Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4017 August 30, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
JOSE C. ZULUETA, respondent-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Special Counsel Pedro Quinto for petitioners
and appellants.
Manuel C. Briones and Mariano A. Albert for respondent and appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

Review of decision of the Court of Appeals that annulled the order of Hon. Juan R. Liwag, Judge
admitting the amended information filed in Criminal Case No. 11232 of Manila.

There is no question about these facts:

1. On October 15, 1949 an information was filed in said criminal case charging Jose C. Zulueta with
the crime of malversation of public property. Copy of the information is appended hereto (App. A.).
The substance of the accusation is that the accused, as Acting Chairman of the Surplus Property
Commission, wilfully or thru abandonment permitted Beatriz Poblete to take and convert 3,000 kegs
of nails of the aforesaid Commission. It is alleged that he secured the approval of sale to her of said
nails at very low prices by "astutely" prevailing upon Commissioner Angel Llanes to approve it on the
pretext of urgency to expedite the liquidation of surplus properties. As an alternative charge the
information states that at least through abandonment the accused permitted Beatriz Poblete to carry
the hardware away.

2. Arraigned on November 24, 1949, the accused pleaded "not guilty."

3. On January 14, 1950, the prosecution submitted an amended information (App. B), which practically
reproducing the original accusation, contained the additional assertion — among others — that in
permitting the misappropriation the accused Jose C. Zulueta acted in conspiracy with Commissioner
Llanes, who had subsequently been booked for malversation of the identical public property (nails) in
Criminal Case no. 11727 of the same court.

4. The accused objected to the admission of the amended information contending that it introduced
allegations about acts and omission constituting another offense, and that the amendments were
substantial and prejudicial to his right.

5. The court admitted amended information by its order dated February 28, 1950.

6. Having failed a in a motion to reconsider, the accused started proceedings on certiorari in the Court
of Appeals to annul the last mentioned order of admission.
7. The appellate court upheld his contentions. Hence, the People presented this petition for review,
which was given due course.

The issue require application of the principles that after the defendant has pleaded, the information
may be amended as to all matters of form, in the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. (Sec. 13, Rule 106). At that stage,
no substantial amendment may be permitted.

The question for decision is: Was the amendment purely a matter of form? Or did it touch upon matters
of substance?

The amended pleading, with its deletions, transportation and rephrasing, practically added a full page
to the original seven-page information. Seeing the prosecution's insistence in its admission, to the
extent of appealing to this Court even at the risk of delaying the proceedings, one would naturally
suppose that its moves are dictated by the necessities — neither formal nor unsubstantial — of the
case for the People.

Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive that whereas in the first the accused is
charged with misappropriation, of public property because: (1) he deceived Angel Llanes into
approving the bargain sale of nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment he permitted
that woman to obtain information a third ground responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived
and conspired with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction.

Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in effect contradicts the original theory of the
information: if the accused conspired with Llanes, he did not deceive the latter, and did not by
mere negligence permit the sale.

Now therefore, an amended information stating forth a different manner of committing the felony, — a
totally new proposition-does it merely introduce a formal amendment?

We do not think so. Even in civil cases — wherein the rules are more liberal as to amendments — its
not generally permissible to alter plaintiff's theory of the case, alteration being substantial.1

In this connection it must be recalled that under the rules of criminal procedure there is further limitation
to formal amendments, namely, that the amendment "can be done without prejudice to the rights of
the defendant." Surely the preparation made by herein accused to face to meet the new situation. For
undoubtedly the allegations of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the
accused Zulueta all the facts, knowledge, admission and even omissions2 of his co-conspirator Angel
Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendments thereby widens the battlefront to allow the
use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp.
Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy,
bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial. Needless to
emphasize, as in criminal cases the liberty, even the life, of the accused is the at stake, it is always
wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead
to injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting
unprepared adversaries.

Some passages from "Regala contra El Juez de Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bataan"3 are quoted
by petitioners. Therein the accused pleaded not guilty to an formation for murder, and later the fiscal
amended the indictment by including two other persons charged with the same offense and alleging
conspiracy between the three. Five justices held that the amendment was not substantial. But that
situation differs from the one at bar. The amendment there did not modify the basic theory of the
prosecution that the accused had killed the deceased by a voluntary act and deed. Here there is an
innovation, or the introduction of another alternative imputation, which, to Make matters worse, is
inconsistent with the original allegations. In view of the above, we believe it unnecessary to discuss
the defendant's proposition that the original information did not actually describe the crime, of
malversation (but only of theft), which the amended information sets forth. Neither is it unnecessary to
pass on the other minor amendments objected to.

One other point remains to be threshed out. The petitioners insist that certiorari is improper, because
the accused has an adequate remedy by appeal. Of course these special civil actions may not
generally be entertained if the party has an adequate remedy by appeal. However there have been
exceptions. (Cf. Moran 3rd Ed. Vol. II, p. 148). For instance, in Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad 47 Phil. 385
this Court took cognizance of a petition for certiorari and prohibition notwithstanding the accused could
have appealed in due time. The Court's action was premised on the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, in view of the many merchants interested in the Chinese Bookkeeping
Law.

In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo (43 Phil., 304) this Court admitted a petition to enjoin the prosecution of
certain chiropractors. Although these could have appealed if convicted, the petition was given due
course for the orderly administration of justice to avoid possible oppression by the strong arm of the
law.

And Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno (63 Phil. 627), was a petition for certiorari to challenge the trial judge's
action permitting an amended information. This Court passed on the petition, despite the availability
of appeal at the proper time.

Now, inasmuch as the surplus properly cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential
to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof, and inasmuch as the Court of Appeals delving
into the legal question has reached a conclusion which we do not reckon to be erroneous, it would not
be in furtherance of justice presently to dismiss the whole proceedings on the technical ground that
the accused has a remedy by appeal at the proper time.

Wherefore the judgment under review will be affirmed. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.