUALTIES Tanks rwyuyy Jo ange as < w ls x le eases = 18 49 sanydeg F exoenyy 40 voy enusquog | SSS fe ary o1n99 v0 exorny | B sonty ousy B enon teen] 7 GUT Aezenp ou Bumeoup) IS uboeuo # euoyi0 Jo 9umdey 243 7 J9AIY OuBuRs sutrosig sayy cy ey ov ase 5 | > prowuovog 0/20 7 uBjeéueg OUI J0qUIA SUL + le cur aman non omen 0 8 | ° yea) 40 voy een L L L L L L 3 a z z = 2 3 & 5 1945 tot 1948 1943 ow ows 1949 ows lows Peoualtioe was not available. due to type of records used data as to Hisc. Hon-Rneny Note:KEY CAUSATION UNITED KINGDOM TARE CASUALTIES Us Taw CASUALTIESSAMPLING OF ALLIED TANK CASUALTIES. (Causation by Numbers of Tanks) Figure 18. Figure 18 North Africa 1941-1943 US TANK CASUALTIES UNITED KINGDOM TANK CASUALTIES Hstuny uy Ixy 40 Weesog 4 uj soncey nays a80s309 sn | an-Pl vo funy 403 90ey ay: uo} seauy No. of Tanks 204 10] KEY erstuny usr apes0y our 40 Guryeoue se0d0g $1Xy 40 31nsung aULoUR LY 134 9A1SUass0 Away WRB 0138 Josuog 7 usowely 137 0} yeoaroy 16463 uo antag sixy puooag Burqyb1s 217038 (@nysuesso ys!z14g) efq17 40 913308 puosog ‘@AtSuaJJ0 YSI914B 404 pOldeg dn-pl ing ‘@nysu9sso-seqUNOg Ys!}149 enysuoss0 38414 5, Louwoy bu y¢no.604 | eXqi7 40 913388 38414 40 eseud LeULY No. of Tanks 300, 250 200 150 100 50 1943 1942, 1943, 1942. -eneny causes omitted because of inadequate records. lot Casualty data on miscellaneous enemy and non: this Line was onitted. ‘As hollow charge weapons were not in general use in North Africa, @ Note:Figure 19. SAMPLING OF ALLIED TANK CASUALTIES (Causation Expressed In Monthly Percentages) KEY North Africa 1941-1993 Figure 19 ‘ causaTion [UNITED XINSDOM TANK CASUALTIES Gunfire TANK CASUALTIES Percent 100 ing of the Mareth Line fssrsrna The Race for TunisiaAPFENDIX B FRENCH TANK CASUALTY DATASECRET APPENDIX B FRENCH TANK casuaLty pavale/ GENERAL Over~all French tank casualty data are not included in any French Army study, nor are there any stetistios as to specific causes of immobilization of armored vehicles. HISTORICAL DATA Cany of 1939-1940. The following data represent losses of ton battalists Wish belo jelonged to the Reserve Generale: four armored divisions, five light mechsnized divisions, mechanized cavalry divi- sions, reconnaissance groups, and territorial units. Tanks, hit but salvaged and repaired by the field echelons in a very short tine, were screened out. Tank losses for the indiosted period of time by number and percentage were as follows: ‘TABLE XKVIT FRENCH TANK CASUALTY DATA, 1939-1940 cuse A Artillery (cannon and tank) 1669 95.4 Mines 45 268 Aircraft 35 2.0 total 1 7ag/ Y/THelides 151 obsolete tanks. In the campaign of 1939-1940, approximately 4071 tenks of all typos were actually engaged, and $413 of then were modern tanks, About 187 Abstract of data provided by the Service Historique de l'Armee jotice relative aux doatructions a'engins Elinise ai coure de le guerre 1939-1945," and "Fiche: Annexe a ltetude sur les pertos on chars au cours de la campagne 1939-1940..." (SECRET) Roceived by Office of the army Attache, American Embassy, Paris, France, 20 Dec 1950, in reply to an ORO request of 4 aug 1950, *ORO? 117 Appendix B 260 modern tanks wore put back in combat condition after the armistice, in the Free Zone. The difference represents those tanks thet met with accidents, broke down, were abandoned, or wore set afire by their crews to avoid capture. No data exist as to those tanks repaired in factories and parke betwoen 10 May and 25 June 1840, or those sal~ vaged on the battlefield, repaired, and sext back into battle. Nothing has yet beon found to make it possible to calculate the depot replecements, especially of Somua (cavalry) tanks, Tunician Campaign, See Tebles I and II of the present study. Italian Campeign. Definite information is lacking on this campelgn. Western Burope, 1944-1045, French tank casualties in the final ommpeigui of 152i asd 1095 int Europe wore as follows: £49 light and nodium tanks, 95 tank destroyers, and 184 combat ears. No tenk was put out of action by enemy air action, The tanks immobilized by mines could be repaired in a few hours. The “real” losses were due to artillery end hollow charge weapons, but in very small proportions from the letter weapon. |APPENDIX ¢ ‘LAND MINE WARFARE DATA conrents, PART I: Allied Tonk Casualties to Mines = All Theaters 65 SEenee Tank Casualties to Mines ~ All Theaters, North African Theater of Operations. . . . 6 2 ee 53 Mediterranean Theater of Operations » . - 6. 2 1 we 83 European Theater of Operations =» « . ss . 1 7 te Sh Southoest Asia Command » ss ee + ee ee ew 56 Pacific Theater of Operations. . 2 . ss 6 ee ee 8P PART II; Land Mine Exchange Rates - Three Special Studies 59 Introduction. 2. . . hee eee 5D Study 1, The Battles for Beyst, 1942 2] of see 59 Study 2. Targul Frums, 1944. . . see ee B Study 5. The Aachen-Roor Offensive, Oct-tov ist 1 lt o Conclusions + 6 se ee ee ee eee ee ANNEX 1. German Lend Mine Employment . . 2 . 2 . 71 Tables and Figures Teble XVIII: Sampling of British Tank Casualties to Mines = Western Burops «©. - 1 1 we oe we 5G Table XXIX: German Mino-Leying, Egypt, 10 July-1 Wov 1942, 61 Table Xxx: British Tank Casualties, Egypt, 30 Aug-4 Nov a WME. FF feo se le sss Se Table I: US Tank Casualties, The Aachen-Roer Offensives Table XXXII: Mines Laid by German IXXXI Corps, Oct-Nov 1944 66 Table XXXIIT: Man-Hours of Leber Consumed by Allies in Clear- ing Enemy Mine Fields, ETO, 1944-1945. . . 70 Figure 20. 6 4 6 6 ee ee 2 ee eo following © 5h Figure 21. 4 6 6 6 6 1 we ee ew ew following Shono-n=137 Figure 22, Figure 23, Figure 24, Pigure 26, Figure 26. #4 8 ee © Kollowing sos ee 6 6 following + oe 2 8 2 6 following +e 4 + 2 6 following sob eee 6 followingOROWT=1217 PART I ALLIED TANK CASUALTTES TO MINES - ALL THEATERS NORTH APRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS TREE AERTOAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS 4 total of 1718 British tenk casualties were noted in Africa, suring the period of 1941-1943, of which 15 percent were mined losses. This figure represents the averaging out of a steadily inoressing mine toll: 7 percent in 1941, 17 percent in 1942, and 28 peroont in 1945, To each of these figures should be added about 2 percent, which would represent the mined portion included within the separate ostegory entitled "miscellaneous enemy" or multiple weapon demage, i.e., mine plus gunfire, ete. The resultent figure sccords well with the US sample of 16 percent mined, of a known total of 118, and the French loss of 25 percent of « snaller sample of 39 in Tunisia, The Western Desort of North Africa afforded special advantages for major mine employment. Long stretches of undulating sand, broken by rare natural features of oscarpments, depressions, and salt marshes, accentuated the need for chanselizing eneny armored thrusts in western Egypt, Cyrenaica, Libya, and Tunisia, Nor was ‘the laying of mines the problem it was in other terrains. (See studies in Part II, Appendix ¢). MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS Mines caused many of the Allied tenk casualties suffered in Ttaly during the operations prior to the crossing of the Po River. As the Campaign progressed into and across the valley of the Po, Dazockas, antitank guns, and tanks knocked out increasing numbers of Allied tanks. The over-all figure of 22 percent for Allied armor mined in Italy represents the average of losses throughout the various phases of the fighting. The US mine casualties averaged 25 percent fron a known sample of 688; the British, 25 percent from @ known sample of 728; the Canadians, 16 percent from © Imown sample of 567 tanks. The inclusion of those tenke which suffered multiple enemy weapon hits, plus the inclusion of that portion of the unknown causation sample which was mined, might be expected to raise the over-all figure to sbout 50 percent for the Italien theater. This percentage closely approximates the over-all soeORO =127 Appendix ¢ figure of 25 percent mined in the Sicilian operetion, based upon a much smaller sample of 72 Allied tanks. The Italian terrain tended to channelize armor's movement and room for maneuver, which in turn facilitated defensive utilization of mine fields, Ravines, trails, rocky slopes, terraces, defilos and river lines--all were mined, more or less methodically, in the slow German retreat throughout the comparatively narrow peninsula, and largely explains the greater number of mine casualties suffored in this theater than in Northwest Europe. BUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS Tanks mined, as a percentage of total tank casualties in the theater, totuled 20 percent for the US, British, and Canadian forces "sampling" which respectively suffered 18 percent, 26 per- cent, and 12 poroont of their tank casualties to mines alone. The total kmown sample comprised 6800 temks, broken down as 63 percent US, 25 percent UK, 12 percent Canadian. It should be noted that mines exected an increasing toll until early 1945. ‘Thus General Martel has said thet lend mines were but little used early in Yiorld Wear II; "It was not thought thet mines would be used in ary largo numbers in the initial stages in Europe /i980~407 8s mobile warfere precludes the use of extensive minefields. Actually ‘they were hardly used in France at all. It was thought better to use ditches and other artificial obstacles to stop tanks."19/ Our records show no Canadian tanks mined at Dieppe. As will be seen from Fig- ures 1 ~ 4, the Axis began to employ land mines in huge numbers in 1944 and 1946 in Burope. The addition of those mined tanks included in the multiple-weapon category, plus that mined portion that probably exists in the large "umlnowns" (27 percent for Canada, 20 percent for the US forces, and 4 percent for the British) would doubt les: ly, increase the over-all mined figure to about 30 percent for the three armies. This percentage represents Allied tank casualties incurred in every type of fighting engaged in during the Europeen campaign: amphibious, offensive, defensive, and pursuit phases. The number of German tanks encountered in the West, however, never equalled the scale of armored fighting on the Bastern Front, where battles involving several thousand tanks on each side were not unkuom, For e more complete discussion of the quantitative problem of German armored opposition, see Appendix D. The frequency of attack by different types of Axis mines in Western Europe was tabulated by a British medical research team attached to the 21st Army Group; the semple comprised 77 mined British tanks, (See Table XXVIII): 19/ lt Gen Sir G. 1eQ. Martel, Our Armoured Forces, London, 1945, p 53 CLASSIFIED) « ‘ Zz= SS curved ZA nwo wT Bs— ss #3 = LL Be Be L Bo és dune daly Avg Dec | Jan F Mar Apr May leas lous 0 ~ 40 Ba0- WE AREPAIRABLE 3 CERES UNREPAIRABLE =o (CD eNenowN z= Foe 1o- : ! ! In vone July Aug dct Nov Dec | Jan Fob Mar Apr May ws (RO 135-5 APR SI FIGURE 20.—U$ FIRST ARMY TANK CASUALTIES TO MINES (Monthly).TANK CASUALTIES. 90. 00 7 so PERCENT 30 FIGURE 21.—US FIRST ARMY TANK CASUALTIES TO MINES. BREAKOOWN OF 435 10 POINTS HIT ON 167 MINED TANKS. Ki i oun Shietd yoter crtment Final orive ing VraekSECRET ORO =117 @ndixc NOTES TO FIGURE 21. US FIRST ARMY, DISTRIBUTION OF HITS, MINED TANK CASUALTIES The 167 tanks hit by mines had 485 different recorded hits. The 435 hits were distributed as follows: Suspension: 361/435 = 83.2% Hull: 39/435 = 15.8% Turret BASS = 1% Less then 10 percent of the mined tanks burned, and only 8 percent had their ammunition hit. Less then 15 persent of ‘the mined tanks were recorded as having been penetrated by the nines, with $ percent of this total representing combined artillery-mine penetration. Moet of the tanks mined suffered damage or penetration at nore than one point of the vehicle involved. The suspension suffered 83 percent of the hits, 1 percent on the turret, and ‘the remaining 16 percent on the hull. Only two tanks wore hit in the turret--in five plac‘SeoRET Ya ho CASUALTIES Repairability Unknown Unrepairal Ropelrabie (OM otwer Tank casuacties 5 TANKS = MINE & ARTILLERY PEMETRA® TATION. ONE BURNED 18 TANKS = MIRE PENETRATION ONLY. 13 BURKED a a 5 = Ss B 2 3S ws 2 = ws a a = = = a @ g 5 2 a TANE CASUALTIES “ORO TST APR AT FIGURE 22,—US FIRST ARMY TANK CASUALTIES (SAMPLING)oRno-?-117 ppendix ¢ waple 2ovrTLl/ SAMPLING OF BRITISH TANK CASUALTIES TO MINES, ‘WESTERN EUROPE ‘Type Ninos No, of Attacks % All attacks Riegel Mine 43 1s 28, Teller Mines 2 5 Riegel or Teller 4 5 Other (Hungarian Box, oto.) 3 4 ‘Unknown 50 65 V Capt H. B. Wright and Capt R. D. Harkness, A Survey of Casvaltics ngst_Armoured Unite in Northwest Europe, Jan 1946 (SECRET) Relative to the decreased losses to ontitenk mines after the ercenins) of the Rhine River, the following explenation has beer tiven.2o/” “Except for a few cases of mined roads and verges (e.g+, Riesexbeck; Hahrenberg; the verge: between Elmenhorst and Talkan), there were few German 4/? mines, Tho view was gonerally expressed thet this was because the Germans were in their om lend and would not endanger their own civilians. This may have been a deterrent but it must be re~ membered that in the previous pursuit from the Seine to Brussels and Antwerp equelly few mines were mot. The more likely explanation would seem to be that in a fest pursuit the enemy cannot lay mines because so many of their troops are up to the last minute try- ing to withdrew. In this view lack of mines of the adventages gained from speed in the pursuit, SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND The sample of tank casualties of the 225th Indien Brigade was inourred during the period February ~ May 1945, when they were pushing 400 miles from the Irrawaddy to Rangoon. The British 20/7 W.0.R.U. Report No, 82, Report on the Armoured Pursuit after the Grossing of the Rhine. Par. 15: Mined pelts of Ground. * ieRost =117, Appendix ¢ possessed great superiority in armor and heavy armor and heavy weepons over the Japanese. The letter wore therefore obliged to improvise unorthodox autitank weapons which in the case of mines included such expsdients as aerial-bonb mines and picric charges. Generally, there was no European perallel to these improvisation: of limited success. Therefore, the case of the Burma campaign may be considered to have been atypical and special. ‘The percentage of tanks mined, as a proportion of total knom losses was 20 persext, It should be noted thet actual damage caused to all tanks was considerably less than thet caused by com- pareble hits in Burope. PACIFIC THEATER 0? OPERATIONS Tank casualties to mines wore highest in the island fighting of ‘the Far East. Of @ total sample of 775 US Army and Marine tank casualties, about 30 percent were from mines. In addition, a very large proportion of the 20 percent of ossualties to miscellaneous and multiple enemy weapons were the result of satchel charge and "Molotov cocktail’ attacks upon mined tanks. Therefore, it may be safely assimed thst the over-all percentage of mined tanks in the Pacific approximated 40 percent. The Army's mined tenk casualties in the Philippines (43 percent plus a large fraction of the 25 per- vent unknown multiple weapon damage) made thet operation the most costly to lend mines. The separate averages of the US Army and ‘the Marines for the Pacific fighting accorded well: about 30 per- cent mined, from almost idextical samples of 385 kmown tank casualtios. Employment of arnor in Pacific island fighting presented special aspects. Armored opposition was negligible. The extremely @iffioult terrain and restricted compass for operations were 6s- pecially important factors in the type of fighting engaged in, Tenk losses of any sort were important, due to the critical prob- lem with regerd to replacement tanks, of which there was a very limited number availsble. Replacement of armored personnel was a difficult problen, especially in the case of key men, e.g. the tank commander and ‘the gunner. Sufficient key personnel wore not availeble through normal replacement channels. MEAL Light tenks were seldom employed, being inadequate both in armor and ermaxent to meet the type of opposition encountered, Mines of various sizes were encountered in large numbers. Jepanose soldiers, whether as individuals or in small groups, were prompt to attack, with satchel charges and "Molotov cocktails", any tanks 2Row 117 Appendix ¢ within renge, especially those inmobilized by mines, terrain, or damage. Evacuation of personnel from stricken tanks wae another problem.ORO-D=117 Appendix ¢ PART IT LAND MINE EXCHANGE RATES ~ TERRE SPECIAL STUDIES INTRODUCTION Cortein historical deta exist, from which an attompt has been made to derive input-output reletionships betwoon the numbers of axis land mines laid and the toll of Allied tank casualties exacted. ‘Tho results of these investigations are given in studies 1, 2, and 3, which represent, respectively, typical examples fron three different theaters of war. Study 1 represents a study of the British vs. the axis at Bl Alenein in 1942; Study 2 presents the Soviets 7s. the Axis ab Targul Frumos, Rumania, in 1944; and study 3 presente the Americans vs. the Germans in the Aachen~Eschwoiler operations in 1944, The conclusions follow the presentation of the studies. An attompt wes made to establish similar oxchange retes for ‘the German campaign in Polend, 1949, Insufficient data exist to make this study possible. It is known thet in the period of 1 ~ 24 September 1939, the Germans laid 42,000 antitank mines in Poland. We do not have any infornstion,unfortunately, as to how many of the Poles! six hundred 2$~ton Tanketke TK-3 tanks, and ‘oo or three hundred 71P 10=ton modifications of the Vickers Arm= strong 6-ton type B, were inncbilized by the German lend mines; we can therefore derive no exchange ratios therefrom,=| STUDY 1. THE BATTIES FOR EGYPT, 1942 SEUDE 1, _THE BATTIBS FOR EGYPT, 1942 After the Axis armies wore checked at Alem ol Halfe in early September 1942, they prepared reinforced field works, covered by six belts of antitank and antipersonnel mine fields. The position at El Alamein included, in its northern section, a second line of defended localities behind the main forward mine fields. The two-rlines «wore aomocted with each sthor by tranworse mine fields, with the intention of luring the British 26/ Aveileble German dete based upon document relating to nine ‘Consumption, OKH, Gen. St.d.H./sen.Q.(Qu 1), 27 Sep 1939 (CONFI- DENTIAL); Polish date derived from conversation with Major M. Ge Bokkor, 18 Feb 1951; and from Tanks and Armored Vehiclos, by Lb Col Re Je Ioks, NY, 1945, pp 288 ond 252, _—T 59oRO-r-117 Appendix ¢ attacking forces, via prepared channels, into deceptively attractive clear areas entirely surrounded by mines, where the Gormans could open fire from all sides, Thus a belt was prepared, between five end eight thousand yards deep, covered with mines and defended posts, stretching Irom the sea to the Deir ol Mreir, a deep depres- sion lying southwest of the end of the Ruweiset ridge. North of El Mreir there was a peculiar mine field in the shape of a shallow S-bend running roughly east to west at right angles to the main Positions and extending for sone distance behind them; this was Presumably intended os a cover for the right flank of the northern sector of the front, if the British proved able +o penetrate the Southern sector. Behind the main defenses in the north, a third line of positions, starting east of Sidi Abd el Rahman, end run- ning south for sbout eight miles, was still in course of prepara- ‘tion but already well advanced, ‘The defenses had been less sys- tenatically developed to the south of El Mreir, but since the capture of the British mine fields there in September, that part of the line presented a formidable obstacle. There were two mine field barriers, based on the old British mine field and the original enemy mine field, with a gap between then, The going on the southern flenk wes bad for the British, and from Qaret 01 Himeimst the enemy had excollent observation. To sum up, the Axis position at Bl Alamein had been developed for three months. It wae well dug in, end well covered by wire and mines. At least half the mines were British, lifted from the enormous fields at Mersa Matruh and elsewhere. The defenses had oonsiderable depth (3,000-5,000 yards in most places), but there were no anbitenk ditches or concrete pill boxes. Tho British armored forces required gaps in the mine fields 40 yards wide, as in soft ground the leading vehicles churned up the sand so badly ‘thet those following needed space to avoid the worst aress. But the enginpors settled for 16-yard gaps broached first, end widened later «: bey Seo ‘article by Brigadier C, R, Nelisokan, "Tho Assault at Alamoin,” The Royel Engineers Journal, Dec. 1949, LKIII, pp 319-20 (UNCLASSIFIED). * SEgmEreTABLE XIX oRo-P-217 fapperstixlOy Fars GERMAN MINE-LAYING, BOYPT, 10 JULY~1 NOVEMBER 1942)/ Aerial Totals Period AG Mines Laid AP Mines Laid Bonbs laid _ Laid July 10- Aug. 31 of ef Bre 178,903 Sept. 1 Oct. 5 49,087 3,135 uw? 52,379 Oct. 5- Wov. 1 63,700 25,300 85 £69,085 1,136 520,367 y Source: Minenlibersioht Xgypten, 01 Alemein-Stellung, 1942, 2 only totels are = . Sra. TABLE 200 BRITISH TANK CASUALTIES, EGYPT, 30 AUGUST-4 NOVEMBER 1942 Own Tank Casualties Period All Causes Own Forces Engaged 30 Aug.