UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Legal Theory

Lopez, Franco Luis G. (B2023) Lec. Neil Silva

Peay v. US
943 So. 2d 919
JUDGE STEADMAN

Article/s invoked

Fourth Amendment, US Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

CASE SUMMARY

This case involves an encounter between a lone police officer and the appellant, clutching in his hand
something that "could possibly have been a weapon, a small knife, possibly a gun," on the third floor of an
apartment building known for narcotics trafficking.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the officer’s stop of the appellant for further
investigation was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

FACTS OF THE CASE

 On an afternoon in 1429 Girard St., N.W. Washington D.C—an apartment building the police would
routinely enter and check for illegal drug trafficking, Officer Emmett Queen and two fellow officers,
in plain clothes, pulled up to the entrance of the building to make such a routine check.

The appellant was standing in the doorway of the building

 As he looked at the officers exiting their car, he left the scene hurriedly and went
inside the building

 The team of officers entered the building and fanned out to engage in the drug patrolling.

o Officer Queen mounted the staircase to the third floor, where he came upon appellant in the
hallway some three feet away.

o Queen noticed appellant clutching something in his left hand.

 Queen could not tell exactly what it was but thought it "could possibly have been a
weapon, a small knife, possibly a gun."

o As Queen approached, the appellant turned away from Queen.

o Thereupon, in a roughly simultaneous time frame, Queen identified himself as a police

officer, asked appellant to stop, inquired what appellant had in his hand
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Legal Theory
Lopez, Franco Luis G. (B2023) Lec. Neil Silva

o As the appellant started walking away without responding, followed and put his hand on
appellant's shoulder, at which time, as he pulled away from Queen, appellant dropped some
thirteen small plastic bags to the floor.

 These subsequently were found to contain marijuana.

 Following a suppression hearing, the trial court found that on the facts, Queen had "articulable
suspicion of criminal activity and danger to himself" upon which to base the stop.

o Hence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

 At trial, a jury found appellant guilty of possession with intent to distribute cannabis in violation of
D.C. law.

 On appeal, a panel of the appellate court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress.

 Hence the instant petition

ISSUE

Whether or not the appellant’s detention was constitutional

HELD

Yes, the detention is constitutional.

To justify an investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio, the police must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonable warrant
intrusion.

This minimum level of objective justification is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a standard of
preponderance of evidence.

In determining whether a Terry stop is lawful, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances, and
even if each specific act by a suspect could be perceived in isolation as an innocent act, the observing police
officer may see a combination of facts that make out an articulable suspicion.

The trial court, as affirmed, held that the case presented sufficient specific and articulable facts to make
constitutionally reasonable the police officer’s decision to detain the appellant briefly in order to investigate
the circumstances that provoked suspicion.

On the context of the case in view of ‘specific and articulable facts’

 The officers arrived for the routine patrol of a specific building known for its narcotics trade. As they arrived, the
defendant, upon seeing them, rapidly went into the building.

o Appellant argues that this fact should be discounted, since the defendant may not have been aware that they
were police officers and since appellant "merely walked" away, citing jurisprudence on the matter

o However, the instant case is significantly different from the jurisprudence cited.

 Here, the defendant did not depart from the area of suspected activity but on the contrary went
directly toward it.
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Legal Theory
Lopez, Franco Luis G. (B2023) Lec. Neil Silva

 Moreover, the movement of appellant occurred previous and not subsequent to the immediate event
leading to the stop.

 The reaction of the appellant thus bears upon the issue as not only a possible reflection of
"consciousness of guilt" but also as related to the possible on-going narcotics trafficking within the
building itself (such as a warning to such participants of approaching strangers).

 Moreover, the place to which the appellant hurried and where the subsequent confrontation took place
was not some generalized neighborhood or even public street where drug activity was rife but rather a
specified identified and isolated private locale, known for such trafficking and regularly patrolled by
the police.

o Thus, when Queen mounted the apartment stairway to the third floor and entered the third story hallway, he
came upon appellant not as a total stranger, not as an apartment dweller just leaving his quarters or strolling the
halls, but as an individual who had hastily entered the building shortly before.

o Furthermore, appellant had not, as might be expected were he a resident, entered the apartment in which he lived
but instead was standing in the hallway "clutching something in his hand" at a distance of some three feet from
Queen, who was by himself.

o Queen testified that he thought the object appellant was clutching "could possibly have been a weapon, a small
knife, possibly a gun.

