Stone

The Trading Culture of Jade Stones among the Yunnanese in
Burma and Thailand, 1962-88

Wenjin Zhang
Journal of Chinese Overseas, Volume 2, Number 2, November 2006,

pp. 269-293 (Article)
Published by NUS Press Pte Ltd

DOI: 10.1353/jco.2006.0024
For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jco/summary/v002/2.2zhang.html
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JOURNAL OF CHINESE OVERSEAS | V2 N2
The Trading Culture of Jade Stones

Among the Yunnanese in Burma and
Thailand, 1962–88 1
WEN-CHIN CHANG
This article aims to illustrate the trading culture of jade stones by

examining the social life of the traded stones in their transnational movement
from Burma to Thailand during the period of the Burmese socialist regime.
Drawing on the work of the well-known anthropologist, Appadurai, I adopt
a perspective emphasizing processes to look into the complex intersection of
economic, political, and cultural factors relating to repeated transactions.
These factors include the politics of organization, the politics of knowledge,
personal guts, and the uncontrollable factor of luck. The research shows that
market laws entwined with intricate socio-political forces of the region were
the driving force in the exercise of the trade beyond national boundaries.
Introduction: Cultural Significance vs. Commoditization

[In ancient times] superior men found the likeness of all excellent qualities in jade. Soft,
smooth, and glossy, it appeared to them like benevolence; fine, compact, and strong … like
intelligence; angular, but not sharp and cutting … like righteousness; hanging down (in
beads) as if it would fall to the ground … like (the humility of ) propriety; when struck,
yielding a note, clear and prolonged, yet terminating abruptly … like music; its flaws not
concealing its beauty, nor its beauty concealing its flaws … like loyalty; with an internal
radiance issuing from it on every side … like good faith; bright as a brilliant rainbow … like
heaven; exquisite and mysterious, appearing in the hills and streams … like the earth;
standing out conspicuous in the symbols of rank … like virtue; esteemed by all under the
sky … like the path of truth and duty (Li Ji (LJ)=, Book XLV, translation by Legge 2001
[1895–1910]: 464).
Virtues of the righteous man! Beauty of jade! Only by discarding the part of commoditization,
can [jade’s] value be promoted; and only by promotion of its value, can it be vested with
honor. In the course of transaction among dealers, how can one expect to find the virtue
of uprightness that was invested in jade [by the ancient sages] (Zhou 1989: 246)?
Wen-Chin Chang is Assistant Research Fellow at Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS),
Academia Sinica. Her email address is wencc@gate.sinica.edu.tw
© J O U R N A L O F C H I N E S E O V E R S E A S 2 , 2 ( N O V . 2 0 0 6 ) : 2 6 9 – 2269
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W E N - C H I N C H A N G | T R A D I N G C U LT U R E O F J A D E S TO N E S
The above two quotations illustrate the sharp contrast between the cultural
significance invested in jade by Chinese society and the process of commoditization
of jade. The sentiment in the first quotation, which is frequently referred to in
studies of Chinese jade culture, was expressed by the great Chinese philosopher,
Confucius, who attributed 11 virtues to jade. In his eyes, jade was the perfect stone
that metaphorically embodied all the necessary virtues required in being an ideal
man. In many other Confucian texts we also find the recurrence of parallels
between human virtues and the mineral structure of jade. Throughout Chinese
history, Confucianism was the most prominent philosophy which best exalted the
ethical connotations of jade. In addition, jade has embraced esoteric and ritual
qualities conferred on it by the ruling class for confirmation of their political
power since ancient times, and glorified by popular Taoists and folk beliefs at a
later date.
Consequently, cultural meanings attributed to jade have permeated aesthetic,
religious, moral, political, and mystic value domains, and contributed to the
enduring nature of jade culture developed in Chinese history (Gump 1962; Goette
1976; Na 1990; Yin 1993). These different values, though not always consistent,
have contributed to the idiosyncrasies of this particular precious stone and
increased its immense economic value. There is an inalienable bond between the
Chinese people and jade. Jade artifacts are highly desired objects both as gifts and
commodities and occupy a uniquely distinctive role in comparison to other objects
of material culture that existed or came into fashion only in certain periods of
time (such as the bronze objects of the Shang and Zhou periods, the tricolor
figurines of the Tang period, and the china of the Song, Ming and Qing periods).
Simply put, the Chinese passion for jade is incomparable.
These references to value domains have been the focus of research by academics.
Popular research topics include the designs of jadeware of different dynasties,
classification of jade objects for multifarious purposes and respective jade cultures
in different periods. However, the aspect of commoditization has rarely been
touched on.2 While praising the beauty and symbolic meanings of jade, “the social
life” of jade trade is almost completely ignored. According to Appadurai,
“commodities, like persons, have social lives” (1986: 3). They move in and out
of different “regimes of value in space and time” (1986: 4). He reminds us that
paying attention to the cultural biography of things restricted to a certain social
class is not sufficient; it is necessary to “look at longer-term shifts (often in
demand) and larger-scale dynamics” in order to illuminate the complex intersection
of economic, political, and cultural factors relating to the transformation of the
value of commodities (1986: 34).
In contrast to Confucius’ observation, the second quotation from Zhou’s work
diverts our attention from the esteemed moral virtues with which jade is imbued
to the secular sphere of jade trade that is concerned with profit seeking. Mr Zhou
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was a Yunnanese refugee engaged in jade mining and trading in the 1970s in the
Kachin state of Burma which produces the highest quality of jadeite in the
world. The different ideas conveyed in these two quotations drive us to ask: What
is the reality of jade trade operation? Is the sharp contrast revealed by the two
quotations real?
In the initial stage of my research on the jade trade among the migrant
Yunnanese in northern Thailand and upper Burma, informants frequently mentioned
the principle of trust (xinyong ), which they stressed as the foundation for
cooperation within a trading group and also with other related groups/people
during the course of trade. No written contracts or legal agreements were resorted
to; it was one’s word that mattered. Initially, it seemed that trust governed the
business and the operation appeared to be linked to the moral values metaphorically
seen in jade by ancient philosophers. In other words, there seemed to be an
intrinsic linkage between the internalized ethical virtues of jade and the economic
transaction. However, as I became familiar with more and more traders, their
numerous accounts of ups and downs in jade deals gradually led me to perceive
the insight in Zhou’s words. Mr Lin’s narrative further vividly describes the “dark
side” of this risky enterprise that contains amazing profit margins. He said:
The jade trade is a cheating business. Traders tend to boast about the value of the stones
they have …. If you don’t know jade, you must not engage in the business …. [otherwise]
… you will be cheated …. The jade trade makes the father eat the son [laodie chi erzi
!", meaning cheating someone]. If you are not heartless, you should not try it …
(Mr Lin).
Apparently, there is another aspect of jade culture in relation to its exchangeability

