Paul Veyne ‘Translated by Paula Wissing SHORT LOAN DID THE GREEKS BELIEVE IN THEIR MYTHS? _ AnEssayon Essay on the Constitutive Imagination{eats du Sel, 1988, ‘hs Univer of Caps Ps. Chg 40857 (© 198 by The Unnersiy of Cingo libres Pathe It ‘Prodi he Ud Sats oF Amara sn ysssuone7 se Liars of Congress Cataloging a Pabetin Date Die Ges bebeve i th mths? “rcetno Let Gres om eas yes? atopy pt 1 Mooloy.Geek 1. Te ISBNO-226-45433-7_— ISBN 026-4545 ek) ‘To Estell: Blane (Que um conjunto real e vendadeiro uma doenga das nossa ideas. PessoaCcuarten Two sate ofa rivers derived from aman’s mame, we are brought back to tho original human presence dating from the time when the region became a human teritory."? But what caused the name of aking of oldto pas to, o be given wo this cvec? This is precisely what the genealogist would never ask ‘Verbal analogy is sufficient, and his preferred mode of explanation is archetypal. One might as well wonder what concrete relationship feist betweon Faunus and the Fauns, between Hellen and the Hellenes, between Pelasgus andthe Pelasgians, or, in the following eviological pastiche, borween Elephant and the elephants: “In the beginning the elephants had no trunk, but a god piled on Elephants nase co nish him for some trickery, and since that day al elephants havea unk."* Pausanias no longer understands this archetypal logic, fan he takes the archetype, who, like Adam, was the omy being, fo the fist king of the country. “The Arcadians,” he sy, say that Pelasgus was the frst inhabitant of this land. It is ‘atural to suppose that others accompanied Pelasgus and that he was not by himself or othenwise he would have been King without any subjects to rule over. However, in stature and in prowes, in hearing andin wisdom, Pelasgus excelled his fellows, and for this eason, I think. he was chosen tbe king by them. sius the poce says of him The godlike Pelasgus on the wooded mountains | Black earth gave up. ‘hat the race of mortals | might exis “These few lines offer usa kind of "collage": old mythical th is plastered over the type of rationalism practiced by Pausanias, who seems largely unaware ofthe ditfereace between these materials 3 The Social Distribution of Knowledge and the Modalities of Belief How could people believe in all these legends, and did they truly believe in them? Thisis no a subjective question. modalities of beict are related t0 the ways in which uth is possessed. Throughout the ages a plurality of programs of truth has existed, and itis these programs, involving dffeentéstibutions of knowledge that expan the subjective degrees of intensity of belies, the ba faith, amd the ‘comtudictions that coexist in tbe same individual We agree with Michel Foucault on this point. The history of ideas trly begins with the histricization of the philosophic idea of tt Thete fs no such thing asa sense of the eu Furthermore, there is ro reason quite the contrary—for repesenting what is past or Toreign as analogous to hat is current or ner. The conten of myth was situated in a noble and platonic temporality, 25 foreign to individual experience and individval interests as are goverment proclamations of esocric theories learned at school and accepted face value, In other respoets, myth was information obtained oom someone else. This was the primary attitude of the Greeks toward tnt in this modality of Belief they were depending en vomeone clie's word. Two eects can be noted. Firs there is a sor of lethargic indifference, or atleast bestation, about ruth and fetion. And this dependence ends up leading 1 rebelion: people wish to judge things for themselves, according to their own exporcnee. Its precisely this principle of current tings that will cause the Greeks to measure the marvelous against everyday realty and pass onto other modalities of belief Can belief divorced from setion be sincere? When we are separated from something by an abyss, we ourselves do not know whether we believe in itor not, Pindar was already hesitating about myth, andthe language of the Tenth Pythian, respeciul as itis, beirays somewavering: “Neither hy land nor sea do we find the route tat leads to thecelebrations oF the peoples ofthe Great North. The daring Perseus, in old times, eld easily goto them, to the forunate ones. Athena ‘tas his ide, and fe killed the Gorgon! On my par, noting suprises re or seem unbelicvable when the gods hing ito pas." "The most widespread modality of elif occurs when ove trusts the word of another. elieve that Tokyo exists, although L have not yet been there, because I cannot sez how the geographers and travel fgencies would gain anything by tricking me."® This modality ean ‘endures long a the believer truss the professionals oe until there are ‘no professionals 10 make laws on the subjcet. Westerners, atleast those among us who are not bucterologists, believe in germs and. ierease the sanitary precautions we take for the sme reason thatthe ‘Azande believe in witches and multiply their magical precautions lagiinst them heir belief is hase on trast For Pindats or Homer's contemporaries, truth was defined either ax it related to daily {experience or it terms ofthe speaker's eharaeter: whether it was loyal lor reacherous, Slalements foreign Wo experience Were nether tue noe fal. Nor wete they falschoods, fo ae doesnot exist when the Har ‘ins noting from it and does us no harm. & disinterested i is 10 ‘deception. Myth was a rertum quid, sether true noe false. Einstein ‘woul be the same for us ith uth did noe come fom a third source, the realm of professional authority Tn those far-of? times this authory had not been bom, and theology. physics, sd history did not exist. The intelloctual universe ‘was exclusively Itrary. True myths fllowed the poets” inventions in the minds ofthe listeners, wo listened dolly tothe man who knew: they had no incest in separating tuth from falehoox! and were not shaken by fictions that contradicted no knowa scence. Thus, they lislened to trae myths and inventions inthe same frame of mind. [n ‘order to shake his comtemporures out ofthis lethargy. Hesiod will be ‘obliged to create a sti ant proclaim that poets i; for he wishes for his own benefit, to constitute a realm of th, where one will ao Toager say just anything about the gods. Given is disymmetry, boli in someone else's word could in fact suppot individual enteprises that opposed ther truth tothe general fre of ignorance. This is the case with Hesiod’s speculative theogony, which i= not a revelation given by the gods. Hesiod received this knowledge from the Muses that is, from his own ‘The Social Distribution cf Kraledge andthe Modalities of Belief refectons. By ponding al ht hd ben sid about the gs andthe oti, he understood many thngs and was able establish rue and emplcts list of genealogies, Fis wore Chaos ang Earth, és well as Love: Chas Degt Night, Eat gave bint to Heaven and Oceanus ‘Tre aterhad forty dats, shone names Hesiod gives uP, Adie, lathe, the lat Polydor, ct. Many ofthese genealogies ane allegories, and ene has the impression that Hesio’ takes his Bod concepts more seriously than he takes the Olympians. But how does he Know so many names and 30 many details? How does it come © pass that all bie old cosmogonies are veriable nove? Because of, the dissymmy tha charstenzes knowledge hssed om faith it note Hesiod know that we wil ake him ats word, anh tests mse ashe wll bo ested: ho she fist to eliove everthing hat enters is head Tate mater of great problems, says the Phaedo, when oe as ot beenablewofing the wuth ones chs ot recived the revelation of it fom seme go, one can only atthe Best that has ben sa fd out fom someone who knows# The people si” of myth Gs lakes ona diferent messing. Myth no lager knowledge hovering in te ar, a natural resource whose captors ae dsungusied by treater luck or ail. Its 2 privilege of the great minds, whose teachings ae repeated. “Tt that, when one dies, one Beses like the stars i he sky," declares one of Aristophanes” heroes, who has heard tel ofthe ity knowledge eld by senain set ofthe day.” ‘ony ih these roe ess exo peulations, Cu ase on beliorhad another spe of her: the solver idles. Here we fd the 3tdevelopments of physics or metaphysics—that moins Less than the presimed beginnings of Weslrm thought. Developing 3 plyscscomisted in finding the Key wo the idle of the wold for there mas adil, and, once it was solved, all Scere would be Perce at once, rae, the mystery woul disappear. che Scales woul fal rom our eyes. For example, heres how Gresk ration depicted the evinsingsof pulosophy. Thales was the fst to ind the ey 10 all things “Everythings water” Was he teaching the unity of be word? Was, be om the tick that would ea to mona, tothe problems of Being andthe unity of natre? I fae, if we Pio Wadibon is thesis Was neither metaphysical noc ontological bul, iasead, alegrcal and. chemical, Things are made wae hese way for‘Cuarran Tans us, sea salt is made of sodium and chloride. And, since everything is water, everyting passes, flows, changes; everything runs away. A strange chemistry: on what can it base a claim to recombine the Aiversiyof its parts in ane simple body? It makes no such cain. His not an explanation but a key, and a key must be simple, Monisin? Not ‘even that, I is nok monism that leds us to speak of the “key"” to an cnigma in the singular. Now, a key is mot an explanation. While an ‘explanation accounts for a phenomenon, a key makes us forget the rid. Iv eases and replaces tin the same Way thit a clear sentence eclipses an exit, more confused, and obscure formulation. As Greek philosophical radition presents him, Thales does noc account for the world in its diversity. He gives us iste meaning,“ water,” and this answer replaces the enigmatic confusion, which is immediately forgoten. Foc one forges the ext of aril; the solution isthe whole point. ‘An explanation is something that is sought and proved. The key ofa riddle is guessed and, once guessed, it operates instantaneously ‘Thete isnot even the possiblity of an argument, The vel falls away, and our eyes are opened. Itis only necessary to say “Open sesame, Each of the firs physicists of early Greece had opened everything by himself, ina single act. Two hundred yeas later, Epicurean physics ‘would presenta similarease, We can get glimpse of in the work of Freud. Ie is amazing that the strangeness of his work states us $0 Title; these tacts, unfuling dhe map of the depths of the psyche, ‘without a shred of proof or arzument; without examples, even for purposes of clarification; without the slightest clinical illustration; ‘without any means of sing where Froud found all that o how be knows it. From observing his patients? Or, more likely, from ‘observing himslf? Its nt surprising that this archaic work has been ‘eared on ina form of knowledge tha isp less archaic: commentary ‘What else can be done but comment when the Key tothe enigma has been found? Moreover, only a genius, an inspired man, almost a god, could find the key to such an enigma. Epicursisa god-—yes, a god— proclaims his dseiple, Lucretius. The man with the key is believed at his word and will not ask more of himself than his admirers do. His siseiples do not continue his work: they transmit it an add nothing, ‘They restrict themselves to defending, illustrating, and applying it ‘We have just spoken of masters and disciples, To returm from them to the matter of myth itself incredulity arses from at least two » The Soci Distribution of Knowledge andthe Modalites of Beli sources, an upsurge of imactabilty in response tothe word of another {and the Formation of professional centers of tath ‘As will sill be the case in the eighteenth century, the Greek anstoracy wavered between two atindes toward legend: © be Dramatic and puricipate in the popular credulity, for the people Dalieve as dociely a6 they obey; oF else to refuse, on their own account, a humiliating submission, which was perceived asa result of naivet. Understanding ete fist of privileges In the frat cas, the aristocrats aio gained the power to appeal to the authority of mythical genealogies: Plato's Lysis had an ancestor who was fathered by Zeus and had received in his bouse his half brother, Heracles, another ofthe gods bastard children“? But other fashionable people had the good taste to be enlightened an to think diferetly from the crowd. Xenophanes docs not wish his guests a banquets to fall to quareling oF to spout foolishness, and, a8 a consequence, he forbs them to speak “of Titans, Giants, Centaurs, (fal inventions ofthe Ancients," Te lesson was heatd;at the end (of Aristophanes’ Te Wagps, ason who tres to inculcate ite social istinetion in is athe, whose ideas ae lower class tells him that itis ‘ot polite to tlk about myths atthe table. One must speak of human things. 