= 68 500 Mediums 7 Sept. 80 Light Tanks 230 armored Cars _ 100 Reserve Tanks 68 710 23 Oct em 337 Repairable 267 Wa (Sherman) 4 Nov. 193 Non-repaireble 128 MS (Grant) 530 126 Stewarts 105 Crusaders (6-pdr.) 255 Crusaders (2-pdr.) 35 Crusaders (close support) 196 Valentines ue * ORE:Appendix ¢ A total of 698 British tanks wore immobilized (repairable end non-repairable, due to battle causes) in large-scale armored battlos that covered 21 of the 114 days with which this study is concerned. Most of the period betweon and before the battles was relatively static, with only patrols and skirmishes to produce minor tank casualties. The latter figures, not available, are in eny case deemed to be negligible, in terns of this study, We may consider the totals of Axis antitenk, mines leid to have been: 10 July - 31 August 1042, 142,4382/ gr mines and 874 serial bonbs; 1 Septenber ~ 1 Novenber 1942, 112,767 AT mines and 262 serial bonbs, or a total of 266,336, Studies of British tank casualties to mines in Afrioa indicate an over-all casualty factor of about 22 percent at the time of El Alamein, Therefore we mey assume thet at least 152 of the 598 British tanks immobilized in the period were mine casualties. The erohonge ratio of Gorman mines laid (before sweeping, etc.) per ‘Ttiel eked out = I0IZs1. This Talia would-be shou aere Tavoreble to the Gornans, if British losses of motor transport, , end other vehicles were considered, Such figures are not available, however. In the absence of an exact soale of costs for Italian, German and other axis lend mines employed at Bl Alamein, the current cost feotors (1950) for the equivalent US autitank mine, HE, M6Al will be applied. The costs of the meditm tanks engaged et Bl Alamein will be equated with the estimated mass production cost of the US medium tonk 142, Thus, 256,326 x $16.60 = $4,255,000 and 182 x $195,500 = $25,779,600 or $4,255,000 : $25,779,600 (Total mine investment : Cost of tanke lost to mines). Therefore, Mine investment | $52,235 _ i641 i tank mined ~ §195,500 21/ This estimate is based upon a ratio of & AT mine: gt 1 anti- Personnel mine, and is based on the known totel of 178,029 mines laid in tho period. Note that antipersonnel mines wore not then used in the quantity encountered later in World Wer IT. * [aoRo~T~117 Appendix ¢ It should be noted thet the doller loss for mined tanks is conditioned by the fact that only 25 percent are assumed to have been non-repairable. But the teuporary loss of the tanks tactically cannot be assessed in terms of dollars; repair costs, oxponsive as ‘they may have been, cannot compare with such intangibles, which win or lose battles and compaigns. STUDY 2. TARGUL FRUMOS, 1944 Limited information is availeblo on the important tank battles that took place noar Targul Frumos, west of Jassy, in May 1944, Under Mantouffel the following units held defensive positions, to ‘thwart © tank-led Soviet thrust toward the Ploesti oil fields; Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschlend 3rd 88 Panzer Division "pi 2ath Panzer Division Pert of 1st Rumanian Guards Division Part of Royal Rumanian I Army Corps Tt is lmown that the 6th Rumanian Infantry Division, an elenent of the Rumanian I Corps, laid 16,000 antitenk and 15,730 entiper= somel mines, through May 20. Since the major battles ended on May 6, on exchange rate can be attempted, which, however, represents © Proportion even less favorable to the Axis than was probebly the case. Nor does the rate consider the toll of Soviet motor transport and other vehicular casualties exacted by mines; these figures were not available. We do know, however, that in the sector of the 6th Rumanian Infantry Division the Soviets attacked with 20-25 tanks on May 2 Seven tanks (or 35 pereont of the attacking force) were immobilized by Axio mines. From the above facts, we observe thet Total mines laid _ 16,000 = 28,000 Tanks mined 7 or Mines leid . 2286 Ltank mined 1 In the absence of a yardstick of costes of Soviet armored vehicles, the ebove exchange rate will be equated in terms of costs of US mines and tanks, as of the current 1950 index. The US T-3 Heavy Tonk will be equated with the Soviet JS-IR] floury Tonk; the US land mine (antitank), with the Axis version,22/ 22/7 7-45: $174,000 (estimsted cost, in production). ‘ine, antitank, HE, MéAl: $16.60 (estimate), ” Sean?ORO-T=1i7 Appendix ¢ Thus, the total Axis mine investment would be about $265,600: $1,216,000, for the total of tanks mined. Or, $87,947 $174,000 = 1:4.8, (Mine investment per 1 tank knocked cut.) STUDY 3. THE AACHEN - ROER OFFENSIVES, 2 OCTOBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1944 During October and November 1941, the Germen LXXXI Arny Corps defended the region fron Geilenkirchen to Aschen, and eastward to the Roer and Inde. The torrain in this sector is flet, open ground. The whole area is dotted with villeges located a mile or so apart, which the Germans turned into formidable, mutually-supporting strongpoints. A good network of roads covered the zono, though severe rains and hard usage reduced their offectivensss. The LXXKL Corps attempted to deny any American advance in this area by manning the defenses of the West Wall, which lay within its sector. Those defenses consisted of an endless chain of pill boxes and emplacements, augmented by extensive antitank obstacles to conslize attacks against the stronger defenses, In early October ‘tho DXZI Corps was in position within the West Wall. The October fighting saw the Gersans try to prevent a breach in the defense line. When the American First Army broke through, the LXKXI Corps fell back slowly, defending each tom and village. Mechine guns, ertillery, and tanks were empleced within houses with good fields of fire, The defenders relied heavily on land mines and artillery to stop further advance. In the region of the First-Ninth Army boundery, US units ren into one of the most heavily mined areas experienced in the war up to that time, After-sction reports refer to the abundance of covering artillery end antitank weapons employed by the LOI Corps. United States armor which fought against the LOI Corps, and for which date on tank losses is available, included: 2nd Armored Division rd Armored Division ‘748rd Tank Battalion 748th Tank Battalion 746th Tonk Battalion Tah Tenk Battalion 750th Tank Battalion ‘759th Tank Battalion ‘Toth Tank Battalion *QRO~T=117 Appendix ¢ FACTS TABLE XXXI + TANK CASUALTTES, THE AACHBN-ROER OFFENSIVES!/ 1 ~ 51 October TODAL MINED ‘UNKNOWN our CASUALETES TANKS. CAUSATION 66th Arm'd Regt (CO-A) 20 4 2 67th Arma Regt (Co-B) 55 7 ol 32nd Arm'a Regt (co~a) ° ° ‘33rd Arm'd Regt (Cc-B) ° oO 82nd Ron Sqd 2 2 ° ‘45rd Tank Battalion 36 S(Ltous 0 mine) 745th Battalion 26, 3 2 189 B 60, 1 = 50 Novenber TOTAL MINED UNKNOMN our CASUALTIES — TANKS GAUSATTON 66th Arm'd Regt (cC~A) 10 z lo 67th arm'd Regt (CC-B), (ess 3rd Bn) 47 ’ ar Srd Bn, 67th Armtd Regt 16 ° 52nd Arm'd Regt (CC=A) 21 ° 38rd Arm'd Regt (CC-B) 61 12 9 748rd Tank Battalion 25 B(2towS 0 mines) 745th Tank Battalion 30 2 3 746th Tank Battalion 10 5 2 The term tank casualty is used to mean any tank (not including uk destroyers GF assauit guna) which wes put out of action for ‘the remainder of the day's operation as a result of enemy action or becoming bogged down by terrain. Mechanical failure is not here included as a cause of tenk casualties. “ SERED“Sai ROW 117 Appendix ¢ TABLE XXKI (cont.) U.S. TANK CASUALTIES, THE AACHEN-ROER OFFENSIVES 1 = 50 Novenbor TOTAL 1SINED UNKNomT Nar OASUALDIES TANKS CAUSATION TATth Tank Battalion 18 6 ° 750th Texk Battalion 54 25 2 ‘789th Tenk Battalion 1 ° Toth Tank Battalion 3 3 _2 2e6 n eo Totals for October and Novenber Totel tank casualties mown and unknown causes) 425 Total tank casuelties ‘tc enemy mines 80 or 1646 percent TABLE XXII MINES LAID BY GERMAN LXXXI CORPS, OCTOBER = NOVEMBER 1944 PERIOD Av MINES LAID AP MINES LAID TOTAL LAID October 1944 10,234, 10,633 20,867 Hovonber 1944 1416 8,558 118,950 17,650 19,167 36,817 From the foregoing facts, we observe that Total AT mines laid . 17,650 tanks mined * ~85 Mines laid. 220.6 or = 2008 cat * <<oRo-r. 7 Appendix 6 Using as a yardstick of cost the estimated’ 1950 mass produc tion figure of a US medium tank 742 as $195,300, and $16.60 for = ‘US antitank mine, HE, M6Al, we may set up the following equations. 