that is yet to be explored.
In this article, I aim to illustrate the trading culture of jade stones by examining
the social life of the traded stones in their transnational movement from Burma
to Thailand during the period of the Burmese socialist regime. This was a period
of isolation for Burmese society, and is also a much understudied period. Due
to the closed economic policies implemented in Burma, nearly all border trade
was illegal during this time. The special politico-economic background compounded
the risks of the trade and the tension of repeated contests in transaction. Tracing
the social life of the traded jade thus provides an outlook for a dynamic social
history connected to the popular realm of the migrant Yunnanese traders beyond
state regulations and national boundaries. Attention will center on the subject of
connectivity of interacting forces over time and space and will highlight borderlands
as “scenes of intense interactions” instead of passive geographical margins
(Baud and van Schendel 1997: 216). Based on field data, the intertwining factors
in the process of jade trade included the politics of organization, the politics of
knowledge, personal guts, and the uncontrollable factor of luck.
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Furthermore, corresponding to the stance of Wang Gungwu on the entre-

preneurship of overseas Chinese (1991a, 1991b, 2001) that stresses their risk-
taking spirit, adaptability to the society in which they settle and appropriation
of traditional values, my findings point to the pragmatism of the jade traders based
on instrumental rationality, and stray from an essentialized cultural perspective
overemphasizing the influence of ethical/Confucian values (such as familism,
trust, loyalty, reciprocity and harmony) in the economic practices of Chinese
merchants.3 Wang points out that trade recognizes no boundaries, but only the
laws of the marketplace that direct “what the trader will or will not do, how far
he is prepared to go in search of trade” (2001: 166). He refers to the laws as the
trading values that form the trading culture.
With the focus on the social life of traded jade, the research shows that the
laws of markets entwine with non-economic factors, especially the socio-political
forces of the region. Together, they play the role of the driving force in the exercise
of the trade beyond boundaries and contribute to the formation of the Yunnanese
mercantile ethos. While the abundant cultural meanings of jade throughout
Chinese history have greatly enhanced its economic exchangeability, in the trans-
actions of jade stones between Burma and Thailand they are not considerations
for traders. Instead, what is emphasized is the control of trading connections and
manipulation of trading knowledge. Application of cultural interpretations is
limited to traders’ reference to destiny concerning their vicissitudes in the trade.
The paper will therefore not construct a superficial picture of the correspondence
between the realm of cultural meanings and that of commoditization; instead, it
centers on the latter domain to display an unfamiliar side of the jade culture.
In the following sections, I will first review the existing literature related to the
trade of Burmese jade stones, and then analyze respective trading factors and
their interplay.
Burmese Jadeite and Relevant Literature

Jade is a general term that indicates two different varieties: the nephrite and the
jadeite. Scientifically speaking, their distinction is based on their respective
chemical composition, and density (nephrite: 6 to 6.5; jadeite: 6.5 to 7) and
gravity (nephrite: 2.9 to 3.2; jadeite: 3.2 to 3.4) (Hemrich 1966: 6). But in terms
of economic value and aesthetic preference, jadeite is usually more appreciated
than nephrite for its rarity and more vivid green colors and a finer translucency.
The region known for the highest-quality jadeite in the world is located in the
Kachin state of upper Burma, especially where the alluvial deposits of the Uru
River conglomerate are found, e.g., in Tawmao, Hpakan, Hweka and Mamon.
Nevertheless, in contrast to the antiquity of employing nephrite in object making,
the appearance of jadeite artifacts in China possibly came only around the Ming
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period (1368–1644 CE).4 Historical records indicate that eunuchs were assigned
to Yunnan to purchase gem stones, including jadeite, from Burma (Xia 1948:
77–78; Chen 1966: 86; Qiu 1997: 206–11; Sun 2000: 134–54). Following the
acceptance of this new type of jade in China, it inherited the essential symbolic
values already developed from nephrite in earlier Chinese history. Its imported
volume increased during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911 CE). The beauty of the
best rank of jadeite, commonly called feicui (), revealed in its color,
translucency and texture, gradually overcame the Qing court’s tastes in evaluating
a piece of jade and replaced its former appreciation of the familiar nephrite. It
was then also referred to as imperial jade. Dowager Empress Cixi (1835–1908 CE)
especially indulged in this kind of precious stone. Feicui was thus widely
recognized as the supreme rank in jade category among the Chinese. With the
easing of restrictions on coastal trade toward the end of the Qing dynasty, most
of the high-quality precious stones made their way from Burma to the ports of
Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Shanghai by sea. The medium-quality stones were
transported by land in caravans via Yunnan (Xia 1948: 107; TCXZ 1995: 413).
With respect to literature on the jade trade from Burma, although academic
research previous to my fieldwork was scarce, there were some relevant works.
Most publications were written by British colonial officers, who carried out several
expeditions to the jade land in upper Burma in order to learn about the mining
conditions of this natural resource and taxation possibilities. Important works
were authored by Griffith (1847), Scott (1901), Hertz (1912), and Chhibber
(1934). Hughes has made an annotated discussion of these works (1999). He is
a gemologist who visited the mining areas twice with other people in 1996.
Together they published several articles concerning the trips and also filmed a
video (Hughes et al. 1996–67, 2000; Hughes and Ward 1997; Ward 1997; Müller:
1997).5 These articles cover information on the present day situation in the jade
lands, yet an analysis of how it came into being is lacking. Combined with field
data and documentary review, the works by Lintner (1997), and Levy and Scott-
Clark (2001) (all journalists) provide more in-depth discussion. The book written
by Levy and Scott-Clark especially highlights the interlacing of the modern history
of Burma and China with the Chinese people’s unusual passion for jadeite, the
so-called stone of heaven.
Apart from the western authors, Yin Deming’s Yunnan beijie kanchaji (
!" Investigation of Yunnan frontiers) (1933) recorded detailed jade
mining that he observed in his expedition in 1929–30 under the Chinese
government’s assignment (for the purpose of examining a part of the disputed
Sino-Burmese border). Another book (1934) with photos of the trip contains
several pictures of jade mining at that time. Moreover, Zhou’s Yushi tianming
( ! Destiny of jade stone) is a valuable autobiography (1989), which relates
his own life stories from being a Yunnanese refugee in upper Burma to a jade miner
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and then a jade trader. The narration conflates his philosophical understanding
of Chinese jade culture with significant information in relation to the socio-
political conditions of the mining areas during the Burmese socialist regime. Other
books by Zhou (1992, 1996) also include useful information.
With regard to academic research, prior to my commencement of the study
of the jade trade, I only found one relevant conference paper by Khin Maung
Nyunt (1996), a Burmese historian, on the history of the Burmese jade trade (till
1938). According to him, the use of Burmese jadeite may have begun in the Pyu
period (3rd to 8th centuries CE), but large-scale excavation was not undertaken
until the second half of the 18th century when great numbers of Yunnanese miners
and jade traders flowed into the mining region in upper Burma (1996: 258, 272).
Based primarily on colonial sources, the paper essentially discusses the mining,
taxing and trading conditions of jade stones during the British colonial period.
As far as my research is concerned, I have published two papers on the subject.
In one paper (Chang 2003), I apply the genre of life stories (of three jade traders)
connected to a long historical perspective to discuss the migration culture of
Yunnanese traders from Tengchong, an important border entrepot for centuries.
In another paper (2004), I apply the network approach to analyze the jade trading
connections with reference to different standpoints in guanxi studies, and explore
the role of the regulatory practices initiated by the jade companies.
The Politics of Organization

In Appadurai’s prominent article (1986) on the circulation of commodities, he
gives an insightful analysis of the interplay of the various political dimensions that
account for the exchange value of commodities, including the politics of diversion
and of display, the politics of authenticity and of authentication, the politics of
knowledge and of ignorance, the politics of expertise and of sumptuary control,
and the politics of connoisseurship and of deliberately mobilized demand. In order
to apprehend the “social life of things,” he stresses the investigation of the “total
trajectory” of commodities in relation to all these dimensions from the course of
production, through exchange/distribution to consumption. His analytical cutting
point into “politics” highlights the dynamics of transaction. He explains: “What
is political about [the process] … is the constant tension between the existing
frameworks (of price, bargaining, and so forth) and the tendency of commodities
to breach these frameworks” (1986: 57). The most intensive scenes relating to the
politics of trade are seen in price negotiations and contests which lead to what
Appadurai terms “value tournaments” (1986).
Drawing on Appadurai’s theory, I see the jade trade in question particularly
connected to the politics of organization (i.e., the trading network formation and
operation) and the politics of knowledge (i.e., the knowledge of languages, of
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trading routes, of evaluation, and of markets). Before 1980, the number of

Yunnanese jade traders and mine owners in the mining areas was still small due
to the restriction imposed by the local rebel group — the Kachin Independence
Army (KIA) — that controlled most of the jade mines. The Yunnanese had to
disguise themselves as Kachin or Shan in order to get permission to enter the areas.
But thereafter, the KIA relaxed its control and more and more Yunnanese arrived
to venture into the business. They gradually became the majority. However,
whether before or after 1980, informants claim that outside the mining areas, the
jade trade was dominated by male Yunnanese operators with their well-organized
networks and knowledge of trade that enabled them to get around the state
laws of Burma and Thailand, and to compete among themselves and also against
other ethnic traders. As a consequence, the extension of the trade to Thailand was
nearly monopolized by Yunnanese traders, and made it primarily a Yunnanese
ethnic enterprise.6 The trade involved the interplay of market demand, power
struggle at different levels, and regulatory initiation and observance. The trading
process was full of tensions, competition, and uncertainties. It was therefore
political and parallels Appadurai’s analysis. However, this article will not cover the
“total trajectory” of the trade; it focuses on the part of the transaction from
Burma to Thailand. Before looking into the Yunnanese trading networks, a
summary of the socio-political contexts of Yunnan, Burma and Thailand will be
given first.
Since early times, Yunnan has maintained close connections with its neighboring
countries of upper mainland Southeast Asia and also part of present day India for
the sake of human migration and the flow of goods, capital and information. The
massive migration of Muslims and Han Chinese into Yunnan during the Yuan,
Ming and Qing dynasties greatly enhanced the transborder trade and human
movement. Among the neighboring countries, Burma has played an important role
in mutual interaction (Hill 1998; Sun 2000; Giersch 2001; Yang 2004). There
have always been Yunnanese “movers” and “stayers” in Burma, using Curtin’s terms
in his Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (1984: 53). The latter are settled
immigrants, and function as cross-cultural brokers for the mobile fellowmen, the
movers, in transnational trade. However, these two categories are not rigidly fixed
among the Yunnanese; they are mutually changeable. For example, a Yunnanese
stayer in Burma for over 20 years may later become a mover between Thailand
and Burma (see Chang 2003: 27). Seen from a historical perspective, the political
changes of each new period particularly led to massive migrations across the
national border. During the contemporary period, when the Chinese Communists
took over China in 1949, unprecedented waves of Yunnanese refugees fled to
Burma. In the 1960s, following the worsening situation in Burma, great numbers
of Yunnanese refugees again left the country for northern Thailand (Chang 1999,
2001, 2002, 2005, 2006). Throughout history, frequent transnational movements
275
by Yunnanese and their engagement in border trade have assisted them in