5" Such, he copeludes, isthe conversation of proper people Not to believe everything was a Greck quality par excellence: "For centuries past, says Herodoas, “the Greeks have distinguished themselves from less civilized peoples by their greater awareness and lack of foolish ereduly Unuilingness to accep the word of anothers less amt of lass Jmerest than a character tut, and it would be 2 mistake to see this rebelliousness as an aristocratic privilege. One would be equally ristaken to suppose that it belongs to certain periods that alternate with periods of faith. One peed only think of the pages of Eudes de "ociologie religieuse, in which Gabriel Le Beas analyzes the reports ‘made by bishops ofthe Old Regime after their diocesan inspections. Esch village had is miseeant, who, nt daring to fil in heir Sunday obligations. remained in the back of the church during the Mass or ‘even stayed outside on the portico, Bach society had its doubters, who ‘were more of less numerous and bold, depending on the indulgence Aisplayed by the authorities. Greece had its share, asi attested by a femarkable line from Aristophanes’ The Knights. A slave despairing over his fate says 10 his companion in misfortune, The a(Cnarren Tunez ‘only thing left fe dois to throw ourselves atthe feet ofthe gods," nd his comrade answers him, “Indeed! Say, then, do you realy believe thc tere ae gous?" Lam aot sue chat his slave's es were opened by the Sophist enlightenment. He belongs tothe irreducible tinge of unbelievers who make their refusal less because of reason and the ‘movement of idess than in reaction toa subtle form of authonty. the ‘ery same authority that Polybis aibuted co the Roman Senate and Ata is preted by all those acho ally their hrone tothe alae" Not that religion necessarily has a conservative influence, but some ‘modalities of belief are a form of symbolic obedience. To believe isto ‘obey. The political role of religion isnot at alla rater of ideological centcnt ‘A second reason for no longer believing everything that wis said ‘vas that myth, 38 it pertained to information, wasin competion with the specialists in tru, the “investigators” oF historians who, as professionals, began to carry authority. Now, in their eyes it was ‘ecessary for myths oft wii the rest of reality, since they claimed to be real. Herodotus, collecting information in Egypt, discovers a cult fof Herackes (fora god isa god everywhere, just as an oak isan oak everywhere; but each people gives ita diferent name, so that divine names ae fanslated from one language to anther, just ike common nouns). As the date thatthe Egyptians assigned to this Heracles did not at all coincide with the legendary chronology of the Grecks, Herodotus tried to resolve the dificulty by inquiring about the date that the Phoenicians tributed to their ow Heracles, and is itficulty only grew. All that he was able to conclude was that al men were in sgreemeat about seeing Heracles as a very ancient go and also tht ‘ne could extricate oneself from the difculy by distinguishing two of them, That is not all, “The Greeks say’ many othor things withoot thinking. No less credible is amyth that they tell about Heracles, when the Later went to Egypt," the inhabitants of this country had apparently tempted. sariice im i Zeus, but Heracles would not [et them take him and killed them al. Impossible, protests Herodoaus. ‘The Egyptians do not make living sacrifice, as anyone who knows thei laws is sware, And since Heracles was sil only a man according to what people say indeed, he became a god only a his death), would itbe natura for a single man to beable to kil myriads fof other men?” We see just how fur Herodotus is from acceping 2 The Soviet Disribucon of Knowledge andthe Modalities of Belief knowledge based on the word of another. Such a source provides information: What fs the capital city ofthis kingdom? What are So and-So's Kinship lines? Wht ae Heracles’ dates? Those who inform ‘youare themselvesinformed, and inthis area the siporiant opposition ‘snot between rth nd ero but between information and ignorance Except that, in matters of information, 2 professional investigator does not have the docility of other men. He eross-checks and verifies At, The social distibuton of knowledge is thereby wansformes; henceforth other men, not wishing to appear untuored, will prefer to consult this profesional. And, as the investigator cross-checks information, he imposes the need for coherence on reality. Mythical time can no longer remain secretly different fom our own ‘temporality. Its nothing more than the post. “The criticism of myth aries fom the methods of inguiry. It has nothing to do either with the Sophiste mavemont, which ended rather in a cniicism of religion and society, with the cosmologies of piysies How can such a transformation be explained! I don't know and am rot vory eager to lear. History bas long been defined as an explanatory account, a narativefentoring causes, To explain used to ‘uss for being the sublime pur of the historians rat. Indeed it was Considered that explanation consisted in finding reason, garbed asa cause—that i, a scheme (the rise ofthe bourgeoisie, the forces of production, the revolt ofthe masses) that brought great and exciting ‘eos into ply. But let us suppose that explanation is reduced to ‘envisagi polygon of minor causes that do notemain constant from ‘ne set of citcumstances tothe next and that do not fill de specific places tht a pattern would assign to them in advance. In this ease, ‘explanation, which has become circumstantial and aneedoul, would be no more than an accumblation of chance occumences and would soon lose all inorot, In eturn, another task that sno les interesting emerges: reveal tho unpredictable contours of ths polygon, which no longer has dhe ‘conventional forms or ample folds that make history into # noble tragedy, and to restore their original silvtts to events, which has ben concealed under borrowed garments. The te forms are so ‘ereglar that they literally go unseen. Presuppositions "go without saying" and past unsoticed, and in their place conventional peneralities are scen. One notices neither the ingury nor the 3(Cnarren Tune controversy. One sees histrical knowledge throughout the centuries ‘and its progress. Geek enticism of myth becomes an episod inthe Progress of Reason. and Greek democracy would be etemsl Demoeracy if ic were not fo the blot of slavery 1, then, history proposes 10 lift the clath and make what goes- without-saying explicit, it ceases to be explanatory and becomes & hermeneutic. Thea we will nt wonder what social cause le atthe root of the criticism of mth. In place of @ kind of holy history of Enlightenment or Society we prefer to substitute a perpetual chance redisrbution of ever-changing minor causes that engende effects 0 less due to chance but which pas for being great and revelatory of hhuman purpose. Scheme for scheme, that of Peete Bourdieu, which ovisions the specificity and autonomy ofthe symbolic fed as divided among centers of force, seems preferable 10 the scheme of social lasses 0 schemes are better than one, Letus pen here wis will at first seem to hea parenthesis of several pages but which will in Tat lead us to the heart of our problem of ryt. IFeverything has t be sid, we resign ourselves all the more easily to not explaining as we are led think that the unpredictable nature of history is de less to its contingency (which would not prevent post evetum explanations) than tis capacity for invention. ‘The idea brings on a smile, for everyone knows that tis nystical and antscientifc wo believe in absolute beginnings. Thus its annoying to rote that scientific and explanatory thought ress, without our ‘knowing it, on presuppositions that are no less arbitrary. Lec us say it ina few words, forthe use of those who, in public or private life, one fine moming find themselves doing oF thinking things they never would have imagined the night before. And also fr the use of those who have found themselves unable to predict the behavior of thie most intimate friend but who, after the fact, have in retrospect ‘iscovered in this friend's past or character tat that would have foretold it [Nothing is simpler or more empirical in appearance than causality. Fire makes water boil; the rise of a new clas Brings about 2 new ideology. This apparent simplicity camouflages a complexity we are Unaware of. «polarity between action and passivity. Fire is an agent ‘hat makes itself be obeyed; water is passive and does what the fre ‘makes it do. In onder to knose what will happen, is necessary t0 see in what direction the cause moves the effec forthe effect can no more Py The Social Dusribton of Knowledge ond the Modelies of Belef ‘innovate than a billiard ball can when it is struck and propelled by another, Same cause, same effect; causality will mean regular ‘secession, The empirical interpretation of eausality is no different. It abandons the anthropomorphism of a slave-like effect, rezulatly ‘obeying the order of is cause, but it retains the essential part of the fargument, the idea of regularity. Under the false sobriety of ‘etupiicsm lurks metaphor. 'Now, since one metaphors as good as anether, one could as easily speak offre and boiling ora sing class and its revolution indifferent terms, in which only active subjects operated. Then one would say that when an apparatus is assembled, comprising fire, a pot, wate and an infinity of other details, water “invents boiling and Teinvent it each time itis put on the fie. As an agent, itresponds toa ‘uation; it actalizes a polygon of possibilities and deploys an activity tha channels a polygon of tiny causes, which are obstacles limiting this energy more than they are motors. The metaphor is no Jonger that of aball thrown ina specific Jireetion but that of un elastic ss occupying the space left tot ts no longerby considering the use that we know what the gas will do o rather, there is 0 longer any cause, The polygon does not permit the prediction ofthe future ‘configuration ofthis expansion of energy rather, its the expansion of ‘energy tht reveals the polygon, This natural resiliency is als called the will o power. we livedinasociety in which this metaphorical scheme operated, we would have no trouble admitng that a revolution, om intelectual fashion, a thust of imperialism, or the success ofa polities system responds not to human nature, the needs of society. © the loge of things, bur that his sa fashion, a project that we ge tired up about. Notonly would thave heen posible forthe Revolution of 1789 notto have occured (history being contingen), but. moreover, the bourgeoisie could have invented something else. In accordance with thisdynamie andindeterminate scheme we would imagine the process fof becoming as the more or lss unpredictable work of exclusively setive subjects that obey no Taw, ‘One could counter that this scheme is as unverifiable and metaphysical asthe others, which ae no less so, certainly; but thas the advantage of being an alternative solution tht eliminates some false problems and frees our imagination. We were beginning 10 ‘weary ofthe prison of socal and ideological functionalism. One could 3s(Cuarren Toner equally object that if becoming comprises only active subjects, the causal regularities that reappear from time 10 time. become incomprehensible. Not necessary. If ose unfailingly pits a heavyweight boxer against a feutberweight the heavier agent ill regularly win. But let us suppose that, throughout the world, boxers are matched and paired off by chance. The regularities of such victories would cease tbe the general rue, ane boxing results would fun the gamut from fll predictability to complete regularity «0 the stroke of genus, In this way we also account far the mast obvious ctaraetersic of historical vansformation. Ic is composed of a Spectrum of events that run from the most predictable and regular to the most unpredictable. Our theory of ence isa monism made up of chances—in otter words, 2 pluralism. We will not make the “Manichaean opposition between inertia and innovation, of between ‘fer andthe vital impulse, e7 other avatars of Gonads Evil. The hance matching of unegual agents accouncs as effectively for physical necessity as for radical innovation. Everything siavention ot ‘invention, one afer the oer In truth, the role of pula succession or reinvention isthe effect oF 8 post eventum analysis or even a reuspectve illusion, Fir will explain boiling, and slippery strets will explain a frequent type of ‘automobile accident if we subtract sll the othr infinitely varied ‘Geeumstances at work in these inaurerable plots, Thus, historians and sociologists can never predict anything and can abways be right. ‘As Bergson writes in hs admirable study onthe possible and the eal, the inventive ture of becoming is sich that it 48 only by a retrospective usin that the possible seems (o exist priori the real How can we not se tha if the events always explained after the fat by such and such antecedent events, a completely ‘diferent event would also be equally explained, in the same cireumstances, by antecedents otherwise chosen—how to puri? y the same antecedents broken down, distibutd, nd perceived in a diferent way and, nally, by retrospective tension? So let us not get 100 impassioned for or against the past eventum analysis of the causal structures among the student population of The Social Disibton sf Knee andthe Modal of Beli NNanteme in April, 1968. In May of 1968 or July of 1789, if the revolutionaries bad for some minor reason discovered a pasion for 3 new religiosity, after the fact we would probaly be able to find, in ‘their mentale. a means of making this fashion understandable. The simplest wai til conveniently break down the event rather than the eauses, [F May of 1968 isan explosion of dissatisfaction withthe administration (surrounded, las, by a charade which, Deing exaggerated, does not uly exist), tae tue explanation of May. 1968, will assuredly be the poor alminisiraive organization of the Universit system ofthe time, Since Marx the sprit of seriousness has Jed us to consider historical or scientific becoming a8 a succession of problems that huronity poses for itself and resolves, while, obviously acting or knowing humanity ceaselessly forgets cach problem in onder to think of something else, Thus a realise approach would le less in aking. “How wil al this end?” han woncering, "Wht are they going to invont this time?" The existence of inventiveness means that history doesnot conform to schemes Hilerism was invention in the sense thar itis explained neither by eternal polities nor by the forces of production, It was ancacounter among Un causa cries. The famous fc that “Pacts do notexist” the words are Nietsehe' sand not Max Weber's) is nt linked tothe methodology of historical knowledge and the plurality of interpretations ofthe past made by different historians. .deseribes the structue of physical and human fealty. Bac fact (the telationships of produetion, “Power,” “religious need." or social exigencies) plays a differen: role, or rather changes from one ‘onjunctre to another. Its ole and identity ae onl cium “Motcover, ifone thing mustsurprise us, itis less the explanation of| histoncal formations than their very existence. History is as complicated as itis inventive. Whatis man’ scapacity to actualize, for ‘no reason and abot nothing, these capacious constsctions thot go by the name of sovial and eultural works and practices and that areas ‘complex and as unexpected as living species, as if man Radenersy he ‘did not kw what vo do with? [Natural reslieney orthe willt power, explains paradox knownas the Tocqueville effect. Revolutions break out when an oppressive regime begins to-become more liberal. Uprisings are not like a Kettle ‘ha blows it id off because ichas hegun to oil. On the contrary, itis‘cuarren Tine aslighcrasingof the lid because of some external cause that brings the kettle to boil, and this succeeds i blow ing ofthe lid ‘This long’ parenthesis brings us t0 the heart of our theme: the flowering of myth and all manner of foolish ales ceases to mystify ws by its gratitousness and useessness if we see that history’ itself is ceaseless invention and doesnot lead the reasonable lie ofa petty sconomizer, We have the habit of explaining events by a eause that ‘moves the passive object ina predictable direction (Guards, bey me!) bu since the future remains unforeseeable, we ate resigned 0 the composite solution of mixing intelligibility with contingency. A tiny pebble can jam or throw the moving body offcourse, the guard can fail to obey (and, if they had obeyed, writes Trotsky, there would have been no revolution in Leningrad in February, 1917), andthe revolution ean fil to break out (and, Trotsky also writes, if Lenin had Inadatiny stone in his bladder, the revolution of October, 1917, would ‘ot have begun), Pebbles so minute that they have neither the dignity of intelligible schemes nor the weight needed o disqualify them. ‘But suppose that, instead of a cause, corrected by contingency, we have elasticity anda polygon with an indefinite numberof sides (or ‘often the sides wll be counted i the retrospective light ofthe event) “he resulting event is active. Like a ga, it occupies al the space left free between the causes, and it occupies them rather then not ‘occupying them. History expends itself for nothing and fails to moet its own needs. The possibilty of predicting wil depend on the ‘configurstion ofeach polygon an will alway be Himiteds for we can never account for an indefinite numberof sides of which no one is ‘more determinative than the others. The dualism of ntlligitiity corrected by the admission of contingency disappears o, rather, is replaced by contingency in a diferent sense, one that i truly richer than that of Cleopatra's nse: dhe negation of prime mover of history (Guchas the relationshipof production, Politis, the wile power) and the afirmation ofthe plurality of movers (we would say instead, the plurality of these obstacles that are the sides of the polygon). A thousand tiny causes take the place of a single intelligibility. I Aisappears as well, because a polygon is nota scheme. No longer is there any transhistrical scheme of revolution or social preferences in literature or cuisine. Henceforth, every event resembles, more orless, ‘an unpredictable invention. Elucidating this event will be more interesting than enumerating its minute causes, andit will inany case « The Social Disibuion of Krowledge and ihe Modalies of Belief be the preliminary task, Finally, if everyting is history, and if there areas many diferent polygons as there are revolutions, what remains foe the human scinces to talk about? What then could they tll us abou Greek myth that history could noe roach us?5 Behind This Sociology an Implicit Program of Truth Relationships of force, whether symbolic or not, are not invariable “They undoubtedly have the arbitrariness of analogical formations, but different ones. Their transhistrical appearance Is an analogical lsion. Their sociology is set within the limits of an arbitrary and historical program. CCiticiing: myths did got mean proving they were false but rediscovering their truthful bass. For histrath had been overaid with lies. “All dough the ages, many events that have occurred inthe pst and even some that occur today, have heen generally dseredited because of the lis built up on a foundation of fact... Those who ikea listen tothe miraculous are themselves apt toad tothe marvel, and so they run tuth by ming it with falsehood." But where do these lies come from, and what purpose do they serve? This is something the Greeks did not wonder about great deal, since ali has ‘nothing positive about it.I is nonbeing, and that is all. They hardly ‘wondered why some had led; instead, ey wondered why others had believed. It is with the modems, from Fontenelle to Cassie, Bergson, and Lévi-Strauss, that the problem of myth becomes that of its genesis. Farthe Greek, this genesis did not pose any problems. At bottom, myths are authentic historical traditions for how could one speak of what docs not cxist? The truth can be altered, buts i impossible t speak of nothing. On this point the moderns wonder instead whether one is able to speak without a motive, without some imterest being involved. Even Bergson, who developed the idea of| sratuitous mthmaking to its fullest, postulates fist that storyeling inally has vital funetion?® only this function goes awry and often tums io nothing. Fontenelle was doubles the fistone to say: myths have a0 basis im truth and are not even allegories, “Therefore let us‘cuarten ve ‘not seek anything else in fable but the histony of the errors of the human sprit." ‘The Grecks sought a truth behind the lies. They asked what was the cause—ingenuousness, nalveté, euetheia—tor sucht was the sanctioned term.*7 Its ingenwousness that leads one to place one's faith in *whatin the historical depths has ben tainted with falsity," and these falsies, mixed with myth, ae called the myths. ts truly naiveté that is responsible for lies, There would be fewer SMoryelles if there were fewer naive listeners." The antigua ‘reduluas explains that most myths date back to ancient times! Mythis an account of te events covered witht acretion of legends ‘hat have mukiplied overtime. The older a tation , the more the _mythodes encumbers it and renders it less worthy of belie. For the modems, on the contrary. myth will be the nacration of teat event, and itis this that gives rise to its legendary aspect. This event is less altered by adventitious elements than it is epically ‘magnified. For the popular soul enlarges great national exploits Legend has is origin in the popular genius, which makes up stories to tell what i eally tue. That which is most ire in legends is precisely the marvelous; that is where the emotion of the national soul is revealed. Rightly or wrongly, ancients and modems believe in the historicity of the Trojan War—but forthe opposite reasons, We believe because ofits marvelous aspect; they believed inspite of i. For the Geeks, the Trojan Warhad existed because a war has nothing ‘of the marvelous about its fone takes dhe marvelous out of Homer, {his war temsins. For the modems, the Trojan Waris true because of the fabulous elements with which Homer surrounds it: only an ‘authentic event that moved the national sol gives birth to epic and legen. For the Grecks a mythic tration is tree despte the marvelous (Ocigen says it very well: historic events cannot he subject to logical proof even when they are authentic. For example, it would be impossible to demonstrate thatthe Trojan War try took place i Someone denied iton the grounds tha he aceounof this war contains certain unlikely details, to wit: that Achilles was the son ofa goddess, ‘Aeneas the son of Aphrodite, and Sarpedon