80 x $195,300 = $15,624,000 and 17,650 x $16.60 = $292,990 or $292,990 + $15,624,000 (Totel mine investment : Cost of tanks lost to mines) Mine investment . $3,663, Therefore: T"tank mined * §195,800 or 1253 (Qiine investment per 1 tank knocked out.)CONCLUSIONS. On the basis of the preceding studios, whatever the limitations in their completensss, we must consiude thet the "orthodox" antitank mines of World War II "paid off" for the Axis, Despite vigorous Allied countermeasures, one British or Soviet tank was immobilized for every 1900 - 2500 lend mines originally laid, in the two on~ gagenents exanined in Studies 1 and 2, This figure accords with ‘the conclusion of the British AORG, based upon theoretical studies, ‘that "nearly 2000 enemy mines were required to cause the loss of one British tank, on the assumption that equal mmbers of mines went to each mile of the German front lino."2% Study 3 is en exemplo of US armored operations in one of the most heavily mined areas encountered by the US Army in Europes The terrain favored canelization into avenues of armored attack, The Germans mined the approaches to every village, and covered ‘those approaches by a very heavy, mutually supporting antitank fire. There is little evidence of concerted mine sweeping by the Americans, whose attempts at detection with the new nonmetallic mine detector did not perform satisfactorily. The Germans laid glase Topfmines very heavily in November 1944, and US tank casuel- ‘ties showed a marked increase that month. These factors appear to scoount for the ten-fold increase in effootiveness of land mince in the Aachen-Bschweiler operations, reflected by the exchange ratio as compared with those observed in Studies 1 and 2. Experi~ ence at the Sangro river crossing and in certain North african dattles accentuates the conclusion thet land mines may be a serious menace to a particular operation, and thus may pay off even more dramatically for the defense. Even if a proportion of the tanks mined in the three engage= ments studied were repaireble, at a certain cost, the mines laid made a "profit" for the Axis, Had the antiyehicular mines laid in World War IT beon less easily detectable24/ and truly lethal against tanks, the exchange rates would have become more advanta= geous to the Axis, even if a mere parity of incidence of hits were 28/ Internal Memorandum No. 16, The Comparative Performance of Ger~ man Antitenk Weapons during World War I. Way 1960. (UNCLASSIFIED)~ Fy ae at anaes Talaaste. Tore Gxample, visual detection was often possible, ‘Whon the wind had blown the surface sand eway from the shallowly laid mine:Appendix © mainteined with the actuations effected in the battles noted, If available, records of motor transport and of other vehicles in- mobilized by mines would have similarly accentuated the mine-laying “profit” to the dofense Transcending a reckoning in materiel alone are the factors of psychological and tactical deley presented ty mine ficlds leid in depth, 4n American observer in the Buropean Theater has ro~ ported that "the presence of enemy mines tended to lower the morele of US troops," since the shook effect caused by the detona- tion of antitank mines wes considerable. The British AOR@ have attempted to quantify the factor of tactical delay.2°/ Within a smple of 97 British tank regiments engaged in North Africa, Italy, and northwest Europe, 22 instances were recorded in which the times given for delays due to mine fields everaged 15.3 hours per regiment per incident. In addition, there were 20 occasions When regiments were delayed or stopped in their advance by mines, and on four of these occasions the delay was stated to be con- siderable. Research done for the present study indicated a further 21 incidents of US dolay by antitenk mines, 15 of which (the majority in Italy) caused abandonment of the advance or its delay for 1-24 hours. Field Marshal Alexander testified at a conference held et Marble arch (Egypt) in 1943 that the hundreds of thousands of land mines laid by the Germans along their path of retreat in Afrioa had held up the Bighth Army materially. One has but to Peruse the battle dispatches of this Army to note how frequent wore the delays in “tinetsbles" of attack and of exploitation, before mino fields leid in depth. Rommel, the man behind this mine leying program, never forgot this experience. When he com~ manded Germen enti~invasion forces in 1944, he proposed to lay 50 to 100 million mines and, after surrounding all strongholds with deop mine fields, to fill up the couxtry between then with mines, wherever it was “tankablo,” 4 factor not betrayed by exchange rates alone-~the magnitude of the task of sweeping discovered or suspected mine fields~~is suggested by the following figures recorded by the 6th US Armored Division (1944—45): 28/ See note 28, > omeAppendix ¢ Miles of roads swept for mines: France 221 Belgium 3 Luxembourg e7 Gorneny 2s Total 549 Over-all figures of the cost in man-hours to clear the enemy mine fields in France, Belgium, and Germany, have been provided in the final report of the Chief of Engineers, for the European Theater of Operations, through 1945: ‘TABLE XXEIIT MAN-BOURS OF LABOR CONSUMED BY ALLIES IN CLEARING ENEMY MINE FIELDS, ETO, 1944-1945 MILITARY Pom CIVILIAN TOALS France 815,569 22,608 24,532 360,708 Belgium 1,282 ° ° 1,282 Gormeny 402 402 315,203 24,582 362,345AEX 1 GERMAN LAND MINE EMPLOYIENT An extract of gugstions and enewers from an Army Ground porte Forees Board Re reveals pertinent comments by enginecr members of various US Armies engaged in combat in the European Theater, concerning their experience with German land mine employment : westion 2, "Yo what extent were the Germans able uy nines in their retreat? Did they mainly rely on filling gaps in existing fields as they with- arex? Were fields employed of a hasty or deliberate type? Wore many nuisance mines and booby traps used by the Germans before the Western Front becene rela~ tively stabilized? How dia the stabilisation of the Front effect the German employment of mines?” Seventh Amy; "Character of fields indicate That the enemy retreated behind previously prepared fields, "Gaps are scarce in German fields. Fields on both sides of the road are made continuous by the construction of mined road blocks + “Fields were of a deliberate type, woll marked and camouflaged. type fields were principally emplo|)| in con- jmotion with the road block, Many mines laid by the Germans particularly in roads were removed by them to permit hie use of Boar Answers To Questions Submitted by the Engineer School, AGF Report NosAnnex 1, Appendix ¢ more roads in his retreat and by so doing decreased his loss by our air power. "Yos, many nuisance (unpatterned) mines were found particularly in the St. Die, Baccaret, Bruyeres area. Booby traps and antipersonnel mines are SOP for all German nine fields. “Front not stabilized.” Third army: "While moving acro: France, Bo Bias ho mines were encountered in mary places where they could have been employed effectively, The Germans did not rely on filling geps in existing fields as they withdrew. During our drive across France, Prectioally all fields encountered were of @ hasty type. The Germans rarely employed nuisance mines or booby traps before the Western Front becane relatively stebilized, After stabilization, the Germans laid many deliberate minefields with autipersonnel mines interspersed among antitank mines. They also frequently laid antitank and anti- Personnel mines at feasible bridge sites.” Binth "Phe Germans while hastily rotréating fre ‘om Normandy to the Siegfried line, did not have time to install deliberate minefields; those minos encountered were placed in and around hastily prepared road dlocks, Very few nuisance mines and booby ‘traps were encountered. In an orderly with- arewal, the Germans rely mainly on filling gaps in existing fields. Since the Western Front has become somewhat stabilized, the’ Germans are installing very extensive deliberate fields with numerous booby traps and booby trapped antitank mines, In general, the type and density of German minefields depends on the time available.” ion 6, "In the current German salient, what barrier sustiae ies and obstacles were used by the Germans to protect their flanks?" " -SEeretSERRBY ORO“ dumex 1, Appendix ¢ Third Army: "In the recent German ealiont tie Goemane mined natural approaches and also used blown bridges and culverts, ebatis, and improvised road blocks to protect ‘their flanks. Warning devices such as per- cussion mines and signal flere dovicos were elso employed." Question 7, “How prevalont are § mines modified for instantaneous or knee firing?” Seventh Army: "Modified 's' mines - not prevalent! Third Army: "S mines modified for instantaneous or kise firing are prevalent in some areas and are not found in others. It is estimated that these mines ere at Present prevalent on about one~bhird of this Army's front.” Ninth Army; "Approximately eight to ‘ten percent of S-mines discovered have been modified for instantaneous or knee firing.” A captured Gernan‘Arny Service leaflet28/ reveals the type of instructions issued for the advice of German commanders in the field: Minefields, Calculation of requirements should be based on & doisity of at least three, preferably five 4/f mines per meter frontage (depending on available supplies). Hrong procedure: Uniform distribution of the 8 over a wide front with only two or even one mine per meters Correct procedure: Concentration at the decisive points, i.e. two or more mine- fields behind each other. Mixture of a/? and antipersonnel mines is to be used in all types of minofields in front of MIR, Within min zone of resistence, only minefields of one or the other ‘type may be used. Additionel donends for antipersonnel 23/ Principlos of Recomadssance and Construction of Tank Obstacles. (German) I Aug From the 8 Of GS, US Sixth Groupeono? 