G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS,
in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303,
312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491,
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836,
923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279,
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180,
187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343,
346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713,
726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-
1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-
1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892,
1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-
2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-
528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107,
120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved,
or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does
not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the
people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered
to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but
not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of
such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with
respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in
the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the

Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until
the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though
some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA, Petitioners, v. MA. JOPETTE M.
REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL AND LORAINE S.
SCHNEIDER-CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

All Filipinos are entitled to the protection of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying
that judgment be rendered reversing and setting aside the June 16, 2011 Decision1 and September 13,
2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006.

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the
laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It has a Philippine office located at 4/F, Metro House Building,
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City.3 In its Petition filed with this court, Saudia identified itself as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing under the Royal Decree No. M/24
of 18.07.1385H (10.02.1962G) in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its Philippine Office is located
at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City (Philippine Office). It may be served
with orders of this Honorable Court through undersigned counsel at 4th and 6th Floors, Citibank Center
Bldg., 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.4 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary
Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.5 After undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration for deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight
attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as Temporary Flight Attendants,
respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts
with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette) on May 16, 1990;6 Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong
(Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993;7 and Loraine Schneider-Cruz
(Loraine) on August 27, 1995.8

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on
various dates in 2006.9

Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal. They alleged that the
termination was made solely because they were pregnant.10

As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through
the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but
later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their
maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters.11

Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat
of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements.12

Specifically, Ma. Jopette received a call on October 16, 2006 from Saudia's Base Manager, Abdulmalik
Saddik (Abdulmalik).13 Montassah was informed personally by Abdulmalik and a certain Faisal Hussein
on October 20, 2006 after being required to report to the office one (1) month into her maternity
leave.14Rouen Ruth was also personally informed by Abdulmalik on October 17, 2006 after being
required to report to the office by her Group Supervisor.15 Loraine received a call on October 12, 2006
from her Group Supervisor, Dakila Salvador.16

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on
its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract).17 Under the Unified
Contract, the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. It
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on board to provide
various services required in normal or emergency cases on both domestic/international flights beside
her role in maintaining continuous safety and security of passengers, and since she will not be able to
maintain the required medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air Hostess
becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment
contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness.18 (Emphasis supplied)

In their Comment on the present Petition,19 respondents emphasized that the Unified Contract took
effect on September 23, 2006 (the first day of Ramadan),20 well after they had filed and had their
maternity leaves approved. Ma. Jopette filed her maternity leave application on September 5,
2006.21 Montassah filed her maternity leave application on August 29, 2006, and its approval was
already indicated in Saudia's computer system by August 30, 2006.22 Rouen Ruth filed her maternity
leave application on September 13, 2006,23 and Loraine filed her maternity leave application on August
22, 2006.24

Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents filed separate appeal letters that were
all rejected.25

Despite these initial rejections, respondents each received calls on the morning of November 6, 2006
from Saudia's office secretary informing them that their maternity leaves had been approved. Saudia,
however, was quick to renege on its approval. On the evening of November 6, 2006, respondents again
received calls informing them that it had received notification from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia that their
maternity leaves had been disapproved.26

Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents executed handwritten
resignation letters. In Montassah's and Rouen Ruth's cases, their resignations were executed on Saudia's
blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These letterheads already had the word "RESIGNATION"
typed on the subject portions of their headings when these were handed to respondents.27
On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal
and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, premium, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, night shift differentials, medical expense
reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.28 The case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Hermino V.
Suelo and docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-12342-07.

Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.29 It claimed that all the determining points of
contact referred to foreign law and insisted that the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground
of forum non conveniens.30 It added that respondents had no cause of action as they resigned
voluntarily.31

On December 12, 2008, Executive Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco rendered the
Decision32dismissing respondents' Complaint. The dispositive portion of this Decision
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises' considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for
lack of jurisdiction/merit.33cralawlawlibrary

On respondents' appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission's Sixth Division reversed the ruling of
Executive Labor Arbiter Jambaro-Franco. It explained that "[considering that complainants-appellants
are OFWs, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC has [sic] jurisdiction to hear and decide their complaint for
illegal termination."34 On the matter of forum non conveniens, it noted that there were no special
circumstances that warranted its abstention from exercising jurisdiction.35 On the issue of whether
respondents were validly dismissed, it held that there was nothing on record to support Saudia's claim
that respondents resigned voluntarily.

