CHAPTER 4
Contemporary Models of Intelligence
Janet E. Davidson and Iris A. Kemp
Few constructs are as mysterious and contro-
versial as human intelligence. One mystery
is why, even though the concept has existed
for centuries, there is still little consensus
on exactly what it means for someone to
be intelligent or for one person to be more
intelligent than another. Oddly enough, the
heterogeneity among views of intelligence
seems to have increased over time rather
than decreased (Stanovich, 2009). This lack
of agreement fuels unresolved controversies,
such as whether intelligence is comprised of
one main component or many, and it results
in claims that intelligence is too imprecise a
term to be useful (Jensen, 1998). A related
mystery is why the field has generated rela-
tively few new models of intelligence in the
past 20 years. Is this scarcity due to a per-
ceived futility? Will it eventually result in
the field’s demise? Or has scientific progress
been sufficient enough to make the pursuit
of new directions unnecessary?
The existence of the first mystery
is understandable and perhaps inevitable,
given that intelligence is currently defined,
assessed, and studied on at least three dif-
ferent levels: psychometric, physiological,
58
and social (Eysenck, 1988; Flynn, 2007).
Each level has its own organizing concepts,
hypotheses, research methodologies, and
conclusions that can limit comparison and
consensus. For example, the physiological
approach typically employs advanced tech-
nology to examine indices of intelligence
in the brain, whereas the social (or soci-
etal usefulness) approach uses performance
on “real-world” tasks to study intellectual
skills in context. Fortunately, there has been
some recent cross-fertilization between lev-
els, which bodes well for future agreement
on what it means to be intelligent (Flynn,
2007).
Why are the mysteries surrounding intel-
ligence important ones to solve? Even
though the construct is difficult to define,
assess, and explain, the goal is a worthy one.
If humans continue to live among each other
and differ in their abilities to learn and adapt,
the concept of intelligence is going to endure
socially and scientifically. Fully and indis-
putably understanding this elusive construct
means that cultures can fairly identify and
cultivate it (Nisbett, 2009). Scientific knowl-
edge about the workings of the human mind
64 JANET E. DAVIDSON AND IRIS A. KEMP
shortcomings. The first has to do with our
criterion that models be based on relevant
assumptions. It is not clear that psychomet-
ric theories meet this requirement; they rest
on the supposition that analyses of scores,
from tests taken once, reveal the true struc-
ture of intelligence. Test taking occupies a
relatively small part of most people’s lives
and it does not necessarily reflect their intel-
ligent behavior in daily problem-solving sit-
uations. Even though the scores are moder-
ately predictive of school achievement and
work success (Flynn, 2007), they fall short
of capturing many aspects of what is con-
sidered intelligence. For example, as Horn
and Blankson (2005) note, standard tests of
Gc do not measure the depth of knowl-
edge and reasoning required for expertise
in a domain. Mental ability tests will prob-
ably always exist and we are not advocat-
ing their demise. However, it might be too
much to assume that they can tell us all that
we would like to know about the structure
of intelligence.
The second shortcoming has to do with
the criterion that models should contain
only relevant and comprehensible compo-
nents. Unfortunately, g and its role in intel-
ligence are not well understood. For exam-
ple, the Gf-Gc theory does not propose g
as a latent source of individual differences
in intelligence, while Carroll’s three-stratum
theory does. Partly because of these hierar-
chical models, g remains a controversial and
pervasive issue for contemporary theories of
intelligence.
At one time we thought that the mean-
ing of g needed to be resolved before intel-
ligence could fully be understood (David-
son & Downing, 2000). Perhaps it is time
to consider that this might never occur. Is g
a useful construct if there is never consen-
sus on what it represents? Earlier versions
of the CHC model omitted g because of its
irrelevance to the development, interpreta-
tion, selection, and revision of intelligence
tests. In contrast, patterns of broad and nar-
row abilities are relevant (McGrew & Flana-
gan, 1998) and some of these abilities explain
school achievement beyond the effects of g
(McGrew, 2009). Given that a single factor
does not account for all individual differ-
ences in intellectual performance and little
consensus has been reached on g’s meaning,
it seems unlikely that correlations between
g and scores on mental ability tests will ever
capture the full story of intelligence. This
point brings us to the next section on the
physiological approach to intelligence.
The Physiological Level and its Models
Everyone we have met believes that the
brain plays a central role in intelligence, and
no one we have met knows exactly what
this role entails. Fortunately, this lack of
knowledge is likely to change because of
the physiological level’s focus on the rela-
tionship between brain activity and mental
ability. The primary goal of this level is to
determine the neural basis of intelligence.
Recent theories, hypotheses, and empirical
results related to this goal will be reviewed
in this section.
Brain Efficiency and the Parieto-Frontal
Integration Theory (P-FIT )
The parieto-frontal integration theory iden-
tifies a network of discrete brain regions
related to individual differences in general
intelligence and reasoning (Jung & Haier,
2007). As the theory’s name implies, these
areas are primarily located in the parietal and
frontal lobes, and one of their main functions
is to integrate information among various
parts of the brain. Many of the P-FIT regions
are related to basic cognitive processes, such
as attention and working memory. In other
words, the attributes of general intelligence
are not associated with one central part of
the brain but with a network of structures
and functions distributed throughout the
cortex. According to Jung and Haier’s the-
ory, highly intelligent people have cortical
networks that operate more accurately and
quickly than those of less intelligent individ-
uals.
The argument for brain efficiency is not
new. Studies using positron emission tomog-
raphy (PET) found that individuals who
 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF INTELLIGENCE
obtained high IQ scores had brains that
expended less energy, and consequently
consumed less glucose, than the brains of
individuals with lower IQ scores (Haier
et al., 1988). Similarly, research employ-
ing electroencephalography (EEG) mapping
methods discovered that highly intelligent
participants exhibited more focused corti-
cal activation, and less overall brain activa-
tion, than did their lower ability counter-
parts (Neubauer & Fink, 2005). P-FIT builds
on this earlier work and extends the neural
efficiency hypothesis by specifying where in
the cortex this neural efficiency occurs.
More specifically, P-FIT is based on con-
verging evidence from 37 cognitive neu-
roimaging studies that varied in their oper-
ational definitions of intelligence and their
methods of assessing it (Jung & Haier, 2007).
Despite procedural differences, there was
reassuring consistency across studies in the
brain regions associated with individual dif-
ferences in performance on general intel-
ligence and reasoning tasks. The underly-
ing theoretical assumptions tying the data
together are that (a) regions within the
occipital and temporal lobes help humans
begin processing relevant visual and audi-
tory information from their environments;
(b) the results from this early sensory pro-
cessing are sent to areas in the parietal cor-
tex for more in-depth processing; (c) the
parietal cortex then interacts with regions
in the frontal cortex that perform hypothe-
sis testing on solutions to a known problem;
(d) after an optimal solution is reached, the
anterior cingulate constrains response selec-
tion and inhibits competing responses; and
(e) the underlying white matter facilitates
efficient transmission of data from the poste-
rior to frontal regions of the brain. According
to Jung and Haier (2007), regions of the brain
that are not part of the P-FIT network con-
tribute minimally to individual differences
in intelligence; their role is to ensure the
reliability of basic brain functions common
to all humans. In contrast, regions within
the P-FIT network set no limits on potential
variations between individuals and can dif-
fer in terms of their blood flow, volume, and
chemical composition.
65
P-FIT accounts for a range of empir-
ical findings on individual differences in
intelligence and reasoning (e.g., Colom
et al., 2009; Jung & Haier, 2007; Schmithorst,
2009), However, the theory is not without
its critics. For example, several researchers
(Blair, 2007; Lee, Choi, & Gray, 2007; Ror-
ing, Nandagopal, & Ericsson, 2007) claim
that the P-FIT network focuses primarily
on fluid intelligence and working memory
rather than on the broader construct of intel-
ligence.
Developmental perspectives. It is not
yet clear how P-FIT addresses systematic
changes in intelligence across the life span.
In their comparison of P-FIT with a model
of cognitive development, Demetriou and
Mouyi (2007) found areas of agreement and a
few shortcomings. As Jung and Haier (2007)
note, more empirical work and revision of
P-FIT need to occur to account for develop-
ment.
Applications. After extensive testing and
modification, P-FIT will most likely have
practical implications for societal issues.
According to Jung and Haier (2007), for
example, the model might eventually be
useful in developing treatments for men-
tal retardation and other neurological con-
ditions.
The Neural Plasticity Model of Intelligence
The ability to adapt to a wide range of cir-
cumstances is central to many definitions of
intelligence (Binet & Simon, 1916; Neisser
et al., 1996; Sternberg, 1985). Dennis Gar-
lick’s (2002, 2003) neural plasticity model
of intelligence imports adaptability to the
physiological level. According to this model,
intelligent individuals have brains that pro-
ductively change in response to their sur-
rounding environments.
A great deal of empirical research has
shown that neural plasticity allows synap-
tic connections between neurons to develop,
change, and reorganize in response to
environmental stimulation (Hebb, 1949;
Rosenzweig, 2003). For example, enlarged
hippocampi were commonly found in
London taxi drivers, who heavily relied on
66 JANET E. DAVIDSON AND IRIS A. KEMP
this area of their brains to navigate the city
(Maguire et al., 2000). In short, the environ-
ment shapes specialized neural connections
that are required for different cognitive abil-
ities (Garlick, 2002, 2003).
On the surface, the plasticity and special-
ization of neural connections in response to
environmental stimuli implies that a highly
genetic general factor of intelligence (g) does
not underlie all mental activities. Instead,
individual differences in intelligence would
be due to individual differences in envi-
ronments and to the specialized synap-
tic connections these environments create.
However, through the use of computer
simulations and neurophysiological data,
Garlick (2002) demonstrates that some
human brains may be more “plastic” than
others and, therefore, better able to adapt
to a range of circumstances. According to
Garlick, this capacity for neural adaptation is
dependent, in large part, on a variety of neu-
ral substrates encoded in the genes. More-
over, the brain’s overall ability for neural
plasticity would be reflected in a general fac-
tor of intelligence.
Garlick’s model also explains individ-
ual differences in neural efficiency. Indi-
viduals who have neural networks that are
shaped and organized to fit a variety of task
demands are better able to process informa-
tion quickly and accurately. In addition, only
task-appropriate regions of their brains are
activated, which limits the amount of glu-
cose needing to be metabolized.
Two recent theoretical views are related
in many respects to Garlick’s model of
neural plasticity. The first explains fluid
intelligence as the product of a flexible,
adaptive neural system. More specifically,
Newman and Just (2005) propose that intel-
ligent individuals have dynamic neural net-
works that alter their composition in order
to accommodate task demands, and corti-
cal regions that work in synchrony to per-
form a specific function. In support of this
theory, results from neuroimaging studies
have found that neural synchrony becomes
more precise when tasks become more diffi-
cult. In addition, this synchrony is positively
related to task performance and scores on
intelligence tests (Newman & Just, 2005;
Stankov, 2005).
Recently, Eduardo Mercado III (2008,
2009) refined the neural plasticity model of
intelligence by focusing on cortical mod-
ules. In short, these modules are specific,
vertical columns of interconnected neurons
located in different areas of the cerebral cor-
tex. According to Mercado, the capacity to
learn (i.e., cognitive plasticity) is directly
related to the availability, reconfigurability,
and customizability of the cortical modules.
In other words, the neural modules and their
flexibility provide the structural basis for
acquiring knowledge and improving skills.
Individual differences in intelligence are a
product of the number and diversity of avail-
able cortical modules.
Developmental perspective. According to
Garlick (2002), intellectual development and
its time frame are due to a “long-term pro-
cess whereby the brain gradually alters its
connections to allow for the processing of
more complex environmental stimuli” (p.
120). In addition, he emphasizes critical peri-
ods for neural plasticity in different regions
of the brain. These periods influence the
development of intelligence. Fortunately,
some plasticity has been found to occur
throughout the life span (Kaas, 1991).
Applications. Models of neural plasticity
highlight the importance of being exposed
to stimulating environments. According to
Mercado (2009), research on the relation-
ship between cognitive and neural plasticity
has relevant implications for education and
other societal practices.
Critique of the Physiological Level and
Its Model
The physiological level and its models are
appealing for a variety of reasons. From
a scientific standpoint, this approach pro-
vides a potentially uncomplicated, parsimo-
nious view of intelligence as a biological
phenomenon. Furthermore, recent advances
in neuroimaging techniques make it possi-
ble to examine the brain regions associated
with intelligence, reducing the need to make
inferences about the brain from behavioral
 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF INTELLIGENCE
measures. From a practical standpoint, neu-
rological measurements provide a glimmer
of hope for future “culture-fair” measure-
ment of intelligence. For example, physi-
ological measures are less likely to penal-
ize individuals for poor test-taking skills.
Similarly, understanding the relationship
between the brain and intelligent behavior
could result in interventions and treatments
that foster both brain development and cog-
nitive abilities.
Unfortunately, fully understanding the
neural basis of intelligence will probably
not occur any time soon. Even though
the physiological models meet our cri-
teria of building on previous knowledge
and generating new research that advances
the field, they are faced with some
difficult problems. One methodological
concern involves the inconsistency of neu-
roimaging results across studies. For exam-
ple, not all empirical results support the
neural efficiency hypothesis. Rypma and
Prabhakaran (2009) propose that replication
failures are due to differences in cognitive
tasks and analysis techniques. They propose
that neuroimaging studies need to separate
individual differences in processing speed
from individual variations in processing
capacity.
Another common problem for the phys-
iological models is that the empirical sup-
port tends to be based on the question-
able assumption that intelligence quotients
(IQ) and related tests are sufficient
standards of comparison for the physio-
logical measurements. As noted in this
chapter and elsewhere (Gardner, 1983;
Kaufman, 2009; Sternberg, 1985), there is
persuasive evidence that IQ is an incom-
plete measure of intelligence. Dempster
(1991) and Kaufman (2009), for example,
note that the ability appropriately to resist
task-irrelevant information plays a crucial
role in intelligence that is frequently over-
looked on most standardized tests. Further-
more, extensive work still needs to be done
cross-culturally to determine whether the
relationship between performance on the
neurological measures and the tasks of intel-
ligence is universal.
67
Finally, the physiological models are not
yet fully explanatory. The mechanisms caus-
ing neural efficiency and neural plasticity in
the brain still need to be established. Simi-
larly, the direction of causality is not known.
For example, it is tempting to conclude that
brain efficiency is the underlying cause of
high intelligence. However, as implied by
the work on neural plasticity, some neuro-
logical responses may be reacting to behav-
ioral responses rather than causing them.
Another possibility is that neurological func-
tions and cognitive performance are reflec-
tions of some other aspect of physiological
or psychological functioning that has yet to
be discovered. Unfortunately, correlational
studies cannot explain causation. Different
types of experiments will need to clarify the
relationship between the brain’s activity and
an individual’s intelligent behavior.
In short, the physiological models have
shortcomings but tremendous heuristic
value. Current empirical support is primar-
ily positive and the physiological approach
will undoubtedly continue to generate a
great deal of intriguing research.
The Social Level and Its Models
Our third approach focuses on the social
usefulness of intelligence and takes into
account individuals’ functional abilities and
skills that make significant contributions to
their societies (Flynn, 2007). Consequently,
the resulting models view intelligence as a
complex dynamic system involving interac-
tions between mental processes, contextual
influences, and multiple abilities that may or
may not be recognized in an academic set-
ting. Although the following three models
have been in existence for some time, their
recent applications, additions, and clarifica-
tions merit inclusion in this chapter.
The Triarchic Theory of Successful
Intelligence and Beyond
Robert Sternberg’s theories have an
admirable history of building upon them-
selves. His componential theory (Sternberg,