127 Amex 1, Appendix ¢ mines should be taken into account. Dumy minefields are effective only in connection with real minefields. Dumy minoa are particularly successful in irregular minefields, The laying of minos is permitted exclusively to engineers, organic engineer trained personel of other branches, and mine-leying platoons. Experience shows that the laying of mines by non-engineers does. more harm than good, Captured documents dated late January 1945 indicate that cer- tain s in laying of minefielde may be expected in the near future.Z"/ Based upon experience, the following suggestions were submitted to German Engineer unite: More stress on mining roads and narrow passes, and fewer, attempts to lay fields in open terrain, This will result in a fer greater economy in mines, and in most cases bo more effective in delsying enemy movenent Echeloning of minefields in depth rather than extending them on a wide front. Laying of tank mines in front of MIR hes. proven ineffective, particulerly on the Russian Front. On the Western Front, s/f minefields were only found of value when coordinated with other 4/? obstacles, such as road blocks. More stress on arming tank mines with T Mi Z 45 end on using auti-lifting devices, in order to renter clearing of fields more difficult, More extensive use of mixed minefields. Better camouflage of mines. Preparing of unarmed minefields whenever possible, in order to permit passing of Gorman traffic over mined ereas. Safeties to be removed by last unit clearing area. 29/ Recent Develoy in the German Technique of Minefields Ermorad Roport Yoo 6, Wij Eh Tray Group, TOMBE Toes (le TEESE army).opO-T-117 Amex 1, Appendix 0 More irroguler minefield patterns. Avoidance of parallel guide ropes, and of repetitive pattorns. e., ‘Tho completed field presents a picture of utter ir. regularity, yet can be easily detected once the scheme is known,MILLIONS 1999 1940 tour fous 9uy 1918 1915 1916 4917 1918 AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION (ALL MINES) THOUSANDS 120: 100: 80: 60 op 20: 1939 1940 1981 MONTHLY PRODUCTION (T & 8 MINES) ORO 15-8 APRSI FIGURE 23.-—GERMAN LAND MINE PRODUCTION (MONTHLY) SOURCE: Hei 2 Munitions, ffenatab, Heeres Waffenamt.ROSES ES SSE, % a:= QRO-T-117 Appendix D presusably. they are, since its production figures include thome Strength in the West, Geyr von Schwoppenburg says thet the "mmber of tanks availeble to the Cermn armies in France on D-Day was between 2,000 and 2,100." This figure presumbly includes assault guns for Blunentritt says: "On June 6th there were 9 Parser Divisions in France, Between them they had 1,000 to 1,200 tanks, no more, and about 900 to 1,000 assault guns." Wo do not know the actual. strength of each of the Panzer divisions, indepeniont tank battalions and assault gun brigades but a fair estimte of the D-Day strength (based on tho strength of those units for which we have the figures) seems to be 1,200 tanks and 800 assault guns. To these we must add the ernour which 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions brought back with then from Poland - approximately 130 tanks and 100 assault guns. After D-Day losses rose steeply and for June-Septenber (inclusive) far outstripped production. Accoptanco: Wastege: Net loss: UK, VI 376 509 133 MK, Vv 1,435 1,47. 39 MK, IV 2,080 1,915 835 2,891 3,898 1,007 15 AGe 1,61 2,233 sue Total: 4,582 6,131, 1,5h9 ‘Thus in these four months the Wehrmacht had lost as many Pangers as it had lost in the whole of 19,3—but production bad so greatly ircreased that threc-quartors of these losses had been replaced—at least that is what the NG figures show, But in the West during this pericd there had been a catastrophic decline in ‘the strength of the Panzer divisions and othor arnoured unitse On September 27th Model reported that in Army Group B he had orly "239 tonks and assault gurs." At the same time Army Group @ propably had 250 tanks and assault guns—certainly no more, Thus ‘there were in the West at the end of September a maximum of 500 tanks and assault guns, That means that only one-quarter of its losses since D-Day had been replaced even though the factories had produced enough tanks and assault guns to replace three-quarters of the losses on all fronts, »Appendix D Indeed the West was so starved, oven during the crisis of September, that Army Croup B, which had "about 100 tankst on the 7th, reported that it had only 239 on the 27th, Obviously, if there had been more tanks available thoy would have been sent) to the West theng ORO-T-117 ‘hat is the cnawer? The possibilities are: .. (1) One's first inclination is to doubt the USSBS production figures, but those aro confirmed by the Acceptance figures of JN6 and, in the case of Tigers by the records of the Henschel works which made them, Thust Production Acceptance 29h, USS8S —Honsehel O.KeHe Jan.—June 2 620 585 July—Dece 380 380 3h (The discrepancy between the first two columns and the third is easily accounted for by tine-lag in acceptances, owing to disorganization of transport, rejects, losses at factory due to bombing. (2) The second possibility is that tho figure of overall losses is too low, but there is no firm evidence to suggest that a very large percentage of losses went unrecorded at this time— probably 10%—~15% were missed but hardly mores The USSBS Report (p. 169) says that "in the five months after D-Day, 10,000 Panzer vehicles were destroyed in battle or abandoned in retreats." The JN6 figure for this period (i.e. to the end of October) is 7011. However, this discrepancy can be accounted for by the fact that the JN6 figure covers only Marks IV, Vand VI and 75 mm AGs, The USSBS Figure presumably includes all fighting arnour including S.P.Gs. (3) Tho third possible solution is that throughout the sumer the Eastern Front wes given absolute priority and absorbed all—or very nearly all—the replacements. In Jum, for instance, total tank losses (according to 6) were 507: total acceptances came to 777. How mny of this surplus 270 went to the West? On July 15th Rommel reported that so far he had received "17 tanks to replace about 225 destroyed." These, plus some 36 Tigers which were sont to France with a new heavy tank battalion, were evidently all that Rommel received from the June surplus, for when II S$ Panser Corps came back from Poland at the end of June 1t did not pick up any fresh tanks on routeRowt-117 Appendix D to the West. ‘The answer sooms to be that for the first to months aftor D-Day the Vest was starved because it appeared to Hitler that tho Allicd bridgehead was being containod with tho forces already on the spot—and anyway it was uorely a l¢O~mile front. On the other hand the denanis of the Tastern Front wore more vast and more urgent, Becauso of the great distancos tho woar andtear on tanks and engines was vory much greater end the battle was so much nore open that more armour was needed, In addition, the Russians were advancing and the Western Allies wore not, As late as the start of dugust Hitler still regarded the campaign in France as a holding action. Iniced, thc apparent success of tho German Command in the West in the defensive battles of June and July paved the way for its utter defeat in August, The Panzer divisions had been exhausted in the bocage and had not the strength to counter the breakout. Hitler's natural inclination to give priority to the East was reinforced when Gudorian, who had been Inspector of Pomer Troops, became Chief of Staff at O,K.H, on. duly 20th, (In support of this view, see von Kiuge's last letter—dug. 18th—and Foonbach's interrogations) Since he was now comerned exclusivoly with the East and since he still exercised control over the Inspectorete of Panzer Troops, it was mtural that he directed to ‘the Eastern Front the bulk of the tanks that becane available, By the tine Hitler woke up to the danger in the West the now tanks had already been sent to the East and were heavily ongageds With the railway network alroady disorgendzed by bonbing, there was no chence of carrying out a major strategic switch of armoured forces. Tho denands of the Eastern front in Juno ami July must have seemed mich the more urgent. In these months the losses of tanks and 75.nm aGs on ali fronts came to 2669, Of these at least 2,000 mist have been on tho Russian front, In the samo poriod output of these types was 2,li6l—of which perhaps 150 all told wont to France, This mcans that losses in the East were replaced tank for tank during June and July, while the West received roplacenents for less thane third of its losses—if that. In August and Soptenber losscs wero up and output was down, Of the 3,462 tanks and 75 mm assault guns written off by JN6, replacomerts wore received for only 2,118. Of those not more than 500 had been sent to the West by tho end of Soptonber, On a strict mmerical calculation this was tho West's share for only a quarter of the Panzer-typo divisions were thore, but this allocation ignored the fact that during tho previous four months, : =— RO-T=11.7 Appendix D while at least 85% of the tank losses in the East had been replaced, the Panzer forces in the West hid boon reduced to skeletons, and had received replacements for less than 25% of thoir tank and assault gun losses, Tho result was that at the end of September, when there were some 500 tanks and assault guns in the West and another 200-250 in Italy, the total holdings of MK, Vis, Vs and IVs and 75mm AGs was, according to JN6, the If this is correct, it means that more than 5,000 tanks and ‘75m AGs were in the East giving this front a ton to one advantago over the West in armour, LGERMAN TANK CASUALTY DATAAPPENDIX E GERMAN TANK CASUALIY DATS CONTENTS: Page Discussion. «ss 6 ee 6 ww ee eB Gunfire 88 Hollow Charge Weapons 88 land Hines 88 ddr Action 89 Miscellaneous Causes 89 ANNEX 1, Statistical Amlysis of Tank Losses by Gause in the German-Sovict War. ~» » 90 ANNEX 2, German Estinates and Comments on Om. Tank Casualties » es 6 + 6 6 0 92 ANNEX 3, Sovict Data on Gorman Tank Casualties. . 9 ANNEX 4, US Employnent of Lani Mines... . 698 ANNEX 5, antitank and Antipersonnel Mines . . 4 97 ANNEX 6, Bazookas and Parwerfaust Weapons . . +100 ANNEX 7. Examination of Causes for Rendering Tanks Inoporativo » . + 2 « + slOL Tables and Figures Table XXXV: German Tank Losses by Causation UPINS 2 we ee wwe 8 BD Table XXXVI: Soviet Clains of German Tank Losses . 