The dispositive portion of the November 19, 2009 National Labor Relations Commission
Decision36reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the appeal impressed with
merit. The respondents-appellees are hereby directed to pay complainants-appellants the aggregate
amount of SR614,001.24 corresponding to their backwages and separation pay plus ten (10%) percent
thereof as attorney's fees. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 12, 2008 is hereby
VACATED and SET ASIDE. Attached is the computation prepared by this Commission and made an
integral part of this Decision.37cralawlawlibrary

In the Resolution dated February 11, 2010,38 the National Labor Relations Commission denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

In the June 16, 2011 Decision,39 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Rule 65 Petition and modified
the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with respect to the award of separation pay
and backwages.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November 19, 2009 issued by
public respondent, Sixth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission - National Capital Region
is MODIFIED only insofar as the computation of the award of separation pay and backwages. For greater
clarity, petitioners are ordered to pay private respondents separation pay which shall be computed from
private respondents' first day of employment up to the finality of this decision, at the rate of one month
per year of service and backwages which shall be computed from the date the private respondents were
illegally terminated until finality of this decision. Consequently, the ten percent (10%) attorney's fees
shall be based on the total amount of the award. The assailed Decision is affirmed in all other respects.

The labor arbiter is hereby DIRECTED to make a recomputation based on the

foregoing.40cralawlawlibrary

In the Resolution dated September 13, 2011,41 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, this Appeal was filed.

The issues for resolution are the following:

First, whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission may exercise jurisdiction
over Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine law in adjudicating the present dispute;

Second, whether respondents' voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated; and

Lastly, whether Brenda J. Betia may be held personally liable along with Saudi Arabian
Airlines.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Summons were validly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over it validly acquired.

There is no doubt that the pleadings and summons were served on Saudia through its counsel.42 Saudia,
however, claims that the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission had no jurisdiction
over it because summons were never served on it but on "Saudia Manila."43 Referring to itself as "Saudia
Jeddah," it claims that "Saudia Jeddah" and not "Saudia Manila" was the employer of respondents
because:

First, "Saudia Manila" was never a party to the Cabin Attendant contracts entered into by respondents;

Second, it was "Saudia Jeddah" that provided the funds to pay for respondents' salaries and benefits;
and

Lastly, it was with "Saudia Jeddah" that respondents filed their resignations.44

Saudia posits that respondents' Complaint was brought against the wrong party because "Saudia
Manila," upon which summons was served, was never the employer of respondents.45

Saudia is vainly splitting hairs in its effort to absolve itself of liability. Other than its bare allegation, there
is no basis for concluding that "Saudia Jeddah" is distinct from "Saudia Manila."

What is clear is Saudia's statement in its own Petition that what it has is a "Philippine Office . . . located
at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City."46 Even in the position paper that
Saudia submitted to the Labor Arbiter,47 what Saudia now refers to as "Saudia Jeddah" was then only
referred to as "Saudia Head Office at Jeddah, KSA,"48 while what Saudia now refers to as "Saudia Manila"
was then only referred to as "Saudia's office in Manila."49

By its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a Philippine office.

Section 3(d) of Republic Act No.. 7042, otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act of 1991,
provides the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The phrase "doing business" shall include . . . opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or
branches; . . . and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements
and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the
functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose and
object of the business organization. (Emphasis supplied)

A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act leads to no other conclusion than that
Saudia is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia may be sued in the
Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.

Moreover, since there is no real distinction between "Saudia Jeddah" and "Saudia Manila" — the latter
being nothing more than Saudia's local office — service of summons to Saudia's office in Manila sufficed
to vest jurisdiction over Saudia's person in Philippine tribunals.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

II

Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are not in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts. This is because respondents' Cabin Attendant contracts require the
application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, rather than those of the Philippines.50 It claims that the difficulty
of ascertaining foreign law calls into operation the principle of forum non conveniens, thereby rendering
improper the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals.51

A choice of law governing the validity of contracts or the interpretation of its provisions dees not
necessarily imply forum non conveniens. Choice of law and forum non conveniens are entirely different
matters.

Choice of law provisions are an offshoot of the fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts. Article
1306 of the Civil Code firmly ensconces this:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.

In contrast, forum non conveniens is a device akin to the rule against forum shopping. It is designed to
frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if
the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.

Contractual choice of law provisions factor into transnational litigation and dispute resolution in one of
or in a combination of four ways: (1) procedures for settling disputes, e.g., arbitration; (2) forum, i.e.,
venue; (3) governing law; and (4) basis for interpretation. Forum non conveniens relates to, but is not
subsumed by, the second of these.

Likewise, contractual choice of law is not determinative of jurisdiction. Stipulating on the laws of a given
jurisdiction as the governing law of a contract does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by tribunals
elsewhere. The reverse is equally true: The assumption of jurisdiction by tribunals does not ipso
factomean that it cannot apply and rule on the basis of the parties' stipulation. In Hasegawa v.
Kitamura:52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is
fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law V'hich will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum
law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often, coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one
do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the other. The question of whether the
law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that
state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.53cralawlawlibrary

As various dealings, commercial or otherwise, are facilitated by the progressive ease of communication
and travel, persons from various jurisdictions find themselves transacting with each other. Contracts
involving foreign elements are, however, nothing new. Conflict of laws situations precipitated by
disputes and litigation anchored on these contracts are not totally novel.

Transnational transactions entail differing laws on the requirements Q for the validity of the formalities
and substantive provisions of contracts and their interpretation. These transactions inevitably lend
themselves to the possibility of various fora for litigation and dispute resolution. As observed by an
eminent expert on transnational law:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The more jurisdictions having an interest in, or merely even a point of contact with, a transaction or
relationship, the greater the number of potential fora for the resolution of disputes arising out of or
related to that transaction or relationship. In a world of increased mobility, where business and personal
transactions transcend national boundaries, the jurisdiction of a number of different fora may easily be
invoked in a single or a set of related disputes.54cralawlawlibrary

Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic validity of contracts. The first
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he forms and solemnities of contracts . . . shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed"55 (i.e., lex loci celebrationis).
In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of settling conflict of laws situations on matters
pertaining to substantive content of contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes have emerged:
(1) lex loci contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex loci solutionis or the law of the place
of performance; and (3) lex loci intentionis or the law intended by the parties.56

Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving the present dispute is lex loci intentionis.

An author observed that Spanish jurists and commentators "favor lex loci intentionis."57 These jurists
and commentators proceed from the Civil Code of Spain, which, like our Civil Code, is silent on what
governs the intrinsic validity of contracts, and the same civil law traditions from which we draw ours.

In this jurisdiction, this court, in Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio
Construction, Inc.,58 manifested preference for allowing the parties to select the law applicable to their
contract":chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed
by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by the lex
contractus or "proper law of the contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex
loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis). The
law selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or the
nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic
rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract,
subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the
chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction.59 (Emphasis in the original)

Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws
of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction.

As mentioned, contractual choice of laws factors into transnational litigation in any or a combination of
four (4) ways. Moreover, forum non conveniens relates to one of these: choosing between multiple
possible fora.

Nevertheless, the possibility of parallel litigation in multiple fora — along with the host of difficulties it
poses — is not unique to transnational litigation. It is a difficulty that similarly arises in disputes well
within the bounds of a singe jurisdiction.

When parallel litigation arises strictly within the context of a single jurisdiction, such rules as those on
forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata come into operation. Thus, in the Philippines, the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure provide for willful and deliberate forum shopping as a ground not only for
summary dismissal with prejudice but also for citing parties and counsels in direct contempt, as well as
for the imposition of administrative sanctions.60 Likewise, the same rules expressly provide that a party
may seek the dismissal of a Complaint or another pleading asserting a claim on the ground "[t]hat there
is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause," i.e., litis pendentia, or "[t]hat
the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment,"61 i.e., res judicata.

Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of
addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res
judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non
conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.

Forum non conveniens literally translates to "the forum is inconvenient."62 It is a concept in private
international law and was devised to combat the "less than honorable" reasons and excuses that
litigants use to secure procedural advantages, annoy and harass defendants, avoid overcrowded
dockets, and select a "friendlier" venue.63 Thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens addresses the
same rationale that the rule against forum shopping does, albeit on a multijurisdictional scale.

Forum non conveniens, like res judicata,64 is a concept originating in common law.65 However, unlike the
rule on res judicata, as well as those on litis pendentia and forum shopping, forum non conveniens finds
no textual anchor, whether in statute or in procedural rules, in our civil law system. Nevertheless,
jurisprudence has applied forum non conveniens as basis for a court to decline its exercise of
jurisdiction.66

Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address parallel litigation and undermine a litigant's
capacity to vex and secure undue advantages by engaging in forum shopping on an international scale. It
is also grounded on principles of comity and judicial efficiency.

Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in exercising jurisdiction on account
of forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a measure
that prevents the former's having to interfere in affairs which are better and more competently
addressed by the latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only that tribunals
elsewhere are better suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals are better
positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice. Forum non conveniens prevents the
embarrassment of an awkward situation where a tribunal is rendered incompetent in the face of the
greater capability — both analytical and practical — of a tribunal in another jurisdiction.

The wisdom of avoiding conflicting and unenforceable judgments is as much a matter of efficiency and
economy as it is a matter of international courtesy. A court would effectively be neutering itself if it
insists on adjudicating a controversy when it knows full well that it is in no position to enforce its
judgment. Doing so is not only an exercise in futility; it is an act of frivolity. It clogs the dockets of
a.tribunal and leaves it to waste its efforts on affairs, which, given transnational exigencies, will be
reduced to mere academic, if not trivial, exercises.