the son of Zeus. The demonstration would be all the more difficult because we would be hampered by “the fictitious stores which for some unknown reason Behind Thi Sociology an Imps Prograr of Tradh are bound up with the opinion, which everyone believes, that there ‘was a war in Troy.” Let us suppose again, continues Origen, that someone “doesnot believe the story about Oedipus and Jocasts an Eteocles and Polyneices, sons of them bath, because the half ‘maiden Sphinx is bound up with it, Proot is immediatly impossible ‘The same will be said of the Epigones, even though thei story ‘contains no fictitious clemonts, and of the retarm ofthe Herilid, 8 vwellas ofa thousand oer stories.” Myths therefore have truebsis, and ifthe historicity ofthe wars of Troy and Thebes, recognized by all, snot demonstrable, its because no event canbe prove ‘Bur then, if along withthe ies, myth contains some truth, the mest urgent ask is noo psychologize the storyteller but o lear how tobe alert fo falsehood. The victim is more intzesting than the guilty psy ‘The Greeks always thought thatthe human scienees were normative rather than descriptive, of, rather, they never even thought to make a Aistinetion.1®" In their eyes a science of myth would not undertake ro ‘lcidate the error bu to lear how to beware oft, Instead of asking, ‘whether myth explains riual, or reveals through is structure the structure of the human mind, or is a functional or disordered creativity, ete. twill be more useful tobe the watchdog of though: fone will condemn human naiveté and separate the wheat from the chat. ‘And, since there is a watchdog. i less urgent to understand the forger’s motives than to identity him. Who is the author of mythology? Who made up this mass of far-fetched and, even worse, indecent legends, from which nursing children drive a false idea of the gods? Who atributed t the gods a conduct unworthy of thei Doliness? Not too much was knavin, No one knes the name ofthe inventor of mythology. However, since a guilty party was nzessary, Homer, Hesiod, and other poets Served the purpose, “fort sth ‘undoubvedly, who gave men these false als." They invented Some myths, at east. And then, who invented the lis, if nt the professionals in mendacious invention? Even when these inventions have a lofty allegorical meaning, they are nonetheless podagogically dangerous. This i why Homer will be expelled from the city. As ‘we see, Homer is herenot the poet we know. He isnot the authorof the Mad but the supposed creator of all mythology. Plato does not ‘ogulate the foationship between the State and blle-lerres bu thatCcuarren Five (of the State and the collective consciousness. His postion is not ‘explained by the Greek idea tha every poet creates myths but by tis ‘other idea that ll myths were invented by poets. 17 ‘This rationalise canbe countered by a rtionalism-ande-a-hal: can fone seriously believe that the posts invented mythology for the pleasure oft? Could imagination be ivolous? Its far oo fit 0 sy, with Plato, that myths, if well chosen, ean be educational, Stabo speculates that every myth hasan instructive intention and thatthe [oct didnot write the Oayssey to entertain but to teach weograpy.* ‘To the rationalist condernnation of the imaginary as fase, the apologetic of tho imaginary replies thatit conforms toa hidden reason. For its not possible tole ‘Therefore iis impossible For a myth to be completely mythical “The Greeks could enize the deals of fables, but they could aot disregard the fables themselves. The only debate was to decide Whether mythology was trattal only in part or in its entity, The voyages af Odysseus.re a courvein geography im which everything is voracious, andthe legend of Athena born from Zeus’s head proves, according to Chrysipps, hat technical knowledge i transite! by speech, which is ceoteed in the bead, Myth is truthful, but figuratively so, 1 is pot historical truth mined with ies; iti @ high pilosophical ccaching that is entirely tue, on the condition that, instead of taking i literally, one sees ini an allegory. Two schools exist then: te criticism of legends by historians and te allegorical interpretation of legends by the majonty of philosophers, including the Stoies." From this ill emerge te allegorical exegesis of the Bible, destined fr fifteen hundred years of triumph, The assumption behind Sioicallegorism was the same as tha of biblical allogorism. The ext under consideration was held tobe a ie authority. Everything that Homer and de other poets said proved it ‘This is an aspect of Greok thinking about which tisnecessary 1889/8 few words. In order to prove something or persuade someone of @ teuth thinker could proceed in t least three ways: develop line of reasoning reputed to be rigorous, touch the listener's heart bythe use ‘of thetorc, orrefer othe authority of Homer or another ancient poet ‘The Swwis, whites an ivitated Galen, are virtua in matters of loge: but ones it isa question of puting this logic into practice on some specitie problem, they are worthless and resort to the most hollow o Behind Tals Sccoiogy an plicit Program of Diath mode of argument: they ple up quotations irom the poets as evidence." Rigorous reasoning? A great reader of the Second Amalie, Galen knows only syllogistic proofs the goes so for as t0 call ther geometric)!" Lam not soe whether he has fulilled hs promises in the De usu parsurn, where ho demanstares the finality ofeach ofthe organs of the human body by analogy to machines built by men CClaimsto rigorand even deduetion according othe Aristotelian ideal ‘ordinarily amount oa thal atte (ane wishes tobe serous, ne will no ay just anything) and toa certain relationship o others. One will make a distinction between demonstation and persuasion and refuse o play on the readers” sensibiles, a shetorie does. OF course, the thetorcal art also gave speechmakers and orators 1ypes of speeches, models of reasoning, and common(or not)-places tat needed only tobe developed. Nonetheless, the specificity of thetoic Jay in is rejection ofa technical, cold sppearance in otter persuade Dy virtue of infectious enthusiasen, insinuating charm, string movements, of sometimes a captivating nervous tension. This lay [reachers? att was recognized as 1 perfectly legitimate mode of persuasion —or, rather, the audience was divided between this mode and the preceding one Buta third mode of persusion aso existed, at least among the founders of Stoicism: to invoke the witness of the poets and, paniculaly, of Homer. Galen is indignant to see a Chrysippus Ahandon sciatic proof so often and peefer to multiply quotations from Homer,'"? just as rhtoreians seek to impress the judges by calling the greatest possible number of witnesses before the bench. It isin this manner that Chrysippus, wishing 10 prove that governing reason was lodged in the heart inicad of the mind, filled long pages ‘wih poetic quotations ofthis sorts“ Achilles resolved in his heat to raw his sword,” do not know whether the tre nlure ofthis proof by poetry was recognized among the Stoes, who do not themselves seem to have made a theory oft, but their practice constitutes an impli theory. Homer's prestige as a classic, or suber as a focus of national recognition throughout the Greek world, does not count for much Dhete, nor does the prestige of poetry in general; Chrsippus is no Heidegger. Besides Homer, he quotes many other poets and evenCurren Five tragic poets, forgetting thatthe tragedians put in the mouths of their ‘characters what was demanded hy ther oles, not bythe truth. And, besides poctry, Chrysippus and all the other Stoics quoted rmyths, the allegorical interpretation of which they had systematically chat, they didnot consider that myths and poetry conveyed a revealed wisdom, for they just as often quoted proverbs. and ‘etymologies forthe same purpose. In thei eyes the “etymological meaning) was the “authentic” or “ewe” meaning (such 1s the ‘meaning ofthe wor! erymon). Thus hey did not see pete activity a8 having privileged aceess tothe truth, ether. What di poetry, myihs, exymologies, and proverbs al! have in common? Did they serve a8 type of proof by general consensus? No, since prose—ot, gute simply, any phrase heard from the lips of a passer-py—would then ave been equally acceptable asproof. Was ittheancient quality ofthe evidence? No, since Euripides was als called as a support. ‘Theexplanstion, [imuagine, is tha poetry belongs wo the same realm as vocabulary, myth, and figures of speech. Far from taking i authority from the poet's genius, poetry, despic the poet's existence, isa sor ofauthoriess speech. It has o locator its what is sad." ‘Thus iteanno le, see only aloeutor would be able to do that. Prose has speaker, who tells the truth ores les or smistaken, But poetry has no more ofan author than vocabulary dees. resembles myth, nd the profound reason that makes the Gresks say thatapoetby definition creates myths is perhaps linked less to the frequency of mythological allusion io poetic works than to the fact that myth and poctry draw their authority from themselves. The tuth comes forth from the lips of the poets as naturally a6 i issues from those of ehildren. They do nothing but reflect things as they are. They expess the truth 25 naturally as springs flow, and they could not reflect what does not exist. [Ei to be belioved that for Chrysippus as mich as for ‘Antitheses, one cannot speak of what is not!" Poewy ie an fnvoluntary” and truthfol mirror, and it is because st reflects involuntarily thar Chrysippus did not tire of accumulating the evidence of the poets. If in his eyes the poets had been reflective ‘thinkers, who cook responsibilty for adoctrine, a single quote would have suficed, as Galen has bm note; but they tll the truth as if ‘without thinking of it, Chiysippus, awestruck, does not tie of Behind This Socoigy a plc Program of Dah showing how the basement over whieh his own philosophy is uit continuously sllows truth to low in fom all ids. ‘Since the Stoes are certain beforehand that myth and poetry speak the tut, they have aly o put ther o torture wo recone them wit this truth, Allegory will fUrish this Procrsiean bed. The Stoics Shrink before nothing. One day Chrysippas was shown a paiating in hich the salacious imagination of the cicerom saw Hera inflicting on ‘Zeus an agreeable treatment hat cannot he named indecent compaty CChrysippus managed to recognize in itan allegory of mater absorbing spermatic Reason in order to engender the cosmos. For the philosopher, myth was thus an allegory of philosophical truths. For the historians, it wat a slight deformation of historical teats, Let it be sad im passing that each ofthese versions is found in Plato—but let us not dwell on a subject that would make the most intrepid of commentators finch. Sometimes Plato crates his own ryt, which are approximations ofthe Ie, and sometimes, as we have briefly indicated earlier, he encouners some of the Greek bistorical myth along his way and than subjects hor tothe same type ‘of ertcism that was used bythe historians of his time. However, for Plato, philosophical allegory, this half-rath, corresponded 9 the rrticipation of the sensible in che truth ‘of the Weas and— potwithstanig. this—corresponded also t0 the impossibility of rigorous knowledge of te sensible. How did the Stoies expiin that the poets told the tut by allegory? To hide sn reveal the tah inn enigma? Out of some ancient naivets? And pethaps these thinkers did fot consider thi question, For the Greeks, the medium disappears [hind the message Whether as allegeris or somewhat altered titions, myths gencrally found credence so that nthe middle ofthe Metaphysics an ‘Aristotle, little given te developing facile criticisms, nevertheless jidges it opportune to discuss in 3 tone of scathing irony the legends ‘bout ambrosia und nectar, the liquors of immortality. Even those ‘who mistrostd myths di not dar challenge thom atthoirbassshence thei dificult. This is why they so often ser only to al-believe in their legends orto believe thathey believein them - . Butdo partial rmodilities of belief exist? Were they notraterhesitating between two program of trath? It was atthe faith that ws divided, but mth hat ‘vashalf- rotten in theieyes: for itarose from wo wuts’ acrtcismof 6Curren Five the unlikely or the unworthy, based onthe content, and a rationality of the imagination, according to which it was impossible for the Container t0 contain nothing and for one to imagine in 0 void ‘Therefore, myth always mixed tho tue and the false. Lies served to ‘adorn the te in orer to make it palatable; o else myth tld the tath by enigma and allegory: or agin, it had come to attach sll (0 2 bbuckground of truth." But one could not lie initially. Myth ill (cansmit either some useful teaching, of a physical or theological Aoctrne hidden under the veil of allegory, othe memory of events of pst times.4"* AS Plutarch says, truth and myth have the same ‘elationship as the sun to the rainbow, which dissipate light ito an iridescent variety." ‘What interests usin this affair is nyth as historical waditon, Since ‘myth as form was never questioned, ancient rites varied according to its content: t offer more pious version ofthe mythical ods oF (0 transform the heroes ino historical characters. Legends bring us sneedotes or tales related to the great Figures ofthe heroic times, These are so many sources fo histor, nd what is history? Mis the politics of olden times. One will therefore tke the myth in ¢ politica sense. The Greeks will na be the lat to act tis way, and Machiavelli will do the samme thing ageio, According to him, Moses was prince who had to conquer the thione, which presupposes = merit far superior to that possessed by those who nly at take the trouble to inherit one. However, he shares this merit with Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus, who also conquered power, ad, “although ‘one must not speak of Moses, since he only executed the wil of God, nevertieless” one will agree that his methods “do not seem very different” ffom those of other princes. “"He who reads the Bible with good sense will see that Mages, to ensure the observation ofthe Tables ofthe Law, vas constrained to put an infinite auriber of people co death.” Machiavelli had no need forthe Bible fr this politics version of Moses; he hd only to read the Jewish Anuguites by Flavius Josephus, who subjects Moses to the sreatmedt that Thucydides or Arstole imposed on Theseus or Minos.!2° And Probebly with the same secret feeling that one must not foster 8 childish aotion of princes. The great and sublime thing alle politics is not made for he nlve. Now, nothing is mote naive than legend. It sees princes with a child's eyes: nothing but love alas with the els, extravagant exploits, miracles made to asound old women, 66 Behind This Sociology a mpi Program of Tach Fw ean the text ofthe most ancient history be aeorded its pis] [Ltckily, the thing is possible. For if che unlikely purities are obviously fale, falsehood, sen fom its own standpoint, is nothing but the ruth deformed. I is therefore possible to restore the irue historical text, and we have seen chat Polybius and Aristotle rediscovered the orginal meaning of Acolus and the Minotaur. But the most masterful ofthe corrctors was Placphtus. Hts principles aye very sound: if they have not been educated, men believe ‘everything that is tld them; but wise men believe in nothing. The later are wrong, for everything tht has been spoken of has existed (otherwise how would one speak of i). One merely has to keep strc co the ele that what is possible i only tha hich sll exits today. ‘In order to make the transition from myth wo history, i will hus be sulficien to correct mistakes that often ae simple confusions over words. The centaur mentioned by the poets are impossible, for, if suck hybrid beings had exited, some of them would stil be around today. A moment's reflection enables us to see how the legend developed: in order to kill wild bulls, someone invented horseback riding and spering the quay with javelin (Kem). Nor did Duedalus ‘mak living and moving sates, but he had 2 more supple and lifelike style than hisrivals, Polops noverhad winged horses, but he had ship ‘on which winged horses were painted. Palaephatus, let us note, does not for an instant douby the historicity of Daedalus, Pelops, and ‘Acolus (whom he explains inthe same manner as Polybius will), He also admits that in there faroff times the gods mingled in human affairs, Athena and Apollo ad a hand in the tonture of Masyas, and ‘Apollo actually loved Hyacinth, but it would be childish to Delieve that this god wrote the name of his lover onthe petals ofa lower, The ‘mith is that Apollo went no further than ewving this lower the name of| the beautiful yout, We sce just how far Paluephats takes rationalist optimism. The text of the uth is noc iremediaby spoiled, and for reson, One cannot lie er niko, one can only distort the tuth. Palaephatus thinking ceases wo be bewildering i we see that its supported by this ide, dear tothe Greeks, as wells by ancther one: thatthe problem of rediscovering the orginal ext is defined quite narrowly, for error is ‘multiple nd conest meaning unique‘cunrora Five And how does one rediscover this correct meaning?” By going ‘against natural inclination. There infact exists an inclination for stortion among men, who slide ever all the obstacles formed by relations between things and thei words; they take a word fora thing. ‘one Word for another, painting for realty, thing foran idea, Wesce the originality of Palaephatusvs-icvis te enticamof myths ait had been practiced sinee Hecatacus: for him, myth hs not recived foreign additions but has undergone alterations, This is. why Paluephatus isthe omly one to rttn the intervention ofthe gods. He oes not measure the mythical past against present reality, in which tho gods do not intervene, but considers myth in itself and finds caricatured by misunderstanings or involuntary puns. Instead of removing the supernatural he comet semiological distortion. ‘Myth is a copy of the pasts and it does not so much undergo incepolation 26 i is altered. Palaephatus does not regard mth a8 2 vehicle for history, transiting the memory of kings, founders, or ‘masters of the sea Or at least the only myths that he riicizes are private anecdotes, simple human-interost stories of former times, falsely transformed into the marvelous by semiti distrtion.Ayth is bom of u pun. Palaephaus reduces the legen of Pavdora in this fashion (it matters lide bow ke goes abou it) 10 the story of @ rch ‘woman who loved to wear makeup. “These are human-intecest stories whose memory has buen preserved up to our own time because of the supernatural element tha has sxcrued 9 them. Butitis we who say tat, not the Grecks. hoy never ssked themselves Why or how the traditions were handed dow. They ‘wet simply there, and dat was enough or the Greeks. They were not {or moment suprised that reflections ofthe pas were among der, “They gathered myths everyubere. How did these acrolies come down tothemt They donot think about it perceiving only the message, they dd not se the mediums. Nora they surprise tet the post has et memory. Iti selEevident that everything has is cellection, just bodies have shadows. The explanation of myth isthe historical reality that it reets, for a copy is expluied by its model. They do not \wondor how the reflections eouldtrverse 0 many centris, oF by ‘what means or for what purpose. Simi, inthe Crary words are ‘explained by the things that they depict. The role of ime is limited 9 the changes cocurcng in words, and tho alterations hardly edit the ‘name ofhistory. They do not obey photic laws they ae aleatory and os Behind This Sociology an pit Program of Trt inessential. They do not exhibit any regularity and are devoid of imerest. Furthermore, one will not posit that myth could have distorted the wut For positive reasons, such as wonder or naions] emotion, The cause of it alterations i only negative; it esis in lack of rtcal spirit, The Geeks never hada science of myth as sch, but only a seience of th history hat myths transmitted, For the mode of transmission does not count. Spesch is simple mirror, By speech, Gresks understood myth, the lenicon (or taher, etymology), poetry, provesbs—in shor, everything that “is said” and speaks by itself (since we are only repeating it). Consequently, how could speech speak of nothing? We know what a huge problem the existence of nonbeing ws for Greek philosophy upto the tine of Plato, This is another symptom of tis “discourse” ofthe miro that ‘we have just found inthe problem of myth. In order tobe mistaken, ta lie, or io speak about nothing, one must spel of what is ot. Thus, ‘hat isnot must be, in order for one tbe abe to speak of it. But what 'sanonbeing tat is not nothing? Pato was determined to turn the tide, tokill “our father Parmenides,” and, by a stroke as great as that by hich Greek mathematicians had just admitted the exisence of ‘ncommensurable numbers (dhe famous “irrational” number), £9 adiit the existence of nonbeing. We are amazed that it took so peat fan effort. But if speech is» mirzor, the dificulty is understo: how can a mirror reflect wht isnot there? To reflect what isnot comes down to not reflecting inversely, if he mirorreeets an objet, this object exists. Therefore, myth cannot speak of nothing. The ‘conclusion: we are certain in advance thatthe most nave of myths will havea tuthful bass, and if we ask ourselves, with Palsephatus, about the origin ofthe errors that one finds in them, we wil note that these ferors ate simple accidents in reproduction. The original was authentic, but, in the process of reflecting it, one word ws taken for another, a thing was taken fora word, and 0 fot ‘To eflect nothingnessis nttorelet likewise, to eect fog will ‘mean reficeting ina confused way. When the objects cloudy, 0 sthe ‘mimor. Degrees of knowledge will thus be parallel to those of being: all of Plstonism is there. The young Aristotle will sill be ensnared in the dollowing problem: the principle according to which everyting is sestrvetible must therefore self be destructible; bur if his prineple perishes, then things cease to perish... Whats sad of things shares the fate OF things. A science of what x confused wil therefore he a @Caarsen Fv science that is self confused, a poor speculative knowledge. On the contrary, science will be noble if the things that it reflects are themselves elevated, “Inthe fables of which we wero just now speaking,” writes Plato, ‘owing o our ignorance of the truth abou aniquit we liken the false to the true as far as we may... "2 Plato isnot being ironic Falsehood, we know, is nothing but inexactess, and 80 we rectly inexact traditions to rediscover wit seems bs the truth, In moder terms, we formulate probable historical hypotheses. Bebolding theit rythical age, the Greeks had two attitudes: a naveté that wants tO believe in order to be charmed, and this sober order of perpetual suspense that we call scientific hypothesis. But they never rediscovered the tranquil assurance with which, once bac in the taly historical perio, they believed the words of their predecessors, the historians, wom they echo. They expres the slate of seientiie doubt that they rinain before yeh as well as hey can by sang thatthe heroic era was 00 far away, to effaced by time, fo themto beable to discern its contours with complete certainty. °° 6 Restoring Etiological Truth to Myth ‘To purify mth and make it into am exclusively historical taditon, i will sufice to eliminace everything thst hss no proven equivalent in fur historical era. “Tam af an unbelieving disposition with regard to the myehddes, and with good reason; [have never seen anyone who has observed it with his own eyes. One says that another told him about it the second, that he is ofthis opinion, and the third forgets {everything as con 26 poct speaks." Therefore let usaide bythe ‘current realities, which have been properly observed: You tl a tht Hercules, mortal that be was, managed to become & god? I shall certainly call upon you to explain how such a miracle could be ‘accomplished and why itno longer oceus."