9 Figure 27, German Merk IIT and IV Tank 4 Casualties + . . + « .followinglo2 Figure 28, Site of Hits on Gorman Mark =, . TIT and IVTanks . . « aPollowingloz Figure 29, German Mark V and VI Tank Casualties « 4 + + + efollowingiog Figure 30. Site of Hits on German Mark Vand VI Tanks, . . . .followingloz . eSAPPENDIX 5 GERMAN TANK CASUALTY DATA During static periods of the European campaign, there was Little opportunity for obtaining battlefield data concerning ‘those tanks repaired or salvaged by the Germans, Britich euthor Alan Morehead says "The Germans had an excellent tank recovery organization, Their huge tracked and whecled tank~transporters were actually going into battle with the tanks thomselves. Even while the. fighting was still on, the men in the transporters were prepared to dash into battle, hook on to damaged vehicles and dj then out to a point where they could start repeirg right omey aL On the other hand, periods of exploitation and pursuit furnish a feirly representative tank casualty picture, inasmuch as the proportion of damaged or immobilized tanks recovered was mozssarily omall, An attempt was made in the Office of the Chief of Wilitary Histcry, US Army, to tabulate Gorzen tank casualties incurred on tho Eastern Front, on the basis of the document holdings of tho German Military Documents Section, The kdjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, The findings were largely negative, as may be soen in Annex 1, this Appendixs In the course of the tabulation of data for the study of Allied tank casualties, material on German tank casualtios was more or less incidentally gathered, for whatever value it might later prove to be, It is now felt that the sampling of 1207 such tank casualties provides sufficient basis for certain preliminary con- clusions, as scon in Table XXKV, which follows: ‘B77 Tian Morehead, & Year of Battle, p 61, London, 1913. : =er RO-T=11. Appendix B TABLE XXXV GERMAN TANK LOSSES BY CAUSATION - 1944-1945 (Sampling) CAUSE OF INKOBILIZATION HO. OF TANKS | PERCENT OF TOTAL KHOWH UNF! 75-nn or 76-nn AP 65 75am HE + AP 2 $0-na AP 6 Tank 125 Tank + Artitiery 100 1D Ey TO + Artillery 7 ArtiNery 4 a v7 ave 7 a (10) 2 RE 43 S7-na AT 3 se 1 Fountiret 26 Tora 529 HOLLOW CHARGE WEAPONS: » Hot tow Charge Weapons Tora, 83 44 aike Rocket 35 38.5 4 “8 1 ur 7 77 38 wuz TOTAL at 7.5 WINE: Hine Tor, 3 1 02 WISCELLANEOUS, ENEMY ACTION: Multiple Action: AP + HE 5 Grenade 1 Captured e 3 Tora 8 ISCELLANEDUS, WOY-ENEW RETTOW: Mechanical or Terrain, 48 9.4 bandon rts, gas, fecoverys andor attack, “ete. ) 22 42.5 Sel f-dostruction 251 48.1 TOTAL 522 48.2‘Sle RO-T-117 Appendix B DISCUSSION Gunfire. It is interesting to compare the figure of kl percent for the Gorman tank casualty sample to gunfire with that of tho Allies in the same theater of 52 poreont, Tho difference lies in the very heavy percentage of German tanks abandoned or solf-destroyed. In the interrogations cf Guderian, von Geyr, Dietrich, and Heusser, no mention was mde of the latter two causative categories, Soo the section following, which gives the Germans! own estimates of tank losses. A Ninth US Army estipate of Germon tanks destroyed by all groumi force action more nearly approxinated the figure of Allied gunfire casualties in Europe, Bes 5305 porcent based upon a sample of 6190 tanks claimede Mc. Chester Wilmot, the Australian war historian, in an unclassified letter to 4s Ds Coox (0,8.0,) under date of 15 Feb 1951, notes thats In the last year of the war thoro was a vory high percentage of nechanical failures, due partly to flaws in production, partly to bad driving—itself the result of inadequate training, and pirtiy to the breakdown of railways which compelled tanks to travel on their tracks, My own impression is thet "availability" so far as the Germans were concerned, was affoctod nore by mechanical unserviceability than by battle losses. The Germens tended to handle their arnour with a rathor brutal stupidity. For a sampling of sites of hits upon German tanks, see Figures 27930, at the end of this Appendix, Hollow Charge Weapons. The mumber of German tanks inmobilized by hollow charge weapons ran about one third the percentage for Allied tanks in Western Burope—l..5 percent, instead of 11 percent, ‘The Cermans, of course, were fighting a generally defensive campaign, and threw more man-portable rocket weapons into the fray, For the views of Guderian, Dietrich, Hausser, and von Geyr, see section on "German Comments On Their Own Tank Casualties," Zand Mines, Less than one percent of the German tank casualty sample was mined. This is in contrast to the percentage of Allied tanks mined in the same theater which was 20 percerty.. ‘actually, ‘the Allies had but infrequent occasion to engage in the type of defensive warfare that would necessitate mins-laying, e.g., the Normandy beachhead (Caen), Strasbourg, the Ardennes, and Itz, See the section on “American Employment of Land Mines," We have Froviously scen the comparative ease of repairability of tanks damaged by mines but it is remarkable how tho Gormans! excellent system gencrally facilitated swift salvage and repair. Consequently, our forces encountered few enemy tanks immobilized by our land 88RO~T=11: peace ead mines, Quderian estinates that only five percent of German tank casualties were suffered to land mims, Air Action, Atout eight porcent of the German tank casualty sample was immobilized by Allied air action, of which rocket attack appeared to outmumber cannon ani bomb strikes by about four to om. A claim sheet issued by the Mnth US Army, based upon a sample of 8190 Gernan tank casualties, attributed 22 porcent to air action but, as we shall see, much of tho discrepancy is attributable to the difficulty of distinguishing between tanks immobilized by direct and indircct air attack. Von Geyr thought ‘thet enemy air-tank cooperation was a very deadly and much feared conbination, but could give no approximate figures, Dictrich estimated tho tank casualties to air attack as 10 percent of the total, Haussor'sestimte being 20 percent. See the section treating "German Estimates..." Miscellancous Causes. Of the Gorman tank casualty sample, ul percent was immobilized by miscellaneous causes, of which non- onemy causes accounted for over 98 percent, Mechanical or terrain causes knocked out adout: 10 percent of the miscellancous total. This compares with Dietrich's figure of 30 percent; Hausser's of 15 percent (or 20-30 percent during long route marches); and Guderian's much higher figure for the Eastern Front of 60-70 percent.22/ We consider that our own figure for mechanical ani terrain immobilization is definitely too low to be representative, a fact that is explicable by the very nature of the records at our disposal, About 90 percent of our data came from Allied combat records, which had little opportunity to note or cxanine "nom enemy" causes of Gernan tark immobilisation, as opposed to destruct— ton, Of the miscellaneous causes, 3 percent of the German tenk casualties were in the abandoned category, either because of lack of fuel, parts, or recovery facilities, or beacuse of direct, or indirect action (largoly air attack),33/ Another 48 percont’ of the miscellancous sample was self-destroyed, None of the Gorman generals interrogated said anything about these tno large factors of tank casualty causationl See Annex 2 of this Appondix. It is interesting to note that the Mnth US Army's estimate of German tanks innobilized by miscellancous causes, 1. 0+, solf- destroyed or abamioned, plus those inmobilized by acrial attacks totaled 16.5 percent (2.5 percent plus 22 percent respectively, of a sample of 8190 tanks), This estimate accords woll with our own conbined total of 50,7 percent, (7.5 percent plus 13.2 percent respectively.) Zz ‘Riso ORS Report WS, 17, Analysis of Gorman Tank Casualtios in "AN » 33/ For elaboration, see ibid. > im.ANNEX 1 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY csHTS LL iby 1950 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, APPLIED STUDIES DIVISION SUBJECT: Statictical Analysis of Tank Losses by Causes in German-Soviet Ware 1, An oxhaustive esearch has been conducted in the document holdings of OMDS to establish whether or not the German Arny maintained a system for recording their tank losses in World War 1 broken down as to causes such as ertillory fire, mines, the airplane bonbs, bazookas, etc. The research covored the daily War Diaries, the Periodic, and other Operational Reports ona representative cross section of German combat units ranging from division to army group. Research was also conducted in the availeble records of OKH, OKW, and the Fuehrer headquarters, 2, Where tank losses are dealt with they are usually shown as "total" or “repairable.” ‘The tank status reports normally show the mmber in line, in repair in tho opcrational area, or in repair in rear arce shops. The cause of tank destruction or damage is not usually indicated unless circumstances were extraordinary, The battle losses are chicfly duo to artillery fire. However, there is a report by Guderian to Hitler in 1944 in which he does not, discubs percentage rates, but states that the main reason for tank losses can be ascribed to the lack of recovery gear, It appears that in the over-all production effort the Germans cut down on the rate of production of tank transporters, and this was later re- flected in inability to get damaged tanks out of the combat area, CONCLUSIONS: a. The combat units reported their losses chiefly in nunbers with the causes not mentioned, or only as incidental parts of their report. bs On the highest echelons the statistics appear to be largely the mmber of tanks in operational use, the number in production, the number on route to the armies, the forecast of future production, »-ORO-T=117_ Annex 1, Appendix B ce. While there is evidence to support the conclusion that the Germans kept a statistical analysis of reasons for tank losses, ‘there is really no evidence that they did not. The document: holdirgs in this ficld are so scattered and so fragmontary as to make any conclusion we might make rathor dubious, JOHN Ry ULMER Tt. Colonel, 050 Chief, Foreign Studies BranchQRO-T-117. Appendix B ANNEX 2 GERMAN ESTIMATES AND COMMENTS ON THEIR OWN TANK CASUALTIES On 24 May 19h5, at the Seventh Army Interrogation Center, a number of questions were directed toward prisoner-of-war German Gonorals Guderian, von Geyr, Dietrich, Heusser, and others, In answor to tho following questions: "To what do you attribute German tank losses by porcentages; air, antitank, and mechanical? Which was mst feared by the tank crews?" the following statoments wore made+ Gen Guderiant "60-70 percent through mechanical failures (Zastern Front); 15 porcent A/T; 5 percent artillery; 5 percent: mines; end 5 percent others." (Note: figures are only a very rough approximations source was vory hesitant about answering this