PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

MODULE 1 CASES
1. Cayetano vs. Monsod

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman
of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years as provided in the constitution.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Ruling: No. University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public
service. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
2. IN RE CUNANAN
FACTS: Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74% P
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed
to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general
average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING: No. Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title
of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus
failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II; The law is, in effect, a judgment
revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates; The law is an encroachment on the
Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this
power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation. As to the portion declared in force
and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952,
to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar
of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify
rules of admission to the practice of law.
3. In the Matter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines SC Resolution (9 January 1973)

Facts: The Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the “earnest recommendation” — on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and “consistently
with the views and counsel received from the Commission’s Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar” — that the Honorable Supreme Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule.” The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local
Bar associations. The Court accepted all comments on the proposed integration.

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating
Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court
formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972.

Issues (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar
be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

Ruling: Yes. On all issues.The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law.”

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of
the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is “perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable,” within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an
imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

NB: The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence,
public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and
the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and
unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults
that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through
influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout
the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate
the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of
preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in
the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.

4. Petition to Re-Acquire the Privilege to Practice Law by Epifanio Muneses

B.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012

Facts: On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying
that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The petitioner alleged that he became a
member of the IBP on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
USA on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.
No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.

Issue: Whether or not the court should grant the petition to resume the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.

Ruling: Yes. The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact,
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s
membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay,
the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to
practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage
in such practice. Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in
relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed
to resume his practice of law.

5. Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through Amendments
to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court B.M. No. 1153

Note: This is a bar matter, so no facts, issue and ruling.

The Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to
wit:

SEC. 5. Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those referred
to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they
have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper
authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to
the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or
university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and
private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal
ethics.

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar
examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses
leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law
school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws
academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.

SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate
issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto
the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree
in arts or sciences.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent
in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate bachelor's degree course.

6. RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS - ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN

FACTS: The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations. Petitioner Atty. De Guzman at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of
Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar
examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner
as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other
persons.

Petitioner was thereafter disbarred. He now prays that he be granted judicial clemency and be reinstated as a
member in good standing in the Philippine Bar. He presented as evidence his track record in public service that
has been going on before he entered law school. After his disbarment, he worked as the consultant of the City
Government of Taguig and later, a member of the secretariat of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board. It was
coupled with testimonials and endorsements from various individuals and entities all attesting to his good
character.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion of petitioner should be granted.

RULING: Yes. The Court is convinced that petitioner has reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the penalty of
disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already
been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said commuted
penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

The Court deems petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years
suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose.
7. In the matter of disqualification of bar examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 BAR Examinations

Facts:

This case was filed by the Petitioner, Aty. Froilan R. Melendrez, against Haron S. Meling, to disqualify the
latter for taking the 2002 BAR Examination and to impose appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a BAR.

Melendrez alleged that Meling failed to disclose in his petition to take the BAR that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases filed in the RTC of Cotabato City. These cases were filed during one instance wherein the
defendant herein allegedly uttered derogatory words against Atty. Melendrez and his wife while around media
practitioners.

Meling’s defense was that, in good faith, he thought that the cases filed against him by the herein
petitioner were already closed and terminated, for the reason that they have already settled the issue as advised
by a retired Judge.

Issue:

Whether Meling’s act of concealing his criminal cases upon filing for a petition to take the BAR would
bar to his good moral character

Held:

Yes.

Whether the cases filed against Meling were closed or still pending, he still has to disclose it in his petition
to take the BAR, for the court to ascertain his good moral character. His acts of concealing the cases filed against
him constitute dishonesty. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. Therefore, it was
recommended that if ever Meling passed the BAR, he will not be allowed to take the oath and sign the roll of
attorneys. However, Meling failed to pass the 2002 BAR Examination thus, the case was dismissed for being
moot and academic.
8. IN RE: AL ARGOSINO

FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical
injuries uponhim in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February
11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period
of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was
allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994,
Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He
averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for
more than 10 months.

ISSUE:

What should Argosino do to be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law

HELD:

Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. In short, he mustshow evidence that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fitfor admission to the profession of law.

He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents
or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

NOTES:

The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of goodmoral character, with special
education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.

Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and proper
administration of justice is concerned.

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the
Bar.

Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who wouldseek admission to the bar must be a
necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.
 Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was possessed of good moral character.

Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the time of the
application for permission to take the barexaminations and more importantly at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

9. AVIDA LAND CORPORATION (FORMERLY LAGUNA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS, INC.), Complainant, v. ATTY. AL
C. ARGOSINO, Respondent.
FACTS: Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision houses and
lots. Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development Corporation (Rodman).
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman, under which the latter was to acquire from the former
a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. After settling the downpayment,
Rodman took possession of the property. Complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance.
Rodman only made a partial payment, and then he claimed to have made other payments from March 1999 to
July 1999, which complainant disputed.
Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded that Rodman vacate
the subject property. As Rodman remained in possession of the property, complainant filed an unlawful detainer
case against the former before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City. Soon after, Rodman filed a
Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) seeking the nullification of the rescission
of the Contract to Sell. It also prayed for the accounting of payments and the fixing of the period upon which
the balance of the purchase price should be paid. In the course of the case, the respondent filed numerous
pleadings.
In the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant - through its vice president for project
development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-Affidavit against respondent for alleged professional misconduct
and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint alleged that respondent's conduct in relation to the HLURB
case manifested a disregard of the following tenets:
1. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.
2. Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.
3. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.
4. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
5. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.
ISSUE: Whether respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that caused delay in the execution of a final
judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer's Oath
HELD: YES. Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct. Despite the simplicity of the issue involved in the
HLURB case, the path towards its resolution became long, tedious, and frustrating because of the deliberate
attempts of respondent to delay the actual execution of the judgment therein. He continued to file pleadings
over issues already passed upon even after being enjoined not to do so, and made unfounded accusations of
bias or procedural defects. These acts manifest his propensity to disregard the authority of a tribunal and abuse
court processes, to the detriment of the administration of justice. The defense that respondent is merely
defending the cause of his client is untenable.
As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his client and is expected to serve the latter with
competence and diligence. As such, respondent is entitled to employ every honorable means to defend the
cause of his client and secure what is due the latter. Professional rules, however, impose limits on a lawyer's
zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
lawyers are required to exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. The Code also obliges lawyers to employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of their client. In Millare v. Montero, the Court ruled that it is unethical for a lawyer to abuse
or wrongfully use the judicial process - such as the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation, and frivolous
appeals - for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment. In Garcia v. Francisco, a
lawyer willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse - all of which were rebuffed - to get a favorable
judgment. Respondent cannot hide behind the pretense of advocating his client's cause to escape liability for
his actions that delayed and frustrated the administration of justice.
What is patent from the acts of respondent — as herein narrated and evident from the records - is that he has
made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and ultimately caused unjust delays in the
administration of justice. These acts are in direct contravention of Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provide:
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court processes.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are required to exert every effort and consider it their
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. The Code also obliges lawyers to employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of their client.
Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the
finality of this Resolution.

10. ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONSOLIDATED CASES

FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second day of initiation
rites has ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal
(Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session
of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again,
the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the
carport. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting.
When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened,
the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, a criminal case
for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.

G.R. No. 151258; Villareal v. People: The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision
dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof
beyond reasonable doubt. While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed
a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March
2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive
the death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101; Dizon v. People: Petitioner Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due
process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he
was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis
of acquittal of the other accused.

G.R. No. 154954; People v. Court of Appeals: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the
CAs Decision, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans
of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that
there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it
found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death,
petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080; Villa v. Escalona: Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case
involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed
to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution
cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but
were still in the appellate court.

ISSUES:
[1] G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: Did the death of Villareal extinguish his criminal liability?
[2] G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People: Was Dizon deprived of due process?
[3] G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals: Did the CA err in convicting accused of the lesser offense of
slight physical injuries instead of homicide?
[4] G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona): Did the CA err in dismissing the case for violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial?

HELD:
1. G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if
the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties, while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,
including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However,
civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is
recoverable through a separate civil action.
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and
pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his
Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.

2. G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People):

The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.
Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense,
as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a
waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel
justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial
evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks
later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted
to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons
testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to
see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present
evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to
attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact
nature and consequences of a waiver.

3. G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona):

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial
of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated
in this case.

The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were elevated to
the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to
secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September
21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice,
to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the
said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995.
Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied
with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the
trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by
co-accused Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years,
there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution
and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set
case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable
length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns
upon.
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et
al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of
this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be
limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

4. G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals):

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the
acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for
the same offense. This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal
of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1)
where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a
deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion. The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks
the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may
be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. The present case is one of
those instances of grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa in
finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because
of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance required. The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced.

On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight
physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused "were found
to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.
It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
"multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites. Considering that the CA found that the
"physical punishment heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature, it was patently erroneous for the court to
limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an
act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial
felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are
required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory,
and not subject to discretion. Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and
of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the death of
the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that
criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the
infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac
arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an
allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition.

11. Piatt vs Abordo

Facts:

On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar entered into a transaction
between two individuals to purchase a quantity of opium for Php 600. Abordo found out that the opium was
fake and he reported to the Luneta Police Station of Manila that he had been robbed of P600. The two individuals
were later arrested, charged with the crime of estafa, and convicted.

Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that "he is sincerely sorry for it and
vows not to repeat". His defense is that "there being no evidence in the record establishing the relationship of
attorney and client between the respondent and the malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been
committed in the exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed could not affect his status
as attorney-at-law and could not, therefore, constitute a ground for disciplinary action.

ISSUE: W/N the acts committed by Atty. Abordo constitute a ground for disciplinary action.

RULING:

Yes, the Court issued an Order that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year to begin on September 1, 1933. The courts are not curators of the morals of the
bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respect as to show that he is unsafe and unfit
to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.

It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to engage in an opium deal
in direct contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from
succeeding was the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even
if consummation of the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics which
govern the conduct of attorneys, the act was as reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful
culmination. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws" said the
United States Supreme Court in the well-known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882], 107 U.S., 265), and to that
doctrine we give our unqualified support.

Although the respondent had been acquitted on the charge of estafa, yet it was held that, since the promotion
of an organization for the purpose of violating or evading the penal laws amounted to such malpractice on the
part of an attorney as will justify removal or suspension, the respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a term of one year
12. Stemmerik v Mas

FACTS: Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips in the Philippines, he met Atty. Mas. Since he was marveled
at the beauty of the country, he wanted to buy a real property and consulted Atty. Mas. The latter told Stemmerik that he could legally
acquire a real property in the PH and even suggested a 86k hectare land in Subic, Zambales. Atty. Mas, as the atty-in-fact of Stemmerik
bought the property from Bonifacio de Mesa. The contract to sell provided that De Mesa sold the property to Ailyn Gonzales for 3.8
M. Then, in another notarized deed made by Atty. Mas, it was stated that Gonzales received the funds from Stemmerik. In preparing
all these documents, Atty. Mas received 400k fee from Stemmerik. The latter also gave Atty. Mas, the 3.8M purchase price to which
the latter issued a receipt.
Suddenly, Atty. Mas becomes scarce and no longer answer the calls of Stemmerik. When Stemmerik visited the PH, he engaged the
service of the Fernandez Law Office and found out the subject property is inalienable, being located in the former US military
reservation. Also, he was apprised that aliens cannot own real properties in the PH.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can be administratively liable.
RULING: Yes. Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession. All lawyers take an oath to support the
Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood. That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is
a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Lawyers are servants of the law and the law is their
master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as
exemplars worthy of emulation. Atty. Mas, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,
showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he
knew were void and illegal.
Respondent's misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real
estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a
falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. A lawyer
who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to further his selfish ends to the
great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only
tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that
the legal profession stands for.

13. Embido v Pe

Facts:

On two occasions, Atty. Sustiya, Clerk of Court of the RTC in Branch 64 of Antique received a request for a copy
of the decision in Special Proceeding Case no. 84 entitled “In the matter of the declaration or presumptive death
of Rey Laserna” from Mr. Ballam Hunt, a Solicitor in the UK.

Judge Penuela of Branch 64 instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of case no 84, but discovered
that it had no records of such a case, but rather case 84 referred to another case regarding the presumptive
death of Rolando Austria.

This prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate the situation to the NBI prompting an investigation. The IBP
submitted its report and recommended the suspension of Att.y Pe for violation of the Attorney’s Oath and Code
of Professional Responsibility. It appeared that Atty. Pe forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by
making it appear that case 84 regarding the presumptive death of Rey Laserna was real.

Issue: W/N the falsification of public documents is a crime involving moral turpitude

Ruling: Yes

The deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. Gross
immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s
disbarment or suspensions from the practice of law. The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Atty. Pe is disbarred.

14. MELVYN G. GARCIA vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015
FACTS:
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant. Garcia
alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie
Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment
of their marriage, which was eventually granted. Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño,
representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros
Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth
was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s
children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that
he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in
Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a
crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with
the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory
penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was
motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters
in court.

ISSUE: WON the conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude?

HELD:
Yes, it does. The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by
this Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled: This is not to say that all convictions
of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not
shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x
generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or
as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and
there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral
turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial
inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
 In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide. The Decision showed that the victim
Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just
passed by Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house,
aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were
just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by
Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado. We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the
executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his
argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon"11 which restored his
"full civil and political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of Commutation13 did
not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. Again, there was no mention that the executive
clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.15 In this
case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to
10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of
penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was
never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.
More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory
penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it
was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. 19 It is granted
only to those possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.

15. Pp v. Atty. Fe T. Tuanda [A.M. 3360, Jan. 30, 1990]

FACTS: Respondent filed a motion to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed on her by a decision
of the CA.

Respondent received several pieces of jewelry from Herminia A. Marquez worth P36k, for sale on a commission
basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items
to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning
the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks (which
totaled to P26,250.00, which were all dishonored due to insufficient funds. Multiple criminal actions were filed
against her. Respondent was acquitted of the charge of estafa but was convicted of violating BP 22. Lower court
fined her. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the decision, but with the addition of suspending her from the practice of
law. Respondent claimed that she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground
that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms.
Marquez.

ISSUE: WON the order of suspension from practice of law should be lifted.

HELD: No. The offense of which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a
worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but
also an injury to the public. Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had
been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.

The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense.

16. Tan vs Sabanal

On 29 November 1983, this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent
Nicolas Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter’s petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys. From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of
the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied. The Court, however, after considering his plea for
mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral
character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the
lawyer’s oath. However, before a date could be set for Sabandal’s oathtaking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and
Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and
maliciously excluded them in his Petition. That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition
respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial
from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, certifying that respondent was “acting with morality and has been
careful in his actuations in the community.” Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed
only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without
authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent’s own counsel
as well as the lawyer of respondent’s parents-in-law.

Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers of the IBP,
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to
respondent’s good moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer’s oath, and if not, the reason therefor.
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a
COMMENT on respondent’s moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, filed his
Comment. “The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any
acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention,
however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of
Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent is alleged to have secured
a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a
swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural
Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent
has not redeemed the land until the present.”

Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge
Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal.
In the meantime, In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, complainant Tan informed the Court that her
relationship with Sabandal has “already been restored,” as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to
her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him.

Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge
Pelagio Lachica) submitted to this Court a copy of the “Judgment,” Said judgment reveals that an amicable
settlement, had been reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by
the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Issue: W/N Sabanal should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

Ruling: No

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

Although the term “good moral character” admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as including at
least common honesty. It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness or candor.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment
facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but have known was public
land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of
gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the
Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been
compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to
a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet
he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure
of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the
civil case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair
dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during
the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor
and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge
of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not,
therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

17. Fernandez vs Grecia

Facts:

This is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia on August 20, 1991 by Dr. Fernandez,
Dr. Ongtengco, Dr. Bartolome and St. Luke’s Medical Center. The respondent is charged with dishonesty band
grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages (he tore page 72-73) from the medical chart which
was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his client (Atty. Damaso B. Aves, husband of late Fe Aves (7 mos
pregnant) who was hospitalized due to dizziness, hypertension and vaginal bleeding) against the forenamed
doctors and St. Luke’s.
 Atty. Grecia had a previous disbarment case filed on November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for his
immoral complicity or “unholy alliance” with a Judge in Quezon city. After three years since the first disbarment
case he was reinstated in the profession. Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against
him did not effectively reform him.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a Member of the Bar.

RULING:

No. The Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly
unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of the profession,
the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice
law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced
the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable
fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.

The Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from
Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:

Canon 1. . . .

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

18. Pimentel v Llorente

Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for
gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in connection with the discharge of
their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then
election officer of (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City
Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman. Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate
for the Senate in that election. Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b), respondents
tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and
Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce
Enrile, and other candidates were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually
received while, on the other hand, petitioner's votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enrile's votes were in
excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice
recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents' knowledge
that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their
lawyers' oath.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was
made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They
claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or
fatigue. In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the
illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the
canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision.
 On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was
denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c). It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents
before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b). In its resolution dated
January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainant's charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a
petition for certiorari filed by complainant, this Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.

Issue: Whether or not respondents engaged in dishonest and deceitful conduct when they certified the
statement of votes and certificate of Canvass

Ruling:

Yes. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government
service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.”

Nowhere is the-need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings better
expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said:

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor it is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do
not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality . . .

It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to
observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust.

Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on
lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving no less
than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them
suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon,
after a long public service. Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of
the respondents should be sufficient. Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY
of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that
commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely

Additional doctrines not really related sa PALE:

In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required
to establish liability.

Appeals; Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of
justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals
even though filed six, four, and three days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.

Remedial Law; Motions; Question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or
not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao vs. Villanueva.—The question of whether a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao v.
Villanueva, in which this Court held: Although Rule 139-B, §12(c) makes no mention of a motion for
reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be
filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort
is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the
judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or
misappreciation of the evidence.

19. Freeman vs Reyes, A.C. 6246, 15 November 2011

FACTS: Marites E. Freeman sought the disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from
her, without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased husband.
Complainant also sought recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance proceeds, which was remitted to
the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages.
Complainant alleged that when her husband, a British national, died in London, she and her son applied for visas, to enable them to
attend the wake and funeral, but their visa applications were denied. Complainant engaged the services of respondent who, in turn,
assured her that she would help her secure the visas and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims due her. Respondent
told complainant that she had to personally go to London to facilitate the processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear
all expenses for the trip. Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came out.
Atty. Reyes received monies from her client for securing insurance claims of client’s deceased husband. She failed to present an
accounting of the monies received. She received the insurance proceeds equivalent to P700,000.00 but failed to remit them to
complainant. She falsified the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing her to receive the insurance proceeds. She received money
for a trip to UK to pursue the insurance claims of client but her trip to UK was actually to attend an international convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent betrayed the trust of complainant for being dishonest in her dealings.
RULING: Yes. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent to have betrayed the trust
of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her dealings and appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended for
complainant. The respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that through deceitful means, she was able
to appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of complainant's husband. The Court agrees that complainant had
sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance proceeds of the
complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be disbarred.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of
justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law
persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members
of the bar.
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice, by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the respondent's administrative liability. This
does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral and exemplary damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may
very well be the subject of a separate civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular
courts. When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.

20. AMADO DIZON VS DE TAZA

FACTS:

Petitioner along with his siblings engaged the services of Respondent Atty. to represent them in a case. The
complainant claimed that Respondent demanded ₱75,000.00 from him to expedite the proceedings before the
Court. This was over and above their stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract. According to the
complainant, unknown to him at that time was that Atty. De Taza had already demanded and
received₱800,000.00 from his sibling for the same reason.

The complainant went to this Court and learned that the Court had already denied the petition contrary to Atty.
De Taza’s representations that the case was still pending. He tried to communicate with respondent, but she
could no longer be found.

Thereafter petitioner instituted a complaint for disbarment against respondent. He also attached several
affidavits and documents from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing checks and/or
failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit which was attached to the
complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters
sent to her went unheeded. Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit averred that
Atty. De Taza issued a check which was dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed account.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. De Taza should be held administratively liable for issuing bouncing checks, demanding
and/or receiving money from her clients under the guise of having the proceedings before the court expedited.

RULING: YES

The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by the Court to ascertain
whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. "Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court to preserve the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of
such act to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to
the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not use
the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. In this case,
the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and nonexistent. Thus, her demand should
not have even been made in the first place.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any
of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
“Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.” “The Judiciary has been besieged
enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke
the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and
cannot be tolerated.”

21. Ui v. Bonifacio

Facts: Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed
by complainant against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because
they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status,
she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

Issue: Whether she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law.

Held: No. The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was
dismissed. All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was
with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
“grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.

22. FIGUEROA vs BARRANCO, JR.

276 SCRA 445, JULY 31, 1997

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Patricia Figueroa way back in 1971, against respondent
Simeon Barranco Jr., a successful bar candidate in the 1970 Bar examination, praying thereto that herein
respondent be denied admission to the legal profession.
Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco were town-mates and teen sweethearts. Their intimacy yielded to
a child Simeon. Subsequently, Simeon first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. Their relationship continued and Simeon allegedly made more than twenty or thirty
promises of marriage.
Patricia learned that Simeon married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon successfully passed the 1970
bar examinations. But before he could take his oath, Patricia filed a petition to disqualify Simeon to take
the Lawyer’s Oath on the ground of gross immoral conduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Simeon in engaging in premarital relations with Patricia and making
promises to marry her constitute gross immoral conduct.
RULING: NO. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the charges of
gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations
with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does
not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to
a high degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.

23. Cordova vs. Cordova, Adm. Case No. 3249. November 29, 1989
Facts: Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member
of the Bar. After the scheduled hearings and rescheduling, the hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her husband had already
“reconciled”. The findings of the IBP Board of Governors in relation to the relations of the parties are as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, 2 children were born. In
1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job
as Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one
Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent.
Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova
introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely
Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to
support his legitimate family. On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued
to neglect the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila
necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with complainant’s
children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and
had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the
complainant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial
Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children. Notwithstanding respondent’s promises to reform, he continued to live
with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent lawyer should be suspended for violating the good moral character requirement
for bar members
Held: YES. The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not
excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public and necessarily
adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to
membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not
exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists
as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. In the instant case, respondent Cordova
maintained for about 2 years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general
public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to
support. After a brief period of “reform”, respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her,
and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.

24. Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares, complainant, versus Justice Onofre A. Villaluz (retired), respondent.

Adm. Case No. 4431 June 19, 1997

Facts:

Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City while respondent Onofre
A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.

Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares. She obtained a decree
declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years. Thus, she got married to respondent
in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge Myrna Lim Verano.

They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that time the Presiding Judge
of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the death of the son of Mijares.

During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an illicit affair with another
woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the complainant judge. As a result, they lived
separately and did not get in touch with one another and the respondent did not bother to apologize for what
happened.
Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia Geraldez. Complainant then
filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter immorally and bigamously entered into a
second marriage while having a subsisting marriage and distorted the truth by stating his civil status as single.

In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham marriage”; that he
voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case for immorality filed against her
by her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he contracted his marriage with complainant, he
had a subsisting marriage with his first wife because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had
not yet become final and executory or published.

Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and later on affirmed by the
Court.

Issue:

a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and respondent valid

b. Whether or not the marriage of complainant and respondent was a sham marriage

Ruling:

a. Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3
of the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance that he was facing criminal case for
bigamy and assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in civil case declaring the annulment of
marriage between respondent and the first wife had not attained complete finality, the marriage between
complainant and respondent is not void but only voidable.

b. As to the issue that it was a “sham” marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. Thus, former
Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
he is hereby suspended from practice of law for two years with the specific warning.

25. Calub v Atty. Suller

Facts: Atty. Suller raped the wife of his neighbor Cristino Calub. A criminal complaint for rape was filed against
Suller. A complaint for disbarment was also filed by Calub before the SC. The CFI acquitted Suller for failure of
the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Can Atty. Suller be disbarred?
Held: Yes. Acquittal in a criminal case is not determinative of an administrative case for disbarment. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
that he lacks moral character to continue as officer of the court. The rape by a lawyer of his neighbor’s wife
constitutes such serious moral depravity.
26. CASE: Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Attys. Angel E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia [A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010]
FACTS: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty.
Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging
them with gross immorality.

Maelotisea alleged that she is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children. Sometime in 1987, one of their children
confided that an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of Atty Garrido. Also, one of her
daughter, May Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido strolling at a mall together with a woman and a child who
was later identified as Atty. Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively.

Maelotisea was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is the
daughter of Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia.

In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty. Valencia at their residence. Since he left the conjugal home
Atty. Garrido failed and still failing to give Maelotisea the needed financial support to the prejudice of their children who
stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

By way of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia
David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways.
As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became
close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except
for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979,
with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with
Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

On her part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the
legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage
of Atty. Garrido with Constancia

In the course of the hearings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of
her complaint, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6)
children.

ISSUES:

A. Should the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido be dismissed because the alleged immoral acts were committed
before he was admitted to the Philippine Bar?

B. Whether the desistance of Maelotisea merits the dismissal of the case.

RULING:

A. Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness
for membership in the Bar. Admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter
of public interest because it involves service to the public.

The time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the
qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be
a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed
before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. The possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.
Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be
refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.

B. In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public
interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her
affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court’s
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely because
of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido).

27. Ventura vs. Samson

Facts:

Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or Suspension before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly
immoral conduct” .

Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was sleeping in
the maid’s room at respondent’s house when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips,
sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty.
She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondent’s poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty where he sexually
abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened
or he would kill her and her mother.

In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse indeed transpired
between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself but vehemently denies the truth of the
allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in having sex with complainant was done with
mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submits that his act of having
sex with complainant once does not constitute… grossly immoral conduct.

Issue: Whether or not the act of the respondent lawyer constitutes grossly immoral conduct?

Ruling:

Yes. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as
to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that
respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral
conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also
showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even
gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by
enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human
person and the ethics of his profession.

In Cordova v. Cordova, we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor, who for a
time was under respondent’s care. Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was
not with the latter’s consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly
reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should
be disciplined accordingly.
28. Ong v. Delos Santos, A.C. No. 10179 (Formerly CBD 11-2985), March 04, 2014
Facts:
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos by
Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls and personal interactions
between them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends
In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in
dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged
about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong
handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s
Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.
However, the check was dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account was closed. Ong relayed
the matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored
him. When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos. Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty.
Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-
2985.

Issue:
By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling:
Yes. A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To accord
with the canon of professional responsibility that requires him to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes, he thereby becomes administratively liable for
gross misconduct.
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral character.
In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice
of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar. The
Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual in whom the
public may repose confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him
unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his dealings
with the public. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but
would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that he was in good
financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when the contrary was true manifested his intent to
mislead the latter into giving a substantial amount in exchange for his worthless post-dated check. Such
actuation did not speak well of him as a member of the Bar.
Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative
sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
already dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong the full amount of P100,000.00,[23] both of which are
treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
suspend him from the practice of law for a period of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to
suspension from the practice of law to six months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang.

29. Cruz v. Mina

Facts: On Sept. 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness. The petitioner, a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz,
Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case. The MeTC
denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation
of trial. Cruz filed a motion for reconsidration, but this was denied by the MeTC, and elevated his petition to the
RTC, where he filed a Petition for Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant.

Ruling: Yes, the MeTC was directed to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of the petitioner inCriminal Case No. 00-
1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides: Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled
in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or
officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without
the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been
confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A
should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective
of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer
before inferior courts. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.

30. SPOUSES ROMUALDO and NORA SUAREZ vs. ARSENIO SALAZAR, et al.,

FULL TEXT:

RESOLUTION

Considering respondents' "Motion to Expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon A. Manangan with Motion to
Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to Dismiss the Petition" and said Atty. Manangan's admission at the hearing
this morning, September 29, 1999, that he is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and that he
is the same "Filemon A. Manangan" who was found by this Court in G.R. No. 82760 (Filemon Manangan v. Court
of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28) decided on August 30, 1990, to be in reality Andres Culanag who
is not a member of the Philippine Bar, but despite these facts he has continued to misrepresent himself to be
an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in this case, "Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who
is in reality Andres Culanag, is hereby declared guilty of indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby
sentenced to three (3) months imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila, until further orders from this Court.
31. Aguirre vs Rana B.M. 1036 June 10 2003

Facts: Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-taking,
complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. The Court allowed
respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the
Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel
for a candidate in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law
to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading
as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue: Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling: Yes. The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

32. 32. OCA (Office of the Court Administrator) vs Ladaga

Facts: Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a relative in a criminal
case (for Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City), without
the previous authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as required by the Administrative Code. An
administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law without permission from the
Department Head (CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he merely gave a free legal
assistance to a relative and that he was on an approved leave of absence during his appearances as such counsel.
He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the
defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on
the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin.
Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest
of the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered
by leave applications approved by the presiding judge.

Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec.
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees," which provides: … the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:… (b) Outside employment and other
activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:… (2) Engage in the
private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.

Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes practice of law as
prohibited by the Administrative Code.

Ruling: No. The "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited,
does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. The isolated instances when respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice"
of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he
failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required
by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus: “Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department…” The
presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated
by law. Atty. Misael M. Ladaga was thus reprimanded.

33. Alawi v Alauya AM SDC-97-2-P, Feb. 24, 1997

Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a
District in Marawi City. A contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units belonging to Villarosa & Co. and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
On December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. for termination of
his contract with the company. He expounded in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds
which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by
the unscrupulous sales agent.” A copy was also sent to the Vice President.
Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint accusing Alauya, among others, of usurpation of
the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
 Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial,"
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
In contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan, and his two (2) earlier letters both
dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5,
1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
Issue:
Whether or not a Sharia lawyer like Alauya can use the title of “Attorney”
Ruling:
No. Persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari’a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel
or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those
who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and
it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region,
there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The
ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney.

34. Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)

Facts: The consolidated cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus
drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for overtime
with the CIR. The disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an Agreement where
the Administratrix would transfer to the employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of
land was eventually registered in the name of the Union.

The Union, through Atty. Pineda sought with the Ministry of Labor and Employment for authority to sell and
dispose of the property. The Union informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the
said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever amount would be awarded
the Union.
Atty. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim. When Atty. Pineda appeared
for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name B.C. Pineda
and Associates," giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases.

Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were pending resolution. He always
held office in the firm's place at Puyat Building, except in 1966 to 1967 when he transferred to the Lakas ng
Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint at the latter office, Atty. Pineda continued handling the case
with the arrangement that he would report the developments to the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law
firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases and using the Puyat Building office as his address in the
pleadings.
When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his partners (he was made the most
senior partner) that he had a retainer's contract. He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did not divulge
the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of the Union knew of the contract.

The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even illegal as well
as unethical considering that-
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the 45% fee for those who
were no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group who should and were entitled to more
benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the Halili Transit had already
stopped operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the workers would be out of work which
would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.

A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected in view of PD 1529 which requires no
less than an order from a court of competent jurisdiction as authority to sell property in trust.

Atty. Pineda, without authority from the SC but relying on the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of
Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The sale was finally
consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow agreement.

When Atty. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union) learned of the sale and
apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president, he requested Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to allow him
to look into the records of the case. The latter, however, told him that the records of the case were missing.
Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested the Director of the NLRC to locate the records.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred.

Ruling: YES.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.—A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corrupt or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence
and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or
showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence.

In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for such
authority to sell the property make the entire transaction dubious and irregular.

Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an admission on his
part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait for valid
authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered
to so authorize.
The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working and the 30% lien
on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the alleged retainer's contract are also very
exorbitant and unconscionable.

Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to imprisonment and directed
to show cause why he should not be disbarred.

34. Luzviminda Lijuaco vs Atty. Rogelio Terrado

Facts:

According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00
to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified
as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional lTrial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24
docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant
was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not
include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint was referred[3] to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding
respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue:
Whether the respondent violated Canon 9 Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:
Yes.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees respondent
violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring
complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and misleading assurance that complainant
can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

Respondent’s admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release
him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed
to practice law, except in certain cases.

The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public and the legal
profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that
similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.

36. IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO

FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at
the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because
he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his
things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at
the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The
matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based
on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for
his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

YES.

the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty
of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not
warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the
passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of
the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and
its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed
at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized
that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a
valid justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose
to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the
Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not
allowed to engage in the practice of law.

37. Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada

FACTS: Alvin Feliciano filed an injunction and TRO against Atty. Carmencita Bautista – Lozada in representing his
husband Edilberto Lozada in the latter’s case against the complainant on June 5, 2007. Feliciano alleged that
Atty. Bautista – Lozada appeared as a counsel for his husband and actively participated in the court proceedings
while she is still suspended from the practice of law in reference to a court judgment on December 15, 2005.
Feliciano argued that the act of the respondent constitutes willful disobedience to a court order. In her reply,
Atty Bautista – Lozada claims that she was only forced by the situation that she needed to defend the right of
his husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She believes that since she is representing his husband and not
a client, it is not within the prohibition of the law. The case was referred to the IBP for investigation and the IBP
Investigating Officer recommended disbarment for Atty. Bautista – Lozada in violation of Rule 1.01, 1.02 and
Rule 18.01 of the CPR. The IBP-BOG adopted the recommendation with modification to suspension of only 3
months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Atty. Bautista – Lozada warrant disciplinary action?
RULING: Yes. Atty. Bautista – Lozada’s act of representing his husband in court proceedings while still serving
her suspension is an act prohibited by law that should warrant disciplinary action. Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court clearly stated that a willful disobedience of any lawful order of the superior court, or for corruptly
or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so is a ground for disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law. The practice of law is defined as any activity, in or out of the court, which
requires that application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. In the case at bar, Atty.
Bautista-Lozada in appearing, signing for and in behalf of his husband in pleadings and court proceedings
constitutes practice of law where she should desist herself from engaging during the period of her suspension.
The prior judgement of her suspension was promulgated on December 15, 2005, therefore she cannot engage
in the practice of law until December 2007.
38. Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

FACTS: Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila.
His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the
units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned
the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent
issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when
he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months. Respondent was found guilty of professional misconduct
for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal
of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the
department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.