developing widespread networks of ties in the region.
With respect to the socio-political conditions of Burma, the country gained
its political independence in 1948 after more than a century of penetration by
British colonial power. However, the state was in practice torn apart by the
intensification of ethnic insurgencies in different parts of the country.7 Many
ethnic minorities had never really conformed to external polities either before or
during the British colonial period (see Smith 1993 [1991]; Lintner 1994). In
1962, General Ne Win took over the reins of government in a military coup. His
intolerance of ethnic autonomy further aggravated the confrontation between the
central government and local ethnic rebel groups. In addition to the political
instability, Ne Win’s infamous policy of the “Burmese way to Socialism,” aiming
at the establishment of a state economy, resulted in the breakdown of the country’s
economy. Consequently, an underground economic system flourished to meet the
consumption demands through the black market (hmaung-kho) trade (Chao Tzang
Yawnghwe 1990 [1987]: 203; Smith 1993 [1991]: 24–26; Smith 2001; Lintner
1994: 178–79; Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2001).
Even though gemstones and other natural resources were designated as national
property, private trade in the areas in these natural resources was under the control
of local ethnic militias rather than the central government in Yangon (Rangoon).
They were largely smuggled out from the areas controlled by rebel groups, and
in turn daily consumer items and weaponry were smuggled into Burma, primarily
through the conveyance of mule caravans (Smith 1993 [1991]: 25; Chen Wen
1996: 144). Opium and jade were two highly valuable items. The former was often
referred to as the black commodity and the latter as the green commodity.
It is estimated that the illicit trade during the Ne Win regime accounted for
about 80 percent of the national economy (Mya Than 1996 [1992]: 3). Burma’s
major partner in this illegal trade was market-oriented Thailand to which more
than half the smuggled goods made their way (1996 [1992]: 57). While the Thai
media from time to time accused these minority militias of causing political
insecurity at the border and engaging in the contraband trade, the Thai government
tacitly allowed the ongoing trade despite its claim to tightening border control.
It was fully aware of the economic benefits that the country obtained from the
informal cross-border trade. The gems brought in from Burma further attracted
foreign jewelry dealers to trade in Thailand, as pointed out by two former Thai
officers in the interviews.
As far as the Yunnanese networks of jade trade between Burma and Thailand
were concerned, they comprised three nodes. The first node was made up of
personal connections of kith and kin based on mutual trust. Partners usually
spread themselves in both countries to facilitate the procurement of jade stones
in Burma and arrangement of their transportation to Thailand and then the
276
transaction in Thailand with dealers from Hong Kong or Taiwan. Take Mr Lin’s
group as an example.8 Mr Lin is now in his early seventies and has resided with
his family in a border Yunnanese village in Chiang Rai province of northern
Thailand for more than 40 years. He and several fellow villagers (who were
relatives or close friends from the same home district in Yunnan) started to engage
in jade trade in the early 1970s. Prior to this engagement, he had conducted
caravan trade in other merchandize back and forth between Thailand and Burma.
Mr Lin stressed that owing to his trading experiences and good reputation for
honesty, he was entrusted by other partners (most of the time ranging from five
to ten) with the task of going to Burma for the purchase of jade stones. He went
to Burma once a year; sometimes even twice. Some partners had larger shares,
while others had smaller shares. Mr Lin met another partner in Mandalay in
Burma, who was a relative of a major partner of the group; he was responsible
for buying jade stones from the jade mines. After the stones arrived in Thailand,
some other members adept at price negotiation would deal with buyers through
the brokerage served by the jade company (see following paragraphs). In effect,
the composition of partners of the first node helped distribute different tasks
among the members according to their specialty; in addition, it helped accumulate
capital for the purchase of good jade stones, and reduced personal economic loss
in case failure occurred.
To avoid taking high risk, after procuring jade stones from the partner in
Burma, Mr Lin handed the stones to a caravan company in Mandalay to be
transported to a designated point on the Thai-Burmese border. The transportation
fees (agreed upon prior to transportation) accounted for about seven percent of
the appraised value of the stones to be carried. Caravan companies constituted
the second node of the trade — 90 percent of them were said to be organized
by the Yunnanese. They were familiar with the trading routes and conveyed the
precious stones, paying bribes to the Burmese authorities and taxes to ethnic
militias for safe passage. On reaching the destination, they handed the stones to
the representatives of the jade company, which was entrusted by the traders with
the sale of the stones. On the return journey, the empty caravans were filled up
with Thai merchandize for sale in the black market in Burma.
Jade companies constituted the third node of the trade. They were lawful
corporations located in Thailand. After receiving the jade stones, the companies
legalized the imported commodities by paying tax at the border customs house.
The tax certificate indicated the nature and quantity of goods taxed, and the
amount and place of taxation. The place of origin of the stones was unspecified
in a bid to counter protests from the Burmese government regarding the Thai
government’s participation in this contraband trade. It is said that the “tea money”
paid to the customs officers was more than the amount of the tax. After a deal
was settled between the seller and the buyer, the jade company took up the export
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procedures for the transportation of the transacted stones to the buyer’s country
at the Bangkok airport. Accordingly, the three nodes in the jade trade networks
were organized on different bases — the first node on a personal basis, and the
second and third nodes on an institutional basis in terms of their monetary
resource and connections with official apparatuses and rebel groups. We may
further inquire into their initiation.
In the face of the unsafe trading environment and the great economic potential
of the jade stones, one would assume that trust was a necessary foundation for
cooperation among partners and between traders in transaction. In fact, trust was
a value rarely observed in practice, receiving only lip-service. Informants frequently
talked of distrust between traders and told me in confidence stories of betrayal,
which mostly occurred at the first node, despite the members’ close relations with
one another. In the case of Lin’s group, the partner in Burma was considered
dishonest as he kept valuable stones to himself and handed over the less valuable
ones to Lin. He was accused of swallowing the group’s capital for personal benefit.
Having been engaged in the jade trade for about ten years, Lin despised the
chicanery of jade traders, and made the sharp comments referred to earlier. Zhou,
in the same vein, separated economic transaction from the moral value domain
with which jade is imbued. Several informants pointed out that the commoditization
of this precious stone fueled the insatiable human greed, resulting in crimes and
evil deeds.9 The goal to gain enormous wealth from jade stones lured mine owners
and miners to risk their lives against constant danger and threat from diseases
(especially malaria), secret reports to the Burmese authorities furnished by other
competitors or even partners, and capture by the Burmese army. An informant
thus described the trade as vicious (xiemende ), and full of chicanery.
Because of all these complex factors, Yunnanese developed the second and third
nodes in order to ensure the continuity of this ethnic enterprise. In contrast to
the unstable trading relationships at the personal level, the institutional organization
of the caravan and jade companies was said to be very reliable. Both had strong
connections with official apparatuses and ethnic rebel groups. The jade companies
even guaranteed a full compensation in case of loss of the stones during trans-
portation or the failure of a buyer to pay. In comparison, the caravan companies
were not able to fully provide such assurance due to the highly perilous circum-
stances in Burma; yet their reliability was largely confirmed. On account of this
dependable relationship, we may say that the jade and caravan companies, in
effect, converted the value of trust into the practice of credit. This conversion was
especially realized through the initiation of a series of regulations, which I term
“non-state regulations.” These regulations were unwritten rules, tacitly agreed
upon by the trading parties, unlike the trading laws which were instituted and
implemented by the state. Their implementation was in particular enforced by the
jade companies, which were forceful in adjusting the percentage of the commission
278
in their brokerage service between the seller and the buyer, in overseeing the
negotiations among the companies themselves when trading conflicts flared up,
and in meting out punishments to traders who broke an agreement after a deal
had been reached. The jade companies hence acted as the most powerful node
in the trading process. From the 1960s to 1980s, four major jade companies
located in Mae Sai and Chiang Mai dominated the jade market through a shifting
power hierarchy. Minor companies or interested parties that tried to gain a
foothold were edged out by these big companies. Two of the companies even had
their own troops stationed at some border points.
Accordingly, the three nodes constituted a set of well-organized networks for
the jade trade. While each performed its particular function, it was interlocked
with the other two in its operations. The trade was constantly challenged by
tensions among trading partners, fear of being captured by the Burmese army or
police, conflict between ethnic militias and the Burmese army, and competitions
or power struggles between traders and between the jade companies themselves.
The operation of the trading networks served to keep these negative factors to
the lowest level and was thereby political. In the face of danger or the occurrence
of a power struggle, strategies of changing partners, diverting transportation
routes, making new alliances or arranging negotiations by involving “significant
middlemen” were resorted to. A jade trader in Chiang Mai and a retired Thai
officer separately revealed that on one occasion, General Kriangsak Chomanand
(Thai Prime Minister in 1977–80) was involved in the negotiations over a serious
power struggle between two major jade companies in the competition for
brokerage service. On the one hand, the politics of organization helped to reduce
risks, and on the other hand, it sought to maintain cooperative relationships.
In contrast to the skillfulness of the Yunnanese in network organization, non-
Yunnanese traders are said to be incapable of connection work; only a small
amount of jade trade is handled by them, largely inside Burma. Moreover, they
are not as knowledgeable about jade as the Yunnanese. As a result, they constantly
lose out in price negotiations. Mr Yang, who has been engaged in jade trade for
over 20 years, illustrated the situation with a true story. He said once two Kachin
merchants from upper Burma carried a few pieces of jade stones to trade in Chiang
Mai. Encouraged by the positive indications on the skin of the stones, which led
them to be confident of the stones’ value, they did not entrust the sale of these
stones to a jade company. However, news of these stones spread among the
Yunnanese. A group of Yunnanese who knew each other came one by one to look
at the stones. On the basis of their claims to be knowledgeable about the jade
trade, everyone in the group offered very low prices and undervalued the stones.
In this way, the Kachin sellers became confused about the value of their stones.
They finally contacted the one who had offered the highest bid, but he expressed
no interest in buying. The sellers then contacted another buyer who came up with
279
a lower price than the one he had offered earlier. Unable to bargain, the Kachins
ended up selling the stones at a price several times less than what they had
expected. The story not only shows the lack of network support of the Kachin
sellers, but also the ease with which they were manipulated by Yunnanese traders
who claimed to possess superior trading knowledge. Informants repeatedly told
me that jade companies did not show their commodities to many buyers. If a piece
of stone was seen by too many people, its value naturally dropped, and specu-
lations about its defects would spread. Jade trade remained a closed business. Both
sellers and buyers needed to build their reputation (mingqi ) with the caravan
and jade companies in order to make use of their institutional services.
The above comments by Yunnanese traders were confirmed by Burmese jade
traders in a series of interviews conducted in the Mandalay jade market (kyauk
wain) (on the 38th street) in 2005 and 2006. The interviewees consistently said
that most Burmese traders only had small capital in comparison to Yunnanese
merchants, and they also lacked transnational connections. Both factors restricted
their transnational engagement. Moreover, a few interviewees pointed out that
jade was not a particular gem favored by the Burmese (who esteem gold much
more), and their knowledge of jade could not be compared to that of the
Yunnanese.
The Politics of Knowledge

The politics of knowledge in the jade trade involved the knowledge of languages,
of trading routes, of evaluation, and of markets. With respect to the first factor,
different languages were used for communication. Among the Yunnanese traders
I have spoken with, most of them were capable of using three to four languages
to deal with people of different ethnicities in varied situations; for example, using
Kachin and Shan with miners, traders and militias of these two languages groups,
and Burmese with Burmese officials and ordinary people in daily contact.
Furthermore, their Chinese background facilitated their trading with buyers from
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Mandarin, which is similar to Yunnanese, was used in
transaction. This fact excluded most traders of other ethnicities from Burma and
revealed the trade as primarily a Chinese business. In short, the multilingual ability
of the Yunnanese traders facilitated their engagement in Burma, and their ethnicity
further ensured easy contact with Chinese dealers.
Regarding the trading routes from Burma to Thailand, I have described the
connection of major points in two of my papers (Chang 2003: 21–23, 25; 2004:
490, 491, 495). Here I will only delineate them on Map A, and highlight their
implications and significance. As mentioned earlier, the age-long tradition of the
movement of Yunnanese between Yunnan and Burma has ensured their familiarity
of the region and enabled them to build up a wide network of connections. This
280
knowledge and human linkages have been transmitted from generation to

generation. When relating their travel to Burma, informants clearly indicated the
places they passed, the means of transportation of each stage, the road condition
and the time they spent. They paid agreed tolls and taxes to rebel groups and local
headmen just like their predecessors had done in caravan trade for centuries (Hill
1998). In addition, they also hired the Local Defense Force recognized by the
Burmese government (Ka kwe ye) to guard the convoy. They were familiar with
every stage of the transportation routes. Whenever there were dangers on the way,
they could immediately change their paths. Informants pointed out that a trade
route had different trails leading to the destination of each stage. Hence, it was
not a lineal line as drawn on the map, but composed of irregular patterns of tracks
in response to imperative conditions. When I attempted to draw detailed trade
routes, informants who had participated in caravan transportation repeatedly told
me that there were numerous paths and that it was not possible to indicate all
of them on paper. Some of them could recite detailed landmarks on the way and
the various villages inhabited by respective ethnic groups, but it was difficult for
them to translate these familiar mental images onto paper (see also Frake 1985).
This phenomenon is in fact one aspect of dynamism in the caravan trade that has
not been sufficiently discussed by scholars. The following two narrations disclose
the informants’ astonishing knowledge of their trading routes.
The mountainous route started from a valley village [in Mae Hongson province, Thailand]
named Mazhanbe …. This was a caravan [border] post; traders could hire mules there for
the transportation of merchandize to Burma. There were also muleteers available for
employment. Mazhanbe was a remote and small place. Though I did not carry goods to
Burma for sale, I walked together with other caravans. The caravans often carried Thai textile,
medicine, and daily consumer articles. There were usually 30 to 40 mules walking together;
sometimes ten to 20 mules. Two to three mules required a muleteer …. From Mazhanbe
[inside the Thai border] [you walked upward and] crossed the river [Salween] [in Burma];
it took less than two days (laingxiaotian, ). [Then] you walked three to four days,
[on a] mountainous route, till the mountain area near Taunggyi. You climbed down to
Taunggyi and took bus to Mandalay. It took about seven hours. The caravan traders usually
rented cars to transport their goods at a highway stop outside Taunggyi to go to Taunggyi
or to Mandalay to sell the goods. Prior to transportation, they had bribed the Burmese troops
and policemen (xianhe laomianbing jingcha huodonghao, !"#$%&'). It all
depended on connections; where you had good connections, you sold your goods there
(Mr Lin, the route was used in the 1970s).
Crossing the river [Salween], [we] reached a Lisu village, named Gonpia. Then [we] passed
a Baiyi [Shan] village, named Nawang. [We] passed another Baiyi village, named Longxiangpu.
[Then we] passed the highway in Mong Pong. If [we] met the Burmese army, our troops
fought with them. [We] then passed Laizholo, a Bonglong [Benglong] village. Going down
to a Baiyi village, Xiaojingdong; then passing the highway of Xiaojingdong, [we] reached
the village, Nafu; the name meant a place with water in the Baiyi language. [We] then passed
another Baiyi village, Longbai … (Mr Huang).
281
Kachin
state
Hpakan
Myitkyina
Mogaung
Monyin Hopin
Shan
state
Mandalay
Kengtung
MYANMAR
Taunggyi
BURMA Nansang
Tachilek
Meng Mao Maesai
Miwo Piang Luang
Mae Hongson
Chiang Mai
Yangon
Tak
Mae Sot
Mawlamyine
THAILAND
Map - A:
jade trade routes from Burma to Thailand, 1960s–1980s
rail way
primary route of the 1960s
jade mines Æ Mandalay Æ Taunggyi Æ Kengtung Æ Tachilek Æ Mae Sai