questions) Gen von Geyr+ Source could not give any approximate figures, He thinks air-tank cooperation the most deadly combirations Air attacks are very effective and most feared by tank crews. Gen Districht "Mechenical failures, 30 percent; air, 10 per- cent; A/T, 15 percent; tanks, 45 percent, Losses due to artil- lery were mgligible, Most feared by crews: Allicd tanks and TD's," Gen fausser: “During long movements to the zone of action, 20-30 percent of all tanks en route fall out due to mechanical failures, Considering the romainder as 100 porcent, 15 percent are lost through mechanical failures; 20 percent through air attacks; 50 percent through A/T defense; and 15 percent are knock~ ed out by artillery, Tanks and TD's are foared most by German tank crews." Another source, a German tank man with eight years of experience, in answer to the question: "What was feared most by ‘the tank crews?" gave the following answer: "36 TD's end bazookas." Prisoner of war stated that usually more Panthers were disabled by overland moves (motor troubles) than in actual battles. From comments on oneny equipment made by a US sourcedli/ the following statoment was extracted: 3L7 Wotes on Separate Tark Battalions, No. 2, Hq, 12th Army Group, enored Section, 13 Aug I9bke ” lheROT dmnex 2, Appendix B Most of the ereny tanks destroyed in this battle sector were destroyed by our US aircraft. Both rockets and Cal.50 have hean-rsed to destroy these tanks, By firing Cal,50 on the ercund ahead or behind the tank, ‘the bullets ricochet through the thin floor plate and start the tank afire. They believe that this mothod of combatting enemy tanks is most effective and they would like to seo it used more often, In arother instance, a prisoner of war at the Namur (Belgium) cage was interviewed on the subject’ of white phosphorus used against Allied tanks and stated bo did not know of a tank being set afire by white phosphorus, He belioved that if this happened, it was due to an overheated engine and gas fumes in the engine compartment being set afire by the hot air being drawn in from the burning white phosphoruse Note Other prisoners-of-war had previously stated that many German tanks had beon set afire by white phosphorus shells bursting on the engine compartment, and that Ger kers feared white phosphorus more than airplanes 557 Visit to Armored Units, Armored Section, Ha, 12th Army Group, 13 Feb, 91 93,QRO~T-117 ANNEX 3 SOVIET DATA ON GERMAN TANK CASUALTIES The French General A. Guillaume, in his book entitled Soviet irs and Soviet Poyer, employs official Soviet souress ‘Throughout. On this basis, it may be of intcrest to tabulate ‘tho Soviet claims, by cause, of 2 sample of sone 3hSh German tank casualties knocked out on the Eastern Front: ‘TABLE XXXVI SOVIET CLAIMS OF GERMAN TANK LOSSES (Sampling) Cause Claimed Total Claimed AT Guns and Artillery 2602 15 03 Tanks 435 12.6 AT Rifles (or Molotov cocktails) 18 0.5 Air (Stornovik) 400 11.6 Total = 5U5h 100% No details are given as to those German tanks claimed immbilized by mires, self-destruction, abandomment, terrain, or mechanical failure, or other means, Captured tanks are also excluded from this sample.AMEX Appendix B US EMPLOWWENT OF LAND wrmes From an Army Ground Forees Board Report3 cones a number of questions and answers which shed further light on the US employment of land mines during World War II: Question 3+ Did US troops reinforce their positions by use of mines as the situation became more stable? If sv, what technique did tho Gormans employ to enforce a breach in thie barrier for the current Belgian salient? Seventh Army: "Since the assumption of our present nission our troops have laid the following:" sOAL 12,036 = MKV (Br) 10,97 MAL (Br) 226 MV (BT) 1p TéEL 9,975 Not specified 45,967 T6EL (Br) 60 Anti-Porsonnel Mines: wee “92 Flares 102 M2 w/trip 1,800 Bangalore (trip) 8 3 17h = W.P. Grenades 10 3 w/trip 1,595 W.P, Grenades (trip) 82 1-3 w/pressure 4 Grenades og Artillery shells 9 Grenades w/trip 190 Frag Grenades Inprovised (TNT) 32 2 Frag Grenades w/trip 3 Improvised (INT)w/tp 103 Not specified 155 Not specified w/trip 163 Third Army: “As the front became more stable, our troops reinforced their positions by use of mines when operational plans and the situation indicated the advisability of their use, Ninth Army: "When the situation became stable, our troops THstaTiee mines, initially, for local protection only. After the Germans launched their attack in Belgiun, extensive deliberate mimfields were installed in the Ninth Army sector, with many booby:trapped mines inter~ spersed. Approximately 200,000 mines wore installed along a LSmmile front, The Germans did not attempt an advanve through the fields described above, 37 Taswers to Questions Submitted by the ers! Sheool, AGF joard Report, 3. aeAnnex iy j.ppundix stion kr "In our retreat before the German bruak- through, were we able to employ nuisance mincs, antipersonnel mines and booby traps to any appreciable extent? Woro we able to lay any hasty mine belts? What other obstecles were employed to inpede the Geruan advance?" Third Army: "Since Third Arny was not involved in the retreat before German breakthrough, no first~hand information is available as to employnent of muisance nines, antipersonnel mines end bocby traps at that tine. However, it cen be stated thet after arrival of aa Aray on the sceno that oxtonotve minefields were / athacke by third kenp’ to etepbeeat tee eerone™ OUrENE Question 5: "Does it appear that our troops have made adequate use Of mine technique in the advance and with- drawal? Have they shown proficiency in mine technique and barrier practice? Did responsible comarders make the naximun possible uso of this proficiency? Seventh Army; "In spite of experience of the units of this aray in cnemy mino warfare in Tunisia, Sicily, Ttaly and France, there is evidence that they do not comprehend the use of mines as dofersive weapons, Our experienced units have become extrenely efficient in mine removale In the laying, markirg, and recording of minefields there is much to be desired, though these subjects have been covered in all mine schools, Since this same lack of training and experience appears in the organization of fixed positions, it is possible that this my be attributed to an absence of e defensin frame of mind on the part of cur troops or not suf- ficient emphasis on this phase of training." Question 8: "ire M6 and M7 mines being used to any extent in the Suropean Thoater?!" Seventh Army: "M-7 no, Me6 yes ~ 25,000 re- ceived and laid, This mine in short supply hero, 11 issued in liew of M6 did not prove entirely satisfactory." Third ‘M-6 and ie? mines are not available In this Theater. Ninth Army: "Neither 166 or M7 mines mve buon available For use by Niuth army trocps.! aHl iE ANNEE 5 ANTITANK AND ANTIPERSONNEL MINES Fron an Army Ground Forces Report2!/ cone a umber of interesting comments from Army and Corps Engineering Officers: antipersonnel mine Ques’ ion 103: “To what oxtent have US antitank and mes been employed and what types have been used? Gol H. 8. Miller, Engineer, XIX Corps: "This Corps has employed all issue types available anda few captured ones, We have used fever booby traps duc to the fact that we were on the offensive, The two Corps groups have laid a total of 75,360 AT minos and have removed cr destroyed 160,000 enemy AT mines, The three min places where we laid mines were at Sittard, the Roer River near Julich, and in the Hurtgen Forest. We employed mostly ML, Tho most difficult mine ficld problem was that of adequate reports, Units would leave hasty mine fields that had been placed without recording to protect overnight bivouacs." CoLF, S, Blinn, Engineer. XIII Corps: "The doforse of the Roer River Line betneon Brachelen and just north of dulich, was accomplished in dopth by mines, road blocks, outpost lines ani a warning-flare system, The defenso in depth was formed by three phase lines, cach with a "switch position! to protect Corps northorn flank, Mein weapons for each phaso line and switch position wore British MkV and Am MlAl A/T minos, which wore augmented by AP mincs (British M1 and US M2) Placed on onony approaches to and borders of mine fields laid, Barrier roports compiled from recent and interim reports in Office of Corps of Enginsers wore utilized in locating and detormining limits of eneny fields, In many instances their fields wore joined end-to-end to other eneny fields by Zz Tngwers to Questions Submitted by the OCE, AGF Board sport No. 1010,oRO-P-117 Annox $4 the MeV and MLAl laid by the divisions, The use in tho Amerioan fiolds and road blocks of AP. nines was restricted to the extrem formard fields, in which the procedures cutlined in FM 5-30 and FM 5-31 were followed. “Along the actual river line warning flares and AP mines were laid. This was carefully coordinated with infantry units who patrolled east bank, and wore only activated at night, The actual number of antiperscnnel mines cannot be computed since the records ani sketches have been forwarded or disposed of. Complete files to facilitate removal of the 200-odd fields, of approximately 90,000 A/T mines, 3,000 AP, 2,000 flares, are available to troops at Ninth US Arny headquarters, "In addition to the hasty and deliberate ficlds as mentioned provicusly, mmorous road bridges were prepared for demolition in event of attack, which Engineer guards . » « were to. perforn on ordors by telepnone a messengers "Approximately ono A/T mine in ten was a "double mine," (one on top of another), in the ‘ forward belts. Rear belts were standard hasty pattern with road breaches to nake our om use of the roads possible. Mines to cover gape were piled ina safe spot near gap and marked. Guards or patrols sccured the breaches. "The AP mines were interspersed in deliberate fields or in purely AP bolts, in a ratio of one AP to each 10-15 mines, Jctivated A/T minos were in the same ratio, placed in each deliberate section, The AP mines were so placed in each de- liberate section that a wallcing man could not shuffle through the field from any angle ani fail to set off one min. “All fiolds were marked in accordance with