SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS

Cross-Cultural Dimensions and Geopolitical Interests in the

South China Sea Conflict

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Cross-Cultural Dimensions and Geopolitical Interests in the South China Sea Conflict

Introduction

This paper looks into the cross-cultural dimensions and geopolitical interests that are

behind the conflict over the South China Sea, in particular the static of culture between China

and the Philippines. While the economic and security interests at stake for the claimant states

may preclude military conflict, the paper warns that the Philippines’ long alliance and

entanglement with the US and China’s thrusting towards superpower status make for a ready

stage for a potential pocket war in the event of a cross-cultural miscue. As a peaceful way

forward, it explores the possibility of the disputed waters becoming once again a commercial

commons, as it once was before western powers muddled the local narratives and introduced

Westphalian concepts of sovereignty and territoriality.

Geopolitical cultures and historical collocations

Just below the radar screen of much security analysis in this region is a largely unnoticed

feature of globalization: the fact that we are dealing with countries who have acquired

conceptual and material tools from what we call the ‘West,’ and yet remain deeply embedded in

their traditional cultures.

In popular culture, globalization has now conflated and put side by side, in a single

time and space, the computer and the abacus, the tractor and the carabao, sushi and

MacDonald’s, anime, Korean telenovelas and Bollywood alongside Hollywood

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blockbusters, smart phones and Facebook alongside traditional communication centers like

barber-shop talk and gossip round the village well.

Similarly, we see this collocation of traditional and modern life systems and their

artifacts in the conflict over the South China Sea.

For example, all claimant states seem to have acquired the European language of post-

Westphalian concepts like ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial rights.’ At the same time, we are seeing

the traditional preference for opaque, behind-the-scenes negotiations in conflict management, the

so-called ‘ASEAN way.’

In strategic security issues, we have a situation where the global order that emerged out

of the rubble of two world wars -- the UN, NATO, the European community, the Cold War as

the Soviets and the Americans faced off by organizing ideological alignments -- is breaking up

and in flux, as evidenced by Brexit, Donald Trump and his own version of ‘Fortress America,’

and the rising number of fragile and rogue states wracked by internal unrest, fragmentation and

repressive autocratic governments, both ancient and modern.

Meanwhile, Asia has emerged as an alternate center of power and wealth, with its

multiple versions of industrialized modernity, -- first led by Japan which acquired technical

skills from the West and carefully assimilated them within its own cultural traditions, and now

China which opened up its economy to global capitalism while keeping to its ‘socialism with

Chinese characteristics.’ Alongside the global shift in the redistribution of wealth is this rising
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re-assertiveness of self-identities, which for “a fleeting moment in history” have been

suppressed and rendered dormant by colonialism.

Most of these countries are just beginning to consolidate as ‘nation-states’ in the

European sense after the trauma of colonization and the throes of internal turmoil over

grievances caused by economic and political imbalances due to ideological, ethnic and religious

differences. While some have acquired the formal apparatus of what passes for democratic

institutions in the western sense, they are actually still located culturally in their pre-colonial

periods, immersed in their primal identities and re-fitting them for the challenges of a globalized

world.

China, for one, has embarked on a grand project that resembles its old place and self-

understanding in the world. This self-identity shows itself in the bold vision of reinventing the

old Silk Road and once again ruling over vital maritime trade routes as in the heyday of the

voyager Zheng He in the 15th century.

The announcement of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative is indicative of an

emerging grand design of reclaiming its supposed historic entitlements, not merely over the

South China Sea, but over a world that has seen the breakup of large architectonic structures

like the Soviet Union and the unraveling of that global social imaginary once known as the

‘Free World.’
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OBOR is perceived as an initiative driven by the impulse to centralize power through

commercial and civilizational influence. It is a crystallization of China’s national identity

and ideological sense of mission, as drawn from lessons in its long history as well as

from observations on the rise of other great nations.1

As articulated by Zhang Wenmu, professor at the Center for Strategic Studies at

Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, ““In military history, command of the sea

was at one point an important factor behind the rise and fall of nations….China today is a

flying dragon. But that is not enough…China must also be a dragon in the deep pool of the

Western Pacific. Otherwise, it will not achieve the great revitalization of the entire Chinese

nation.” 2

The rise of China, and its perceived aggressiveness, has been largely analyzed by

western scholars as either a threat that needs to be contained, or a defensive posture in

response to vulnerabilities arising from its economic ‘overstretch,’ energy needs and bad

prospects in its demographics.

The debate, as posed by security analysts Nathan and Scobell, is framed in this way: “Is

China’s foreign policy-making driven by culture, nationalism, resentment over a ‘century of

humiliation’ or by a realistic calculus that seeks to match available resources to security goals?”
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In response to analysts like Bernstein and Munro, who argue from realist premises that

China needs containing as it shifts from the Deng Xiao Ping-era of ‘peaceful rise’ to a larger,

more aggressive quest for hegemony, Nathan and Scobell maintain that China is still a

vulnerable power facing numerous threats: “The main tasks of Chinese foreign policy are still

defensive: to blunt destabilizing influences from abroad, to avoid territorial losses, to moderate

surrounding states’ suspicions, and to create international conditions that will sustain economic

growth.” 4

More recently, some Chinese scholars would echo this sense of China’s vulnerability

as well as its search for a global role.

The Belt and Road initiative, for instance, is explained by Wang (2016, pp.455-463) as a

response to the ‘new normal’ of the Chinese economy, which has been slowing down since 2012,

and the need to transform its growth model from one driven by exports and investments to one

driven by domestic consumption. In spite of the startling rise of income among the growing

urban middle class and the ultra-rich, the majority in the countryside remain poor. China also

suffers from overcapacity in its production of low-cost, low-technology goods, hence the need to

spill them over to far-flung markets like Africa. Its march westward is meant to expand space for

its huge population. Its reliance on imported energy has surpassed that of the US, posing the

challenge of ensuring energy supply. On the whole, OBOR is “a proactive approach in meeting

expectations of China’s international obligation and leadership.”

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Similarly, Hong (2013, pp. 27-43) notes that the South China Sea policy shift from

‘good neighborliness’ to the post-Deng era of assertiveness is said to be accounted for by

uncertainties over energy security, occasioned by constraints in North Africa and the Middle

East on the supply of oil. To fuel its continued growth, China is said to be targeting the

production of 1 million boepd – barrels of oil equivalent per day-- by 2020 in the deep water

areas of the South China Sea.

On the other hand, in the light of the unrelenting military buildup and insistent

bilateralism of China in energy exploration, Southeast Asians tend to be cautious, even

mistrustful, of China’s growing power in the region. “China’s behaviour and unbending

assertion of its position on the South China Sea disputes show a different side of China that is

worrisome for ASEAN.” 5

Early on, China was shown to be not quite forthright in its dealings with the ASEAN

on South China Sea issues. The Philippines in 1992 spearheaded the crafting of a code of

conduct for claimant countries in the region. China endorsed it, but refused to make it legally

binding and had the language changed to a ‘declaration,’ and not a ‘code,’ hence the ‘ASEAN

Declaration on the South China Sea,’ which was more a political rather than a legal document

and has yet to be implemented in earnest. A Chinese analyst explains China’s reluctance to get

nailed down in an agreement: “aware of its market size and bargaining power vis-à-vis

ASEAN neighbors and oil companies, China refuses any cooperative arrangements whose

terms it cannot dictate.” 6 Premier Li Peng in a press conference in Singapore in 1990 said
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China was prepared to set aside the sovereignty question and join ASEAN in developing

marine and seabed resources surrounding the Spratleys. Still, China proceeded to sign

contracts with foreign companies for oil exploration without the participation of any claimant

state. 7

In the Mischief Reef incident, when the Philippines discovered Chinese-built structures

inside its EEZ in 1995, three days of bilateral talks were held but ended in a stalemate. China

insisted that the Reef was part of its territory, and the structures were merely for fishermen’s

shelters, not military bunkers. ASEAN condemned the Chinese action as contravening the

Declaration. 8

Post-arbitration, there is a growing suspicion that China’s presence in ASEAN affairs

may be a ‘trojan horse.’ As a Singaporean analyst, Siew Mun Tang, sees it, “While ASEAN was

successful in differentiating between national and regional interests, its member states’ divided

support for the collective interest after the arbitration case has been disconcerting. Their failure

to affirm the primacy of international law in international affairs can be seen as a sign of the

regional organisation’s fraying unity. At the same time, China’s “Trojan Horse” tactics to break

ASEAN consensus on the South China Sea is evidence of Beijing’s disregard for ASEAN

centrality in managing Southeast Asian diplomatic and security issues.” 9

Underlying this continuing ASEAN distrust is the lingering memory of China’s support

for communist insurgencies in the region. Indonesia has yet to forget the failed communist coup

in 1965 which was largely encouraged by China.

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The Philippine government continues to fight a 50-year insurgency which drew ideological

inspiration and arms support from the Maoist regime. 10 Singapore and Malaysia both had to

‘ride the communist tiger’ in fear of the then looming threat posed by the so-called ‘domino

theory’ as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma fell into the orbit of Chinese communist

hegemony.

Western scholars tend to frame this moment in the history of these nations within the

ideological struggles of the Cold War. However, what was happening then was perhaps less an

ideological war as a search for a vision of what it means to be nations. After waging wars of self-

determination against colonial powers, they had to navigate through competing visions of what

their societies should look like. To some political stakeholders within these countries, China’s

massive socialist experiment following 1949 seemed to promise a way of breaking free from the

stranglehold of elites entrenched by former colonial arrangements so they can chart a more just

and equitable path to being nations.

Out of this internal turmoil, political contestation and a sense of fragility as small

nations, there emerged the ASEAN vision to step out of the shadows of the major powers and

walk their own path. This impulse was initially given voice by the Afro-Asian Bandung

Conference hosted by Indonesia’s Soekarno in the mid-50’s, then later by ASEAN senior

statesmen like Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore and Mohamad Mahathir of Malaysia. Reacting to

western criticism that Southeast Asian countries like theirs were run too tightly, both Lee Kwan

Yew and Mahathir held up ‘Asian values’ and the need for a strong state and purposive

command economies.
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Lee Kwan Yew, interviewed by the press in Manila, was at one point quoted as saying that part

of the reason the Philippines had been lagging behind the tiger economies was that it had “too

much democracy.”

This running current towards a more autochthonous vision of what Southeast Asian

countries should look like, -- post-colonialism -- finds congruence with China’s patent

‘nationalism,’ for want of a better, more culturally precise word to describe its present

attitudinal patterns in its inter-state relations.

At a time when ‘nationalism’ is a bad word for most Europeans, having gone through

the rise of the Third Reich under its banner and the ethnic cleansing wars of the Balkan states, it

is a word that for much of Asia and the nonwestern world remains a primary motivating force

for consolidating and mobilizing their peoples, an instrument for deepening core values and

realizing aspirations and goals. 11

It is important to note that many countries in this region are historically proximate to

the time when Europe was just rising from the anarchy of multi-polar wars of self-

determination that eventually crystallized into independent ‘nation-states’ and hardened into

territorial borders.

Western countries tend to forget the fact that ‘nation’ is a political construct that took

them centuries to evolve since the transformation of 11th-century medieval communes in Italy

into powerful city states modelled on ancient Roman republicanism, such as Venice, Florence,
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and Genoa, among others. The idea of ‘nation,’ and the regime of institutions and structures

that will make it work, achieved full maturity only in the 19th century. And even afterwards,

territorial wars kept the borders shifting.

In contrast, the newly-independent countries that emerged out of colonialism have had to

deal with the ravages of abuse and pillage by foreign powers, rebuild from out of the ruins of

their communal structures, redefine their suppressed identities, and shoulder their way for a

place at the table of nations, all within the space of the last half-century or so. Some continue to

have trouble being nations, like much of Africa, whose 2,000 tribal units were herded together

and controlled from six European capitals, then artificially cut up into nations that crisscrossed

tribal lines. The result is an atavistic return to tribalism and a never-ending contest for power

between and among rival tribes.

These diverse nations are under various stages of construction, at a time when

transnational forces are putting them under pressure to de-territorialize. Proximity through

global media has sharpened awareness of otherness and self-identities, with indigenous and

ethnic migrants rising to assert their rights within national communities. Alongside global

integration is this phenomenon of internal fragmentation brought about by a return to primal

identities, usually ethnically or religiously defined.

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A re-assertive China and an ASEAN that for all its institutional softness has proven

itself sturdily resilient for half a century are early warning signs of a strong particularism that

resists the tendency of the West to unduly universalize its values and its structuring of the

world order. 12 What we are seeing these days is perhaps the re-surfacing of ancient Asian

cultures as alternative bases for structural arrangements that are more congruent with their

socio-political realities.

Johnston (1995) explains that in the South China Sea conflict, it is important to

understand the cultural and historical narratives that drive its trajectory. Alastair Ian Johnston

has helpfully provided insight that culture has a historically imposed inertia on the policy

choices countries make. He calls this ‘strategic culture,’ where “both conflict and cooperation

in international politics are rooted in historically constructed and socially-learned assumptions

about the strategic environment and appropriate responses to it.”

Johnston’s study sees the Chinese idea of expansionism as “a progressive evolution

towards a preordained and inevitable unity,” such as the expansion to the South in the 13th

century by the Yuan dynasty. This strategy of conquest is rooted in its history of ‘Sinicizing the

natives,’ according to Kolb (1971). Central and South China were added to the North by a

gradual process of colonizing adjacent areas, not by military force, but by a process that went

on for 2,500 years.

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“The Chinese tradition has for its primary model for interstate relations a system in

which the focus of national policy is, in effect, a struggle for primacy, and legitimate, stable

order is possible only when one power reigns supreme – by direct bureaucratic control of the

Sinic geographic core and by at least tributary relationships with all other participants in the

world system.” (Ford, 2010, p.4)

In short, it is possible that the bilateral agreements contemporary China wants to forge

with the littoral states of the South China Sea and the bold vision of the ‘One Belt, One Road’

initiative are really reinventions of the old imperial impulse to unify ‘all under heaven.’

This imperial impulse can go the way of the old benevolent paternalism and civilizing

influence, - a revivified version of the tributary system, with a resurgent China at its

center. Or it can be a strategic coercive diffusion of its economic power and influence, so

as to control and eventually establish hegemony in the region that is likely to be as harsh

and draconian as the unification of ancient warring states under the Qin. 13

Towards an Asian maritime commons

Hot on the heels of the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyuma prematurely

announced that we are at ‘the end of history,’ meaning that the old ideological battles are over

and all we are left with are boring technical questions on how to make economies grow.
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The unraveling of the global order as we know it and the resurgence of China as a

would-be hegemonic power may, however, bring us back to a re-drawing of the lines, this time

not so much ideological as civilizational. Samuel Huntington’s idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’

may have sounded sweeping decades ago as a generalized explanation for the multiple polarities

of conflict erupting round religious and cultural fault lines. Today, as a confident and strong

Chinese state seems to be resurfacing a Sinic vision of a world order that can rival that which

has been constructed by the West, we may be seeing free-forming realignments organized round

civilizational affinities.

Already, most of the ASEAN countries are lining up behind the reality of China as

economic leader in the region. These countries have moved from containing a perceived

communist threat in the region to economic cooperation and a growing appreciation of China’s

rise. 14 Victor Limlingan (October 16, 2017), businessman and economic analyst at the Asian

Institute of Management, echoes sentiments on the ground that for all its continuing

repressiveness, China at least has mopped up a substantial portion of its poor. He cites a study

that puts at 800 million the number of mainland Chinese who rose out of the poverty line, or

about 80% of its current population. Besides ASEAN receiving loans and trade inflows,

Limlingan notes a sizable influx of the new ‘hwa chiao’ – overseas Chinese, part of the 180

million Chinese tourists every year who have become globally mobile since 2015.
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According to Nyiri and Tan (2016), there is a new wave of Chinese diaspora in the

region, with mass migrations from the People’s Republic of China to Southeast Asia estimated

to be at 2.3 to 2.7 million just in the two decades after 1990. This is part of its ‘going out’

(‘zouchugua’) strategy to accelerate overseas expansion and commercial acquisitions. There

have been contingents of Hui Muslims migrating to Indonesia and Malaysia, and a large influx

of mainland Chinese in Singapore, from several thousands in the 1990’s to one million by

2008, making them the largest and most visible ethnic migrant community in this city state. 15

Consistent with its age-old practice of occupying and Sinicizing its acquired border territories,

China is diffusing its influence and moving its population across the region.

Aiding the economic push and pull of these countries are cultural and kinship

affinities. The ambiguities in the response of these countries to the PCA ruling, for instance,

are not just geopolitical balancing acts, but postures rooted in historical ties and certain shared

values, like the concern for ‘face,’ harmony and social maintenance.

Vietnam for instance, of late the most vociferous among the claimant states since the

Philippines’ turnabout under the Duterte regime, tries to strike a delicate balance “between

China and the US, between a hard and soft approach, between patience and haste, and between

legal clarity and ambiguity” as the defining characteristic of Vietnam’s policy approach in the

post-arbitration context. 16
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In the May 2014 incident, when China installed an oil rig in the Paracels, both Beijing

and Hanoi deployed naval vessels, but there was no public uproar over the standoff. Later, right

after the oil rig was withdrawn, “sources revealed that Dinh The Huynh, a pro-China camp

member who heads the communist Party’s Department of Propaganda and Education, instructed

the media not to further discredit China and make it lose face because of the move.” 17

This cultural commonality accounts for the ambivalence about China among ASEAN

countries and calls for a more nuanced approach in dealing with the political and security

dimensions of the South China Sea issue. It is important to recognize that always at play in

negotiating country-specific interests are such common values as respect for a hierarchical order

of powers, an emphasis on harmonizing differences behind the scenes rather than openly

confronting, and considerable weight put on the collective interest rather than individual rights

and identity.

These partly account for these countries’ ambiguous stance towards China, and explains

also in part the obduracy under western pressure to take on social reforms such as expanding

democratic space and respecting ‘human rights’ and individual liberties. 18

It used to be posited that economic growth will lead to the emergence of a politically

literate middle class that can exert pressure towards democratization. 19 While this may hold

for a wide cross-section of countries as studied by the economist Robert Barro, the experience

of China and other economically successful Southeast Asian countries has been the opposite:
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economic growth has strengthened the hold of the tight political elites ruling them. Already,

the era of Xi Jinping is being described as “a perfect dictatorship.” 20

The continuing intransigence over its repressive policies, and the published intention to

adhere to ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ as well as its increasingly bare-faced

aggressiveness in reclaiming its supposed maritime entitlements, has led to the sense

among some scholars that the Cold War may not be over yet.

Alister Inglis (November 9, 2017), speaking from his studies of ancient Chinese

literature, believes that while there is nothing from Chinese history that indicates a propensity

for military aggression, the present communist regime is still on the campaign trail to remake

the world according to its Sinicized version of socialism. According to him, the establishment of

various ‘Confucian Institutes’ in many parts of the world is perceived as an extended form of

‘thought control’, meant to influence the curriculum of Chinese studies in the West and the

ideological formation of Chinese communities overseas in the guise of introducing traditional

Chinese culture. He suggests that in dealing with current policy issues, there ought to be a

clearly nuanced recognition of the distinction between China as a civilizational influence in the

world and China as a communist state.

It seems that whatever internal debates present-day China may be undergoing as to the

way forward, there is this continuing missional sense as represented by its new breed of Neo-

Confucianists and New Left intellectuals. Mark McConaghy, in mapping the present
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configuration of the intellectual climate in China, speaks of a resurgent Neo-Confucian

movement that seeks a return to the ‘DNA’ of Chinese civilization – an emphasis on family,

reciprocity, harmony and a strong state. There is this search for a more indigenous model of

governance after the liberalism of the May 4th movement, the disasters of Mao’s socialist

experiments and Deng’s push for modernization. Reacting to the excesses of Deng-era capitalism

during the ‘90s, the New Left is pressing for social safety nets and the recovery of the ‘historical

mission of socialism.’ Xi Jinping and his cohort of party-mates in the Politburo seems to have

listened, and appears to return to the ‘Chinese Dream’ of becoming a benevolent hegemon once

again, a flexible authoritarianism that will manage growth and its more equitable distribution

after the fractures of China’s recent history. 21

It is worth remembering that it was this missional sense, in contra-distinction from

realist or liberal calculations, which served as driving force during Maoist China’s war forays.

In his review of The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, China’s Search for Security by

Nathan and Ross, which makes the case that China is weak, non-aggressive, and motivated by

defensive purposes, John Garver notes that “Chinese material inferiority has not prevented it

from warring with great powers – Korea in 1950 against the US; India in 1962 when the

Soviets abandoned China and it was starving. In 1969 Mao struck at Soviet forces in Chen Bao

island, even if China was isolated and the People’s Liberation Army was enmeshed in the

Cultural Revolution. In 1996 Beijing embarked on armed coercion of Taiwan, even if it was

backed by the US and is one of the largest suppliers of foreign investment to China.”
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In response to the view that the increasing use of military might in addressing regional

issues is merely a defensive posture, Garver refutes as “palpably wrong” benign interpretations

of China’s actions. “The PRC has always used force for near in-defence of its home territory,”

he says, and at times has been motivated by hegemonic reasons. “Mobilization on India’s

borders during the 1965 war with Pakistan was clearly aimed at influencing the South Asian

balance of power.” Similarly, he continues, “in 1978 the punitive war against Vietnam was

aimed at preventing Vietnamese domination of Cambodia, and even in the Korean war, Mao

was influenced by the effect of US defeat on China’s standing with the socialist camp and in

Asia.” 22

In today’s multi-polar world, China, Taiwan and the whole of Southeast Asia are faced

with a historic opportunity to step out of the shadows of the old global order as constructed by

Western powers and re-make the region according to home-grown socio-political systems

evolved out of the rich diversity of its cultures.

This movement towards a new architecture for the region requires recognizing and

suspending reflexes based on anachronisms such as the idea of a ‘Chinamerica,’ 23 which

indicates a mindset still immersed in the geopolitics of a bipolar world.

Likewise, we may need to consign to the dustbin of colonial history scholarship that

keeps on rehearsing China’s repetitive rhetoric on ‘historic rights,’ along with the habit of

making tangential claims based on ancient maps and voluminous references to territories ceded

or inherited under various treaties with former imperial powers who in the first place had no

right to occupy them. 24

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What seems needed is not a return to old patterns of establishing order by hegemony. It

is said that China, in contrast to Europe’s evolution of nation-states, drew the opposite

conclusion from its inter-state wars – going for a unified empire, not the creation of multi-

states. Hegemony was the preferred mode for organizing inter-state relations. Later, however,

Europe evolved a system of constraining mores, now known as ‘international law,’ for ordering

the independent society of states. “This conceptual shift meant that Europe did not replay the

zero-sum history of China’s Warring States period but developed an international society.” Its

answer to chaos is “not hegemony but a system of states bound by a limited but crucial set of

constraining mores.” 25

Neither will the South China Sea dispute be resolved by asserting retroactively

imaginary boundaries based on the legacies of western imperialism and rigid Westphalian

concepts of sovereignty and territoriality. Instead, a more autochthonous move would be to

recover what the South China Sea used to be – an ancient maritime commons where trade and

cultural exchange flourished among its coastal states. 26

Until the intrusion of western powers, there was then no notion of staking claims on these

waters, not even during the days of the great voyager Zheng He, whose voyages were meant to

intimidate and impress allies, adversaries, and those with undecided allegiance, as well as open

trade sea lanes between Ming China and South East Asia, and all through the Indian Ocean.

These were not, as with the Europeans, voyages of exploration to discover new worlds, expand

markets, or claim territories for the imperial crown. “The economic benefits were secondary to
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the assertion of Chinese cultural primacy.” The primary purpose was to “advertise the glories of

the Ming Dynasty and the power of its new emperor and to strengthen, expand, and extend the

axes along which Ming China’s gravitational pull could be felt, and especially within the

parameters of the tributary system.” 27

Halliden (2014) mentions that, from historical evidence, what there seems to be is “a long

history of the region being dominated by sea-faring traders who did not necessarily

demonstrate significant territorial aspirations for China in the South China Sea.” It is a historic

fact that at the height of its power, the Ming Dynasty “turned its back on the sea and

squandered its opportunity to be the dominant maritime power in Asia.”

While it cast a large presence, at no time was China ever in effective control of the sea.

This has evoked a sense of irony in this comment in China Goes to Sea (2016): “...a dynasty

that had once sent great armadas of ships and tens of thousands of men as far as the coast of

Africa in the early 15th century was by the mid-point of the 16th century incapable of

responding effectively to piracy along its own coast.”

Resurgent China’s turn towards the sea can push the region towards a new way of

framing the space within which claimant countries can safely navigate through the troubled

waters. The South China Sea issue is a test of the claimant states’ capacity to rein in historically-

learned reflexes and re-surface the deep structures of the cultures involved as primary resources

rather than sources of conflict.

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China, particularly, is now strong enough to refuse to play according to the rules of the

game as set by western powers. It can either choose to do a reprise of its old ‘Middle Kingdom’

behavior, or help in inaugurating a new era of independent states moving together towards

regional peace and prosperity.

So far, China’s global presence has been marked by a pronounced ethnocentrism as

zhong guo- the central state -- and a palpable lack of an ethical center in its business

dealings. Experiences on the ground with Chinese business firms in places like Burma

and Sri Lanka, for instance, have done little to dissipate the mistrust of countries in the

region. 28

Even its ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, while promising that Chinese companies will

come and invest and provide jobs to local communities along the revived Silk Road, is

increasingly suspected as driven by the impulse to centralize power through commercial and

civilizational influence. OBOR is “globalization on China’s terms – creating new markets for

China’s firms which face slowdown in growth and overcapacity at home,” says Brahman

Chellaney (May 29, 2017). It is “the 21st century equivalent of the East India Company, which

paved the way for British imperialism in the East.”

While sounding futuristic, its expansionism is in fact anachronistic, a throwback to the

race for supremacy in the old bipolar world, this at a time when small cells of terror can cause

multi-state conflicts, and global economic integration is no guarantee against political

fragmentation.
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
24

On the other hand, China can also choose to be a genuine alternative to the self-serving

capitalism of the West. With sensitivity to local cultures and reciprocity that is not only

transactional but also ethical, China can lead the region towards becoming a prosperous society

of strong and independent states, claiming as a common heritage the bounties of the South China

Sea.

At the center of this forward movement is the ASEAN’s ability to formulate and enforce

mechanisms for resolving disputes. Its amorphous and rather spineless ‘ASEAN way’ needs to

harden into a regime of binding rules and agreements, like the long delayed Code of Conduct. It

has to demonstrate capacity to exercise multilateralism, even when it involves parties whose

powers are asymmetrical. Already, there are rumblings to the effect that its consensus-based

decision-making needs to be re-examined. “The unintended consequence of China’s actions

aimed at containing ASEAN’s response to the Award has been the opening of this discourse on

the ASEAN consensus model. Siew Mun Tang (n.d.)”

An ASEAN with more muscular institutional powers for a decisive intervention is

especially critical at a time when cross-cultural mis-cues are likely to lead to pockets of armed

conflict. While a large-scale war is not likely in the immediate horizon, the strategic geography

of the South China Sea and the cultural orientation of the countries involved make the security

situation volatile. 29 Rahman and Tsamenyi (2010) point out that the small size of the Spratley

islands, for instance, may only have “minimal strategic value in any significant conflict,” says

military analysts, but during peacetime, it may have strategic value as “surveillance or staging
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
25

outposts, and as political indicators of intent with respect to territorial and maritime claims.”

This means that “any thoughts that the South China Sea can become a zone of peace and

cooperation may have to be placed on hold for some time yet.”

With the Philippines perceived as fronting for US interests in the region, and China

imperiously behaving out of sync with the evolving legal environment round these troubled

waters, cultural differences and suspicions as to motives behind each other’s intentions and

actions are likely to heighten from mere offstage noise to loud decibels that can be misread and

trigger large-scale conflict.

An aspect of the global order that bears watching is the fact that while cultures have

come together and various peoples are now face to face, such proximity does not necessarily

lead to trust and greater understanding. It may even lead to the hardening of preconceptions and

stereotypes. The social psychologist Daniel Katz had long ago observed that “while physical

barriers to communication are rapidly disappearing, the psychological obstacles remain.”

There is always the ever-present possibility of cross-cultural miscues, which may have

catastrophic consequences. There is the famous story, for instance, of the Allied powers

misunderstanding the term ‘mokusatsu’ as used by Japanese Premier Kantaro Suzuki in a press

conference July 28, 1945 when pressed about the government’s reply to the ultimatum to

surrender as stipulated by the Potsdam Declaration issued two days earlier.

SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
26

If read in context, the translation could be taken that the decision to surrender is merely

being delayed pending consultation within the cabinet. If taken out of context, it can be read

literally as ‘ignore,’ or, contemptuously, ‘not worth a reply’ – meaning, the Japanese are silent

because they are digging in their heels and it is not worth giving an answer. 30 International

news agencies saw fit to tell the world that in the eyes of the Japanese government the

ultimatum was "not worthy of comment." Within days, the Americans and their Allies dropped

the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Based on declassified documents, it turns out that the Japanese were prepared to

surrender. There were internal debates on how to reply given the need for face-saving and the

harsh threats against non-compliance: “An appearance of negotiating for terms less onerous

than unconditional surrender was maintained....It seems clear, however, that in extremis the

peacemakers would have peace, and peace on any terms. This was the gist of the advice given

to Hirohito by the Jushin in February, the declared conclusion of Kido in April, the specific

injunction of the Emperor to Suzuki on becoming premier which was known to all members

of the Cabinet.” 31

Similarly, one cross-cultural mis-step in the South China Sea issue may make the

conflict spiral beyond control.

SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
27

A possible bright spot, though as yet faint, in the peace prospects of the region are the

small nations seeking a role in this dispute. Taiwan, for one, whose strong claim to at least Itu

Aba was unfortunately sidelined by the PCA ruling, has scientific capacity for research in

biodiversity, geological and climate change matters, and has announced officially its intention

to collaborate with countries in the region to protect and develop resources in the South China

Sea and advance peace and stability. 32 Based on practices of littoral states round the Caribbean

and the Mediterranean Sea, the question is posed by Alfred Hu (2010): “Is it possible that the

bordering states of the South China Sea could come together to take the South China Sea as a

common heritage and give themselves the opportunity of joint development through regional

cooperation in the spheres of management and conservation of marine living resources,

protection of marine environment, and joint scientific programs?”

The Philippines has shown that smaller nations can serve as countervailing force towards

balancing the asymmetry of power relations in the region through the soft power of legal and

meta-legal pressures. The PCA ruling is a ‘game changer’ that signals the ability of small but

determined nations to press for rights under an evolving rules-based maritime order. China may

refuse to abide by it, but it risks being seen as a rogue state, its credibility as a benign power

rising eroded by behaving as the big bully in the neighborhood.

The Chinese Communist Party leadership may want to heed K’ang Yu Wei’s advice to the

government of the Manchus during the crisis of the 1880’s:

SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
28

“If the Europeans had not appeared, we might have gone on in our old way

for centuries…..If we wish to reform our own state, we must first of all abandon the

old idea of supremacy. We must accept the fact that the world, instead of being a

unity under our dominion, is made up of many different states.” Kolb (2010) 33

The current Philippine leadership, rendered unduly compliant and subservient to

Chinese demands, unaccountably unwilling to push back blatant encroachments on its

maritime rights, will likewise need to suspend its most basic cultural instinct, --

accommodation -- and heed this advice in the face of a gaping asymmetry in the power

relations between these two nations: “The Philippines must be creative in finding legal means

of enforcing the ruling, and not be timid in exploring the frontiers of international law. To

paraphrase Sun Tzu, you must defeat the enemy in the courtroom if you cannot defeat the

enemy on the battlefield. Antonio Carpio (July 21, 2016)”

While ‘might is right’ is a tenet for those who still think that the high seas are fair game

for piratical powers, sometimes, ‘right can be might,’ -- particularly when there is growing

global consensus that there is such a thing as a universal ‘commons,’ an evolving space for a

rule-based order where all, big and small nations, are being made subject to civilizational norms

that have been achieved, not without crisis and contention, in our time.
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
29
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
30

REFERENCES

Carpio, A. T. (2016, July 21). The Hague Tribunal: Ramifications of Ruling. Philippine Daily
Inquirer.

Chellaney, B. (2017, May 29). China's Imperial Overreach. Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Chung, C. (2004). Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes.

Dr. Alister Inglis, personal communication, November 9, 2017

Dr. Victor Limlingan, personal communication, October 16, 2017

Erickson, A. S., Goldstein, L. J., & Lord, C. (2009). China goes to sea: Maritime transformation
in comparative historical perspective. Annapolis: Md.

Ford, C. A. (2015). The mind of empire: Chinas history and modern foreign relations.
Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.

Garver, J. W. (1998). Review of The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress. Political Science
Quarterly,113(3), autumn 1998, 547-548.

Halliden, B. (n.d.). China’s Historic Rights in the South China Sea, A Time for Reconsideration
and Pacific Settlement. George Washington University Law School.

Hong, Z. (2013). South China Sea Dispute and China-Asean Relations. Asian Affairs
Journal,44(1), 27-43.

Hu, N. A. (2010). Semi-enclosed Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application of the
1982 UNCLOS Article 123 to the South China Sea. Ocean Development & International
Law,41(3), 281-314.

Hu, N. A., & McDorman, T. L. (2013). Maritime issues in the South China Sea:
Troubled waters or a sea of opportunity. London: Routledge.

Johnson, A. (1995). Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press,1-12.
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
31
Kolb, A. (1971). Geography of a Cultural Region. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.,47.

M. Mcconaghy, personal communication, November 3, 2017

Nyiri, P., & Tan, D. (n.d.). Chinese Encounters in Southeast Asia: How People, Money, and
Ideas from China Are Changing a Region. Donald R. Ellegood International Publications.
Rahman, C., & Tsamenyi, M. (2010). A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in
the South China Sea. Ocean Development & International Law,41(4), 315-333.

Tang, S. (n.d.). South China Sea Lawfare. 183.

Wang, Y. (2016). Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand
Strategy. The Pacific Review Journal,29(3), 455-463.
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
32

FOOTNOTES

1
In 2006, the Chinese government commissioned a study – ‘Daguo Jueqi,’ or ‘The Rise of Great

Powers’ – on how to catch up and overtake leaders in modernization and achieve national

rejuvenation. The factors identified were foreign trade and sea power, based on a historical

analysis of the rise of such powers as Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, UK, France, Germany,

Japan, Russia and the US. See Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China Studies the

Rise of Great Powers,” in a book edited by these authors, China Goes to Sea, Maritime

Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, Annapolis, Maryland: Carnes Lord,

Naval Institute Press, 2009, pp.401 ff. Hereinafter referred to as China Goes to Sea.

2
Erickson and Goldstein’s Introduction, in China Goes to Sea, XXI.

3
Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell in the Introduction to China’s Search for Security, New

York: Columbia University Press, 2012, p.XV. This sequel to the earlier book, The Great Wall

and the Empty Fortress, maintains that vulnerability, and not expansion, remains the primary

driver behind China’s current policies.

SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
33
4
Cf. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, 1997; Nathan and

Scobell, writing in 2012, define instead what has changed: “These internal and regional

priorities are now embedded in a larger quest: to define a global role that serves Chinese interests

but also wins acceptance from other powers.” See China’s Search for Security, p. XII.

5
Siew Mun Tang, “ASEAN’s Policy Options and Future Prospects,” South China Sea Lawfare,

Post-Arbitration Ruling Policy Options and Future Prospects, Fu Kuo Liu, Keyuan Zou, Shicun

Wu, Jonathan Spangler, eds., South China Sea Think Tank, Taiwan Center for Security Studies,

April 2017, p.181. Hereinafter referred to as China Sea Lawfare.

6
Chien-peng Chung, a research fellow at the Department of East Asian Studies in the University

of Toronto, in Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes,

London and NY: Routledge Curzon, 2004; PHD dissertation at the University of Southern

California, version in UMI Microform, 1999, p.227.

7
Ibid.

8
It was after this incident that China’s top unofficial spokesman Pan Shiying told US officials

that if necessary, China “will take over the islands forcibly.” Since then, though the Tribunal has

declared China’s construction of facilities on Mischief Reef to be illegal under international law,

continuing construction of an artificial island there indicates that China has no intention to leave.

Instead, it has fortified its presence in the area despite President Duterte’s soft approach. The
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
34
Philippine government announced in May 2016 that as a sign of China’s goodwill, Filipino

fishermen could now fish in the waters of the Scarborough Shoal; however, there were reports

that the China Coast Guard continued to bar Filipino fishermen from fishing in the area,

immediately after the issuance of the PCA ruling. (Kristine Daguno-Bersamina, “BFAR: Pinoy

fishermen can now freely fish in Scarborough Shoal,” Philippine Star, May 21, 2016; JC

Gotinga, “Filipino fishermen still barred from Scarborough Shoal,” CNN Philippines, July 15,

2016. ) Such incidents have built the impression, particularly on the part of the Philippines, that

non-military means such as oil exploration and research ships are merely a ploy to advance

China’s territorial claims, as with the supposed expedition in the Scarborough Shoal of an

international club composed of US, Japan and Chinese nationals on May 1, 1997. Information

from the Chinese organizer of the trip said it was the Chinese government that paid thousands of

dollars to charter the ships, and the expedition itself was led by a former People’s Liberation

Army operator. See this elaborated by Chien-peng Chung, in Domestic Politics, International

Bargaining, op.cit., pp. 233-234.

9
Siew Mun Tang, head of the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in

Singapore, expresses apprehension that “China’s ‘Trojan Horse’ tactics pose an existential threat

to ASEAN, which was originally founded in 1967 to band five small Southeast Asian states

together to ward off major power interference and dominance.” South China Sea Lawfare,

pp.173 and 181.

SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
35
10
A fictionalized but historical account on this from inside the Maoist movement in the

Philippines is The Secret of the 18 Mansions, written by Mario Miclat, who lived 15 years in

China under the patronage of the Chinese government, along with other colleagues engaged in

fomenting a Maoist-type revolution.

11
It is reported that both China and the Philippines, in pulsing the temper of their respective

peoples, have found that domestic sentiment favors a strong nationalist stance vis-à-vis the South

China Sea issue. A survey shows that eight out of ten Filipinos believe that the country should

assert its rights in the West Philippine Sea as provided by international law, in contrast to the

accommodative stance of the present government. In China, The People’s Daily posted the

question in their website on whether the South China Sea is a ‘core interest’ on par with Tibet,

Taiwan and Xinjiang so that military intervention is justified. As of January 2011, 97% of nearly

4,300 respondents said ‘yes,’ regardless of age or gender. See Albert del Rosario’s article, “A

Year After Arbitration: Options and Directions,” Inquirer.net. July 12, 2017, and Shen

Hongfang’s “The South China Sea Issue in China-ASEAN Relations: An Alternative Approach

to Ease the Tension,” International Journal of China Studies, KL, Vol.2 Issue 3, December 2011.

12
In a personal interview, Mark McConaghy, a visiting post-doctoral fellow at Academia Sinica's

Institute for Chinese Literature and Philosophy, offers the insight that Chinese intellectuals
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
36
emphasize to an important degree the particularity of China's historical experience. This

emphasis on particularism shows itself in the Chinese government's insistence that it be judged

by its own standards and no one else's. The West, the Chinese say, has no moral ascendancy in

lecturing China and the world about human rights and democracy in the light of the Western

historical record of imperialism as well as the US's continuing troop presence in Asia. This

particularism also shows itself in China’s policy of ‘no-strings attached’ aid and non-interference

in the internal affairs of countries it does business with.

13
For a recent interpretation of this period of Warring States in the history of China, see Dingxin

Zhao, The Confucian-Legalist State, A New Theory of Chinese History, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2015.

14
The Indonesian Dahlan Iskan, owner of the Java Pos Group, the largest media conglomerate in

East Java, has been quoted as saying that “no one has a spirit of progress and development as

strong as China’s.” Likewise, Probowo Subianto, the retired army general who instigated the

May 1998 pogroms against Chinese Indonesians and ran for vice-president with Megawati

Sukarnoputri in 2009, said in a speech in Surabaya: “In Mao Zedong’s time, China was fraught

with problems, famine and the Cultural Revolution. Once Deng Xiaoping took over the

leadership, China woke up, and for more than 20 years now, that nation has maintained a two-

digit rate of growth… We should learn that if a nation has leaders with a long-term vision, with a

glorious dream for their people, with a strong determination to learn from any source, it can
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
37
achieve great development and progress.” See Johanes Herlijanto, “ ‘Search for Knowledge as

Far as China’, Indonesian Responses to the Rise of China,” in Chinese Encounters in South East

Asia, How People, Money and Ideas from China are Changing a Region, Pal Nyiri and Danielle

Tan, eds. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2017, pp.195-213. Hereinafter referred to as

Chinese Encounters in East Asia.

15
See Hen Wai Weng’s “Translocal Pious Entrepreneuralism, Hui Business and Religious

Activities in Malaysia and Indonesia,” pp.58-76, and “Multiplying Diversities, How New

Chinese Mobilities are Changing Singapore,” by Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Weiguan Lin, pp.42-57,

in Chinese Encounters in South East Asia, ibid.

16
See “Vietnam’s Policy Options and Future Prospects,” by Truong-Minh Vu, visiting fellow at

the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, and Director of the Center for International Studies

(SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City, and Nguyen

Thanh Trung, Dean of Faculty of International Relations at the University of Social Sciences in

Ho Chi Minh City, in South China Sea Lawfare, p.169.

17
As cited by Le Liang, “The Rise of China as a Constructed Narrative: South East Asia’s

Response to Asia’s Power Shift,” Pacific Review, 11 September 2017.

18
The Chinese, especially, refuse the universalism of western values, according to Dr. Mark

McConaghy, a Canadian sinologist currently serving as a visiting post-doctoral scholar at

Academia Sinica's Institute for Chinese Literature and Philosophy, in a personal interview on
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
38
November 3, 2017. Moreover, this author senses that there is no known philosophical basis,

within Asian religious and cultural traditions, for valuing the individual apart from the collective

self-identity. Even so-called ‘cleft countries’ like the Philippines, with a long tradition of western

Christianity alongside an Islamic minority in the south and a largely Buddhist/Taoist Chinese

community, defines its sense of self as analogous to ‘multiple fried eggs.’ If one fries a number

of eggs in one large pan, all the egg whites seamlessly connect to one another. This root

metaphor is descriptive of the Filipino sense of self as un-individuated; it is always connected to

others and does not think of itself as having an identity independent of the sakop or clan group.

This makes for some difficulty in valuing the individual apart from its significance to communal

identity and collective interests.

19
See the Harvard economist Robert J. Barro’s work on this, particularly “Economic Growth in a

Cross Section of Countries,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 106, Issue 2, 1 May

1991, Pages 407–443, https://doi.org/10.2307/2937943. The main thesis is that economic growth

leads to the rise of a society whose human capital is a major factor in political stability.

20
Xi Jinping is said to now have full control over the Party Congress and the military, having

eliminated rivals touted to be successors. He is perceived as aiming to go down in history as a

national leader on par with Mao Xedong. As public symbol of this rise, he presided over a

massive military parade of the People’s Liberation Army at Zhurihe base, Asia’s largest military

training ground, in the Inner Mongolian region just recently.

SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
39
21
This missional sense, especially strong during the Maoist era, remains a continuous strand in

the internal debates within the ruling Chinese Communist Party. As a self-enclosed bureaucracy,

its recent published intention to prioritize wealth creation over ‘political reform’ does not

necessarily mean that its missional vision has taken a back seat; it may only mean that it waits

for its auspicious time.

22
See also John Garver’s The Sino-American Alliance, Nationalist China and American Cold War

Strategy in Asia, Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997 and the Review by Dan Brody,

China Information, Vol. XII No. 4, Spring 1998. More recently, John Garver has also written on

China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, New

York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

23
Man-houng Lin, Research Fellow at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, in a

paper titled “A Neglected Treaty for the South China Sea,” presented at the 2017 South China

Sea Conference held June 1, 2017 at Chang Yung Fa Foundation, International Convention

Center, Taipei, Taiwan.

24
Scholars are agreed that ancient maritime maps do not constitute or can be a basis for titles and

sovereignty. This author also believes that claims based on treaties ceding territories by a

defeated colonizing power are best treated as historical distortions rather than legitimations for

historic claims, as with the following examples: a) the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its sequel,

the Taipei Treaty, wherein Japan surrendered its claims to the Spratleys and Paracel Islands,
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
40
which forms the basis of the Republic of China’s claims, and assumes that Taiwan was the

recipient of the renunciation, still an area of contestation; b) Vietnam claims the Paracels as part

of the territory it inherited from France; c) likewise, the Philippines argues that as a former

colony of the US, it has a right to the Scarborough Shoal when it was ceded by Spain to the US

under the 1900 Treaty of Washington; d) the People’s Republic of China has also produced its

own maps, dating back to the 13th century and to the 1930s, made by Chinese authorities or

individuals and even foreigners, and has a running battle with the Philippines on whose maps

legitimize claims to ‘historic rights.’ Justice Carpio, on the Philippine side, pointed out that even

in those Chinese maps, the southernmost territory of China has always been Hainan Island, and

has labeled China’s claims as “historic lies.” He said that Philippine maps from 1636 to 1940, or

for 340 years, “consistently show Scarborough Shoal, whether named or unnamed, as part of the

Philippines…China’s so-called historical facts to justify its nine-dash line are glaringly

inconsistent with actual historical facts, based on China’s own historical maps, constitutions and

official pronouncements. China has no historical link whatsoever to Scarborough Shoal.

The rocks of Scarborough Shoal were never bequeathed to the present generation of Chinese by

their ancestors because their ancestors never owned those rocks in the first place,” he said.

25
See Ford, The Mind of Empire, pp. 63-64. This vision of independent states was only partially

realized, however. The West had its own version of hegemonic attempts at unification— the

Roman imperium, Europe under pre-Reformation Catholicism, Charlemagne, Frederick II,

Napoleon, and recently, Pax Americana.

SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
41
26
By the mid-Ming Dynasty, in the 1540s, Ming silks and porcelains were readily available in the

shops of Lisbon and Antwerp. There was a boom in maritime trade with the coming of the Dutch,

Spanish and Portuguese ships. In 1597 alone, it was estimated that nearly 35 metric tons of silver

(more than 8.5 million taels) entered China via Manila, exceeding the total produced by Chinese

mines in the preceding 50 years, and more than twice the Ming tax revenue for that year. Wilson,

China Goes to Sea, p. 264.

27
Wilson, ibid., pp. 249, 252 .

28
Hardeep Puri, chair of India’s Research and Information System for Developing countries,

warns that countries like the Philippines should be wary of China-funded projects. He cites the

case of Sri Lanka, for instance. China gave loans for an international airport and deep-sea port

which are now white elephants. The airport receives only one flight a day, and the seaport only

six ships a week. To avoid defaulting on its loan payments, Sri Lanka agreed to a debt-equity

swap: it gave China Merchants Port Holdings 80% stake in the seaport for 99 years, plus 6,000

hectares of land round the port. This has enabled China to gain access to a strategic

outpost in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka owes China US$ 8 Billion in high-interest loans,

and 65% of its GDP goes to debt servicing. (Adlai Noel Velasco, “Indian Think Tank to Manila:

Beware of Beijing-funded Projects,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 13, 2017). Similarly, there

have been civil society protests in Burma against Chinese-funded projects like the Myitsone dam

in Kachin state and Let Padaung copper mine. Chinese investment fell from US$ 12 billion

during 2008-2011 to only US$ 407 million in 2012-2013 since the reformist government took

over in 2011. This signals a transition away from China towards the West, with its promise of
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
42
more transparent and accountable business practices. (Kevin Woods, “China in Burma: A Multi-

scalar Political Economy Analysis,” Chinese Encounters in South East Asia, pp.157-173.)

29
There was a report that “Military Conflict ‘unlikely’ over South China Sea Dispute,” according

to the Hongkong Daily, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, London, 22 June 2011. But China, as

Alaistair Ian Johnston has noted, is “likely to resort to force in disputes involving territory, and

where the gap between ascribed and desired international status is large or growing,” as quoted

by Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining, p. 2. Note that Chinese

assertiveness has increased military spending in the region, and with it the potential for armed

conflict: “The conflict would be either planned or unplanned, and involve, initially, either China

and the US or China and a South East Asian state.” (Raine and Lemiere, supranote 15, at 187)

Halliden thesis, p. 52.

30
As defined by its dictionary meaning, ‘mokusatsu’ can mean a) ‘take no notice of; b) treat

(anything) with silent contempt; c) ignore [by keeping silence]; d) remain in a wise and masterly

inactivity. -- Kenkyusha's New Japanese - English Dictionary, p.1129. For an understanding of

this word in the Japanese cultural context, the author interviewed Prof. Naoki Yamazaki, the

author’s fellow visiting scholar from Kansai University in Osaka at the Research Institute for the

Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University, under the Taiwan Fellowship of the
SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: CULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS
43
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prof. Yamazaki taught for six years at the Institute on the Science of

Peace at Hiroshima University. See also Stewart Chase, The Power of Words, and “Good

Translation Might Have Prevented Hiroshima,” by John J. Marchi, State Senator, 24th District

Albany, in Opinion, New York Times, August 21, 1989.

31
See Kazuo Kawai’s account, “Mokusatsu, Japan's Response to the Potsdam Declaration.”

Kazuo Kawai is lecturer in Far Eastern history at Stanford University and formerly an instructor

in history in the University of California at Los Angeles. During the war years he was editor of

the Tokyo Nippon Times. Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Nov., 1950), pp. 409-414,

University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3635822 Accessed: 26-

06-2017.

32
On July 19, 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen outlined Taiwan’s ‘four principles and five actions’

pertaining to issues in the South China Sea, among which are a commitment to joint

development, multilateral consultations and scientific and humanitarian collaboration.

33
In 1898, K’ang worked as the Emperor’s closest adviser, but the conservatives in the court

gained the upper hand. On October 10, 1911, the troops at Wuchang mutinied, the revolution

broke out, and on February 12, 1912 the last of the Manchu emperors abdicated and China

became a republic.