!25 Present things give us the idea of what i naturally possible, “tis sid that the heroes were ten cubits tall. This acharming but misleading and unbelievable myth, if one looks at mature, in which today's individuals ate the Standaré.""°° The reduction of myth to history will require 80 ‘operations Paaephatus confined himself purifying the taditions of what was physically unbelievable; what was historically impossible remained to be climinsied—to wit, the coexistence of gods and ‘mortals. For in our historical age the gods have withdrawn faraway from men, Pausanas" troubled evolution, which will fumish most of ‘our examples, unfolds between these two terms. ‘Nature, say the Epicureans, hes, i not lws that would demand that suc or such a thing be done, at last pacts or foeders that forbid Certain things, notably, conkising the boundaries etween living species. Thus, etamorphoses would be impossible. [is said tht on the oanks ofthe Po a musician became king ofthe country and tat, upon his deat, the will of Apollo transformed him into swan. Lam ‘ready toboliove,” writes Patsanias, “that a musieian became king oF the Ligyes, but leannot believe thata itd grew outof aman." NorCcnarren Sis took it away from me." Similarly, I read the following inthe Pet Larousse of 1908: “2ichy Eugene de), Hungarian politician and explorer, bom in Zichyfalva in 1837; Zeigler (Claude), French painter, born in London (1804—1856)."" ‘Thus, thanks to etiology, even the most obscure of Greck ities has it personaly. It willbe a moral person, «fll member inthe soeety fofeites, Iwill be comparable toa man wha fully amar, a freebora man. Such ities “frombicth arenotable and di notbeginas slaves,” ‘writes Menander the Rhetorcian in the treatise he devoted to st speeches for orator to use 0 prasea city before its inbitans. "| ” 7 Myth and Rhetorical Truth ‘To say that, asa consequence, myth became apolitical ideology snot false, but itdoes not belpus very much. A deta leads us beyond these generalities: the Grecks often seem not to believe very much in thet political myths and were the first vo laugh at therm when they launted ‘them on esremonial eeasions. Ther ws of etiology was formalin fact, myth had become dbetorical ruth. One imagines, then thar what they felt was less disbelief, strictly speaking, than a feeling of cenvetionality or derision in response 1 the fixed character ofthis mythology. Hence, a special madality of belie: the content of st speeches was perceived not a tne of, mareaver, as false, but of verbal. The obligations ofthis stock language" devolve not to the sie of political power but to an insitution peculiar to the perio: rhetoric. Nevertheless, interested parties were not against it for they ‘ould distinguish becween the [etter and the good intention although t ‘was no tre, it was well a ‘The Greeks ha long been kindly disposed towand the bene roma, ‘hich confirms an idea of the youn Nietzsche: aie does ot exist the liar has no motive fr lying. "One cannot be lying when speaking ‘more highly of values than one strictly shoul The Homeric Hymn Hermes offers an amusing illustration ofthis plows zeal. Acconding 9 the poet, the god Hermes, the young prodigy full of malicious impulses, had hardly eft his mother's wom when he invented the at ‘of singing. The frst composition ofthis privileged witness consisted Intelling of the loves of his father and mother. The crows of pilgrims ‘no heard this yn recited forthe ist tme must have elt Tike public accestc. fs and applaided wholeheartedly. No one was taken in by the clever tale, but they expected no ess of Hermes and were graf tothe poet for inventing thi legend, For these pilgrims were good peoples they hud respect fo values‘Cuarten Seven Serious persons of responsible character will indeed make the noble Ukecision concerning the following case: can one without pedantry condemn someone who zealously embraces the good cause—that of the Good, whichis also that of th True for reasons that contain no literal wuih? Is it not better to ignore this purely verbal inaccuracy? ‘When ue vales ee evident, similar indifference o veracity defines whole series of historically Uversifed conducts, Throughout Greece these verbal behaviors, in whic language informs less than i fullsa fonction, occur in the ares of international relations. Ip ioteral politics they were represented in iterary genre: the paneyyic ofthe ity, pronounced before it citizens In 480 8c. the day afer hoe triumph averthe Persians at Salamis, the Greeks convened ina congress. The definitive victory wasia igh, fand already Athens, which had saved all of Hellas from the barbarians, appeared as the hegemonical city. Ithad the power and possessed the language fort. When another city decided wo oppose to this new primacy its own traditional privileges, the Athenians replied that theie own rights were no Jess ancient. For Athens had been vetorious in the times of the Heracldae, the wars recounted inthe Thebuid, andthe invasion of the Amazons." Everyone undersood what che speochifying meant, and Athens won its cae. Te mthicsl titles had served to designate relations of force by justifying them, Which dispensed the Athenians from having to name them. Ls his an ‘eological cover? The relationship is not ane of superpastin, 28 is that between a Blanket and wat lies beveath itis te relationship between the paper money of worls and the god depositary of power. ‘Was it threat enuched in prise? It was more than that By refering tolotty reasons instead of making ashow of force, one encourages the otherto submit willingly and for honorable reasons, which saves Face. Ieology isnot a mere echo of reality; t works like coin iserted ina ‘machine. In intermational society, mythical tls to glory, a8 wel 3s legendary kinship among peoples, served as ceremonial salutes." Ech city would stat ite legendary origins to ts purtncrs, who tok care notto be skeptical. Itwasa way of aflimming oneself sa person The society of cities thus was composed of noble persons who had their bonds of kinship. Accepting these fictions as articles of faith signaled recognition of the rules of the international life of civilized cities Is curious that his affirmation ofthe personality ofeach city. Hike Myth and Rhetorical Trath the creation of individuality by fixing itn space and tim, played an ‘equally great role i intemal politics, Indeed, the pleasure thatcitizens ‘wok in bearing an orator pronounce the panegyic oftheir city eannot be believed. These speeches of prise were a fashion that lasted fora nilleanium, up to the end of Antiquity. People spoke of mythical origins and of kinship among the cities of Grsece asofte asthe people who frequented the salons of the faubourg SaintGeanain talked onealogy, and forthe same reasons." Whether he was a native or ame from another cit, the orator celebrated te origins ofthe city, and this was not the last ofthe praises he would lavish. The citizens took the greatest pleasure in hearing him. “When T hear praise, Socrates sas ironically, “those who have just ied in bate and, with them, our sneestors, our ciy, and ourselves, I feel more noble and reat each ofthe ote listeners fels the sam on his par, so that the entre civie body comes oto it exalted, and it takes me thee days to getover this emotion." Inthe absurdities, discomforts, and small ironies of daily ie, more serious processes are brought into awareness. ll cities, large or small, had their ongin, and one ean praise all of them. Manuals of thetoric furnish recipes for discovering some merit in no mater what Title hole‘in-the-wal. Moreover, these panegyrics aimed less at exating one city above al others than at recognizing is dignity a a person, And these words of praise were addressed less wo the group {an tothe individuals within it In the panegyries spoken before the assembled city, i¢ vas noche group that worshiped ise, as was the casein Nuremberg. The piss of the ity made each etizen fee, n0t fhac he was catied bya collective fore, bu ater that, in addon to his other mets, he had another personal dignity, the quality of n. The glorification of the group was the glocfcation of individuals, 3s fone ha praised noblity in front ofa group of nobles. was nat patriotic pede; the individual was proud, no to belong to shat eit rather han anoxher one, butio be aeitizen instead of not Being fone. For citizenship was not felt to be a universal tat, a sort of baseline of individuality, asic is with us, whete one is French or German because one cannot not be something. It id not mater that everyors might belong vo aeity tat made one no ess proudo beings citizen. To explain why, i would be necessary to search the hidden part of the iceberg of ancient politics. Letus say oaly thatthe city was nota “population. "" Ir was not the human fauna that mere chance of‘Carine Seven birth brought together within a panicular esto limit Each city felt self to be a sor of constituted body, in the manner of a corporation of the French Old Regime oF the Order of Notaries of Physicians. A strange privilege, in this Hellas or Roman Empire, where every fee man, or nearly. isthe citizen of some city. It can be ‘understood that the contradiction of universal privilege would have aiven rise to some uneasiness inthe subconscious of the interested Dares. Ths vague torment gave rise toa vivid sense of pleasure When 4 pancgyric was heard in which one of the two terms of the contradiction was exalted to the exclusion ofthe other For we ure capable of reacting affective to contradictions of which ‘we ae not clearly aware. Without knowing the reason, on such ‘occasions we experience that uneasy reaction called the sense ofthe ‘dicuious. The Greeks were the isto make funof their tase for civie Panegytics: “You ate, O Athenians, 2 people of dupes. When the ‘epics of the subject towns wished vo fool you, hey began ealing ‘you brilliant Athens, and, upon hearing tht, you sit down on your behinds.” Inthe work of another comic poe, a seller of gies who has ‘brought suit against one of his clients recalls tothe jury that their justice must show itself worthy of the founders oftheir ity, Heracles tnd Asclepius.17! Uneasines and doubt can arse from a dysfunction aswell. nthe diplomatic fe, invocation of great ancestors tookthe place of solid reasons when more sobstantial interests were lacking. ‘They became ridiculous formalities when these interests existed and the occasion demanded that one speak of business,"7= Another source of skepticism was the presence of rhetoric ‘constituted as self-conscious technique. People had leaned the as ‘of persuasion or how to um a phrase school end ere not taken in by them." Sometimes they carried bad faith 10 the point of ‘idactcism. In his Panegyric of Athens, socrates warts the reader 0 seck proofs of Athenian grandeur and generosity in the time "well before the Trojan War,” and he adds that, “even though the account ‘ofthese proof is muiides, its no less proper opie it"!* How can "this orator be So lumsy as to contradict his on assertions? Because he is also a teacher of shetorc, and so he comments on each of his ‘oratrical effets fo his readers instruction One more source was the nonprofessional quality ofthe historian’ activity. We saw earlier thatthe fine name of historian was borne ‘equally by authors, such as Diodorus, who intended above al to diver 2 Myhand Rhetorical Pate their readers or faster in them their own pious convictions, and by “serious,” indeed “pragmatic” historians, who meant to leave ‘edifying ossons forthe politieins. Atleast ths was what hoy sai. In fact, they particulary intended to leave fuure politicians some ieresting. if not instroctive, sorcs that spoighted their colleagues Jn the political corporation—-far the shoemaker likes to hear about shozmakers. Such isthe case forthe hima es aei* of Thucydides and his history lessons. Thus, thee were serious history books, and there were also many of dhem that were not so serious: but the most Important thing is that no exteral sign differentiated the fist from the second. The public was reduced to judging them on an individual basis. As we see, nonprofessionalization had harmful etfects. Let us hasten to a that curren academic professionalization alo hay such effects, as well as others no less perverse, although academic sociologists, not surprisingly, sevm Io be less aware of them Neverticless, the blending of best and worst sled mins, ruined the readers’ moral nature, and fostered a sly skepticism, It thus was necessary forthe historians ofthe day to tetully manage al the inclinacions ofa atber mixed audience, When Li of Cicero in De re puilica write that Rome is enough ofa big city for people wo respect the ales with which he adorned her vigins, they are nor bing their readers with ideological stories—quite the coninry. As good reporter-historian, they disdainfully allow each of their readers to choose his prefered version ofthe facts, Nonetheless, they revel dat ‘on their par they do not believe a word of these tales. ‘We sce how far ancien alessness was removed from ideological Aictxorship or edifying prtenses. Te function created its organ, the "stock anguages"” of etiology or thetoric, buna pole or religious authority contitute ts weight, Compared to the Christiano Marxist centuries, Antiquity often has a Voltairean ai. Two soothsayers {cannot meet withou:smieking at each other, writes Cicero. {ee Lat becoming a god, sa «dying emperr. This poses a general problem. Like the Dorzé, who imine both thatthe leopard fasts and that one must be on guar agains him every Laer, 1 posession or a ime” Rex Ware, the Peng sin, bie, bt was done afr ever (Tha 132) ah i pu oe ome, 8CCuarzem Seven day, the Greeks believe and do not believe in their myths. They believe in them, but they use them and cease believing atthe point Where their interest in believing ends. It should be added in their defense tat thee ad faith resided in thei lit eater than in their llterior motives, Myth as nothing more than a superstition of the hall-literate, which the learned called into question. The coexistence ‘of contradictory truths in the same mind is nonetheless a universal fact, Léviirause's sorcerer believes in his magic and cynically ‘manipulates it. Acconding to Bergson, the magician resorts to magic ‘only when no sure technical recipes exist. The Greeks question the Pia and know that sometimes ths popeess makes propaganda for Persia or Macedonia; the Romans fx their state religion for politics! purposes by throwing sacred fowl imo the water if these do fot furnish the necessary predictions; and all peoples give thet ‘oracles —or their tatstial data—a nudge to confirm what they wish totelieve, Heaven helps thse who help themselves; Paradise, but the later the beter. How could one not be tempted to speak of ideology here? IE we are able to believe in contradictory things it probably because in some cases the knowledge we have ofan objectis distorted bby our interests, For objects sti the sphere of realty exist naturally, and « natural light of the mind is reflected off dhem and back 10 us. Sometimes the light comes to ws directly at others itis influenced by imagination or pasion, as they said inthe seventeenth century—of| by authority, oF imerest, as we Say tay. And so the same object gives off two reflections, and the second is distorted. Ideology is a fertium quid next to the truth and to the inevitable and haphiszard breakdowns of truth known as errors. Ideology is a constant and directed ror. What lends plausibility to this scheme is that treclls ‘the old idea of temptation and corruption: interest and money can twist the most righteous conscience. The notion of ideology is laudable and unsuccessful attempt to guard against the legend of the idea ofa disinterested knowledge, at the limits of which there would exist @ natural understanding, am fuonomous faculty, diffevent fom the interests of practical ie Unfortunatly, this attempt ends in a rough compromise: ideology blends two irreconcilable conceptions of knowledge, reflection and ‘operation. arly striking at fist sight but fone thinks about for 3 Tmoment, this contradiction is redhibitory: knowledge cannot be Muth and Rhetorical Fah correct and biased at the same time. I Forces such as class interest or poskersway'itwhen its false, then the same force also aban When it speaks the ruth. Knowledge isthe product ofthese forces, not the reflection of ts objet 1k would be better to admit that no knowledge is disinterested and ‘tha truths and interests are to different terms forthe same thing: Tor practice thinks what it does. It was desirable 19 make a distinction ‘heween truth nd interestonlyinordertoexplainthe limitation ofthe former, it was thought thatthe truth was hounded by the influence of imeresis. This is 10 forget that interests themselves are limited (in every age they fll with historical limits; they are arbitrary in theic fierce interestedness) and that they have the same boundaries 28 the corresponding truths. They are inscribed within the horizons that the accidents of history assign to different programs. this were not the case, it would seem paradoxical that interests can be the vitims oftheir own ideology. IF one were to forget that practices and interests are limited and rare, one would tke Atbenian and Hiteian imperialism fortwo examples of ancteral Imperialism, and then Hitlrian racism would be nothing more than an ideological blanket—a motley one, tobe sure, but what does that matter? Since the only funetion of racism is to justify totalitarianism or fascism, the Hitrian version would be only «superstition or a shim. Then one ‘would note with astonishment that Hitler, because of his racism, sometimes compromised the success of his totaltarin imperialism ‘The th is less complicated. Hiller confined himself t puting his racist ideas, which were what interested him, into peactce. Jackel nd ‘Trevor-Roper have shown that his true war aim was the extermination ‘ofthe Jews and the extension of Germanic colonization throughout the ‘Slavie states, For him Russian, Jews, and Bolsheviks amounted 10 the same thing, and he did no think that is persecution ofthe ist wo ‘would compromise his victory over he lattor. . Just because one is interested does not mean that one i rational even clas interests are the products of ehance. Since interests and truths donot arise from “reality” ora powerful infrastructure but are jointly limited by the programs of chance, it would be giving them too much credit to think that the eventual ‘cniradiction between them is disturbing. Contradictory truths do not reside in the same mind—only different programs, each of which encloses different traths and interests, even if these truths have the ; \ :Cuarnes Seven same name. [know a doctor who is passionate homeopsth bit who ‘noneteess has the wisdom to preseribe antibiotics in serious cases bbe reserves homeopathy for mild or hopeless situations. His good faith Js whole, Taos it. On the ome hand, he wane to take pleasure in ‘unorthodox medicines, and, on the othe, he i of the opinion tha the Interest of both doctor und patent is thatthe patient recovers. These ‘80 programs neither contradict cach ether nor have anyehing in ‘common, andthe apparent contradiction emerges only by taking the corespoading ths literally, which demand that one be aomeopath for not. Bu ruths are not sprinkled like srs onthe celestial spher: they are the point of light that appears athe cad of the telescope of & program, and so «wo different truths obviously comespond 10 £40 Afferent programs, even if hey goby the same name This is not without interest intho history of beliefs, We do mot suffer ‘when our mind, apparently contradicting isl, secretly changes programs of truth and interest, as it unceasingly does. This isnot ology; it is our most habitual way of being. A Roman who ‘manipulates the sue religions according wohisplitica ends can be of as good foithas my fiend the homeopath [Theis acting inbad ath it willbe because he does ot belive in one of his ¥o programs sie the is using ii will aot be because he believes in two coneiiory truths, Besides bad eth snot always found where we think tis. Our Roman could be sincerely pious. Irheaffets a religious scruple that bh searcly believes in in order to call off an election in whic the people at likely to mike a poor choice, this does not prove tht he {oes aot heave in his godt proves only that he does not believe in the state religion and holds ito be useful imposture invented by men. Even moc likely, ho will think that all the valves must be efended together religion or fatherland, and tha reason is never a thud one when it supports a good cause (Our daily life is composed ofa great numberof different programs, tnd the impression of quotidian mediocrity is precisely the result of this plurality, which in some states of neuro serupulosty i sensed 18 hypocrisy. We move endlessly from ane progrim to another the way We change channels on the radio, but wedo it without realizing it Religion is only one of these programs, andi rarely acts within the caters ‘As Paul Pruyser says in his Dynamic Paschology of Reliion religion occupies only the slightest part of a celigious man's dioughts Moth and Rhetorical rath uring the day, but he same could be suid ofa spon fn, militant, of poet. It occupies a narrow band, but x does 50 genvinely and Inensely. The author ofthese ines has Tong fel uneasy with historians of religion. They sometimes seemed to him ot only 19 make thei object into a monolith, hen the mind in fact is noe w stone, but (0 secord ligion an aru predominance over other practices thot bes the importance it theoretically has. Daily ie contradicts these able illusions. Religion, politics, and postry may well be the mast important things inthis orld or any ethee; nevertheless, in practice they occupy only #nazrow bund of our existence, and they tolerate contradiction all the more easily since it gencrlly passes unnoticed, ‘This does not mean that these belies are any Tes sincere and intense The metaphysical importance or individval sincerity of truth isnot measured by its wavelength [9 any case, we speak of tits in the Pal and believe thatthe history of religions has something to gain from this, ‘One feels more at ease studying belies, religious or otherwise, when one understands chat tr s plural and analagical. This analogy famong the true makes the heterogeneity of the programs £0 unsuspected. We continue tobe within the true when we unwtingly ‘change wavelengths. Our sincerity is complete when we forget the imperatives and usages ofthe trth of five minutes age in ar to adopt those ofthe new one ‘The differen truths se all true in our eyes, ut we do not thin bout them with the same part of our head. In a passage in Das Hellge, Rudolf Ort analyzes the foat of ghosts. To be exact, if we ‘ought about ghosts with dhe same mind that makes ws thik about physical fats, we would not be afraid of them, oF at leat not inthe same way. We would be afraid as we would be of a revolver or of & vicious dog, while the fear of ghosts isthe fear of the intrusion of & Aiferent word. For my pat, hold ghosts to be simple tions but perceive thei tath nonetheless. am almost newroically afraid of them, and the months I spent sorting dough the papers of dead fiend were an extended nightmare. Atthe very moment | type these pages Ife! the airs stand up on the back of my neck. Noshing Would reassure me more than to lear that ghosts “really” exist. Then they ‘would be a phenomenon ike any ote, which could be studied with the right inscumonts, a camera or a Geiger counter, This is why science fiction, far from fightening me, delightfully reassures me. ©CCuarten Seve Is this phenomenology? No, itishistory, and doubly so, Hussein Exfahrung und Une bas givenusa suggestive description of what he calls the world ofthe imaginary. The ime and space of tis ate ot those of what he calls the world of real experience, and there individuation remains incomplete, Zeus is only a figure fom a tale, without te civie standing, and i would be absurd to wonder if he seduced Danaé before or afer he ravished Leda, Except that Huser, ina very classic manner. sof the mind tha 8 ‘wanshistorieal ground of truth exists, Firs of al, it would be rather lunhistorical fo distinguish between experience and a world of the imaginary in which the trth would be not only diferent but lesser second, the number and structure of experiential or imaginary worlds fare nt an antheopological constant but vary throughout history. The ‘only constant of truth lies in is ela to truth, and ths claim is only formal ene. The content of norms embodies depends onthe society ‘F, to pu it difereny: in the same society there are several tuts, Which, despite their differences, ae each as tre asthe other, What ‘does “imaginary mean? What i imaginary is the reality of oer, Just as, according to a phrase of Raymond Aron, ideologies are the ‘eas of others. “Imaginary” —unlike “image"”—is nota psycholo sists or anthropologists tem but expresses a dogmatic judgment ‘concerning ean belief of another. If our intent isnot o dogmatze ‘onthe existence of God or the gous, we must confine ourselves «0 stating thatthe Greeks held their god tobe te, although these gods ‘existed for them in a space-time that was secretly differen from the ‘one in sehich their belicvers lived. This elie ofthe Greeks does not ‘oblige us to believe in their gods, but it says a great deal regarding what the tath is for men ‘Sartre used to say thatthe imaginary isan analogon ofthe real. One could say that the imaginary isthe name we give to certain truths and ‘that all truths are analogous. These different words of truth ane historical antifaets, not psychic constants. Aled Schutz tried to draw ‘pa philosophical ist ofthese different worlds, and in his Collected Papers one can read his studies, the titles of which are revealing: "On Multiple Realities” and “Don Quixote andthe Problem of Reality. When a historian reads them, he fels slightly disappointed. The ‘multiple realities that Schue discovers in the payee ar the ones that find credence in our time, but they are a bit faded and somewhat ‘vague, which gives them an aura of etemity. This phenomenology i, ” Mythand Rhetorical Tu Lunitingly. in fact contemporary history, and one would seach there in vain forthe Greek blits regarding myth. Schutz nonetheless has the men of articulating the pluralty of our ‘worlds, which historians of eligioas sometimes fal recognize. Let ls examine another one of these stock languages that served as ‘ideology among the Ancien: the divinizaton ofthe sovereign, The Egyptians took their pharaoh for «god, the Greco-Romans divinized their emperors alive or dead, and we ell that Pausunis saw nothing but ‘vain flatery" in these apotheoses. Did people realy belive in them? One fact shows just where our duplicity with ourselves leads: although the emperors were gods, and although archeologists have found tens of thousands of ex-voios offered to diferent deities for healing, safe returns, et, not one ex-voto offered tan emperor god ‘exists. When the faithful needed a true god, they did not tur tothe ‘emperor. And yet there are no less striking proofs that the same faithful considered the sovereign to be more than human, a kind of ‘magus or thaumaturge Struggling to determine “the true thought of these people is Pointless, and itis equally unproductive to attempt to resolve these ‘contradictory thoughts by abating oe to popular religion and the ‘other tothe beliefs ofthe privilege socal lasses. The faithful didnot consider their all-powerful master to he an oedinary man, and the “official hyperbole that made of this mortal a god was uve in spit. I. corresponded to thie filial devotion. Swept on by the linguistic tide, they experienced ths feeling of dependence all dhe moce srongly However, the absence of votive oferings poves that hey didnot ake ‘he hyperbole iterally. They also knew that their sublime master was atthe same time a poor man, i the same way that at Versailles they ‘made a cult ofthe Grand Monarch and gossiped about his slightest ‘movements. G. Posener has shown that in the popular tales of ancient Egypt the pharaoh is nothing more than a banal and sometimes ridiculous potentate, Nevertheless, inthis same Egypt, intellectuals, theologians, and others claborated a pharaonie thealogy in which the pharaoh snot divinized by semplebyperbole or etonymical shifting ‘This doctrine was “an inelecual discovery, the frit of metaphysical and theological arguments," writes Frangois Daumas, who, by a ‘contradictory and ingenious expression, endows it with linguistic ‘Why not? The constiutional texts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and officalCCunraen Seven Marxism, are no Jess real and no less linguistic in nature. In Greece and Rome, onthe other hand, the divinity ofthe emperors was never made the ‘object of an official doctrine, and the skepticism of Puusanios was the rule among the intellectuals and among. the emperors theriselves, who sometimes were the frst to laugh at their divin ‘AIL of this is truly history, since myths, apotheoses, and Declarations of Rights, imaginary or not, were nonetheless historical forces, and since an imaginary Word, where the gods can be morals and are male or female, can he dated: it precedes Christianity, Is history for another reason as wel: these truths are ony the clashing of forces; they are practices, not the ight that guides them. When rien ‘depend on an all-powerful man, they experience him as aman and see him fiom a vale’s perspective as a mere moral; but they also feaperience him s their master and therefore also sce im a5 a god. “The plurality of tus, an affront to logic, isthe normal consequence ‘ofthe plurality of forces. The thinking ved is humbly proud oppose his weak and pure tra to brote forces, yet all he while this uth is tone of these forces. Thought belongs tthe infinitely phraized ‘monism of the will to power. All types of forces enter into play’ political power, professional authory in knowledge, sociliztion, and taining. And because thought i force, it isnot separated from ‘practice the waythe soul is from the body. Iisapartofit Marx spoke fof ideology 10 emphusize tat thought was action and not pure understanding; but as materialist ofthe old schoo! he attached the soul to the body instead of not distinguishing the one from the other and hsdling practice as a unit. This hs forced historians to perform ectc exercises (the sul reacts on the body) t straighten out he muddle. “Truth is Halkanized by forces and blocked by forces. Worship snd Jove of the sovereign rellect the efforts ofthe subjugated to gain the Uuppet hand: "Sine IJove him, therofore he must wish me no atm.” (A German fiend told me that his father tad voted for Hitler to ‘eassure himself; since I vote fo him, Jew that Lam, cis because ins heart he believes as I do.) And. if the emperor demanded of, more ‘often, allowed himself fo be worshiped, this served as “threatening information.” Since he can be worshiped, lt no one think to contest his authority, The Egypeian theologians who elaborated a whole ideology ofthe king-god must indeed have had some interestin doing Myth and Retrial Fath so, even fit were only to provide themselves with an uplifting novel Under France's Old Regime, people believed and wanted obeieve in the king's kindness and thatthe enste problem was the fault of his sinistrs, If this were not the eas, all was lost, since one oul not ope to expel the King the way one cou! remave a more minster. As we sce, causality is always at work, even among those ‘who ‘supposedly undergo is effects, The master does not inculcate an geology in the slave he ha only to show that he is more powerful “The slave will do what he can to react, even creating an imaginary taut for himself, The slave underakes what Léon Festinger—a psychologist with on innate shrewdness, whose insights are instructive —calls a redaction of dissonance. Psychology indeed, fr often the contradictions betwen behaviors can be observed and so beta the movement of underying forces Bad conscience and bad fithemerge, ot Parisceisn. Duly life is full of them, anda whole anecdotal psychology wll enable so inish up ‘more quickly in a minor mode. Since Forces are the truth of truths, We ‘know only what ve are allowed io know. Weare genuinely ignorant of wnat we do not have the night ta Jeam, “Newer confess,” Proust advised tho author of Corydon; inthis way no one will see whist is Staring him in the face, for the justice of the solon admits only ‘canfossions and reproves the one who sets himself up the inguisitor ofhis pees. Similarly, betrayed husbancl are blind because, without ‘hint of proof, they have no right co suspect ieir wives. Tasir only options ignorance, unless a fact comes to light ight before theireyes, But what they do not know is fa on much, You canheur their silence ‘In Bérouls Tristan tere is an episode tat sets one wo speculating ‘Yeeut has left King Mare and fled with Testa ito the forest. Aer three years have passed, one moraing te lovers awake feling nothing for each other. The love potion, whose effets for Béroul are not temal, has exhausted its potency. Tristan decides that the wisest ‘course is for Yseu to return to her husband. So he brings er back to Mare, challenging to combat anyone who would claim that he hau fever touched Yseut, No one took up the glove, and the queen's innocence was incontestable, What di Béroul or his readers tink of this? Nothing here can replace the text and its unfathomable artessness. ‘Béroul indeed feels that, as a jealous lover, Mare knew everything but that, as husband snd king, he ad no righ to know, For Marc and oyCCuartne Seven for Bérvul this conflict takes place on a conscious level, o rather ata level situated just beneath it, where we Know Full well wht iis we rust nt diseover. Betayed husbands and bind parent see what they ‘must not ce from long way off, and the uri and anguished tone of voice with which they instandy reort leaves no doube concerning. their unwiting lucidity. Betwcen this blindness and bad faith and the verbiage of formal salutations. all psychological degrees are conceivable, The same was true among the Grecks in matters of mst, beginning with Isocraes. Plato betrays an uneasy state of mind when he says in book 7of the Laws thate has two reasons for believing that ‘women are capable of being good soldiers. “On the one hand, Thave faith ma myth thats tld," tat ofthe Amazons, “and, onthe other, ‘know (for thai the word] tat, in or day.” the women ofthe tribe of ‘the Sauromatians prectce archery. Yet psychological anecdotes are ‘one thing, and the constitutive imagination snother. Despite his bad ‘conscience, or rather because of i, Plato doesnot reject mys but Secks their undisputed Kernel of rth, since sch was the program of| Which he, along witha his contemporaries, was prisoner Nonetheless, we know (or believe —itsthe same thing) only what we have the right 10 know. Lucidity remains the captive of this relationship of fore, which easily passes itself of as superior ability ‘The result can be observed in a certain number of exemplary cases. We have aleady seen that its important to know tha opinions are