Anstructions contained in FM 5-30 ond Fil 5-31, and additional instructions regarding expedition of reports were required by this Headquarters." Gol. W. Ae Carter, Engincer, First US Army: "A/T mines and antipersonnel mines were used extensively for defense during the Ardennes Battloa RO-P-217 inex 5, Appendix B in Deconber 19h and Jamary 19)5. During rapid advance across France and Belgium and across the Khine River into Gormany, they were used primarily as hasty local defense measures, which were removed when the advance resmed, Types of mines used were AT, MLAL, HB-AT, Contect, UkV (British), and AP Mine N-3. Several casualties resulted from sensitiveness of the British MkV AT mine, “During the month of December 19k and in Jamary 1915, extensive standard, hasty and deliberate mine fields were laid along the US First Army front, Large deliberate fields wore laid on west bank of Roer River by Division and Corps of Engineers units, Ore standard deliberate field laid by 329th Enginer Conbat Battalion, 1Okth Infantry Division, was laid in Incherberg— Inden (Germny) area, This field which was lO yards Jong and included 2,000 yards of dumy field, contained 5,10) AT mines, In the Butgerbach- Waimes (Belgium) area large deliberate fields were laid to block enomy in their wostward advance, AlL fields were laid in accordance with standard mine field technique and were reported as being very effective against eremy armor. "Daisy" chain mine roadblocks were extensively used in December 19h, and Jamary 1945. Their offectiveness in stopping advance enomy reconnaissance vehicles was oxcellonte" estion 10h: "Have the mines, AT, HE, ¥46 and M7 boon Saar TF 30, which is most suitable for front lino uso?" Answert Col Miller said no l-6 and W-7 mines were available; Col Carter said these mines have mot been used by US First Army, “uesil ORO-T-117, Appendix E ANNEX 6 BAZOOKAS AND PANZERFAUST Investigation of an jgjerview report tron the Seventh 4rny Interrogation Centor3°/ reveals interesting comonts relative to the Gorman use of bazookas and Panzerfaust weapons. An extract from theso comments followss estion 3; "nt are your views on effectively com batting infantry 4/T noasures in the usa of the Panzerfaust?" Answors32/ cenerat dudorian thinks the Panzerfaust an excellent weapon, easy to transport, cheap and casy to mamafacture ona mass production basis, and easy to handle ina foxhole, Its disadvantages, as seen by General Guderian, are its short range and the jet flan, Both Dietrich and Hausser think that although invented as a result of the A/T gun shortage, the Fangerfaust has proven itself to a point whore it can no longer be regarded ae a pure “ouergency weapon," 4s Gereral Dictrich puts it, even if he could obtein as many 4/T guns as he wanted, ho would not like to omit the Panzerfaust in or- ganizing A/T defenses. General von Geyr regards Panzerfaust as an emergency weapon par execllence, His answer, in full: "Faute de micux, on se couche avec sa femme..,'' Z Observations on Armor nt. Seventh Army Interrogation renter, 2, May 19hS- (SECRET) 39/ Answers in Reply to Questionnaire, Ha, Seventh Army, Office of the Armored Orriesr, TB iby 151s~” Sources! Col Gen Gudorian, OKH, forner C/S German Ground Forces; Lt Gen von Goyr, Inspector, femorod Unites S$ Col Con Dietrich, 6G Sixth $3 Panzer rny; SS ol Gen Hauser, formar CG, AGp “a, »O-T-117 Appondix E ANNEX 7 HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY Office of the Ordnance Officer ‘APO 103 RRD/rfo 19 March 19h5 SUBJECT: Hxanimtion of Causce for Rendering Tanke Inoporativos 70 + Chief of Staff, Third US army + 100 Gorman Merk IIT and IV tanks oxaminod. 59 - Tanks or 59% wore destroyed by enemy gunfire as follows: 8 ~ Hit by rockets & - Hit by 90-nm aP A? ~ Hit by 751m or 76-mn AP 1 = Tank destroyed by mine, 40 - Tanks or 0% were destroyed by terrain obstacles or mechanical deficiencies. Of the 59 tanks destroyed by gunfire, 20 or 3h% burned, For details of location of hits on tanks see Figure 28, 4. 30 German Mark V and VI tanks examined. 30 ~ Tanks or 83% wore destroyed by enemy gunfire as follows? 9 - Hit by rockets 2 - Bit by 90-mm AP 19 - Hit by 75—mm or 76-nm AP No tanks costroyed by mines. 6 - Tanks or 17% were destroyed by terrain obstacles or mechanical deficiencies, Of the 30 tanks destrcyed by gunfire, 12 tanks or LOS burned. For details of location of hits on tanks, seo Figure 30. * sieoRO-1-117_ Annex 7, Appendix E 5. Discussion: The value of mobility over hoavy armament, is borne out by the fact that 83 percent of the Mark V and VI Gorman tanks were destroyed by gunfire as compared to 67 percent for dmerican My, and 59 porcent for German Mark III and IV, The minor importance of shoulder rocket guns is ovidenced by the low percentage of tanks destroyed by their use, both Ancrican and German, The Amorican tank appears to be more susceptible to fire when hit than ‘the German, Th: recognizable groups of hits as shown in Figures 28 and 30 show that the German and American gunner is shooting for the drivor and essistant driver on his front shots, The American ains nore for fini] drive than tho Gorman. On the side shcts, the German is still shooting at the spot on the forward sponson in which anmnition was stored in carly lh tanks, It is ovident from this study that oithor tho American 75-mm gun or tho 76-m gun is capable of destroying any German tanks For the Arny Ordnance Officer: K, Re DANTEL Lt Col, Ord'Dept Asst Orémnee Officer 4 Tncls Incl 1 = Statistics, Mk III & IV German Tanks Incl 2 = Plot of All Hits, ik IIT & IV Gernan Tanks Incl 3 - Statistics, lik V & VI Gorman Tanks Incl l, - Plot of A11 Hits, ld V & VI Gorman Tonksigre 27. HE 1 ANB 1 Tam eASMLES oo Tes cheese (ota oF Ha Hite agit) ‘aM Segoe wy Tah TMH CEA ACTON user: P= raateation; = Resch igre 28. SITE OF WITS SAMAK MARE 11 A 1 Th seckerAPPENGIX F LIST OF ALLIED aRMORED UNITS STUDIED - BY THEATERAPPENDIX J LIST OF ALLIED ARMORED UNITS STUDIED » BY THEATER NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS United States of fmorica lst irnored Division Ast Armored Regiment 13th Armored Regiment 2nd Armored Division 67th Armored Regiment 70th Tank Battalion United dor Tho queen's Bays 3rd Sing's Om Hussars 8th Ming's Royal Irish Hussars 9th Queen's Roynl Lancers loth Royel Hussar? The Royal Wiltshiro Yeomanry ‘The Warwickshire Yoonanry The Nottinghamshire Yeomanry The Staffordshire Yeomanry ‘Tho Yorkshire Dragoons 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars 3rd County of Lonion Yeomanry SeOROWT-127 MEDITORRANEAN 1 ‘Amed) United Kingdon (coi lth County of London Yeomnry lst, 2nd, 3rd, Sth, 6th, 8th, hOth, hist, hend, hth, sth, kéth, 47th, and 50th Battalions of the Royal Tank Reginonts OF OPI ONS (Sicily & Italy) United States of smerica lst Cavalry Reconmissance Squadron 70th Tank Battalion gist Tenk Battalion Tlst, 152nd, 73rd, 75th, 756th, 757th, 758th, 70th Tank Battalions, Ast Armored Division Ast Armored Regiment ist Tank Battalion yth Tank Battalion 2nd iirmored Division 66th Armored Regiment: 67th Armored Regiment United Kington Tho Queon's Bays The Royal Seots Groys 3rd King's Own Hussars th Queen's Own Hussars 7th Quecn's Own Hussars wes aSQRO-T=LL Appendix F United Kingdon (contimed) Sth Queen's Royal Lancers 16th/Sth Lancers 27th/2ist Lancers Ths Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry The Varwickshire Yeonanry lst Derbyshire Yeonanry 2nd Lothians and Border Yeonanry 3rd County of London Toouanry North Irish Horse Ist, 2nd, Sth, 6th, 6th, 12th, 4Oth, kth, héth, UBth, 50th, 51st, lbend, and 15th Battalions of The Royal Tank Regiment oe pala) Ast Canedian irmoured Brigade 2nd Camdian Armoured Brigade 2nd Camdion drnoured Regiment Sth Camdian Armoured Regiment, 9th Canadian Armoured Regiment 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment 12th Canadian Arnoured Regiment Ujth Canadian drnoured Regiment BUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS United States of America 2nd iwmored Division “ SeQRO-T-117 oe United States of America (continued) 66th Armored Reginent 67th iwmored Reginent 3r iwmored Division 32nd fimared Regiment 33rd Armored Reginent Ath firmored Division Sth Tank Bettalion 35th Tank Battalion 37th Tank Battalion Sth irmored Division loth Tank Battalion 3hth Tank Battalion Sst Tark Battalion 6th ixmored Division 15th Tank Battalion 68th Tank Battalion 69th Tark Battalion 7th Srnored Division 17th Tank Battalion Bist Tank Battalion Oth Tank Battalion 8th Arnored Division 18th Tank Battalion 36th Tank Battalion - ae“Ge: kO-T-127 Appendix: F United States of America (continued) 80th Tank Battalion 9th iemored Division 2nd Tanke Battalion sth Tank Battalion 19th Tark Battalion loth Armored Division 3rd Tank Battalion th Tank Bottalion 2ist Tank Battalion llth Armored Division 22nd Tonk Battalion Uist Tank Battalion 42nd Tank Battalion 12th Armored Division 23rd Tark Battalion Agra Tank Battalion \ Tita Tank Battalion 13th Armored Division alith Tank Battalion LSth Tank Battalion 46th Tank Battalion uth Armored Division 25th Tank Battalion 7th Tank Battalion 108OTT od Unites States of America (contimed) 48th Tank Battalion 16th Armored Division Sth Tark Battalion 16th Tank Battalion 26th Tank Battalion 20th Knox, Kj. (COMIFEMTAL) Data on Tark Losses; Letter & File from Lt Col K, R, Daniel, Asst Grd 0, Third US Arny, 19 Mar 1945, Subject: Fxamination of Causes for Rendering Tanks Inoporative. The Armored School, Fo. Knox, Wy (UNCLASSIFIED) Data on Tank Losses; Letter & file from Hq, Third US Army, to CG, ComiZ BTO, Attn: Brig Gon J, A, Holly, fenored Soction, 8 Apr 1945, Subject: Data on US Tanks Knocked Out by Ei Act: ‘the Armored School, Fes Knox, Kp. CUROUSSHTED) Data on Tank Losses in Sicily. Letter & file from Gen G. S. Patton, dr., to Maj Gen Alvan C, Gillen, 17 Nov 1943. The Agmored School, Ft. Knox, Ky, (UNCLASSIFIED) Eisenhower's Om Story of the War. Dwight D, Eisenhowor, New York, 19L6 Equipment, AGF Board Report No. 894, 30 Apr 1945 (SECRET) El Alamein to The River Sangro, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Tow ark, 19 Intelligence Summaries. 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