jade mines Æ Mandalay Æ Taunggyi Æ PiangLuang or Miwo or Meng Mao

jade mines Æ Mandalay Æ Mawlamyine Æ Mae Sot
Map A
282
The amazing knowledge illustrated above also indicates the wonderful network
established by the Yunnanese. They knew exactly whom they should contact in
each post and the headman of each village. Informants commonly said that after
arriving at a village, they often sent a man to check on the safety of the road ahead.
Within the power domain of ethnic militias, they sometimes hired their troops
to escort them. Despite their good knowledge and the various precautions they
had taken (including bribery), the trading routes were still full of danger. Several
traders I have interviewed had the experience of being captured by the Burmese
troops or policemen, or suffering from serious illnesses. One of Mr Lin’s calves
has a scar from a deep wound inflicted by a Burmese soldier when he was captured.
In addition to the external perils, the indeterminacy of the quality embedded
in uncut jade stones compounded the risks in the jade trade and made the trade
a “big gamble” as referred to by informants. Prior to 1990, on account of the
trading restrictions, the quantities of excavated jade stones were small and their
trafficking was a highly risky venture. Each smuggled piece had a value on account
of its exchangeability. This situation induced merchants to trade with uncut
pieces, which were enclosed with a thick layer of skin.10 An evaluation could only
be made by examining the show points on the surface, such as colored spots,
defects and texture of the sand of the skin, depending on the experience of the
evaluer. However, no matter how experienced a person is, there is no absolute
guarantee. A Yunnanese proverb says: “even gods are unable to correctly predict
jade quality (Shenxian nanshi cunyu !").”11 Therefore, the price of a
jade stone often fluctuated greatly once it had been cut. If the quality was good,
the price immediately soared (zhang le ) by ten or even one hundred times.
But if the quality was not good, the price plummeted (die le ), and the dealer
who had bought the stone would have lost a huge sum of money. The fluctuation
in the value of jade stones was thus a great danger as well as a great opportunity
to the traders. “Gold has its fixed price, but jade is priceless (huangjin youjia, yu
wujia !"#!),” informants often commented. “Before a piece of jade
stone is cut, it has no settled price; it is a valuable in traders’ eyes,” says Mr Jing
who worked for a jade company for more than ten years. On the one hand, this
priceless nature is due to the unpredictable content, on the other hand, it is derived
from the profound cultural significance discussed earlier, that results in jade being
constantly in demand among the Chinese, driving the traders to risk their lives
in a quasi gambling business.
Prior to making the deal at the jade company, jade stones might have changed
hands a few times between different buyers in Burma. The commoditization of
jade stones was intensified through repeated transactions and reached its height
when sold at the jade companies. Normally while a stone still did not have legal
status, the range of price fluctuation was not large, for risk taking was calculated
on its economic valuation. But, once it was taken to Thailand and attained legal
283
status, the price rise would be much higher. Deals taking place at the jade company
especially accentuated the nervousness in the game, for it was often after this
transaction that the stones were cut (either at the company or after having arrived
in the buyer’s country) to reveal their content. The tension at the tournaments
of value is vividly displayed here. On the one hand, the stones could not be shown
to too many people, particularly strange dealers with unknown credentials; but
on the other hand, sellers always hoped to meet buyers who would make a good
offer. Jade companies played the key role in arranging deals. In a “good deal,”
both the seller and the buyer made money. The interrelationships between sellers,
jade companies and buyers involved the politics of knowledge and the politics
of organization. Each jade company was eager to keep the clients who had a
good knowledge of jade and often obtained valuable jade stones from Burma.
With such clients, the companies were quick to contact interesting buyers to
come and see the stones. They were even willing to loan money to these clients
to assist them in buying stones in Burma. As for the traders, be they sellers or
buyers, in order to keep good relations with the powerful companies, they had
to establish their credibility apart from their knowledge of jade as mentioned in
the previous section.
Sometimes a small part of the surface was polished or chiseled through the skin
to reveal the possible content of a stone prior to transaction. This operation
required both good knowledge and luck. If on polishing the stone, a fine interior
was indicated, a good price was assured; conversely, a chiseled “window”
(chuangkou ) (a term used by traders) that showed no sign of good quality
would not attract buyers’ interest. Always, sellers tried their best to convince
buyers on the basis of the appearance (biaoxian ) of the chiseled “window”
and the surface of the stones. On the other hand, buyers in every case attempted
to highlight any defects they could find in order to bring down the price. Simply
put, the knowledge of jade was converted to trading skills and became the politics
of value control.
With respect to the knowledge of the market, Yunnanese are quick in res-
ponding to external restrictions imposed by different governments to ensure the
supply of jade stones in meeting the market demand. Following the takeover
by the Chinese Communists in 1949, the country’s border was sealed off and
the border trade was strictly controlled. The import of Burmese jadeite in conse-
quence came to an end. Yet, with many jade artisans and merchants fleeing from
Guangzhou and Shanghai to Hong Kong, the latter has emerged as the major
jade market since the 1950s. It received Burmese jade by air or ship from Yangon
until Ne Win seized power in 1962 (Zhou 1996: 77–81). There was then a break
in the supply of jade from Burma to Hong Kong for a few years according to
informants. But around the mid-1960s, Yunnanese traders in Burma and Thailand
managed to resume the traffic of jade stones to Hong Kong via Thailand. There
284
were Yunnanese merchants who went to Hong Kong to re-establish trading con-
nections. They helped to sell jade stones smuggled from Burma and Thailand by
fellow Yunnanese.12 With the founding of jade companies from the second half
of the 1960s, the trading web incorporated more and more jewelry dealers from
Hong Kong and then Taiwan (from where jade artifacts were sold to Chinese in
different parts of the world). Again, the politics of knowledge interplayed with
the politics of organization. Apprehending the demand for jade among a large
number of Chinese outside China, and the foundation of the jade market in
Hong Kong, the jade companies took up the brokerage service. Their engagement
professionally dealt with the import-export systems of Burma, Thailand and
Hong Kong, be it officially or unofficially.13
Based on the data analyzed above, we can discern that the knowledge involved
in the trade is basically practical knowledge acquired from experience and rational
thinking. Contrary to the abundant cultural significance attributed to jade by
ancient philosophers, rulers and religious people, informants consistently state
that good traders only focus on the technical part of jade stones; cosmological
associations are rarely appropriated in transaction. Reference to cultural interpretation
is limited to traders’ perception of destiny relating to the vicissitudes in the trade.
It is said that if person and stone do not match, a person may find a valuable
piece but sell it at a cheap price or even discard it. Conversely, if a person has
the destiny (ming ) to obtain a precious piece, he may get it accidentally or at
a very low price. Yunnanese by and large do not possess a concrete knowledge of
conventional jade culture; nevertheless, they have no hesitation in naming jade
as the most precious stone. When required to explicate this, they simply point
to the antiquity of its usage in Chinese society and the popular belief in its esoteric
power of protection (hushen ), but no structural explanation can be provided.
Evidently, the cultural value of jade is remarkably simplified; this, however, does
not reduce its value of economic exchangeability.
How do we explain this phenomenon? Again drawing on Appadurai, tournaments
of value of certain objects once “occur in special times and places, their forms and
outcomes are always consequential for the more mundane realities of power and
value in ordinary life” (1986: 21). It is not the place to review the development
of jade culture in Chinese history here, suffice it to say that the great value tied
to jade primarily originated from its “sumptuary exclusivity” (1986: 22; cf.
Kopytoff 1986). In ancient China, jade articles served as ritual objects in religious
performances as well as signifiers of political authority (see Chang 1983). Their
usage was associated with the social and cosmological orders, and restricted to the
privileged class.14 Cultural interpretations emphasizing ethical, transcendental and
socio-political meanings were continually invested in jade. However, when the
sumptuary laws started to lose their enforcement during the Eastern Zhou period
(770–256 BCE) due to socio-political instability, jade objects appeared in markets,
285
and their commoditization developed thereafter. More and more artistic styles and
various forms of usage were applied to the production of jadeware in the following
dynasties. In the Song period (420–589 CE), jade commodities became widely
favored valuables among the populace (see Yin 1993). In terms of transaction,
economic exchangeability took precedence over metaphorical values. Nevertheless,
cultural meanings were not wiped out, but modified or simplified to enhance the
economic value of traded jade. It is important to mention that on account of
different situations, the social life of jade trade in each period is not the same.
The jade trade explored here highlights the commoditization of Burmese jadeite
from the phase of uncut stones to that of cut pieces, encompassing distinctive
trajectories with economic, political and cultural implications.
Guts and Luck

In addition to their knowledge of jade and ability in networking, Yunnanese
traders like to emphasize another essential element contributing to their predomi-
nance in the trade, viz. guts (poli ). “The Burmese have no such knowledge
and nerve for the jade trade,” Mr Dong in Mandalay commented. “Very few
Yunnanese can hold on to their wealth in the jade trade,” Mr Lin stated. These
two remarks refer to the Yunnanese audacity in gambling on the jade trade. Profit
or not, many Yunnanese seem to be deeply enchanted by the trade and are unable
to give it up. While trading in uncut stones during the period concerned, every
jade trader was said to have experienced repeated fluctuations in their wealth.
I have heard several stories of Yuannanese traders building up a new business
after bankruptcy or loss of purchased stones or jail terms served in Burma. Some
stories were told by the traders themselves. Their tenacity is amazing.15 Consistently,
these informants stressed their trading experience, interpersonal ties and established
credibility that helped them to secure loans from friends or jade companies to
participate in the trade.
It is also this unique daring characteristic that the Yunnanese refer to when
differentiating their overland mercantile spirit from the entrepreneurship of the
Teochiu, Hakka, Hokkien, Hainanese and Cantonese in Thailand and Burma, the
descendants of earlier migrants from the coastal provinces of southeastern China.
While acknowledging the success of the latter in their economic undertaking, the
Yunnanese generally comment on these “overseas” counterparts as conservative and
prudent, and like to contrast these qualities with their own quick temper and even
reckless spirit expressed in the local term menglang (). A middle-aged
informant frankly said: “We Yunnanese love gambling on big trade…. [We] have
a sort of wild temper ( ! shanba piqi ).” This wild temper and adventurous
disposition are said to be connected to the rugged topography of the region that
has interacted with their mobility in this ethnically diverse land which accommodates
286
numerous power entities. The organization of the jade trade is testimony to a

distinctive commercial ethos among the Yunnanese that is composed of a fearless
spirit of risk-taking, the adaptive application of strategies, cooperation, and
military action in an environment which is complex in terms of physiography,
ethnic structure and political systems.
However, in the operation of the trade, guts were said to go with luck (yunqi
), which was an uncontrollable factor and yet played a determining role in
the trade especially before the 1990s. Its uncontrollability was linked to the
indeterminacy of the jade quality, the complex trading environment, and one’s
destiny/fate referred to above. In effect, it created constant tensions in transactions
and led to the vicissitudes in traders’ business. Informants said that success in this
trade depended 70 percent on luck and only 30 percent on trading knowledge
and experience (qifen yunqi sanfen yanguang !"#$). (Some even
suggested that luck accounted for 90 percent.) While engaging in the trade, traders
were counting on luck. Although they were fully aware that good luck befriended
only a small number of people and that it never abided with the same person for
too long, Yunnanese traders seemed to have been driven by their daring to stake
their luck. Everyone dreamed of obtaining the best quality of jade stones. In
reality, only few people were lucky in the trade for some period of time, while
most traders frequently lost their fortunes in the game. While looking back on
their ephemeral and occasional economic gains and numerous perils encountered
in the trade, elderly informants commonly attribute the turbulence in their former
trading experiences to “destiny.” Possibly this explanation offers comfort when
their mind wanders back to their undertaking of this risky enterprise. Nevertheless,
it would be wrong to over emphasize this uncontrollable factor and underestimate
the Yunnanese efforts in network organization and knowledge appropriation
during the trade. The analysis in the first two sections has illustrated the intricacy
of the politics of these two aspects.
Conclusion
This case study shows that the extremely complex jade trade during the period
under discussion held great attraction for the Yunnanese. The various factors
involved in the operation contribute to the richness of its social life as a valuable
commodity in different phases (from illegal to legal and from uncut to cut pieces).
Underlying the Yunnanese adventurous temperament is their pragmatism and
instrumental rationality that practically direct their economic agency to deal with
the challenges arising from external socio-political forces underlying intricate
environments. The case study breaks the essentialized cultural perspective, often
applied to the studies of Chinese entrepreneurship, that tends to overstress the
binding effects of traditional moral values, and pays attention primarily to the
287
harmonious interactions in personal connections and overlooks the mutual

conflicts and the dynamism in conflict resolution. In this case study, by locating
its particular social, economic and political backgrounds, I have illuminated these
frequently neglected aspects. Tensions and power struggles perpetually emerged
in this commercial pursuit; but strategies to ensure the ongoing of trade included
making connections or alliances, initiating regulations, establishing brokerage and
manipulating trading knowledge. In other words, different obstacles and facilitators
continuously interacted with each other, and the trade was characterized by the
intensification and easing of political strains. This dimension of the commoditization
of jade stones is an important part of jade culture, which has not previously been
adequately researched.
Although I affirm the interrelationship of the realm of cultural significance and
that of exchangeability (Gudeman 2001), their interaction is far more complex
than the simple description of mutual dependence. Human pragmatism moves
between the two spheres in response to different contexts. Sometimes the two
realms complement each other, at other times they may be subject to changing
processes of tension, discontinuity, and incongruity. This case study has led me
to look into the constant tensions that occur during the trade for the analysis of
the politics of its operation. It suggests that while the pursuit of self-interest is
the main goal among jade traders, the high cultural values may be dormant in
their commercial engagement. The cultural attributions of jade and its economic
account are certainly connected, but they do not coherently co-exist at each stage
of its “total trajectory from production, through exchange/distribution, to consumption”
(Appadurai 1986: 13). The present research only covers the process of production
and exchange; transactions are primarily governed by traders’ economic agency in
connection to the laws of markets. A sharp contrast and breach between the two
realms referred to are notable.
Following the political changes in Burma and more flexible economic policies
since the 1990s, jade trade has become open in the country. Foreign dealers are
allowed to enter Burma to trade directly. Mandalay, with several newly established
jade companies, has replaced the former market of Chiang Mai. Some of them
have been formed by the reorganization of former jade companies or corporations
initiated by former jade traders. These changes have greatly reduced the uncertainties
of the past. Most dealers from Hong Kong now trade in cut-off pieces that reveal
the content, but among the Yunnanese trading in uncut stones remains a common
practice. This shows the Yunnanese propensity for gambling on high profits. The
commoditization of jade stones in connection with these changes is another
interesting subject that highlights a different phase of the social life of traded jade
stones; moreover it provides further insights into the dynamism of the Yunnanese
traders in their reaction to new politico-economic circumstances. But this will be
the subject of discussion in another paper.
288
Notes
1
I would like to thank Andrew Strathern, Pamela J. Stewart, and Guido Sprenger for their
careful reading and commenting on earlier versions of this article. I am also indebted to
the two anonymous referees for JCO for their valuable remarks. I conducted my doctoral
fieldwork among the Yunnanese migrants in northern Thailand which lasted 20 months
between 1994 and 1996. During this period, I focused on their migration history and
process of resettlement. I took Ban Mai Nongbua (in Chaiprakan district, Chiang Mai
province) as the major site for participant observation, and visited 24 other Yunnanese
villages in the border areas, and also some Yunnanese communities in Chiang Mai and
Bangkok. Subsequently, I did short-term fieldwork ranging from one to three months in
Thailand and Burma in 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004–2005 and 2006 (totaling ten and a half
months). Since 2000, I have extended my interest to the jade trade between Burma and
Yunnan and Thailand. I have stayed with several families of Yunnanese traders and have
conducted in-depth interviews on top of participant observation. The number of jade
traders I have interviewed is over 80.
2
So far I have only found two articles that discuss a particular case of illicit jade trade —
the Gaopu case — which took place during the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1736–96 CE).
Both investigate the imperial control of jade flow from Xinjiang province, the occurrence
of the case, subsequent punishment meted out by the court and its impact on jade trade
and the people participating in it in the following 20 years (see Chen 1994; Lai 2002).
For existing literature on jade trade between Burma and China, see next section.
3
This latter view is especially stressed by many current scholars of guanxi (social connections)
studies (e.g. Limlingan 1986; Redding 1990; Fukuyama 1995; Hamilton 1996 [1991]).
4
Although there is suggestion of an earlier date of Burmese jadeite to China, there are no
certain records of proof.
5
The video (Müller et al. 1997) gives a general idea about the excavation of jadeite in upper
Burma, its smuggling to Thailand and finally sale in Hong Kong. The discussion on the
trade as a form of gambling is very interesting, but an in-depth examination of the trading
networks involved in the process is lacking.
6
According to informants, among the Yunnanese jade traders, Yunnanese Han (or Yunnanese
Chinese) amounted to 90 percent, and Yunnanese Muslims constituted ten percent.
7
The ethnic structure and politics in Burma are very complicated. It is difficult to speak
about the exact number of ethnic groups in Burma. Although more than 100 languages
have been identified in Burma (Smith 1993 [1991]), we cannot equate the number of
language groups with that of ethnic groups, for the question of ethnic identification involves
much more complex factors than just that of language alone; see Kunstadter, ed., part on
Burma (1967).
8
For other examples, see Chang (2003, 2004).
9
Other negative associations frequently referred to cover the problems of drug-abuse and
prostitution in the mining areas (see also Zhou 1996: 298; Hughes 1997; Levy and Scott-
Clark 2001). Miners as well as mine-owners resort to them to soothe their physical pain
and loneliness in these isolated areas.
10
Apart from small pieces of jade stones which were transacted in whole pieces, there
were large pieces of jade boulders that weighed hundreds of kilos and were cut into smaller
pieces in the mining areas for the convenience of transportation. In most cases, large
boulders contain lower grade of jade without good color. They are named zhuangshi
(), in contrast to the good jade stones with vivid green color, named seshi (). Price
289
fluctuations of zhuangshi were less and predictable. Here I focus on the discussion of the
deals in whole pieces of jade stones.
11
There are other sayings that convey the messages of being prudent in buying jade stones,
and of the very low probability of obtaining good jade, such as: “Seeing more and buying
less (duokan shaomai !),” “Only polish [a spot] through the skin [of a piece of jade
stone] and do not cut it off [when selling it] (duomo shaogai[jie] !),” “After cutting
through ten pieces of jade stones, nine are discarded (shigai[jie] jiuzhuai !).” (The
Yunnanese pronunciation for is gai, instead of jie in Mandarin.)
12
In my article (2004), I have detailed the process in the case of Mr Liu (Chang 2004:
489–91).
13
Following the opening of the Chinese market, migrant Yunnanese in Burma started to
engage in smuggling between Burma and Yunnan in the mid-1980s. Some people began to
transport jade stones secretly to Ruili, a border town in Yunnan, or farther up to Tengchong
for sale.
14
Take the example of jade-made Yuzong () for explanation. It was an essential ritual
object used in Liangzhu culture between 4,000 and 2,000 BCE (You 1997: 79). The diviners
(wushi ) were the privileged people in control of political authority at that time and
monopolized the task to contact the supernatural forces through the material medium of
Yuzong (Zhang et al. 1987: 68; see also Zhang 1993). It is shaped like a rectangular tube,
but the inside is a hollow cylinder. Zhang Guangzhi suggests that the combination of both
shapes served the function of communicating with both heaven and earth (1987: 69–70),
and in practice, the Yuzong was the primary cultural product applied for the confirmation
of social and cosmological orders. Moreover, the ancient classic, Zhouli (), records the
application of Liurui () and Liuqi () in audience and religious performances.
Liurui was a category composed of six jade-made political insignia, differentiated by rank.
On being summoned to the court or while participating in sacrificial rites, the officials had
to bring their respective insignia as an expression of loyalty. Liuqi were six ritual objects,
also made of jade, and were used to worship the four cardinals and heaven and earth,
considered the major supernatural forces in control of the universe. The recorded messages
concerned reveal an ideal, ordered feudal society, which the authors projected onto the
times of the Western Zhou (1066–771 BCE), and the objects were in practice seen as a
significant part of material culture (see Hansford 1968: 59-60; Na Zhiliang 1990: 83; Yin
Zhiqiang 1993: 14–15).
15
See the three case stories that I presented in another article, Chang (2003: 19–26).
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The Trading Culture of Jade Stones among the Yunnanese in

Burma and Thailand, 1962-88

Journal of Chinese Overseas, Volume 2, Number 2, November 2006,

Published by NUS Press Pte Ltd

For additional information about this article

The Trading Culture of Jade Stones

This article aims to illustrate the trading culture of jade stones by

Introduction: Cultural Significance vs. Commoditization

Apparently, there is another aspect of jade culture in relation to its exchangeability

Furthermore, corresponding to the stance of Wang Gungwu on the entre-

Burmese Jadeite and Relevant Literature

The Politics of Organization

trading routes, of evaluation, and of markets). Before 1980, the number of

by Yunnanese and their engagement in border trade have assisted them in

The Politics of Knowledge

knowledge and human linkages have been transmitted from generation to

primary route of the 1970s

primary route of the 1980s

Guts and Luck

numerous power entities. The organization of the jade trade is testimony to a

harmonious interactions in personal connections and overlooks the mutual

. 2002. “Identification of Leadership among the KMT Yunnanese Chinese in

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