Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.

Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor for appellee.

PARAS, C. J.:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal possesion of fire-arms in the Court of First
Instance of Lanao under the following information:

That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep
and have his custody and control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions, without firs
having obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority.

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and ammunitions in question, invokes as his legal excuse
or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows:t

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig,
Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he
is hereby authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with
twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his hazardous mission.

Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities and whereabouts of lawless and
wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein
existing.lawphi1.net

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit; but section 879 of
the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo. Labrador and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-
appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of
the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The
undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number,
with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May
counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to
possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question
the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked
the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the
information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or
permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon
which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented
four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June
2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay
and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963,
to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of
the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as
such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the
parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and
ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." 6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the
appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Exhibit 1.
2
Exhibit 2.
3
Exhibit 3.
4
Exhibit 4.
5
Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.
6
Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.
7
Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.
8
L-12088, December 23, 1959.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue
the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
person not authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody
and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells
without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no
license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor
Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the
detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect
to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection
of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take
effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be
those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this province and
to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority
on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and
immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088
dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in
connection with the performance of your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and
filing the original thereof with us.
 Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE

Provincial Governor

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to
furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might
affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the
evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC
Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint,
nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and
abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang,
We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to
possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret
Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm
and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to
the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the
temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to
effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that
in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any
firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No.
4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary,
guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in
view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally
passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet"
— the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in
the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is
especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.
2 106 Phil. (1959), 713.
3 103 Phil. (1958), 500.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.

Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for
appellee.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:

Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the costs.

The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then
Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the
accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 to
the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given
to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of
his official duty and for his personal protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the
above-described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted
and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was
convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accused assigned three
errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.

Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject matter falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special
agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit
corresponding thereto.

Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No.
2613, the justice over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took cognizance
of this case had jurisdiction over the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have
original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months, or a fine
of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period
of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law
is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment
and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the
appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5)
years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The
Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry
and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal
protection. 5 It also appears that appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to
register the said firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's
name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol
was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent."

At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein
We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of
crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under
the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol in question.

Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for his provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Exhibit 1, p. 52, Rollo.
2 Exhibit 2, p. 53, Rollo.
3 Exhibit 3, p. 54, Rollo.
4 Exhibit 1 reads:

You are hereby accredited as Special Agent without regular compensation. This designation does
not confer upon you police powers and authority to make investigations provided by Section 848
of the Revised Administrative Code nor does it entitled you to (possess and carry firearms or) take
free rides in any public conveyances. ..." (The parentheses are ours and the words within were
crossed out and initialed by Col. Jose C. Maristela, Chief, CIS, who signed appellant's
appointment.)

5 Exhibit 2 reads:

I acknowledged to have received from Captain Adolfo M. Bringas, Inf (PC) ASO, CIS, HPC, the
following property for which I am responsible, subject to the provisions of the Accounting Law,
and will be used in the office of CIS, HPC: 1 Pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag & stock
Total value P40.00 Note: For the use of Agt. Jesus E. Santayana while in the performance of his
official duties. Approved: t/s/ Jose C. Maristela, Colonel, Inf (GSC) Chief, CIS, HPC. ...

6 T.S.N., p. 4, July 30, 1963.

7 L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713. See also People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607.
8 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.