 In the District of Columbia, it is an offense to carry "either openly or concealed on or about [one's] person . . . a[n]
[unlicensed] pistol . . . or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed."

o Moreover, as has been often observed, drugs and weapons go together.

 Therefore, Queen might reasonably suspect not only that a criminal violation was taking place but that his own personal
safety was at peril.

 As the trial court stated, when Queen stopped appellant and asked what he had in his hand, Queen "was only addressing
what for him was an articulable suspicion of criminal activity and danger to himself."

 The suggestion that the belief of Queen was not objectively reasonable because no pistol or switchblade knife is capable
of concealment by someone who is clutching something in his left hand is untenable

o The Court notes that they cannot make a finding of fact in contradiction of the stated belief of a trained police
officer and in the absence of any such showing in the record or finding by the trial court

o Moreover, with respect to other objects which might constitute dangerous or deadly weapons if carried with an
intent to so use them and which could be readily concealed, considering the surrounding circumstances
discussed above, The Court rejects the notion that Queen's concern that appellant might use whatever was
concealed in his hand in that manner can be labeled objectively unreasonable as a matter of law.

 The appellant makes much of the fact that after the challenge by Queen, appellant began walking away, which should
have dissipated any suspicion on Queen's part as to how the object might be used.

o The Court notes that it is not appropriate to see why as a matter of law, Queen must have been expected to
continue his patrolling of the hall without regard to appellant's possible possession of a weapon, given all the
surrounding circumstances, or why the fact that appellant turned away from Queen necessarily indicates that he
had no intent to use a weapon against anyone.
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Legal Theory
Lopez, Franco Luis G. (B2023) Lec. Neil Silva

The personal safety of a police officer in a confrontation is a relevant factor and consideration in the Terry
equation. The Court notes that it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks
in the performance of their duties in light of the tendency of American criminals’ long tradition of armed
violence and the fatalities suffered by the police force in light of such fact.

RULING

Trial court ruling AFFIRMED

OPINIONS

JUDGE FERREN, Dissenting Opinion

As I now see this case, nothing can properly be made of appellant's hurriedly entering the apartment
building when the three plainclothes officers pulled up in front and got out of an unmarked car. There is no
record basis for believing appellant perceived a police "jump-out" squad, and thus I see no way we can
properly attribute even a hint of guilt-consciousness to appellant at that time.

It is just as likely that he feared a "gang of fast-driving toughs" rather than the police. At this point,
therefore, the police had no basis for an articulable suspicion of criminal activity — unless appellant's entry
into the building itself was suspicious.

It is true appellant entered a specific building, not merely a geographical area of several blocks, known for
"high crime" activity. Indeed, this building apparently was so well known for narcotics distribution that the
police routinely patrolled it and inspected every floor when doing so.

But what are the police to make of someone seen in the corridor, even someone who ran inside upon seeing
three men approaching the building? Without more, I believe there can be no basis for a reasonable
inference that the person is criminally involved. There are too many other legitimate reasons to be in an
apartment building, not the least of which is that the person lives there and is going home.

Even if drug dealing is known to take place in a multi-story apartment building, that fact in itself cannot
make someone in the corridor criminally suspect. Innocent activities do not become sinister by the mere fact
that they take place in one of these [high narcotics] areas.

Morever, when Officer Queen confronted appellant on the third floor he saw him clutching something
(without knowing what) in his left hand near his waist. According to Officer Queen's testimony at the
suppression hearing, "[i]t could possibly have been a weapon, a small knife, possibly a gun." But only
"possibly." The officer did not see something shiny, or pointed, or anything at all for that matter. It is an
untenable assumption that any adult male in the particular building was likely to carry a gun or a knife.

More importantly, factoring in the police officer’s subjective view of his personal safety runs counter to
the essence of a Terry seizure, which justifies a Fourth Amendment intrusion-- A Terry seizure, rather, must
be reasonably premised on the suspect's behavior, not on a police officer's subjective state of mind.

Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, so it may be difficult to
sympathize with him. But because this seizure is sustained, I worry that the police will feel justified in
stopping innocent citizens simply because of a hunch that the suspect "possibly" is carrying a weapon.
I believe the Fourth Amendment forbids such policing.