Accordingly, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most 'convenient' or available forum and the parties
are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere."67 In Puyat v. Zabarte,68 this court recognized the
following situations as among those that may warrant a court's desistance from exercising
jurisdiction:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main
aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their
residence there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum shopping[,]
merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non residents or aliens when the docket may
already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained;
and

5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.69

In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,70 this court
underscored that a Philippine court may properly assume jurisdiction over a case if it chooses to do so to
the extent: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that
the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."71

The use of the word "may" (i.e., "may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction"72) in the decisions shows
that the matter of jurisdiction rests on the sound discretion of a court. Neither the mere invocation
of forum non conveniens nor the averment of foreign elements operates to automatically divest a court
of jurisdiction. Rather, a court should renounce jurisdiction only "after 'vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances' require the court's desistance."73 As the propriety of
applying forum non conveniens is contingent on a factual determination, it is, therefore, a matter of
defense.74

The second sentence of Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is exclusive in its recital of
the grounds for dismissal that are exempt from the omnibus motion rule: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription. Moreover, dismissal on account
offorum non conveniens is a fundamentally discretionary matter. It is, therefore, not a matter for a
defendant to foist upon the court at his or her own convenience; rather, it must be pleaded at the
earliest possible opportunity.

On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must
not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible
opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.

This court notes that in Hasegawa,76 this court stated that forum non conveniens is not a ground for a
motion to dismiss. The factual ambience of this case however does not squarely raise the viability of this
doctrine. Until the opportunity comes to review the use of motions to dismiss for parallel
litigation, Hasegawa remains existing doctrine.

Consistent with forum non conveniens as fundamentally a factual matter, it is imperative that it proceed
from & factually established basis. It would be improper to dismiss an action pursuant to forum non
conveniens based merely on a perceived, likely, or hypothetical multiplicity of fora. Thus, a defendant
must also plead and show that a prior suit has, in fact, been brought in another jurisdiction.

The existence of a prior suit makes real the vexation engendered by duplicitous litigation, the
embarrassment of intruding into the affairs of another sovereign, and the squandering of judicial efforts
in resolving a dispute already lodged and better resolved elsewhere. As has been
noted:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A case will not be stayed o dismissed on [forum] non conveniens grounds unless the plaintiff is shown to
have an available alternative forum elsewhere. On this, the moving party bears the burden of proof.

A number of factors affect the assessment of an alternative forum's adequacy. The statute of limitations
abroad may have run, of the foreign court may lack either subject matter or personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. . . . Occasionally, doubts will be raised as to the integrity or impartiality of the foreign
court (based, for example, on suspicions of corruption or bias in favor of local nationals), as to the
fairness of its judicial procedures, or as to is operational efficiency (due, for example, to lack of
resources, congestion and delay, or interfering circumstances such as a civil unrest). In one noted case,
[it was found] that delays of 'up to a quarter of a century' rendered the foreign forum... inadequate for
these purposes.77cralawlawlibrary

We deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant not only allege
supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in this jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that such
danger is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has commenced in another
jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise jurisdiction.

III

Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of
jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law.

Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant
contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.

Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing law. Thai forum non
conveniensmay ultimately result in the application of foreign law is merely an incident of its application.
In this strict sense, forum non conveniens is not applicable. It is not the primarily pivotal consideration in
this case.

In any case, even a further consideration of the applicability of forum non conveniens on the incidental
matter of the law governing respondents' relation with Saudia leads to the conclusion that it is improper
for Philippine tribunals to divest themselves of jurisdiction.

Any evaluation of the propriety of contracting parties' choice of a forum and'its incidents must grapple
with two (2) considerations: first, the availability and adequacy of recourse to a foreign tribunal; and
second, the question of where, as between the forum court and a foreign court, the balance of interests
inhering in a dispute weighs more heavily.

The first is a pragmatic matter. It relates to the viability of ceding jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal and
can be resolved by juxtaposing the competencies and practical circumstances of the tribunals in
alternative fora. Exigencies, like the statute of limitations, capacity to enforce orders and judgments,
access to records, requirements for the acquisition of jurisdiction, and even questions relating to the
integrity of foreign courts, may render undesirable or even totally unfeasible recourse to a foreign court.
As mentioned, we consider it in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant show, in
pleading forum non conveniens, that litigation has commenced in another jurisdiction and that a foieign
tribunal has, in fact, chosen to exercise jurisdiction.

Two (2) factors weigh into a court's appraisal of the balance of interests inhering in a dispute: first, the
vinculum which the parties and their relation have to a given jurisdiction; and second, the public interest
that must animate a tribunal, in its capacity as an agent of the sovereign, in choosing to assume or
decline jurisdiction. The first is more concerned with the parties, their personal circumstances, and
private interests; the second concerns itself with the state and the greater social order.

In considering the vinculum, a court must look into the preponderance of linkages which the parties and
their transaction may have to either jurisdiction. In this respect, factors, such as the parties' respective
nationalities and places of negotiation, execution, performance, engagement or deployment, come into
play.

In considering public interest, a court proceeds with a consciousness that it is an organ of the state. It
must, thus, determine if the interests of the sovereign (which acts through it) are outweighed by those
of the alternative jurisdiction. In this respect, the court delves into a consideration of public policy.
Should it find that public interest weighs more heavily in favor of its assumption of jurisdiction, it should
proceed in adjudicating the dispute, any doubt or .contrary view arising from the preponderance of
linkages notwithstanding.

Our law on contracts recognizes the validity of contractual choice of law provisions. Where such
provisions exist, Philippine tribunals, acting as the forum court, generally defer to the parties' articulated
choice.

This is consistent with the fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts. Article 1306 of the Civ:l Code
expressly provides that "[t]he contracting parties may establish 'such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient."78 Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting as the
forum court) is called upon to respect the parties' choice of governing law, such respect must not be so
permissive as to lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
that underlie the contract central to the controversy.

Specifically with respect to public policy, in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople,79 this
court explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that
provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are
deemed written inta the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not
contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters
heavily impressed with public interest.80(Emphasis supplied)

Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State ... shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men." Contrasted with Article II, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution's statement that "[n]o person shall ... be denied the equal protection of the laws," Article II,
Section 14 exhorts the State to "ensure." This does not only mean that the Philippines shall not
countenance nor lend legal recognition and approbation to measures that discriminate on the basis of
one's being male or female. It imposes an obligation to actively engage in securing the fundamental
equality of men and women.

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), signed and
ratified by the Philippines on July 15, 1980, and on August 5, 1981, respectively,81 is part of the law of
the land. In view of the widespread signing and ratification of, as well as adherence (in practice) to it by
states, it may even be said that many provisions of the CEDAW may have become customary
international law. The CEDAW gives effect to the Constitution's policy statement in Article II, Section 14.
Article I of the CEDAW defines "discrimination against women" as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.82cralawlawlibrary

The constitutional exhortation to ensure fundamental equality, as illumined by its enabling law, the
CEDAW, must inform and animate all the actions of all personalities acting on behalf of the State. It is,
therefore, the bounden duty of this court, in rendering judgment on the disputes brought before it, to
ensure that no discrimination is heaped upon women on the mere basis of their being women. This is a
point so basic and central that all our discussions and pronouncements — regardless of whatever
averments there may be of foreign law — must proceed from this premise.

So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia's policy. As
argued by respondents, Saudia's policy entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who
become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically
to women. Saudia's policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other
consideration but sex.
We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render
difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be
the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that, it must entail
the termination of one's employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender, may be
subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, we fail to appreciate how
pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete
termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.

Apart from the constitutional policy on the fundamental equality before the law of men and women, it is
settled that contracts relating to labor and employment are impressed with public interest. Article 1700
of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good."

Consistent with this, this court's pronouncements in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation83 are
clear and unmistakable:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly,
the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement, and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement
of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan".
The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws
and'regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship between
petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much
affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be
rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. . . . Under
these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust
Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.84 (Emphasis
supplied)

As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be) the illegal termination of
respondents' employment, this case is immutably a matter of public interest and public policy.
Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find
application in and govern this case. 'Moreover, as this premise for Saudia's insistence on the
application forum non conveniens has been shattered, it follows that Philippine tribunals may properly
assume jurisdiction over the present controversy. Philippine jurisprudence provides ample illustrations
of when a court's renunciation of jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is proper or
improper.'

In Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals,85 this court noted that the trial court failed to
consider that one of the plaintiffs was a domestic corporation, that one of the defendants was a Filipino,
and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt that was the object of the transaction subject of
the litigation. Thus, this court held, among others, that the trial court's refusal to assume jurisdiction
was not justified by forum non conveniens and remanded the case to the trial court.

In Raytheon International, Inc. v. Rouzie, Jr.,86 this court sustained the trial court's assumption of
jurisdiction considering that the trial court could properly enforce judgment on the petitioner which was
a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.

In Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr.,87 this court found no reason to disturb the trial court's
assumption of jurisdiction over a case in which, as noted by the trial court, "it is more convenient to
hear and decide the case in the Philippines because Todaro [the plaintiff] resides in the Philippines and
the contract allegedly breached involve[d] employment in the Philippines."88

In Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld,89 this court held that the fact that the
complainant in an illegal dismissal case was a Canadian citizen and a repatriate did not warrant the
application of forum non conveniens considering that: (1) the Labor Code does not include forum non
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of a complaint for illegal dismissal; (2) the propriety of
dismissing a case based on forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; and (3) the requisites
for assumption of jurisdiction as laid out in Bank of America, NT&SA90 were all satisfied.

In contrast, this court ruled in The Manila Hotel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission91 that the
National Labor Relations Q Commission was a seriously inconvenient forum. In that case, private
respondent Marcelo G. Santos was working in the Sultanate of Oman when he received a letter from
Palace Hotel recruiting him for employment in Beijing, China. Santos accepted the offer. Subsequently,
however, he was released from employment supposedly due to business reverses arising from political
upheavals in China (i.e., the Tiananmen Square incidents of 1989). Santos later filed a Complaint for
illegal dismissal impleading Palace Hotel's General Manager, Mr. Gerhard Schmidt, the Manila Hotel
International Company Ltd. (which was, responsible for training Palace Hotel's personnel and staff), and
the Manila Hotel Corporation (which owned 50% of Manila Hotel International Company Ltd.'s capital
stock).

In ruling against the National Labor Relations Commission's exercise of jurisdiction, this court noted that
the main aspects of the case transpired in two (2) foreign jurisdictions, Oman and China, and that the
case involved purely foreign elements. Specifically, Santos was directly hired by a foreign employer
through correspondence sent to Oman. Also, the proper defendants were neither Philippine nationals
nor engaged in business in the Philippines, while the main witnesses were not residents of the
Philippines. Likewise, this court noted that the National Labor Relations Commission was in no position
to conduct the following: first, determine the law governing the employment contract, as it was entered
into in foreign soil; second, determine the facts, as Santos' employment was terminated in Beijing; and
third, enforce its judgment, since Santos' employer, Palace Hotel, was incorporated under the laws of
China and was not even served with summons.

Contrary to Manila Hotel, the case now before us does not entail a preponderance of linkages that favor
a foreign jurisdiction.

Here, the circumstances of the parties and their relation do not approximate the circumstances
enumerated in Puyat,92 which this court recognized as possibly justifying the desistance of Philippine
tribunals from exercising jurisdiction.
First, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more conveniently tried elsewhere. As
established earlier, Saudia is doing business in the Philippines. For their part, all four (4) respondents are
Filipino citizens maintaining residence in the Philippines and, apart from their previous employment
with Saudia, have no other connection to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It would even be to respondents'
inconvenience if this case were to be tried elsewhere.

Second, the records are bereft of any indication that respondents filed their Complaint in an effort to
engage in forum shopping or to vex and inconvenience Saudia.

Third, there is no indication of "unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or

aliens."93 That Saudia has managed to bring the present controversy all the way to this court proves this.

Fourth, it cannot be said that the local judicial machinery is inadequate for effectuating the right sought
to be maintained. Summons was properly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over its person was validly
acquired.

Lastly, there is not even room for considering foreign law. Philippine law properly governs the present
dispute.

As the question of applicable law has been settled, the supposed difficulty of ascertaining foreign law
(which requires the application of forum non conveniens) provides no insurmountable inconvenience or
special circumstance that will justify depriving Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction.

Even if we were to assume, for the sake of discussion, that it is the laws of Saudi Arabia which should
apply, it does not follow that Philippine tribunals should refrain from exercising jurisdiction. To. recall
our pronouncements in Puyat,94 as well as in Bank of America, NT&SA,95 it is not so much the mere
applicability of foreign law which calls into operation forum non conveniens. Rather, what justifies a
court's desistance from exercising jurisdiction is "[t]he difficulty of ascertaining foreign law"96 or the
inability of a "Philippine Court to make an intelligent decision as to the law[.]"97

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., "to make an
intelligent decision"98), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact,
(albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents'
citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In
their Comment, respondents write:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the
employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict
[sic] in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the
same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto
quoted as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same
while on maternity leave." (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No.
M/51.)99cralawlawlibrary
All told, the considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals as outlined in Bank of
America, NT&SA100 have been satisfied. First, all the parties are based in the Philippines and all the
material incidents transpired in this jurisdiction. Thus, the parties may conveniently seek relief from
Philippine tribunals. Second, Philippine tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts. Third, Philippine tribunals are in a position to enforce their decisions. There is no
compelling basis for ceding jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal. Quite the contrary, the immense public
policy considerations attendant to this case behoove Philippine tribunals to not shy away from their
duty to rule on the case.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

IV

Respondents were illegally terminated.

In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines,101 this court defined voluntary resignation as "the voluntary act of an
employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of
the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is
a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office
accompanied by the act of relinquishment."102 Thus, essential to the act of resignation is voluntariness.
It must be the result of an employee's exercise of his or her own will.

In the same case of Bilbao, this court advanced a means for determining whether an employee resigned
voluntarily:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee
before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact,
intended, to sever his or her employment.103 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, constructive dismissal has been defined as "cessation of work because 'continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank
or a diminution in pay' and other benefits."104

In Penaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation,105 constructive dismissal has been described
as tantamount to "involuntarily [sic] resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions
set by the employer."106 In the same case, it was noted that "[t]he gauge for constructive dismissal is
whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to give up his
employment under the prevailing circumstances."107

Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive dismissal, it is clear that respondents were
constructively dismissed. Hence, their termination was illegal.

The termination of respondents' employment happened when they were pregnant and expecting to
incur costs on account of child delivery and infant rearing. As noted by the Court of Appeals, pregnancy
is a time when they need employment to sustain their families.108 Indeed, it goes against normal and
reasonable human behavior to abandon one's livelihood in a time of great financial need.
It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with Saudia. All they did was avail of their
maternity leaves. Evidently, the very nature of a maternity leave means that a pregnant employee will
not report for work only temporarily and that she will resume the performance of her duties as soon as
the leave allowance expires.

It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed with Saudia. Each of them
repeatedly filed appeal letters (as much as five [5] letters in the case of Rebesencio109) asking Saudia to
reconsider the ultimatum that they resign or be terminated along with the forfeiture of their benefits.
Some of them even went to Saudia's office to personally seek reconsideration.110

Respondents also adduced a copy of the "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin
Attendants."111This contract deemed void the employment of a flight attendant who becomes pregnant
and threatened termination due to lack of medical fitness.112 The threat of termination (and the
forfeiture of benefits that it entailed) is enough to compel a reasonable person in respondents' position
to give up his or her employment.

Saudia draws attention to how respondents' resignation letters were supposedly made in their own
handwriting. This minutia fails to surmount all the other indications negating any voluntariness on
respondents' part. If at all, these same resignation letters are proof of how any supposed resignation did
not arise from respondents' own initiative. As earlier pointed out, respondents' resignations were
executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These letterheads already had the
word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portion of their respective headings when these were
handed to respondents.113ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the
employer."114 In this case, Saudia makes much of how respondents supposedly completed their exit
interviews, executed quitclaims, received their separation pay, and took more than a year to file their
Complaint.115 If at all, however, these circumstances prove only the fact of their occurrence, nothing
more. The voluntariness of respondents' departure from Saudia is non sequitur.

Mere compliance with standard procedures or processes, such as the completion of their exit
interviews, neither negates compulsion nor indicates voluntariness.

As with respondent's resignation letters, their exit interview forms even support their claim of illegal
dismissal and militates against Saudia's arguments. These exit interview forms, as reproduced by Saudia
in its own Petition, confirms the unfavorable conditions as regards respondents' maternity leaves. Ma.
Jopette's and Loraine's exit interview forms are particularly telling:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. From Ma. Jopette's exit interview form:

3. In what respects has the job met or failed to meet your expectations?

THE SUDDEN TWIST OF DECISION REGARDING THE MATERNITY LEAVE.116

b. From Loraine's exit interview form:

 1. What are your main reasons for leaving Saudia? What company are you joining?

xxx xxx xxx

Others

CHANGING POLICIES REGARDING MATERNITY LEAVE (PREGNANCY)117

As to respondents' quitclaims, in Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v. Paramio,118 this court noted
that "[i]f (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or
(b) the terms of the settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must be
struck down as invalid or illegal."119 Respondents executed their quitclaims after having been unfairly
given an ultimatum to resign or be terminated (and forfeit their benefits).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Having been illegally and unjustly dismissed, respondents are entitled to full backwages and benefits
from the time of their termination until the finality of this Decision. They are likewise entitled to
separation pay in the amount of one (1) month's salary for every year of service until the fmality of this
Decision, with a fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year.

Moreover, "[m]oral damages are awarded in termination cases where the employee's dismissal was
attended by bad faith, malice or fraud, or where it constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or where it
was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy."120 In this case, Saudia
terminated respondents' employment in a manner that is patently discriminatory and running afoul of
the public interest that underlies employer-employee relationships. As such, respondents are entitled to
moral damages.

To provide an "example or correction for the public good"121 as against such discriminatory and callous
schemes, respondents are likewise entitled to exemplary damages.

In a long line of cases, this court awarded exemplary damages to illegally dismissed employees whose
"dismissal[s were] effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."122 This court has awarded
exemplary damages to employees who were terminated on such frivolous, arbitrary, and unjust grounds
as membership in or involvement with labor unions,123 injuries sustained in the course of
employment,124development of a medical condition due to the employer's own violation of the
employment contract,125and lodging of a Complaint against the employer.126 Exemplary damages were
also awarded to employees who were deemed illegally dismissed by an employer in an attempt to evade
compliance with statutorily established employee benefits.127 Likewise, employees dismissed for
supposedly just causes, but in violation of due process requirements, were awarded exemplary
damages.128

These examples pale in comparison to the present controversy. Stripped of all unnecessary complexities,
respondents were dismissed for no other reason than simply that they were pregnant. This is as wanton,
oppressive, and tainted with bad faith as any reason for termination of employment can be. This is no
ordinary case of illegal dismissal. This is a case of manifest gender discrimination. It is an affront not only
to our statutes and policies on employees' security of tenure, but more so, to the Constitution's dictum
of fundamental equality between men and women.129

The award of exemplary damages is, therefore, warranted, not only to remind employers of the need to
adhere to the requirements of procedural and substantive due process in termination of employment,
but more importantly, to demonstrate that gender discrimination should in no case be countenanced.

Having been compelled to litigate to seek reliefs for their illegal and unjust dismissal, respondents are
likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award.130

VI

Petitioner Brenda J. Betia may not be held liable.

A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it. Thus, as a
rule, corporate directors and officers are not liable for the illegal termination of a corporation's
employees. It is only when they acted in bad faith or with malice that they become solidarity liable with
the corporation.131

In Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. (EEMI) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng Ever Electrical,132 this court
clarified that "[b]ad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud."133

Respondents have not produced proof to show that Brenda J. Betia acted in bad faith or with malice as
regards their termination. Thus, she may not be held solidarity liable with Saudia.cralawred

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not solidarity liable with
petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral
and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly,
petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:

(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in which each of the
respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;

(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents commenced
employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of one (1) month's salary for every year of
service, with a fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 per respondent;

(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent; and

(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.

Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this
Decision until full satisfaction thereof.

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to
respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of
death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed
in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have
now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen
with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which
may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of
which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue
of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines,
and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the
above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen
should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of
her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his
will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property
is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen,
through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT
HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY
THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following
nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine
years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his
last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on
March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by
the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since
he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps
to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in
that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in
the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile.
The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living
in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et
the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law"is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of
the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing
the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it
in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on
executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal
law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity
of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's
domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied
the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference
back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain
of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would
have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet
there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather
than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will
be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in

Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to
intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since
by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be
to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court
were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution
to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the
surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply
the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it
accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers
to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case,
the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also
to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the
main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account
the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum.
The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx xxx xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile,
or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of
law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of
nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In
re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as
are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow
the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner
of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will
be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at
the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two
sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof
and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for
those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law
on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer
the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59
Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the
state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil
Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code
of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court
with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
reversed, with costs against appellees.
April 24, 2018

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set
aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce
Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial
hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation.
During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated
February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that
based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a
divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are
no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously
registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment.
Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form
and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March
6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New
Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in
the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and
duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and
civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the
legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to
the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it
was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the
latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types:
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following
rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly
thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the
Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by
the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting
after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine
law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution
of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still
be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to
avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is
recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after
the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American
citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but
their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity
to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for
the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear
anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation,respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor
daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement,
alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There,
we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-
husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was
alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband
averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws
of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court
discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines.
Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in
the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et
al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a
judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband,
who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or
wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These
property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which
was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the
petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including
the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized
a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the
marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the
Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound
to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words
advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of
the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have
the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial
review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it
is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are
those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free
speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On
the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state
for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety
or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to
the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court.
In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal
protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated
by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and
void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her
alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of
the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever
law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for
she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism
now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the
bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how
they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers
to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance
that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to
marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he
intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the
rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other
evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any
illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a
foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of
genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of
the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more
often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive
behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by
Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically
to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on
divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to
encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce
law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage
on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943,
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously
for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's
incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950,
upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-
institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills,
H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with
134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute
divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or

abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during
the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in
vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner;
and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both
spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or
over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents
guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together
as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be
incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for
absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or
not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual
as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt
to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has
looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups.
To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a
state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they
are good for country.77While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences
which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that
the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is
equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively
enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost
always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable
legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No
10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-
Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every
human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino
citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent
relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The
irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality
for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found
and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according
to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore,
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of
the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign
country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court
allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and
the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the
Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are
constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a
a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by
the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do
so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it,
as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and
October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as
to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED