Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION

G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,

vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate of
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter
Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.

Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

(respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the
issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare
the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven
by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed
to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3

We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.

The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents.

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the
spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita
and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s
parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents,
were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel
Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.

In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among
others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of
Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial
Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was
already out of the hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as
schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist
(sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958,
years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing at
the time of the marriage:

xxxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition
of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in
this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient,
that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).4

Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a
complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same
special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted
their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty
minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in court that her
grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.5

On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate docketed
as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1)
as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s
estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be
accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been
alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in
the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and
Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal
properties, and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the
probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s
allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground
that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate
grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void.
However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings,
having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3,
Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the
estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate
on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III
filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

On 13 November 2000, Federico died.

Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing
Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in-
Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator of the
estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the
same, or dividends thereon;

(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by
the court, and

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the
subject estate:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if
any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be
issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱
200,000.00) Pesos.7

As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the
appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving
weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and

Isabel, we considered that:

1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband,
Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina,
as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;

3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains
undetermined and unliquidated; and

4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of
the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in
representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her
sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate
she seeks to administer.

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the
order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that
Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had
demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.

Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an
heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent,
has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s
actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001
emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no
"opposing parties or factions to be represented."

To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel,
is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not choose.
Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III
should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-
administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider
our decision of 16 June 2010.

The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of
an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse,
the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence.8

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a

decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.9 This is the same consideration
which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will
reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the
alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that
the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.

To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of a
decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or
community property forming part of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the
entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute
community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been
allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving
spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."

In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for
the benefit of the estate and those interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment.14

Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of
their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to
work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the
office.18

In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special co-
administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will. Pending
the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal
heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the
administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions
among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and
intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the management of the
decedent’s estate.19

Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as
petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of
her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate
of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20

Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura21 where we
allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as co-
administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the
nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona
while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The
"next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution
to the decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among
members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference
over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the
discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that
case, we affirmed the legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as
regular administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower
court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that
unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.

In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over the
estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as
special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the
decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the
probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the
estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias,
Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of
Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim,
these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint
special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs.
Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not
just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the
probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a
matter left entirely to its sound discretion.

Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances
other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant
case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the
applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered
to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite
significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than
one special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in
ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special administrator.

In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,

considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the
testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is
also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the
heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator
as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow"
the objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."

Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-
administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns
one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would
be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special
administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that
the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper administration of
the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the
good or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the
naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status
of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when
we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of
the widow from the administration."

Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was
based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee
that were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule on
the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of
kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator.
It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27

Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of a

"next of kin," thus:

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law
speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of
distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of
whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the
probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action
will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within
bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late
Francisco Angeles.29

Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the
estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that where
the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment
of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.

In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the
estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio
III’s demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts
and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position
by the foregoing survey of cases.

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not
ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling
among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set
forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one
of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment
of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter
left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.33

Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we
reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.

These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the
other.

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one
hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents
were alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility
of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;

2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working
harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate,
ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
 3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate, has
not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.

Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the
estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has
turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that
after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked
after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice
thereof as evidenced by the following:

1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory,
omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the estate35 including
several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles,
and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules
of Court.

2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s settlement of the
decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration
that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to
succeed to her estate.37

In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the
following imputations of Isabel that:

1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;

2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;

3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or
persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and

4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified documents;38

Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing the
functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:

1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her
pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office,
arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the
judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or
executed;"

2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s vociferous objections
to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal
to the Court of Appeals;

3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and
one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s estate, such
that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties; and

4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private
complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a
possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.

While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of
an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the
course of the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s
accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which properties of
Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in
his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact
when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two
occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her
siblings, from the list of heirs.

As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully
discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the
heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and
inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as
it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is
the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each
other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work
as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of
Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were
estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a
co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to
those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.

Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to
facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without
remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of
Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or
"any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:

xxxx

4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to
complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"

5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and
allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"

6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties
of the estate; and

7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order
for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either
satisfied or provided for.44

In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule
82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon
death, resignation, or removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account
and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him
to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to
someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may
be granted to any suitable person.

Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the
question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil
Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to
administer the estate of the decedent.

Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final
declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:

The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently
shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened,
and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must
come after the inheritance is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed
by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.45

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III
questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III
asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and
void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June 2010
on the petition filed by him:

7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from
the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions
of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special
Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila.47

For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different
division created by the Supreme Court.

The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of Justice
Nachura’s retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court provides:

Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed

resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special
Division. – Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and
all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the
ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision
or signed resolution.

If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited
himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall
be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of
the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who
concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new
ponente.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution
has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself
from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through
raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a new
Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new
Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special
Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other
Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed
Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the
Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the
participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said
pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the
Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R.
No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.

The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.

On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:

"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of
any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he
is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth
up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,

Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED."4

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration5 praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.

On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having
a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to
have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence,
her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of
that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of
the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the
Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother."7

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.9

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use
of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or
a widow, thus:

"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally
use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name
and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname,
unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to
use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the
word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall
either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

x x x"

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name –

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known
as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to
what middle name a child may use.

The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."
Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;

x x x"

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to which he
belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child
but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how
will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it
should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the
case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364, which
reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce
Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him
Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname
is David but they all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they
take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered
in the appropriate chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that
the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which
is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of
the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly
allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adopted Child –

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding
in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as
a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations,
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges
for the adopted.20

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section
1722 Article V of RA 8552.23

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article
189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship
with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination
of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law."28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle
name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process
in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of
himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in
which he lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation
to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were
about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves
clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan
(Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia,
Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the
streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook
page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to
have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually

suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on
the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high
school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were
castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including
Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr.
Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred
from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan),
filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al.,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined
from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement
exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray
as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same
day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises,
its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity
before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only."
They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of
laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have
known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and
not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and
were punished outright;
 4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of
the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data,
and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an
invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe
issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and
printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial,
judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed,
saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation
of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5,
2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were
directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5)
working days from service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return,
laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the
proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant
case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their
right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of
the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted,
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of
the Rule on Habeas Data.10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be
issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point
of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas
dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access
to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus,
the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs
this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and
promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial
barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in
OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the
end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before
addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the
purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed
by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless,
erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and
collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that
habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party
and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be
in the business of collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage"

means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be
done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to
a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and
storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to
protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and
communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology
themselves are not capable of protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the
controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three
strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy;
and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays,
not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more
reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and
that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that
given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as
wishful thinking."24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that
would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy
possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its
Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that
"[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also
socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the
courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent
with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of
habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities,
including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in
mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very
purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have
otherwise remained personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing
of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is
akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of
which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner
can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend
on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since
gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social
networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook),
which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to
discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By
sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can
view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted,
the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends
Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-
one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access
to his or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29

To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this
ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook
states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof."33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile
picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
 (a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among
others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue
to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what
extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others,
coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the
spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes
more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through
the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information
they post or upload thereto.35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation
of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world,
of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to
his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a
feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information
to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only
the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if
the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will
not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of
the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook
users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit
the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of
privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures
and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their
Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded
with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since
their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not
their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their
knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the
subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do
not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some
pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior
high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that]
there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the
computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from
there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these
photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure
to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the
photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their
statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private
posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case,
they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce
all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to
the Web page or the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the
less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or
e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this
setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the
tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own
Facebook friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is
no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with
the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook
friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience
of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200
friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can
view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards
user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting
of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-
tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a
profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically,
be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors.
Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No.
CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights,
contrary to petitioners’ assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos
of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s
privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that
they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of
privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the
photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means that
self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be
proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users,
especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the
part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers
can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to
conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in
its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not
only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to
include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in
view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online
activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as
well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their
unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining and
educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions
and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit
enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in
the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their
privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves
they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading
any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it
permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control.
Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by
them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed access to
such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant.
Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care
in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We
cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the
confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in
the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is
notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find
no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July
27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is
hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF

ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN
LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,
vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.

Revelation 3:5

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner
sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.

The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.

The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of
their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang….

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because
they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in
Singapore…. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not
carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated
against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his
sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different
surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.1

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.2 The trial court found that
the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition—that is, that petitioner Julian
may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name—did not
fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely
for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names
cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family
Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and
there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he
is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he
could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name.3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution
dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a
middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who
intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due
recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is
controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a
fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is
itself not reasonable.5

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)6 arguing that the trial
court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is:
whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 1747 of the
Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need
for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his
new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the
"best interest of the child."8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for
changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that
the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing
or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean
community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for
change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use,
contrary to previous cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of
name.10

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The
OSG filed its Comment11 positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of
name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the
mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the
dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere
convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of
entry.12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify
the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioner’s allegation
that the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly
more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the
dropping of the child’s middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true
parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang,
there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is
customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of
such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.13

We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.

The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a
privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given
him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or
any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be
denied.14

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable
cause’ for which the change is sought.15 To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.16

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere
matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results
in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
lodged in the courts.17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to
change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the
middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name
usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving
requests for change of the given name18 and none on requests for changing or dropping of the
middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We
have to answer in the negative.

A discussion on the legal significance of a person’s name is relevant at this point. We quote,
thus:

…For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the
identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the
essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or
misspelling of, the name is immaterial.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can
be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man,
and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.19

This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle
names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal
lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the
same given name and surname as he has.

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother,21 while illegitimate children shall use the surname of
their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
father’s surname.22

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears
only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of
the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the
illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s
surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the
middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a
surname.

Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would
help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he
cites Oshita v. Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which, however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome,
and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita
to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations:
she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who
had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mother’s surname; she was
embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due
to the last World War; and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a
fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.

In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor
child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to
Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her
mother’s husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be
granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration
the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she
would carry if she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced
that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his
social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the
State or of other people.

Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code gives
the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not
mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the family name of the
mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella
Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as
registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since
childhood, in her school records and in her voter’s registration). The trial court denied her
petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states
that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal
obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which she is entitled. In addition,
the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.

Weighing petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards
set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is
amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.

The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to
the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon,
where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name.
Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing
the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that
the reason for the grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the
presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the
tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World
War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioner’s election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the
Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a name
different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school
records and voter’s registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to
confusion.

Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf
of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not
have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest
in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount
consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition
for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.26 As he is of tender age, he may
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the
same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male
and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming
from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices
said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and
slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s
sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to

the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé]
and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG]
has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It
ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and
sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
 recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or

midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of
the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the
local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as
used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning
are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice
to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of
a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131
of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret
the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there
are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However,
the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner, Present:

- versus - Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Carpio Morales,

Respondent. Tinga,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and
seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by
Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate:
(1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to
"male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to
have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged
that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and
was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his
appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon
issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this condition is
very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that
she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen
role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting
of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his
body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed
fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR
"GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION,
i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s
petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends
respondent’s petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as
mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition
known as CAH does not make her a male.7

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, 8 respondent is actually a male person
and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, 9 change of sex or gender
is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.11

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103

CHANGE OF NAME

Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court].

Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at
least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3)
successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall
deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor
within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the
Republic.

Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order
has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be
changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation;
(n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights
of the parties pending such proceedings.

Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served
upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3,
Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required
to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as
falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. 13 The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any
interest that would be affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of
securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We
agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the
petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction
of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.18

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.19

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.20

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of
male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris
with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female;
(2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian
tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice,
facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century,
medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either
male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary
sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex
may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex
individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of
modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia
have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold
the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is
some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly
‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person
be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the
birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female
nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes.
However, respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself
as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one
who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness
and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms
as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition
and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering
the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer
to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice