CASES

 IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  I   practically  nullify  the  mandate  of  the  fundamental  law.  This  can  be  cataclysmic.    That  is  why  
  the  prevailing  view  is,  as  it  has  always  been,  that  -­‐  
   
THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES   x   x   x   x   in   case   of   doubt,   the   Constitution   should   be   considered   self-­‐
  executing   rather   than   non-­‐self-­‐executing   x   x   x   x   Unless   the   contrary   is  
Rules  of  Construction  of  Doubts  in  the  Constitution   clearly   intended,   the   provisions   of   the   Constitution   should   be   considered  
  self-­‐executing,  as  a  contrary  rule  would  give  the  legislature  discretion  to  
  Manila  Prince  Hotel  vs.  GSIS  [G.R.  No.  122156,  February  3,  1997]   determine   when,   or   whether,   they   shall   be   effective.     These   provisions  
  would   be   subordinated   to   the   will   of   the   lawmaking   body,   which   could  
  Doctrine  of  Constitutional  Supremacy   make   them   entirely   meaningless   by   simply   refusing   to   pass   the   needed  
  implementing  statute.  
A   constitution   is   a   system   of   fundamental   laws   for   the   governance   and    
administration  of  a  nation.    It  is  supreme,  imperious,  absolute  and  unalterable  except  by  the   Francisco  vs.  House  of  Representatives  [G.R.  No.  160261,  Nov  10,  2003]  
authority  from  which  it  emanates.    It  has  been  defined  as   the  fundamental  and  paramount  
law   of   the   nation.   It   prescribes   the   permanent   framework   of   a   system   of   government,   To   determine   the   merits   of   the   issues   raised   in   the   instant   petitions,   this   Court   must  
assigns   to   the   different   departments   their   respective   powers   and   duties,   and   establishes   necessarily   turn   to   the   Constitution   itself   which   employs   the   well-­‐settled   principles   of  
certain   fixed   principles   on   which   government   is   founded.     The   fundamental   conception   in   constitutional  construction.    
other   words   is   that   it   is   a   supreme   law   to   which   all   other   laws   must   conform   and   in  
accordance   with   which   all   private   rights   must   be   determined   and   all   public   authority  
administered.  Under  the  doctrine  of  constitutional  supremacy,  if  a  law  or  contract  violates   First,   verba   legis,   that   is,   wherever   possible,   the   words   used   in   the   Constitution   must   be  
any  norm  of  the  constitution  that  law  or  contract  whether  promulgated  by  the  legislative  or   given   their   ordinary   meaning   except   where   technical   terms   are   employed.   Thus,   in   J.M.  
by  the  executive  branch  or  entered  into  by  private  persons  for  private  purposes  is  null  and   Tuason  &  Co.,  Inc.  v.  Land  Tenure  Administration,36   this   Court,   speaking   through   Chief   Justice  
void   and   without   any   force   and   effect.     Thus,   since   the   Constitution   is   the   fundamental,   Enrique  Fernando,  declared:  
paramount   and   supreme   law   of   the   nation,   it   is   deemed   written   in   every   statute   and  
contract.   We  look  to  the  language  of  the  document  itself  in  our  search  for  its  
  meaning.   We   do   not   of   course   stop   there,   but   that   is   where   we  
Concept  of  Self-­‐Executing  Provisions   begin.   It   is   to   be   assumed   that   the   words   in   which   constitutional  
  provisions   are   couched   express   the   objective   sought   to   be   attained.  
Admittedly,  some  constitutions  are  merely  declarations  of  policies  and  principles.     They  are  to  be  given  their  ordinary  meaning  except  where  technical  
Their  provisions  command  the  legislature  to  enact  laws  and  carry  out  the  purposes  of  the   terms  are  employed  in  which  case  the  significance  thus  attached  to  
framers   who   merely   establish   an   outline   of   government   providing   for   the   different   them   prevails.  As  the  Constitution  is  not  primarily  a  lawyer's  document,  
departments   of   the   governmental   machinery   and   securing   certain   fundamental   and   it   being   essential   for   the   rule   of   law   to   obtain   that   it   should   ever   be  
inalienable  rights  of  citizens.  A  provision  which  lays  down  a  general  principle,  such  as  those   present  in  the  people's  consciousness,  its  language  as  much  as  possible  
found  in  Art.  II  of  the  1987  Constitution,  is  usually  not  self-­‐executing.    But  a  provision  which   should   be   understood   in   the   sense   they   have   in   common   use.   What   it  
is   complete   in   itself   and   becomes   operative   without   the   aid   of   supplementary   or   enabling   says  according  to  the  text  of  the  provision  to  be  construed  compels  
legislation,  or  that  which  supplies  sufficient  rule  by  means  of  which  the  right  it  grants  may   acceptance   and   negates   the   power   of   the   courts   to   alter   it,   based   on   the  
be  enjoyed  or  protected,  is  self-­‐executing.    Thus  a  constitutional  provision  is  self-­‐executing   postulate   that   the   framers   and   the   people   mean   what   they   say.   Thus  
if   the   nature   and   extent   of   the   right   conferred   and   the   liability   imposed   are   fixed   by   the   these   are   the   cases   where   the   need   for   construction   is   reduced   to   a  
constitution  itself,  so  that  they  can  be  determined  by  an  examination  and  construction  of  its   minimum.37  (Emphasis  and  underscoring  supplied)  
terms,  and  there  is  no  language  indicating  that  the  subject  is  referred  to  the  legislature  for  
action.   Second,   where   there   is   ambiguity,   ratio   legis   est   anima.   The   words   of   the   Constitution  
  should   be   interpreted   in   accordance   with   the   intent   of   its   framers.   And   so   did   this   Court  
As   against   constitutions   of   the   past,   modern   constitutions   have   been   generally   apply  this  principle  in  Civil  Liberties  Union  v.  Executive  Secretary38  in  this  wise:  
drafted  upon  a  different  principle  and  have  often  become  in  effect  extensive  codes  of  laws  
intended   to   operate   directly   upon   the   people   in   a   manner   similar   to   that   of   statutory  
enactments,  and  the  function  of  constitutional  conventions  has  evolved  into  one  more  like   A   foolproof   yardstick   in   constitutional   construction   is   the   intention  
that   of   a   legislative   body.     Hence,   unless   it   is   expressly   provided   that   a   legislative   act   is   underlying   the   provision   under   consideration.   Thus,   it   has   been   held  
necessary  to  enforce  a  constitutional  mandate,  the  presumption  now  is  that  all  provisions  of   that   the   Court   in   construing   a   Constitution   should   bear   in   mind   the  
the  constitution  are  self-­‐executing.    If  the  constitutional  provisions  are  treated  as  requiring   object   sought   to   be   accomplished   by   its   adoption,   and   the   evils,   if   any,  
legislation   instead   of   self-­‐executing,   the   legislature   would   have   the   power   to   ignore   and   sought   to   be   prevented   or   remedied.   A   doubtful   provision   will   be  
  1  
 examined  in  the  light  of  the  history  of  the  times,  and  the  condition  and   In   other   words,   the   court   must   harmonize   them,   if   practicable,   and   must   lean   in  
circumstances  under  which  the  Constitution  was  framed.  The   object   is   favor   of   a   construction   which   will   render   every   word   operative,   rather   than   one  
to   ascertain   the   reason   which   induced   the   framers   of   the   which  may  make  the  words  idle  and  nugatory.45  (Emphasis  supplied)  
Constitution   to   enact   the   particular   provision   and   the   purpose  
sought  to  be  accomplished  thereby,  in  order  to  construe  the  whole   If,  however,  the  plain  meaning  of  the  word  is  not  found  to  be  clear,  resort  to  other  aids  is  
as   to   make   the   words   consonant   to   that   reason   and   calculated   to   available.   In   still   the   same   case   of   Civil   Liberties   Union   v.   Executive   Secretary,   this   Court  
effect  that  purpose.39  (Emphasis  and  underscoring  supplied)   expounded:  

As   it   did   in   Nitafan  v.  Commissioner  on  Internal  Revenue40   where,   speaking   through   Madame   While   it   is   permissible   in   this   jurisdiction   to   consult   the   debates   and  
Justice  Amuerfina  A.  Melencio-­‐Herrera,  it  declared:   proceedings   of   the   constitutional   convention   in   order   to   arrive   at   the  
reason  and  purpose  of  the  resulting  Constitution,  resort   thereto   may   be  
x   x   x   The   ascertainment   of   that   intent   is   but   in   keeping   with   the   had  only  when  other  guides  fail  as  said  proceedings  are  powerless  
fundamental  principle  of  constitutional  construction  that  the  intent   to   vary   the   terms   of   the   Constitution   when   the   meaning   is   clear.  
of   the   framers   of   the   organic   law   and   of   the   people   adopting   it   Debates   in   the   constitutional   convention   "are   of   value   as   showing   the  
should  be  given  effect.   The   primary   task   in   constitutional   construction   views  of  the  individual  members,  and  as  indicating  the  reasons  for  their  
is  to  ascertain  and  thereafter  assure  the  realization  of  the  purpose  of  the   votes,  but  they  give  us  no  light  as  to  the  views  of  the  large  majority  who  
framers   and   of   the   people   in   the   adoption   of   the   Constitution.   It   may   did  not  talk,  much  less  of  the  mass  of  our  fellow  citizens  whose  votes  at  
also  be  safely  assumed  that  the  people  in  ratifying  the  Constitution   the   polls   gave   that   instrument   the   force   of   fundamental   law.   We  think  it  
were   guided   mainly   by   the   explanation   offered   by   the   framers.41   safer   to   construe   the   constitution   from   what   appears   upon   its   face."  
(Emphasis  and  underscoring  supplied)   The   proper   interpretation   therefore   depends   more   on   how   it   was  
understood   by   the   people   adopting   it   than   in   the   framers's  
Finally,  ut  magis  valeat  quam  pereat.  The  Constitution  is  to  be  interpreted  as  a  whole.  Thus,   understanding  thereof.46  (Emphasis  and  underscoring  supplied)  
in  Chiongbian  v.  De  Leon,42  this  Court,  through  Chief  Justice  Manuel  Moran  declared:    
 
Effectivity  of  the  1987  Constitution  
x   x   x   [T]he   members   of   the   Constitutional   Convention   could   not    
have   dedicated   a   provision   of   our   Constitution   merely   for   the     De  Leon  vs.  Esguerra    [G.R.  No.  78059,  August  31,  1987]  
benefit   of   one   person   without   considering   that   it   could   also   affect      
others.   When   they   adopted   subsection   2,   they   permitted,   if   not   1987   CONSTITUTION;   DATE   OF   RATIFICATION;   RETROACTS   ON   THE   DAY   OF   THE  
willed,   that   said   provision   should   function   to   the   full   extent   of   its   PLEBISCITE.   —   The   main   issue   resolved   in   the   judgment   at   bar   is   whether   the   1987  
substance  and  its  terms,  not  by  itself  alone,  but  in  conjunction  with   Constitution  took  effect  on  February  2,  1987,  the  date  that  the  plebiscite  for  its  ratification  
all   other   provisions   of   that   great   document.43   (Emphasis   and   was   held   or   whether   it   took   effect   on   February   11,   1987,   the   date   its   ratification   was  
underscoring  supplied)   proclaimed  per  Proclamation  No.  58  of  the  President  of  the  Philippines,  Corazon  C.  Aquino.  
The   thrust   of   the   dissent   is   that   the   Constitution   should   be   deemed   to   "take   effect   on   the  
Likewise,  still  in  Civil  Liberties  Union  v.  Executive  Secretary,44  this  Court  affirmed  that:   date   its   ratification   shall   have   been   ascertained   and   not   at   the   time   the   people   cast   their  
votes   to   approve   or   reject   it."   This   view   was   actually   proposed   at   the   Constitutional  
It   is   a   well-­‐established   rule   in   constitutional   construction   that   no   Commission   deliberations,   but   was   withdrawn   by   its   proponent   in   the   face   of   the  
one   provision   of   the   Constitution   is   to   be   separated   from   all   the   "overwhelming"  contrary  view  that  the  Constitution  "will  be  effective  on  the  very  day  of  the  
others,   to   be   considered   alone,   but   that   all   the   provisions   bearing   plebiscite."   The   record   of   the   proceedings   and   debates   of   the   Constitutional   Commission  
upon  a  particular  subject  are  to  be  brought  into  view  and  to  be  so   fully   supports   the   Court's   judgment.   It   shows   that   the   clear,   unequivocal   and   express   intent  
interpreted   as   to   effectuate   the   great   purposes   of   the   instrument.   of   the   Constitutional   Commission   in   unanimously   approving   (by   thirty-­‐five   votes   in   favor  
Sections   bearing   on   a   particular   subject   should   be   considered   and   and   none   against)   the   aforequoted   Section   27   of   Transitory   Article   XVIII   of   the   1987  
interpreted   together   as   to   effectuate   the   whole   purpose   of   the   Constitution   was   that   "the   act   of   ratification   is   the   act   of   voting   by   the   people.   So   that   is   the  
Constitution  and  one  section  is  not  to  be  allowed  to  defeat  another,   date   of   the   ratification"   and   that   "the   canvass   thereafter   [of   the   votes]   is   merely   the  
if   by   any   reasonable   construction,   the   two   can   be   made   to   stand   mathematical   confirmation   of   what   was   done   during   the   date   of   the   plebiscite   and   the  
together.   proclamation  of  the  President  is  merely  the  official  confirmatory  declaration  of  an  act  which  
was  actually  done  by  the  Filipino  people  in  adopting  the  Constitution  when  they  cast  their  
votes  on  the  date  of  the  plebiscite."  
 
  2  
The  Court  next  holds  as  a  consequence  of  its  declaration  at  bar  that  the  Constitution  took   —  and  none  has  been  brought  to  our  attention  —  supporting  the  conclusion  drawn  by  the  
effect  on  the  date  of  its  ratification  in  the  plebiscite  held  on  February  2,  1987,  that:  (1)  the   amicus   curiae.   In   fact,   the   term   "or"   has,   oftentimes,   been   held   to   mean   "and,"   or   vice-­‐versa,  
Provisional   Constitution   promulgated   on   March   25,   1986   must   be   deemed   to   have   been   when  the  spirit  or  context  of  the  law  warrants  it.      
superseded   by   the   1987   Constitution   on   the   same   date   February   2,   1987   and   (2)   by   and      
after  said  date,   February  2,  1987,  absent  any  saying  clause  to  the  contrary  in   the   Transitory   It   is,   also,   noteworthy   that   R.B.H.   Nos.   1   and   3   propose   amendments   to   the   constitutional  
Article  of  the  Constitution,  respondent  OIC  Governor  could  no  longer  exercise  the  power  to   provisions   on   Congress,   to   be   submitted   to   the   people   for   ratification   on   November   14,  
replace   petitioners   in   their   positions   as   Barangay   Captain   and   Councilmen.   Hence,   the   1967,   whereas   R.B.H.   No.   2   calls   for   a   convention   in   1971,   to   consider   proposals   for  
attempted   replacement   of   petitioners   by   respondent   OIC   Governor's   designation   on   amendment   to   the   Constitution,   in   general.   In   other   words,   the   subject-­‐   matter   of   R.B.H.   No.  
February   8,   1987   of   their   successors   could   no   longer   produce   any   legal   force   and   effect.   2  is  different  from  that  of  R.B.H.  Nos.  1  and  3.  Moreover,  the  amendments  proposed  under  
While   the   Provisional   Constitution   provided   for   a   one-­‐year   period   expiring   on   March   25,   R.B.H.  Nos.  1  and  3,  will  be  submitted  for  ratification  several  years  before  those  that  may  be  
1987  within  which  the  power  of  replacement  could  be  exercised,  this  period  was  shortened   proposed  by  the  constitutional  convention  called  in  R.B.H.  No.  2.  Again,  although  the  three  
by  the  ratification  and  effectivity  on  February  2,  1987  of  the  Constitution.  Had  the  intention   (3)   resolutions   were   passed   on   the   same   date,   they   were   taken   up   and   put   to   a   vote  
of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  been  otherwise,  they  would  have  so  provided  for  in  the   separately,  or  one  after  the  other.  In  other  words,  they  were  not  passed  at  the  same  time.  
Transitory   Article,   as   indeed   they   provided   for   multifarious   transitory   provisions   in   twenty    
six  sections  of  Article  XVIII,  e.g.  extension  of  the  six-­‐year  term  of  the  incumbent  President   In  any  event,  we  do  not  find,  either  in  the  Constitution,  or  in  the  history  thereof,  anything  
and   Vice-­‐President   to   noon   of   June   30,   1992   for   purposes   of   synchronization   of   elections,   that   would   negate   the   contested   of   different   Congresses   to   approve   the   contested  
the  continued  exercise  of  legislative  powers  by  the  incumbent  President  until  the  convening   Resolutions,  or  of  the  same  Congress  to  pass  the  same  in  different  sessions  or  different  days  
of  the  first  Congress,  etc.   of  the  same  congressional  session.  And,  neither  has  any  plausible  reason  been  advanced  to  
  justify  the  denial  of  authority  to  adopt  said  resolutions  on  the  same  day.  
The  Power  to  Amend  the  Constitution  is  not  included  in  the  General  Legislative  Power    
  Counsel   ask:   Since   Congress   has   decided   to   call   a   constitutional   convention   to   propose  
Gonzales  vs.  COMELEC    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐28196,  November  9,  1967]   amendments,   why   not   let   the   whole   thing   be   submitted   to   said   convention,   instead   of,  
  likewise,  proposing  some  specific  amendments,  to  be  submitted  for  ratification  before  said  
NATURE   OF   POWER   TO   AMEND   THE   CONSTITUTION.   —   The   power   to   amend   the   convention  is  held?  The  force  of  this  argument  must  be  conceded,  but  the  same  impugns  the  
Constitution   or   to   propose,   amendments   thereto   is   not   included   in   the   general   grant   of   wisdom  of  the  action  taken  by  Congress,  not  its  authority  to  take  it.  One  seeming  purpose  
legislative  powers  to  Congress  (Sec.  1,  Art,  VI,  Const.)  It  is  part  of  the  inherent  powers  of  the   thereof   is   to   permit   Members   of   Congress   to   run   for   election   as   delegates   to   the  
people  -­‐  as  the  repository  of  sovereignty  in  a  republican  state,  such  as  ours  (Sec.  1,  Art.  II,   constitutional   convention   and   participate   in   the   proceedings   therein,   without   forfeiting  
Const.)   —   to   make   and   hence,   to   amend   their   own   Fundamental   Law.   Congress   may   their   seats   in   Congress.   Whether   or   nothing   should   be   done   is   a   political   question,   not  
propose   amendments   to   the   Constitution   merely   because   the   same   explicitly   grants   such   subject  to  review  by  the  courts  of  justice.  
power   (Sec.   1,   Art.   XV,   Const.).   Hence,   when   exercising   the   same,   it   is   said   that   Senators   and    
Members   of   the   House   of   Representatives   act,   not   as   members   of   Congress,   but   as   RATIFICATION   OF   THE   CONSTITUTION   MAY   BE   HELD   SIMULTANEOUSLY   IN   A   GENERAL  
component   elements   of   a   constituent   assembly.   When   acting   as   such,   the   members   of   ELECTION.    There  is  in  this  provision  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  "election"  therein  referred  
Congress  derive  their  authority  from  the  Constitution,  unlike  the  people,  when  performing   to  is  a  "special,"  not  a  general  election.  The  circumstance  that  three  previous  amendments  
the  same  function,  for  their  authority  does  not  emanate  from  the  Constitution  -­‐  they  are  the   to   the   Constitution   had   been   submitted   to   the   people   for   ratification   in   special   elections  
very  source  of  all  powers  of  government,  including  the  Constitution  itself.   merely   shows   that   Congress   deemed   it   best   to   do   so   under   the   circumstances   then  
  obtaining.  It  does  not  negate  its  authority  to  submit  proposed  amendments  for  ratification  
POWER  OF  THE  COURT  TO  REVIEW  THE  EXERCISE  OF  THIS  POWER  BY  THE  CONGRESS.  In   in  general  elections.  
short,  the  issue  whether  or  not  a  Resolution  of  Congress  —  acting  as  a  constituent  assembly    
—   violates   the   Constitution,   is   essentially   justiciable,   not   political,   and,   hence,   subject   to   It   would   be   better,   from   the   viewpoint   of   a   thorough   discussion   of   the   proposed  
judicial  review,  and,  to  the  extent  that  this  view  may  be  inconsistent  with  the  stand  taken  in   amendments,   that   the   same   be   submitted   to   the   people's   approval   independently   of   the  
Mabanag  vs.  Lopez  Vito,        the  latter  should  be  deemed  modified  accordingly.  The  Members   election  of  public  officials.  And  there  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  an  adequate  appraisal  of  the  
of  the  Court  are  unanimous  on  this  point.   merits   and   demerits   of   proposed   amendments   is   likely   to   be   overshadowed   by   the   great  
  attention   usually   commanded   by   the   choice   of   personalities   involved   in   general   elections,  
THE   CONGRESS,   ACTING   AS   A   CONSTITUENT   ASSEMBLY   MAY   DIRECTLY   PROPOSE   particularly   when   provincial   and   municipal   officials   are   to   be   chosen.   But,   then,   these  
AMENDMENTS  TO  THE  CONSTITUTION,  AND  SIMULTANEOUSLY  CALL  A  CONSITUTIONAL   considerations  are  addressed  to  the  wisdom  of  holding  a  plebiscite  simultaneously  with  the  
CONVENTION  TO  PROPOSE  THE  NEEDED  AMMENDMENTS.    Atty.  Juan  T.  David,  as  amicus   election   of   public   officers.   They   do   not   deny   the   authority   of   Congress   to   choose   either  
curiae  maintains  that  Congress  may  either  propose  amendments  to  the  Constitution  or  call   alternative,   as   implied   in   the   term   "election"   used,   without   qualification,   in   the   above-­‐
a  convention  for  that  purpose,  but  it  cannot  do  both,  at  the  same  time.  This  theory  is  based   quoted   provision   of   the   Constitution.   Such   authority   becomes   even   more   patent   when   we  
upon   the   fact   that   the   two   (2)   alternatives   are   connected   in   the   Constitution   by   the   consider:   (1)   that   the   term   "election,"   normally   refers   to   the   choice   or   selection   of  
disjunctive  "or."  Such  basis  is,  however,  a  weak  one,  in  the  absence  of  other  circumstances  
  3  
candidates  to  public  office  by  popular  vote;  and  (2)  that  the  word  used  in  Article  V  of  the   amending,   like   all   other   powers   organized   in   the   Constitution,   is   in   form   a   delegated   and  
Constitution  concerning  the  grant  of  suffrage  to  women  is,  not  "election,"  but  "plebiscite."   hence  a  limited  power,  so  that  the  Supreme  Court  is  vested  with  that  authority  to  determine  
  whether  that  power  has  been  discharged  within  its  limits.    
Petitioners   maintain   that   the   term   "election,"   as   used   in   Section   1   of   Art.   XV   of   the    
Constitution,  should  be  construed  as  meaning  a  special  election  Some  members  of  the  Court   Political  questions  are  neatly  associated  with  the  wisdom,  not  the  legality  of  a  particular  act.  
even  feel  that  said  term  ("election")  refers  to  a  "plebiscite,"  without  any  "election,"  general   Where   the   vortex   of   the   controversy   refers   to   the   legality   or   validity   of   the   contested   act,  
or  special,  of  public  officers.  They  opine  that  constitutional  amendments  are,  in  general,  if   that  matter  is  definitely  justiciable  or  non-­‐political.  What  is  in  the  heels  of  the  Court  is  not  
not  always,  of  such  importance,  if  not  transcendental  and  vital  nature  as  to  demand  that  the   the   wisdom   of   the   act   of   the   incumbent   President   in   proposing   amendments   to   the  
attention   of   the   people   be   focused   exclusively   on   the   subject-­‐matter   thereof,   so   that   their   Constitution,  but  his  constitutional  authority  to  perform  such  act  or  to  assume  the  power  of  
votes  thereon  may  reflect  no  more  than  their  intelligent,  impartial  and  considered  view  on   a  constituent  assembly.  Whether  the  amending  process  confers  on  the  President  that  power  
the  merits  of  the  proposed  amendments,  unimpaired,  or,  at  least,  undiluted  by  extraneous,   to  propose  amendments  is  therefore  a  downright  justiciable  question.  Should  the  contrary  
if  not  insidious  factors,  let  alone  the  partisan  political  considerations  that  are  likely  to  affect   be   found,   the   actuation   of   the   President   would   merely   he   a   brutum   fulmen.   If   the  
the  selection  of  elective  officials.   Constitution   provides   how   it   may   be   amended,   the   judiciary   as   the   interpreter   of   that  
  Constitution,   can   declare   whether   the   procedure   followed   or   the   authority   assumed   was  
This,  certainly,  is  a  situation  to  be  hoped  for.  It  is  a  goal  the  attainment  of  which  should  be   valid  or  not.      
promoted.   The   ideal   conditions,   are,   however,   one   thing.   The   question   whether   the    
Constitution  forbids  the  submission  of  proposals  for  amendment  to  the  people  except  under   We   cannot   accept   the   view   of   the   Solicitor   General,   in   pursuing   his   theory   of   non-­‐
such  conditions,  is  another  thing.  Much  as  the  writer  and  those  who  concur  in  this  opinion   justiciability,   that   the   question   of   the   President's   authority   to   propose   amendments   and   the  
admire   the   contrary   view,   they   find   themselves   unable   to   subscribe   thereto   without,   in   regularity   of   the   procedure   adopted   for   submission   of   the   proposals   to   the   people  
effect,   reading   into   the   Constitution   what   they   believe   is   not   written   thereon   and   can   not   ultimately  lie  in  the  judgment  of  the  latter.  A  clear  Descartes  fallacy  of  vicious  circle.  Is  it  not  
fairly  be  deduced  from  the  letter  thereof,  since  the  spirit  of  the  law  should  not  be  a  matter  of   that  the  people  themselves,  by  their  sovereign  act,  provided  for  the  authority  and  procedure  
sheer  speculation.   for   the   amending   process   when   they   ratified   the   present   Constitution   in   1973?   Whether,  
  therefore,   that   constitutional   provision   has   been   followed   or   not   is   indisputably   a   proper  
Sanidad  vs.  COMELEC    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐44640,  October  12,  1976]   subject  of  inquiry,  not  by  the  people  themselves  —  of  course  —  who  exercise  no  power  of  
  judicial   review,   but   by   the   Supreme   Court   in   whom   the   people   themselves   vested   that  
THE   POWER   TO   PROPOSE   AMENDMENTS   TO   THE   CONSTITUTION   IS   A   PURELY   power,   a   power   which   includes   the   competence   to   determine   whether   the   constitutional  
JUSTICEABLE   CONTROVERSY.   -­‐   The   Solicitor   General   would   consider   the   question   at   bar   as   norms  for  amendments  have  been  observed  or  not.  And,  this  inquiry  must  be  done  a  priori  
a  pure  political  one,  lying  outside  the  domain  of  judicial  review.  We  disagree.  The  amending   not  a  posteriori,  i.e.,  before  the  submission  to  and  ratification  by  the  people  
process   both   as   to   proposal   and   ratification,   raises   a   judicial   question.     This   is   especially    
true   in   cases   where   the   power   of   the   Presidency   to   initiate   the   amending   process   by   SINCE   THE   PRESIDENT,   UNDER   THE   1973   CONSTITUTION,   MAY   EXERCISE   LEGISLATIVE  
proposals   of   amendments,   a   function   normally   exercised   by   the   legislature,   is   seriously   POWER,   HE   MAY   LIKEWISE   THEREFORE,   PROPOSE   AMENDMENTS   TO   THE  
doubted.  Under  the  terms  of  the  1973  Constitution,  the  power  to  propose  amendments  to   CONSTITUTION.  -­‐  As  earlier  pointed  out,  the  power  to  legislate  is  constitutionally  consigned  
the   Constitution   resides   in   the   interim   National   Assembly   during   the   period   of   transition   to   the   interim   National   Assembly   during   the   transition   period.   However,   the   initial  
(Sec.  15,  Transitory  Provisions).  After  that  period,  and  the  regular  National  Assembly  in  its   convening   of   that   Assembly   is   a   matter   fully   addressed   to   the   judgment   of   the   incumbent  
active  session,  the  power  to  propose  amendments  becomes  ipso  facto  the  prerogative  of  the   President.  And,  in  the  exercise  of  that  judgment,  the  President  opted  to  defer  convening  of  
regular   National   Assembly   (Sec.   1,   pars.   1   and   2   of   Art.   XVI,   1973   Constitution).   The   normal   that   body   in   utter   recognition   of   the   people's   preference.   Likewise,   in   the   period   of  
course   has   not   been   followed.   Rather   than   calling   the   interim   National   Assembly   to   transition,   the   power   to   propose   amendments   to   the   Constitution   lies   in   the   interim  
constitute   itself   into   a   constituent   assembly,   the   incumbent   President   undertook   the   National   Assembly   upon   special   call   by   the   President   (Sec.   15   of   the   Transitory   Provisions).  
proposal   of   amendments   and   submitted   the   proposed   amendments   thru   Presidential   Again,   harking   to   the   dictates   of   the   sovereign   will,   the   President   decided   not   to   call   the  
Decree   1033   to   the   people   in   a   Referendum-­‐Plebiscite   on   October   16.   Unavoidably,   the   interim  National  Assembly.  Would  it  then  be  within  the  bounds  of  the  Constitution  and  of  
regularity   of   the   procedure   for   amendments,   written   in   lambent   words   in   the   very   law  for  the  President  to  assume  that  constituent  power  of  the  interim  Assembly  vis-­‐a-­‐vis  his  
Constitution   sought   to   be   amended,   raises   a   contestable   issue.   The   implementing   assumption  of  that  body's  legislative  functions?  The  answer  is  yes.  If  the  President  has  been  
Presidential  Decree  Nos.  991,  1031,  and  1033,  which  commonly  purport  to  have  the  force   legitimately  discharging  the  legislative  functions  of  the  interim  Assembly,  there  is  no  reason  
and  effect  of  legislation  are  assailed  as  invalid,  thus  the  issue  of  the  validity  of  said  Decrees   why  he  cannot  validly  discharge  the  function  of  that  Assembly  to  propose  amendments  to  
is  plainly  a  justiciable  one,  within  the  competence  of  this  Court  to  pass  upon.  Section  2  (2)   the  Constitution,  which  is  but  adjunct,  although  peculiar,  to  its  gross  legislative  power.  This,  
Article   X   of   the   new   Constitution   provides:   "All   cases   involving   the   constitutionality   of   a   of   course,   is   not   to   say   that   the   President   has   converted   his   office   into   a   constituent  
treaty,   executive   agreement,   or   law   shall   be   heard   and   decided   by   the   Supreme   Court   en   assembly   of   that   nature   normally   constituted   by   the   legislature.   Rather,   with   the   interim  
banc  and  no  treaty,  executive  agreement,  or  law  may  be  declared  unconstitutional  without   National   Assembly   not   convened   and   only   the   Presidency   and   the   Supreme   Court   in  
the  concurrence  of  at  least  ten  Members.  .  .  .."  The  Supreme  Court  has  the  last  word  in  the   operation,  the  urges  of  absolute  necessity  render  it  imperative  upon  the  President  to  act  as  
construction   not   only   of   treaties   and   statutes,   but   also   of   the   Constitution   itself.     The   agent   for   and   in   behalf   of   the   people   to   propose   amendments   to   the   Constitution.  
  4  
Parenthetically,   by   its   very   constitution,   the   Supreme   Court   possesses   no   capacity   to   necessary  implication  withdrawn  or  removed  by  the  Constitution  from  the  ambit  
propose   amendments   without   constitutional   infractions.   For   the   President   to   shy   away   of   legislative   action.   And   as   long   as   such   statutory   details   do   not   clash   with   any  
from   that   actuality   and   decline   to   undertake   the   amending   process   would   leave   the   specific  provision  of  the  Constitution,  they  are  valid.  
governmental   machinery   at   a   stalemate   or   create   in   the   powers   of   the   State   a   destructive    
vacuum,   thereby   impeding   the   objective   of   a   crisis   government   "to   end   the   crisis   and   4.   Consequently,  when  Congress,  acting  as  a  Constituent  Assembly,  omits  to  provide  
restore   normal   times."   In   these   parlous   times,   that   Presidential   initiative   to   reduce   into   for  such  implementing  details  after  calling  a  constitutional  convention,  Congress,  
concrete   forms   the   constant   voices   of   the   people   reigns   supreme.   After   all,   constituent   acting  as  a  legislative  body,  can  enact  the  necessary  implementing  legislation  to  fill  
assemblies   or   constitutional   conventions,   like   the   President   now,   are   mere   agents   of   the   in   the   gaps,   which   authority   is   expressly   recognized   in   Sec.   8   of   Res.   No.   2   as  
people.   amended  by  Res.  No.  4.  
   
Imbong  vs.  Ferrer,  COMELEC    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐32432,  September  11,  1970]   5.   The  fact  that  a  bill  providing  for  such  implementing  details  may  be  vetoed  by  the  
  President   is   no   argument   against   conceding   such   power   in   Congress   as   a  
THE   CONGRESS,   ACTING   AS   A   CONSTITUENT   ASSEMBLY,   MAY   PROPOSE   AMENDMENTS   legislative   body   nor   present   any   difficulty;   for   it   is   not   irremediable   as   Congress  
TO  THE  CONSTITUTION,  AND  EXERCISING  ITS  GENERAL  LEGISLATIVE  POWER,  PROVIDE   can   override   the   Presidential   veto   or   Congress   can   reconvene   as   a   Constituent  
FOR  THE  DETAILS  OF  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION.  —  The  constitutionality  of  the   Assembly  and  adopt  a  resolution  prescribing  the  required  implementing  details.  
enactment   of   R.A.   6132   by   Congress   must   be   upheld   for   the   following   reasons:   1)   Congress,      
acting  as  Constituent  Assembly  pursuant  to  Article  XV  of  the  Constitution,  has  authority  to   Occena  vs.  COMELEC    [G.R.  No.  56350,  April  2,  1981]  
propose   constitutional   amendments   or   call   a   convention   for   the   purpose   by   3/4   votes   of      
each  house  in  joint  session  assembled  but  voting  separately;  2)  Such  grant  includes  all  other   TO   APPROVE   PROPOSALS   TO   AMEND   THE   CONSTITUTION,   THE   CONSTITUTIONAL  
powers  essential  to  the  effective  exercise  of  the  principal  power  by  necessary  implication;   CONVENTION   ONLY   NEEDS   MAJORITY   VOTE,   SUBJECT   TO   THE   RATIFICATION   BY   THE  
3)   Implementing   details   are   within   the   authority   of   Congress   not   only   as   a   Constituent   PEOPLE.   -­‐   The   Interim   Batasang   Pambansa,   sitting   as   a   constituent   body,   can   propose  
Assembly  but  also  in  the  exercise  of  its  comprehensive  legislative  power  so  long  as  it  does   amendments.   In   that   capacity,   only   a   majority   vote   is   needed.   It   would   be   an   indefensible  
not  contravene  any  provision  of  the  Constitution;  and  4)  Congress  as  a  legislative  body  may   proposition  to  assert  that  the  three-­‐fourth  votes  required  when  it  sits  as  a  legislative  body  
thus   enact   necessary   implementing   legislation   to   fill   in   the   gaps   which   Congress   as   a   applies   as   well   when   it   has   been   convened   as   the   agency   through   which   amendments   could  
Constituent  Assembly  omitted.   be  proposed.  That  is  not  a  requirement  as  far  as  constitutional  convention  is  concerned.  It  is  
  not   a   requirement   either   when,   as   in   this   case,   the   Interim   Batasang   Pambansa   exercises   its  
1.   Congress,   when   acting   as   a   Constituent   Assembly   pursuant   to   Art.   XV   of   the   constituent  power  to  propose  amendments.    
Constitution,   has   full   and   plenary   authority   to   propose   Constitutional    
amendments   or   to   call   a   convention   for   the   purpose,   by   a   three-­‐fourths   vote   of   AMNEDMENT  INCLUDES  REVISION   -­‐  Petitioners  would  urge  upon  us  the  proposition  that  
each   House   in   joint   session   assembled   but   voting   separately.   Resolutions   Nos.   2   the  amendments  proposed  are  so  extensive  in  character  that  they  go  far  beyond  the  limits  
and   4   calling   for   a   constitutional   convention   were   passed   by   the   required   three-­‐ of   the   authority   conferred   on   the   Interim   Batasang   Pambansa   as   successor   of   the   Interim  
fourths  vote.   National  Assembly.  For  them,  what  was  done  was  to  revise  and  not  to  amend.  It  suffices  to  
  quote   from   the   opinion   of   Justice   Makasiar,   speaking   for   the   Court,   in   Del   Rosario   v.  
2.   The  grant  to  Congress  as  a  Constituent  Assembly  of  such  plenary  authority  to  call  a   Commission   on   Elections       to   dispose   of   this   contention.   Thus:   "3.   And   whether   the  
constitutional   convention   includes,   by   virtue   of   the   doctrine   of   necessary   Constitutional   Convention   will   only   propose   amendments   to   the   Constitution   or   entirely  
implication,   all   other   powers   essential   to   the   effective   exercise   of   the   principal   overhaul   the   present   Constitution   and   propose   an   entirely   new   Constitution   based   on   an  
power   granted,   such   as   the   power   to   fix   the   qualifications,   number,   ideology   foreign   to   the   democratic   system,   is   of   no   moment;   because   the   same   will   be  
apportionment,   and   compensation   of   the   delegates   as   well   as   appropriation   of   submitted  to  the  people  for  ratification.  Once  ratified  by  the  sovereign  people,  there  can  be  
funds  to  meet  the  expenses  for  the  election  of  delegates  and  for  the  operation  of   no   debate   about   the   validity   of   the   new   Constitution.   4.   The   fact   that   the   present  
the   Constitutional   Convention   itself,   as   well   as   all   other   implementing   details   Constitution   may   be   revised   and   replaced   with   a   new   one   .   .   .   is   no   argument   against   the  
indispensable   to   a   fruitful   convention.   Resolutions   Nos.   2   and   4   already   embody   validity   of   the   law   because   'amendment'   includes   the   'revision'   or   total   overhaul   of   the  
the  above-­‐mentioned  details,  except  the  appropriation  of  funds.   entire   Constitution.   At   any   rate,   whether   the   Constitution   is   merely   amended   in   part   or  
  revised  or  totally  changed  would  become  immaterial  the  moment  the  same  is  ratified  by  the  
3.   While   the   authority   to   call   a   constitutional   convention   is   vested   by   the   present   sovereign  people."      There  is  here  the  adoption  of  the  principle  so  well-­‐known  in  American  
Constitution  solely  and  exclusively  in  Congress  acting  as  a  Constituent  Assembly,   decisions   as   well   as   legal   texts   that   a   constituent   body   can   propose   anything   but  
the   power   to   enact   the   implementing   details,   which   are   now   contained   in   conclude  nothing.      We  are  not  disposed  to  deviate  from  such  a  principle  not  only  sound  in  
Resolutions  Nos.  2  and  4  as  well  as  in  R.A.  No.  6132,  does  not  exclusively  pertain   theory  but  also  advantageous  in  practice.  
to   Congress   acting   as   a   Constituent   Assembly.   Such   implementing   details   are    
matters   within   the   competence   of   Congress   in   the   exercise   of   its   comprehensive   Tolentino  vs.  COMELEC    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐34150,  October  16,  1971]  
legislative   power,   which   power   encompasses   all   matters   not   expressly   or   by    
  5  
PROPOSED  AMENDMENTS  TO  THE  CONSTITUTION  MUST  BE  SUBMITTED  TO  THE  PEOPLE    
FOR   RATIFICATION   IN   ONE   ELECTION,   PIECE-­‐MEAL   RATIFICATION   IS   NOT   ALLOWED.   -­‐   This  cannot  happen  in  the  case  of  the  amendment  in  question.  Prescinding  already  from  the  
The  ultimate  question,  therefore,  boils  down  to  this:  Is  there  any  limitation  or  condition  in   fact   that   under   Section   3   of   the   questioned   resolution,   it   is   evident   that   no   fixed   frame   of  
Section  1  of  Article  XV  of  the  Constitution  which  is  violated  by  the  act  of  the  Convention  of   reference   is   provided   the   voter,   as   to   what   finally   will   be   concomitant   qualifications   that  
calling  for  a  plebiscite  on  the  sole  amendment  contained  in  Organic  Resolution  No.  1?  The   will  be  required  by  the  final  draft  of  the  constitution  to  be  formulated  by  the  Convention  of  
Court  holds  that  there  is,  and  it  is  the  condition  and  limitation  that  all  the  amendments  to  be   a  voter  to  be  able  to  enjoy  the  right  of  suffrage,  there  are  other  considerations  which  make  
proposed   by   the   same   Convention   must   be   submitted   to   the   people   in   a   single   "election"   or   it  impossible  to  vote  intelligently  on  the  proposed  amendment,  although  it  may  already  be  
plebiscite.   It   being   indisputable   that   the   amendment   now   proposed   to   be   submitted   to   a   observed   that   under   Section   3,   if   a   voter   would   favor   the   reduction   of   the   voting   age   to  
plebiscite   is   only   the   first   amendment   the   Convention   will   propose   We   hold   that   the   eighteen  under  conditions  he  feels  are  needed  under  the  circumstances,  and  he  does  not  see  
plebiscite  being  called  for  the  purpose  of  submitting  the  same  for  ratification  of  the  people   those   conditions   in   the   ballot   nor   is   there   any   possible   indication   whether   they   will   ever   be  
on   November   8,   1971   is   not   authorized   by   Section   1   of   Article   XV   of   the   Constitution,   hence   or  not,  because  Congress  has  reserved  those  for  future  action,  what  kind  of  judgment  can  he  
all  acts  of  the  Convention  and  the  respondent  Comelec  in  that  direction  are  null  and  void.   render  on  the  proposal?  
   
We  have  arrived  at  this  conclusion  for  the  following  reasons:   But   the   situation   actually   before   Us   is   even   worse.   No   one   knows   what   changes   in   the  
  fundamental  principles  of  the  constitution  the  Convention  will  be  minded  to  approve.  To  be  
1.   The   language   of   the   constitutional   provision   aforequoted   is   sufficiently   clear.   It   more  specific,  we  do  not  have  any  means  of  foreseeing  whether  the  right  to  vote  would  be  
says   distinctly   that   either   Congress   sitting   as   a   constituent   assembly   or   a   of   any   significant   value   at   all.   Who   can   say   whether   or   not   later   on   the   Convention   may  
convention   called   for   the   purpose   "may   propose   amendments   to   this   Constitution,   decide   to   provide   for   varying   types   of   voters   for   each   level   of   the   political   units   it   may  
"thus   placing   no   limit   as   to   the   number   of   amendments   that   Congress   or   the   divide   the   country   into.   The   root   of   the   difficulty   in   other   words,   lies   in   that   the   Convention  
Convention   may   propose.   The   same   provision   also   as   definitely   provides   that   is   precisely   on   the   verge   of   introducing   substantial   changes,   if   not   radical   ones,   in   almost  
"such  amendments  shall  be  valid  as  part  of  this  Constitution  when  approved  by  a   every   part   and   aspect   of   the   existing   social   and   political   order   enshrined   in   the   present  
majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  an  election  at  which  the  amendments  are  submitted  to   Constitution.  How  can  a  voter  in  the  proposed  plebiscite  intelligently  determine  the  effect  of  
the  people  for  their  ratification,"  thus  leaving  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  how  many   the   reduction   of   the   voting   age   upon   the   different   institutions   which   the   Convention   may  
"elections"   or   plebiscites   may   be   held   to   ratify   any   amendment   or   amendments   establish  and  of  which  presently  he  is  not  given  any  idea?  
proposed   by   the   same   constituent   assembly   of   Congress   or   convention,   and   the    
provision  unequivocably  says  "an  election"  which  means  only  one.   We   are   certain   no   one   can   deny   that   in   order   that   a   plebiscite   for   the   ratification   of   an  
  amendment   to   the   Constitution   may   be   validly   held,   it   must   provide   the   voter   not   only  
2.   Very   little   reflection   is   needed   for   anyone   to   realize   the   wisdom   and   sufficient  time  but  ample  basis  for  an  intelligent  appraisal  of  the  nature  of  the  amendment  
appropriateness  of  this  provision.  As  already  stated,  amending  the  Constitution  is   per  se  as  well  as  its  relation  to  the  other  parts  of  the  Constitution  with  which  it  has  to  form  a  
as  serious  and  important  an  undertaking  as  constitution  making  itself.  Indeed,  any   harmonious  whole.  In  the  context  of  the  present  state  of  things,  where  the  Convention  has  
amendment  of  the  Constitution  is  as  important  as  the  whole  of  it,  if  only  because   hardly  started  considering  the  merits  of  hundreds,  if  not  thousands,  of  proposals  to  amend  
the  Constitution  has  to  be  an  integrated  and  harmonious  instrument,  if  it  is  to  be   the   existing   Constitution,   to   present   to   the   people   any   single   proposal   or   a   few   of   them  
viable   as   the   framework   of   the   government   it   establishes,   on   the   one   hand,   and   cannot  comply  with  this  requirement.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  present  Constitution  
adequately  formidable  and  reliable  as  the  succinct  but  comprehensive  articulation   does  not  contemplate  in  Section  1  of  Article  XV  a  plebiscite  or  "election"  wherein  the  people  
of   the   rights,   liberties,   ideology,   social   ideals,   and   national   and   nationalistic   are   in   the   dark   as   to   frame   of   reference   they   can   base   their   judgment   on.   We   reject   the  
policies   and   aspirations   of   the   people,   on   the   other.   It   is   inconceivable   how   a   rationalization  that   the  present  Constitution  is   a  possible  frame  of  reference,  for  the  simple  
constitution   worthy   of   any   country   or   people   can   have   any   part   which   is   out   of   reason   that   intervenors   themselves   are   stating   that   the   sole   purpose   of   the   proposed  
tune  with  its  other  parts.   amendment   is   to   enable   the   eighteen   year   olds   to   take   part   in   the   election   for   the  
  ratification  of  the  Constitution  to  be  drafted  by  the  Convention.  In  brief,  under  the  proposed  
A   constitution   is   the   work   of   the   people   thru   its   drafters   assembled   by   them   for   the   plebiscite,  there  can  be,  in  the  language  of  Justice  Sanchez,  speaking  for  the  six  members  of  
purpose.   Once   the   original   constitution   is   approved,   the   part   that   the   people   play   in   its   the  Court  in  Gonzales,  supra,  "no  proper  submission".  
amendment  becomes  harder,  for  when  a  whole  constitution  is  submitted  to  them,  more  or    
less   they   can   assume   its   harmony   as   an   integrated   whole,   and   they   can   either   accept   or    
reject  it  in  its  entirety.  At  the  very  least,  they  can  examine  it  before  casting  their  vote  and     Santiago  vs.  COMELEC    [G.R.  No.  127325,  March  19,  1997]  
determine  for  themselves  from  a  study  of  the  whole  document  the  merits  and  demerits  of    
all  or  any  of  its  parts  and  of  the  document  as  a  whole.  And  so  also,  when  an  amendment  is   PROVISION   ON   THE   RIGHT   OF   THE   PEOPLE   TO   DIRECTLY   PROPOSE   AMENDMENTS   TO  
submitted  to  them  that  is  to  form  part  of  the  existing  constitution,  in  like  fashion  they  can   THE  CONSTITUTION,  NOT  SELF-­‐EXECUTORY.  —  Section  2  of  Article  XVII  of  the  Constitution  
study   with   deliberation   the   proposed   amendment   in   relation   to   the   whole   existing   is   not   self-­‐executory.   In   his   book,   Joaquin   Bernas,   a   member   of   the   1986   Constitutional  
constitution   and   or   any   of   its   parts   and   thereby   arrive   at   an   intelligent   judgment   as   to   its   Commission,   stated:   Without   implementing   legislation   Section   2   cannot   operate.   Thus,  
acceptability.   although  this  mode  of  amending  the  Constitution  is  a  mode  of  amendment  which  bypasses  
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congressional   action,   in   the   last   analysis   it   still   is   dependent   on   congressional   action.   (2)   Delegation   of   emergency   powers   to   the   President   under   Section   23(2)   of  
Bluntly   stated   the   right   of   the   people   to   directly   propose   amendments   to   the   Constitution   Article  VI  of  the  Constitution;  
through   the   system   of   initiative   would   remain   entombed   in   the   cold   niche   of   the   (3)   Delegation  to  the  people  at  large;  
Constitution   until   Congress   provides   for   its   implementation.   Stated   otherwise,   while   the   (4)   Delegation  to  local  governments;  and  
Constitution  has  recognized  or  granted  that  right,  the  people  cannot  exercise  it  if  Congress,   (5)   Delegation  to  administrative  bodies.      
for  whatever  reason,  does  not  provide  for  its  implementation.    
  Empowering   the   COMELEC,   an   administrative   body   exercising   quasi-­‐judicial   functions,   to  
REPUBLIC   ACT   NO.   6735   IS   INSUFFICIENT,   AND   DOES   NOT   COVER   INITIATIVE   ON   THE   promulgate   rules   and   regulations   is   a   form   of   delegation   of   legislative   authority   under   no.   5  
CONSTITUTION.   -­‐   First,   Contrary   to   the   assertion   of   public   respondent   COMELEC,   Section   2   above.  However,  in  every  case  of  permissible  delegation,  there  must  be  a  showing  that  the  
of  the  Act  does  not  suggest  an  initiative  on  amendments  to  the  Constitution.  The  inclusion   delegation   itself   is   valid.   It   is   valid   only   if   the   law   (a)   is   complete   in   itself,   setting   forth  
of   the   word   "Constitution"   therein   was   a   delayed   afterthought.   That   word   is   neither   therein  the  policy  to  be  executed,  carried  out,  or  implemented  by  the  delegate;  and  (b)  fixes  
germane  nor  relevant  to  said  section,  which  exclusively  relates  to  initiative  and  referendum   a  standard  —  the  limits  of  which  are  sufficiently  determinate  and  determinable  —  to  which  
on   national   laws   and   local   laws,   ordinances,   and   resolutions.   That   section   is   silent   as   to   the  delegate  must  conform  in  the  performance  of  his  functions.  A  sufficient  standard  is  one  
amendments   on   the   Constitution.   As   pointed   out   earlier,   initiative   on   the   Constitution   is   which  defines  legislative  policy,  marks  its  limits,  maps  out  its  boundaries  and  specifies  the  
confined  only  to  proposals  to  AMEND.  The  people  are  not  accorded  the  power  to  "directly   public   agency   to   apply   it.   It   indicates   the   circumstances   under   which   the   legislative  
propose,   enact,   approve,   or   reject,   in   whole   or   in   part,   the   Constitution"   through   the   system   command  is  to  be  effected.  
of   initiative.   They   can   only   do   so   with   respect   to   "laws,   ordinances,   or   resolutions."'   .   .   .    
Second.   It   is   true   that   Section   3   (Definition   of   Terms)   of   the   Act   defines   initiative   on   It   logically   follows   that   the   COMELEC   cannot   validly   promulgate   rules   and   regulations   to  
amendments   to   the   Constitution   and   mentions   it   as   one   of   the   three   systems   of   initiative,   implement   the   exercise   of   the   right   of   the   people   to   directly   propose   amendments   to   the  
and   that   Section   5   (Requirements)   restates   the   constitutional   requirements   as   to   the   Constitution   through   the   system   of   initiative.   It   does   not   have   that   power   under   R.A.   No.  
percentage   of   the   registered   voters   who   must   submit   the   proposal.   But   unlike   in   the   case   of   6735.   Reliance   on   the   COMELEC's   power   under   Section   2(1)   of   Article   IX-­‐C   of   the  
the   other   systems   of   initiative,   the   Act   does   not   provide   for   the   contents   of   a   petition   for   Constitution   is   misplaced,   for   the   laws   and   regulations   referred   to   therein   are   those  
initiative   on   the   Constitution.   Section   5   paragraph   (c)   requires,   among   other   things,   a   promulgated  by  the  COMELEC  under  (a)  Section  3  of  Article  IX-­‐C  of  the  Constitution,  or  (b)  a  
statement   of   the   proposed   law   sought   to   be   enacted,   approve   or   rejected,   amended   or   law   where   subordinate   legislation   is   authorized  and  which  satisfies  the  "completeness"  and  
repealed,  as  the  case  may  be.  It  does  not  include,  as  among  the  contents  of  the  petition,  the   the  "sufficient  standard"  tests.  
provisions   of   the   Constitution   sought   to   be   amended,   in   the   case   of   initiative   on   the    
Constitution.   .   .   .   The   use   of   the   clause   "proposed   laws   sought   to   be   enacted,   approved   or     Lambino  vs.  COMELEC    [G.R.  No.  174153,  October  25,  2006]  
rejected,   amended   or   repealed"   only   strengthens   the   conclusion   that   Section   2,   quoted    
earlier,   excludes   initiative   on   amendments   to   the   Constitution.   Third.   While   the   Act   PETITION   FOR   INITIATIVE   TO   PROPOSE   AMENDMENTS   TO   THE   CONSTITUTION   MUST  
provides   subtitles   for   National   Initiative   and   Referendum   (Subtitle,   II)   and   for   Local   CONTAIN   THE   PROPOSED   AMENDMENTS.     -­‐   Clearly,   the   framers   of   the   Constitution  
Initiative   and   Referendum   (Subtitle   III),   no   subtitle   is   provided   for   initiative   on   the   intended  that  the  "draft  of  the  proposed  constitutional  amendment"  should  be  "ready  and  
Constitution.  This  conspicuous  silence  as  to  the  latter  simply  means  that  the  main  thrust  of   shown"   to   the   people   "before"   they   sign   such   proposal.   The   framers   plainly   stated   that  
the  Act  is  initiative  and  referendum  on  national  and  local  laws.  If  Congress  intended  R.A.  No.   "before   they   sign   there   is   already   a   draft   shown   to   them."   The   framers   also   "envisioned"  
6735   to   fully   provide   for   the   implementation   of   the   initiative   on   amendments   to   the   that   the   people   should   sign   on   the   proposal   itself   because   the   proponents   must   "prepare  
Constitution,  it  could  have  provided  for  a  subtitle  therefor,  considering  that  in  the  order  of   that  proposal  and  pass  it  around  for  signature."  
things,   the   primacy   of   interest,   or   hierarchy   of   values,   the   right   of   the   people   to   directly    
propose   amendments   to   the   Constitution   is   far   more   important   than   the   initiative   on   The   essence   of   amendments   "directly   proposed   by   the   people   through   initiative   upon   a  
national  and  local  laws.  .  .  .  The  foregoing  brings  us  to  the  conclusion  that  R.A.  No.  6735  is   petition"  is  that  the  entire  proposal  on  its  face  is  a  petition  by  the  people.  This  means  two  
incomplete,  inadequate,  or  wanting  in  essential  terms  and  conditions  insofar  as  initiative  on   essential  elements  must  be  present.  First,  the  people  must  author  and  thus  sign  the  entire  
amendments   to   the   Constitution   is   concerned.   Its   lacunae   on   this   substantive   matter   are   proposal.  No  agent  or  representative  can  sign  on  their  behalf.  Second,  as  an  initiative  upon  a  
fatal   and.   cannot   be   cured   by   "empowering"   the   COMELEC   "to   promulgate   such   rules   and   petition,  the  proposal  must  be  embodied  in  a  petition.  
regulations  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  [the]  Act."    
  These   essential   elements   are   present   only   if   the   full   text   of   the   proposed   amendments   is  
THE  CONGRESS  CANNOT  DELEGATE  TO  OTHER  AGENCIES  THE  POWER  TO  PROVIDE  FOR   first  shown  to  the  people  who  express  their  assent  by  signing  such  complete  proposal  in  a  
THE   EXERCISE   OF   THE   RIGHT   OF   INITIATIVE   ON   THE   CONSTITUTION.   -­‐   The   rule   is   that   petition.  Thus,  an  amendment  is  "directly  proposed  by  the  people  through  initiative  upon  a  
what   has   been   delegated,   cannot   be   delegated   or   as   expressed   in   a   Latin   maxim:   potestas   petition"   only   if   the   people   sign   on   a   petition   that   contains   the   full   text   of   the   proposed  
delegata  non  delegari  potest.  59  The  recognized  exceptions  to  the  rule  are  as  follows:   amendments.  
   
(1)   Delegation   of   tariff   powers   to   the   President   under   Section   28(2)   of   The   full   text   of   the   proposed   amendments   may   be   either   written   on   the   face   of   the   petition,  
Article  VI  of  the  Constitution;   or  attached  to  it.  If  so  attached,  the  petition  must  state  the  fact  of  such  attachment.  This  is  an  
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assurance  that  every  one  of  the  several  millions  of  signatories  to  the  petition  had  seen  the   [T]he   very   term   "constitution"   implies   an   instrument   of   a   permanent   and   abiding   nature,  
full  text  of  the  proposed  amendments  before  signing.  Otherwise,  it  is  physically  impossible,   and  the  provisions  contained  therein  for  its  revision  indicate  the  will  of  the  people  that  the  
given  the  time  constraint,  to  prove  that  every  one  of  the  millions  of  signatories  had  seen  the   underlying   principles   upon   which   it   rests,   as   well   as   the   substantial   entirety   of   the  
full  text  of  the  proposed  amendments  before  signing.   instrument,   shall   be   of   a   like   permanent   and   abiding   nature.   On   the   other   hand,   the  
  significance  of  the  term  "amendment"  implies  such  an  addition  or  change  within  the  lines  of  
Moreover,   "an   initiative   signer   must   be   informed   at   the   time   of   signing   of   the   nature   and   the  original  instrument  as  will  effect  an  improvement,  or  better  carry  out  the  purpose  for  
effect  of  that  which  is  proposed"  and  failure  to  do  so  is  "deceptive  and  misleading"  which   which  it  was  framed.  
renders  the  initiative  void.      
  Revision   broadly   implies   a   change   that   alters   a   basic   principle   in   the   constitution,   like  
Section  2,  Article  XVII  of  the  Constitution  does  not  expressly  state  that   the  petition  must  set   altering  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  or  the  system  of  checks-­‐and-­‐balances.  There  
forth  the  full  text  of  the  proposed  amendments.  However,  the  deliberations  of  the  framers   is  also  revision  if  the  change  alters  the  substantial  entirety  of  the  constitution,  as  when  the  
of  our  Constitution  clearly  show  that  the  framers  intended  to  adopt  the  relevant  American   change   affects   substantial   provisions   of   the   constitution.   On   the   other   hand,   amendment  
jurisprudence   on   people's   initiative.   In   particular,   the   deliberations   of   the   Constitutional   broadly  refers  to  a  change  that  adds,  reduces,  or  deletes  without  altering  the  basic  principle  
Commission   explicitly   reveal   that   the   framers   intended   that   the   people   must   first   see   the   involved.   Revision   generally   affects   several   provisions   of   the   constitution,   while  
full  text  of  the  proposed  amendments  before  they  sign,  and  that  the  people  must  sign  on  a   amendment  generally  affects  only  the  specific  provision  being  amended.  
petition   containing   such   full   text.   Indeed,   Section   5(b)   of   Republic   Act   No.   6735,   the    
Initiative   and   Referendum   Act   that   the   Lambino   Group   invokes   as   valid,   requires   that   the   In   California   where   the   initiative   clause   allows   amendments   but   not   revisions   to   the  
people  must  sign  the  "petition  .  .  .  as  signatories."   constitution   just   like   in   our   Constitution,   courts   have   developed   a   two-­‐part   test:   the  
  quantitative  test  and  the  qualitative  test.  The  quantitative  test  asks  whether  the  proposed  
An  initiative  that  gathers  signatures  from  the  people  without  first  showing  to  the  people  the   change  is  "so  extensive  in  its  provisions  as  to  change  directly  the  'substantial  entirety'  of  the  
full   text   of   the   proposed   amendments   is   most   likely   a   deception,   and   can   operate   as   a   constitution   by   the   deletion   or   alteration   of   numerous   existing   provisions."     The   court  
gigantic  fraud  on  the  people.  That  is  why  the  Constitution  requires  that  an  initiative  must  be   examines   only   the   number   of   provisions   affected   and   does   not   consider   the   degree   of   the  
"directly  proposed  by  the  people  .  .  .  in  a  petition"  —  meaning  that  the  people  must  sign  on  a   change.  
petition   that   contains   the   full   text   of   the   proposed   amendments.   On   so   vital   an   issue   as    
amending   the   nation's   fundamental   law,   the   writing   of   the   text   of   the   proposed   The   qualitative   test   inquires   into   the   qualitative   effects   of   the   proposed   change   in   the  
amendments   cannot   be   hidden   from   the   people   under   a   general   or   special   power   of   constitution.   The   main   inquiry   is   whether   the   change   will   "accomplish   such   far   reaching  
attorney  to  unnamed,  faceless,  and  unelected  individuals.   changes   in   the   nature   of   our   basic   governmental   plan   as   to   amount   to   a   revision."     Whether  
  there   is   an   alteration   in   the   structure   of   government   is   a   proper   subject   of   inquiry.   Thus,   "a  
The  Constitution  entrusts  to  the  people  the  power  to  directly  propose  amendments  to  the   change  in  the  nature  of  [the]  basic  governmental  plan"  includes  "change  in  its  fundamental  
Constitution.  This  Court  trusts  the  wisdom  of  the  people  even  if  the  members  of  this  Court   framework  or  the  fundamental  powers  of  its  Branches."    A  change  in  the  nature  of  the  basic  
do   not   personally   know   the   people   who   sign   the   petition.   However,   this   trust   emanates   governmental   plan   also   includes   changes   that   "jeopardize   the   traditional   form   of  
from  a  fundamental  assumption:  the  full  text  of  the  proposed  amendment  is  first  shown  to   government  and  the  system  of  check  and  balances."    
the  people  before  they  sign  the  petition,  not  after  they  have  signed  the  petition.      
  Under   both   the   quantitative   and   qualitative   tests,   the   Lambino   Group's   initiative   is   a  
INTIATIVE   CAN   ONLY   BE   EXERCISED   TO   PROPOSE   AMENDMENTS   TO   THE   revision   and   not   merely   an   amendment.   Quantitatively,   the   Lambino   Group's   proposed  
CONSTITUTION,   AND   NOT   REVISION.   -­‐   This   Court,   whose   members   are   sworn   to   defend   changes   overhaul   two   articles   —   Article   VI   on   the   Legislature   and   Article   VII   on   the  
and   protect   the   Constitution,   cannot   shirk   from   its   solemn   oath   and   duty   to   insure   Executive  —  affecting  a  total  of  105  provisions  in  the  entire  Constitution.  40  Qualitatively,  
compliance   with   the   clear   command   of   the   Constitution   —   that   a   people's   initiative   may   the   proposed   changes   alter   substantially   the   basic   plan   of   government,   from   presidential   to  
only  amend,  never  revise,  the  Constitution.   parliamentary,  and  from  a  bicameral  to  a  unicameral  legislature.  
   
The  question  is,  does  the  Lambino  Group's  initiative  constitute  an  amendment  or  revision  of   A   change   in   the   structure   of   government   is   a   revision   of   the   Constitution,   as   when   the   three  
the  Constitution?  If  the  Lambino  Group's  initiative  constitutes  a  revision,  then  the  present   great   co-­‐equal   branches   of   government   in   the   present   Constitution   are   reduced   into   two.  
petition   should   be   dismissed   for   being   outside   the   scope   of   Section   2,   Article   XVII   of   the   This  alters  the  separation  of  powers  in  the  Constitution.  A  shift  from  the  present  Bicameral-­‐
Constitution.   Presidential  system  to  a  Unicameral-­‐Parliamentary  system  is  a  revision  of  the  Constitution.  
  Merging   the   legislative   and   executive   branches   is   a   radical   change   in   the   structure   of  
Courts   have   long   recognized   the   distinction   between   an   amendment   and   a   revision   of   a   government.  
constitution.   One   of   the   earliest   cases   that   recognized   the   distinction   described   the    
fundamental  difference  in  this  manner:   The  abolition  alone  of  the  Office  of  the  President  as  the  locus  of  Executive  Power  alters  the  
  separation   of   powers   and   thus   constitutes   a   revision   of   the   Constitution.   Likewise,   the  

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abolition  alone  of  one  chamber  of  Congress  alters  the  system  of  checks-­‐and-­‐balances  within   conditions   of   a   legal   order   and   to   enter   into   international   relations.     With   the   latter  
the  legislature  and  constitutes  a  revision  of  the  Constitution.   requisite  satisfied,  international  law  do  not  exact  independence  as  a  condition  of  statehood.  
  So  Hyde  did  opine.  
By   any   legal   test   and   under   any   jurisdiction,   a   shift   from   a   Bicameral-­‐Presidential   to   a    
Unicameral-­‐Parliamentary   system,   involving   the   abolition   of   the   Office   of   the   President   and     Bacani  vs.  NACOCO  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐9657,  November  29,  1956]  
the   abolition   of   one   chamber   of   Congress,   is   beyond   doubt   a   revision,   not   a   mere    
amendment.   On   the   face   alone   of   the   Lambino   Group's   proposed   changes,   it   is   readily   FUNCTIONS   OF   THE   GOVERNMENT;   CONSTITUENT   AND   MINISTRANT.   -­‐   To   begin   with,   we  
apparent  that  the  changes  will  radically  alter  the  framework  of  government  as  set  forth  in   state   that   the   term   "Government"   may   be   defined   as   "that   institution   or   aggregate   of  
the   Constitution.   Father   Joaquin   Bernas,   S.J.,   a   leading   member   of   the   Constitutional   institutions   by   which   an   independent   society   makes   and   carries   out   those   rules   of   action  
Commission,  writes:   which  are  necessary  to  enable  men  to  live  in  a  social  state,  or  which  are  imposed  upon  the  
  people   forming   that   society   by   those   who   possess   the   power   or   authority   of   prescribing  
An   amendment   envisages   an   alteration   of   one   or   a   few   specific   and   them"   (U.S.   vs.   Dorr,   2   Phil.,   332).   This   institution,   when   referring   to   the   national  
separable  provisions.  The  guiding  original  intention  of  an  amendment  is   government,   has   reference   to   what   our   Constitution   has   established   composed   of   three  
to  improve  specific  parts  or  to  add  new  provisions  deemed  necessary  to   great   departments,   the   legislative,   executive,   and   the   judicial,   through   which   the   powers  
meet   new   conditions   or   to   suppress   specific   portions   that   may   have   and   functions   of   government   are   exercised.   These   functions   are   twofold:   constituent   and  
become   obsolete   or   that   are   judged   to   be   dangerous.   In   revision,   ministrant.   The   former   are   those   which   constitute   the   very   bonds   of   society   and   are  
however,   the   guiding   original   intention   and   plan   contemplates   a   re-­‐ compulsory  in  nature;  the  latter  are  those  that  are  undertaken  only  by  way  of  advancing  the  
examination   of   the   entire   document,   or   of   provisions   of   the   document   general   interests   of   society,   and   are   merely   optional.   President   Wilson   enumerates   the  
which   have   over-­‐all   implications   for   the   entire   document,   to   determine   constituent  functions  as  follows:  
how   and   to   what   extent   they   should   be   altered.   Thus,   for   instance   a    
switch   from   the   presidential   system   to   a   parliamentary   system   would   be   (1)   The   keeping   of   order   and   providing   for   the   protection   of   persons   and  
a   revision   because   of   its   over-­‐all   impact   on   the   entire   constitutional   property  from  violence  and  robbery.  
structure.   So   would   a   switch   from   a   bicameral   system   to   a   unicameral   (2)   The   fixing   of   the   legal   relations   between   man   and   wife   and   between  
system   be   because   of   its   effect   on   other   important   provisions   of   the   parents  and  children.  
Constitution.   (3)   The  regulation  of  the  holding,  transmission,  and  interchange  of  property,  
  and  the  determination  of  its  liabilities  for  debt  or  for  crime.  
  Republic  Act  No.  6735   (4)   The  determination  of  contract  rights  between  individuals.  
  COMELEC  Resolution  No.  2300   (5)   The  definition  and  punishment  of  crime.  
  (6)   The  administration  of  justice  in  civil  cases.  
THE  CONCEPT  OF  THE  STATE   (7)   The   determination   of   the   political   duties,   privileges,   and   relations   of  
  citizens.  
Collector  of  Internal  Revenue  vs.  Campos  Rueda  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐13250,  Oct  29,  1971]   (8)   Dealings   of   the   state   with   foreign   powers:   the   preservation   of   the   state  
  from   external   danger   or   encroachment   and   the   advancement   of   its  
FOREIGN  COUNTRY  IS  DIFFERENT  FROM  A  STATE;  A  FOREIGN  COUNTRY  DOES  NOT  NEED   international   interests.'"   (Malcolm,   The   Government   of   the   Philippine  
TO  POSSESS  THE  ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS  OF  A  STATE.    It  does  not  admit  of  doubt  that  if  a   Islands,  p.  19.)  
foreign   country   is   to   be   identified   with   a   state,   it   is   required   in   line   with   Pound's    
formulation  that  it  be  a  politically  organized  sovereign  community  independent  of  outside   The  most  important  of  the  ministrant  functions  are:  public  works,  public  education,  public  
control   bound   by   penalties   of   nationhood,   legally   supreme   within   its   territory,   acting   charity,  health  and  safety  regulations,  and  regulations  of  trade  and  industry.  The  principles  
through   a   government   functioning   under   a   regime   of     determining   whether   or   not   a   government   shall   exercise   certain   of   these   optional   functions  
law.     It   is   thus   a   sovereign   person   with   the   people   composing   it   viewed   as   an   organized   are:   (1)   that   a   government   should   do   for   the   public   welfare   those   things   which   private  
corporate  society  under  a  government  with  the  legal  competence  to  exact  obedience  to  its   capital   would   not   naturally   undertake   and   (2)   that   a   government   should   do   these   things  
commands.   It   has   been   referred   to   as   a   body-­‐politic   organized   by   common   consent   for   which   by   its   very   nature   it   is   better   equipped   to   administer   for   the   public   welfare   than   is  
mutual  defense  and  mutual  safety  and  to  promote  the  general  welfare.  Correctly  has  it  been   any  private  individual  or  group  of  individuals.  (Malcolm,  The  Government  of  the  Philippine  
described   by   Esmein   as   "the   juridical   personification   of   the   nation."     This   is   to   view   it   in   the   Islands,  pp.  19-­‐20.)  
light   of   its   historical   development.   The   stress   is   on   its   being   a   nation,   its   people   occupying   a    
definite   territory,   politically   organized,   exercising   by   means   of   its   government   its   sovereign   From   the   above   we   may   infer   that,   strictly   speaking,   there   are   functions   which   our  
will   over   the   individuals   within   it   and   maintaining   its   separate   international   personality.   government   is   required   to   exercise   to   promote   its   objectives   as   expressed   in   our  
Laski   could   speak   of   it   then   as   a   territorial   society   divided   into   government   and   subjects,   Constitution  and  which  are  exercised  by  it  as  an  attribute  of  sovereignty,  and  those  which  it  
claiming   within   its   allotted   area   a   supremacy   over   all   other   institutions.     McIver   similarly   may   exercise   to   promote   merely   the   welfare,   progress   and   prosperity   of   the   people.   To   this  
would  point  to  the  power  entrusted  to  its  government  to  maintain  within  its  territory  the   latter   class   belongs   the   organization   of   those   corporations   owned   or   controlled   by   the  
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government   to   promote   certain   aspects   of   the   economic   life   of   our   people   such   as   the    
National   Coconut   Corporation.   These   are   what   we   call   government-­‐owned   or   controlled   "In   its   more   general   sense   the   phrase   'municipal   corporation'   may  
corporations   which   may   take   on   the   form   of   a   private   enterprise   or   one   organized   with   include  both  towns  and  counties,  and  other  public  corporations  created  
powers  and  formal  characteristics  of  a  private  corporations  under  the  Corporation  Law.   by   government   for   political   purposes.   In   its   more   common   and   limited  
  signification,   it   embraces   only   incorporated   villages,   towns   and   cities.  
GOVERNMENT-­‐OWNED   AND   CONTROLLED   CORPORATIONS   ARE   NOT   GOVERNMENT   Dunn   vs.   Court   of   County   Revenues,   85   Ala.   144,   146,   4   So.   661."  
ENTITIES.  -­‐  The  question  that  now  arises  is:  Does  the  fact  that  these  corporations  perform   (McQuillin,  Municipal  Corporations,  2nd  ed.,  Vol.  1,  p.  385.)  
certain  functions  of  government  make  them  a  part  of  the  Government  of  the  Philippines?    
  "We  may,  therefore,  define  a  municipal  corporation  in  its  historical  and  
The  answer  is  simple:  they  do  not  acquire  that  status  for  the  simple  reason  that  they  do  not   strict  sense  to  be  the  incorporation,  by  the  authority  of  the  government,  
come   under   the   classification   of   municipal   or   public   corporation.   Take   for   instance   the   of  the  inhabitants  of  a  particular  place  or  district,  and  authorizing  them  
National   Coconut   Corporation.   While   it   was   organized   with   the   purpose   of   "adjusting   the   in   their   corporate   capacity   to   exercise   subordinate   specified   powers   of  
coconut  industry  to  a  position  independent  of  trade  preferences  in  the  United  States"  and  of   legislation   and   regulation   with   respect   to   their   local   and   internal  
providing   "Facilities   for   the   better   curing   of   copra   products   and   the   proper   utilization   of   concerns.  This  power  of  local  government  is  the  distinctive  purpose  and  
coconut  by-­‐products",  a  function  which  our  government  has  chosen  to  exercise  to  promote   the   distinguishing   feature   of   a   municipal   corporation   proper."   (Dillon,  
the  coconut  industry,  however,  it  was  given  a  corporate  power  separate  and  distinct  from   Municipal  Corporations,  5th  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  59.)  
our  government,  for  it  was  made  subject  to  the  provisions  of  our  Corporation  Law  in  so  far    
as  its  corporate  existence  and  the  powers  that  it  may  exercise  are  concerned  (sections  2  and    
4,   Commonwealth   Act   No.   518).   It   may   sue   and   be   sued   in   the   same   manner   as   any   other     Philippine  Virginia  Tobacco  Adm.  vs.  CIR    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐32052,  July  25,  1975]  
private   corporations,   and   in   this   sense   it   is   an   entity   different   from   our   government.   As   this      
Court   has   aptly   said,   "The   mere   fact   that   the   Government   happens   to   be   a   majority   THE   PROMOTION   OF   GENERAL   WELFARE   IS   A   GOVERNMENT   FUNCTION,   REPUDIATION  
stockholder   does   not   make   it   a   public   corporation"   (National   Coal   Co.   vs.   Collector   of   OF   THE   CONCEPT   OF   LAISSEZ   FAIRE.   -­‐   The   growing   complexities   of   modern   society,  
Internal   Revenue,   46   Phil.,   586-­‐587).   "By   becoming   a   stockholder   in   the   National   Coal   however,  have  rendered  this  traditional  classification  of  the  functions  of  government  quite  
Company,   the   Government   divested   itself   of   its   sovereign   character   so   far   as   respects   the   unrealistic,   not   to   say   obsolete.   The   areas   which   used   to   be   left   to   private   enterprise   and  
transactions   of   the   corporation.   .   .   .   Unlike   the   Government,   the   corporation   may   be   sued   initiative   and   which   the   government   was   called   upon   to   enter   optionally,   and   only   'because  
without   its   consent,   and   is   subject   to   taxation.   Yet   the   National   Coal   Company   remains   an   it   was   better   equipped   to   administer   for   the   public   welfare   than   is   any   private   individual   or  
agency   or   instrumentality   of   government."   (Government   of   the   Philippine   Islands   vs.   group   of   individuals,'   continue   to   lose   their   well-­‐defined   boundaries   and   to   be   absorbed  
Springer,  50  Phil.,  288.)   within   activities   that   the   government   must   undertake   in   its   sovereign   capacity   if   it   is   to  
  meet   the   increasing   social   challenges   of   the   times.   Here   as   almost   everywhere   else   the  
To   recapitulate,   we   may   mention   that   the   term   "Government   of   the   Republic   of   the   tendency   is   undoubtedly   towards   a   greater   socialization   of   economic   forces.   Here   of   course  
Philippines"   used   in   section   2   of   the   Revised   Administrative   Code   refers   only   to   that   this  development  was  envisioned,  indeed  adopted  as  a  national  policy,  by  the  Constitution  
government   entity   through   which   the   functions   of   the   government   are   exercised   as   an   itself  in  its  declaration  of  principle  concerning  the  promotion  of  social  justice."      Thus  was  
attribute   of   sovereignty,   and   in   this   are   included   those   arms   through   which   political   laid  to  rest  the  doctrine  in  Bacani  v.  National  Coconut  Corporation,  based  on  the  Wilsonian  
authority   is   made   effective   whether   they   be   provincial,   municipal   or   other   form   of   local   classification   of   the   tasks   incumbent   on   government   into   constituent   and   ministrant   in  
government.   These   are   what   we   call   municipal   corporations.   They   do   not   include   accordance  with  the  laissez  faire  principle.  That  concept,  then  dominant  in  economics,  was  
government   entities   which   are   given   a   corporate   personality   separate   and   distinct   from   the   carried   into   the   governmental   sphere,   as   noted   in   a   textbook   on   political   science,   the   first  
government   and   which   are   governed   by   the   Corporation   Law.   Their   powers,   duties   and   edition   of   which   was   published   in   1898,   its   author   being   the   then   Professor,   later   American  
liabilities   have   to   be   determined   in   the   light   of   that   law   and   of   their   corporate   charters.   President,   Woodrow   Wilson.   He   took   pains   to   emphasize   that   what   was   categorized   by   him  
They  do  not  therefore  come  within  the  exemption  clause  prescribed  in  section  16,  Rule  130   as   constituent   functions   had   its   basis   in   a   recognition   of   what   was   demanded   by   the  
of  our  Rules  of  Court.   "strictest   [concept   of]   laissez   faire,   [as   they]   are   indeed   the   very   bonds   of   society."       The  
  other  functions  he  would  minimize  as  ministrant  or  optional.  
"Public  corporations  are  those  formed  or  organized  for  the  government    
of  a  portion  of  the  State."  (Section  3,  Republic  Act  No.  1459,  Corporation   It  is  a  matter  of  law  that  in  the  Philippines,  the  laissez  faire  principle  hardly  commanded  the  
Law).   authoritative   position   which   at   one   time   it   held   in   the   United   States.   As   early   as   1919,  
  Justice   Malcolm   in   Rubi   v.   Provincial   Board,       could   affirm:   "The   doctrines   of   laissez   faire  
"'The   generally   accepted   definition   of   a   municipal   corporation   would   and   of   unrestricted   freedom   of   the   individual,   as   axioms   of   economic   and   political   theory,  
only   include   organized   cities   and   towns,   and   like   organizations,   with   are  of  the  past.  The  modern  period  has  shown  a  widespread  belief  in  the  amplest  possible  
political  and  legislative  powers  for  the  local,  civil  government  and  police   demonstration   of   government   activity."     The   1935   Constitution,   as   was   indicated   earlier,  
regulations   of   the   inhabitants   of   the   particular   district   included   in   the   continued   that   approach.   As   noted   in   Edu   v.   Ericta:     "What   is   more,   to   erase   any   doubts,   the  
boundaries  of  the  corporation.'  Heller  vs.  Stremmel,  52  Mo.  309,  312."   Constitutional   Convention   saw   to   it   that   the   concept   of   laissez-­‐faire   was   rejected.   It  
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entrusted   to   our   government   the   responsibility   of   coping   with   social   and   economic   of   its   general   superintending   authority   over   the   public   interests,   where  
problems  with  the  commensurate  power  of  control  over  economic  affairs.  Thereby  it  could   no  other  person  is  entrusted  with  it."  (4  Kent  Com.,  508,  note.)    
live  up  to  its  commitment  to  promote  the  general  welfare  through  state  action."      Nor  did    
the  opinion  in  Edu  stop  there:  "To  repeat,  our  Constitution  which  took  effect  in  1935  erased   The   Supreme   Court   of   the   United   States   in   Mormon   Church   vs.   United   States,   supra,   after  
whatever   doubts   there   might   be   on   that   score.   Its   philosophy   is   a   repudiation   of   laissez-­‐ approving  also  the  last  quotations,  said:  
faire.  One  of  the  leading  members  of  the  Constitutional  Convention,  Manuel  A.  Roxas,  later    
the   first   President   of   the   Republic,   made   it   clear   when   he   disposed   of   the   objection   of   "This  prerogative  of    parens  partiae  is  inherent  in  the  supreme  power  of  
Delegate   Jose   Reyes   of   Sorsogon,   who   noted   the   'vast   extensions   in   the   sphere   of   every   State,   whether   that   power   is   lodged   in   a   royal   person   or   in   the  
governmental   functions'   and   the   'almost   unlimited   power   to   interfere   in   the   affairs   of   legislature,   and   has   no   affinity   to   those   arbitrary   powers   which   are  
industry  and  agriculture  as  well  as  to  compete  with  existing  business'  as  'reflections  of  the   sometimes   exerted   by   irresponsible   monarch   to   the   great   detriment   of  
fascination  exerted  by  [the  then]  current  tendencies'  in  other  jurisdictions.  He  spoke  thus:   the  people  and  the  destruction  of  their  liberties.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  a  
'My   answer   is   that   this   constitution   has   a   definite   and   well   defined   philosophy,   not   only   most   beneficent   function,   and   often   necessary   to   be   exercised   in   the  
political   but   social   and   economic.   .   .   .   If   in   this   Constitution   the   gentlemen   will   find   interest   of   humanity,   and   for   the   prevention   of   injury   to   those   who  
declarations  of  economic  policy  they  are  there  because  they  are  necessary  to  safeguard  the   cannot  protect  themselves."  
interest   and   welfare   of   the   Filipino   people   because   we   believe   that   the   days   have   come    
when   in   self-­‐defense,   a   nation   may   provide   in   its   constitution   those   safeguards,   the   The   court   in   the   same   case,   after   quoting   from   Sohier   vs.   Mass.   General   Hospital   (3   Cush.,  
patrimony,  the  freedom  to  grow,  the  freedom  to  develop  national  aspirations  and  national   483,  497),  wherein  the  latter  court  held  that  it  is  deemed  indispensible  that  there  should  be  
interests,  not  to  be  hampered  by  the  artificial  boundaries  which  a  constitutional  provision   a   power   in   the   legislature   to   authorize   the   sale   of   the   estates   of   infants,   idiots,   insane  
automatically  imposes."       persons,  and  persons  not  known,  or  not  in  being,  who  cannot  act  for  themselves,  said:  
   
It   would   be   then   to   reject   what   was   so   emphatically   stressed   in   the   Agricultural   Credit   "These  remarks  in  reference  to  infants,  insane  persons  and  persons  not  
Administration  decision  about  which  the  observation  was  earlier  made  that  it  reflected  the   known,   or   not   in   being,   apply   to   the   beneficiaries   of   charities,   who   are  
philosophy   of   the   1935   Constitution   and   is   even   more   in   consonance   with   the   expanded   often  incapable  of  vindicating  their  rights,  and  justly  look  for  protection  
role  of  government  accorded  recognition  in  the  present  Charter  if  the  plea  of  petitioner  that   to  the  sovereign  authority,  acting  as  parens  partiae.  They  show  that  this  
it  discharges  governmental  function  were  not  heeded.  That  path  this  Court  is  not  prepared   beneficent   function   has   not   ceased   to   exist   under   the   change   of  
to  take.  That  would  be  to  go  backward,  to  retreat  rather  than  to  advance.  Nothing  can  thus   government  from  a  monarchy  to  a  republic;  but  that  it  now  resides  in  the  
be   clearer   than   that   there   is   no   constitutional   obstacle   to   a   government   pursuing   lines   of   legislative   department,   ready   to   be   called   into   exercise   whenever  
endeavor,   formerly   reserved   for   private   enterprise.   This   is   one   way,   in   the   language   of   required  for  the  purposes  of  justice  and  right,  and  is  as  clearly  capable  of  
Laski,   by   which   through   such   activities,   "the   harsh   contract   which   [does]   obtain   between   being  exercised  in  cases  of  charities  as  in  any  other  cases  whatever."  
the   levels   of   the   rich   and   the   poor"   may   be   minimized.       It   is   a   response   to   a   trend   noted   by    
Justice  Laurel  in  Calalang  v.  Williams  for  the  humanization  of  laws  and  the  promotion  of  the   In  People  vs.  Cogswell  (113  Cal.  129,  130),  it  was  urged  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  real  
interest  of  all  component  elements  of  society  so  that  man's  innate  aspirations,  in  what  was   party   in   interest;   that   the   Attorney-­‐General   had   no   power   to   institute   the   action;   and   that  
so  felicitously  termed  by  the  First  Lady  as  "a  compassionate  society"  be  attained.   there   must   be   an   allegation   and   proof   of   a   distinct   right   of   the   people   as   a   whole,   as  
  distinguished   from   the   rights   of   individuals,   before   an   action   could   be   brought   by   the  
Gov.  of  the  Philippine  Islands  vs.  Monte  de  Piedad  [G.R.  No.  9959,  December  13,   Attorney-­‐General  in  the  name  of  the  people.  The  court,  in  overruling  these  contentions,  held  
1916]   that  it  was  not  only  the  right  but  the  duty  of  the  Attorney-­‐General  to  prosecute  the  action,  
    which   related   to   charities,   and   approved   the   following   quotation   from   Attorney-­‐General  vs.  
DOCTRINE   OF   PARENS   PATRIAE   -­‐   In   Fontain   vs.   Ravenel   (17   How.,   369,   384),   Mr.   Justice   Compton  (1  Young  &  C.  C.,  417):  
McLean,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court  in  a  charity  case,  said:   "Where   property   affected   by   a   trust   for   public   purposes   is   in   the   hands   of   those   who   hold   it  
  devoted   to   that   trust,   it   is   the   privilege   of   the   public   that   the   crown   should   be   entitled   to  
"When   this   country   achieved   its   independence,   the   prerogatives   of   the   intervene  by  its  officers  for  the  purpose  of  asserting,  on  behalf  on  the  public  generally,  the  
crown   devolved   upon   the   people   of   the   States.   And   this   power   still   public   interest   and   the   public   right,   which,   probably,   no   individual   could   be   found  
remains   with   them   except   so   far   as   they   have   delegated   a   portion   of   it   to   effectually  to  assert,  even  if  the  interest  were  such  as  to  allow  it."  (2  Kent's  Commentaries,  
the   Federal   Government.   The   sovereign   will   is   made   known   to   us   by   10th   ed.,   359;   Lewin   on   Trusts,   sec.   665;   1   Daniell's   Chancery   Practice,   sec.   13;   Perry   on  
legislative  enactment.  The  State  as  a  sovereign,  is  the  parens  partiae."   Trusts,  sec.  732.)  
   
Chancelor  Kent  says:   It   is   further   urged,   as   above   indicated,   that   "the   only   persons   who   could   claim   to   be  
  damages  by  this  payment  to  the  Monte,  if  it  was  unlawful,  are  the  donor  or  the  cestuis  que  
"In   this   country,   the   legislature   or   government   of   the   State,   as   parens   trustent,  and  this  Government  is  neither.  Consequently,  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  proper  party  
partiae,  has  the  right  to  enforce  all  charities  of  a  public  nature,  by  virtue   to   bring   the   action."   The   earthquake   fund   was   the   result   or   the   accumulation   of   a   great  
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number  of  small  contributions.  The  names  of  the  contributors  do  not  appear  in  the  record.   aggressor,   who   is   presumed   to   be   intent   upon   causing   as   much   harm   as   possible   to   the  
Their   whereabouts   are   unknown.   They   parted   with   the   title   to   their   respective   inhabitants   or   nationals   of   the   enemy's   territory,   and   prejudice   the   latter;   it   would   cause  
contributions.   The   beneficiaries,   consisting   of   the   original   sufferers   and   their   heirs,   could   more   suffering   to   the   conquered   and   assist   the   conqueror   or   invader   in   realizing   his  
have  been  ascertained.  They  are  quite  numerous  also.  And  no  doubt  a  large  number  of  the   nefarious   design;   in   fine,   it   would   result   in   penalizing   the   nationals   of   the   occupied  
original   sufferers   have   died,   leaving   various   heirs.   It   would   be   impracticable   for   them   to   territory,  and  rewarding  the  invader  or  occupant  for  his  acts  of  treachery  and  aggression.  
institute  an  action  or  actions  either  individually  or  collectively  to  recover  the  $80,000.  The    
only   course   that   can   be   satisfactorily   pursued   is   for   the   Government   to   against   assume   We  held  in  our  decision  that  the  word  "processes,"  as  used  in  the  proclamation  of  General  
control  of  the  fund  and  devote  it  to  the  object  for  which  it  was  originally  destined.   Douglas  MacArthur  of  October  23,  1944,  cannot  be  interpreted  to  mean  judicial  processes;  
  and  because  of  the  cogent  reasons  therein  set  forth,  we  did  not  deem  it  necessary  to  specify  
The   impracticability   of   pursuing   a   different   course,   however,   is   not   the   true   ground   upon   the  processes  to  which  said  proclamation  should  be  construed  to  refer.  As  some  doubt  still  
which  the  right  of  the  Government  to  maintain  the  action  rests.  The  true  ground  is  that  the   lingers   in   the   minds   of   person   interested   in   sustaining   a   contrary   interpretation   or  
money  being  given  to  a  charity  became,  in  a  measure,  public  property,  only  applicable,  it  is   construction,   we   are   now   constrained   to   say   that   the   term   as   used   in   the   proclamation  
true,  to  the  specific  purposes  to  which  it  was  intended  to  be  devoted,  but  within  those  limits   should   be   construed   to   mean   legislative   and   constitutional   processes,   by   virtue   of   the  
consecrated   to   the   public   use,   and   became   part   of   the   public   resources   for   promoting   the   maxim   "noscitur   a   sociis."   According   to   this   maxim,   where   a   particular   word   or   phrase   is  
happiness  and  welfare  of  the  Philippine  Government.  (Mormon  Church  vs.  U.  S.,  supra.)  To   ambiguous  in  itself  or  is  equally  susceptible  of  various  meaning,  its  meaning  may  be  made  
deny   the   Government's   right   to   maintain   this   action   would   be   contrary   to   sound   public   clear   and   specific   by   considering   the   company   in   which   it   is   found.   (Black   on   Interpretation  
policy,   as   tending   to   discourage   the   prompt   exercise   of   similar   acts   of   humanity   and   of   Laws,   2d   ed.,   pp.   194-­‐196.)   Since   the   proclamation   provides   that   "all   laws,   regulations  
Christian  benevolences  in  like  instances  in  the  future.   and   processes   of   any   other   government   in   the   Philippines   than   that   of   the   said  
  Commonwealth  are  null  and  void,"  the  word  "processes"  must  be  interpreted  or  construed  
Co  Kim  Cham  vs.  Valdez  Tan  Keh  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐5a,    November  16,  1945]   to  refer  to  the  Executive  Commission,  Ordinances  promulgated  by  the  President  of  the  so-­‐
    called   Republic   of   the   Philippines,   and   the   Constitution   itself   of   said   Republic,   and   others  
DURING  BELLIGERENT  OCCUPATION,  JUDICIAL  DECISIONS  RENDERED  BY  THE  INVADER   that  are  of  the  same  class  as  the  laws  and  regulations  with  which  the  world  "processes"  is  
CONTINUE   ITS   FORCE   AND   EFFECT   EVEN   AFTER   THE   CESSATION   OF   INVASION.     Suffice   it   associated.  
to   say   that   the   provisions   of   the   Hague   Conventions   which   imposes   upon   a   belligerent    
occupant   the   duty   to   continue   the   courts   as   well   as   the   municipal   laws   in   force   in   the   As   the   said   judicial   acts   which   apply   the   municipal   laws,   that   is,   such   as   affect   private   rights  
country   unless   absolutely   prevented,   in   order   to   reestablish   and   insure   "I'ordre   et   la   vie   or  persons  and  property  and  provide  for  the  punishment  of  crimes,  are  good  and  valid  even  
publice,"  that  is,  the  public  order  and  safety,  and  the  entire  social  and  commercial  life  of  the   after  occupation  has  ceased,  although  it  is  true  that  no  crucial  instances  exist  to  show  that,  
country,   were   inserted,   not   for   the   benefit   of   the   invader,   but   for   the   protection   and   benefit   were  they  reversed  or  invalidated  by  the  restored  or  legitimate  government,  international  
of   the   people   or   inhabitants   of   the   occupied   territory   and   of   those   not   in   the   military   wrong   would   be   committed,   it   is   nonetheless   true   and   evident   that   by   such   abrogation  
service,   in   order   that   the   ordinary   pursuits   and   business   of   society   may   not   be   national  wrong  would  be  caused  to  the  inhabitants  or  citizens  of  the  legitimate  government.  
unnecessarily  deranged.   According  to  the  law  of  nations  and  Wheaton  himself,  said  judicial  acts  are  legal  and  valid  
  before   and   after   the   occupation   has   ceased   and   the   legitimate   government   has   been  
This  is  the  opinion  of  all  writers  on  international  law  up  to  date,  among  them  Wheaton  (Vol.   restored.   As   there   are   vested   rights   which   have   been   acquired   by   the   parties   by   virtue   of  
II,   p.   236)   and   Oppenheim   (Vol.   II,   p.   338)   in   their   recently   revised   Treatises   on   such  judgments,  the  restored  government  or  its  representative  cannot  reverse  or  abrogate  
International  Law,  edited  in  the  year  1944,  and  the  interpretation  of  the  Supreme  Court  of   them   without   causing   wrong   or   injury   to   the   interested   parties,   because   such   reversal  
the   United   States   in   many   cases,   specially   in   the   case   of   Dow   vs.   Johnson   (106   U.   S.,   158),   in   would  deprive  them  of  their  properties  without  due  process  of  law.  
which  that  Court  said:  "As  a  necessary  consequence  of  such  occupation  and  domination,  the    
political  relations  of  its  people  to  their  former  government  are,  for  the  time  being,  severed.   People  vs.  Gozo    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐36409,  October  26,  1973]  
But   for   their   protection   and   benefit,   and   the   protection   and   benefit   of   others   not   in   the    
ordinary  pursuits  and  business  of  society  may  not  be  unnecessarily  deranged,  the  municipal   SOVEREIGNTY  IS  COMPREHENSIVE,  BUT  ITS  EXERCISE  MAY  BE  RESTRICTED.  -­‐  Much  less  
laws,   that   is,   such   as   affect   private   rights   of   persons   and   property   and   provide   for   the   is   a   reversal   indicated   because   of   the   alleged   absence   of   the   rather   novel   concept   of  
punishment  of  crime,  are  generally  allowed  to  continue  in  force,  and  to  be  administered  by   administrative  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  Olongapo  City.  Nor  is  novelty  the  only  thing  that  
the   ordinary   tribunals   as   they   were   administered   before   the   occupation.   They   are   may   be   said   against   it.   Far   worse   is   the   assumption   at   war   with   controlling   and  
considered   as   continuing,   unless   suspended   or   superseded   by   the   occupying   belligerent."   authoritative   doctrines   that   the   mere   existence   of   military   or   naval   bases   of   a   foreign  
(Dow  vs.  Johnson,  100  U.  S.,  158;  25  U.  S.  [Law,  ed.],  632).   country   cuts   deeply   into   the   power   to   govern.   Two   leading   cases   may   be   cited   to   show   how  
  offensive   is   such   thinking   to   the   juristic   concept   of   sovereignty,   People   v.   Acierto,         and  
The   fact   that   the   belligerent   occupant   is   a   treacherous   aggressor,   as   Japan   was,   does   not,   Reagan  v.  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue.          As  was  so  emphatically  set  forth  by  Justice  
therefore,   exempt   him   from   complying   with   said   precepts   of   the   Hague   Conventions,   nor   Tuason   in   Acierto:   "By   the   Agree   it   should   be   noted,   the   Philippine   Government   merely  
does  it  make  null  and  void  the  judicial  acts  of  the  courts  continued  by  the  occupant  in  the   consents  that  the  United  States  exercise  jurisdiction  in  certain  cases.  The  consent  was  given  
territory   occupied.   To   deny   validity   to   such   judicial   acts   would   benefit   the   invader   or   purely  as  a  matter  of  comity,  courtesy,  or  expediency.  The  Philippine  Government  has  not  
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abdicated   its   sovereignty   over   the   bases   as   part   of   the   Philippine   territory   or   divested   itself   'although  the  former  is  in  fact  prevented  from  exercising  the  supremacy  over  them'  is  one  of  
completely  of  jurisdiction  over  offenses  committed  therein.  Under  the  terms  of  the  treaty,   the   'rules   of   international   law   of   our   times';   (II   Oppenheim,   6th   Lauterpach   ed.,   1944,   p.  
the   United   States   Government   has   prior   or   preferential   but   not   exclusive   jurisdiction   of   482),   recognized,   by   necessary   implication,   in   articles   23,   44,   45,   and   52   of   Hague  
such   offenses.   The   Philippine   Government   retains   not   only   jurisdictional   rights   not   granted,   Regulation;   and   that,   as   a   corollary   of   the   conclusion   that   the   sovereignty   itself   is   not  
but  also  all  such  ceded  rights  as  the  United  States  Military  authorities  for  reasons  of  their   suspended   and   subsists   during   the   enemy   occupation,   the   allegiance   of   the   inhabitants   to  
own   decline   to   make   use   of.   The   first   proposition   is   implied   from   the   fact   of   Philippine   their  legitimate  government  or  sovereign  subsists,  and  therefore  there  is  no  such  thing  as  
sovereignty  over  the  bases;  the  second  from  the  express  provisions  of  the  treaty."          There   suspended   allegiance,   the   basic   theory   on   which   the   whole   fabric   of   the   petitioner's  
was   a   reiteration   of   such   a   view   in   Reagan.   Thus:   "Nothing   is   better   settled   than   that   the   contention  rests  
Philippines   being   independent   and   sovereign,   its   authority   may   be   exercised   over   its   entire    
domain.  There  is  no  portion  thereof  that  is  beyond  its  power.  Within  its  limits,  its  decrees   Considering   that   even   adopting   the   words   'temporary   allegiance,'   repudiated   by  
are  supreme,  its  commands  paramount.  Its  laws  govern  therein,  and  everyone  to  whom  it   Oppenheim  and  other  publicists,  as  descriptive  of  the  relations  borne  by  the  inhabitants  of  
applies   must   submit   to   its   terms.   That   is   the   extent   of   its   jurisdiction,   both   territorial   and   the  territory  occupied  by  the  enemy  toward  the  military  government  established  over  them,  
personal.   Necessarily,   likewise,   it   has   to   be   exclusive.   If   it   were   not   thus,   there   is   a   such   allegiance   may,   at   most,   be   considered   similar   to   the   temporary   allegiance   which   a  
diminution   of   its   sovereignty."         Then   came   this   paragraph   dealing   with   the   principle   of   foreigner  owes  to  the  government  or  sovereign  of  the  territory  wherein  he  resides  in  return  
auto-­‐limitation:  "It  is  to  be  admitted  that  any  state  may,  by  its  consent,  express  or  implied,   for  the  protection  he  receives  as  above  described,  and  does  not  do  away  with  the  absolute  
submit   to   a   restriction   of   its   sovereign   rights.   There   may   thus   be   a   curtailment   of   what   and  permanent  allegiance  which  the  citizen  residing  in  a  foreign  country  owes  to  his  own  
otherwise   is   a   power   plenary   in   character.   That   is   the   concept   of   sovereignty   as   auto-­‐ government  or  sovereign;  that  just  as  a  citizen  or  subject  of  a  government  or  sovereign  may  
limitation,   which,   in   the   succinct   language   of   Jellinek,   'is   the   property   of   a   state-­‐force   due   to   be  prosecuted  for  and  convicted  of  treason  committed  in  a  foreign  country,  in  the  same  way  
which  it  has  the  exclusive  capacity  of  legal  self-­‐determination  and  self-­‐restriction.'  A  state   an   inhabitant   of   a   territory   occupied   by   the   military   forces   of   the   enemy   may   commit  
then,   if   it   chooses   to,   may   refrain   from   the   exercise   of   what   otherwise   is   illimitable   treason  against  his   own  legitimate   government   or   sovereign   if   he   adheres   to   the   enemies   of  
competence."           The   opinion   was   at   pains   to   point   out   though   that   even   then,   there   is   at   the   the  latter  by  giving  them  aid  comfort;  and  that  if  the  allegiance  of  a  citizen  or  subject  to  his  
most  diminution  of  jurisdictional  rights,  not  in  appearance.  The  words  employed  follow:  "Its   government   or   sovereign   is   nothing   more   than   obedience   to   its   laws   in   return   for   the  
laws   may   as   to   some   persons   found   within   its   territory   no   longer   control.   Nor   does   the   protection   he   receives,   it   would   necessarily   follow   that   a   citizen   who   resides   in   a   foreign  
matter   end   there.   It   is   not   precluded   from   allowing   another   power   to   participate   in   the   country  or  state  would,  on  one  hand,  ipso  facto  acquire  the  citizenship  thereof  since  he  has  
exercise   of   jurisdictional   right   over   certain   portions   of   its   territory.   If   it   does   so,   it   by   no   to   obey,   with   certain   exceptions,   the   laws   of   that   country   which   enforce   public   order   and  
means   follows   that   such   areas   become   impressed   with   an   alien   character.   They   retain   their   regulate  the  social  and  commercial  life,  in  return  for  the  protection  he  receives,  and  would,  
status   as   native   soil.   They   are   still   subject   to   its   authority.   Its   jurisdiction   may   be   on   the   other   hand,   lose   his   original   citizenship,   because   he   would   not   be   bound   to   obey  
diminished,   but   it   does   not   disappear.   So   it   is   with   the   bases   under   lease   to   the   American   most   of   the   laws   of   his   own   government   or   sovereign,   and   would   not   receive,   while   in   a  
armed  forces  by  virtue  of  the  military  bases  agreement  of  1947.  They  are  not  and  cannot  be   foreign  country,  the  protection  he  is  entitled  to  in  his  own;  
foreign  territory."    
  Considering   that,   as   a   corollary   of   the   suspension   of   the   exercise   of   rights   of   sovereignty   by  
  Laurel  vs.  Misa    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐409,  January  30,  1947]   the  legitimate  government  in  the  territory  occupied  by  the  enemy  military  forces,  because  
  the  authority  of  the  legitimate  power  to  govern  has  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  occupant  
LAW   ON   TREASON,   THOUGH   POLITICAL   IN   NATURE,   IS   NOT   SUSPENDED   DURING   (Article   43,   Hague   Regulations),   the   political   laws   which   prescribe   the   reciprocal   rights,  
BELLIGERENT   OCCUPATION.     Considering   that   the   absolute   and   permanent   allegiance   of   duties   and   obligation   of   government   and   citizens,   are   suspended   or   in   abeyance   during  
the   inhabitants   of   a   territory   occupied   by   the   enemy   to   their   legitimate   government   or   military  occupation  (Co  Kim  Cham  vs.  Valdez  Tan  Keh  and  Dizon,  supra),  for  the  only  reason  
sovereign   is   not   abrogated   or   severed   by   the   enemy   occupation,   because   the   sovereignty   of   that   as   they   exclusively   bear   relation   to   the   ousted   legitimate   government,   they   are  
the  government  or  sovereign  de  jure  is  not  transferred  thereby  to  the  occupier,  as  we  have   inoperative   or   not   applicable   to   the   government   established   by   the   occupant;   that   the  
held   in   the   cases   of   Co   Kim   Cham   v~.   Valdez   Tan   Keh   and   Dizon   (75   Phil.,   113)   and   of   crimes   against   national   security,   such   as   treason   and   espionage,   inciting   to   war,  
Peralta  vs.  Director  of  Prisons  (75  Phil.,  285),  and  if  it  is  not  transferred  to  the  occupant  it   correspondence   with   hostile   country,   flight   to   enemy's   country,   as   well   as   those   against  
must  necessarily  remain  vested  in  the  legitimate  government;  that  the  sovereignty  vested  in   public  order,  such  as  rebellion,  sedition,  and  disloyalty,  illegal  possession  of  firearms,  which  
the   titular   government   (which   is   the   supreme   power   which   governs   a   body   politic   or   are  of  political  complexion  because  they  bear  relation  to,  and  are  penalized  by  our  Revised  
society   which   constitute   the   state)   must   be   distinguished   from   the   exercise   of   the   rights   Penal   Code   as   crimes   against   the   legitimate   government,   are   also   suspended   or   become  
inherent   thereto,   and   may   be   destroyed,   or   severed   and   transferred   to   another,   but   it   inapplicable  as  against  the  occupant,  because  they  can  not  be  committed  against  the  latter  
cannot   be   suspended   because   the   existence   of   sovereignty   cannot   be   suspended   without   (Peralta   1.S.   Director   of   Prisons,   supra);   and   that,   while   the   offenses   against   public   order   to  
putting   it   out   of   existence   or   divesting   the   possessor   thereof   at   least   during   the   so-­‐called   be   preserved   by   the   legitimate   government   were   inapplicable   as   offenses   against   the  
period   of   suspension;   that   what   may   be   suspended   is   the   exercise   of   the   rights   of   invader   for   the   reason   above   stated,   unless   adopted   by   him,   were   also   ill   operative   as  
sovereignty  with  the  control  and  government  of  the  territory  occupied  by  the  enemy  passes   against  the  ousted  government  for  the  latter  was  not  responsible  for  the  preservation  of  the  
temporarily   to   the   occupant;   that   the   subsistence   of   the   sovereignty   of   the   legitimate   public  order  in  the  occupied  territory,  yet  article  114  of  the  said  Revised  Penal  Code,  was  
government   in   a   territory   occupied   by   the   military   forces   of   the   enemy   during   the   war,   applicable   to   treason   committed   against   the   national   security   of   the   legitimate   government,  
  13  
because   the   inhabitants   of   the   occupied   territory   were   still   bound   by   their   allegiance   to   the   political   nature   or   affecting   political   relations   are   considered   superseded   or   in   abeyance  
latter  during  the  enemy  occupation;   during  the  military  occupation,  is  intended  for  the  governing  of  the  civil  inhabitants  of  the  
  occupied  territory.  It  is  not  intended  for  and  does  not  bind  the  enemies  in  arms.  This  is  self-­‐
Considering   that,   although   the   military   occupant   is   enjoined   to   respect   or   continue   in   force,   evident   from   the   very   nature   of   things.   The   paradox   of   a   contrary   ruling   should   readily  
unless   absolutely   prevented   by   the   circumstances,   those   laws   that   enforce   public   order   and   manifest   itself.   Under   the   petitioners'   theory   the   forces   of   resistance   operating   in   an  
regulate  the  social  and  commercial  life  of  the  country,  he  has,  nevertheless,  all  the  powers  of   occupied  territory  would  have  to  abide  by  the  outlawing  of  their  own  existence.  They  would  
a   de   facto   government   and   may,   at   his   pleasure,   either   change   the   existing   laws   or   make   be  stripped  of  the  very  lifeblood  of  an  army,  the  right  and  the  ability  to  maintain  order  and  
new  ones  when  the  exigencies  of  the  military  service  demand  such  action,  that  is,  when  it  is   discipline  within  the  organization  and  to  try  the  men  guilty  of  breach  thereof.  
necessary  for  the  occupier  to  do  so  for  the  control  of  the  country  and  the  protection  of  his    
army,   subject   to   the   restrictions   or   limitations   imposed   by   the   Hague   Regulations,   the   THE  DOCTRINE  OF  STATE  IMMUNITY  
usages  established  by  civilized  nations,  the  laws  of  humanity  and  the  requirements  of  public    
conscience   (   Peralta   vs.   Director   of   Prisons,   supra;   1940   United   States   Rules   of   Land   Republic  vs.  Sandoval    [G.R.  No.  84607,  March  19,  1993]  
Warfare   76,   77);   and   that,   consequently,   all   acts   of   the   military   occupant   dictated   within      
these   limitations   are   obligatory   upon   the   inhabitants   of   the   territory,   who   are   bound   to   CONCEPT  OF  STATE  IMMUNITY.  -­‐  Under  our  Constitution  the  principle  of  immunity  of  the  
obey  them,  and  the  laws  of  the  legitimate  government  which  have  not  been  adopted,  as  well   government  from  suit  is  expressly  provided  in   Article  XVI,  Section  3.  The  principle  is  based  
and   those   which,   though   continued   in   force,   are   in   conflict   with   such   laws   and   orders   of   the   on  the  very  essence  of  sovereignty,  and  on  the  practical  ground  that  there  can  be  no  legal  
occupier,   shall   be   considered   as   suspended   or   not   in   force   and   binding   upon   said   right  as  against  the  authority  that  makes  the  law  on  which  the  right  depends.    It  also  rests  
inhabitants;   on   reasons   of   public   policy   —   that   public   service   would   be   hindered,   and   the   public  
  endangered,   if   the   sovereign   authority   could   be   subjected   to   law   suits   at   the   instance   of  
Considering   that,   since   the   preservation   of   the   allegiance   or   the   obligation   of   fidelity   and   every   citizen   and   consequently   controlled   in   the   uses   and   dispositions   of   the   means  
obedience  of  a  citizen  or  subject  to  his  government  or  sovereign  does  not  demand  from  him   required  for  the  proper  administration  of  the  government.  
a   positive   action,   but   only   passive   attitude   or   forbearance   from   adhering   to   the   enemy   by    
giving  the  latter  aid  and  comfort,  the  occupant  has  no  power,  as  a  corollary  of  the  preceding   INSTANCES  OF  SUITS  AGAINST  THE  STATE.  -­‐  Some  instances  when  a  suit  against  the  State  
consideration,   to   repeal   or   suspend   the   operation   of   the   law   of   treason,   essential   for   the   is  proper  are:  
preservation   of   the   allegiance   owed   by   the   inhabitants   to   their   legitimate   government,   or    
compel   them   to   adhere   and   give   aid   and   comfort   to   him;   because   it   is   evident   that   such   (1)   When  the  Republic  is  sued  by  name;  
action   is   not   demanded   by   the   exigencies   of   the   military   service   or   not   necessary   for   the   (2)   When  the  suit  is  against  an  unincorporated  government  agency;  
control   of   the   inhabitants   and   the   safety   and   protection   of   his   army,   and   because   it   is   (3)   When  the  suit  is  on  its  face  against  a  government  officer  but  the  case  is  
tantamount  to  practically  transfer  temporarily  to  the  occupant  their  allegiance  to  the  titular   such   that   ultimate   liability   will   belong   not   to   the   officer   but   to   the  
government  or  sovereign;  and  that,  therefore,  if  an  inhabitant  of  the  occupied  territory  were   government.  
compelled   illegally   by   the   military   occupant,   through   force,   threat   or   intimidation,   to   give    
him  aid  and  comfort,  the  former  may  lawfully  resist  and  die  if  necessary  as  a  hero,  or  submit   While  the  Republic  in  this  case  is  sued  by  name,  the  ultimate  liability  does  not  pertain  to  the  
thereto  without  becoming  a  traitor;   government.   Although   the   military   officers   and   personnel,   then   party   defendants,   were  
  discharging  their  official  functions  when  the  incident  occurred,  their  functions  ceased  to  be  
Considering  that  adoption  of  the  petitioner's  theory  of  suspended  allegiance  would  lead  to   official   the   moment   they   exceeded   their   authority.   Based   on   the   Commission   findings,   there  
disastrous  consequences  for  small  and  weak  nations  or  states,  and  would  be  repugnant  to   was   lack   of   justification   by   the   government   forces   in   the   use   of   firearms.     Moreover,   the  
the  laws  of  humanity  and  requirements  of  public  conscience,  for  it  would  allow  invaders  to   members  of  the  police  and  military  crowd  dispersal  units  committed  a  prohibited  act  under  
legally   recruit   or   enlist   the   Quisling   inhabitants   of   the   occupied   territory   to   fight   against   B.P.  Blg.  880  as  there  was  unnecessary  firing  by  them  in  dispersing  the  marchers.  
their   own   government   without   the   latter   incurring   the   risk   of   being   prosecuted   for   treason,    
and   even   compel   those   who   are   not   to   aid   them   in   their   military   operation   against   the   While  it  is  true  that  nothing  is  better  settled  than  the  general  rule  that  a  sovereign  state  and  
resisting   enemy   forces   in   order   to   completely   subdue   and   conquer   the   whole   nation,   and   its  political  subdivisions  cannot  be  sued  in  the  courts  except  when  it  has  given  its  consent,  it  
thus   deprive   them   all   of   their   own   independence   or   sovereignty   —   such   theory   would   cannot  be  invoked  by  both  the  military  officers  to  release  them  from  any  liability,  and  by  the  
sanction   the   action   of   invaders   in   forcing   the   people   of   a   free   and   sovereign   country   to   be   a   heirs   and   victims   to   demand   indemnification   from   the   government.   The   principle   of   state  
party  i  n  the  nefarious  task  of  depriving  themselves  of  their  own  freedom  and  independence   immunity   from   suit   does   not   apply,   as   in   this   case,   when   the   relief   demanded   by   the   suit  
and  repressing  the  exercise  by  them  of  their  own  sovereignty;  in  other  words,  to  commit  a   requires  no  affirmative  official  action  on  the  part  of  the  State  nor  the  affirmative  discharge  
political  suicide.   of  any  obligation  which  belongs  to  the  State  in  its  political  capacity,  even  though  the  officers  
  or   agents   who   are   made   defendants   claim   to   hold   or   act   only   by   virtue   of   a   title   of   the   state  
  Ruffy  vs.  Chief  of  Staff    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐533,  August  20,  1946]     and   as   its   agents   and   servants.         This   Court   has   made   it   quite   clear   that   even   a   "high  
THE   SUSPENSION   OF   POLITICAL   LAWS   DURING   BELLIGERENT   OCCUPATION   DOES   NOT   position   in   the   government   does   not   confer   a   license   to   persecute   or   recklessly   injure  
APPLY   TO   THE   ENEMIES   IN   ARMS.     The   rule   invoked   by   counsel,   namely,   that   laws   of   another."  
  14  
   immediate   superior   of   Sanders   and   directly   answerable   to   Naval   Personnel   in   matters  
THE   STATE   IMMUNITY   IS   NOT   WAIVED   ONLY   FOR   THE   REASON   THAT   THE   PRESIDENT   involving   the   special   services   department   of   NAVSTA.   In   fact,   the   letter   dealt   with   the  
CREATED  A  COMMISSION  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE  INCIDENT,  OR  BY  THE  PRESIDENT’S  ACT   financial   and   budgetary   problems   of   the   department   and   contained   recommendations   for  
OF  JOINING  A  RALLY  OF  THE  COMPLAINANTS.    In  effect,  whatever  may  be  the  findings  of   their   solution,   including   the   re-­‐designation   of   the   private   respondents.   There   was   nothing  
the   Commission,   the   same   shall   only   serve   as   the   cause   of   action   in   the   event   that   any   party   personal  or  private  about  it.  
decides  to  litigate  his/her  claim.  Therefore,  the  Commission  is  merely  a  preliminary  venue.    
The  Commission  is  not  the  end  in  itself.  Whatever  recommendation  it  makes  cannot  in  any   Given   the   official   character   of   the   above-­‐described   letters,   we   have   to   conclude   that   the  
way   bind   the   State   immediately,   such   recommendation   not   having   become   final   and   petitioners  were,  legally  speaking,  being  sued  as  officers  of  the  United  States  government.  
executory.  This  is  precisely  the  essence  of  it  being  a  fact-­‐finding  body.   As  they  have  acted  on  behalf  of  that  government,  and  within  the  scope  of  their  authority,  it  
  is   that   government,   and   not   the   petitioners   personally,   that   is   responsible   for   their   acts.  
Secondly,   whatever   acts   or   utterances   that   then   President   Aquino   may   have   done   or   said,   Assuming  that  the  trial  can  proceed  and  it  is  proved  that  the  claimants  have  a  right  to  the  
the   same   are   not   tantamount   to   the   State   having   waived   its   immunity   from   suit.   The   payment   of   damages,   such   award   will   have   to   be   satisfied   not   by   the   petitioners   in   their  
President's   act   of   joining   the   marchers,   days   after   the   incident,   does   not   mean   that   there   personal  capacities  but  by  the  United  States  government  as  their  principal.  This  will  require  
was   an   admission   by   the   State   of   any   liability.   In   fact   to   borrow   the   words   of   petitioners   that   government   to   perform   an   affirmative   act   to   satisfy   the   judgment,   viz.,   the  
(Caylao  group),  "it  was  an  act  of  solidarity  by  the  government  with  the  people".  Moreover,   appropriation   of   the   necessary   amount   to   cover   the   damages   awarded,   thus   making   the  
petitioners   rely   on   President   Aquino's   speech   promising   that   the   government   would   action  a  suit  against  that  government  without  its  consent.      
address   the   grievances   of   the   rallyists.   By   this   alone,   it   cannot   be   inferred   that   the   State   has    
admitted  any  liability,  much  less  can  it  be  inferred  that  it  has  consented  to  the  suit.    
  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   STATE   IMMUNITY   APPLIES   TO   FOREIGN   STATES   SUED   IN   THIS  
Although   consent   to   be   sued   may   be   given   impliedly,   still   it   cannot   be   maintained   that   such   JURISDICTION.  -­‐  There  should  be  no  question  by  now  that  such  complaint  cannot  prosper  
consent  was  given  considering  the  circumstances  obtaining  in  the  instant  case.   unless  the  government  sought  to  be  held  ultimately  liable  has  given  its  consent  to  be  sued.  
  So   we   have   ruled   not   only   in   Baer   but   in   many   other   decisions   where   we   upheld   the  
  doctrine  of  state  immunity  as  applicable  not  only  to  our  own  government  but  also  to  foreign  
  Sanders  vs.  Veridiano    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐46930,  June  10,  1988]   states  sought  to  be  subjected  to  the  jurisdiction  of  our  courts.          
     
ACTS   COMMITTED   BY   THE   OFFICERS   IN   THEIR   OFFICIAL   CAPACITY   ARE   COVERED   BY   The   practical   justification   for   the   doctrine,   as   Holmes   put   it,   is   that   "there   can   be   no   legal  
STATE  IMMUNITY.  -­‐  It  is  stressed  at  the  outset  that  the  mere  allegation  that  a  government   right  against  the  authority  which  makes  the  law  on  which  the  right  depends."        In  the  case  
functionary  is  being  sued  in  his  personal  capacity  will  not  automatically  remove  him  from   of   foreign   states,   the   rule   is   derived   from   the   principle   of   the   sovereign   equality   of   states  
the   protection   of   the   law   of   public   officers   and,   if   appropriate,   the   doctrine   of   state   which  wisely  admonishes  that  par  in  parem  non  habet  imperium  and  that  a  contrary  attitude  
immunity.   By   the   same   token,   the   mere   invocation   of   official   character   will   not   suffice   to   would   "unduly   vex   the   peace   of   nations."       Our   adherence   to   this   precept   is   formally  
insulate   him   from   suability   and   liability   for   an   act   imputed   to   him   as   a   personal   tort   expressed   in   Article   II,   Section   2,   of   our   Constitution,   where   we   reiterate   from   our   previous  
committed  without  or  in  excess  of  his  authority.  These  well-­‐settled  principles  are  applicable   charters  that  the  Philippines  "adopts  the  generally  accepted  principles  of  international  law  
not   only   to   the   officers   of   the   local   state   but   also   where   the   person   sued   in   its   courts   as  part  of  the  law  of  the  land.  
pertains  to  the  government  of  a  foreign  state,  as  in  the  present  case.    
  par  in  parem  non  habet  imperium  (meaning,  an  equal  has  no  authority  over  an  equal)  
It   is   abundantly   clear   in   the   present   case   that   the   acts   for   which   the   petitioners   are   being    
called  to  account  were  performed  by  them  in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duties.  Sanders,   Festejo  vs.  Fernando    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐5156,  March  11,  1954]  
as   director   of   the   special   services   department   of   NAVSTA,   undoubtedly   had   supervision    
over   its   personnel,   including   the   private   respondents,   and   had   a   hand   in   their   employment,   ACTS   COMMITTED   BY   OFFICIALS   OUTSIDE   THEIR   AUTHORITY   WILL   NOT   GIVE   RISE   TO  
work  assignments,  discipline,  dismissal  and  other  related  matters.  It  is  not  disputed  that  the   THE   CONCEPT   OF   STATE   IMMUNITY.     Ordinarily   the   officer   or   employee   committing   the  
letter   written   was   in   fact   a   reply   to   a   request   from   his   superior,   the   other   petitioner,   for   tort   is   personally   liable   therefor,   and   may   be   sued   as   any   other   citizen   and   held   answerable  
more   information   regarding   the   case   of   the   private   respondents.         Moreover,   even   in   the   for   whatever   injury   or   damage   results   from   his   tortious   act."   —   49   Am.   Jur.   289.   .   .   If   an  
absence   of   such   request,   he   still   was   within   his   rights   in   reacting   to   the   hearing   officer's   officer,  even  while  acting  under  color  of  his  office,  exceeds  the  power  conferred  on  him  by  
criticism  —  in  effect  a  direct  attack  against  him  —  that  Special  Services  was  practicing  "an   law,  he  cannot  shelter  himself  under  the  plea  that  he  is  a  public  agent."  —  43  Am.  Jur.  86.  
autocratic  form  of  supervision."    
  It   is   a   general   rule   that   an   officer-­‐executive,   administrative   quasi-­‐judicial,   ministerial,   or  
As  for  Moreau,  what  he  is  claimed  to  have  done  was  write  the  Chief  of  Naval  Personnel  for   otherwise   who   acts   outside   the   scope   of   his   jurisdiction   and   without   authorization   of   law  
concurrence   with   the   conversion   of   the   private   respondents'   type   of   employment   even   may  thereby  render  himself  amenable  to  personal  liability  in  a  civil  suit.  If  he  exceeds  the  
before   the   grievance   proceedings   had   even   commenced.   Disregarding   for   the   nonce   the   power   conferred   on   him   by   law,   he   cannot   shelter   himself   by   the   plea   that   he   is   a   public  
question  of  its  timeliness,  this  act  is  clearly  official  in  nature,  performed  by  Moreau  as  the  
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agent   acting   under   color   of   his   office,   and   not   personally.   In   the   eye   of   the   law,   his   acts   then   The  general  law  waiving  the  immunity  of  the  state  from  suit  is  found  in  Act  No.  3083,  under  
are  wholly  without  authority."  —  43  Am.  Jur.  89-­‐90.   which   the   Philippine   government   "consents   and   submits   to   be   sued   upon   any   moneyed  
  claim   involving   liability   arising   from   contract,   express   or   implied,   which   could   serve   as   a  
United  States  vs.  Guinto    [G.R.  No.  76607,  February    26,  1990]   basis   of   civil   action   between   private   parties."   In   Merritt   v.   Government   of   the   Philippine  
  Islands,         a   special   law   was   passed   to   enable   a   person   to   sue   the   government   for   an   alleged  
CONCEPT  OF  STATE  IMMUNITY.  -­‐  The  rule  that  a  state  may  not  be  sued  without  its  consent,   tort.   When   the   government   enters   into   a   contract,   it   is   deemed   to   have   descended   to   the  
now   expressed   in   Article   XVI,   Section   3,   of   the   1987   Constitution,   is   one   of   the   generally   level  of  the  other  contracting  party  and  divested  of  its  sovereign  immunity  from  suit  with  its  
accepted   principles   of   international   law   that   we   have   adopted   as   part   of   the   law   of   our   land   implied   consent.         Waiver   is   also   implied   when   the   government   files   a   complaint,   thus  
under  Article  II,  Section  2.  This  latter  provision  merely  reiterates  a  policy  earlier  embodied   opening  itself  to  a  counterclaim.        
in  the  1935  and  1973  Constitutions  and  also  intended  to  manifest  our  resolve  to  abide  by      
the  rules  of  the  international  community.   The  above  rules  are  subject  to  qualification.  Express  consent  is  effected  only  by  the  will  of  
  the   legislature   through   the   medium   of   a   duly   enacted   statute.         We   have   held   that   not   all  
Even  without  such  affirmation,  we  would  still  be  bound  by  the  generally  accepted  principles   contracts   entered   into   by   the   government   will   operate   as   a   waiver   of   its   non-­‐suability;  
of  international  law  under  the  doctrine  of  incorporation.  Under  this  doctrine,  as  accepted  by   distinction   must   be   made   between   its   sovereign   and   proprietary   acts.         As   for   the   filing   of   a  
the   majority   of   states,   such   principles   are   deemed   incorporated   in   the   law   of   every   civilized   complaint  by  the  government,  suability  will  result  only  where  the  government  is  claiming  
state  as  a  condition  and  consequence  of  its  membership  in  the  society  of  nations.  Upon  its   affirmative  relief  from  the  defendant.  
admission   to   such   society,   the   state   is   automatically   obligated   to   comply   with   these    
principles  in  its  relations  with  other  states.   RESTRICTIVE  THEORY  OF  STATE  IMMUNITY.  -­‐  There  is  no  question  that  the  United  States  
  of  America,  like  any  other  state,  will  be  deemed  to  have  impliedly  waived  its  non-­‐suability  if  
As   applied   to   the   local   state,   the   doctrine   of   state   immunity   is   based   on   the   justification   it   has   entered   into   a   contract   in   its   proprietary   or   private   capacity.   It   is   only   when   the  
given   by   Justice   Holmes   that   "there   can   be   no   legal   right   against   the   authority   which   makes   contract   involves   its   sovereign   or   governmental   capacity   that   no   such   waiver   may   be  
the  law  on  which  the  right  depends."      There  are  other  practical  reasons  for  the  enforcement   implied.  This  was  our  ruling  in  United  States  of  America  v.  Ruiz,        where  the  transaction  in  
of   the   doctrine.   In   the   case   of   the   foreign   state   sought   to   be   impleaded   in   the   local   question  dealt  with  the  improvement  of  the  wharves  in  the  naval  installation  at  Subic  Bay.  
jurisdiction,   the   added   inhibition   is   expressed   in   the   maxim   par   in   parem,   non   habet   As   this   was   a   clearly   governmental   function,   we   held   that   the   contract   did   not   operate   to  
imperium.  All  states  are  sovereign  equals  and  cannot  assert  jurisdiction  over  one  another.  A   divest   the   United   States   of   its   sovereign   immunity   from   suit.   In   the   words   of   Justice   Vicente  
contrary  disposition  would,  in  the  language  of  a  celebrated  case,  "unduly  vex  the  peace  of   Abad  Santos:  
nations."          
  The  traditional  rule  of  immunity  exempts  a  State  from  being  sued  in  the  
While  the  doctrine  appears  to  prohibit  only  suits  against  the  state  without  its  consent,  it  is   courts   of   another   State   without   its   consent   or   waiver.   This   rule   is   a  
also  applicable  to  complaints  filed  against  officials  of  the  state  for  acts  allegedly  performed   necessary  consequence  of  the  principles  of  independence  and  equality  of  
by   them   in   the   discharge   of   their   duties.   The   rule   is   that   if   the   judgment   against   such   States.  However,  the  rules  of  International  Law  are  not  petrified;  they  are  
officials  will  require  the  state  itself  to  perform  an  affirmative  act  to  satisfy  the  same,  such  as   constantly  developing  and  evolving.  And  because  the  activities  of  states  
the  appropriation  of  the  amount  needed  to  pay  the  damages  awarded  against  them,  the  suit   have   multiplied,   it   has   been   necessary   to   distinguish   them   —   between  
must  be  regarded  as  against  the  state  itself  although  it  has  not  been  formally  impleaded.        In   sovereign  and  governmental  acts  (jure  imperii)  and  private,  commercial  
such  a  situation,  the  state  may  move  to  dismiss  the  complaint  on  the  ground  that  it  has  been   and   proprietary   acts   (jure   gestionis).   The   result   is   that   State   immunity  
filed  without  its  consent.   now  extends  only  to  acts  jure  imperii.  The  restrictive  application  of  State  
  immunity  is  now  the  rule  in  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom  and  
The  doctrine  is  sometimes  derisively  called  "the  royal  prerogative  of  dishonesty"  because  of   other  states  in  Western  Europe.  
the  privilege  it  grants  the  state  to  defeat  any  legitimate  claim  against  it  by  simply  invoking    
its  non-­‐suability.  That  is  hardly  fair,  at  least  in  democratic  societies,  for  the  state  is  not  an   xxx                                        xxx                                        xxx  
unfeeling   tyrant   unmoved   by   the   valid   claims   of   its   citizens.   In   fact,   the   doctrine   is   not    
absolute   and   does   not   say   the   state   may   not   be   sued   under   any   circumstance.   On   the   The   restrictive   application   of   State   immunity   is   proper   only   when   the  
contrary,   the   rule   says   that   the   state   may   not   be   sued   without   its   consent,   which   clearly   proceedings   arise   out   of   commercial   transactions   of   the   foreign  
imports  that  it  may  be  sued  if  it  consents.   sovereign,   its   commercial   activities   or   economic   affairs.   Stated  
  differently,   a   State   may   be   said   to   have   descended   to   the   level   of   an  
WAIVER   OF   STATE   IMMUNITY.     The   consent   of   the   state   to   be   sued   may   be   manifested   individual   and   can   thus   be   deemed   to   have   tacitly   given   its   consent   to   be  
expressly   or   impliedly.   Express   consent   may   be   embodied   in   a   general   law   or   a   special   law.   sued  only  when  it  enters  into  business  contracts.  It  does  not  apply  where  
Consent  is  implied  when  the  state  enters  into  a  contract  or  it  itself  commences  litigation.   the   contract   relates   to   the   exercise   of   its   sovereign   functions.   In   this   case  
  the  projects  are  an  integral  part  of  the  naval  base  which  is  devoted  to  the  
defense   of   both   the   United   States   and   the   Philippines,   indisputably   a  
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 function   of   the   government   of   the   highest   order;   they   are   not   utilized   for   individual   and   can   thus   be   deemed   to   have   tacitly   given   its   consent   to   be  
nor  dedicated  to  commercial  or  business  purposes.   sued   only   when   it   enters   into   a   business   contract.   It   does   not   apply  
  where   the   contract   relates   to   the   exercise   of   its   functions.'   (136   SCRA  
SUABILITY   IS   NOT   SYNONYMOUS   WITH   LIABILITY.   -­‐   The   private   respondent   invokes   487,  492.)  
Article  2180  of  the  Civil  Code  which  holds  the  government  liable  if  it  acts  through  a  special    
agent.  The  argument,  it  would  seem,  is  premised  on  the  ground  that  since  the  officers  are   "In  the  instant  case,  the  Memorandum  of  Agreement  entered  into  by  the  
designated  "special  agents,"  the  United  States  government  should  be  liable  for  their  torts.   PC  Chief  and  PADPAO  was  intended  to  professionalize  the  industry  and  
  to   standardize   the   salaries   of   security   guards   as   well   as   the   current   rates  
There   seems   to   be   a   failure   to   distinguish   between   suability   and   liability   and   a   of   security   services,   clearly,   a   governmental   function.   The   execution   of  
misconception   that   the   two   terms   are   synonymous.   Suability   depends   on   the   consent   of   the   the  said  agreement  is  incidental  to  the  purpose  of  R.A.  5487,  as  amended,  
state  to  be  sued,  liability  on  the  applicable  law  and  the  established  facts.  The  circumstance   which  is  to  regulate  the  organization  and  operation  of  private  detective,  
that   a   state   is   suable   does   not   necessarily   mean   that   it   is   liable;   on   the   other   hand,   it   can   watchmen   or   security   guard   agencies.   (Emphasis   Ours.)"   (pp.   258-­‐259,  
never  be  held  liable  if  it  does  not  first  consent  to  be  sued.  Liability  is  not  conceded  by  the   Rollo.)  
mere   fact   that   the   state   has   allowed   itself   to   be   sued.   When   the   state   does   waive   its    
sovereign   immunity,   it   is   only   giving   the   plaintiff   the   chance   to   prove,   if   it   can,   that   the   The   state   immunity   doctrine   rests   upon   reasons   of   public   policy   and   the   inconvenience   and  
defendant  is  liable.   danger  which  would  flow  from  a  different  rule.  "It  is  obvious  that  public  service  would  be  
  hindered,  and  public  safety  endangered,  if  the  supreme  authority  could  be  subjected  to  suits  
The   said   article   establishes   a   rule   of   liability,   not   suability.   The   government   may   be   held   at  the  instance  of  every  citizen,  and,  consequently,  controlled  in  the  use  and  disposition  of  
liable   under   this   rule   only   if   it   first   allows   itself   to   be   sued   through   any   of   the   accepted   the  means  required  for  the  proper  administration  of  the  government"  (Siren  vs.  U.S.  Wall,  
forms  of  consent.   152,   19   L.   ed.   129,   as   cited   in   78   SCRA   477).   In   the   same   vein,   this   Court   in   Republic   vs.  
  Purisima  (78  SCRA  470,  473)  rationalized:  
Moreover,  the  agent  performing  his  regular  functions  is  not  a  special  agent  even  if  he  is  so    
denominated,  as  in  the  case  at  bar.  No  less  important,  the  said  provision  appears  to  regulate   "Nonetheless,   a   continued   adherence   to   the   doctrine   of   nonsuability   is  
only   the   relations   of   the   local   state   with   its   inhabitants   and,   hence,   applies   only   to   the   not   to   be   deplored   for   as   against   the   inconvenience   that   may   be   cause  
Philippine  government  and  not  to  foreign  governments  impleaded  in  our  courts.   [by]  private  parties,  the  loss  of  governmental  efficiency  and  the  obstacle  
  to  the  performance  of  its  multifarious  functions  are  far  greater  if  such  a  
Veterans  Manpower  &  Protective  Services,  Inc.  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  91359,  September   fundamental   principle   were   abandoned   and   the   availability   of   judicial  
25,  1992]   remedy   were   not   thus   restricted.   With   the   well   known   propensity   on   the  
  part  of  our  people  to  go  to  court,  at  the  least  provocation,  the  loss  of  time  
WAIVER   OF   STATE   IS   CONSTRUED   STRICTISSIMI   JURIS.   -­‐   Waiver   of   the   State's   immunity   and   energy   required   to   defend   against   law   suits,   in   the   absence   of   such   a  
from   suit,   being   a   derogation   of   sovereignty,   will   not   be   lightly   inferred,   but   must   be   basic   principle   that   constitutes   such   an   effective   obstacles,   could   very  
construed   strictissimi   juris   (Republic   vs.   Feliciano,   148   SCRA   424).   The   consent   of   the   State   well   be   imagined."   (citing   Providence   Washington   Insurance   Co.   vs.  
to  be  sued  must  emanate  from  statutory  authority,  hence,  from  a  legislative  act,  not  from  a   Republic,  29  SCRA  598.)      
mere  memorandum.  Without  such  consent,  the  trial  court  did  not  acquire  jurisdiction  over    
the  public  respondents.   Merritt  vs.  Government  of  Philippine  Islands  [G.R.  No.  11154,  March  21,  1916]  
   
We  agree  with  the  observation  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  that  the  Memorandum  of  Agreement   SPECIAL   LAW   WAIVING   STATE   IMMUNITY.   -­‐   Act   No.   2457,   effective   February   3,   1915,  
dated  May  12,  1986  does  not  constitute  an  implied  consent  by  the  State  to  be  sued:   reads:  
   
"The  Memorandum  of  Agreement  dated  May  12,  1986  was  entered  into   "An  act  authorizing  E.  Merritt  to  bring  suit  against  the  Government  of  the  
by   the   PC   Chief   in   relation   to   the   exercise   of   a   function   sovereign   in   Philippine   Islands   and   authorizing   the   Attorney-­‐General   of   said   Islands  
nature.   The   correct   test   for   the   application   of   state   immunity   is   not   the   to  appear  in  said  suit.  
conclusion  of  a  contract  by  the  State  but  the  legal  nature  of  the  act.  This    
was   clearly   enunciated   in   the   case   of   United   States   of   America   vs.   Ruiz   "Whereas   a   claim   has   been   filed   against   the   Government   of   the  
where  the  Hon.  Supreme  Court  held:   Philippine   Islands   by   Mr.   E.   Merritt,   of   Manila,   for   damages   resulting  
  from   a   collision   between   his   motorcycle   and   the   ambulance   of   the  
"'The   restrictive   application   of   State   immunity   is   proper   only   when   the   General  Hospital  on  March  twenty-­‐fifth,  nineteen  hundred  and  thirteen;  
proceedings   arise   out   of   commercial   transactions   of   the   foreign    
sovereign,   its   commercial   activities   or   economic   affairs.   Stated  
differently,   a   State   may   be   said   to   have   descended   to   the   level   of   an  
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 "Whereas   it   is   not   known   who   is   responsible   for   the   accident   nor   is   it   SUABILITY   VS.   LIABILITY.   -­‐   As   to   the   scope   of   legislative   enactments   permitting   individuals  
possible   to   determine   the   amount   of   damages,   if   any,   to   which   the   to   sue   the   state   where   the   cause   of   action   arises   out   of   either   tort   or   contract,   the   rule   is  
claimant  is  entitled;  and     stated  in  36  Cyc.,  915,  thus:  
   
"Whereas   the   Director   of   Public   Works   and   the   Attorney-­‐General   "By  consenting  to  be  sued  a  state  simply  waives  its  immunity  from  suit.  It  
recommend   that   an   act   be   passed   by   the   Legislature   authorizing   Mr.   E.   does   not   thereby   concede   its   liability   to   plaintiff,   or   create   any   cause   of  
Merritt  to  bring  suit  in  the  courts  against  the  Government,  in  order  that   action   in   his   favor,   or   extend   its   liability   to   any   cause   not   previously  
said  questions  may  be  decided:  Now,  therefore,   recognized.  It  merely  gives  a  remedy  to  enforce  a  preexisting  liability  and  
  submits   itself   to   the   jurisdiction   of   the   court,   subject   to   its   right   to  
"By   authority   of   the   United   States,   be   it   enacted   by   the   Philippine   interpose  any  lawful  defense."  
Legislature,  that:    
  In  Apfelbacher  vs.  State  (152  N.  W.,  144,  advanced  sheets),  decided  April  16,  1915,  the  Act  
"SECTION  1.  E.   Merritt  is  hereby  authorized  to  bring  suit  in  the  Court   of  1913,  which  authorized  the  bringing  of  this  suit,  read:  
of   First   Instance   of   the   city   of   Manila   against   the   Government   of   the    
Philippine   Islands   in   order   to   fix   the   responsibility   for   the   collision   "SECTION  1.   Authority   is   hereby   given   to   George   Apfelbacher,   of  
between  his  motorcycle  and  the  ambulance  of  the  General  Hospital,  and   the  town  of  Summit,  Waukesha  County,  Wisconsin,  to  bring  suit  in  such  
to  determine  the  amount  of  the  damages,  if  any,  to  which  Mr.  E.  Merritt  is   court  or  courts  and  in  such  form  or  forms  as  he  may  be  advised  for  the  
entitled   on   account   of   said   collision,   and   the   attorney-­‐General   of   the   purpose   of   settling   and   determining   all   controversies   which   he   may   now  
Philippine   Islands   is   hereby   authorized   and   directed   to   appear   at   the   have   with   the   State   of   Wisconsin,   or   its   duly   authorized   officers   and  
trial   on   the   behalf   of   the   Government   of   said   Islands,   to   defend   said   agents,  relative  to  the  mill  property  of  said  George  Apfelbacher,  the  fish  
Government  at  the  same.   hatchery  of  the  State  Wisconsin  on  the  Bark  River,  and  the  mill  property  
  of   Evan   Humphrey   at   the   lower   end   of   Nagawicka   Lake,   and   relative   to  
"SEC.  2.   This  Act  shall  take  effect  on  its  passage.   the   use   of   the   waters   of   said   Bark   River   and   Nagawicka   Lake,   all   in   the  
  county  of  Waukesha,  Wisconsin."  
"Enacted,  February  3,  1915."    
  In  determining  the  scope  of  this  act,  the  court  said;  
Did  the  defendant,  in  enacting  the  above  quoted  act,  simply  waive  its  immunity  from  suit  or    
did   it   also   concede   its   liability   to   the   plaintiff?   If   only   the   former,   then   it   cannot   be   held   that   "Plaintiff   claims   that   by   the   enactment   of   this   law   the   legislature  
the   Act   created   any   new   cause   of   action   in   favor   of   the   plaintiff   or   extended   the   defendant's   admitted  liability  on  the  part  of  the  state  for  the  acts  of  its  officers,  and  
liability  to  any  case  not  previously  recognized.   that  the  suit  now  stands  just  as  it  would  stand  between  private  parties.  It  
  is   difficult   to   see   how   the   act   does,   or   was   intended   to   do,   more   than  
All   admit   that   the   Insular   Government   (the   defendant)   cannot   be   sued   by   an   individual   remove   the   state's   immunity   from   suit.   It   simply   gives   authority   to  
without  its  consent.  It  is  also  admitted  that  the  instant  case  is  one  against  the  Government.   commence   suit   for   the   purpose   of   settling   plaintiff's   controversies   with  
As  the  consent  of  the  Government  to  be  sued  by  the  plaintiff  was  entirely  voluntary  on  its   the   state.   Nowhere   in   the   act   is   there   a   whisper   or   suggestion   that   the  
part,   it   is   our   duty   to   look   carefully   into   the   terms   of   the   consent,   and   render   judgment   court   or   courts   in   the   disposition   of   the   suit   shall   depart   from   well  
accordingly.   established  principles  of  law,  or  that  the  amount  of  damages  is  the  only  
  question   to   be   settled.   The   act   opened   the   door   of   the   court   to   the  
The   plaintiff   was   authorized   to   bring   this   action   against   the   Government   "in   order   to   fix   the   plaintiff.  It  did  not  pass  upon  the  question  of  liability,  but  left  the  suit  just  
responsibility   for   the   collision   between   his   motorcycle   and   the   ambulance   of   the   General   where   it   would   be   in   the   absence   of   the   state's   immunity   from   suit.   If   the  
Hospital   and   to   determine   the   amount   of   the   damages,   if   any,   to   which   Mr.   E.   Merritt   is   Legislature   had   intended   to   change   the   rule   that   obtained   in   this   state   so  
entitled  on  account  of  said  collision,  .  .  .  ."  These  were  the  two  questions  submitted  to  the   long  and  to  declare  liability  on  the  part  of  the  state,  it  would  not  have  left  
court   for   determination.   The   Act   was   passed   "in   order   that   said   questions   may   be   decided."   so   important   a   matter   to   mere   inference   but   would   have   done   so   in  
We  have  "decided"  that  the  accident  was  due  solely  to  the  negligence  of  the  chauffeur,  who   express  terms.  (Murdoc  Grate  Co.  vs.  Commonwealth,  152  Mass.,  28;  24  
was   at   the   time   an   employee   of   the   defendant,   and   we   have   also   fixed   the   amount   of   N.  E.,  854;  8  L.  R.A.,  399)  
damages  sustained  by  the  plaintiff  as  a  result  of  the  collision.  Does  the  Act  authorize  us  to    
hold  that  the  Government  is  legally  liable  for  that  amount?  If  not,  we  must  look  elsewhere   It  being  quite  clear  that  Act  No.  2457  does  not  operate  to  extend  the  Government's  liability  
for  such  authority,  if  it  exists.   to  any  cause  not  previously  recognized,  we  will  now  examine  the  substantive  law  touching  
  the   defendant's   liability   for   the   negligent   acts   of   its   officers,   agents,   and   employees.  
Paragraph  5  of  article  1903  of  the  civil  Code  reads:  
 
  18  
 "The   state   is   liable   in   this   sense   when   it   acts   through   a   special   agent,   but    
not   when   the   damage   should   have   been   caused   by   the   official   to   whom   The   State   is,   of   course,   immune   from   suit   in   the   sense   that   it   cannot,   as   a   rule,   be   sued  
properly   it   pertained   to   do   the   act   performed,   in   which   case   the   without  its  consent.  But  it  is  axiomatic  that  in  filing  an  action,  it  divests  itself  of  its  sovereign  
provisions  of  the  preceding  article  shall  be  applicable."   character  and  sheds  its  immunity  from  suit,  descending  to  the  level  of  an  ordinary  litigant.  
  The  PCGG  cannot  claim  a  superior  or  preferred  status  to  the  State,  even  while  assuming  to  
Amigable  vs.  Cuenca  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐26400,  February  29,  1972]   represent  or  act  for  the  State.    
     
THE  DOCTRINE  OF  STATE  IMMUNITY  CANNOT  BE  USED  TO  PERPETRATE  INJUSTICE.  -­‐  In   The   suggestion   that   the   State   makes   no   implied   waiver   of   immunity   by   filing   suit   except  
the   case   of   Ministerio   vs.   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Cebu,   1   involving   a   claim   for   payment   of   when  in  so  doing  it  acts  in,  or  in  matters  concerning,  its  proprietary  or  non-­‐governmental  
the  value  of  a  portion  of  land  used  for  the  widening  of  the  Gorordo  Avenue  in  Cebu  City,  this   capacity,   is   unacceptable;   it   attempts   a   distinction   without   support   in   principle   or  
Court,   through   Mr.   Justice   Enrique   M.   Fernando,   held   that   where   the   government   takes   precedent.  On  the  contrary  —  
away   property   from   a   private   landowner   for   public   use   without   going   through   the   legal    
process   of   expropriation   or   negotiated   sale,   the   aggrieved   party   may   properly   maintain   a   "The  consent  of  the  State  to  be  sued  may  be  given  expressly  or  impliedly.  
suit   against   the   government   without   thereby   violating   the   doctrine   of   governmental   Express   consent   may   be   manifested   either   through   a   general   law   or   a  
immunity  from  suit  without  its  consent.  We  there  said:   special   law.   Implied   consent   is   given   when   the   State   itself   commences  
  litigation  or  when  it  enters  into  a  contract."      
".   .   .   If   the   constitutional   mandate   that   the   owner   be   compensated   for    
property   taken   for   public   use   were   to   be   respected,   as   it   should,   then   a   "The  immunity  of  the  State  from  suits  does  not  deprive  it  of  the  right  to  
suit  of  this  character  should  not  be  summarily  dismissed.  The  doctrine  of   sue  private  parties  in  its  own  courts.  The  state  as  plaintiff  may  avail  itself  
governmental   immunity   from   suit   cannot   serve   as   an   instrument   for   of   the   different   forms   of   actions   open   to   private   litigants.   In   short,   by  
perpetrating  an  injustice  on  a  citizen.  Had  the  government  followed  the   taking   the   initiative   in   an   action   against   the   private   parties,   the   state  
procedure  indicated  by  the  governing  law  at  the  time,  a  complaint  would   surrenders   its   privileged   position   and   comes   down   to   the   level   of   the  
have  been  filed  by  it,  and  only  upon  payment  of  the  compensation  fixed   defendant.   The   latter   automatically   acquires,   within   certain   limits,   the  
by   the   judgment,   or   after   tender   to   the   party   entitled   to   such   payment   of   right  to  set  up  whatever  claims  and  other  defenses  he  might  have  against  
the  amount  fixed,  may  it  have  the  right  to  enter  in  and  upon  the  land  so   the   state.   .   .   .   (Sinco,   Philippine   Political   Law,   Tenth   E.,   pp.   36-­‐37,   citing  
condemned,   to   appropriate   the   same   to   the   public   use   defined   in   the   U.S.  vs.  Ringgold,  8  Pet.  150,  8  L.ed.  899)'"    51    
judgment.'   If   there   were   an   observance   of   procedural   regularity,    
petitioners   would   not   be   in   the   sad   plaint   they   are   now.   It   is   unthinkable   It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  in  exercising  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  the  State  exercises  
then  that  precisely  because  there  was  a  failure  to  abide  by  what  the  law   its   jus   imperii,   as   distinguished   from   its   proprietary   rights   or   jus   gestionis.   Yet,   even   in   that  
requires,  the  government  would  stand  to  benefit.  It  is  just  as  important,  if   area,  it  has  been  held  that  where  private  property  has  been  taken  in  expropriation  without  
not   more   so,   that   there   be   fidelity   to   legal   norms   on   the   part   of   just   compensation   being   paid,   the   defense   of   immunity   from   suit   cannot   be   set   up   by   the  
officialdom   if   the   rule   of   law   were   to   be   maintained.   It   is   not   too   much   to   State  against  an  action  for  payment  by  the  owner.  
say  that  when  the  government  takes  any  property  for  public  use,  which    
is   conditioned   upon   the   payment   of   just   compensation,   to   be   judicially   Republic  vs.  Feliciano  [G.R.  No.  70853,  March  12,  1987]  
ascertained,   it   makes   manifest   that   it   submits   to   the   jurisdiction   of   a    
court.  There  is  no  thought  then  that  the  doctrine  of  immunity  from  suit   We   find   the   petition   meritorious.   The   doctrine   of   non-­‐suability   of   the   State   has   proper  
could  still  be  appropriately  invoked."   application   in   this   case.   The   plaintiff   has   impleaded   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   as  
  defendant   in   an   action   for   recovery   of   ownership   and   possession   of   a   parcel   of   land,  
Republic  vs.  Sandiganbayan    [G.R.  No.  90478,  November  21,  1991]   bringing  the  State  to  court  just  like  any  private  person  who  is  claimed  to  be  usurping  a  piece  
    of   property.   A   suit   for   the   recovery   of   property   is   not   an   action   in   rem,   but   an   action   in  
STATE   IMPLIEDLY   WAIVES   ITS   IMMUNITY   WHEN   IT   COMMENCES   LITIGATION.   -­‐   So,   too,   personam.       It   is   an   action   directed   against   a   specific   party   or   parties,   and   any   judgment  
the   PCGG's   postulation   that   none   of   its   members   may   be   "required   to   testify   or   produce   therein   binds   only   such   party   or   parties.   The   complaint   filed   by   plaintiff,   the   private  
evidence   in   any   judicial   .   .   .   proceeding   concerning   matters   within   its   official   cognizance,"   respondent   herein,   is   directed   against   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines,   represented   by   the  
has   no   application   to   a   judicial   proceeding   it   has   itself   initiated.   As   just   suggested,   the   act   of   Land  Authority,  a  governmental  agency  created  by  Republic  Act  No.  3844.  
bringing  suit  must  entail  a  waiver  of  the  exemption  from  giving  evidence;  by  bringing  suit  it    
brings  itself  within  the  operation  and  scope  of  all  the  rules  governing  civil  actions,  including   By   its   caption   and   its   allegation   and   prayer,   the   complaint   is   clearly   a   suit   against   the   State,  
the  rights  and  duties  under  the  rules  of  discovery.  Otherwise,  the  absurd  would  have  to  be   which   under   settled   jurisprudence   is   not   permitted,   except   upon   a   showing   that   the   State  
conceded,   that   while   the   parties   it   has   impleaded   as   defendants   may   be   required   to   has   consented   to   be   sued,   either   expressly   or   by   implication   through   the   use   of   statutory  
"disgorge  all  the  facts"  within  their  knowledge  and  in  their  possession,  it  may  not  itself  be   language   too   plain   to   be   misinterpreted.       There   is   no   such   showing   in   the   instant   case.  
subject  to  a  like  compulsion.  
  19  
Worse,  the  complaint  itself  fails  to  allege  the  existence  of  such  consent.  This  is  a  fatal  defect,   and  can  thus  be  deemed  to  have  tacitly  given  its  consent  to  be  sued  only  when  it  enters  into  
and  on  this  basis  alone,  the  complaint  should  have  been  dismissed.   business   contracts.   It   does   not   apply   where   the   contract   relates   to   the   exercise   of   its  
  sovereign  functions.  In  this  case  the  projects  are  an  integral  part  of  the  naval  base  which  is  
THE   STATE   IMMUNITY   MAY   BE   INVOKED   AT   ANY   STAGE   OF   THE   PROCEEDINGS.     -­‐   The   devoted  to  the  defense  of  both  the  United  States  and  the  Philippines,  indisputably  a  function  
failure  of  the  petitioner  to  assert  the  defense  of  immunity  from  suit  when  the  case  was  tried   of   the   government   of   the   highest   order;   they   are   not   utilized   for   nor   dedicated   to  
before  the  court  a  quo,  as  alleged  by  private  respondent,  is  not  fatal.  It  is  now  settled  that   commercial  or  business  purposes.  
such  defense  "may  be  invoked  by  the  courts  sua  sponte  at  any  stage  of  the  proceedings."    
  That  the  correct  test  for  the  application  of  State  immunity  is  not  the  conclusion  of  a  contract  
EXPRESS   WAIVER   OF   IMMUNITY   MUST   BE   THROUGH   LEGISLATIVE   ACT.     -­‐   Private   by  a  State  but  the  legal  nature  of  the  act  is  shown  in  Syquia  vs.  Lopez,  84  Phil.  312  (1949).  In  
respondent   contends   that   the   consent   of   petitioner   may   be   read   from   the   Proclamation   that   case   the  plaintiffs   leased  three  apartment  buildings  to  the  United  States  of  America  for  
itself,  when  it  established  the  reservation  "subject  to  private  rights,  if  any  there  be."  We  do   the  use  of  its  military  officials.  The  plaintiffs  sued  to  recover  possession  of  the  premises  on  
not   agree.   No   such   consent   can   be   drawn   from   the   language   of   the   Proclamation.   The   the   ground   that   the   term   of   the   leases   had   expired,   They   also   asked   for   increased   rentals  
exclusion  of  existing  private  rights  from  the  reservation  established  by  Proclamation  No.  90   until  the  apartments  shall  have  been  vacated.  
can   not   be   construed   as   a   waiver   of   the   immunity   of   the   State   from   suit.   Waiver   of    
immunity,   being   a   derogation   of   sovereignty,   will   not   be   inferred   lightly,   but   must   be   The  Holy  See  vs.  Rosario    [G.R.  No.  101949,  December  1,  1994]  
construed   in   strictissimi   juris.       Moreover,   the   Proclamation   is   not   a   legislative   act.   The    
consent   of   the   State   to   be   sued   must   emanate   from   statutory   authority.   Waiver   of   State   PROCEDURE   IN   INVOKING   STATE   IMMUNITY   BY   FOREIGN   STATES.   -­‐   In   Public  
immunity  can  only  be  made  by  an  act  of  the  legislative  body.   International   Law,   when   a   state   or   international   agency   wishes   to   plead   sovereign   or  
  diplomatic  immunity  in  a  foreign  court,  it  requests  the  Foreign  Office  of  the  state  where  it  is  
Neither   is   there   merit   in   respondent's   submission.   which   the   respondent   appellate   court   sued  to  convey  to  the  court  that  said  defendant  is  entitled  to  immunity.  
sustained,  on  the  basis  of  our  decision  in  the  Begosa  case,    that  the  present  action  is  not  a    
suit   against   the   State   within   the   rule   of   State   immunity   from   suit,   because   plaintiff   does   not   In   the   United   States,   the   procedure   followed   is   the   process   of   "suggestion,"   where   the  
seek   to   divest   the   Government   of   any   of   its   lands   or   its   funds.   It   is   contended   that   the   foreign   state   or   the   international   organization   sued   in   an   American   court   requests   the  
complaint  involves  land  not  owned  by  the  State,  but  private  land  belonging  to  the  plaintiff,   Secretary  of  State  to  make  a  determination  as  to  whether  it  is  entitled  to  immunity.  If  the  
hence  the  Government  is  not  being  divested  of  any  of  its  properties.  There  is  some  sophistry   Secretary   of   State   finds   that   the   defendant   is   immune   from   suit,   he,   in   turn,   asks   the  
involved   in   this   argument,   since   the   character   of   the   land   sought   to   be   recovered   still   Attorney   General   to   submit   to   the   court   a   "suggestion"   that   the   defendant   is   entitled   to  
remains   to   be   established,   and   the   plaintiff's   action   is   directed   against   the   State   precisely   to   immunity.   In   England,   a   similar   procedure   is   followed,   only   the   Foreign   Office   issues   a  
compel  the  latter  to  litigate  the  ownership  and  possession  of  the  property.  In  other  words,   certification   to   that   effect   instead   of   submitting   a   "suggestion"   (O'Connell,   I   International  
the   plaintiff   is   out   to   establish   that   he   is   the   owner   of   the   land   in   question   based,   Law   130   [1965];   Note:   Immunity   from   Suit   of   Foreign   Sovereign   Instrumentalities   and  
incidentally,   on   an   informacion   posesoria   of   dubious   value,   and   he   seeks   to   establish   his   Obligations,  50  Yale  Law  Journal  1088  [1941]).  
claim  of  ownership  by  suing  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines  in  an  action  in  personam.    
  In   the   Philippines,   the   practice   is   for   the   foreign   government   or   the   international  
    organization   to   first   secure   an   executive   endorsement   of   its   claim   of   sovereign   or  
United  States  vs.  Ruiz  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐35645,  May  22,  1985]   diplomatic  immunity.  But  how  the  Philippine  Foreign  Office  conveys  its  endorsement  to  the  
  courts   varies.   In   International   Catholic   Migration   Commission   v.   Calleja,   190   SCRA   130  
RESTRICTIVE   THEORY   OF   STATE   IMMUNITY.   The   traditional   rule   of   State   immunity   (1990),  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  just  sent  a  letter  directly  to  the  Secretary  of  Labor  
exempts   a   State   from   being   sued   in   the   courts   of   another   State   without   its   consent   or   and   Employment,   informing   the   latter   that   the   respondent-­‐employer   could   not   be   sued  
waiver.  This  rule  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  principles  of  independence  and  equality   because  it  enjoyed  diplomatic  immunity.  In  World  Health  Organization  v.  Aquino,  48  SCRA  
of   States.   However,   the   rules   of   International   Law   are   not   petrified;   they   are   constantly   242  (1972),  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  sent  the  trial  court  a  telegram  to  that  effect.  In  
developing   and   evolving.   And   because   the   activities   of   states   have   multiplied,   it   has   been   Baer  v.  Tizon,  57  SCRA  1  (1974),  the  U.S.  Embassy  asked  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  
necessary  to  distinguish  them  —  between  sovereign  and  governmental  acts  (jure  imperii)   request   the   Solicitor   General   to   make,   in   behalf   of   the   Commander   of   the   United   States  
and   private,   commercial   and   proprietary   acts   (jure   gestionis).   The   result   is   that   State   Naval   Base   at   Olongapo   City,   Zambales,   a   "suggestion"   to   respondent   Judge.   The   Solicitor  
immunity   now   extends   only   to   acts   jure   imperii.   The   restrictive   application   of   State   General  embodied  the  "suggestion"  in  a  Manifestation  and  Memorandum  as  amicus  curiae.  
immunity   is   now   the   rule   in   the   United   States,   the   United   Kingdom   and   other   states   in    
western  Europe.  (See  Coquia  and  Defensor-­‐Santiago,  Public  International  Law,  pp.  207-­‐209   TWO   CONFLICTING   CONCEPTS   OF   SOVEREIGN   IMMUNITY.   -­‐   There   are   two   conflicting  
[1984].)       concepts  of  sovereign  immunity,  each  widely  held  and  firmly  established.  According  to  the  
  classical  or  absolute  theory,  a  sovereign  cannot,  without  its  consent,  be  made  a  respondent  
The  restrictive  application  of  State  immunity  is  proper  only  when  the  proceedings  arise  out   in   the   courts   of   another   sovereign.   According   to   the   newer   or   restrictive   theory,   the  
of  commercial  transactions  of  the  foreign  sovereign,  its  commercial  activities  or  economic   immunity   of   the   sovereign   is   recognized   only   with   regard   to   public   acts   or   acts   jure   imperii  
affairs.  Stated  differently,  a  State  may  be  said  to  have  descended  to  the  level  of  an  individual   of  a  state,  but  not  with  regard  to  private  acts  or  acts  jure  gestionis  (United  States  of  America  
  20  
v.  Ruiz,  136  SCRA  487  [1987];  Coquia  and  Defensor-­‐Santiago,  Public  International  Law  194   not   dissimilar.   So   it   was   indicated   in   a   recent   decision,   Providence   Washington   Insurance  
[1984]).       Co.  v.  Republic  of  the  Philippines,        with  its  affirmation  that  "a  continued  adherence  to  the  
  doctrine   of   non-­‐suability   is   not   to   be   deplored   for   as   against   the   inconvenience   that   may   be  
In   the   absence   of   legislation   defining   what   activities   and   transactions   shall   be   considered   caused   private   parties,   the   loss   of   governmental   efficiency   and   the   obstacle   to   the  
"commercial"   and   as   constituting   acts   jure   gestionis,   we   have   to   come   out   with   our   own   performance   of   its   multifarious   functions   are   far   greater   if   such   a   fundamental   principle  
guidelines,  tentative  they  may  be.   were  abandoned  and  the  availability  of  judicial  remedy  were  not  thus  restricted.  With  the  
  well  known  propensity  on  the  part  of  our  people  to  go  to  court,  at  the  least  provocation,  the  
Certainly,  the  mere  entering  into  a  contract  by  a  foreign  state  with  a  private  party  cannot  be   loss  of  time  and  energy  required  to  defend  against  law  suits,  in  the  absence  of  such  a  basic  
the   ultimate   test.   Such   an   act   can   only   be   the   start   of   the   inquiry.   The   logical   question   is   principle  that  constitutes  such  an  effective  obstacle,  could  very  well  be  imagined."        
whether  the  foreign  state  is  engaged  in  the  activity  in  the  regular  course  of  business.  If  the    
foreign   state   is   not   engaged   regularly   in   a   business   or   trade,   the   particular   act   or   This   fundamental   postulate   underlying   the   1935   Constitution   is   now   made   explicit   in   the  
transaction  must  then  be  tested  by  its  nature.  If  the  act  is  in  pursuit  of  a  sovereign  activity,   revised   charter.   It   is   therein   expressly   provided:   "The   State   may   not   be   sued   without   its  
or   an   incident   thereof,   then   it   is   an   act   jure   imperii,   especially   when   it   is   not   undertaken   for   consent."      A  corollary,  both  dictated  by  logic  and  sound  sense  from  such  a  basic  concept  is  
gain  or  profit.   that  public  funds  cannot  be  the  object  of  a  garnishment  proceeding  even  if  the  consent  to  be  
  sued  had  been  previously  granted  and  the  state  liability  adjudged.  Thus  in  the  recent  case  of  
REMEDY   OF   THE   COMPLAINANTS   WHEN   THE   STATE   IMMUNITY   IS   INVOKED.   -­‐   Private   Commissioner  of  Public  Highways  v.  San  Diego,        such  a  well-­‐settled  doctrine  was  restated  
respondent  is  not  left  without  any  legal  remedy  for  the  redress  of  its  grievances.  Under  both   in   the   opinion   of   Justice   Teehankee:   "The   universal   rule   that   where   the   State   gives   its  
Public  International  Law  and  Transnational  Law,  a  person  who  feels  aggrieved  by  the  acts   consent  to  be  sued  by  private  parties  either  by  general  or  special  law,  it  may  limit  claimant's  
of  a  foreign  sovereign  can  ask  his  own  government  to  espouse  his  cause  through  diplomatic   action  `only  up  to  the  completion  of  proceedings  anterior  to  the  stage  of  execution'  and  that  
channels.   the  power  of  the  Courts  ends  when  the  judgment  is  rendered,  since  government  funds  and  
  properties   may   not   be   seized   under   writs   of   execution   or   garnishment   to   satisfy   such  
Private   respondent   can   ask   the   Philippine   government,   through   the   Foreign   Office,   to   judgments,   is   based   on   obvious   considerations   of   public   policy.   Disbursements   of   public  
espouse   its   claims   against   the   Holy   See.   Its   first   task   is   to   persuade   the   Philippine   funds   must   be   covered   by   the   corresponding   appropriation   as   required   by   law.   The  
government   to   take   up   with   the   Holy   See   the   validity   of   its   claims.   Of   course,   the   Foreign   functions   and   public   services   rendered   by   the   State   cannot   be   allowed   to   be   paralyzed   or  
Office   shall   first   make   a   determination   of   the   impact   of   its   espousal   on   the   relations   disrupted   by   the   diversion   of   public   funds   from   their   legitimate   and   specific   objects,   as  
between   the   Philippine   government   and   the   Holy   See   (Young,   Remedies   of   Private   appropriated   by   law."           Such   a   principle   applies   even   to   an   attempted   garnishment   of   a  
Claimants   Against   Foreign   States,   Selected   Readings   on   Protection   by   Law   of   Private   salary   that   had   accrued   in   favor   of   an   employee.   Director   of   Commerce   and   Industry   v.  
Foreign  Investments  905,  919  [1964]).  Once  the  Philippine  government  decides  to  espouse   Concepcion,          speaks  to  that  effect.  Justice  Malcolm  as  ponente  left  no  doubt  on  that  score.  
the  claim,  the  latter  ceases  to  be  a  private  cause.     Thus:   "A   rule,   which   has   never   been   seriously   questioned,   is   that   money   in   the   hands   of  
  public  officers,  although  it  may  be  due  government  employees,  is  not  liable  to  the  creditors  
According   to   the   Permanent   Court   of   International   Justice,   the   forerunner   of   the   of   these   employees   in   the   process   of   garnishment.   One   reason   is,   that   the   State,   by   virtue   of  
International  Court  of  Justice:   its   sovereignty,   may   not   be   sued   in   its   own   courts   except   by   express   authorization   by   the  
  Legislature,  and  to  subject  its  officers  to  garnishment  would  be  to  permit  indirectly  what  is  
"By   taking   up   the   case   of   one   of   its   subjects   and   by   reporting   to   prohibited  directly.  Another  reason  is  that  moneys  sought  to  be  garnished,  as  long  as  they  
diplomatic   action   or   international   judicial   proceedings   on   his   behalf,   a   remain   in   the   hands   of   the   disbursing   officer   of   the   Government,   belong   to   the   latter,  
State   is   in   reality   asserting   its   own   rights   —   its   right   to   ensure,   in   the   although   the   defendant   in   garnishment   may   be   entitled   to   a   specific   portion   thereof.   And  
person   of   its   subjects,   respect   for   the   rules   of   international   law   (The   still   another   reason   which   covers   both   of   the   foregoing   is   that   every   consideration   of   public  
Mavrommatis   Palestine   Concessions,   1   Hudson,   World   Court   Reports   policy  forbids  it."  
293,  302  [1924]).    
  Department  of  Agriculture  vs.  NLRC  [G.R.  No.  104269,  November  11,  1993]  
   
Republic  vs.  Villasor    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐30671,  November  28,  1973]   FORMS  OF  WAIVER  OF  IMMUNITY.  -­‐  The  basic  postulate  enshrined  in  the  constitution  that  
  "(t)he  State  may  not  be  sued  without  its  consent,"  reflects  nothing  less  than  a  recognition  of  
FUNDS   OF   THE   GOVERNMENT   ARE   NOT   SUBJECT   TO   GARNISHMENT.  –   It   is   a   fundamental   the   sovereign   character   of   the   State   and   an   express   affirmation   of   the   unwritten   rule  
postulate  of  constitutionalism  flowing  from  the  juristic  concept  of  sovereignty  that  the  state   effectively   insulating   it   from   the   jurisdiction   of   courts.   It   is   based   on   the   very   essence   of  
as   well   as   its   government   is   immune   from   suit   unless   it   gives   its   consent.   It   is   readily   sovereignty.  As  has  been  aptly  observed,  by  Justice  Holmes,  a  sovereign  is  exempt  from  suit,  
understandable   why   it   must   be   so.   In   the   classic   formulation   of   Holmes:   "A   sovereign   is   not   because   of   any   formal   conception   or   obsolete   theory,   but   on   the   logical   and   practical  
exempt   from   suit,   not   because   of   any   formal   conception   or   obsolete   theory,   but   on   the   ground  that  there  can  be  no  legal  right  as  against  the  authority  that  makes  the  law  on  which  
logical   and   practical   ground   that   there   can   be   no   legal   right   as   against   the   authority   that   the   right   depends.     True,   the   doctrine,   not   too   infrequently,   is   derisively   called   "the   royal  
makes  the  law  on  which  the  right  depends."      Sociological  jurisprudence  supplies  an  answer   prerogative   of   dishonesty"   because   it   grants   the   state   the   prerogative   to   defeat   any  
  21  
legitimate   claim   against   it   by   simply   invoking   its   non-­‐suability.     We   have   had   occasion   to   does,   in   effect,   is   to   give   the   other   party   an   opportunity   to   prove,   if   it   can,   that   the   State   has  
explain  in  its  defense,  however,  that  a  continued  adherence  to  the  doctrine  of  non-­‐suability   a  liability.  In  Republic  vs.  Villasor,    this  Court,  in  nullifying  the  issuance  of  an  alias  writ  of  
cannot   be   deplored,   for   the   loss   of   governmental   efficiency   and   the   obstacle   to   the   execution  directed  against  the  funds  of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  to  satisfy  a  final  
performance   of   its   multifarious   functions   would   be   far   greater   in   severity   than   the   and  executory  judgment,  has  explained,  thus  —  
inconvenience   that   may   be   caused   private   parties,   if   such   fundamental   principle   is   to   be    
abandoned  and  the  availability  of  judicial  remedy  is  not  to  be  accordingly  restricted.     The   universal   rule   that   where   the   State   gives   its   consent   to   be   sued   by  
  private   parties   either   by   general   or   special   law,   it   may   limit   claimant's  
The  rule,  in  any  case,  is  not  really  absolute  for  it  does  not  say  that  the  state  may  not  be  sued   action  "only  up  to  the  completion  of  proceedings  anterior  to  the  stage  of  
under  any  circumstance.  On  the  contrary,  as  correctly  phrased,  the  doctrine  only  conveys,   execution"  and  that  the  power  of  the  Courts  ends  when  the  judgment  is  
"the  state  may  not  be  sued  without  its  consent;"  its  clear  import  then  is  that  the  State  may  at   rendered,   since   government   funds   and   properties   may   not   be   seized  
times   be   sued.     The   States'   consent   may   be   given   either   expressly   or   impliedly.   Express   under   writs   of   execution   or   garnishment   to   satisfy   such   judgments,   is  
consent   may   be   made   through   a   general   law   or   a   special   law.     In   this   jurisdiction,   the   based   on   obvious   considerations   of   public   policy.   Disbursements   of  
general  law  waiving  the  immunity  of  the  state  from  suit  is  found  in  Act  No.  3083,  where  the   public   funds   must   be   covered   by   the   corresponding   appropriation   as  
Philippine  government  "consents  and  submits  to  be  sued  upon  any  money  claim  involving   required   by   law.   The   functions   and   public   services   rendered   by   the   State  
liability  arising  from  contract,  express  or  implied,  which  could  serve  as  a  basis  of  civil  action   cannot  be  allowed  to  be  paralyzed  or  disrupted  by  the  diversion  of  public  
between  private  parties."    Implied  consent,  on  the  other  hand,  is  conceded  when  the  State   funds  from  their  legitimate  and  specific  objects,  as  appropriated  by  law.  
itself  commences  litigation,  thus  opening  itself  to  a  counterclaim    or  when  it  enters  into  a    
contract.    In  this  situation,  the  government  is  deemed  to  have  descended  to  the  level  of  the   PNB  vs.  Pabalan    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐33112,  June  15,  1978]  
other   contracting   party   and   to   have   divested   itself   of   its   sovereign   immunity.   This   rule,    
relied  upon  by  the  NLRC  and  the  private  respondents,  is  not,  however,  without  qualification.   DOCTRINE   OF   STATE   IMMUNITY   FROM   SUIT;   A   GOVERNMENT   OWNED   AND  
Not   all   contracts   entered   into   by   the   government   operate   as   a   waiver   of   its   non-­‐suability;   CONTROLLED  CORPORATION  HAS  DISTINCT  PERSONALITY  OF  ITS  OWN;  FUNDS  OF  THE  
distinction   must   still   be   made   between   one   which   is   executed   in   the   exercise   of   its   CORPORATE   ENTITY   MAY   BE   PROCEEDED   AGAINST.   —   The   doctrine   of   non-­‐suability  
sovereign  functions  and  another  which  is  done  in  its  proprietary  capacity.   cannot   be   legally   set   forth   as   a   bar   or   impediment   to   a   notice   of   garnishment.   In   National  
  Shipyard  and  Steel  Corporation  v.  Court  of  Industrial  Relations,  118  Phil.  782  (1963),  it  was  
PROCEDURE   IN   ENFORCING   THE   LIABILITY   OF   THE   STATE.   -­‐   But,   be   that   as   it   may,   the   explicitly  stated:  "That  allegation  to  the  effect  that  the  funds  of  the  NASSCO  are  public  funds  
claims   of   private   respondents,   i.e.,   for   underpayment   of   wages,   holiday   pay,   overtime   pay   of   the   government,   and   that,   as   such   the   same   may   not   be   garnished,   attached   or   levied  
and   similar   other   items,   arising   from   the   Contract   for   Security   Services,   clearly   constitute   upon,  is  untenable  for,  as  a  government  owned  and  controlled  corporation,  the  NASSCO  has  
money  claims.  Act  No.  3083,  aforecited,  gives  the  consent  of  the  State  to  be  "sued  upon  any   a   personality   of   its   own,   distinct   and   separate   from   that   of   the   Government.   It   has   —  
moneyed   claim   involving   liability   arising   from   contract,   express   or   implied,   .   .   ."   Pursuant,   pursuant  to  Section  2  of  Executive  Order  No.  356,  dated  October  23,  1950  .  .  .,  pursuant  to  
however,   to   Commonwealth   Act   ("C.A.")   No.   327,   as   amended   by   Presidential   Decree   which   the   NASSCO   has   been   established   —   "all   the   powers   of   a   corporation   under   the  
("P.D.")   No.   1445,   the   money   claim   should   first   be   brought   to   the   Commission   on   Audit.   Corporation  Law  .  .  .  "  Accordingly,  it  may  sue  and  be  sued  and  may  be  subjected  to  court  
Thus,  in  Carabao,  Inc.,  vs.  Agricultural  Productivity  Commission,      we  ruled:   processes  just  like  any  other  corporation  (Section  13,  Act  No.  1459,  as  amended.)  
     
"(C)laimants   have   to   prosecute   their   money   claims   against   the   Rayo  vs.  CFI  of  Bulacan    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐55273-­‐83,  December  19,  1981]  
Government   under   Commonwealth   Act   327,   stating   that   Act   3083   stands    
now   merely   as   the   general   law   waiving   the   State's   immunity   from   suit,   GOVERNMENT   OWNED   AND   CONTROLLED   CORPORATION   HAS   A   SEPARATE  
subject   to   its   general   limitation   expressed   in   Section   7   thereof   that   'no   PERSONALITY   INDEPENDENT   OF   THE   GOVERNMENT,   AND   THUS,   THE   QUESTION   OF  
execution  shall  issue  upon  any  judgment  rendered  by  any  Court  against   SUABILITY   MAY   BE   DETERMINED   FROM   ITS   CHARTER.   -­‐   It   is   not   necessary   to   write   an  
the   Government   of   the   (Philippines),   and   that   the   conditions   provided   in   extended   dissertation   on   whether   or   not   the   NPC   performs   a   governmental   function   with  
Commonwealth  Act  327  for  filing  money  claims  against  the  Government   respect  to  the  management  and  operation  of  the  Angat  Dam.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  
must  be  strictly  observed.'  "   government  has  organized  a  private  corporation,  put  money  in  it  and  has  allowed  it  to  sue  
  and   be   sued   in   any   court   under   its   charter.   (R.A.   No.   6395,   Sec.   3[d].)   As   a   government  
We   fail   to   see   any   substantial   conflict   or   inconsistency   between   the   provisions   of   C.A.   No.   owned   and   controlled   corporation,   it   has   a   personality   of   its   own,   distinct   and   separate  
327   and   the   Labor   Code   with   respect   to   money   claims   against   the   State.   The   Labor   Code,   in   from   that   of   the   Government.   (See   National   Shipyards   and   Steel   Corp.   vs.   CIR,   et   al.,   L-­‐
relation  to  Act  No.  3083,  provides  the  legal  basis  for  the  State  liability  but  the  prosecution,   17874,   August   31,   1963,   8   SCRA   781.)   Moreover,   the   charter   provision   that   the   NPC   can  
enforcement  or  satisfaction  thereof  must  still  be  pursued  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and   "sue   and   be   sued   in   any   court"   is   without   qualification   on   the   cause   of   action   and  
procedures  laid  down  in  C.A.  No.  327,  as  amended  by  P.D.  1445.   accordingly  it  can  include  a  tort  claim  such  as  the  one  instituted  by  petitioners.  
   
When  the  State  gives  its  consent  to  be  sued,  it  does  not  thereby  necessarily  consent  to  an    
unrestrained   execution   against   it.   Tersely   put,   when   the   State   waives   its   immunity,   all   it  
  22  
 Bureau   of   Printing   vs.   Bureau   of   Printing   Employees   Ass.   [G.R.   No.   L-­‐15751,    
January  28,  1961]   Mobil  Phils.  Exploration  vs.  Customs  Arrastre  Service  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐23139,  December  
  17,  1966]  
GOVERNMENTAL   ENTITIES,   THOUGH   INCEDENTALLY   PERFORMING   PROPRIETARY    
FUNCTIONS,  ARE  ENTITLED  TO  STATE  IMMUNITY.    -­‐  The  Bureau  of  Printing  is  an  office  of   PROPRIETARY   FUNCTIONS   NECESSARY   TO   THE   GOVERNMENTAL   PURPOSES   OF   THE
the   Government   created   by   the   Administrative   Code   of   1916   (Act   No.   2657).   As   such   GOVERNMENT  ENTITY  ARE  COVERED  BY  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  STATE  IMMUNITY.  -­‐  The  situation  here
instrumentality   of   the   Government,   it   operates   under   the   direct   supervision   of   the   is   not   materially   different.   The   Bureau   of   Customs,   to   repeat,   is   part   of   the   Department   of   Finance
Executive   Secretary,   Office   of   the   President,   and   is   "charged   with   the   execution   of   all   (Sec.   81,   Rev.   Adm.   Code),   with   no   personality   of   its   own   apart   from   that   of   the   national   government.
printing  and  binding,  including  work  incidental  to  those  processes,  required  by  the  National   Its   primary   function   is   governmental,   that   of   assessing   and   collecting   lawful   revenues   from   imported
Government  and  such  other  work  of  the  same  character  as  said  Bureau  may,  by  law  or  by   articles   and   all   other   tariff   and   customs   duties,   fees,   charges,   fines   and   penalties   (Sec.   602,   R.   A.
order   of   the   (Secretary   of   Finance)   Executive   Secretary,   be   authorized   to   undertake   .   .   .."   1937).  To  this  function,  arrastre  service  is  a  necessary  incident.  For  practical  reasons  said  revenues
(Sec.   1644,   Rev.   Adm.   Code.)   It   has   no   corporate   existence,   and   its   appropriations   are   and   customs   duties   can   not   be   assessed   and   collected   by   simply   receiving   the   importer's   or   ship
provided  for  in  the  General  Appropriations  Act.  Designed  to  meet  the  printing  needs  of  the   agent's  or  consignee's  declaration  of  merchandise  being  imported  and  imposing  the  duty  provided  in
Government,   it   is   primarily   a   service   bureau   and   is   obviously,   not   engaged   in   business   or   the   Tariff   law.   Customs   authorities   and   officers   must   see   to   it   that   the   declaration   tallies   with   the
occupation  for  pecuniary  profit.   merchandise  actually  landed.  And  this  checking  up  requires  that  the  landed  merchandise  be  hauled
  from   the   ship's   side   to   a   suitable   place   in   the   customs   premises   to   enable   said   customs   officers   to
Indeed,  as  an  office  of  the  Government,  without  any  corporate  or  juridical  personality,  the   make  it,  that  is,  it  requires  arrastre  operation.    
Bureau   of   Printing   cannot   be   sued.   (Sec.   1,   Rule   3,   Rules   of   Court.)   Any   suit,   action   or    
proceeding   against   it,   if   it   were   to   produce   any   effect,   would   actually   be   a   suit,   action   or   Clearly,   therefore,   although   said   arrastre   function   may   be   deemed   proprietary,   it   is   a   necessary
proceeding   against   the   Government   itself,   and   the   rule   is   settled   that   the   Government   incident   of   the   primary   and   governmental   function   of   the   Bureau   of   Customs,   so   that   engaging   in   the
cannot  be  sued  without  its  consent,  much  less  over  its  objection.  (See  Metran  vs.  Paredes,   same  does  not  necessarily  render  said  Bureau  liable  to  suit.  For  otherwise,  it  could  not  perform  its
45  Off.  Gaz.,  2835;  Angat  River  Irrigation  System,  et  al.  vs.  Angat  River  Workers'  Union,  et   governmental  function  without  necessarily  exposing  itself  to  suit.  Sovereign  immunity,   granted  as  to
al.,  G.R.  Nos.  L-­‐10943-­‐44,  December  28,  1957).   the  end,  should  not  be  denied  as  to  the  necessary  means  to  that  end.  
   
It  is  true,  as  stated  in  the  order  complained  of,  that  the  Bureau  of  Printing  receives  outside   Civil  Aeronautics  Administration  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐51806,  November  8,  1988]  
jobs   and   that   many   of   its   employees   are   paid   for   overtime   work   on   regular   working   days    
and   on   holidays,   but   these   facts   do   not   justify   the   conclusion   that   its   functions   are   THE   DOCTRINE   OF   STATE   IMMUNITY   DOES   NOT   APPLY   TO   GOVERNMENT   OWNED   AND  
"exclusively   proprietary   in   nature."   Overtime   work   in   the   Bureau   of   Printing   is   done   only   CONTROLLED   CORPORATIONS.   -­‐   This   doctrine   has   been   reaffirmed   in   the   recent   case   of  
when   the   interest   of   the   service   so   requires   (sec.   566,   Rev.   Adm.   Code).   As   a   matter   of   Malong   v.   Philippine   National   Railways   [G.R.   No.   L-­‐49930,   August   7,   1985,   138   SCRA   63],  
administrative   policy,   the   overtime   compensation   may   be   paid,   but   such   payment   is   where  it  was  held  that  the  Philippine  National  Railways,  although  owned  and  operated  by  
discretionary   with   the   head   of   the   Bureau   depending   upon   its   current   appropriations,   so   the   government,   was   not   immune   from   suit   as   it   does   not   exercise   sovereign   but   purely  
that   it   cannot   be   the   basis   for   holding   that   the   functions   of   said   Bureau   are   wholly   proprietary  and  business  functions.  Accordingly,  as  the  CAA  was  created  to  undertake  the  
proprietary   in   character.   Anent   the   additional   work   it   executes   for   private   persons,   we   find   management  of  airport  operations  which  primarily  involve  proprietary  functions,  it  cannot  
that  such  work  is  done  upon  request,  as  distinguished  from  those  solicited,  and  only  "as  the   avail   of   the   immunity   from   suit   accorded   to   government   agencies   performing   strictly  
requirements   of   Government   work   will   permit"   (sec.   1654,   Rev.   Adm.   Code),   and   "upon   governmental  functions.  
terms   fixed   by   the   Director   of   Printing,   with   the   approval   of   the   Department   Head"   (sec.    
1665,   id.).   As   shown   by   the   uncontradicted   evidence   of   the   petitioners,   most   of   these   works   Mun.  of  San  Fernando  vs.  Firme  [G.R.  No.  52179,  April  8,  1991]  
consist   of   orders   for   greeting   cards   during   Christmas   from   government   officials,   and   for    
printing  of  checks  of  private  banking  institutions.  On  those  greeting  cards,  the  Government   THE   SUABILITY   OF   MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS   IS   DETERMINED   THROUGH   THEIR  
seal,  of  which  only  the  Bureau  of  Printing  is  authorized  to  use,  is  embossed,  and  on  the  bank   CHARTER.  -­‐  Municipal  corporations,  for  example,  like  provinces  and  cities,  are  agencies  of  
checks,  only  the  Bureau  of  Printing  can  print  the  reproduction  of  the  official  documentary   the  State  when  they  are  engaged  in  governmental  functions  and  therefore  should  enjoy  the  
stamps   appearing   thereon.   The   volume   of   private   jobs   done,   in   comparison   with   sovereign   immunity   from   suit.   Nevertheless,   they   are   subject   to   suit   even   in   the  
government  jobs,  is  only  one-­‐half  of  1  percent,  and  in  computing  the  costs  for  work  done  for   performance   of   such   functions   because   their   charter   provided   that   they   can   sue   and   be  
private  parties,  the  Bureau  does  not  include  profit,  because  it  is  not  allowed  to  make  any.   sued.  (Cruz,  Philippine  Political  Law,  1987  Edition,  p.  39)  
Clearly,  while  the  Bureau  of  Printing  is  allowed  to  undertake  private  printing  jobs,  it  cannot    
be   pretended   that   it   is   thereby   an   industrial   or   business   concern.   The   additional   work   it   A   distinction   should   first   be   made   between   suability   and   liability.   "Suability   depends   on   the  
executes  for  private  parties  is  merely  incidental  to  its  function,  and  although  such  work  may   consent   of   the   state   to   be   sued,   liability   on   the   applicable   law   and   the   established   facts.   The  
be   deemed   proprietary   in   character,   there   is   no   showing   that   the   employees   performing   circumstance  that  a  state  is  suable  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  is  liable;  on  the  other  
said   proprietary   function   are   separate   and   distinct   from   those   employed   in   its   general   hand,   it   can   never   be   held   liable   if   it   does   not   first   consent   to   be   sued.   Liability   is   not  
governmental  functions.   conceded  by  the  mere  fact  that  the  state  has  allowed  itself  to  be  sued.  When  the  state  does  
  23  
waive  its  sovereign  immunity,  it  is  only  giving  the  plaintiff  the  chance  to  prove,  if  it  can,  that   265-­‐537154-­‐3,   no   levy   under   execution   may   be   validly   effected   on   the   public   funds   of  
the  defendant  is  liable."  (United  States  of  America  v.  Guinto,  supra,  p.  659-­‐660).   petitioner  deposited  in  Account  No.  S/A  263-­‐530850-­‐7.    
   
Anent   the   issue   of   whether   or   not   the   municipality   is   liable   for   the   torts   committed   by   its   Nevertheless,   this   is   not   to   say   that   private   respondent   and   PSB   are   left   with   no   legal  
employee,   the   test   of   liability   of   the   municipality   depends   on   whether   or   not   the   driver,   recourse.  Where  a  municipality  fails  or  refuses,  without  justifiable  reason,  to  effect  payment  
acting   in   behalf   of   the   municipality,   is   performing   governmental   or   proprietary   functions.   of   a   final   money   judgment   rendered   against   it,   the   claimant   may   avail   of   the   remedy   of  
As   emphasized   in   the   case   of   Torio   v.   Fontanilla   (G.R.   No.   L-­‐29993,   October   23,   1978.   85   mandamus  in  order  to  compel  the  enactment  and  approval  of  the  necessary  appropriation  
SCRA  599,  606),  the  distinction  of  powers  becomes  important  for  purposes  of  determining   ordinance,  and  the  corresponding  disbursement  of  municipal  funds  therefor  [See  Viuda  De  
the   liability   of   the   municipality   for   the   acts   of   its  agents   which   result   in   an   injury   to   third   Tan  Toco  v.  The  Municipal  Council  of  Iloilo,  supra;  Baldivia  v.  Lota,  107  Phil.  1099  (1960);  
persons.   Yuviengco  v.  Gonzales,  108  Phil.  247  (1960)].  
     
Mun.  of  San  Miguel  vs.  Fernandez  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐61744,  June  25,  1984]   City  of  Caloocan  vs.  Judge  Allarde  [G.R.  No.  107271,  September  10,  2003]  
   
FUNDS   OF   THE   MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS   ARE   EXEMPT   FROM   EXECUTION.   -­‐   In   Tantoco   GOVERNMENT  FUNDS  APPROPRIATED  FOR  A  PURPOSE  MAY  BE  GARNISHED  TO  SATISFY  
vs.  Municipal  Council  of  Iloilo,  49  Phil.  52,  it  was  held  that  "it  is  the  settled  doctrine  of  the   THAT   PURPOSE.   -­‐   However,   the   rule   is   not   absolute   and   admits   of   a   well-­‐defined   exception,  
law   that   not   only   the   public   property   but   also   the   taxes   and   public   revenues   of   such   that  is,  when  there  is  a  corresponding  appropriation  as  required  by  law.  Otherwise  stated,  
corporations  cannot  be  seized  under  execution  against  them,  either  in  the  treasury  or  when   the  rule  on  the  immunity  of  public  funds  from  seizure  or  garnishment  does  not  apply  where  
in   transit   to   it.   Judgments   rendered   for   taxes,   and   the   proceeds   of   such   judgments   in   the   the  funds  sought  to  be  levied  under  execution  are  already  allocated  by  law  specifically  for  
hands  of  officers  of  the  law,  are  not  subject  to  execution  unless  so  declared  by  statute.   the   satisfaction   of   the   money   judgment   against   the   government.   In   such   a   case,   the  
  monetary  judgment  may  be  legally  enforced  by  judicial  processes.        
Thus,   it   is   clear   that   all   the   funds   of   petitioner   municipality   in   the   possession   of   the    
Municipal   Treasurer   of   San   Miguel,   as   well   as   those   in   the   possession   of   the   Provincial   Thus,  in  the  similar  case  of  Pasay  City  Government,  et  al.  vs.  CFI  of  Manila,  Br.  X,  et  al.,  where  
Treasurer   of   Bulacan,   are   also   public   funds   and   as   such   they   are   exempt   from   execution.   petitioners  challenged  the  trial  court's  order  garnishing  its  funds  in  payment  of  the  contract  
Besides,  there  must  be,  pursuant  to  Section  2(a)  of  Presidential  Decree  No.  477,  known  as   price   for   the   construction   of   the   City   Hall,   we   ruled   that,   while   government   funds   deposited  
"The  Decree  on  Local  Fiscal  Administration,"  a  corresponding  appropriation  in  the  form  of   in   the   PNB   are   exempt   from   execution   or   garnishment,   this   rule   does   not   apply   if   an  
an  ordinance  duly  passed  by  the  Sangguniang  Bayan  before  any  money  of  the  municipality   ordinance  has  already  been  enacted  for  the  payment  of  the  City's  obligations  —  
may  be  paid  out.  In  the  case  at  bar,  it  has  not  been  shown  that  the  Sangguniang  Bayan  has    
passed   an   ordinance   to   this   effect.   Furthermore,   the   procedure   outlined   by   Section   15,   Rule   Upon   the   issuance   of   the   writ   of   execution,   the   petitioner-­‐appellants  
39  of  the  New  Rules  of  Court  has  not  been  followed.   moved  for  its  quashal  alleging  among  other  things  the  exemption  of  the  
  government   from   execution.   This   move   on   the   part   of   petitioner-­‐
Mun.  of  Makati  vs.  CA  [G.R.  Nos.  89898-­‐99,  October  1,  1990]   appellants  is  at  first  glance  laudable  for  'all  government  funds  deposited  
  with   the   Philippine   National   Bank   by   any   agency   or   instrumentality   of  
REMEDY   TO   ENFORCE   THE   LIABILITY   OF   THE   MUNICIPAL   CORPORATION   -­‐   There   is   merit   the   government,   whether   by   way   of   general   or   special   deposit,   remain  
in  this  contention.  The  funds  deposited  in  the  second  PNB  Account  No.  S/A  263-­‐530850-­‐7   government   funds   and   may   not   be   subject   to   garnishment   or   levy.'   But  
are   public   funds   of   the   municipal   government.   In   this   jurisdiction,   well-­‐settled   is   the   rule   inasmuch   as   an   ordinance   has   already   been   enacted   expressly  
that   public   funds   are   not   subject   to   levy   and   execution,   unless   otherwise   provided   for   by   appropriating  the  amount  of  P613,096.00  as  payment  to  the  respondent-­‐
statute  [Republic  v.  Palacio,  supra.;  The  Commissioner  of  Public  Highways  v.  San  Diego,  G.R.   appellee,  then  the  herein  case  is  covered  by  the  exception  to  the  general  
No.   L-­‐30098,   February   18,   1970,   31   SCRA   616].   More   particularly,   the   properties   of   a   rule  
municipality,   whether   real   or   personal,   which   are   necessary   for   public   use   cannot   be    
attached   and   sold   at   execution   sale   to   satisfy   a   money   judgment   against   the   municipality.  
Municipal   revenues   derived   from   taxes,   licenses   and   market   fees,   and   which   are   intended  
primarily   and   exclusively   for   the   purpose   of   financing   the   governmental   activities   and  
functions   of   the   municipality,   are   exempt   from   execution   [See   Viuda   De   Tan   Toco   v.   The  
Municipal   Council   of   Iloilo,   49   Phil.   52   (1926);   The   Municipality   of   Paoay,   Ilocos   Norte   v.  
Manaois,   86   Phil.   629   (1950);   Municipality   of   San   Miguel,   Bulacan   v.   Fernandez,   G.R.   No.  
61744,   June   25,   1984,   130   SCRA   56].   The   foregoing   rule   finds   application   in   the   case   at   bar.  
Absent   a   showing   that   the   municipal   council   of   Makati   has   passed   an   ordinance  
appropriating  from  its  public  funds  an  amount  corresponding  to  the  balance  due  under  the  
RTC  decision  dated  June  4,  1987,  less  the  sum  of  P99,743.94  deposited  in  Account  No.  S/A  

  24  
ARTICLE  II  –  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  STATE  POLICIES   persons,  military  or  civilian,  who  have  been  guilty  of  planning,  preparing  or  waging  a  war  of  
  aggression   and   of   the   commission   of   crimes   and   offenses   consequential   and   incidental  
Section  1   thereto,  in  violation  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war,  of  humanity  and  civilization,  are  held  
  accountable   therefor.   Consequently,   in   the   promulgation   and   enforcement   of   Executive  
  Villavicencio  vs.  Lukban  [G.R.  No.  14639,  March  25,  1919]   Order   No.   68,   the   President   of   the   Philippines   has   acted   in   conformity   with   the   generally  
  accepted  principles  and  policies  of  international  law  which  are  part  of  our  Constitution.  
IN  THE  ABSENCE  OF  ANY  LAW,  GOOD  INTENTIONS  CANNOT  JUSTIFY  THE  CURTAILMENT    
OF   FREEDOM.     -­‐   Law   defines   power.   Centuries   ago   Magna   Charta   decreed   that   —   "No   Petitioner  argues  that  respondent  Military  Commission  has  no  jurisdiction  to  try  petitioner  
freeman   shall   be   taken,   or   imprisoned,   or   be   disseized   of   his   freehold,   or   liberties,   or   free   for   acts   committed   in   violation   of   the   Hague   Convention   and   the   Geneva   Convention  
customs,   or   be   outlawed,   or   exiled,   or   any   other   wise   destroyed;   nor   will   we   pass   upon   him   because   the   Philippines   is   not   a   signatory   to   the   first   and   signed   the   second   only   in   1947.   It  
nor  condemn  him,  but  by  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers  or  by  the  law  of  the  land.  We  will  sell   cannot  be  denied  that  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the  Hague  and  Geneva  conventions  form  
to  no  man,  we  will  not  deny  or  defer  to  any  man  either  justice  or  right."  (Magna  Charta,  9   part   of   and   are   wholly   based   on   the   generally   accepted   principles   of   international   law.   In  
Hen.,  111,  1225,  Cap.  29;  1  Eng.  Stat.  at  Large,  7.)  No  official,  no  matter  how  high,  is  above   fact,   these   rules   and   principles   were   accepted   by   the   two   belligerent   nations,   the   United  
the  law.  The  courts  are  the  forum  which  functionate  to  safeguard  individual  liberty  and  to   States  and  Japan,  who  were  signatories  to  the  two  Conventions.  Such  rules  and  principles,  
punish   official   transgressors.   "The   law,"   said   Justice   Miller,   delivering   the   opinion   of   the   therefore,  form  part  of  the  law  of  our  nation  even  if  the  Philippines  was  not  a  signatory  to  
Supreme   Court   of   the   United   States,   "is   the   only   supreme   power   in   our   system   of   the   conventions   embodying   them,   for   our   Constitution   has   been   deliberately   general   and  
government,   and   every   man   who   by   accepting   office   participates   in   its   functions   is   all   the   extensive   in   its   scope   and   is   not   confined   to   the   recognition   of   rules   and   principles   of  
more  strongly  bound  to  submit  to  that  supremacy,  and  to  observe  the  limitations  which  it   international  law  as  contained  in  treaties  to  which  our  government  may  have  been  or  shall  
imposes   upon   the   exercise   of   the   authority   which   it   gives."   (U.S.   vs.   Lee   [1882],   106   U.S.,   be  a  signatory.  
196,   220.)   "The   very   idea,"   said   Justice   Matthews   of   the   same   high   tribunal   in   another   case,    
"that  one  man  may  be  compelled  to  hold  his  life,  or  the  means  of  living,  or  any  material  right     Agustin  vs.  Edu  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐2662,  March  26,  1949]  
essential  to  the  enjoyment  of  life,  at  the  mere  will  of  another,  seems  to  be  intolerable  in  any    
country   where   freedom   prevails,   as   being   the   essence   of   slavery   itself."   (Yick   Wo   vs.   The  conclusion  reached  by  this  Court  that  this  petition  must  be  dismissed  is  reinforced  by  
Hopkins   [1886],   118   U.S.,   356,   370.)   All   this   explains   the   motive   in   issuing   the   writ   of   this   consideration.   The   petition   itself   quoted   these   two   whereas   clauses   of   the   assailed  
habeas   corpus,   and   makes   clear   why   we   said   in   the   very   beginning   that   the   primary   Letter   of   Instruction:   "[Whereas],   the   hazards   posed   by   such   obstructions   to   traffic   have  
question   was   whether   the   courts   should   permit   a   government   of   men   or   a   government   of   been   recognized   by   international   bodies   concerned   with   traffic   safety,   the   1968   Vienna  
laws  to  be  established  in  the  Philippine  Islands.   Convention   on   Road   Signs   and   Signals   and   the   United   Nations   Organization   (U.N.);  
  [Whereas],   the   said   Vienna   Convention,   which   was   ratified   by   the   Philippine   Government  
One  hundred  and  seventy  women,  who  had  lived  in  the  segregated  district  for  women  of  ill   under  P.D.  No.  207,  recommended  the  enactment  of  local  legislation  for  the  installation  of  
repute  in  the  city  of  Manila,  were  by  orders  of  the  Mayor  of  the  city  of  Manila  and  the  chief   road   safety   signs   and   devices;   .   .   ."       It   cannot   be   disputed   then   that   this   Declaration   of  
of   police   of   that   city   isolated   from   society   and   then   at   night,   without   their   consent   and   Principle   found   in   the   Constitution   possesses   relevance:   "The   Philippines   .   .   .   adopts   the  
without   any   opportunity   to   consult   with   friends   or   to   defend   their   rights,   were   forcibly   generally  accepted  principles  of  international  law  as  part  of  the  law  of  the  land,  .  .  ."      The  
hustled   on   board   steamers   for   transportation   to   regions   unknown.   No   law,   order,   or   1968   Vienna   Convention   on   Road   Signs   and   Signals   is   impressed   with   such   a   character.   It   is  
regulation  authorized  the  Mayor  of  the  city  of  Manila  or  the  chief  of  the  police  of  that  city  to   not   for   this   country   to   repudiate   a   commitment   to   which   it   had   pledged   its   word.   The  
force   citizens   of   the   Philippine   Islands   to   change   their   domicile   from   Manila   to   another   concept  of  Pacta  sunt  servanda  stands  in  the  way  of  such  an  attitude,  which  is,  moreover,  at  
locality.  Held:  That  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  properly  granted,  and  that  the  Mayor  of   war  with  the  principle  of  international  morality.  
the  city  of  Manila  who  was  primarily  responsible  for  the  deportation,  is  in  contempt  of  court    
for  his  failure  to  comply  with  the  order  of  the  court.     Ichong  vs.  Hernandez    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐7995,  May  31,  1957]  
   
These   women,   despite   their   being   in   a   sense   lepers   of   society,   are   nevertheless   not   chattles,   TREATIES   SUBJECT   TO   QUALIFICATION   OR   AMENDMENT   BY   SUBSEQUENT   LAW.   —   The  
but  Philippine  citizens  protected  by  the  same  constitutional  guaranties  as  are  other  citizens.   law   does   not   violate   international   treaties   and   obligations.   The   United   Nations   Charter  
  imposes   no   strict   or   legal   obligations   regarding   the   rights   and   freedom   of   their   subjects  
Section  2   (Jans   Kelsen,   The   Law   of   the   United   Nations,   1951   ed.,   pp.   29-­‐32),   and   the   Declaration   of  
  Human   Rights   contains   nothing   more   than   a   mere   recommendation,   or   a   common   standard  
  Kuroda  vs.  Jalandoni  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐2662,  March  26,  1949]   of   achievement   for   all   peoples   and   all   nations.   The   Treaty   of   Amity   between   the   Republic   of  
  the  Philippines  and  the  Republic  of  China  of  April  18,  1947  guarantees  equality  of  treatment  
PENALIZING   WAR   CRIMES   IS   A   GENERALLY   ACCEPTED   PRINCIPLE   OF   INTERNATIONAL   to  the  Chinese  nationals  "upon  the  same  terms  as  the  nationals  of  any  other  country".  But  
LAW.   -­‐   In   accordance   with   the   generally   accepted   principles   of   international   law   of   the   the  nationals  of  China  are  not  discriminated  against  because  nationals  of  all  other  countries,  
present   day,   including   the   Hague   Convention,   the   Geneva   Convention   and   significant   except   those   of   the   United   States,   who   are   granted   special   rights   by   the   Constitution,   are   all  
precedents   of   international   jurisprudence   established   by   the   United   Nations,   all   those   Prohibited  from  engaging  in  the  retail  trade.  But  even  supposing  that  the  law  infringes  upon  
  25  
the  said  treaty,  the  treaty  is  always  subject  to  qualification  or  amendment  by  a  subsequent    
law  (U.S.  vs.  Thompson,  258,  Fed.  257,  260),  and  the  same  may  never  curtail  or  restrict  the   "The   nationals   of   both   countries   who   shall   have   obtained   degrees   or  
scope  of  the  police  power  of  the  State  (Palston  vs.  Pennsylvania  58  L.  ed.,  539).   diplomas   to   practice   the   liberal   professions   in   either   of   the   Contracting  
  States,   issued   by   competent   national   authorities,   shall   be   deemed  
  Gonzales  vs.  Hechanova  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐21897,  October  22,  1963]   competent   to   exercise   said   professions   in   the   territory   of   the   Other,  
  subject  to  the  laws  and  regulations  of  the  latter.  .  .  ."  
PRESIDENT  MAY  NOT,  BY  EXECUTIVE  AGREEMENT,  ENTER  INTO  A  TRANSACTION  WHICH    
IS  PROHIBITED  BY  STATUTES  ENACTED  PRIOR  THERETO.  —  It  is  lastly  contended  that  the   It   is   clear,   therefore,   that   the   privileges   provided   in   the   Treaty   invoked   by   the   applicant   are  
Government  of  the  Philippines  has  already  entered  into  two  (2)  contracts  for  the  purchase   made   expressly   subject   to   the   laws   and   regulations   of   the   contracting   State   in   whose  
of  rice,  one  with  the  Republic  of  Vietnam,  and  another  with  the  Government  of  Burma;  that   territory   it   is   desired   to   exercise   the   legal   profession;   and   Section   1   of   Rule   127,   in  
these   contracts   constitute   valid   executive   agreements   under   international   law;   that   such   connection   with   Sections   2,   9,   and   16   thereof,   which   have   the   force   of   law,   require   that  
agreements   became   binding   and   effective   upon   signing   thereof   by   representatives   of   the   before   anyone   can   practice   the   legal   profession   in   the   Philippines   he   must   first   successfully  
parties   thereto;   that   in   case   of   conflict   between   Republic   Acts   Nos.   2207   and   3452   on   the   pass  the  required  bar  examinations;  and  
one   hand,   and   the   aforementioned   contracts,   on   the   other,   the   latter   should   prevail,    
because,   if   a   treaty   and   a   statute   are   inconsistent   with   each   other,   the   conflict   must   be   The   aforementioned   Treaty,   concluded   between   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   and   the  
resolved  —  under  the  American  jurisprudence  —  in  favor  of  the  one  which  is  latest  in  point   Spanish  State  could  not  have  been  intended  to  modify  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  
of  time;  that  petitioner  herein  assails  the  validity  of  acts  of  the  executive  relative  to  foreign   admission   to   the   practice   of   law   in   the   Philippines,   for   the   reason   that   the   Executive  
relations   in   the   conduct   of   which   the   Supreme   Court   cannot   interfere;   and   that   the   Department   may   not   encroach   upon   the   constitutional   prerogative   of   the   Supreme   Court   to  
aforementioned   contracts   have   already   been   consummated,   the   Government   of   the   promulgate   rules   for   admission   to   the   practice   of   law   in   the   Philippines,   the   power   to  
Philippines   having   already   paid   the   price   of   the   rice   involved   therein   through   irrevocable   repeal,   alter   or   supplement   such   rules   being   reserved   only   to   the   Congress   of   the  
letters  of  credit  in  favor  of  the  sellers  of  said  commodity.  We  find  no  merit  in  this  pretense.   Philippines.  (See  Sec.  13,  Art.  VIII,  Phil.  Constitution).  
   
The  Court  is  not  satisfied  that  the  status  of  said  contracts  as  alleged  executive  agreements   At   any   rate,   the   Treaty   was   intended   to   govern   Filipino   citizens   desiring   to   practice   their  
has   been   sufficiently   established.   The   parties   to   said   contracts   do   not   appear   to   have   profession   in   Spain,   and   the   citizens   of   Spain   desiring   to   practice   their   professions   in   the  
regarded   the   same   as   executive   agreements.   But,   even   assuming   that   said   contracts   may   Philippines.   Applicant   is   a   Filipino   citizen   desiring   to   practice   the   legal   profession   in   the  
properly   be   considered   as   executive   agreements,   the   same   are   unlawful,   as   well   as   null   and   Philippines.   He   is   therefore   subject   to   the   laws   of   his   own   country   and   is   not   entitled   to   the  
void,   from   a   constitutional   viewpoint,   said   agreements   being   inconsistent   with   the   privileges  extended  to  Spanish  nationals  desiring  to  practice  in  the  Philippines.  
provisions   of   Republic   Acts   Nos.   2207   and   3452.   Although   the   President   may,   under   the    
American   constitutional   system,   enter   into   executive   agreements   without   previous   Section  4  
legislative  authority,  he  may  not,  by  executive  agreement,  enter  into  a  transaction  which  is    
prohibited   by   statutes   enacted   prior   thereto.   Under   the   Constitution,   the   main   function   of     People  vs.  Lagman  [G.R.  No.  45892,  July  13,  1938]  
the  Executive  is  to  enforce  laws  enacted  by  Congress.  The  former  may  not  interfere  in  the    
performance   of   the   legislative   powers   of   the   latter,   except   in   the   exercise   of   his   veto   power.   COMPULSORY  MILITARY  SERVICE  IS  CONSTITUTIONAL.    The  National  Defense  Law,  in  so  
He  may  not  defeat  legislative  enactments  that  have  acquired  the  status  of  laws,  by  indirectly   far   as   it   establishes   compulsory   military   service,   does   not   go   against   this   constitutional  
repealing   the   same   through   an   executive   agreement   providing   for   the   performance   of   the   provision   but   is,   on   the   contrary,   in   faithful   compliance   therewith.   The   duty   of   the  
very  act  prohibited  by  said  laws.   Government   to   defend   the   State   cannot   be   performed   except   through   an   army.   To   leave   the  
  organization   of   an   army   to   the   will   of   the   citizens   would   be   to   make   this   duty   of   the  
The   American   theory   to   the   effect   that,   in   the   event   of   conflict   between   a   treaty   and   a   Government  excusable  should  there  be  no  sufficient  men  who  volunteer  to  enlist  therein.  
statute,  the  one  which  is  latest  in  point  of  time  shall  prevail,  is  not  applicable  to  the  case  at    
bar,  for  respondents  not  only  admit,  but,  also,  insist  that  the  contracts  adverted  to  are  not   In   the   United   States   the   courts   have   held   in   a   series   of   decisions   that   the   compulsory  
treaties.   Said   theory   may   be   justified   upon   the   ground   that   treaties   to   which   the   United   military  service  adopted  by  reason  of  the  civil  war  and  the  world  war  does  not  violate  the  
States  is  signatory  require  the  advice  and  consent  of  its  Senate,  and,  hence,  of  a  branch  of   Constitution,  because  the  power  to  establish  it  is  derived  from  that  granted  to  Congress  to  
the   legislative   department.   No   such   justification   can   be   given   as   regards   executive   declare   war   and   to   organize   and   maintain   an   army.   This   is   so   because   the   right   of   the  
agreements   not   authorized   by   previous   legislation,   without   completely   upsetting   the   Government  to  require  compulsory  military  service  is  a  consequence  of  its  duty  to  defend  
principle   of   separation   of   powers   and   the   system   of   checks   and   balances   which   are   the   State   and   is   reciprocal   with   its   duty   to   defend   the   life,   liberty,   and   property   of   the  
fundamental  in  our  constitutional  set  up  and  that  of  the  United  States.   citizen.   In   the   case   of   Jacobson   vs.   Massachusetts   (197   U.S.,   11;   25   Sup.   Ct.   Rep.,   385),   it   was  
  said  that,  without  violating  the  Constitution,  a  person  may  be  compelled  by  force,  if  need  be,  
  In  Re:  Garcia    [2  SCRA  984,  August  15,  1961]   against   his   will,   against   his   pecuniary   interests,   and   even   against   his   religious   or   political  
  convictions,  to  take  his  place  in  the  ranks  of  the  army  of  this  country,  and  risk  the  chance  of  
Article  I  of  the  Treaty,  in  its  pertinent  part,  provides:   being   shot   down   in   its   defense.   In   the   case   of   United   States   vs.   Olson   (253   Feb.,   233),   it   was  
  26  
also  said  that  this  is  not  deprivation  of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  because,  in  its   constitutional  mandate  allowed  (sec.  5,  Art.  XIII,  Constitution  of  the  Philippines,  in  relation  
just  sense,  there  is  no  right  of  property  to  an  office  or  employment.  The  circumstance  that   to  sec.  928,  Ad.  Code).  Thursday  and  Friday  of  Holy  Week,  Thanksgiving  Day,  Christmas  Day,  
these  decisions  refer  to  laws  enacted  by  reason  of  the  actual  existence  of  war  does  not  make   and  Sundays  are  made  legal  holidays  (sec.  29,  Adm.  Code)  because  of  the  secular  idea  that  
our  case  any  different,  inasmuch  as,  in  the  last  analysis,  what  justifies  compulsory  military   their   observance   is   conducive   to   beneficial   moral   results.   The   law   allows   divorce   but  
service   is   the   defense   of   the   State,   whether   actual   or   whether   in   preparation   to   make   it   punishes   polygamy   and   bigamy;   and   certain   crimes   against   religious   worship   are  
more  effective,  in  case  of  need.   considered  crimes  against  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  state  (see  arts.  132  and  133,  Revised  
  Penal  Code).  
Section  6    
    Taruc  vs.  De  la  Cruz  [G.R.  No.  144801,  March  10,  2005]  
  Aglipay  vs.  Ruiz    [G.R.  No.  45459,  March  13,  1937]    
  INTRAMURAL  RELIGIOUS  ACTIVITIES.    The  only  issue  to  be  resolved  in  this  case  is  whether  
THE   CONSTITUTION   GUARANTEES   RELIGIOUS   FREEDOM,   AND   NOT   MERE   RELIGIOUS   or   not   the   courts   have   jurisdiction   to   hear   a   case   involving   the   expulsion/excommunication  
TOLERATION.   -­‐   The   prohibition   herein   expressed   is   a   direct   corollary   of   the   principle   of   of  members  of  a  religious  institution.    
separation   of   church   and   state.   Without   the   necessity   of   adverting   to   the   historical    
background   of   this   principle   in   our   country,   it   is   sufficient   to   say   that   our   history,   not   to   We  rule  that  the  courts  do  not.  
speak   of   the   history   of   mankind,   has   taught   us   that   the   union   of   church   and   state   is    
prejudicial   to   both,   for   occasions   might   arise   when   the   state   will   use   the   church,   and   the   Section  5,  Article  III  or  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the  1987  Constitution  specifically  provides  that:  
church   the   state,   as   a   weapon   in   the   furtherance   of   their   respective   ends   and   aims.   The    
Malolos  Constitution  recognized  this  principle  of  separation  of  church  and  state  in  the  early   Sec.  5.   No  law  shall  be  made  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion  or  
stages  of  our  constitutional  development;  it  was  inserted  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris  between  the   prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof.  The  free  exercise  and  enjoyment  of  
United   States   and   Spain   of   December   10,   1898,   reiterated   in   President   McKinley's   religious  profession  and  worship,  without  discrimination  or  preference,  
Instructions  to  the  Philippine  Commission,  reaffirmed  in  the  Philippine  Bill  of  1902  and  in   shall   forever   be   allowed.   No   religious   test   shall   be   required   for   the  
the   Autonomy   Act   of   August   29,   1916,   and   finally   embodied   in   the   Constitution   of   the   exercise  of  civil  or  political  rights.      
Philippines   as   the   supreme   expression   of   the   Filipino   People.   It   is   almost   trite   to   say   now    
that   in   this   country   we   enjoy   both   religious   and   civil   freedom.   All   the   officers   of   the   In  our  jurisdiction,  we  hold  the  Church  and  the  State  to  be  separate  and  distinct  from  each  
Government,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  in  taking  their  oath  to  support  and  defend  the   other.   "Give   to   Ceasar   what   is   Ceasar's   and   to   God   what   is   God's."   We   have,   however,  
Constitution,   bind   themselves   to   recognize   and   respect   the   constitutional   guarantee   of   observed  as  early  as  1928  that:  
religious   freedom,   with   its   inherent   limitations   and   recognized   implications.   It   should   be    
stated   that   what   is   guaranteed   by   our   Constitution   is   religious   liberty,   not   mere   religious   upon   the   examination   of   the   decisions   it   will   be   readily   apparent   that  
toleration.   cases   involving   questions   relative   to   ecclesiastical   rights   have   always  
  received  the  profoundest  attention  from  the  courts,  not  only  because  of  
Religious   freedom,   however,   as   a   constitutional   mandate   is   not   inhibition   of   profound   their   inherent   interest,   but   because   of   the   far   reaching   effects   of   the  
reverence   for   religion   and   is   not   a   denial   of   its   influence   in   human   affairs.   Religion   as   a   decisions   in   human   society.   [However,]   courts   have   learned   the   lesson   of  
profession   of   faith   to   an   active   power   that   binds   and   elevates   man   to   his   Creator   is   conservatism  in  dealing  with  such  matters,  it  having  been  found  that,  in  a  
recognized.   And,   in   so   far   as   it   instills   into   the   minds   the   purest   principles   of   morality,   its   form   of   government   where   the   complete   separation   of   civil   and  
influence  is  deeply  felt  and  highly  appreciated.  When  the  Filipino  people,  in  the  preamble  of   ecclesiastical   authority   is   insisted   upon,   the   civil   courts   must   not   allow  
their   Constitution,   implored   "the   aid   of   Divine   Providence,   in   order   to   establish   a   themselves   to   intrude   unduly   in   matters   of   an   ecclesiastical   nature.   4  
government   that   shall   embody   their   ideals,   conserve   and   develop   the   patrimony   of   the   (italics  ours)    
nation,   promote   the   general   welfare,   and   secure   to   themselves   and   their   posterity   the    
blessings  of  independence  under  a  regime  of  justice,  liberty  and  democracy,"  they  thereby   We  agree  with  the  Court  of  Appeals  that  the  expulsion/excommunication  of  members  of  a  
manifested   their   intense   religious   nature   and   placed   unfaltering   reliance   upon   Him   who   religious  institution/organization  is  a  matter  best  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  officials,  and  
guides   the   destinies   of   men   and   nations.   The   elevating   influence   of   religion   in   human   the   laws   and   canons,   of   said   institution/organization.   It   is   not   for   the   courts   to   exercise  
society   is   recognized   here   as   elsewhere.   In   fact,   certain   general   concessions   are   control   over   church   authorities   in   the   performance   of   their   discretionary   and   official  
indiscriminately  accorded  to  religious  sects  and  denominations.  Our  Constitution  and  laws   functions.  Rather,  it  is  for  the  members  of  religious  institutions/organizations  to  conform  to  
exempt   from   taxation   properties   devoted   exclusively   to   religious   purposes   (sec.   14,   subsec.   just  church  regulations.  In  the  words  of  Justice  Samuel  F.  Miller  5:  
3,   Art.   VI,   Constitution   of   the   Philippines   and   sec.   1,   subsec.   Ordinance   appended   thereto;    
Assessment   Law,   sec.   344,   par   [c],   Adm.   Code)   sectarian   aid   is   not   prohibited   when   a   priest,   .   .   .   all   who   unite   themselves   to   an   ecclesiastical   body   do   so   with   an  
preacher,  minister  or  other  religious  teacher  or  dignitary  as  such  is  assigned  to  the  armed   implied  consent  to  submit  to  the  Church  government  and  they  are  bound  
forces   or   to   any   penal   institution,   orphanage   or   leprosarium   (sec.   13,   subsec.   3   Art.   VI,   to  submit  to  it.  
Constitution   of   the   Philippines).   Optional   religious   instruction   in   the   public   schools   is   by    
  27  
In   the   leading   case   of   Fonacier   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   we   enunciated   the   doctrine   that   in   SOCIAL  JUSTICE  IS  NOT  EQUALITY,  BUT  PROTECTION.  -­‐  Lastly,  to  quote  from  the  opinion  
disputes  involving  religious  institutions  or  organizations,  there  is  one  area  which  the  Court   therein   rendered:   "To   be   more   specific,   the   principle   of   social   justice   is   in   this   sphere  
should  not  touch:  doctrinal  and  disciplinary  differences.    Thus,     strengthened   and   vitalized.   A   realistic   view   is   that   expressed   in   Agustin   v.   Workmen's  
  Compensation   Commission:   'As   between   a   laborer,   usually   poor   and   unlettered,   and   the  
The   amendments   of   the   constitution,   restatement   of   articles   of   religion   employer,   who   has   resources   to   secure   able   legal   advice,   the   law   has   reason   to   demand  
and   abandonment   of   faith   or   abjuration   alleged   by   appellant,   having   to   from   the   latter   stricter   compliance.   Social   justice   in   these   cases   is   not   equality   but  
do   with   faith,   practice,   doctrine,   form   of   worship,   ecclesiastical   law,   protection."  
custom   and   rule   of   a   church   and   having   reference   to   the   power   of    
excluding  from  the  church  those  allegedly  unworthy  of  membership,  are   Salonga  vs.  Farrales    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐47088,  July  10,  1981]  
unquestionably  ecclesiastical  matters  which  are  outside  the  province  of    
the  civil  courts.  (emphasis  ours)   SOCIAL  JUSTICE  CANNOT  NULLIFY  THE  LAW  ON  OBLIGATIONS  AND  CONTRACTS.  —  Social  
  Justice   provided   for   in   Sec.   6,   Article   II   of   the   New   Constitution   cannot   be   invoked   to  
Section  10   trample   on   the   rights   of   property   owners   who   under   the   Constitution   and   laws   are   also  
  entitled  to  protection.  The  Social  justice  consecrated  in  our  constitution  was  not  intended  to  
  Calalang  vs.  Williams    [G.R.  No.  47800,  December  2,  1940]   take   away   rights   from   a   person   and   give   them   to   another   who   is   not   entitled   thereto.  
  Evidently,   the   plea   for   social   justice   cannot   nullify   the   law   on   obligations   and   contracts,   and  
SOCIAL  JUSTICE.  —  Social  justice  is  "neither  communism,  nor  despotism,  nor  atomism,  nor   is,  therefore,  beyond  the  power  of  the  Courts  to  grant.  
anarchy,"  but  the  humanization  of  laws  and  the  equalization  of  social  and  economic  forces    
by   the   State   so   that   justice   in   its   rational   and   objectively   secular   conception   may   at   least   be   Section  11  
approximated.   Social   justice   means   the   promotion   of   the   welfare   of   all   the   people,   the    
adoption  by  the  Government  of  measures  calculated  to  insure  economic  stability  of  all  the     Secretary  of  National  Defense  v.  Manalo,  G.R.  No.  180906,  October  7,  2008  
component  elements  of  society,  through  the  maintenance  of  a  proper  economic  and  social    
equilibrium   in   the   interrelations   of   the   members   of   the   community,   constitutionally,   The   writ   of   Amparo   then   spread   throughout   the   Western   Hemisphere,   gradually   evolving  
through   the  adoption   of  measures   legally   justifiable,   or  extra-­‐constitutionally,  through  the   into   various   forms,   in   response   to   the   particular   needs   of   each   country.   It   became,   in   the  
exercise   of   powers   underlying   the   existence   of   all   governments   on   the   time-­‐honored   words   of   a   justice   of   the   Mexican   Federal   Supreme   Court,   one   piece   of   Mexico's   self-­‐
principle  of  salus  populi  est  suprema  lex.  Social  justice,  therefore,  must  be  founded  on  the   attributed   "task   of   conveying   to   the   world's   legal   heritage   that   institution   which,   as   a   shield  
recognition   of   the   necessity   of   interdependence   among   divers   and   diverse  units   of   a   society   of   human   dignity,   her   own   painful   history   conceived."84   What   began   as   a   protection   against  
and   of   the   protection   that   should   be   equally   and   evenly   extended   to   all   groups   as   a   acts  or  omissions  of  public  authorities  in  violation  of  constitutional  rights  later  evolved  for  
combined   force   in   our   social   and   economic   life,   consistent   with   the   fundamental   and   several   purposes:   (1)   Amparo  libertad   for   the   protection   of   personal   freedom,   equivalent   to  
paramount  objective  of  the  state  of  promoting  the  health,  comfort,  and  quiet  of  all  persons,   the   habeas   corpus   writ;   (2)   Amparo   contra   leyes   for   the   judicial   review   of   the  
and  of  bringing  about  "the  greatest  good  to  the  greatest  number."   constitutionality   of   statutes;   (3)   Amparo   casacion   for   the   judicial   review   of   the  
  constitutionality   and   legality   of   a   judicial   decision;   (4)   Amparo   administrativo   for   the  
Almeda  vs.  CA    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐43800,  July  29,  1977]   judicial   review   of   administrative   actions;   and   (5)   Amparo   agrario   for   the   protection   of  
  peasants'  rights  derived  from  the  agrarian  reform  process.    
IN   THE   PROMOTION   OF   SOCIAL   JUSTICE,   THE   STATE   MAY   REGULATE   PROPERTY    
OWNERSHIP.   -­‐   It   is   to   be   noted   that   under   the   new   Constitution,   property   ownership   is   In  sum,  respondents  assert  that  their  cause  of  action  consists  in  the  threat  to  their  right  to  
impressed  with  social  function.  Property  use  must  not  only  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  owner   life  and  liberty,  and  a  violation  of  their  right  to  security.    
but   of   society   as   well.   The   State,   in   the   promotion   of   social   justice,   may   "regulate   the    
acquisition,   ownership,   use,   enjoyment   and   disposition   of   private   property,   and   equitably   Let   us   put   this   right   to   security   under   the   lens   to   determine   if   it   has   indeed   been  
diffuse   property   .   .   .   ownership   and   profits."     7   One   governmental   policy   of   recent   date   violated  as  respondents  assert.  The  right  to  security  or  the  right  to  security  of  person  
projects  the  emancipation  of  tenants  from  the  bondage  of  the  soil  and  the  transfer  to  them   finds  a  textual  hook  in  Article  III,  Section  2  of  the  1987  Constitution  which  provides,  viz:  
of  the  ownership  of  the  land  they  till.  This  is  Presidential  Decree  No.  27  of  October  21,  1972,    
ordaining   that   all   tenant   farmers   "of   private   agricultural   lands   devoted   to   rice   and   corn   Sec.  2.  The  right   of   the   people   to   be   secure   in   their   persons,  houses,  papers  and  
under  a  system  of  sharecrop  or  lease-­‐tenancy,  whether  classified  as  landed  estates  or  not"   effects  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  of  whatever  nature  and  for  any  
shall   be   deemed   "owner   of   a   portion   constituting   a   family-­‐size   farm   of   five   (5)   hectares   if   purpose   shall   be   inviolable,   and   no   search   warrant   or   warrant   of   arrest   shall  
not  irrigated  and  there  (3)  hectares  if  irrigated."   issue  except  upon  probable  cause  to  be  determined  personally  by  the  judge...  
   
Ondoy  vs.  Ignacio    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐47178,  May  16,  1980]   At   the   core   of   this   guarantee   is   the   immunity   of   one's   person,   including   the   extensions   of  
  his/her   person   -­‐   houses,   papers,   and   effects  -­‐   against   government   intrusion.   Section   2   not  
only  limits  the  state's  power  over  a  person's  home  and  possessions,  but  more  importantly,  
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protects  the  privacy  and  sanctity  of  the  person  himself.117  The  purpose  of  this  provision  was   Section  12  
enunciated  by  the  Court  in  People  v.  CFI  of  Rizal,  Branch  IX,  Quezon  City,  viz:      
    Virtouso  vs.  Municipal  Judge  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐47841,  March  21,  1978]  
While  the  right  to  life  under  Article  III,  Section  1  guarantees  essentially  the  right  to  be  alive  -­‐    
upon   which   the   enjoyment   of   all   other   rights   is   preconditioned   -­‐   the   right   to   security   of   THE   STATE   SAFEGUARDS   THE   RIGHTS   OF   THE   YOUTH.   -­‐   This   Court   should,   whenever  
person  is  a  guarantee  of  the  secure  quality  of  this  life,  viz:  "The  life  to  which  each  person  has   appropriate,   give   vitality   and   force   to   the   Youth   and   Welfare   Code,   which   is   an  
a  right  is  not  a  life  lived  in  fear  that  his  person  and  property  may  be  unreasonably  violated   implementation  of  this  specific  constitutional  mandate:  "The  State  recognizes  the  vital  role  
by   a   powerful   ruler.   Rather,   it   is   a   life   lived   with   the   assurance   that   the   government   he   of   the   youth   in   nation-­‐building   and   shall   promote   their   physical,   intellectual,   and   social  
established  and  consented  to,  will  protect  the  security  of  his  person  and  property.  The  ideal   well-­‐being."  
of   security   in   life   and   property...   pervades   the   whole   history   of   man.   It   touches   every   aspect    
of  man's  existence."  In  a  broad  sense,  the  right  to  security  of  person  "emanates  in  a  person's   Section  16  
legal   and   uninterrupted   enjoyment   of   his   life,   his   limbs,   his   body,   his   health,   and   his    
reputation.   It   includes   the   right   to   exist,   and   the   right   to   enjoyment   of   life   while   existing,     Oposa  vs.  Factoran  [G.R.  No.  101083,  July  30,  1993]  
and   it   is   invaded   not   only   by   a   deprivation   of   life   but   also   of   those   things   which   are    
necessary  to  the  enjoyment  of  life  according  to  the  nature,  temperament,  and  lawful  desires   THE  RIGHT  TO  A  BALANCED  AND  HEALTHFUL  ECOLOGY,  THOUGH  NOT  INCLUDED  IN  THE  
of  the  individual."123   BILL   OF   RIGHTS,   IS   A   SOURCE   OF   CIVIL   AND   POLITICAL   RIGHTS.  —   The   complaint   focuses  
  on   one   specific   fundamental   legal   right   —   the   right   to   a   balanced   and   healthful   ecology  
Third,   the   right   to   security   of   person   is   a   guarantee   of   protection   of   one's   rights   by   which,   for   the   first   time   in   our   nation's   constitutional   history,   is   solemnly   incorporated   in  
the   government.   In   the   context   of   the   writ   of   Amparo,   this   right   is   built   into   the   the   fundamental   law.   Section   16,   Article   II   of   the   1987   Constitution   explicitly   provides:  
guarantees   of   the   right   to   life   and   liberty   under   Article   III,   Section   1   of   the   1987   "SEC.   16.   The   State   shall   protect   and   advance   the   right   of   the   people   to   a   balanced   and  
Constitution  and   the   right   to   security   of   person  (as  freedom  from  threat  and  guarantee  of   healthful   ecology   in   accord   with   the   rhythm   and   harmony   of   nature."   This   right   unites   with  
bodily   and   psychological   integrity)   under   Article   III,   Section   2.   The   right   to   security   of   the  right  to  health  which  is  provided  for  in  the  preceding  section  of  the  same  article:  "SEC.  
person  in  this  third  sense  is  a  corollary  of  the  policy  that  the  State  "guarantees  full  respect   15.  The  State  shall  protect  and  promote  the  right  to  health  of  the  people  and  instill  health  
for  human  rights"  under  Article  II,  Section  11  of  the  1987  Constitution.  As  the  government   consciousness   among   them."   While   the   right   to   a   balanced   and   healthful   ecology   is   to   be  
is  the  chief  guarantor  of  order  and  security,  the  Constitutional  guarantee  of  the  rights  to  life,   found  under  the  Declaration  of  Principles  and  State  Policies  and  not  under  the  Bill  of  Rights,  
liberty   and   security   of   person   is   rendered   ineffective   if   government   does   not   afford   it   does   not   follow   that   it   is   less   important   than   any   of   the   civil   and   political   rights  
protection   to   these   rights   especially   when   they   are   under   threat.   Protection   includes   enumerated  in  the  latter.  Such  a  right  belongs  to  a  different  category  of  rights  altogether  for  
conducting   effective   investigations,   organization   of   the   government   apparatus   to   extend   it  concerns  nothing  less  than  self-­‐preservation  and  self-­‐perpetuation  —  aptly  and  fittingly  
protection  to  victims  of  extralegal  killings  or  enforced  disappearances  (or  threats  thereof)   stressed   by   the   petitioners   —   the   advancement   of   which   may   even   be   said   to   predate   all  
and/or  their  families,  and  bringing  offenders  to  the  bar  of  justice.  The  Inter-­‐American  Court   governments   and   constitutions.   As   a   matter   of   fact,   these   basic   rights   need   not   even   be  
of   Human   Rights   stressed   the   importance   of   investigation   in   the   Velasquez   Rodriguez   written  in  the  Constitution  for  they  are  assumed  to  exist  from  the  inception  of  humankind.  
Case,  viz:     If   they   are   now   explicitly   mentioned   in   the   fundamental   charter,   it   is   because   of   the   well-­‐
  founded   fear   of   its   framers   that   unless   the   rights   to   a   balanced   and   healthful   ecology   and   to  
(The  duty  to  investigate)  must  be  undertaken  in  a  serious  manner  and  not  as  a   health   are   mandated   as   state   policies   by   the   Constitution   itself,   thereby   highlighting   their  
mere   formality   preordained   to   be   ineffective.   An   investigation   must   have   an   continuing   importance   and   imposing   upon   the   state   a   solemn   obligation   to   preserve   the  
objective   and   be   assumed   by   the   State   as   its   own   legal   duty,   not   as   a   step   first  and  protect  and  advance  the  second,  the  day  would  not  be  too  far  when  all  else  would  
taken   by   private   interests   that   depends   upon   the   initiative   of   the   victim   or   be   lost   not   only   for   the   present   generation,   but   also   for   those   to   come   —   generations   which  
his  family  or  upon  their  offer  of  proof,  without  an  effective  search  for  the  truth  by   stand   to   inherit   nothing   but   parched   earth   incapable   of   sustaining   life.   The   right   to   a  
the  government.135   balanced  and  healthful  ecology  carries  with  it  the  correlative  duty  to  refrain  from  impairing  
  the  environment.  
This  third  sense  of  the  right  to  security  of  person  as  a  guarantee  of  government  protection    
has  been  interpreted  by  the  United  Nations'  Human  Rights  Committee136  in  not  a  few  cases     Laguna  Lake  Development  Authority  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  110120,  March  16,  1994]  
involving   Article   9137   of   the   ICCPR.   While   the   right   to   security   of   person   appears   in    
conjunction  with  the  right  to  liberty  under  Article  9,  the  Committee  has  ruled  that  the  right   The   immediate   response   to   the   demands   of   "the   necessities   of   protecting   vital   public  
to   security   of   person   can   exist   independently   of   the   right   to   liberty.   In   other   words,   interests"   gives   vitality   to   the   statement   on   ecology   embodied   in   the   Declaration   of  
there  need  not  necessarily  be  a  deprivation  of  liberty  for  the  right  to  security  of  person  to   Principles  and  State  Policies  or  the  1987  Constitution.  Article  II,  Section  16  which  provides:  
be   invoked.   In   Delgado   Paez   v.   Colombia,138   a   case   involving   death   threats   to   a   religion    
teacher  at  a  secondary  school  in  Leticia,  Colombia,  whose  social  views  differed  from  those   "The  State  shall  protect  and  advance  the  right  of  the  people  to  a  balanced  
of  the  Apostolic  Prefect  of  Leticia,  the  Committee  held,  viz:   and  healthful  ecology  in  accord  with  the  rhythm  and  harmony  of  nature."  
   
  29  
As  a  constitutionally  guaranteed  right  of  every  person,  it  carries  the  correlative  duty  of  non-­‐ Association  of  Small  Landowners  in  the  Phils.  vs.  Sec.  of  DAR  [G.R.  No.  78742,  July  
impairment.  This  is  but  in  consonance  with  the  declared  policy  of  the  state  "to  protect  and   14,  1989]  
promote  the  right  to  health  of  the  people  and  instill  health  consciousness  among  them."  It  is    
to   be   borne   in   mind   that   the   Philippines   is   party   to   the   Universal   Declaration   of   Human   The   CARP   Law   and   the   other   enactments   also   involved   in   these   cases   have   been   the   subject  
Rights   and   the   Alma   Conference   Declaration   of   1978   which   recognize   health   as   a   of  bitter  attack  from  those  who  point  to  the  shortcomings  of  these  measures  and  ask  that  
fundamental  human  right.   they  be  scrapped  entirely.  To  be  sure,  these  enactments  are  less  than  perfect;  indeed,  they  
  should  be  continuously  re-­‐examined  and  rehoned,  that  they  may  be  sharper  instruments  for  
The  issuance,  therefore,  of  the  cease  and  desist  order  by  the  LLDA,  as  a  practical  matter  of   the  better  protection  of  the  farmer's  rights.  But  we  have  to  start  somewhere.  In  the  pursuit  
procedure   under   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   is   a   proper   exercise   of   its   power   and   of   agrarian   reform,   we   do   not   tread   on   familiar   ground   but   grope   on   terrain   fraught   with  
authority  under  its  charter  and  its  amendatory  laws.  Had  the  cease  and  desist  order  issued   pitfalls  and  expected  difficulties.  This  is  inevitable.  The  CARP  Law  is  not  a  tried  and  tested  
by   the   LLDA   been   complied   with   by   the   City   Government   of   Caloocan   as   it   did   in   the   first   project.  On  the  contrary,  to  use  Justice  Holmes's  words,  "it  is  an  experiment,  as  all  life  is  an  
instance,  no  further  legal  steps  would  have  been  necessary.   experiment,"   and   so   we   learn   as   we   venture   forward,   and,   if   necessary,   by   our   own  
  mistakes.   We   cannot   expect   perfection   although   we   should   strive   for   it   by   all   means.  
Section  19   Meantime,  we  struggle  as  best  we  can  in  freeing  the  farmer  from  the  iron  shackles  that  have  
  unconscionably,  and  for  so  long,  fettered  his  soul  to  the  soil.        
  Garcia  vs.  Board  of  Investments    [G.R.  No.  92024,  November  9,  1990]    
  By   the   decision   we   reach   today,   all   major   legal   obstacles   to   the   comprehensive   agrarian  
In   the   light   of   all   the   clear   advantages   manifest   in   the   plant's   remaining   in   Bataan,   reform  program  are  removed,  to  clear  the  way  for  the  true  freedom  of  the  farmer.  We  may  
practically   nothing   is   shown   to   justify   the   transfer   to   Batangas   except   a   near-­‐absolute   now  glimpse  the  day  he  will  be  released  not  only  from  want  but  also  from  the  exploitation  
discretion  given  by  BOI  to  investors  not  only  to  freely  choose  the  site  but  to  transfer  it  from   and  disdain  of  the  past  and  from  his  own  feelings  of  inadequacy  and  helplessness.  At  last  his  
their  own  first  choice  for  reasons  which  remain  murky  to  say  the  least.   servitude  will  be  ended  forever.  At  last  the  farm  on  which  he  toils  will  be  his  farm.  It  will  be  
  his  portion  of  the  Mother  Earth  that  will  give  him  not  only  the  staff  of  life  but  also  the  joy  of  
And  this  brings  us  to  a  prime  consideration  which  the  Court  cannot  rightly  ignore.   living.  And  where  once  it  bred  for  him  only  deep  despair,  now  can  he  see  in  it  the  fruition  of  
Section  1,  Article  XII  of  the  Constitution  provides  that:   his  hopes  for  a  more  fulfilling  future.  Now  at  last  can  he  banish  from  his  small  plot  of  earth  
  his  insecurities  and  dark  resentments  and  "rebuild  in  it  the  music  and  the  dream."  
xxx                                        xxx                                        xxx    
"The   State   shall   promote   industrialization   and   full   employment   based   on   Section  25  
sound   agricultural   development   and   agrarian   reform,   through   industries      
that   make   full   and   efficient   use   of   human   and   natural   resources,   and     Basco  vs  PAGCOR  [G.R.  No.  91649,  May  14,  1991]  
which   are   competitive   in   both   domestic   and   foreign   markets.   However,    
the   State   shall   protect   Filipino   enterprises   against   unfair   foreign   LOCAL  AUTONOMY  SIMPLY  MEANS  DECENTRALIZATION.  -­‐  The  power  of  local  government  
competition  and  trade  practices."   to  "impose  taxes  and  fees"  is  always  subject  to  "limitations"  which  Congress  may  provide  by  
xxx                                        xxx                                        xxx   law.  Since  PD  1869  remains  an  "operative"  law  until  "amended,  repealed  or  revoked"  (Sec.  
  3,   Art.   XVIII,   1987   Constitution),   its   "exemption   clause"   remains   as   an   exception   to   the  
Every   provision   of   the   Constitution   on   the   national   economy   and   patrimony   is   infused   with   exercise   of   the   power   of   local   governments   to   impose   taxes   and   fees.   It   cannot   therefore   be  
the   spirit   of   national   interest.   The   non-­‐alienation   of   natural   resources,   the   State's   full   violative  but  rather  is  consistent  with  the  principle  of  local  autonomy.  Besides,  the  principle  
control   over   the   development   and   utilization   of   our   scarce   resources,   agreements   with   of   local   autonomy   under   the   1987   Constitution   simply   means   "decentralization"   (III  
foreigners  being  based  on  real  contributions  to  the  economic  growth  and  general  welfare  of   Records   of   the   1987   Constitutional   Commission,   pp.   436-­‐436,   as   cited   in   Bernas,   The  
the  country  and  the  regulation  of  foreign  investments  in  accordance  with  national  goals  and   Constitution   of   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines,   Vol.   II,   First   Ed.,   1988,   p.   374).   It   does   not  
priorities  are  too  explicit  not  to  be  noticed  and  understood.   make   local   governments   sovereign   within   the   state   or   an   "imperium   in   imperio."   "Local  
  Government   has   been   described   as   a   political   subdivision   of   a   nation   or   state   which   is  
A   petrochemical   industry   is   not   an   ordinary   investment   opportunity.   It   should   not   be   constituted   by   law   and   has   substantial   control   of   local   affairs.   In   a   unitary   system   of  
treated   like   a   garment   or   embroidery   firm,   a   shoe-­‐making   venture,   or   even   an   assembler   of   government,  such  as  the  government  under  the  Philippine  Constitution,  local  governments  
cars   or   manufacturer   of   computer   chips,   where   the   BOI   reasoning   may   be   accorded   fuller   can   only   be   an   intra   sovereign   subdivision   of   one   sovereign   nation,   it   cannot   be   an  
faith   and   credit.   The   petrochemical   industry   is   essential   to   the   national   interest.   In   other   imperium   in   imperio.   Local   government   in   such   a   system   can   only   mean   a   measure   of  
ASEAN  countries  like  Indonesia  and  Malaysia,  the  government  superintends  the  industry  by   decentralization   of   the   function   of   government.   (emphasis   supplied)   As   to   what   state  
controlling  the  upstream  or  cracker  facility.   powers   should   be   "decentralized"   and   what   may   be   delegated   to   local   government   units  
  remains   a   matter   of   policy,   which   concerns   wisdom.   It   is   therefore   a   political   question.  
Section  21   (Citizens   Alliance   for   Consumer   Protection   v.   Energy   Regulatory   Board,   162   SCRA   539).  
  What  is  settled  is  that  the  matter  of  regulating,  taxing  or  otherwise  dealing  with  gambling  is  
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a   State   concern   and   hence,   it   is   the   sole   prerogative   of   the   State   to   retain   it   or   delegate   it   to   language  of  the  provision  which  suggests  such  a  thrust  or  justifies  an  interpretation  of  the  
local  governments.   sort.  
   
  Limbona  vs.  Mangelin  [G.R.  No.  80391,  February  28,  1989]   The   “equal   access”   provision   is   a   subsumed   part   of   Article   II   of   the   Constitution,   entitled  
  “Declaration  of  Principles  and  State  Policies.”  The  provisions  under  the  Article  are  generally  
DECENTRALIZATION   OF   ADMINISTRATION   DISTINGUISHED   FROM   DECENTRALIZATION   considered   not   self-­‐executing,   and   there   is   no   plausible   reason   for   according   a   different  
OF   POWER.   —   Autonomy   is   either   decentralization   of   administration   or   decentralization   of   treatment  to  the  “equal  access”  provision.  Like  the  rest  of  the  policies  enumerated  in  Article  
power.  There  is  decentralization  of  administration  when  the  central  government  delegates   II,  the  provision  does  not  contain  any  judicially  enforceable  constitutional  right  but  merely  
administrative   powers   to   political   subdivisions   in   order   to   broaden   the   base   of   government   specifies   a   guideline   for   legislative   or   executive   action.     The   disregard   of   the   provision   does  
power   and   in   the   process   to   make   local   governments   "more   responsive   and   accountable,"   not  give  rise  to  any  cause  of  action  before  the  courts.    
and   "ensure   their   fullest   development   as   self-­‐reliant   communities   and   make   them   more      
effective  partners  in  the  pursuit  of  national  development  and  social  progress."  At  the  same   An   inquiry   into   the   intent   of   the   framers     produces   the   same   determination   that   the  
time,   it   relieves   the   central   government   of   the   burden   of   managing   local   affairs   and   enables   provision  is  not  self-­‐executory.  The  original  wording  of  the  present  Section  26,  Article  II  had  
it  to  concentrate  on  national  concerns.  The  President  exercises  "general  supervision"  over   read,  “The  State  shall  broaden  opportunities  to  public  office  and  prohibit  public  dynasties.”    
them,   but   only   to   "ensure   that   local   affairs   are   administered   according   to   law."   He   has   no   Commissioner   (now   Chief   Justice)   Hilario   Davide,   Jr.   successfully   brought   forth   an  
control   over   their   acts   in   the   sense   that   he   can   substitute   their   judgments   with   his   own.   amendment  that  changed  the  word  “broaden”  to  the  phrase  “ensure  equal  access,”  and  the  
Decentralization   of   power,   on   the   other   hand,   involves   an   abdication   of   political   power   in   substitution  of  the  word  “office”  to  “service.”  He  explained  his  proposal  in  this  wise:  
the   favor   of   local   governments   units   declared   to   be   autonomous.   In   that   case,   the    
autonomous  government  is  free  to  chart  its  own  destiny  and  shape  its  future  with  minimum   I  changed  the  word  “broaden”  to  “ENSURE  EQUAL  ACCESS  TO”  because  
intervention   from   central   authorities.   According   to   a   constitutional   author,   decentralization   what   is   important   would   be   equal   access   to   the   opportunity.   If   you  
of   power   amounts   to   "self-­‐immolation,"   since   in   that   event,   the   autonomous   government   broaden,   it   would   necessarily   mean   that   the   government   would   be  
becomes  accountable  not  to  the  central  authorities  but  to  its  constituency.   mandated   to   create   as   many   offices   as   are   possible   to   accommodate   as  
  many   people   as   are   also   possible.   That   is   the   meaning   of   broadening  
Under  the  1987  Constitution,  local  government  units  enjoy  autonomy  in  these  two  senses,   opportunities  to  public  service.  So,  in  order  that  we  should  not  mandate  
thus:  Section  1.  The  territorial  and  political  subdivisions  of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines   the   State   to   make   the   government   the   number   one   employer   and   to   limit  
are  the  provinces,  cities,  municipalities,  and  barangays.  There  shall  be  autonomous  regions   offices   only   to   what   may   be   necessary   and   expedient   yet   offering   equal  
in  Muslim  Mindanao  and  the  Cordilleras  as  hereinafter  provided.  Sec.  2.  The  territorial  and   opportunities   to   access   to   it,   I   change   the   word   “broaden.”     (emphasis  
political   subdivisions   shall   enjoy   local   autonomy   .   .   .   Sec.   15.   There   shall   be   created   supplied)  
autonomous   regions   in   Muslim   Mindanao   and   in   the   Cordilleras   consisting   of   provinces,    
cities,  municipalities,  and  geographical  areas  sharing  common  and  distinctive  historical  and   Obviously,  the  provision  is  not  intended  to  compel  the  State  to  enact  positive  measures  that  
cultural  heritage,  economic  and  social  structures,  and  other  relevant  characteristics  within   would   accommodate   as   many   people   as   possible   into   public   office.   The   approval   of   the  
the   framework   of   this   Constitution   and   the   national   sovereignty   as   well   as   territorial   “Davide   amendment”   indicates   the   design   of   the   framers   to   cast   the   provision   as   simply  
integrity   of   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines.   An   autonomous   government   that   enjoys   enunciatory  of  a  desired  policy  objective  and  not  reflective  of  the  imposition  of  a  clear  State  
autonomy   of   the   latter   category   [CONST.   (1987),   art.   X   sec.   15.]   is   subject   alone   to   the   burden.  
decree   of   the   organic   act   creating   it   and   accepted   principles   on   the   effects   and   limits   of    
"autonomy."   On   the   other   hand,   an   autonomous   government   of   the   former   class   is,   as   we   Moreover,  the  provision  as  written  leaves  much  to  be  desired  if  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  
noted,   under   the   supervision   of   the   national   government   acting   through   the   President   (and   source  of  positive  rights.  It  is  difficult  to  interpret  the  clause  as  operative  in  the  absence  of  
the  Department  of  Local  Government).   legislation  since  its  effective  means  and  reach  are  not  properly  defined.  Broadly  written,  the  
  myriad   of   claims   that   can   be   subsumed   under   this   rubric   appear   to   be   entirely   open-­‐ended.    
Section  26   Words   and   phrases   such   as   “equal   access,”   “opportunities,”   and   “public   service”   are  
  susceptible  to  countless  interpretations  owing  to  their  inherent  impreciseness.  Certainly,  it  
  Pamatong  vs.  COMELEC  [G.R.  No.  161872,  April  13,  2004]   was   not   the   intention   of   the   framers   to   inflict   on   the   people   an   operative   but   amorphous  
  foundation  from  which  innately  unenforceable  rights  may  be  sourced.      
THE   STATE’S   PRINCIPLE   OF   EQUAL   ACCESS   TO   OPPORTUNITIES   IS   NOT   JUDICIALLY    
ENFORCEABLE.   -­‐   Implicit   in   the   petitioner’s   invocation   of   the   constitutional   provision   As   earlier   noted,   the   privilege   of   equal   access   to   opportunities   to   public   office   may   be  
ensuring   “equal   access   to   opportunities   for   public   office”   is   the   claim   that   there   is   a   subjected  to  limitations.  Some  valid  limitations  specifically  on  the  privilege  to  seek  elective  
constitutional  right  to  run  for  or  hold  public  office  and,  particularly  in  his  case,  to  seek  the   office  are  found  in  the  provisions  of  the  Omnibus  Election  Code  on  “Nuisance  Candidates”  
presidency.   There   is   none.   What   is   recognized   is   merely   a   privilege   subject   to   limitations   and   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   6452   dated   December   10,   2002   outlining   the   instances  
imposed  by  law.  Section  26,  Article  II  of  the  Constitution  neither  bestows  such  a  right  nor   wherein  the  COMELEC  may  motu  proprio  refuse  to  give  due  course  to  or  cancel  a  Certificate  
elevates   the   privilege   to   the   level   of   an   enforceable   right.   There   is   nothing   in   the   plain   of  Candidacy.  
  31  
   Thus,   while   the   manner   of   examining   public   records   may   be   subject   to   reasonable  
As  long  as  the  limitations  apply  to  everybody  equally  without  discrimination,  however,  the   regulation   by   the   government   agency   in   custody   thereof,   the   duty   to   disclose   the  
equal   access   clause   is   not   violated.   Equality   is   not   sacrificed   as   long   as   the   burdens   information   of   public   concern,   and   to   afford   access   to   public   records   cannot   be  
engendered   by   the   limitations   are   meant   to   be   borne   by   any   one   who   is   minded   to   file   a   discretionary   on   the   part   of   said   agencies.   Certainly,   its   performance   cannot   be   made  
certificate   of   candidacy.   In   the   case   at   bar,   there   is   no   showing   that   any   person   is   exempt   contingent   upon   the   discretion   of   such   agencies.   Otherwise,   the   enjoyment   of   the  
from  the  limitations  or  the  burdens  which  they  create.   constitutional   right   may   be   rendered   nugatory   by   any   whimsical   exercise   of   agency  
  discretion.   The   constitutional   duty,   not   being   discretionary,   its   performance   may   be  
Section  28   compelled  by  a  writ  of  Mandamus  in  a  proper  case.  
   
  Legaspi  vs.  Civil  Service  Commission  [G.R.  No.  72119,  May  29,  1987]     Valmonte  vs.  Belmonte  [G.R.  No.  74930,  February  13,  1989]  
   
AGENCIES   CAN   ONLY   REGULATE   THE   MANNER   OF   INSPECTION,   BUT   MAY   NOT   PROHIBIT   GOVERNMENT   OWNED   AND   CONTROLLED   CORPORATIONS   ARE   LIKEWISE   SUBJECT   TO  
ACCESS.   -­‐   It   is   clear   from   the   foregoing   pronouncements   of   this   Court   that   government   THE   PRINCIPLE   OF   FULL   PUBLIC   DISCLOSURE.   -­‐   Considering   the   intent   of   the   framers   of  
agencies   are   without   discretion   in   refusing   disclosure   of,   or   access   to,   information   of   public   the   Constitution   which,   though   not   binding   upon   the   Court,   are   nevertheless   persuasive,  
concern.   This   is   not   to   lose   sight   of   the   reasonable   regulations   which   may   be   imposed   by   and   considering   further   that   government-­‐owned   and   controlled   corporations,   whether  
said  agencies  in  custody  of  public  records  on  the  manner  in  which  the  right  to  information   performing   proprietary   or   governmental   functions   are   accountable   to   the   people,   the   Court  
may   be   exercised   by   the   public.   In   the   Subido   case,   We   recognized   the   authority   of   the   is   convinced   that   transactions   entered   into   by   the   GSIS,   a   government-­‐controlled  
Register  of  Deeds  to  regulate  the  manner  in  which  persons  desiring  to  do  so,  may  inspect,   corporation   created   by   special   legislation   are   within   the   ambit   of   the   people's   right   to   be  
examine   or   copy   records   relating   to   registered   lands.   However,   the   regulations   which   the   informed  pursuant  to  the  constitutional  policy  of  transparency  in  government  dealings.  
Register  of  Deeds  may  promulgate  are  confined  to:    
  In  fine,  petitioners  are  entitled  to  access  to  the  documents  evidencing  loans  granted  by  the  
.   .   .   prescribing   the   manner   and   hours   of   examination   to   the   end   that   GSIS,   subject   to   reasonable   regulations   that   the   latter   may   promulgate   relating   to   the  
damage   to   or   loss   of,   the   records   may   be   avoided,   that   undue   manner  and  hours  of  examination,  to  the  end  that  damage  to  or  loss  of  the  records  may  be  
interference  with  the  duties  of  the  custodian  of  the  books  and  documents   avoided,   that   undue   interference   with   the   duties   of   the   custodian   of   the   records   may   be  
and   other   employees   may   be   prevented,   that   the   right   of   other   persons   prevented  and  that  the  right  of  other  persons  entitled  to  inspect  the  records  may  be  insured  
entitled   to   make   inspection   may   be   insured   .   .   .   (Subido   vs.   Ozaeta,   80   [Legaspi  v.  Civil  Service  Commission,  supra  at  p.  538,  quoting  Subido  v.  Ozaeta,  80  Phil.  383,  
Phil.  383,  387).   387.]   The   petition,   as   to   the   second   and   third   alternative   acts   sought   to   be   done   by  
  petitioners,  is  meritorious.  
Applying   the   Subido   ruling   by   analogy,   We   recognized   a   similar   authority   in   a   municipal    
judge,  to  regulate  the  manner  of  inspection  by  the  public  of  criminal  docket  records  in  the   THE   RIGHT   TO   INFORMATION   ON   MATTERS   OF   PUBLIC   CONCERN   DOES   NOT   CARRY  
case   of   Baldoza   vs.   Dimaano   (Adm.   Matter   No.   1120-­‐MJ,   May   5,   1976,   71   SCRA   14).   Said   WITH   IT   THE   RIGHT   TO   DEMAND   COPIES   OF   THE   DOCUMENTS   SOUGHT   TO   BE  
administrative  case  was  filed  against  the  respondent  judge  for  his  alleged  refusal  to  allow   INSPECTED.   -­‐   However,   the   same   cannot   be   said   with   regard   to   the   first   act   sought   by  
examination  of  the  criminal  docket  records  in  his  sala.  Upon  a  finding  by  the  Investigating   petitioners,   i.e.,   "to   furnish   petitioners   the   list   of   the   names   of   the   Batasang   Pambansa  
Judge   that   the   respondent   had   allowed   the   complainant   to   open   and   view   the   subject   members   belonging   to   the   UNIDO   and   PDP-­‐Laban   who   were   able   to   secure   clean   loans  
records,   We   absolved   the   respondent.   In   effect,   We   have   also   held   that   the   rules   and   immediately   before   the   February   7   election   thru   the   intercession/marginal   note   of   the   then  
conditions   imposed   by   him   upon   the   manner   of   examining   the   public   records   were   First  Lady  Imelda  Marcos."  
reasonable.    
  Although  citizens  are  afforded  the  right  to  information  and,  pursuant  thereto,  are  entitled  to  
In   both   the   Subido   and   the   Baldoza   cases,   We   were   emphatic   in   Our   statement   that   the   "access   to   official   records,"   the   constitution   does   not   accord   them   a   right   to   compel  
authority   to   regulate   the   manner   of   examining   public   records   does   not   carry   with   it   the   custodians   of   official   records   to   prepare   lists,   abstracts,   summaries   and   the   like   in   their  
power   to   prohibit.   A   distinction   has   to   be   made   between   the   discretion   to   refuse   outright   desire  to  acquire  information  or  matters  of  public  concern.  
the   disclosure   of   or   access   to   a   particular   information   and   the   authority   to   regulate   the    
manner  in  which  the  access  is  to  be  afforded.  The  first  is  a  limitation  upon  the  availability  of     Aquino-­‐Sarmiento  vs.  Morato    [G.R.  No.  92541,  November  13,  1991]  
access   to   the   information   sought,   which   only   the   Legislature   may   impose   (Art.   III,   Sec.   6,    
1987   Constitution).   The   second   pertains   to   the   government   agency   charged   with   the   RIGHT   OF   THE   PEOPLE   TO   INFORMATION   ON   MATTERS   OF   PUBLIC   CONCERN   IS   SELF-­‐
custody  of  public  records.  Its  authority  to  regulate  access  is  to  be  exercised  solely  to  the  end   EXECUTORY.  —  As  We  held  in  Legaspi  v.  Civil  Service  Commission  (150  SCRA  530  [1987]),  
that   damage   to,   or   loss   of,   public   records   may   be   avoided,   undue   interference   with   the   the   constitutional   provision   "The   right   of   the   people   to   information   on   matters   of   public  
duties   of   said   agencies   may   be   prevented,   and   more   importantly,   that   the   exercise   of   the   concern"   is   self-­‐executory   and   supplies   "the   rules   by   means   of   which   the   right   to  
same  constitutional  right  by  other  persons  shall  be  assured  (Subido  vs.  Ozaeta,  supra).       information  may  be  enjoyed  (Cooley,  A  Treatise  on  Constitutional  Limitations  167  [1927])  
  by   guaranteeing   the   right   and   mandating   the   duty   to   afford   access   to   sources   of  
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information.   Hence,   the   fundamental   right   therein   recognized   may   be   asserted   by   the   plain   departure   from   its   command.   The   essence   of   the   trust   reposed   in  
people   upon   the   ratification   of   the   constitution   without   need   for   any   ancillary   act   of   the   him   is   to   decide.   Only   a   higher   court,   as   was   emphasized   by   Justice  
Legislature.   What   may   be   provided   for   by   the   Legislature   are   reasonable   conditions   and   Barredo,   can   pass   on   his   actuation.   He   is   not   a   subordinate   of   an  
limitations  upon  the  access  to  be  afforded  which  must,  of  necessity,  be  consistent  with  the   executive   or   legislative   official,   however   eminent.   It   is   indispensable   that  
declared   State   policy   of   full   public   disclosure   of   all   transactions   involving   public   interest   there  be  no  exception  to  the  rigidity  of  such  a  norm  if  he  is,  as  expected,  
(Constitution,  Art.  II,  Sec.  28)."  (See  also  Tañada  v.  Tuvera,  136  SCRA  27  [1985];  Valmonte  v.   to   be   confined   to   the   task   of   adjudication.   Fidelity   to   his   sworn  
Belmonte,  Jr.,  170  SCRA  256  [1989]).   responsibility   no   less   than   the   maintenance   of   respect   for   the   judiciary  
  can  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less."  
Respondents   contend,   however,   that   what   is   rendered   by   the   members   of   the   board   in    
reviewing   films   and   reflected   in   their   individual   voting   slip   is   their   individual   vote   of   This   declaration   does   not   mean   that   RTC   Judges   should   adopt   an   attitude   of   monastic  
conscience  on  the  motion  picture  or  television  program  and  as  such,  makes  the  individual   insensibility   or   unbecoming   indifference   to   Province/City   Committee   on   Justice.   As  
voting  slip  purely  private  and  personal;  an  exclusive  property  of  the  member  concerned.   incumbent  RTC  Judges,  they  form  part  of  the  structure  of  government.  Their  integrity  and  
  performance   in   the   adjudication   of   cases   contribute   to   the   solidity   of   such   structure.   As  
The   term   private   has   been   defined   as   "belonging   to   or   concerning,   an   individual   person,   public   officials,   they   are   trustees   of   an   orderly   society.   Even   as   non-­‐members   of  
company,  or  interest";  whereas,  public  means  "pertaining  to,  or  belonging  to,  or  affecting  a   Provincial/City   Committees   on   Justice,   RTC   judges   should   render   assistance   to   said  
nation,   state,   or   community   at   large"   (People   v.   Powell,   274   NW   372   [1937]).   May   the   Committees   to   help   promote   the   laudable   purposes   for   which   they   exist,   but   only   when  
decisions   of   respondent   Board   and   the   individual   members   concerned,   arrived   at   in   an   such  assistance  may  be  reasonably  incidental  to  the  fulfillment  of  their  judicial  duties.  
official   capacity,   be   considered   private?   Certainly   not.   As   may   be   gleaned   from   the   decree    
(PD   1986)   creating   the   respondent   classification   board,   there   is   no   doubt   that   its   very     Angara  vs.  Electoral  Commission  [G.R.  No.  45081,  July  15,  1936]  
existence  is  public  in  character;  it  is  an  office  created  to  serve  public  interest.  It  being  the    
case,   respondents   can   lay   no   valid   claim   to   privacy.   The   right   to   privacy   belongs   to   the   CONCEPTS   OF   SEPARATION   OF   POWERS   AND   CHECKS   AND   BALANCES   -­‐   The   separation   of  
individual  acting  in  his  private  capacity  and  not  to  a  governmental  agency  or  officers  tasked   powers   is   a   fundamental   principle   in   our   system   of   government.   It   obtains   not   through  
with,   and   acting   in,   the   discharge   of   public   duties   (See   Valmonte   v.   Belmonte,   Jr.,   supra.)   express   provision   but   by   actual   division   in   our   Constitution.   Each   department   of   the  
There   can   be   no   invasion   of   privacy   in   the   case   at   bar   since   what   is   sought   to   be   divulged   is   government   has   exclusive   cognizance   of   matters   within   its   jurisdiction,   and   is   supreme  
a   product   of   action   undertaken   in   the   course   of   performing   official   functions.   To   declare   within  its  own  sphere.  But  it  does  not  follow  from  the  fact  that  the  three  powers  are  to  be  
otherwise  would  be  to  clothe  every  public  official  with  an  impregnable  mantle  of  protection   kept   separate   and   distinct   that   the   Constitution   intended   them   to   be   absolutely  
against  public  scrutiny  for  their  official  acts.   unrestrained  and  independent  of  each  other.  The  Constitution  has  provided  for  an  elaborate  
  system   of   checks   and   balances   to   secure   coordination   in   the   workings   of   the   various  
SEPARATION  OF  POWERS   departments   of   the   government.   For   example,   the   Chief   Executive   under   our   Constitution   is  
  so  far  made  a  check  on  the  legislative  power  that  this  assent  is  required  in  the  enactment  of  
  In  re:  Manzano    [A.M.  No.  88-­‐7-­‐1861-­‐RTC,  October  5,  1988]   laws.   This,   however,   is   subject   to   the   further   check   that   a   bill   may   become   a   law  
  notwithstanding   the   refusal   of   the   President   to   approve   it,   by   a   vote   of   two-­‐thirds   or   three-­‐
IN  DEFERENCE  TO  THE  CONCEPT  OF  SEPARATION  OF  POWERS,  JUDICIAL  OFFICERS  ARE   fourths,   as   the   case   may   be,   of   the   National   Assembly.   The   President   has   also   the   right   to  
NOT   ALLOWED   TO   BE   APPOINTED   TO   POSITIONS   PERFORMING   NON-­‐JUDICIAL   convene   the   Assembly   in   special   session   whenever   he   chooses.   On   the   other   hand,   the  
FUNCTIONS.  -­‐  Under  the  Constitution,  the  members  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  other  courts   National   Assembly   operates   as   a   check   on   the   Executive   in   the   sense   that   its   consent  
established   by   law   shall   not   be   designated   to   any   agency   performing   quasi-­‐judicial   or   through   its   Commission   on   Appointments   is   necessary   in   the   appointment   of   certain  
administrative  functions  (Section  12,  Art.  VIII,  Constitution).   officers;  and  the  concurrence  of  a  majority  of  all  its  members  is  essential  to  the  conclusion  
  of   treaties.   Furthermore,   in   its   power   to   determine   what   courts   other   than   the   Supreme  
Considering   that   membership   of   Judge   Manzano   in   the   Ilocos   Norte   Provincial   Committee   Court   shall   be   established,   to   define   their   jurisdiction   and   to   appropriate   funds   for   their  
on   Justice,   which   discharges   administrative   functions,   will   be   in   violation   of   the   support,   the   National   Assembly   controls   the   judicial   department   to   a   certain   extent.   The  
Constitution,  the  Court  is  constrained  to  deny  his  request.   Assembly   also   exercises   the   judicial   power   of   trying   impeachments.   And   the   judiciary   in  
  turn,  with  the  Supreme  Court  as  the  final  arbiter,  effectively  checks  the  other  departments  
Former  Chief  Justice  Enrique  M.  Fernando  in  his  concurring  opinion  in  the  case  of  Garcia  vs.   in   the   exercise   of   its   power   to   determine   the   law,   and   hence   to   declare   executive   and  
Macaraig  (39  SCRA  106)  ably  sets  forth:   legislative  acts  void  if  violative  of  the  Constitution.  
   
"While   the   doctrine   of   separation   of   powers   is   a   relative   theory   not   to   be   But   in   the   main,   the   Constitution   has   blocked   out   with   deft   strokes   and   in   bold   lines,  
enforced   with   pedantic   rigor,   the   practical   demands   of   government   allotment   of   power   to   the   executive,   the   legislative   and   the   judicial   departments   of   the  
precluding   its   doctrinaire   application,   it   cannot   justify   a   member   of   the   government.   The   overlapping   and   interlacing   of   functions   and   duties   between   the   several  
judiciary   being   required   to   assume   a   position   or   perform   a   duty   non-­‐ departments,   however,   sometimes   makes   it   hard   to   say   just   where   the   one   leaves   off   and  
judicial  in  character.  That  is  implicit  in  the  principle.  Otherwise  there  is  a   the  other  begins.  In  times  of  social  disquietude  or  political  excitement,   the  great  landmarks  
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of  the  Constitution  are  apt  to  be  forgotten  or  marred,  if  not  entirely  obliterated.  In  cases  of   come  be  tested  in  the  crucible  of  Filipino  minds  and  hearts  than  in  consultation  rooms  and  
conflict,  the  judicial  department  is  the  only  constitutional  organ  which  can  be  called  upon  to   court  chambers.  
determine  the  proper  allocation  of  powers  between  the  several  departments  and  among  the    
integral  or  constituent  units  thereof.   THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  GRANT  OF  POWER  TO  JUDGE  ALL  CONTROVERSIES  RELATING  TO  
  THE   ELECTION,   RETURNS   AND   QUALIFICATIONS   OF   MEMBERS   OF   THE   NATIONAL  
As  any  human  production,  our  Constitution  is  of  course  lacking  perfection  and  perfectibility,   ASSEMBLY   CARRIES   WITH   IT   THE   POWER   TO   ISSUE   REGULATIONS   RELATIVE   TO   THE  
but  as  much  as  it  was  within  the  power  of  our  people,  acting  through  their  delegates  to  so   EXERCISE  OF   THE  POWERS  EXPRESSLY  CONFERRED.   -­‐  The   grant   of   power   to   the   Electoral  
provide,  that  instrument  which  is  the  expression  of  their  sovereignty  however  limited,  has   Commission   to   judge   all   contests   relating   to   the   election,   returns   and   qualifications   of  
established   a   republican   government   intended   to   operate   and   function   as   a   harmonious   members   of   the   National   Assembly,   is   intended   to   be   as   complete   and   unimpaired   as   if   it  
whole,   under   a   system   of   checks   and   balances,   and   subject   to   specific   limitations   and   had   remained   originally   in   the   legislature.   The   express   lodging   of   that   power   in   the  
restrictions   provided   in   the   said   instrument.   The   Constitution   sets   forth   in   no   uncertain   Electoral   Commission   is   an   implied   denial   of   the   exercise   of   that   power   by   the   National  
language  the  restrictions  and  limitations  upon  governmental  powers  and  agencies.  If  these   Assembly.   And   this   is   as   effective   a   restriction   upon   the   legislative   power   as   an   express  
restrictions   and   limitations   are   transcended   it   would   be   inconceivable   if   the   Constitution   prohibition  in  the  Constitution  (Ex  parte  Lewis,  45  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.,  1;  State  vs.  Whisman,  36  
had   not   provided   for   a   mechanism   by   which   to   direct   the   course   of   government   along   S.   D.,   260;   L.   R.   A.,   1917B,   1).   If   we   concede   the   power   claimed   in   behalf   of   the   National  
constitutional  channels,  for  then  the  distribution  of  powers  would  be  mere  verbiage,  the  bill   Assembly   that   said   body   may   regulate   the   proceedings   of   the   Electoral   Commission   and   cut  
of   rights   mere   expressions   of   sentiment,   and   the   principles   of   good   government   mere   off   the   power   of   the   commission   to   lay   down   the   period   within   which   protests   should   be  
political  apothegms.  Certainly,  the  limitations  and  restrictions  embodied  in  our  Constitution   filed,   the   grant   of   power   to   the   commission   would   be   ineffective.   The   Electoral   Commission  
are  real  as  they  should  be  in  any  living  constitution.  In  the  United  States  where  no  express   in  such  case  would  be  invested  with  the  power  to  determine  contested  cases  involving  the  
constitutional  grant  is  found  in  their  constitution,  the  possession  of  this  moderating  power   election,  returns  and  qualifications  of  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly  but  subject  at  
of  the  courts,  not  to  speak  of  its  historical  origin  and  development  there,  has  been  set  at  rest   all  times  to  the  regulative  power  of  the  National  Assembly.  Not  only  would  the  purpose  of  
by  popular  acquiescence  for  a  period  of  more  than  one  and  a  half  centuries.  In  our  case,  this   the   framers   of   our   Constitution   of   totally   transferring   this   authority   from   the   legislative  
moderating  power  is  granted,  if  not  expressly,  by  clear  implication  from  section  2  of  article   body  be  frustrated,  but  a  dual  authority  would  be  created  with  the  resultant  inevitable  clash  
VIII  of  our  Constitution.   of   powers   from   time   to   time.   A   sad   spectacle   would   then   be   presented   of   the   Electoral  
  Commission   retaining   the   bare   authority   of   taking   cognizance   of   cases   referred   to,   but   in  
JUDICIAL  SUPREMACY  -­‐  The  Constitution  is  a  definition  of  the  powers  of  government.  Who   reality   without   the   necessary   means   to   render   that   authority   effective   whenever   and  
is   to   determine   the   nature,   scope   and   extent   of   such   powers?   The   Constitution   itself   has   wherever  the  National  Assembly  has  chosen  to  act,  a  situation  worse  than  that  intended  to  
provided  for  the  instrumentality  of  the  judiciary  as  the  rational  way.  And  when  the  judiciary   be   remedied   by   the   framers   of   our   Constitution.   The   power   to   regulate   on   the   part   of   the  
mediates   to   allocate   constitutional   boundaries,   it   does   not   assert   any   superiority   over   the   National  Assembly  in  procedural  matters  will  inevitably  lead  to  the  ultimate  control  by  the  
other   departments;   it   does   not   in   reality   nullify   or   invalidate   an   act   of   the   legislature,   but   Assembly  of  the  entire  proceedings  of  the  Electoral  Commission,  and,  by  indirection,  to  the  
only   asserts   the   solemn   and   sacred   obligation   assigned   to   it   by   the   Constitution   to   entire   abrogation   of   the   constitutional   grant.   It   is   obvious   that   this   result   should   not   be  
determine   conflicting   claims   of   authority   under   the   Constitution   and   to   establish   for   the   permitted.  
parties  in  an  actual  controversy  the  rights  which  that  instrument  secures  and  guarantees  to    
them.   This   is   in   truth   all   that   is   involved   in   what   is   termed   "judicial   supremacy"   which   We  are  not  insensible  to  the  impassioned  argument  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner  
properly   is   the   power   of   judicial   review   under   the   Constitution.   Even   then,   this   power   of   regarding  the  importance  and  necessity  of  respecting  the  dignity  and  independence  of  the  
judicial   review   is   limited   to   actual   cases   and   controversies   to   be   exercised   after   full   National   Assembly   as   a   coordinate   department   of   the   government   and   of   according   validity  
opportunity   of   argument   by   the   parties,   and   limited   further   to   the   constitutional   question   to   its   acts,   to   avoid   what   he   characterized   would   be   practically   an   unlimited   power   of   the  
raised   or   the   very   lis   mota   presented.   Any   attempt   at   abstraction   could   only   lead   to   commission  in  the  admission  of  protests  against  members  of  the  National  Assembly.  But  as  
dialectics   and   barren   legal   questions   and   to   sterile   conclusions   of   wisdom,   justice   or   we  have  pointed  out  hereinabove,  the  creation  of  the  Electoral  Commission  carried  with  it  
expediency   of   legislation.   More   than   that,   courts   accord   the   presumption   of   ex  necesitate  rei  the  power  regulative  in  character  to  limit  the  time  within  which  protests  
constitutionality  to  legislative  enactments,  not  only  because  the  legislature  is  presumed  to   intrusted  to  its  cognizance  should  be  filed.  It  is  a  settled  rule  of  construction  that  where  a  
abide  by  the  Constitution  but  also  because  the  judiciary  in  the  determination  of  actual  cases   general   power   is   conferred   or   duty   enjoined,   every   particular   power   necessary   for   the  
and  controversies  must  reflect  the  wisdom  and  justice  of  the  people  as  expressed  through   exercise  of  the  one  or  the  performance  of  the  other  is  also  conferred  (Cooley,  Constitutional  
their  representatives  in  the  executive  and  legislative  departments  of  the  government.   Limitations,   eighth   ed.,   vol.   I,   pp.   138,   139).   In   the   absence   of   any   further   constitutional  
  provision   relating   to   the   procedure   to   be   followed   in   filing   protests   before   the   Electoral  
But   much   as   we   might   postulate   on   the   internal   checks   of   power   provided   in   our   Commission,   therefore,   the   incidental   power   to   promulgate   such   rules   necessary   for   the  
Constitution,  it  ought  not  the  less  to  be  remembered  that,  in  the  language  of  James  Madison,   proper  exercise  of  its  exclusive  power  to  judge  all  contests  relating  to  the  election,  returns  
the  system  itself  is  not  "the  chief  palladium  of  constitutional  liberty  .  .  .  the  people  who  are   and   qualifications   of   members   of   the   National   Assembly,   must   be   deemed   by   necessary  
authors  of  this  blessing  must  also  be  its  guardians  .  .  .  their  eyes  must  be  ever  ready  to  mark,   implication  to  have  been  lodged  also  in  the  Electoral  Commission.  
their   voice   to   pronounce   .   .   .   aggression   on   the   authority   of   their   constitution."   In   the   last    
and   ultimate   analysis,   then,   must   the   success   of   our   government   in   the   unfolding   years   to     Casibang  vs.  Aquino  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐38025,  August  20,  1979]  
  34  
   'term'  thereof,"  and  that  "it  is  erroneous  to  conclude  that  under  Section  9,  Article  XVII  of  the  
POLITICAL   QUESTION   -­‐   The   term   "political   question"   connotes   what   it   means   in   ordinary   New   Constitution,   the   term   of   office   of   the   private   respondents   expired,   and   that   they   are  
parlance,   namely,   a   question   of   policy.   It   refers   to   those   questions   which   under   the   now  holding  their  respective  offices  under  a  new  term.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  they  hold  
Constitution,   are   to   be   decided   by   the   people   in   their   sovereign   capacity;   or   in   regard   to   their   respective   offices   still   under   the   term   to   which   they   have   been   elected,   although   the  
which  full  discretionary  authority  has  been  delegated  to  the  legislative  or  executive  branch   same  is  now  indefinite"  (Paredes,  Sunga  and  Valley  cases,  supra).  
of  the  government.  It  is  concerned  with  issues  dependent  upon  the  wisdom,  not  legality,  of  a    
particular  measure"  (Tañada  vs.  Cuenco,  L-­‐1052,  Feb.  28,  1957).  A  broader  definition  was     Tañada  vs.  Cuenco  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐10520,  February  28,  1957]  
advanced   by   U.S.   Supreme   Court   Justice   Brennan   in   Baker   vs.   Carr   (369   U.S.   186   [1962):    
"Prominent   on   the   surface   of   any   case   held   to   involve   a   political   question   is   found   a   THE   COMPOSITION   OF   THE   ELECTORAL   TRIBUNAL   IS   A   JUSTICEABLE   QUESTION   -­‐  
textually   demonstrable   constitutional   commitment   of   the   issue   to   a   coordinate   political   Respondents   assail   our   jurisdiction   to   entertain   the   petition,   upon   the   ground   that   the  
department;  or  a  lack  of  judicially  discoverable  and  manageable  standards  for  resolving  it;   power   to   choose   six   (6)   Senators   as   members   of   the   Senate   Electoral   Tribunal   has   been  
or  the  impossibility  of  deciding  without  an  initial  policy  determination  of  a  kind  clearly  for   expressly   conferred   by   the   Constitution   upon   the   Senate,   despite   the   fact   that   the   draft  
non-­‐judicial  discretion;  or  the  impossibility  of  a  court's  undertaking  independent  resolution   submitted  to  the  constitutional  convention  gave  to  the  respective  political  parties  the  right  
without   expressing   lack   of   respect   due   coordinate   branches   of   the   government;   or   an   to   elect   their   respective   representatives   in   the   Electoral   Commission   provided   for   in   the  
unusual   need   for   unquestioning   adherence   to   a   political   decision   already   made;   or   the   original   Constitution   of   the   Philippines,   and   that   the   only   remedy   available   to   petitioners  
potentiality  of  embarrassment  from  multifarious  pronouncements  by  various  departments   herein  "is  not  in  the  judicial  forum",  but  "to  bring  the  matter  to  the  bar  of  public  opinion."  
on  one  question"  (p.  217).  And  Chief  Justice  Enrique  M.  Fernando,  then  an  Associate  Justice,    
of   this   Court   fixed   the   limits   of   the   term,   thus:   "The   term   has   been   made   applicable   to   We   cannot   agree   with   the   conclusion   drawn   by   respondents   from   the   foregoing   facts.   To  
controversies   clearly   non-­‐judicial   and   therefore   beyond   its   jurisdiction   or   to   an   issue   begin  with,  unlike  the  cases  of  Alejandrino  vs.  Quezon  (46  Phil.,  83)  and  Vera  vs.  Avelino  (77  
involved  in  a  case  appropriately  subject  to  its  cognizance,  as  to  which  there  has  been  a  prior   Phil.,  192)  —  relied  upon  by  the  respondents  —  this  is  not  an  action  against  the  Senate,  and  
legislative  or  executive  determination  to  which  deference  must  be  paid  (Cf.  Vera  vs.  Avelino,   it   does   not   seek   to   compel   the   latter,   either   directly   or   indirectly,   to   allow   the   petitioners   to  
77   Phil.   192   [1946];   Lopez   vs.   Roxas,   L-­‐25716,   July   28,   1966,   17   SCRA   756;   Gonzales   vs.   perform  their  duties  as  members  of  said  House.  Although  the  Constitution  provides  that  the  
Commission   on   Elections,   L-­‐28196,   Nov.   9,   1967,   21   SCRA   774).   It   has   likewise   been   Senate   shall   choose   six   (6)   Senators   to   be   members   of   the   Senate   Electoral   Tribunal,   the  
employed  loosely  to  characterize  a  suit  where  the  party  proceeded  against  is  the  President   latter   is   part   neither   of   Congress   nor   of   the   Senate.   (Angara   vs.   Electoral   Commission,   63  
or  Congress,  or  any  branch  thereof  (Cf.  Planas  vs.  Gil,  67  Phil.  62  [1937];  Vera  vs.  Avelino,  77   Phil.,  139;  Suanes  vs.  Chief  Accountant,  81  Phil.,  818;  46  Off.  Gaz.,  462.)  
Phil.  192  [1946]).  If  to  be  delimited  with  accuracy;  'political  questions  should  refer  to  such    
as  would  under  the  Constitution  be  decided  by  the  people  in  their  sovereign  capacity  or  in   Secondly,   although   the   Senate   has,   under   the   Constitution,   the   exclusive   power   to   choose  
regard  to  which  full  discretionary  authority  is  vested  either  in  the  President  or  Congress.  It   the  Senators  who  shall  form  part  of  the  Senate  Electoral  Tribunal,  the  fundamental  law  has  
is   thus   beyond   the   competence   of   the   judiciary   to   pass   upon.   .   .   ."   (Lansang   vs.   Garcia,   42   prescribed   the   manner   in   which   the   authority   shall   be   exercised.   As   the   author   of   a   very  
SCRA  448,  504-­‐505  [1971])   enlightening  study  on  judicial  self-­‐limitation  has  aptly  put  it:  
   
JUSTICEABLE   QUESTION   -­‐   A   purely   justiciable   question   or   controversy   as   it   implies   a   given   "The   courts   are   called   upon   to   say,   on   the   one   hand,   by   whom   certain  
right,  legally  demandable  and  enforceable,  an  act  or  omission  violative  of  said  right,  and  a   powers  shall  be  exercised,  and  on  the  other  hand,  to  determine  whether  
remedy,  granted  or  sanctioned  by  law,  for  said  breach  of  right  (Tan  vs.  Republic,  107  Phil.   the   powers   thus   possessed   have   been   validly   exercised.   In   performing  
632-­‐633   [1960]).   Before   and   after   the   ratification   and   effectivity   of   the   New   Constitution,   the  latter  function,  they  do  not  encroach  upon  the  powers  of  a  coordinate  
the  nature  of  the  aforesaid  issue  as  well  as  the  consequences  of  its  resolution  by  the  Court,   branch   of   the   government,   since   the   determination   of   the   validity   of   an  
remains  the  same  as  above-­‐stated.   act  is  not  the  same  thing  as  the  performance  of  the  act.  In  the  one  case  we  
  are  seeking  to  ascertain  upon  whom  devolves  the  duty  of  the  particular  
DISTINCTION   BETWEEN   “TERM”   OF   OFFICE   AND   “RIGHT”   TO   OFFICE.   -­‐   That   "there   is   a   service.   In   the   other   case   we   are   merely   seeking   to   determine   whether  
difference  between  the  'term'  of  office  and  the  'right'  to  hold  an  office.  A  'term'  of  office  is   the   Constitution   has   been   violated   by   anything   done   or   attempted   by  
the  period  during  which  an  elected  officer  or  appointee  is  entitled  to  hold  office,  perform  its   either  an  executive  official  or  the  legislative."  (Judicial  Self-­‐Limitation  by  
functions  and  enjoy  its  privileges  and  emoluments.  A  'right'  to  hold  a  public  office  is  the  just   Finkelstein,   pp.   221,   224,   244,   Harvard   Law   Review,   Vol.   39;   emphasis  
and   legal   claim   to   hold   and   enjoy   the   powers   and   responsibilities   of   the   office.   In   other   supplied.)  
words,   the   'term'   refers   to   the   period,   duration   of   length   of   time   during   which   the   occupant    
of  an  office  is  entitled  to  stay  therein  whether  such  period  be  definite  or  indefinite.  Hence,   Again,  under  the  Constitution,  "the  legislative  power"  is  vested  exclusively  in  the  Congress  
although   Section   9,   Article   XVII   of   the   New   Constitution   made   the   term   of   the   petitioners   of  the  Philippines.  Yet,  this  does  not  detract  from  the  power  of  the  courts  to  pass  upon  the  
indefinite,  it  did  not  foreclose  any  challenge  by  the  herein  petitioners,  in  an  election  protest,   constitutionality   of   acts   of   Congress   And,   since   judicial   power   includes   the   authority   to  
of  the  'right'  of  the  private  respondents  to  continue  holding  their  respective  office.  What  has   inquire  into  the  legality  of  statutes  enacted  by  the  two  Houses  of  Congress,  and  approved  by  
been   directly   affected   by   said   constitutional   provision   is   the   'term'   to   the   office,   although   the  Executive,  there  can  be  no  reason  why  the  validity  of  an  act  of  one  of  said  Houses,  like  
the  'right'  of  the  incumbent  to  an  office  which  he  is  legally  holding  is  co-­‐extensive  with  the   that  of  any  other  branch  of  the  Government,  may  not  be  determined  in  the  proper  actions.  
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Thus,   in   the   exercise   of   the   so-­‐   called   "judicial   supremacy",   this   Court   declared   that   a   was  not  a  proper  subject  of  judicial  inquiry  because,  they  claimed,  it  partook  of  a  political  
resolution   of   the   defunct   National   Assembly   could   not   bar   the   exercise   of   the   powers   of   the   nature,   and   We   unanimously   declared   that   the   issue   was   a   justiciable   one.   With   identical  
former   Electoral   Commission   under   the   original   Constitution.   2   (Angara   vs.   Electoral   unanimity.   We   overruled   the   respondent's   contention   in   the   1971   habeas   corpus   cases,  
Commission,  supra),  and  annulled  certain  acts  of  the  Executive  3  as  incompatible  with  the   questioning   Our   authority   to   determine   the   constitutional   sufficiency   of   the   factual   bases   of  
fundamental  law.   the   Presidential   proclamation   suspending   the   privilege   of   the   writ   of   habeas   corpus   on  
  August   21,   1971,   despite   the   opposite   view   taken   by   this   Court   in   Barcelon   vs.   Baker   and  
  Sanidad  vs.  COMELEC  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐44640,  October  12,  1976]   Montenegro   vs.   Castañeda,   insofar   as   it   adhered   to   the   former   case,   which   view   We,  
  accordingly,   abandoned   and   refused   to   apply.   For   the   same   reason,   We   did   not   apply   and  
POWER   TO   PROPOSE   AMENDMENTS   TO   THE   CONSTITUTION   IS   JUSTICEABLE   expressly  modified,  in  Gonzales  vs.  Commission  on  Elections,  the  political-­‐question  thereby  
CONTROVERSY.   -­‐   Political   questions   are   neatly   associated   with   the   wisdom,   not   the   legality   adopted  in  Mabanag  vs.  Lopez  Vito."      13  The  return  to  Barcelon  vs.  Baker  and  Mabanag  vs.  
of  a  particular  act.  Where  the  vortex  of  the  controversy  refers  to  the  legality  or  validity  of   Lopez  Vito,  urged  by  the  Solicitor  General,  was  decisively  refused  by  the  Court.  Chief  Justice  
the  contested  act,  that  matter  is  definitely  justiciable  or  non-­‐political.  What  is  in  the  heels  of   Concepcion  continued:  "The  reasons  adduced  in  support  thereof  are,  however,  substantially  
the  Court  is  not  the  wisdom  of  the  act  of  the  incumbent  President  in  proposing  amendments   the  same  as  those  given  in  support  of  the  political  question  theory   advanced  in  said  habeas  
to   the   Constitution,   but   his   constitutional   authority   to   perform   such   act   or   to   assume   the   corpus  and  plebiscite  cases,  which  were  carefully  considered  by  this  Court  and  found  by  it  
power  of  a  constituent  assembly.  Whether  the  amending  process  confers  on  the  President   to  be  legally  unsound  and  constitutionally  untenable.  As  consequence.  Our  decisions  in  the  
that   power   to   propose   amendments   is   therefore   a   downright   justiciable   question.   Should   aforementioned   habeas   corpus   cases   partakes   of   the   nature   and   effect   of   a   stare   decisis  
the  contrary  be  found,  the  actuation  of  the  President  would  merely  he  a  brutum  fulmen.  If   which  gained  added  weight  by  its  virtual  reiteration."  
the   Constitution   provides   how   it   may   be   amended,   the   judiciary   as   the   interpreter   of   that    
Constitution,   can   declare   whether   the   procedure   followed   or   the   authority   assumed   was     Daza  vs.  Singson    [G.R.  No.  86344,  December  21,  1989]  
valid  or  not.          
  THE  COMPOSITION  OF  THE  COMMISSION  ON  APPOINTMENTS  IS  A  JUSTICIEABLE  ISSUE  -­‐  
We   cannot   accept   the   view   of   the   Solicitor   General,   in   pursuing   his   theory   of   non-­‐ Ruling   first   on   the   jurisdictional   issue,   we   hold   that,   contrary   to   the   respondent's   assertion,  
justiciability,   that   the   question   of   the   President's   authority   to   propose   amendments   and   the   the  Court  has  the  competence  to  act  on  the  matter  at  bar.  Our  finding  is  that  what  is  before  
regularity   of   the   procedure   adopted   for   submission   of   the   proposals   to   the   people   us  is  not  a  discretionary  act  of  the  House  of  Representatives  that  may  not  be  reviewed  by  us  
ultimately  lie  in  the  judgment  of  the  latter.  A  clear  Descartes  fallacy  of  vicious  circle.  Is  it  not   because   it   is   political   in   nature.   What   is   involved   here   is   the   legality,   not   the   wisdom,   of   the  
that  the  people  themselves,  by  their  sovereign  act,  provided  for  the  authority  and  procedure   act  of  that  chamber  in  removing  the  petitioner  from  the  Commission  on  Appointments.  That  
for   the   amending   process   when   they   ratified   the   present   Constitution   in   1973?   Whether,   is   not   a   political   question   because,   as   Chief   Justice   Concepcion   explained   in   Tañada   v.  
therefore,   that   constitutional   provision   has   been   followed   or   not   is   indisputably   a   proper   Cuenco:      
subject  of  inquiry,  not  by  the  people  themselves  —  of  course  —  who  exercise  no  power  of    
judicial   review,   but   by   the   Supreme   Court   in   whom   the   people   themselves   vested   that   .   .   .   the   term   "political   question"   connotes,   in   legal   parlance,   what   it  
power,   a   power   which   includes   the   competence   to   determine   whether   the   constitutional   means  in  ordinary  parlance,  namely,  a  question  of  policy.  In  other  words,  
norms  for  amendments  have  been  observed  or  not.  And,  this  inquiry  must  be  done  a  priori   .  .  .  it  refers  "to  those  questions  which,  under  the  Constitution,  are  to  be  
not  a  posteriori,  i.e.,  before  the  submission  to  and  ratification  by  the  people.   decided  by  the  people  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  or  in  regard  to  which  
  full   discretionary   authority   has   been   delegated   to   the   Legislature   or  
Indeed,   the   precedents   evolved   by   the   Court   on   prior   constitutional   cases   underline   the   executive   branch   of   the   Government."   It   is   concerned   with   issues  
preference  of  the  Court's  majority  to  treat  such  issue  of  Presidential  role  in  the  amending   dependent  upon  the  wisdom,  not  legality,  of  a  particular  measure.  
process   as   one   of   non-­‐political   impression.   In   the   Plebiscite   Cases,       the   contention   of   the    
Solicitor  General  that  the  issue  on  the  legality  of  Presidential  Decree  No.  73  "submitting  to   By   way   of   special   and   affirmative   defenses,   the   respondents   contended   inter   alia   that   the  
the  Filipino  people  (on  January  15,  1973)  for  ratification  or  rejection  the  Constitution  of  the   subject  of  the  petition  was  an  internal  matter  that  only  the  Senate  could  resolve.  The  Court  
Republic   of   the   Philippines   proposed   by   the   1971   Constitutional   Convention   and   rejected  this  argument,  holding  that  what  was  involved  was  not  the  wisdom  of  the  Senate  in  
appropriating   funds   therefor,   "is   a   political   one,   was   rejected   and   the   Court   unanimously   choosing   the   respondents   but   the   legality   of   the   choice   in   light   of   the   requirement   of   the  
considered   the   issue   as   justiciable   in   nature.   Subsequently,   in   the   Ratification   Cases         Constitution.   The   petitioners   were   questioning   the   manner   of   filling   the   Tribunal,   not   the  
involving   the   issue   of   whether   or   not   the   validity   of   Presidential   Proclamation   No.   1102,   discretion   of   the   Senate   in   doing   so.   The   Court   held   that   this   was   a   justiciable   and   not   a  
"announcing   the   Ratification   by   the   Filipino   people   of   the   Constitution   proposed   by   the   political  question,  thus:  
1971   Constitutional   Convention,"   partakes   of   the   nature   of   a   political   question,   the    
affirmative  stand  of  the  Solicitor  General  was  dismissed,  the  Court  ruled  that  the  question   Such   is   not   the   nature   of   the   question   for   determination   in   the   present  
raised  is  justiciable.  Chief  Justice  Concepcion,  expressing  the  majority  view,  said,  "(T)hus,  in   case.  Here,  we  are  called  upon  to  decide  whether  the  election  of  Senators  
the  aforementioned  plebiscite  cases,  We  rejected  the  theory  of  the  respondents  therein  that   Cuenco   and   Delgado   by   the   Senate,   as   members   of   the   Senate   Electoral  
the  question-­‐whether  Presidential  Decree  No.  73  calling  a  plebiscite  to  be  held  on  January   Tribunal,   upon   nomination   by   Senator   Primicias   —   a   member   and  
15,  1973,  for  the  ratification  or  rejection  of  the  proposed  new  Constitution,  was  valid  or  not,   spokesman   of   the   party   having   the   largest   number   of   votes   in   the   Senate  
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 —   on   behalf   of   its   Committee   on   Rules,   contravenes   the   constitutional   legislation  and  not  through  the  intervening  mind  of  another.  (U.  S.  vs.  Barrias,  supra,  at  p.  
mandate   that   said   members   of   the   Senate   Electoral   Tribunal   shall   be   330.)  
chosen   "upon   nomination   .   .   .   of   the   party   having   the   second   largest    
number   of   votes"   in   the   Senate   and   hence,   is   null   and   void.   The   Senate   is   EXCEPTION  OF  NON-­‐DELEGATION,  PERMISSIBLE  DELEGATION  OF  LEGISLATIVE  POWERS.  
not  clothed  with  "full  discretionary  authority"  in  the  choice  of  members   The   rule,   however,   which   forbids   the   delegation   of   legislative   power   is   not   absolute   and  
of   the   Senate   Electoral   Tribunal.   The   exercise   of   its   power   thereon   is   inflexible.   It   admits   of   exceptions.   An   exception   sanctioned   by   immemorial   practice   permits  
subject  to  constitutional  limitations  which  are  claimed  to  be  mandatory   the   central   legislative   body   to   delegate   legislative   powers   to   local   authorities.   "It   is   a  
in   nature.   It   is   clearly   within   the   legitimate   province   of   the   judicial   cardinal  principle  of  our  system  of  government,  that  local  affairs  shall  be  managed  by  local  
department   to   pass   upon   the   validity   of   the   proceeding   in   connection   authorities,   and   general   affairs   by   the   central   authority;   and   hence   while   the   rule   is   also  
therewith.   fundamental   that   the   power   to   make   laws   cannot   be   delegated,   the   creation   of  
  municipalities   exercising   local   self   government   has   never   been   held   to   trench   upon   that  
'.   .   .   whether   an   election   of   public   officers   has   been   in   accordance   with   rule.  Such  legislation  is  not  regarded  as  a  transfer  of  general  legislative  power,  but  rather  as  
law  is  for  the  judiciary.  Moreover,  where  the  legislative  department  has   the  grant  of  the  authority  to  prescribe  local  regulations,  according  to  immemorial  practice,  
by   statute   prescribed   election   procedure   in   a   given   situation,   the   subject   of   course   to   the   interposition   of   the   superior   in   cases   of   necessity."   On   quite   the  
judiciary   may   determine   whether   a   particular   election   has   been   in   same  principle,  Congress  is  empowered  to  delegate  legislative  power  to  such  agencies  in  the  
conformity  with  such  statute,  and  particularly,  whether  such  statute  has   territories   of   the   United   States   as   it   may   select.   A   territory   stands   in   the   same   relation   to  
been   applied   in   a   way   to   deny   or   transgress   on   constitutional   or   Congress  as  a  municipality  or  city  to  the  state  government.  Courts  have  also  sustained  the  
statutory  rights  .  .  .  .'  (16  C.J.S.,  439;  emphasis  supplied).   delegation   of   legislative   power   to   the   people   at   large.   Some   authorities   maintain   that   this  
  may   not   be   done.   However,   the   question   of   whether   or   not   a   state   has   ceased   to   be  
It   is,   therefore,   our   opinion   that   we   have,   not   only   jurisdiction   but   also   republican  in  form  because  of  its  adoption  of  the  initiative  and  referendum  has  been  held  
the   duty,   to   consider   and   determine   the   principal   issue   raised   by   the   not   to   be   a   judicial   but   a   political   question,   and   as   the   constitutionality   of   such   laws   has  
parties  herein."     been  looked  upon  with  favor  by  certain  progressive  courts,  the  sting  of  the  decisions  of  the  
    more   conservative   courts   has   been   pretty   well   drawn.   Doubtless,   also,   legislative   power  
DELEGATION  OF  POWER   may   be   delegated   by   the   Constitution   itself.   Section   14,   paragraph   2,   of   article   VI   of   the  
  Constitution   of   the   Philippines   provides   that   "The   National   Assembly   may   by   law   authorize  
People  vs.  Vera    [G.R.  No.  45685,  November  16,  1937]   the   President,   subject   to   such   limitations   and   restrictions   as   it   may   impose,   to   fix   within  
  specified  limits,  tariff  rates,  import  or  export  quotas,  and  tonnage  and  wharfage  dues."  And  
THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  NON-­‐DELEGATION  OF  POWER.  -­‐  Any  attempt  to  abdicate  the  power  is   section   16   of   the   same   article   of   the   Constitution   provides   that   "In   times   of   war   or   other  
unconstitutional  and  void,  on  the  principle  that  potestas  delegata  non  delegare  potest.  This   national   emergency,   the   National   Assembly   may   by   law   authorize   the   President,   for   a  
principle   is   said   to   have   originated   with   the   glossators,   was   introduced   into   English   law   limited  period  and  subject  to  such  restrictions  as  it  may  prescribe,  to  promulgate  rules  and  
through  a  misreading  of  Bracton,  there  developed  as  a  principle  of  agency,  was  established   regulations  to  carry  out  a  declared  national  policy."  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  decision  to  
by   Lord   Coke   in   the   English   public   law   in   decisions   forbidding   the   delegation   of   judicial   determine   whether   or   not,   in   the   absence   of   the   foregoing   constitutional   provisions,   the  
power,   and   found   its   way   into   America   as   an   enlightened   principle   of   free   government.   It   President  could  be  authorized  to  exercise  the  powers  thereby  vested  in  him.  Upon  the  other  
has  since  become  an  accepted  corollary  of  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers.  (5  Encyc.  of   hand,  whatever  doubt  may  have  existed  has  been  removed  by  the  Constitution  itself.  
the  Social  Sciences,  p.  66.)  The  classic  statement  of  the  rule  is  that  of  Locke,  namely:  "The    
legislative  neither  must  nor  can  transfer  the  power  of  making  laws  to  anybody  else,  or  place   TESTS   TO   DETERMINE   VALIDITY   OF   DELEGATION.   In   testing   whether   a   statute   constitutes  
it   anywhere   but   where   the   people   have."   (Locke   on   Civil   Government,   sec   142.)   Judge   an   undue   delegation   of   legislative   power   or   not,   it   is   usual   to   inquire   whether   the   statute  
Cooley   enunciates   the   doctrine   in   the   following   oft-­‐quoted   language:   "One   of   the   settled   was   complete   in   all   its   terms   and   provisions   when   it   left   the   hands   of   the   legislature   so   that  
maxims  in  constitutional  law  is,  that  the  power  conferred  upon  the  legislature  to  make  laws   nothing  was  left  to  the  judgment  of  any  other  appointee  or  delegate  of  the  legislature.  (6  R.  
cannot   be   delegated   by   that   department   to   any   other   body   or   authority.   Where   the   C.  L.,  p.  165.)  In  United  States  vs.  Ang  Tang  Ho  ([1922],  43  Phil.,  1),  this  court  adhered  to  the  
sovereign   power   of   the   state   has   located   the   authority,   there   it   must   remain;   and   by   the   foregoing   rule   when   it   held   an   act   of   the   legislature   void   in   so   far   as   it   undertook   to  
constitutional  agency  alone  the  laws  must  be  made  until  the  Constitution  itself  is  changed.   authorize  the  Governor-­‐General,  in  his  discretion,  to  issue  a  proclamation  fixing  the  price  of  
The   power   to   whose   judgment,   wisdom,   and   patriotism   this   high   prerogative   has   been   rice   and   to   make   the   sale   of   it   in   violation   of   the   proclamation   a   crime.   (See   and   cf.  
intrusted  cannot  relieve  itself  of  the  responsibility  by  choosing  other  agencies  upon  which   Compañia   General   de   Tabacos   vs.   Board   of   Public   Utility   Commissioners   [1916],   34   Phil.,  
the  power  shall  be  devolved,  nor  can  it  substitute  the  judgment,  wisdom,  and  patriotism  of   136.)  The  general  rule,  however,  is  limited  by  another  rule  that  to  a  certain  extent  matters  
any  other  body  for  those  to  which  alone  the  people  have  seen  fit  to  confide  this  sovereign   of  detail  may  be  left  to  be  filled  in  by  rules  and  regulations  to  be  adopted  or  promulgated  by  
trust."   (Cooley  on  Constitutional  Limitations,  8th  ed.,  Vol.   I,   p.   224.   Quoted   with   approval   in   executive  officers  and  administrative  boards.  (6  R.  C.  L.,  pp.  177-­‐179.)  
U.  S.  vs.  Barrias  [1908],  11  Phil.,  327.)  This  court  posits  the  doctrine  "on  the  ethical  principle    
that  such  a  delegated  power  constitutes  not  only  a  right  but  a  duty  to  be  performed  by  the   For   the   purposes   of   the   Probation   Act,   the   provincial   boards   may   be   regarded   as  
delegate  by  the  instrumentality  of  his  own  judgment  acting  immediately  upon  the  matter  of   administrative  bodies  endowed  with  power  to  determine  when  the  Act  should  take  effect  in  
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their  respective  provinces.  They  are  the  agents  or  delegates  of  the  legislature  in  this  respect.    
The  rules  governing  delegation  of  legislative  power  to  administrative  and  executive  officers   REASON  FOR  PERMISSIBLE  DELEGATION.    The  reason  is  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  
are   applicable   or   are   at   least   indicative   of   the   rule   which   should   be   here   adopted.   An   task   of   government   and   the   growing   inability   of   the   legislature   to   cope   directly   with   the  
examination  of  a  variety  of  cases  on  delegation  of  power  to  administrative  bodies  will  show   myriad  problems  demanding  its  attention.  The  growth  of  society  has  ramified  its  activities  
that   the   ratio   decidendi   is   at   variance   but,   it   can   be   broadly   asserted   that   the   rationale   and   created   peculiar   and   sophisticated   problems   that   the   legislature   cannot   be   expected  
revolves  around  the  presence  or  absence  of  a  standard  or  rule  of  action  —  or  the  sufficiency   reasonably   to   comprehend.   Specialization   even   in   legislation   has   become   necessary.   To  
thereof   —   in   the   statute,   to   aid   the   delegate   in   exercising   the   granted   discretion.   In   some   many   of   the   problems   attendant   upon   present-­‐day   undertakings,   the   legislature   may   not  
cases,   it   is   held   that   the   standard   is   sufficient;   in   others   that   it   is   insufficient;   and   in   still   have   the   competence   to   provide   the   required   direct   and   efficacious,   not   to   say,   specific  
others  that  it  is  entirely  lacking.  As  a  rule,  an  act  of  the  legislature  is  incomplete  and  hence   solutions.   These   solutions   may,   however,   be   expected   from   its   delegates,   who   are   supposed  
invalid   if   it   does   not   lay   down   any   rule   or   definite   standard   by   which   the   administrative   to  be  experts  in  the  particular  fields  assigned  to  them.    
officer  or  board  may  be  guided  in  the  exercise  of  the  discretionary  powers  delegated  to  it.  In    
the   case   at   bar,   what   rules   are   to   guide   the   provincial   boards   in   the   exercise   of   their   The  reasons  given  above  for  the  delegation  of  legislative  powers  in  general  are  particularly  
discretionary   power   to   determine   whether   or   not   the   Probation   Act   shall   apply   in   their   applicable  to  administrative  bodies.  With  the  proliferation  of  specialized  activities  and  their  
respective   provinces?   What   standards   are   fixed   by   the   Act?   We   do   not   find   any   and   none   attendant  peculiar  problems,  the  national  legislature  has  found  it  more  and  more  necessary  
has  been  pointed  to  us  by  the  respondents.  The  probation  Act  does  not,  by  the  force  of  any   to   entrust   to   administrative   agencies   the   authority   to   issue   rules   to   carry   out   the   general  
of   its   provisions,   fix   and   impose   upon   the   provincial   boards   any   standard   or   guide   in   the   provisions  of  the  statute.  This  is  called  the  "power  of  subordinate  legislation."  
exercise  of  their  discretionary  power.  What  is  granted,  if  we  may  use  the  language  of  Justice    
Cardozo  in  the  recent  case  of  Schecter,  supra,  is  a  "roving  commission"  which  enables  the   With   this   power,   administrative   bodies   may   implement   the   broad   policies   laid   down   in   a  
provincial   boards   to   exercise   arbitrary   discretion.   By   section   11   of   the   Act,   the   legislature   statute   by   "filling   in"   the   details   which   the   Congress   may   not   have   the   opportunity   or  
does   seemingly   on   its   own   authority   extend   the   benefits   of   the   Probation   Act   to   the   competence   to   provide.   This   is   effected   by   their   promulgation   of   what   are   known   as  
provinces   but   in   reality   leaves   the   entire   matter   for   the   various   provincial   boards   to   supplementary   regulations,   such   as   the   implementing   rules   issued   by   the   Department   of  
determine.  In  other  words,  the  provincial  boards  of  the  various  provinces  are  to  determine   Labor  on  the  new  Labor  Code.  These  regulations  have  the  force  and  effect  of  law.  
for  themselves,  whether  the  Probation  Law  shall  apply  to  their  provinces  or  not  at  all.  The    
applicability   and   application   of   the   Probation   Act   are   entirely   placed   in   the   hands   of   the   SUFFICIENT   STANDARDS.   Memorandum   Circular   No.   2   is   one   such   administrative  
provincial  boards.  If  a  provincial  board  does  not  wish  to  have  the  Act  applied  in  its  province,   regulation.  The  model  contract  prescribed  thereby  has  been  applied  in  a  significant  number  
all   that   it   has   to   do   is   to   decline   to   appropriate   the   needed   amount   for   the   salary   of   a   of  the  cases  without  challenge  by  the  employer.  The  power  of  the  POEA  (and  before  it  the  
probation   officer.   The   plain   language   of   the   Act   is   not   susceptible   of   any   other   National   Seamen   Board)   in   requiring   the   model   contract   is   not   unlimited   as   there   is   a  
interpretation.   This,   to   our   minds,   is   a   virtual   surrender   of   legislative   power   to   the   sufficient  standard  guiding  the  delegate  in  the  exercise  of  the  said  authority.  That  standard  
provincial  boards.     is   discoverable   in   the   executive   order   itself   which,   in   creating   the   Philippine   Overseas  
  Employment   Administration,   mandated   it   to   protect   the   rights   of   overseas   Filipino   workers  
  Eastern  Shipping  Lines  vs.  POEA  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐76633,  October  18,  1988]   to  "fair  and  equitable  employment  practices."  
   
TESTS   IN   DETERMINING   VALIDITY   OF   DELEGATION.   There   are   two   accepted   tests   to   Parenthetically,   it   is   recalled   that   this   Court   has   accepted   as   sufficient   standards   "public  
determine   whether   or   not   there   is   a   valid   delegation   of   legislative   power,   viz,,   the   interest"   in   People   v.   Rosenthal,         "justice   and   equity"   in   Antamok   Gold   Fields   v.   CIR,        
completeness   test   and   the   sufficient   standard   test.   Under   the   first   test,   the   law   must   be   "public   convenience   and   welfare"   in   Calalang   v.   Williams,         and   "simplicity,   economy   and  
complete   in   all   its   terms   and   conditions   when   it   leaves   the   legislature   such   that   when   it   efficiency"   in   Cervantes   v.   Auditor   General,       to   mention   only   a   few   cases.   In   the   United  
reaches   the   delegate   the   only   thing   he   will   have   to   do   is   enforce   it       Under   the   sufficient   States,  the  "sense  and  experience  of  men"  was  accepted  in  Mutual  Film  Corp.  v.  Industrial  
standard   test,   there   must   be   adequate   guidelines   or   limitations   in   the   law   to   map   out   the   Commission,        and  "national  security"  in  Hirabayashi  v.  United  States.  
boundaries   of   the   delegate's   authority   and   prevent   the   delegation   from   running   riot.         Both    
tests   are   intended   to   prevent   a   total   transference   of   legislative   authority   to   the   delegate,     United  States  vs.  Ang  Tang  Ho  (43  PHIL  1  [1922])  
who   is   not   allowed   to   step   into   the   shoes   of   the   legislature   and   exercise   a   power   essentially    
legislative.     Ynot  vs.  IAC    [G.R.  No.  74457,  March  20,  1987]  
   
The   principle   of   non-­‐delegation   of   powers   is   applicable   to   all   the   three   major   powers   of   the   DELEGATION  MUST  SET  UP  STANDARDS  AND  MUST  BE  CANALIZED  WITHIN  THE  BANKS  
Government  but  is  especially  important  in  the  case  of  the  legislative  power  because  of  the   AND  PREVENT  IT  FROM  OVERFLOWING.  We  also  mark,  on  top  of  all  this,  the  questionable  
many   instances   when   its   delegation   is   permitted.   The   occasions   are   rare   when   executive   or   manner   of   the   disposition   of   the   confiscated   property   as   prescribed   in   the   questioned  
judicial  powers  have  to  be  delegated  by  the  authorities  to  which  they  legally  pertain.  In  the   executive   order.   It   is   there   authorized   that   the   seized   property   shall   "be   distributed   to  
case   of   the   legislative   power,   however,   such   occasions   have   become   more   and   more   charitable  institutions  and  other  similar  institutions  as  the  Chairman  of  the  National  Meat  
frequent,  if  not  necessary.  This  had  led  to  the  observation  that  the  delegation  of  legislative   Inspection   Commission   may   see   fit,   in   the   case   of   carabeef,   and   to   deserving   farmers  
power  has  become  the  rule  and  its  non-­‐delegation  the  exception.   through   dispersal   as   the   Director   of   Animal   Industry   may   see   fit,   in   the   case   of   carabaos."  
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(Emphasis   supplied.)   The   phrase   "may   see   fit"   is   an   extremely   generous   and   dangerous    
condition,  if  condition  it  is.  It  is  laden  with  perilous  opportunities  for  partiality  and  abuse,   INVALID   DELEGATION   OF   LEGISLATIVE   POWER.     Although   Congress   may   delegate   to  
and   even   corruption.   One   searches   in   vain   for   the   usual   standard   and   the   reasonable   another   branch   of   the   government   the   power   to   fill   in   the   details   in   the   execution,  
guidelines,   or   better   still,   the   limitations   that   the   said   officers   must   observe   when   they   enforcement  or  administration  of  a  law,  it  is  essential,  to  forestall  a  violation  of  the  principle  
make  their  distribution.  There  is  none.  Their  options  are  apparently  boundless.  Who  shall   of  separation  of  powers,  that  said  law:  (a)  be  complete  in  itself  —  it  must  set  forth  therein  
be   the   fortunate   beneficiaries   of   their   generosity   and   by   what   criteria   shall   they   be   chosen?   the   policy   to   be   executed,   carried   out   or   implemented   by   the   delegate   —   and   (b)   fix   a  
Only  the  officers  named  can  supply  the  answer,  they  and  they  alone  may  choose  the  grantee   standard  —  the  limits  of  which  are  sufficiently  determinate  or  determinable  —  to  which  the  
as   they   see   fit,   and   in   their   own   exclusive   discretion.   Definitely,   there   is   here   a   "roving   delegate   must   conform   in   the   performance   of   his   functions.   Indeed,   without   a   statutory  
commission,"  a  wide  and  sweeping  authority  that  is  not  "canalized  within  banks  that  keep  it   declaration  of  policy,  the  delegate  would,  in  effect,  make  or  formulate  such  policy,  which  is  
from   overflowing,"   in   short,   a   clearly   profligate   and   therefore   invalid   delegation   of   the   essence   of   every   law;   and,   without   the   aforementioned   standard,   there   would   be   no  
legislative  powers.   means   to   determine,   with   reasonable   certainty,   whether   the   delegate   has   acted   within   or  
  beyond   the   scope   of   his   authority.   Hence,   he   could   thereby   arrogate   upon   himself   the  
  Tablarin  vs.  Gutierrez  [G.R.  No.  78164,  July  31,  1987]   power,   not   only   to   make   the   law,   but,   also   —   and   this   is   worse   —   to   unmake   it,   by   adopting  
  measures   inconsistent   with   the   end   sought   to   be   attained   by   the   Act   of   Congress,   thus  
STANDARDS   SET   FOR   SUBORDINATE   LEGISLATION   NECESSARILY   BROAD   AND   HIGHLY   nullifying  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  and  the  system  of  checks  and  balances,  and,  
ABSTRACT.   —   The   general   principle   of   non-­‐delegation   of   legislative   power,   which   both   consequently  undermining  the  very  foundation  of  our  Republican  system.  
flows   from   the   reinforces   the   more   fundamental   rule   of   the   separation   and   allocation   of    
powers   among   the   three   great   departments   of   government,   must   be   applied   with   Section   68   of   the   Revised   Administrative   Code   does   not   meet   these   well   settled  
circumspection   in   respect   of   statutes   which   like   the   Medical   Act   of   1959,   deal   with   subjects   requirements  for  a  valid  delegation  of  the  power  to  fix  the  details  in  the  enforcement  of  a  
as   obviously   complex   and   technical   as   medical   education   and   the   practice   of   medicine   in   law.   It   does   not   enunciate   any   policy   to   be   carried   out   or   implemented   by   the   President.  
our   present   day   world.   Mr.   Justice   Laurel   stressed   this   point   47   years   ago   in   Pangasinan   Neither  does  it  give  a  standard  sufficiently  precise  to  avoid  the  evil  effects  above  referred  
Transportation   Co.,   Inc.   vs.   The   Public   Service   Commission:   "One   thing,   however,   is   to.   In   this   connection,   we   do   not   overlook   the   fact   that,   under   the   last   clause   of   the   first  
apparent   in   the   development   of   the   principle   of   separation   of   powers   and   that   is   that   the   sentence  of  Section  68,  the  President:  
maxim  of  delegatus  non  potest  delegare  or  delegati  potestas  non  potest  delegare,  adopted    
this  practice  (Delegibus  et  Consuetudiniis  Anglia  edited  by  G.E.  Woodbine,  Yale  University   ".   .   .   may   change   the   seat   of   the   government   within   any   subdivision   to  
Press,   1922,   Vol.   2,   p.   167)   but   which   is   also   recognized   in   principle   in   the   Roman   Law   such  place  therein  as  the  public  welfare  may  require."  
(d.17.18,3)   has   been   made   to   adapt   itself   to   the   complexities   of   modern   government,   giving    
rise   to   the   adoption,   within   certain   limits,   of   the   principle   of   'subordinate   legislation,'   not   It   is   apparent,   however,   from   the   language   of   this   clause,   that   the   phrase   "as   the   public  
only  in  the  United  States  and  England  but  in  practically  all  modern  governments.  (People  vs.   welfare  may  require"  qualifies,  not  the  clauses  preceding  the  one  just  quoted,  but  only  the  
Rosenthal   and   Osmena   [68   Phil.   318,   1939].   Accordingly,   with   the   growing   complexity   of   place   to   which   the   seat   of   the   government   may   be   transferred.   This   fact   becomes   more  
modern  life,  the  multiplication  of  the  subjects  of  governmental  regulation,  and  the  increased   apparent  when  we  consider  that  said  Section  68  was  originally  Section  1  of  Act  No.  1748,  3  
difficulty   of   administering   the   laws,   there   is   a   constantly   growing   tendency   toward   the   which  provided,  that  "whenever  in  the  judgment  of  the  Governor-­‐General  the  public  welfare  
delegation  of  greater  power  by  the  legislature,  and  toward  the  approval  of  the  practice  by   requires,  he  may,  by  executive  order",  effect  the  changes  enumerated  therein  (as  well  as  in  
the   courts."   The   standards   set   for   subordinate   legislation   in   the   exercise   of   rule   making   said  Section  68),  including  the  change  of  the  seat  of  the  government  "to  such  place  .  .  .  as  the  
authority  by  an  administrative  agency  like  the  Board  of  Medical  Education  are  necessarily   public   interest   requires".   The   opening   statement   of   said   Section   1   of   Act   No.   1748   —   which  
broad  and  highly  abstract.  As  explained  by  then  Mr.  Justice  Fernando  in  Edu  v.  Ericta    —     was  not  included  in  Section  68  of  the  Revised  Administrative  Code  —  governed  the  time  at  
  which,   or   the   conditions   under   which,   the   powers   therein   conferred   could   be   exercised;  
"The  standard  may  be  either  expressed  or  implied.  If  the  former,  the  non-­‐ whereas  the  last  part  of  the  first  sentence  of  said  section  referred  exclusively  to  the  place  to  
delegation  objection  is  easily  met.  The  standard   though  does  not  have  to   which  the  seat  of  the  government  was  to  be  transferred.  
be   spelled   out   specifically.   It   could   be   implied   from   the   policy   and    
purpose   of   the   act   considered   as   a   whole.   In   the   Reflector   Law,   clearly   At   any   rate,   the   conclusion   would   be   the   same,   insofar   as   the   case   at   bar   is   concerned,   even  
the  legislative  objective  is  public  safety.  What  is  sought  to  be  attained  as   if   we   assumed   that   the   phrase   "as   the   public   welfare   may   require",   in   said   Section   68,  
in  Calalang  v.  Williams  is  'safe  transit  upon  the  roads.'"     qualifies  all  other  clauses  thereof.  It  is  true  that  in  Calalang  vs.  William  (70  Phil.  726)  and  
  People   vs.   Rosenthal   (68   Phil.   328),   this   Court   had   upheld   "public   welfare"   and   "public  
We  believe  and  so  hold  that  the  necessary  standards  are  set  forth  in  Section  1  of  the  1959   interest",   respectively,   as   sufficient   standards   for   a   valid   delegation   of   the   authority   to  
Medical  Act:  "the  standardization  and  regulation  of  medical  education"  and  in  Section  5  (a)   execute  the  law.  But,  the  doctrine  laid  down  in  these  cases  —  as  all  judicial  pronouncements  
and  7  of  the  same  Act,  the  body  of  the  statute  itself,  and  that  these  considered  together  are   —   must   be   construed   in   relation   to   the   specific   facts   and   issues   involved   therein,   outside   of  
sufficient  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the  non-­‐delegation  principle.   which   they   do   not   constitute   precedents   and   have   no   binding   effect.   4   The   law   construed   in  
  the   Calalang   case   conferred   upon   the   Director   of   Public   Works,   with   the   approval   of   the  
  Pelaez  vs.  Auditor  General  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐23825,  December  24,  1965]   Secretary  of  Public  Works  and  Communications,  the  power  to  issue  rules  and  regulations  to  
  39  
promote  safe  transit  upon  national  roads  and  streets.  Upon  the  other  hand,  the  Rosenthal    
case   referred   to   the   authority   of   the   Insular   Treasurer,   under   Act   No.   2581,   to   issue   and   Section  401  of  the  same  Code  needs  to  be  quoted  in  full:  
cancel   certificates   or   permits   for   the   sale   of   speculative   securities.   Both   cases   involved    
grants   to   administrative   officers   of   powers   related   to   the   exercise   of   their   administrative   "Sec.  401.  Flexible  Clause.  —  
functions,  calling  for  the  determination  of  questions  of  fact.    
  a.   In   the   interest   of   national   economy,   general   welfare   and/or  
  Garcia  vs.  Executive  Secretary    [G.R.  No.  101273,  July  3,  1992]   national   security,   and   subject   to   the   limitations   herein   prescribed,   the  
  President,   upon   recommendation   of   the   National   Economic   and  
TARIFF   POWERS   OF   THE   PRESIDENT   -­‐   Turning   first   to   the   question   of   constitutionality,   Development   Authority   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   NEDA),   is   hereby  
under   Section   24,   Article   VI   of   the   Constitution,   the   enactment   of   appropriation,   revenue   empowered:  (1)  to  increase,  reduce  or  remove  existing  protective  rates  
and  tariff  bills,  like  all  other  bills  is,  of  course,  within  the  province  of  the  Legislative  rather   of   import   duty   (including   any   necessary   change   in   classification).   The  
than   the   Executive   Department.   It   does   not   follow,   however,   that   therefore   Executive   existing   rates   may   be   increased   or   decreased   but   in   no   case   shall   the  
Orders   Nos.   475   and   478,   assuming   they   may   be   characterized   as   revenue   measures,   are   reduced  rate  of  import  duty  be  lower  than  the  basic  rate  of  ten  (10)  per  
prohibited   to   the   President,   that   they   must   be   enacted   instead   by   the   Congress   of   the   cent   ad   valorem,   nor   shall   the   increased   rate   of   import   duty   be   higher  
Philippines.  Section  28(2)  of  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution  provides  as  follows:   than   a   maximum   of   one   hundred   (100)   per   cent   ad   valorem;   (2)   to  
  establish   import   quota   or   to   ban   imports   of   any   commodity,   as   may   be  
"(2)   The   Congress   may,   by   law,   authorize   the   President   to   fix   within   necessary;   and   (3)   to   impose   an   additional   duty   on   all   imports   not  
specified   limits,   and   subject   to   such   limitations   and   restrictions   as   it   may   exceeding   ten   (10)   per   cent   ad   valorem   whenever   necessary;   Provided,  
impose,  tariff  rates,  import  and  export  quotas,  tonage  and  wharfage  dues,   That   upon   periodic   investigations   by   the   Tariff   Commission   and  
and   other   duties   or   imposts   within   the   framework   of   the   national   recommendation   of   the   NEDA,   the   President   may   cause   a   gradual  
development  program  of  the  Government."(Emphasis  supplied)   reduction   of   protection   levels   granted   in   Section   One   hundred   and   four  
  of   this   Code,   including   those   subsequently   granted   pursuant   to   this  
There   is   thus   explicit   constitutional   permission   to   Congress   to   authorize   the   President   section.      
"subject   to   such   limitations   and   restrictions   as   [Congress]   may   impose"   to   fix   "within    
specific  limits"  "tariff  rates  .  .  .  and  other  duties  or  imposts  .  .  .  ."   b.   Before   any   recommendation   is   submitted   to   the   President   by  
  the   NEDA   pursuant   to   the   provisions   of   this   section,   except   in   the  
The   relevant   congressional   statute   is   the   Tariff   and   Customs   Code   of   the   Philippines,   and   imposition   of   an   additional   duty   not   exceeding   ten   (10)   per   cent   ad  
Sections  104  and  401,  the  pertinent  provisions  thereof.  These  are  the  provisions  which  the   valorem,  the  Commission  shall  conduct  an  investigation  in  the  course  of  
President   explicitly   invoked   in   promulgating   Executive   Orders   Nos.   475   and   478.   Section   which   they   shall   hold   public   hearings   wherein   interested   parties   shall   be  
104  of  the  Tariff  and  Customs  Code  provides  in  relevant  part:   afforded  reasonable  opportunity  to  be  present,  produce  evidence  and  to  
  be   heard.   The   Commission   shall   also   hear   the   views   and  
"Sec.  104.   All   tariff   sections,   chapters,   headings   and   subheadings   recommendations   of   any   government   office,   agency   or   instrumentality  
and   the   rates   of   import   duty   under   Section   104   of   Presidential   Decree   concerned.   The   Commission   shall   submit   their   findings   and  
No.   34   and   all   subsequent   amendments   issued   under   Executive   Orders   recommendations   to   the   NEDA   within   thirty   (30)   days   after   the  
and  Presidential  Decrees  are  hereby  adopted  and  form  part  of  this  Code.   termination  of  the  public  hearings.  
   
There   shall   be   levied,   collected,   and   paid   upon   all   imported   articles   the   c.   The   power   of   the   President   to   increase   or   decrease   rates   of  
rates   of   duty   indicated   in   the   Section   under   this   section   except   as   import   duty   within   the   limits   fixed   in   subsection   `a'   shall   include   the  
otherwise   specifically   provided   for   in   this   Code:   Provided,   that,   the   authority  to  modify  the  form  of  duty.  In  modifying  the  form  of  duty,  the  
maximum  rate  shall  not  exceed  one  hundred  per  cent  ad  valorem.   corresponding   ad   valorem   or   specific   equivalents   of   the   duty   with  
  respect  to  imports  from  the  principal  competing  foreign  country  for  the  
The   rates   of   duty   herein   provided   or   subsequently   fixed   pursuant   to   most  recent  representative  period  shall  be  used  as  bases.  
Section   Four   Hundred   One   of   this   Code   shall   be   subject   to   periodic    
investigation   by   the   Tariff   Commission   and   may   be   revised   by   the   d.   The   Commissioner   of   Customs   shall   regularly   furnish   the  
President   upon   recommendation   of   the   National   Economic   and   Commission  a  copy  of  all  customs  import  entries  as  filed  in  the  Bureau  of  
Development  Authority.   Customs.   The   Commission   or   its   duly   authorized   representatives   shall  
  have   access   to,   and   the   right   to   copy   all   liquidated   customs   import  
xxx                                        xxx                                        xxx   entries   and   other   documents   appended   thereto   as   finally   filed   in   the  
  Commission  on  Audit.  
(Emphasis  supplied)    
  40  
 e.   The  NEDA  shall  promulgate  rules  and  regulations  necessary  to   In  the  fourth  place,  petitioner's  concept  which  he  urges  us  to  build  into  our  constitutional  
carry  out  the  provisions  of  this  section.   and   customs   law,   is   a   stiflingly   narrow   one.   Section   401   of   the   Tariff   and   Customs   Code  
  establishes   general   standards   with   which   the   exercise   of   the   authority   delegated   by   that  
f.   Any  Order  issued  by  the  President  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of   provision   to   the   President   must   be   consistent:   that   authority   must   be   exercised   in   "the  
this   section   shall   take   effect   thirty   (30)   days   after   promulgation,   except   interest   of   national   economy,   general   welfare   and/or   national   security."   Petitioner,  
in   the   imposition   of   additional   duty   not   exceeding   ten   (10)   per   cent   ad   however,   insists   that   the   "protection   of   local   industries"   is   the   only   permissible   objective  
valorem   which   shall   take   effect   at   the   discretion   of   the   President."   that   can   be   secured   by   the   exercise   of   that   delegated   authority,   and   that   therefore  
(Underscoring  supplied)   "protection  of  local  industries"  is  the  sum  total  or  the  alpha  and  the  omega  of  "the  national  
  economy,   general   welfare   and/or   national   security."   We   find   it   extremely   difficult   to   take  
THE   GRANT   OF   TARIFF   POWERS   TO   THE   PRESIDENT   IS   NOT   ONLY   INTENDED   TO   seriously  such  a  confined  and  closed  view  of  the  legislative  standards  and  policies  summed  
PROTECT   LOCAL   INDUSTRIES,   BUT   ALSO   TO   RAISE   REVENUE.   -­‐   The   Court   is   not   up  in  Section  401.  We  believe,  for  instance,  that  the  protection  of  consumers,  who  after  all  
persuaded.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  nothing  in  the  language  of  either  Section  104  or  of  401   constitute   the   very   great   bulk   of   our   population,   is   at   the   very   least   as   important   a  
of   the   Tariff   and   Customs   Code   that   suggest   such   a   sharp   and   absolute   limitation   of   dimension   of   "the   national   economy,   general   welfare   and   national   security"   as   the  
authority.  The  entire  contention  of  petitioner  is  anchored  on  just  two  (2)  words,  one  found   protection   of   local   industries.   And   so   customs   duties   may   be   reduced   or   even   removed  
in   Section   401   (a)   (1):   "existing   protective   rates   of   import   duty,"   and   the   second   in   the   precisely  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  consumers  from  the  high  prices  and  shoddy  quality  
proviso  found  at  the  end  of  Section  401  (a):  "  protection  levels  granted  in  Section  104  of  this   and   inefficient   service   that   tariff-­‐protected   and   subsidized   local   manufacturers   may  
Code  .  .  .  ."  We  believe  that  the  words  "protective"  and  "protection"  are  simply  not  enough  to   otherwise  impose  upon  the  community.  
support  the  very  broad  and  encompassing  limitation  which  petitioner  seeks  to  rest  on  those      
two  (2)  words.   Araneta  vs.  Dinglasan    [G.R.  No.  L-­‐2044,  August  26,  1949]  
   
In  the  second  place,  petitioner's  singular  theory  collides  with  a  very  practical  fact  of  which   THE  GRANT  OF  EMERGENCY  POWERS  IS  INTENDED  TO  BE  LIMITED  AND  DOES  NOT  NEED  
this   Court   may   take   judicial   notice   —   that   the   Bureau   of   Customs   which   administers   the   A   LAW   FOR   ITS   WITHDRAWAL.   -­‐   It   is   to   be   presumed   that   Commonwealth   Act   No.   671   was  
Tariff  and  Customs  Code,  is  one  of  the  two  (2)  principal  traditional  generators  or  producers   approved  with  this  limitation  in  view.  The  opposite  theory  would  make  the  law  repugnant  
of  governmental  revenue,  the  other  being  the  Bureau  of  Internal  Revenue.  (There  is  a  third   to   the   Constitution,   and   is   contrary   to   the   principle   that   the   legislature   is   deemed   to   have  
agency,   non-­‐traditional   in   character,   that   generates   lower   but   still   comparable   levels   of   full  knowledge  of  the  constitutional  scope  of  its  powers.  The  assertion  that  new  legislation  
revenue   for   the   government   —   The   Philippine   Amusement   and   Games   Corporation   is  needed  to  repeal  the  act  would  not  be  in  harmony  with  the  Constitution  either.  If  a  new  
[PAGCOR].)   and   different   law   were   necessary   to   terminate   the   delegation,   the   period   for   the   delegation,  
  it   has   been   correctly   pointed   out,   would   be   unlimited,   indefinite,   negative   and   uncertain;  
In  the  third  place,  customs  duties  which  are  assessed  at  the  prescribed  tariff  rates  are  very   "that   which   was   intended   to   meet   a   temporary   emergency   may   become   permanent   law,"  
much  like  taxes  which  are  frequently  imposed  for  both  revenue-­‐raising  and  for  regulatory   (Peck   vs.   Fink,   2   Fed.   [2d],   912);   for   Congress   might   not   enact   the   repeal,   and   even   if   it  
purposes.    Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  "customs  duties"  is  "the  name  given  to  taxes  on  the   would,   the   repeal   might   not   meet   with   the   approval   of   the   President,   and   the   Congress  
importation   and   exportation   of   commodities,   the   tariff   or   tax   assessed   upon   merchandise   might   not   be   able   to   override   the   veto.   Furthermore,   this   would   create   the   anomaly   that,  
imported   from,   or   exported   to,   a   foreign   country."     The   levying   of   customs   duties   on   while  Congress  might  delegate  its  powers  by  simple  majority,  it  might  not  be  able  to  recall  
imported   goods   may   have   in   some   measure   the   effect   of   protecting   local   industries   —   them  except  by  a  two-­‐third  vote.  In  other  words,  it  would  be  easier  for  Congress  to  delegate  
where   such   local   industries   actually   exist   and   are   producing   comparable   goods.   its   powers   than   to   take   them   back.   This   is   not   right   and   is   not,   and   ought   not   to   be,   the   law.  
Simultaneously,   however,   the   very   same   customs   duties   inevitably   have   the   effect   of   Corwin,  President:  Office  and  Powers,  1948  ed.,  p.  160,  says:  
producing  governmental  revenues.  Customs  duties  like  internal  revenue  taxes  are  rarely,  if    
ever,  designed  to  achieve  one  policy  objective  only.  Most  commonly,  customs  duties,  which   "It   is   generally   agreed   that   the   maxim   that   the   legislature   may   not  
constitute   taxes   in   the   sense   of   exactions   the   proceeds   of   which   become   public   funds     —   delegate  its  powers  signifies  at  the  very  least  that  the  legislature  may  not  
have   either   or   both   the   generation   of   revenue   and   the   regulation   of   economic   or   social   abdicate   its   powers.   Yet   how,   in   view   of   the   scope   that   legislative  
activity   as   their   moving   purposes   and   frequently,   it   is   very   difficult   to   say   which,   in   a   delegations   take   nowadays,   is   the   line   between   delegation   and  
particular   instance,   is   the   dominant   or   principal   objective.   In   the   instant   case,   since   the   abdication   to   be   maintained?   Only,   I   urge,   by   rendering   the   delegated  
Philippines   in   fact   produces   ten   (10)   to   fifteen   percent   (15%)   of   the   crude   oil   consumed   powers  recoverable  without  the  consent  of  the  delegate;  .  .  ."  
here,  the  imposition  of  increased  tariff  rates  and  a  special  duty  on  imported  crude  oil  and    
imported   oil   products   may   be   seen   to   have   some   "protective"   impact   upon   indigenous   oil   Section  4  goes  far  to  settle  the  legislative   intention  of  this  phase  of   Act  No.   671.   Section  4  
production.  For  the  effective  price  of  imported  crude  oil  and  oil  products  is  increased.  At  the   stipulates  that  "the  rules  and  regulations  promulgated  thereunder  shall  be  in  full  force  and  
same  time,  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  substantial  revenues  for  the  government  are  raised  by   effect  until  the  Congress  of  the  Philippines  shall  otherwise  provide."  The  silence  of  the  law  
the  imposition  of  such  increased  tariff  rates  or  special  duty.   regarding  the  repeal  of  the  authority  itself,  in  the  face  of  the  express  provision  for  the  repeal  
  of  the  rules  and  regulations  issued  in  pursuance  of  it,  a  clear  manifestation  of  the  belief  held  
by  the  National  Assembly  that  there  was  no  necessity  to  provide  for  the  former.  It  would  be  
  41  
strange  if  having  no  idea  about  the  time  the  Emergency  Powers  Act  was  to  be  effective  the   after   he   had   vetoed   a   bill   on   the   subject   enacted   by   Congress,   and   the   present   Chief  
National   Assembly   failed   to   make   a   provision   for   its   termination   in   the   same   way   that   it   did   Executive   issued   an   executive   order   on   export   control   after   Congress   had   refused   to  
for  the  termination  of  the  effects  and  incidents  of  the  delegation.  There  would  be  no  point  in   approve  the  measure.  
repealing   or   annulling   the   rules   and   regulations   promulgated   under   a   law   if   the   law   itself    
was   to   remain   in   force,   since,   in   that   case,   the   President   could   not   only   make   new   rules   and   Quite   apart   from   these   anomalies,   there   is   good   basis   in   the   language   of   Act   No.   671   for   the  
regulations  but  he  could  restore  the  ones  already  annulled  by  the  legislature.   inference   that   the   National   Assembly   restricted   the   life   of   the   emergency   powers   of   the  
  President   to   the   time   the   Legislature   was   prevented   from   holding   sessions   due   to   enemy  
As   a   contemporary   construction,   President   Quezon's   statement   regarding   the   duration   of   action  or  other  causes  brought  on  by  the  war.  Section  3  provides:  
Act   No.   671   is   enlightening   and   should   carry   much   weight,   considering   his   part   in   the    
passage  and  in  the  carrying  out  of  the  law.  Mr.  Quezon,  who  called  the  National  Assembly  to   "The   President   of   the   Philippines   shall   as   soon   as   practicable   upon   the  
a  special  session,  who  recommended  the  enactment  of  the  Emergency  Powers  Act,  if  indeed   convening  of  the  Congress  of  the  Philippines  report  thereto  all  the  rules  
he  was  not  its  author,  and  who  was  the  very  President  to  be  entrusted  with  its  execution,   and  regulations  promulgated  by  him  under  the  powers  herein  granted."  
stated   in   his   autobiography,   "The   Good   Fight,"   that   Act   No.   671   was   only   "for   a   certain    
period"  and  "would  become  invalid  unless  reenacted."  These  phrases  connote  automatical   The   clear   tenor   of   this   provision   is   that   there   was   to   be   only   one   meeting   of   Congress   at  
extinction  of  the  law  upon  the  conclusion  of  a  certain  period.  Together  they  denote  that  a   which  the  President  was  to  give  an  account  of  his  trusteeship.  The  section  did  not  say  each  
new  legislation  was  necessary  to  keep  alive  (not  to  repeal)  the  law  after  the  expiration  of   meeting,   which   it   could   very   well   have   said   if   that   had   been   the   intention.   If   the   National  
that   period.   They   signify   that   the   same   law,   not   a   different   one,   had   to   be   repassed   if   the   Assembly  did  not  think  that  the  report  mentioned  in  section  3  was  to  be  the  first  and  last  
grant  should  be  prolonged.   and   did   not   think   that   upon   the   convening   of   the   first   Congress   Act   No.   671   would   lapse,  
  what  reason  could  there  be  for  its  failure  to  provide  in  appropriate  and  clear  terms  for  the  
What   then   was   the   contemplated   period?   President   Quezon   in   the   same   paragraph   of   his   filing   of   subsequent   reports?   Such   reports,   if   the   President   was   expected   to   continue  
autobiography  furnished  part  of  the  answer.  He  said  he  issued  the  call  for  a  special  session   making  laws  in  the  form  of  rules,  regulations  and  executive  orders,  were  as  important,  or  as  
of  the  National  Assembly  "when  it  became  evident  that  we  were  completely  helpless  against   unimportant,  as  the  initial  one.    
air   attack,   and   that   it   was   most   unlikely   the   Philippine   Legislature   would   hold   its   next    
regular   session   which   was   to   open   on   January   1,   1942."   (Italics   ours.)   It   can   easily   be   EMERGENCY   POWERS   CEASE   WHEN   THE   CONGRESS   MEET   IN   REGULAR   SESSION.   -­‐   It   is  
discerned  in  this  statement  that  the  conferring  of  enormous  powers  upon  the  President  was   our   considered   opinion,   and   we   so   hold,   that   Commonwealth   Act   No.   671   became  
decided  upon  with  specific  view  to  the  inability  of  the  National  Assembly  to  meet.  Indeed  no   inoperative   when   Congress   met   in   regular   session   on   May   25,   1946,   and   that   Executive  
other  factor  than  this  inability  could  have  motivated  the  delegation  of  powers  so  vast  as  to   Orders  Nos.  62,  192,  225  and  226  were  issued  without  authority  of  law.  In  setting  the  first  
amount   to   an   abdication   by   the   National   Assembly   of   its   authority.   The   enactment   and   regular   session   of   Congress   instead   of   the   first   special   session   which   preceded   it   as   the  
continuation  of  a  law  so  destructive  of  the  foundations  of  democratic  institutions  could  not   point  of  expiration  of  the  Act,  we  think  we  are  giving  effect  to  the  purpose  and  intention  of  
have  been  conceived  under  any  circumstance  short  of  a  complete  disruption  and  dislocation   the  National  Assembly.  In  a  special  session,  the  Congress  may  "consider  general  legislation  
of  the  normal  processes  of  government.  Anyway,  if  we  are  to  uphold  the  constitutionality  of   or   only   such   subjects   as   he   (President)   may   designate."   (Section   9,   Article   VI   of   the  
the  act  on  the  basis  of  its  duration,  we  must  start  with  the  premise  that  it  fixed  a  definite,   Constitution.)  In  a  regular  session,  the  power  of  Congress  to  legislate  is  not  circumscribed  
limited  period.  As  we  have  indicated,  the  period  that  best  comports  with  the  constitutional   except  by  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  organic  law.  
requirements   and   limitations,   with   the   general   context   of   the   law   and   with   what   we   believe    
to   be   the   main  if   not   the   sole  raison  d'etre  for  its  enactment,  was  a  period  coextensive  with   Act  No.  671,  as  we  have  stressed,  ended  ex  proprio  vigore  with  the  opening  of  the  regular  
the  inability  of  Congress  to  function,  a  period  ending  with  the  convening  of  that  body.   session   of   Congress   on   May   25,   1946.   Acts   Nos.   600   and   620   contain   stronger   if   not  
  conclusive   indication   that   they   were   self-­‐liquidating.   By   express   provision   the   rules   and  
THE   CONTINUED   EXERCISE   OF   THE   PRESIDENT   OF   THE   EMERGENCY   POWER   WHEN   THE   regulations   to   be   eventually   made   in   pursuance   of   Acts   Nos.   600   and   620,   respectively  
CONGRESS   HAS   ALREADY   CONVENED   SHALL   CREATE   AN   ANOMALOUS   SITUATION   OF   approved   on   August   19,   1940   and   June   6,   1941,   were   to   be   good   only   up   to   the  
TWO  LEGISLATIVE  BODIES.  -­‐  More  anomalous  than  the  exercise  of  legislative  functions  by   corresponding   dates   of   adjournment   of   the   following   sessions   of   the   Legislature,   "unless  
the  Executive  when  Congress  is  in  the  unobstructed  exercise  of  its  authority  is  the  fact  that   sooner  amended  or  repealed  by  the  National  Assembly."  The  logical  deduction  to  be  drawn  
there  would  be  two  legislative  bodies  operating  over  the  same  field,  legislating  concurrently   from  this  provision  is  that  in  the  minds  of  the  lawmakers  the  idea  was  fixed  that  the  Acts  
and   simultaneously,   mutually   nullifying   each   other's   actions.   Even   if   the   emergency   powers   themselves  would  lapse  not  later  than  the  rules  and  regulations.  The  design  to  provide  for  
of  the  President,  as  suggested,  be  suspended  while  Congress  was  in  session  and  be  revived   the   automatic   repeal   of   those   rules   and   regulations   necessarily   was   predicated   on   the  
after  each  adjournment,  the  anomaly  would  not  be  eliminated.  Congress  by  a  two-­‐third  vote   consciousness   of   a   prior   or   at   best   simultaneous   repeal   of   their   source.   Were   not   this   the  
could   repeal   executive   orders   promulgated   by   the   President   during   congressional   recess,   case,   there   would   arise   the   curious   spectacle,   already   painted,   and   easily   foreseen,   of   the  
and   the   President   in   turn   could   treat   in   the   same   manner,   between   sessions   of   Congress,   Legislature   amending   or   repealing   rules   and   regulations   of   the   President   while   the   latter  
laws   enacted   by   the   latter.   This   is   not   a   fantastic   apprehension;   in   two   instances   it   was  empowered  to  keep  or  return  them  into  force  and  to  issue  new  ones  independently  of  
materialized.  In  entire  good  faith,  and  inspired  only  by  the  best  interests  of  the  country  as   the  National  Assembly.  For  the  rest,  the  reasoning  heretofore  adduced  against  the  asserted  
they  saw  them,  a  former  President  promulgated  an  executive  order  regulating  house  rentals  
  42  
indefinite  continuance  of  the  operation  of  Act  No.  671  equally  applies  to  Acts  Nos.  600  and   OTHER   NATIONAL   EMERGENCIES,   MEANING.   -­‐   Moreover,   section   26   of   Article   VI   of   the  
620.   Constitution,  in  virtue  of  which  Act  No.  671  was  passed,  authorizes  the  delegation  of  powers  
    by   the   Congress   (1)   in   times   of   war   or   (2)   other   national   emergency.   The   emergency  
Rodriguez  vs.  Gella  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐6266,  February  2,  1953]   expressly   spoken   of   in   the   title   and   in   section   1   of   the   Act   is   one   "in   time   of   war,"   as  
  distinguished   from   "other   national   emergency"   that   may   arise   as   an   after-­‐effect   of   war   or  
WITHDRAWAL   OF   THE   EMERGENCY   POWERS   DOES   NOT   NEED   THE   CONSENT   OF   THE   from   natural   causes   such   as   widespread   earthquakes,   typhoons,   floods,   and   the   like.  
DELEGATE.  -­‐  As  the  Act  was  expressly  in  pursuance  of  the  constitutional  provision,  it  has  to   Certainly   the   typhoons   that   hit   some   provinces   and   cities   in   1952   not   only   did   not   result  
be  assumed  that  the  National  Assembly  intended  it  to  be  only  for  a  limited  period.  If  it  be   from  the  last  world  war  but  were  and  could  not  have  been  contemplated  by  the  legislators.  
contended   that   the   Act   has   not   yet   been   duly   repealed,   and   such   step   is   necessary   to   a   At   any   rate,   the   Congress   is   available   for   necessary   special   sessions,   and   it   cannot   let   the  
cessation  of  the  emergency  powers  delegated  to  the  President,  the  result  would  be  obvious   people  down  without  somehow  being  answerable  thereover.  
unconstitutionality,   since   it   may   never   be   repealed   by   the   Congress,   or   if   the   latter   ever    
attempts   to   do   so,   the   President   may   wield   his   veto.   This   eventuality   has   in   fact   taken   place   EMERGENCY  DOES  NOT  CREATE  POWER.  -­‐  The  framers  of  the  Constitution,  however,  had  
when  the  President  disapproved  House  Bill  No.  727,  repealing  all  Emergency  Powers  Acts.   the  vision  of  and  were  careful  in  allowing  delegation  of  legislative  powers  to  the  President  
The  situation  will  make  the  Congress  and  the  President  or  either  as  the  principal  authority   for  a  limited  period  "in  times  of  war  or  other  national  emergency."  They  had  thus  entrusted  
to  determine  the  indefinite  duration  of  the  delegation  of  legislative  powers,  —  in  palpable   to  the  good  judgment  of  the  Congress  the  duty  of  coping  with  any  national  emergency  by  a  
repugnance  to  the  constitutional  provision  that  any  grant  thereunder  must  be  for  a  limited   more  efficient  procedure;  but  it  alone  must  decide  because  emergency  in  itself  cannot  and  
period,   necessarily   to   be   fixed   in   the   law   itself   and   not   dependent   upon   the   arbitrary   or   should   not   create   power.   In   our   democracy   the   hope   and   survival   of   the   nation   lie   in   the  
elastic  will  of  either  the  Congress  or  the  President.   wisdom   and   unselfish   patriotism   of   all   officials   and   in   their   faithful   adherence   to   the  
  Constitution.  
Although  House  Bill  No.  727,  had  been  vetoed  by  the  President  and  did  not  thereby  become  
a  regular  statute,  it  may  at  least  be  considered  as  a  concurrent  resolution  of  the  Congress  
formally   declaring   the   termination   of   the   emergency   powers.   To   contend   that   the   Bill  
needed   presidential   acquiescence   to   produce   effect,   would   lead   to   the   anomalous,   if   not  
absurd,   situation   that,   "while   Congress   might   delegate   its   powers   by   a   simple   majority,   it  
might  not  be  able  to  recall  them  except  by  two-­‐third  vote.  In  other  words,  it  would  be  easier  
for   Congress   to   delegate   its   powers   than   to   take   them   back.   This   is   not   right   and   is   not,   and  
ought  not  to  be  the  law."    
 
Act  No.  671  may  be  likened  to  an  ordinary  contract  of  agency,  whereby  the  consent  of  the  
agent  is  necessary  only  in  the  sense  that  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  accept  the  trust,  in  the  
same  way  that  the  principal  cannot  be  forced  to  keep  the  relation  in  eternity  or  at  the  will  of  
the  agent.  Neither  can  it  be  suggested  that  the  agency  created  under  the  Act  is  coupled  with  
interest.  
 
The   logical   view   consistent   with   constitutionality   is   to   hold   that   the   powers   lasted   only  
during   the   emergency   resulting   from   the   last   world   war   which   factually   involved   the  
Philippines   when   Act   No.   671   was   passed   on   December   16,   1941.   That   emergency,   which  
naturally   terminated   upon   the   ending   of   the   last   world   war,   was   contemplated   by   the  
members   of   the   National   Assembly   on   the   foresight   that   the   actual   state   of   war   could  
prevent   it   from   holding   its   next   regular   session.   This   is   confirmed   by   the   following  
statement   of   President   Quezon:   "When   it   became   evident   that   we   were   completely   helpless  
against   air   attack   and   that   it   was   most   unlikely   the   Philippine   Legislature   would   hold   its  
next  regular  session  which  was  to  open  on  January  1,  1942,  the  National  Assembly  passed  
into  history  approving  a  resolution  which  reaffirmed  the  abiding  faith  of  the  Filipino  people  
in,   and   their   loyalty   to,   the   United   States.   The   Assembly   also   enacted   a   law   granting   the  
President   of   the   Philippines   all   the   powers   that   under   the   Philippine   Constitution   may   be  
delegated   to   him   in   time   of   war."   3   When   President   Quezon   said   "in   time   of   war",   he  
undoubtedly  meant  such  factual  war  as  that  then  raging.  
 

  43  
    
ARTICLE  VIII  –  JUDICIAL  DEPARTMENT   'The  phrase  "judicial  power"  is  not  capable  of  a  precise  definition  which  
  would  be  applicable  to  all  cases.  The  term  has  been  variously  defined  as  
Section  1   the   authority   to   determine   the   rights   of   persons   or   property   by  
  arbitrating  between  adversaries  in  specific  controversies  at  the  instance  
  Santiago  vs.  Bautista  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐25024.    March  30,  1970]   of   a   party   thereto;   the   authority   exercised   by   that   department   of  
  government  which  is  charged  with  the  declaration  of  what  the  law  is  and  
NATURE   OF   JUDICIAL   POWER.     The   last   point   raised   by   appellees   deserves   first   its  construction  so  far  as  it  is  written  law;  the  authority  or  power  vested  
consideration,  for  if  really  the  said  committee  of  teachers  does  not  fall  within  the  category   in   the   judges   or   in   the   courts;   the   authority   vested   in   some   court,   officer,  
of   the   tribunal   board,   or   officer   exercising   judicial   functions   contemplated   by   Rule   65,   or  persons  to  hear  and  determine  when  the  rights  of  persons  or  property  
further  discussion  of  the  issues  raised  by  appellant  may  no  longer  be  necessary.  To  resolve   or   the   propriety   of   doing   an   act   is   the   subject   matter   of   adjudication;   the  
this  problem  the  following  tests  may  be  employed:   power   belonging   to   or   emanating   from   a   judge   as   such;   the   power  
  conferred   upon   a   public   officer,   involving   the   exercise   of   judgment   and  
"In   this   jurisdiction   certiorari   is   a   special   civil   action   instituted   against   discretion   in   the   determination   of   questions   of   right   in   specific   cases  
'any   tribunal,   board,   or   officer   exercising   judicial   functions.'   (Section   1,   affecting   the   interest   of   persons   or   property,   as   distinguished   from  
Rule   67.)   A   judicial   function   is   an   act   performed   by   virtue   of   judicial   ministerial   power   or   authority   to   carry   out   the   mandates   of   judicial  
powers;   the   exercise   of   a   judicial   function   is   the   doing   of   something   in   power   or   the   law;   the   power   exercised   by   courts   in   hearing   and  
the  nature  of  the  action  of  the  court  (34  C.J.  1182).  In  order  that  a  special   determining  cases  before  them,  or  some  matter  incidental  thereto,  and  of  
civil   action   of   certiorari   may   be   invoked   in   this   jurisdiction   the   following   which   they   have   jurisdiction;   the   power   of   a   court   to   decide   and  
circumstances   must   exist:   (1)   that   there   must   be   a   specific   controversy   pronounce  a  judgment;  the  power  which  adjudicates  upon  and  protects  
involving  rights  of  persons  or  property  and  said  controversy  is  brought   the   right   and   interests   of   individual   citizens,   and   to   that   end   construes  
before  a  tribunal,  board  or  officer  for  hearing  and  determination  of  their   and   applies   the   law.   "Judicial   power"   implies   the   construction   of   laws  
respective  rights  and  obligations.   and   the   adjudication   of   legal   rights.   It   includes   the   power   to   hear   and  
  determine   but   not   everyone   who   may   hear   and   determine   has   judicial  
'Judicial   action   is   an   adjudication   upon   the   rights   of   parties   who   in   power.  The  term  "judicial  power"  does  not  necessarily  include  the  power  
general   appear   or   are   brought   before   the   tribunal   by   notice   or   process,   to  hear  and  determine  a  matter  that  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  suit  or  action  
and   upon   whose   claims   some   decision   or   judgment   is   rendered.   It   between  the  parties.'  (34  C.J.  1183-­‐1184.)  
implies  impartiality,  disinterestedness,  a  weighing  of  adverse  claims,  and    
is  inconsistent  with  discretion  on  the  one  hand  —  for  the  tribunal  must   (3)   the   tribunal,   board   or   officer   must   pertain   to   that   branch   of   the  
decide  according  to  law  and  the  rights  of  the  parties   —  or  with  dictation   sovereign   power   which   belongs   to   the   judiciary,   or   at   least,   which   does  
on  the  other;  for  in  the  first  instance  it  must  exercise  its  own  judgment   not  belong  to  the  legislative  or  executive  department.  
under   the   laws   and   not   act   under   a   mandate   from   another   power   .   .   .   The    
character  of  its  action  in  a  given  case  must  decide  whether  that  action  is   ".   .   .   the   distinction   between   legislative   or   ministerial   functions   and  
judicial,  ministerial,  or  legislative,  or  whether  it  be  simply  that  of  a  public   judicial  functions  is  difficult  to  point  out  What  is  a  judicial  function  does  
agent  of  the  country  or  State,  as  in  its  varied  jurisdictions  it  may  by  turns   not  depend  solely  upon  the  mental  operation  by  which  it  is  performed  or  
be  each.'  (In  Re  Saline  County  Subscription,  100  Am.  Dec.  337,  338,  cited   the   importance   of   the   act.   In   solving   this   question,   due   regard   must   be  
in  Southeastern  Greyhound  Lines  v.  Georgia  Public  Service  Commission,   had   to   the   organic   law   of   the   state   and   the   division   of   power   of  
181  S.  E.  836-­‐837.)   government.   In   the   discharge   of   executive   and   legislative   duties,   the  
  exercise   of   discretion   and   judgment   of   the   highest   order   is   necessary,  
'It   may   be   said   generally   that   the   exercise   of   judicial   function   is   to   and   matters   of   the   greatest   weight   and   importance   are   dealt   with.   It   is  
determine  what  the  law  is,  and  what  the  legal  rights  of  parties  are,  with   not   enough   to   make   a   function   judicial   that   it   requires   discretion,  
respect   to   a   matter   in   controversy;   and   whenever   an   officer   is   clothed   deliberation,  thought,  and  judgment.  It  must  be  the  exercise  of  discretion  
with   that   authority,   and   undertakes   to   determine   those   questions,   he   and   judgment   within   the   subdivision   of   the   sovereign   power   which  
acts   judicially.'   (State   ex   rel.   Board   of   Commissioners   of   St.   Louis   County,   belongs   to   the   judiciary,   or,   at   least,   which   does   not   belong   to   the  
et  al.  v.  Dunn,  90  N.  W.  772-­‐773.)   legislative  or  executive  department.  If  the  matter,  in  respect  to  which  it  is  
  exercised,   belongs   to   either   of   the   two   last-­‐named   departments   of  
(2)   the   tribunal,   board   or   officer   before   whom   the   controversy   is   government,  it  is  not  judicial.  As  to  what  is  judicial  and  what  is  not  seems  
brought  must  have  the  power  and  authority  to  pronounce  judgment  and   to   be   better   indicated   by   the   nature   of   a   thing,   than   its   definition.'  
render  a  decision  on  the  controversy  construing  and  applying  the  laws  to   (Whealing   &   Elm   Grove   Railroad   Co.   Appt.   v.   Town   of   Philadelphia,   et   al.,  
that  end.   4  L.R.A.  (N.  S.),  pp.  321,  328-­‐329.)  [Emphasis  supplied]      1    
  44  
   of   the   Constitution.   It   does   not   impair   the   inherent   power   of   courts   "to   settle   actual  
"   'WHAT   ARE   JUDICIAL   OR   QUASI   JUDICIAL   ACTS.   It   is   difficult,   if   not   controversies  which  are  legally  demandable  and  enforceable  and  to  determine  whether  or  
impossible,   precisely   to   define   what   are   judicial   or   quasi   judicial   acts,   not  there  has  been  a  grave  abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  on  
and   there   is   considerable   conflict   in   the   decisions   in   regard   thereto,   in   the   part   of   any   branch   or   instrumentality   of   the   government"   (Sec.   1,   Art.   VIII,   1987  
connection  with  the  law  as  to  the  right  to  a  writ  of  certiorari.  It  is  clear,   Constitution).  The  power  to  define,  prescribe  and  apportion  the  jurisdiction  of  the  various  
however,  that  it  is  the  nature  of  the  act  to  be  performed,  rather  than  of   courts   belongs   to   the   legislature,   except   that   it   may   not   deprive   the   Supreme   Court   of   its  
the  office,  board,  or  body  which  performs  it,  that  determines  whether  or   jurisdiction  over  cases  enumerated  in  Section  5,  Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution  (Sec.  2,  Art.  
not   it   is   the   discharge   of   a   judicial   or   quasi-­‐judicial   function.   It   is   not   VIII,  1987  Constitution).      
essential  that  the  proceedings  should  be  strictly  and  technically  judicial,    
in   the   sense   in   which   that   word   is   used   when   applied   to   courts   of   justice,   The   President,   in   the   exercise   of   her   legislative   power   under   the   Freedom   Constitution,  
but  it  is  sufficient  if  they  are  quasi  judicial.  It  is  enough  if  the  officers  act   issued   Proclamation   No.   50-­‐A   prohibiting   the   courts   from   issuing   restraining   orders   and  
judicially   in   making   their   decision,   whatever   may   be   their   public   writs  of  injunction  against  the  APT  and  the  purchasers  of  any  assets  sold  by  it,  to  prevent  
character  .  .  .'   courts  from  interfering  in  the  discharge,  by  this  instrumentality  of  the  executive  branch  of  
  the   Government,   of   its   task   of   carrying   out   "the   expeditious   disposition   and   privatization   of  
"In   State   ex   rel.   Board   of   Commrs.   vs.   Dunn   (86   Minn.   301,   304),   the   certain   government   corporations   and/or   the   assets   thereof"   (Proc.   No.   50),   absent   any  
following  statements  were  made:   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to   excess   or   lack   of   jurisdiction   on   its   part.   This  
  proclamation,  not  being  inconsistent  with  the  Constitution  and   not   having   been   repealed   or  
'The  precise  line  of  demarcation  between  what  are  judicial  and  what  are   revoked  by  Congress,  has  remained  operative  (Sec.  3,  Art.  XVIII,  1987  Constitution).  
administrative   or   ministerial   functions   is   often   difficult   to   determine.    
The   exercise   of   judicial   functions   may   involve   the   performance   of   While  the  judicial  power  may  appear  to  be  pervasive,  the  truth  is  that  under  the  system  of  
legislative   or   administrative   duties,   and   the   performance   of   separation   of   powers   set   up   in   the   Constitution,   the   power   of   the   courts   over   the   other  
administrative   or   ministerial   duties,   may,   in   a   measure,   involve   the   branches   and   instrumentalities   of   the   Government   is   limited   only   to   the   determination   of  
exercise  of  judicial  functions.  It  may  be  said  generally  that  the  exercise  of   "whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  grave  abuse  of  discretion  (by  them)  amounting  to  lack  or  
judicial   functions   is   to   determine   what   the   law   is,   and   what   the   legal   excess   of   jurisdiction"   in   the   exercise   of   their   authority   and   in   the   performance   of   their  
rights   of   parties   are,   with   respect   to   a   matter   in   controversy;   and   assigned   tasks   (Sec.   1,   Art.   VIII,   1987   Constitution).   Courts   may   not   substitute   their  
whenever   an   officer   is   clothed   with   that   authority,   and   undertakes   to   judgment  for  that  of  the  APT,  nor  block,  by  an  injunction,  the  discharge  of  its  functions  and  
determine  those  questions,  he  acts  judicially.'  "   the  implementation  of  its  decisions  in  connection  with  the  acquisition,  sale  or  disposition  of  
  assets  transferred  to  it.  
It   is   evident,   upon   the   foregoing   authorities,   that   the   so   called   committee   on   the   rating   of    
students  for  honor  whose  actions  are  questioned  in  this  case  exercised  neither  judicial  nor   There   can   be   no   justification   for   judicial   interference   in   the   business   of   an   administrative  
quasi   judicial   functions   in   the   performance   of   its   assigned   task.   From   the   above-­‐quoted   agency,  except  when  it  violates  a  citizen's  constitutional  rights,  or  commits  a  grave  abuse  of  
portions  of  the  decisions  cited,  it  will  be  gleaned  that  before  a  tribunal  board,  or  officer  may   discretion,  or  acts  in  excess  of,  or  without  jurisdiction.  
exercise  judicial  or  quasi  judicial  acts,  it  is  necessary  that  there  be  a  law  that  gives  rise  to      
some  specific  rights  of  persons  or  property  under  which  adverse  claims  to  such  rights  are   Malaga  vs.  Penachos,  Jr.  [G.R.  No.  86695,  September  3,  1992]  
made,   and   the   controversy   ensuing   therefrom   is   brought,   in   turn,   before   the   tribunal,   board    
or  officer  clothed  With  power  and  authority  to  determine  what   that  law  is  and  thereupon   LAWS  WHICH  PREVENT  COURTS  FROM  ISSUING  RESTRAINING  ORDERS  OR  INJUNCTIONS  
adjudicate   the   respective   rights   of   the   contending   parties.   As   pointed   out   by   appellees,       ARE   VALID   BUT   MAY   ONLY   APPLY   TO   CONTROVERSIES   INVOLVING   FACTS   OR   THE  
however,   there   is   nothing   on   record   about   any   rule   of   law   that   provides   that   when   teachers   EXERCISE   OF   DISCRETION   IN   TECHNICAL   CASES.     In   the   case   of   Datiles   and   Co.   vs.  
sit   down   to   assess   the   individual   merits   of   their   pupils   for   purposes   of   rating   them   for   Sucaldito,      this  Court  interpreted  a  similar  prohibition  contained  in  P.D.  605,  the  law  after  
honors,   such   function   involves   the   determination   of   what   the   law   is   and   that   they   are   which  P.D.  1818  was  patterned.  It  was  there  declared  that  the  prohibition  pertained  to  the  
therefore   automatically   vested   with   judicial   or   quasi   judicial   functions.   Worse   still,   this   issuance   of   injunctions   or   restraining   orders   by   courts   against   administrative   acts   in  
Court  has  not  even  been  appraised  by  appellant  of  the  pertinent  provisions  of  the  Service   controversies   involving   facts   or   the   exercise   of   discretion   in   technical   cases.   The   Court  
Manual  of  Teachers  for  Public  Schools  appellees  allegedly  violated  in  the  composition  of  the   observed   that   to   allow   the   courts   to   judge   these   matters   would   disturb   the   smooth  
committee  they  constituted  thereunder,  and,  in  the  performance  of  that  committee's  duties.   functioning  of  the  administrative  machinery.  Justice  Teodoro  Padilla  made  it  clear,  however,  
  that   on   issues   definitely   outside   of   this   dimension   and   involving   questions   of   law,   courts  
Daza  vs.  Singson  [G.R.  No.  86344,  December  21,  1989]   could  not  be  prevented  by  P.D.  No.  605  from  exercising  their  power  to  restrain  or  prohibit  
Mantruste  Systems,  Inc.  vs.  CA  [G.R.  Nos.  86540-­‐41,  November  6,  1989]   administrative  acts.  
   
THE   CONGRESS   HAS   THE   POWER   TO   DEFINE   THE   EXTENT   OF   JURISDICTION   OF   THE   P.D.   1818   was   not   intended   to   shield   from   judicial   scrutiny   irregularities   committed   by  
COURTS  OF  JUSTICE.    Section  31  of  Proclamation  No.  50-­‐A  does  not  infringe  any  provision   administrative   agencies   such   as   the   anomalies   above   described.   Hence,   the   challenged  
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restraining   order   was   not   improperly   issued   by   the   respondent   judge   and   the   writ   of   possible  opportunity;  and  (4)  the  decision  on  the  constitutional  question  must  be  necessary  
preliminary  injunction  should  not  have  been  denied.  We  note  from  Annex  Q  of  the  private   to  the  determination  of  the  case  itself.    
respondent's   memorandum,   however,   that   the   subject   project   has   already   been   "100%    
completed   as   to   the   Engineering   Standard."   This   fait   accompli   has   made   the   petition   for   a   Petitioners   have   far   from   complied   with   these   requirements.   The   petition   is   premised   on  
writ  of  preliminary  injunction  moot  and  academic.   the   occurrence   of   many   contingent   events,   i.e.,   that   Mayor   Binay   will   run   again   in   this  
  coming  mayoralty  elections;  that  he  would  be  re-­‐elected  in  said  elections;  and  that  he  would  
PACU  vs.  Secretary  of  Education  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐5279,  October  31,  1955]   seek   re-­‐election   for   the   same   post   in   the   1998   elections.   Considering   that   these  
  contingencies  may  or  may  not  happen,  petitioners  merely  pose  a  hypothetical  issue  which  
PROPER   PARTY.   "It   is   an   established   principle   that   to   entitle   a   private   individual   has   yet   to   ripen   to   an   actual   case   or   controversy.   Petitioners   who   are   residents   of   Taguig  
immediately  in  danger  of  sustaining  a  direct  injury  as  the  result  of  that  action  and  it  is  not   (except   Mariano)   are   not   also   the   proper   parties   to   raise   this   abstract   issue.   Worse,   they  
sufficient   that   he   has   merely   a   general   interest   to   invoke   the   judicial   power   to   determine   hoist   this   futuristic   issue   in   a   petition   for   declaratory   relief   over   which   this   Court   has   no  
the   validity   of   executive   or   legislative   action   he   must   show   that   he   has   sustained   or   his   jurisdiction.  
interest  common  to  all  members  of  the  public."  (Ex  parte  Levitt,  302  U.  S.  633  82  L.  Ed.  493.)    
  Macasiano  vs.  National  Housing  Authority  [G.R.  No.  107921,  July  1,  1993]  
"Courts   will   not   pass   upon   the   constitutionality   of   a   law"   upon   the   complaint   of   one   who    
fails  to  show  that  he  is  injured  by  its  operation.  (Tyler  vs.  Judges,  179  U.  S.  405;  Hendrick  vs.   REQUISITIES  OF  JUDICIAL  INQUIRY.    It  is  a  rule  firmly  entrenched  in  our  jurisprudence  that  
Maryland,  235  U.  S.  610;  Coffman  vs.  Breeze  Corp.,  323  U.  S.  316-­‐325.)   the  constitutionality  of  an  act  of  the  legislature  will  not  be  determined  by  the  courts  unless  
  that   question   is   properly   raised   and   presented   in   appropriate   cases   and   is   necessary   to   a  
"The   power   of   courts   to   declare   a   law   unconstitutional   arises   only   when   the   interests   of   determination   of   the   case,   i.e.,   the   issue   of   constitutionality   must   be   the   very   lis   mota  
litigants   require   the   use   of   that   judicial   authority   for   their   protection   against   actual   presented.       To   reiterate,   the   essential   requisites   for   a   successful   judicial   inquiry   into   the  
interference,   a   hypothetical   threat   being   insufficient."   (United   Public   Works   vs.   Mitchell,   constitutionality  of  a  law  are:  (a)  the  existence  of  an  actual  case  or  controversy  involving  a  
330  U.  S.  75;  91  L.  Ed.  754.)   conflict  of  legal  rights  susceptible  of  judicial  determination,  (b)  the  constitutional  question  
  must   be   raised   by   a   proper   party,   (c)   the   constitutional   question   must   be   raised   at   the  
"Bona  fide  suit.  —  Judicial  power  is  limited  to  the  decision  of  actual  cases  and  controversies.   earliest  opportunity,  and  (d)  the  resolution  of  the  constitutional  question  must  be  necessary  
The  authority  to  pass  on  the  validity  of  statutes  is  incidental  to  the  decision  of  such  cases   to   the   decision   of   the   case.       A   proper   party   is   one   who   has   sustained   or   is   in   danger   or  
where   conflicting   claims   under   the   Constitution   and   under   a   legislative   act   assailed   as   sustaining  an  immediate  injury  as  a  result  of  the  acts  or  measures  complained  of.        
contrary   to   the   Constitution   are   raised.   It   is   legitimate   only   in   the   last   resort,   and   as    
necessity   in   the   determination   of   real,   earnest,   and   vital   controversy   between   litigants."   It  is  easily  discernible  in  the  instant  case  that  the  first  two  (2)  fundamental  requisites  are  
(Tañada  and  Fernando,  Constitution  of  the  Philippines,  p.  1138.)   absent.  There  is  no  actual  controversy.  Moreover,  petitioner  does  not  claim  that,  in  either  or  
  both   of   the   capacities   in   which   he   is   filing   the   petition,   he   has   been   actually   prevented   from  
JUSTICEABLE   CONTROVERSY.     Mere   apprehension   that   the   Secretary   of   Education   might   performing  his  duties  as  a  consultant  and  exercising  his  rights  as  a  property  owner  because  
under   the   law   withdraw   the   permit   of   one   of   petitioners   does   not   constitute   a   justiciable   of  the  assertion  by  other  parties  of  any  benefit  under  the  challenged  sections  of  the  said  Act.  
controversy.  (Cf.  Com.  ex  rel  Watkins  vs.  Winchester  Waterworks  (Ky.)  197  S.  W.  2d.  771.)   Judicial  review  cannot  be  exercised  in  vacuo.  Judicial  power  is  the  "right  to  determine  actual  
  controversies  arising  between  adverse  litigants."  
An   action,   like   this,   is   brought   for   a   positive   purpose,   nay,   to   obtain   actual   and   positive    
relief.   (Salonga   vs.   Warner   Barnes,   L-­‐2245,   January,   1951.)   Courts   do   not   sit   to   adjudicate   Joya  vs.  PCGG  [G.R.  No.  96541,  August  24,  1993]  
mere   academic   questions   to   satisfy   scholarly   interest   therein   however   intellectually   solid    
the   problem   may   be.   This   is   specially   true   where   the   issues   "reach   constitutional   LEGAL   STANDING.     The   rule   is   settled   that   no   question   involving   the   constitutionality   or  
dimensions,  for  then  there  comes  into  play  regard  for  the  court's  duty  to  avoid  decision  of   validity   of   a   law   or   governmental   act   may   be   heard   and   decided   by   the   court   unless   there   is  
constitutional  issues  unless  avoidance  becomes  evasion."  (Rice  vs.  Sioux  City,  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct.   compliance  with  the  legal  requisites  for  judicial  inquiry,  namely:  that  the  question  must  be  
Adv.  Rep.,  May  23,  1955,  Law  Ed.,  Vol.  99,  p.  511.)   raised   by   the   proper   party;   that   there   must   be   an   actual   case   or   controversy;   that   the  
  question  must  be  raised  at  the  earliest  possible  opportunity;  and,  that  the  decision  on  the  
Mariano,  Jr.  vs.  COMELEC  [G.R.  No.  118577,  March  7,  1995]   constitutional   or   legal   question   must   be   necessary   to   the   determination   of   the   case   itself.    
  But  the  most  important  are  the  first  two  (2)  requisites.  
HYPOTHETICAL   QUESTIONS   ARE   NOT   APPROPRIATE   FOR   JUDICIAL   DETERMINATION.      
We  cannot  entertain  this  challenge  to  the  constitutionality  of  section  51.  The  requirements   On   the   first   requisite,   we   have   held   that   one   having   no   right   or   interest   to   protect   cannot  
before  a  litigant  can  challenge  the  constitutionality  of  a  law  are  well-­‐delineated.  They  are:   invoke  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  as  party-­‐plaintiff  in  an  action.  This  is  premised  on  Sec.  2,  
(1)  there  must  be  an  actual  case  or  controversy;  (2)  the  question  of  constitutionality  must   Rule   3,   of   the   Rules   of   Court   which   provides   that   every   action   must   be   prosecuted   and  
be  raised  by  the  proper  party;  (3)  the  constitutional  question  must  be  raised  at  the  earliest   defended   in   the   name   of   the   real   party-­‐in-­‐interest,   and   that   all   persons   having   interest   in  
the  subject  of  the  action  and  in  obtaining  the  relief  demanded  shall  be  joined  as  plaintiffs.  
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The   Court   will   exercise   its   power   of   judicial   review   only   if   the   case   is   brought   before   it   by   a   either   expressly   or   implicitly   certain   powers.   These   they   exercise   not   for  
party   who   has   the   legal   standing   to   raise   the   constitutional   or   legal   question.   "Legal   their  own  benefit  but  for  the  body  politic  .  .  .  
standing"   means   a   personal   and   substantial   interest   in   the   case   such   that   the   party   has    
sustained   or   will   sustain   direct   injury   as   a   result   of   the   governmental   act   that   is   being   "A  public  office  is  a  public  trust.  That  is  more  than  a  moral  adjuration.  It  
challenged.  The  term  "interest"  is  material  interest,  an  interest  in  issue  and  to  be  affected  by   is  a  legal  imperative.  The  law  may  vest  in  a  public  official  certain  rights.  It  
the   decree,   as   distinguished   from   mere   interest   in   the   question   involved,   or   a   mere   does   so   to   enable   them   to   perform   his   functions   and   fulfill   his  
incidental   interest.     Moreover,   the   interest   of   the   party   plaintiff   must   be   personal   and   not   responsibilities  more  efficiently  .  .  .  It  is  an  added  guarantee  that  justices  
one   based   on   a   desire   to   vindicate   the   constitutional   right   of   some   third   and   unrelated   and   judges   can   administer   justice   undeterred   by   any   fear   of   reprisal   or  
party.     untoward   consequence.   Their   judgments   then   are   even   more   likely   to   be  
  inspired   solely   by   their   knowledge   of   the   law   and   the   dictates   of   their  
There   are   certain   instances   however   when   this   Court   has   allowed   exceptions   to   the   rule   on   conscience,   free   from   the   corrupting   influence   of   base   or   unworthy  
legal   standing,   as   when   a   citizen   brings   a   case   for   mandamus   to   procure   the   enforcement   of   motives.  The  independence  of  which  they  are  assured  is  impressed  with  
a  public  duty  for  the  fulfillment  of  a  public  right  recognized  by  the  Constitution,  and  when  a   a  significance  transcending  that  of  a  purely  personal  right."  (At  pp.  338-­‐
taxpayer   questions   the   validity   of   a   governmental   act   authorizing   the   disbursement   of   339).  
public  funds.    
    As   envisioned   in   the   Constitution,   the   fiscal   autonomy   enjoyed   by   the   Judiciary,   the   Civil  
Legaspi  vs.  Civil  Service  Commission  [G.R.  No.  72119,  May  29,  1987]   Service   Commission,   the   Commission   on   Audit,   the   Commission   on   Elections,   and   the   Office  
Dumlao  vs.  COMELEC  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐52245,  January  22,  1980]   of   the   Ombudsman   contemplates   a   guarantee   of   full   flexibility   to   allocate   and   utilize   their  
Bugnay  Construction  &  Devt.  Corp.  vs.  Laron  [G.R.  No.  79983,  August  10,  1989]   resources  with  the  wisdom  and  dispatch  that  their  needs  require.  It  recognizes  the  power  
Kilosbayan,  Inc.  vs.  Guingona  [G.R.  No.  113375,  May  5,  1994]   and   authority   to   levy,   assess   and   collect   fees,   fix   rates   of   compensation   not   exceeding   the  
Philconsa  vs.  Enriquez  [G.R.  No.  113105,  August  19,  1994]   highest   rates   authorized   by   law   for   compensation   and   play   plans   of   the   government   and  
Tatad  vs.  Garcia,  Jr.  [G.R.  No.  114222,  April  6,  1995]   allocate   and   disburse   such   sums   as   may   be   provided   by   law   or   prescribed   by   them   in   the  
Oposa  vs.  Factoran,  Jr.  [G.R.  No.  101083,  July  30,  1993]   course  of  the  discharge  of  their  functions.  
Kilosbayan  vs.  Morato  [G.R.  No.  118910,  November  16,  1995]    
Lozada  vs.  COMELEC  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐59068,  January  27,  1983]   Fiscal   autonomy   means   freedom   from   outside   control.   If   the   Supreme   Court   says   it   needs  
  100   typewriters   but   DBM   rules   we   need   only   10   typewriters   and   sends   its  
Section  3   recommendations   to   Congress   without   even   informing   us,   the   autonomy   given   by   the  
  Constitution  becomes  an  empty  and  illusory  platitude.  
  Bengzon  vs.  Drilon  [G.R.  No.  103524,  April  15,  1992]    
  The   Judiciary,   the   Constitutional   Commissions,   and   the   Ombudsman   must   have   the  
THE   VETO   POWER   OF   THE   PRESIDENT   CANNOT   BE   EXERCISED   TO   DEPRIVE   THE   independence   and   flexibility   needed   in   the   discharge   of   their   constitutional   duties.   The  
SUPREME   COURT   OF   ITS   FISCAL   AUTONOMY.     There   is   a   matter   of   greater   consequence   imposition   of   restrictions   and   constraints   on   the   manner   the   independent   constitutional  
arising  from  this  petition.  The  attempt  to  use  the  veto  power  to  set  aside  a  Resolution  of  this   offices  allocate  and  utilize  the  funds  appropriated  for  their  operations  is  anathema  to  fiscal  
Court  and  to  deprive  retirees  of  benefits  given  them  by  Rep.  Act  No.  1797  trenches  upon  the   autonomy  and  violative  not  only  of  the  express  mandate  of  the  Constitution  but  especially  
constitutional  grant  of  fiscal  autonomy  to  the  Judiciary.   as  regards  the  Supreme  Court,  of  the  independence  and  separation  of  powers  upon  which  
  the   entire   fabric   of   our   constitutional   system   is   based.   In   the   interest   of   comity   and  
Sec.  3  Art.  VIII  mandates  that:   cooperation,  the  Supreme  Court,  Constitutional  Commissions,  and  the  Ombudsman  have  so  
  far  limited  their  objections  to  constant  reminders.  We  now  agree  with  the  petitioners  that  
"SECTION  3.   The   Judiciary   shall   enjoy   fiscal   autonomy.   this  grant  of  autonomy  should  cease  to  be  a  meaningless  provision.  
Appropriations   for   the   Judiciary   may   not   be   reduced   by   the   legislature    
below   the   amount   appropriated   for   the   previous   year   and,   after   In  the  case  at  bar,  the  veto  of  these  specific  provisions  in  the  General  Appropriations  Act  is  
approval,  shall  be  automatically  and  regularly  released."   tantamount   to   dictating   to   the   Judiciary   how   its   funds   should   be   utilized,   which   is   clearly  
  repugnant  to  fiscal  autonomy.  The  freedom  of  the  Chief  Justice  to  make  adjustments  in  the  
We   cannot   overstress   the   importance   of   and   the   need   for   an   independent   judiciary.   The   utilization   of   the   funds   appropriated   for   the   expenditures   of   the   judiciary,   including   the   use  
Court  has  on  various  past  occasions  explained  the  significance  of  judicial  independence.  In   of  any  savings  from  any  particular  item  to  cover  deficits  or  shortages  in  other  items  of  the  
the  case  of  De  la  Llana  v.  Alba  (112  SCRA  294  [1982],  it  ruled:   judiciary   is   withheld.   Pursuant   to   the   Constitutional   mandate,   the   Judiciary   must   enjoy  
  freedom  in  the  disposition  of  the  funds  allocated  to  it  in  the  appropriations  law.  It  knows  its  
"It   is   a   cardinal   rule   of   faith   of   our   constitutional   regime   that   it   is   the   priorities   just   as   it   is   aware   of   the   fiscal   restraints.   The   Chief   Justice   must   be   given   a   free  
people   who   are   endowed   with   rights,   to   secure   which   a   government   is   hand  on  how  to  augment  appropriations  where  augmentation  is  needed.  
instituted.  Acting  as  it  does  through  public  officials,  it  has  to  grant  them    
  47  
Section  4   It   is   also   emphasized   that   every   court,   including   this   Court,   is   charged   with   the   duty   of   a  
  purposeful   hesitation   before   declaring   a   law   unconstitutional,   on   the   theory   that   the  
  Limketkai  Sons  Milling,  Inc.  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  118509,  September  5,  1996]   measure   was   first   carefully   studied   by   the   executive   and   the   legislative   departments   and  
  determined   by   them   to   be   in   accordance   with   the   fundamental   law   before   it   was   finally  
THE   COMPOSITION   OF   THE   DIVISIONS   OF   THE   SUPREME   COURT   IS   AN   INTERNAL   approved.   To   doubt   is   to   sustain.   The   presumption   of   constitutionality   can   be   overcome  
MATTER   WHICH   COULD   NOT   GIVE   RISE   TO   ANY   CAUSE   OF   ACTION.     What   petitioner   only   by   the   clearest   showing   that   there   was   indeed   an   infraction   of   the   Constitution,   and  
bewails   the   most   is   the   present   composition   of   the   Third   Division   which   deliberated   on   only   when   such   a   conclusion   is   reached   by   the   requipped   majority   may   the   Court  
private   respondents'   motions   for   reconsideration   and   by   a   majority   vote   reversed   the   pronounce,   in   the   discharge   of   the   duty   it   cannot   escape,   that   the   challenged   act   must   be  
unanimous   decision   of   December   1,   1995.   More   specifically,   petitioner   questions   the   struck  down.  
assumption   of   Chief   Justice   Narvasa   of   the   chairmanship   of   the   Third   Division   and    
arrogantly   rams   its   idea   on   how   each   Division   should   be   chaired,   i.e.,   the   First   Division   Larranaga  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  130644,  March  13,  1998]  
should   have   been   chaired   by   Chief   Justice   Narvasa,   the   Second   Division   by   Mr.   Justice      
Padilla,  the  next  senior  Justice,  and  the  Third  Division  by  Mr.  Justice  Regalado,  the  third  in   THE   POWER   TO   CHANGE   VENUE   AND   PLACE   OF   TRIAL   DOES   NOT   INCLUDE   THE  
line.  We  need  only  to  state  that  the  change  in  the  membership  of  the  three  divisions  of  the   PRELIMINARY   INVESTIGATION.     As   regards   petitioner's   motion   to   change   the   venue   and  
Court   with   inevitable   by   reason   of   Mr.   Justice   Feliciano's   retirement.   Such   reorganization   is   the   authority   to   conduct   the   preliminary   investigation,   we   are   constrained   to   dismiss   the  
purely  an  internal  matter  of  the  Court  to  which  petitioner  certainly  has  no  business  at  all.  In   same  for  lack  of  jurisdiction.  The  holding  of  a  preliminary  investigation  is  a  function  of  the  
fact,  the  current  "staggered"  set-­‐up  in  the  chairmanships  of  the  Divisions  is  similar  to  that   Executive   Department   and   not   of   the   Judiciary.     Petitioner   should   therefore   address   their  
adopted  in  1988.  In  the  year,  the  Court's  Third  Division  was  likewise  chaired  by  then  Chief   plea   to   the   Department   of   Justice   that   has   control   and   supervision   over   the   conduct   of  
Justice  Fernan,  while  the  First  and  Second  Divisions  were  headed  by  the  next  senior  Justices   preliminary  investigations.  
—  Narvasa  and  Melencio-­‐Herrera,  respectively.    
  Bustos  vs.  Lucero  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐2068,  October  20,  1948]  
Section  5    
  Separate  Opinion    
  Drilon  vs.  Lim  [G.R.  No.  112497,  August  4,  1994]    
  RIGHT   TO   CROSS-­‐EXAMINATION   DURING   PRELIMINARY   INVESTIGATION   IS   A  
THE   REGIONAL   TRIAL   COURT   HAS   AUTHORITY   TO   RULE   ON   THE   CONSTITUTIONALITY   SUBSTANTIVE   RIGHT   WHICH   CANNOT   BE   WITHHELD   BY   THE   SUPREME   COURT   BY  
OF   ANY   LAW,   BUT   TRIAL   COURTS   ARE   ADVISED   TO   BE   MORE   CIRCUMSPECT   IN   VIRTUE   OF   ITS   RULE   MAKING   POWER.     Section   13,   Article   VIII,   of   the   Constitution  
NULLIFYING   LAWS.     We   stress   at   the   outset   that   the   lower   court   had   jurisdiction   to   prescribes   that   "the   Supreme   Court   shall   have   power   to   promulgate   rules   concerning  
consider  the  constitutionality  of  Section  187,  this  authority  being  embraced  in  the  general   pleading,  practice  and  procedure  in  all  courts,  but  said  rules  shall  not  diminish,  increase  or  
definition   of   the   judicial   power   to   determine   what   are   the   valid   and   binding   laws   by   the   modify   substantive   rights."   The   Constitution   added   the   last   part   of   the   above-­‐quoted  
criterion   of   their   conformity   to   the   fundamental   law.   Specifically,   BP   129   vests   in   the   constitutional  precept  in  order  to  emphasize  that  the  Supreme  Court  is  not  empowered,  and  
regional  trial  courts  jurisdiction  over  all  civil  cases  in  which  the  subject  of  the  litigation  is   therefore  can  not  enact  or  promulgate  substantive  laws  or  rules,  for  it  is  obvious  that  rules  
incapable  of  pecuniary  estimation,  even  as  the  accused  in  a  criminal  action  has  the  right  to   which   diminish,   increase   or   modify   substantive   rights,   are   substantive   and   not   adjective  
question   in   his   defense   the   constitutionality   of   a   law   he   is   charged   with   violating   and   of   the   laws  or  rules  concerning  pleading,  practice  and  procedure.  
proceedings   taken   against   him,   particularly   as   they   contravene   the   Bill   of   Rights.   Moreover,    
Article   X,   Section   5(2),   of   the   Constitution   vests   in   the   Supreme   Court   appellate   jurisdiction   It   does   not   require   an   elaborate   argument   to   show   that   the   right   granted   by   law   upon   a  
over  final  judgments  and  orders  of  lower  courts  in  all  cases  in  which  the  constitutionality  or   defendant   to   be   confronted   with   and   cross-­‐   examine   the   witnesses   for   the   prosecution   in  
validity   of   any   treaty,   international   or   executive   agreement,   law,   presidential   decree,   preliminary  investigation  as  well  as  in  the  trial  of  the  case  is  a  substantive  right.  It  is  based  
proclamation,  order,  instruction,  ordinance,  or  regulation  is  in  question.         on  human  experience,  according  to  which  a  person  is  not  prone  to  tell  a  lie  against  another  
  in   his   presence,   knowing   fully   well   that   the   latter   may   easily   contradict   him,   and   that   the  
In   the   exercise   of   this   jurisdiction,   lower   courts   are   advised   to   act   with   the   utmost   credibility   of   a   person   or   veracity   of   his   testimony  may   be   efficaciously   tested   by   a   cross-­‐
circumspection,   bearing   in   mind   the   consequences   of   a   declaration   of   unconstitutionality   examination.  It  is  a  substantive  right  because  by  exercising  it,  an  accused  person  may  show,  
upon   the   stability   of   laws,   no   less   than   on   the   doctrine   of   separation   of   powers.   As   the   even   if   he   has   no   evidence   in   his   favor,   that   the   testimonies   of   the   witnesses   for   the  
questioned  act  is  usually  the  handiwork  of  the  legislative  or  the  executive  departments,  or   prosecution   are   not   sufficient   to   indicate   that   there   is   a   probability   that   a   crime   has   been  
both,  it  will  be  prudent  for  such  courts,  if  only  out  of  a  becoming  modesty,  to  defer  to  the   committed   and   he   is   guilty   thereof,   and   therefore   the   accused   is   entitled   to   be  released  and  
higher  judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  consideration  of  its  validity,  which  is  better  determined   not   committed   to   prison,   and   thus   avoid   an   open   and   public   accusation   of   crime,   the  
after   a   thorough   deliberation   by   a   collegiate   body   and   with   the   concurrence   of   the   majority   trouble,   expense,   and   anxiety   of   a   public   trial,   and   the   corresponding   anxiety   or   moral  
of  those  who  participated  in  its  discussion.     suffering  which  a  criminal  prosecution  always  entails.  
   

  48  
This  right  is  not  a  constitutional  but  a  statutory  right  granted  by  law  to  an  accused  outside   expressly  states  that  "(T)hey  shall  also  apply  to  appeal  from  final  orders  or  decisions  of  any  
of  the  City  of  Manila  because  of  the  usual  delay  in  the  final  disposition  of  criminal  cases  in   quasi-­‐judicial   agency   from   which   an   appeal   is   now   allowed   by   statute   to   the   Court   of  
provinces.   The   law   does   not   grant   such   right   to   a   person   charged   with   offenses   triable   by   Appeals   or   the   Supreme   Court."   E.O.   266   is   one   such   statute.   Besides,   the   enumeration   is  
the   Court   of   First   Instance   in   the   City   of   Manila,   because   of   the   promptness,   actual   or   preceded  by  the  words  "(A)mong  these  agencies  are  .  .  .,"  strongly  implying  that  there  are  
presumptive,   with   which   criminal   cases   are   tried   and   disposed   of   in   the   Court   of   First   other   quasi-­‐judicial   agencies   which   are   covered   by   the   Circular   but   which   have   not   been  
Instance   of   said   city.   But   this   right,   though   not   a   constitutional   one,   can   not   be   modified,   expressly   listed   therein.   More   importantly,   BOI   does   not   fall   within   the   purview   of   the  
abridged,   or   diminished   by   the   Supreme   Court,   by   virtue   of   the   rule   making   power   exclusions   listed   in   Section   2   of   the   circular.   Only   the   following   final   decisions   and  
conferred  upon  this  Court  by  the  Constitution.   interlocutory   orders   are   expressly   excluded   from   the   circular,   namely,   those   of:   (1)   the  
  National  Labor  Relations  Commission;  (2)  the  Secretary  of  Labor  and  Employment;  (3)  the  
Since  the  provisions  of  section  11  of  Rule  108  as  construed  by  this  Court  in  several  cases,   Central  Board  of  Assessment  Appeals  and  (4)  other  quasi-­‐judicial  agencies  from  which  no  
(in  which  the  question  of  constitutionality  or  validity  of  said  section  had  not  been  squarely   appeal  to  the  courts  is  prescribed  or  allowed  by  statute.  Since  in  DBP  v.  CA      13  we  upheld  
raised)   do   away   with   the   defendant's   right   under   discussion,   it   follows   that   said   section   the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  over  the  Court  of  Tax  Appeals  despite  the  
diminishes   the   substantive   right   of   the   defendant   in   criminal   case,   and   this   Court   has   no   fact   that   the   same   is   not   among   the   agencies   reorganized   by   B.P.   129,   on   the   ground   that  
power  or  authority  to  promulgate  it  and  therefore  is  null  and  void.   B.P.  129  is  broad  and  comprehensive,  there  is  no  reason  why  BOI  should  be  excluded  from  
    Circular  1-­‐91,  which  is  but  implementary  of  said  law.  
First  Lepanto  Ceramics,  Inc.  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  110571,  March  10,  1994]    
  Clearly,  Circular  1-­‐91  effectively  repealed  or  superseded  Article  82  of  E.O.  226  insofar  as  the  
THE  RULES  OF  COURT  WILL  TAKE  PRECEDENCE  OVER  LAWS  REGULATING  PROCEDURES   manner   and   method   of   enforcing   the   right   to   appeal   from   decisions   of   the   BOI   are  
OF  COURTS.    The  argument  that  Article  82  of  E.O.  226  cannot  be  validly  repealed  by  Circular   concerned.  Appeals  from  decisions  of  the  BOI,  which  by  statute  was  previously  allowed  to  
1-­‐91  because  the  former  grants  a  substantive  right  which,  under  the  Constitution  cannot  be   be  filed  directly  with  the  Supreme  Court,  should  now  be  brought  to  the  Court  of  Appeals.  
modified,   diminished   or   increased   by   this   Court   in   the   exercise   of   its   rule-­‐making   powers   is      
not  entirely  defensible  as  it  seems.  Respondent  correctly  argued  that  Article  82  of  E.O.  226   Aruelo  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  107852,  October  20,  1993]  
grants   the   right   of   appeal   from   decisions   or   final   orders   of   the   BOI   and   in   granting   such    
right,  it  also  provided  where  and  in  what  manner  such  appeal  can  be  brought.  These  latter   THE   COMMISSION   ON   ELECTION   CANNOT   PROMULGATE   RULES   GOVERNING  
portions  simply  deal  with  procedural  aspects  which  this  Court  has  the  power  to  regulate  by   PROCEEDINGS   BEFORE   THE   COURTS   OF   JUSTICE.     Section   1,   Rule   13,   Part   III   of   the  
virtue  of  its  constitutional  rule-­‐making  powers.   COMELEC  Rules  of  Procedure  is  not  applicable  to  proceedings  before  the  regular  courts.  As  
  expressly   mandated   by   Section   2,   Rule   1,   Part   I   of   the   COMELEC   Rules   of   Procedure,   the  
The   case   of   Bustos   v.   Lucero       distinguished   between   rights   created   by   a   substantive   law   filing  of  motions  to  dismiss  and  bill  of  particulars,  shall  apply  only  to  proceedings  brought  
and  those  arising  from  procedural  law:   before  the  COMELEC.  Section  2,  Rule  1,  Part  I  provides:  
   
"Substantive   law   creates   substantive   rights   .   .   .   .   Substantive   rights   is   a   "SEC.  2.   Applicability.   —   These   rules,   except   Part   VI,   shall   apply   to   all  
term   which   includes   those   rights   which   one   enjoys   under   the   legal   actions   and   proceedings   brought   before   the   Commission.   Part   VI   shall  
system   prior   to   the   disturbance   of   normal   relations   (60   C.J.,   980).   apply   to   election   contests   and   quo   warranto   cases   cognizable   by   courts  
Substantive   law   is   that   part   of   the   law   which   creates,   defines   and   of  general  or  limited  jurisdiction."  
regulates  rights,  or  which  regulates  rights  and  duties  which  give  rise  to  a    
cause   of   action,   as   opposed   to   adjective   or   remedial   law,   which   It  must  be  noted  that  nowhere  in  Part  VI  of  the  COMELEC  Rules  of  Procedure  is  it  provided  
prescribes   the   method   of   enforcing   rights   or   obtains   a   redress   for   their   that   motions   to   dismiss   and   bill   of   particulars   are   not   allowed   in   election   protests   or   quo  
invasion."         warranto  cases  pending  before  the  regular  courts.  
     
Indeed,  the  question  of  where  and  in  what  manner  appeals  from  decisions  of  the  BOI  should   Constitutionally  speaking,  the  COMELEC  can  not  adopt  a  rule  prohibiting  the  filing  of  certain  
be  brought  pertains  only  to  procedure  or  the  method  of  enforcing  the  substantive  right  to   pleadings   in   the   regular   courts.   The   power   to   promulgate   rules   concerning   pleadings,  
appeal   granted   by   E.O.   226.   In   other   words,   the   right   to   appeal   from   decisions   or   final   practice  and  procedure  in  all  courts  is  vested  on  the  Supreme  Court  (Constitution,  Art  VIII,  
orders   of   the   BOI   under   E.O.   226   remains   and   continues   to   be   respected.   Circular   1-­‐91   Sec.  5  [5]).  
simply  transferred  the  venue  of  appeals  from  decisions  of  this  agency  to  respondent  Court    
of  Appeals  and  provided  a  different  period  of  appeal,  i.e.,  fifteen  (15)  days  from  notice.  It  did   Private   respondent   received   a   copy   of   the   order   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   denying   his  
not  make  an  incursion  into  the  substantive  right  to  appeal.       motion   for   a   bill   of   particulars   on   August   6,   1992.   Under   Section   1   (b),   Rule   12   of   the  
  Revised  Rules  of  Court,  a  party  has  at  least  five  days  to  file  his  answer  after  receipt  of  the  
The  fact  that  BOI  is  not  expressly  included  in  the  list  of  quasi-­‐judicial  agencies  found  in  the   order   denying   his   motion   for   a   bill   of   particulars.   Private   respondent,   therefore,   had   until  
third   sentence   of   Section   1   of   Circular   1-­‐91   does   not   mean   that   said   circular   does   not   apply   August   11,   1992   within   which   to   file   his   answer.   The   Answer   with   Counter-­‐Protest   and  
to  appeals  from  final  orders  or  decision  of  the  BOI.  The  second  sentence  of  Section  1  thereof   Counterclaim  filed  by  him  on  August  11,  1992  was  filed  timely.  
  49  
   it  is  only  the  Supreme  Court  that  can  oversee  the  judges'  and  court  personnel's  compliance  
Javellana  vs.  DILG  [G.R.  No.  102549,  August  10,  1992]   with   all   laws,   and   take   the   proper   administrative   action   against   them   if   they   commit   any  
  violation   thereof.   No   other   branch   of   government   may   intrude   into   this   power,   without  
REGULATIONS   ISSUED   BY   THE   DEPARTMENT   OF   LOCAL   GOVERNMENT   REQUIRING   THE   running  afoul  of  the  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers.  
ELECTIVE   OFFICERS   TO   SEEK   AUTHORITY   FIRST   BEFORE   EXERCISING   A   PROFESSION    
DOES   NOT   VIOLATE   THE   RULE   MAKING   POWER   OF   THE   SUPREME   COURT.     Petitioner's   The  Ombudsman  cannot  justify  its  investigation  of  petitioner  on  the  powers  granted  to  it  by  
contention   that   Section   90   of   the   Local   Government   Code   of   1991   and   DLG   Memorandum   the  Constitution,      for  such  a  justification  not  only  runs  counter  to  the  specific  mandate  of  
Circular   No.   90-­‐81   violate   Article   VIII,   Section   5   of   the   Constitution   is   completely   off   the   Constitution   granting   supervisory   powers   to   the   Supreme   Court   over   all   courts   and  
tangent.  Neither  the  statute  nor  the  circular  trenches  upon  the  Supreme  Court's  power  and   their  personnel,  but  likewise  undermines  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.      
authority   to   prescribe   rules   on   the   practice   of   law.   The   Local   Government   Code   and   DLG    
Memorandum   Circular   No.   90-­‐81   simply   prescribe   rules   of   conduct   for   public   officials   to   Thus,  the  Ombudsman  should  first  refer  the  matter  of  petitioner's  certificates  of  service  to  
avoid   conflicts   of   interest   between   the   discharge   of   their   public   duties   and   the   private   this   Court   for   determination   of   whether   said   certificates   reflected   the   true   status   of   his  
practice  of  their  profession,  in  those  instances  where  the  law  allows  it.   pending   case   load,   as   the   Court   has   the   necessary   records   to   make   such   a   determination.  
  The  Ombudsman  cannot  compel  this  Court,  as  one  of  the  three  branches  of  government,  to  
Section   90   of   the   Local   Government   Code   does   not   discriminate   against   lawyers   and   submit   its   records,   or   to   allow   its   personnel   to   testify   on   this   matter,   as   suggested   by   public  
doctors.  It  applies  to  all  provincial  and  municipal  officials  in  the  professions  or  engaged  in   respondent  Abiera  in  his  affidavit-­‐complaint.        
any  occupation.  Section  90  explicitly  provides  that  sanggunian  members  "may  practice  their    
professions,  engage  in  any  occupation,  or  teach  in  schools  except  during  session  hours."  If   The   rationale   for   the   foregoing   pronouncement   is   evident   in   this   case.   Administratively,   the  
there   are   some   prohibitions   that   apply   particularly   to   lawyers,   it   is   because   of   all   the   question  before  Us  is  this:  should  a  judge,  having  been  granted  by  this  Court  an  extension  of  
professions,  the  practice  of  law  is  more  likely  than  others  to  relate  to,  or  affect,  the  area  of   time   to   decide   cases   before   him,   report   these   cases   in   his   certificate   of   service?   As   this  
public  service.   question   had   not   yet   been   raised   with,   much   less   resolved   by,   this   Court,   how   could   the  
  Ombudsman   resolve   the   present   criminal   complaint   that   requires   the   resolution   of   said  
Section  6   question?  
   
  Maceda  vs.  Vasquez  [G.R.  No.  102781,  April  22,  1993]   In   fine,   where   a   criminal   complaint   against   a   Judge   or   other   court   employee   arises   from  
  their  administrative  duties,  the  Ombudsman  must  defer  action  on  said  complaint  and  refer  
COMPLAINTS  AGAINST  JUDGES  MUST  BE  REFERRED  FIRST  TO  THE  SUPREME  COURT  BY   the  same  to  this  Court  for  determination  whether  said  Judge  or  court  employee  had  acted  
VIRTUE   OF   THE   COURTS   ADMINISTRATIVE   SUPERVISION   OVER   THEM.     Petitioner   also   within  the  scope  of  their  administrative  duties.  
contends   that   the   Ombudsman   has   no   jurisdiction   over   said   case   despite   this   Court's   ruling      
in  Orap  vs.  Sandiganbayan,    since  the  offense  charged  arose  from  the  judge's  performance  of   Raquiza  vs.  Castañeda,  Jr.  [A.M.  No.  1312-­‐CFI,  January  31,  1978]  
his   official   duties,   which   is   under   the   control   and   supervision   of   the   Supreme   Court.    
Furthermore,   the   investigation   of   the   Ombudsman   constitutes   an   encroachment   into   the   IN   ADMISNISTRATIVE   CHARGES   AGAINST   JUDGES   THE   REQUIRED   QUANTUM   OF  
Supreme  Court's  constitutional  duty  of  supervision  over  all  inferior  courts.   EVIDENCE  IS  PROOF  BEYOND  REASONABLE  DOUBT.    The  rules  even  in  an  administrative  
  case   demands   that   if   the   respondent   Judge   should   be   disciplined   for   grave   misconduct   or  
The   Court   disagrees   with   the   first   Part   of   petitioner's   basic   argument.   There   is   nothing   in   any   graver   offense,   the   evidence   presented   against   him   should   be   competent   and   derived  
the  decision  in  Orap  that  would  restrict  it  only  to  offenses  committed  by  a  judge  unrelated   from   direct   knowledge.   The   judiciary,   to   which   respondent   belongs,   no   less   demands   that  
to  his  official  duties.  A  judge  who  falsifies  his  certificate  of  service  is  administratively  liable   before  its  member  could  be  faulted,  it  should  be  only  after  due  investigation  and  based  on  
to  the  Supreme  Court  for  serious  misconduct  and  inefficiency  under  Section  1,  Rule  140  of   competent   proofs,   no   less.   This   is   all   the   more   so   when   as   in   this   case   the   charges   are   penal  
the  Rules  of  Court,  and  criminally  liable  to  the  State  under  the  Revised  Penal  Code  for  his   in  nature.  
felonious  act.    
  The   ground   for   the   removal   of   a   judicial   officer   should   be   established   beyond   reasonable  
However,  We  agree  with  petitioner  that  in  the  absence  of  any  administrative  action  taken   doubt.  Such  is  the  rule  where  the  charges  on  which  the  removal  is  sought  is  misconduct  in  
against  him  by  this  Court  with  regard  to  his  certificates  of  service,  the  investigation  being   office,   willful   neglect,   corruption,   incompetency,   etc.   The   general   rules   in   regard   to  
conducted   by   the   Ombudsman   encroaches   into   the   Court's   power   of   administrative   admissibility  of  evidence  in  criminal  trials  apply.  
supervision   over   all   courts   and   its   personnel,   in   violation   of   the   doctrine   of   separation   of    
powers.   Section  7  
    Kilosbayan  vs.  Ermita  [G.R.  No.  177721,  July  3,  2007]  
Article   VIII,   section   6   of   the   1987   Constitution   exclusively   vests   in   the   Supreme   Court    
administrative  supervision  over  all  courts  and  court  personnel,  from  the  Presiding  Justice  of   Section  10  
the  Court  of  Appeals  down  to  the  lowest  municipal  trial  court  clerk.  By  virtue  of  this  power,     Nitafan  vs.  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐78780,  July  23,  1987]  
  50  
   its  view  be  accorded,  the  fullest  consideration.  No  fear  need  be  entertained  that  there  is  a  
SALARIES   OF   MEMBERS   OF   THE   JUDICIARY   ARE   SUBJECT   TO   TAX.     Besides,   construing   failure   to   accord   respect   to   the   basic   principle   that   this   Court   does   not   render   advisory  
Section   10,   Articles   VIII,   of   the   1987   Constitution,   which,   for   clarity,   is   again   reproduced   opinions.  No  question  of  law  is  involved.  If  such  were  the  case,  certainly  this  Court  could  not  
hereunder:   have  its  say  prior  to  the  action  taken  by  either  of  the  two  departments.  Even  then,  it  could  
  do  so  but  only  by  way  of  deciding  a  case  where  the  matter  has  been  put  in  issue.  Neither  is  
"The   salary   of   the   Chief   Justice   and   of   the   Associate   Justices   of   the   there   any   intrusion   into   who   shall   be   appointed   to   the   vacant   positions   created   by   the  
Supreme   Court,   and   of   judges   of   lower   courts   shall   be   fixed   by   law.   reorganization.   That   remains   in   the   hands   of   the   Executive   to   whom   it   properly   belongs.  
During   their   continuance   in   office,   their   salary   shall   not   be   decreased."   There   is   no   departure   therefore   from   the   tried   and   tested   ways   of   judicial   power.   Rather  
(Emphasis  supplied).   what   is   sought   to   be   achieved   by   this   liberal   interpretation   is   to   preclude   any   plausibility   to  
  the   charge   that   in   the   exercise   of   the   conceded   power   of   reorganizing   the   Inferior   Courts,  
it   is   plain   that   the   Constitution   authorizes   Congress   to   pass   a   law   fixing   another   rate   of   the   power   of   removal   of   the   present   incumbents   vested   in   this   Tribunal   is   ignored   or  
compensation  of  Justices  and  Judges  but  such  rate  must  be  higher  than  that  which  they  are   disregarded.   The   challenged   Act   would   thus   be   free   from   any   unconstitutional   taint,   even  
receiving   at   the   time   of   enactment,   or   if   lower,   it   would   be   applicable   only   to   those   one  not  readily  discernible  except  to  those  predisposed  to  view  it  with  distrust.  Moreover,  
appointed  after  its  approval.  It  would  be  a  strained  construction  to  read  into  the  provision   such   a   construction   would   be   in   accordance   with   the   basic   principle   that   in   the   choice   of  
an  exemption  from  taxation  in  the  light  of  the  discussion  in  the  Constitutional  Commission.   alternatives  between  one  which  would  save  and  another  which  would  invalidate  a  statute,  
  the   former   is   to   be   preferred.   There   is   an   obvious   way   to   do   so.   The   principle   that   the  
With  the  foregoing  interpretation,  and  as  stated  heretofore,  the  ruling  that  "the  imposition   Constitution  enters  into  and  forms  part  of  every  act  to  avoid  any  unconstitutional  taint  must  
of   income   tax   upon   the   salary   of   judges   is   a   dimunition   thereof,   and   so   violates   the   be  applied.  
Constitution"   in   Perfecto   vs.   Meer,   as   affirmed   in   Endencia   vs.   David   must   be   declared    
discarded.   The   framers   of   the   fundamental   law,   as   the   alter   ego   of   the   people,   have   People  vs.  Gacott,  Jr.  [G.R.  No.  116049,  July  13,  1995]  
expressed   in   clear   and   unmistakable   terms   the   meaning   and   import   of   Section   10,   Article    
VIII,  of  the  1987  Constitution  that  they  have  adopted.   NOT   ALL   DISCIPLINARY   ACTION   PROCEEDINGS   NEED   TO   BE   HEARD   EN   BANC.     At   any  
  rate,   the   very   text   of   the   present   Section   11   of   Article   VIII   clearly   shows   that   there   are  
Stated  otherwise,  we  accord  due  respect  to  the  intent  of  the  people,  through  the  discussions   actually   two   situations   envisaged   therein.   The   first   clause   which   states   that   "the   Supreme  
and   deliberations   of   their   representatives,   in   the   spirit   that   all   citizens   should   bear   their   Court  en  banc  shall  have  the  power  to  discipline  judges  of  lower  courts,"  is  a  declaration  of  
aliquot   part   of   the   cost   of   maintaining   the   government   and   should   share   the   burden   of   the   grant   of   that   disciplinary   power   to,   and   the   determination   of   the   procedure   in   the  
general  income  taxation  equitably.   exercise   thereof   by,   the   Court   en   banc.   It   was   not   therein   intended   that   all   administrative  
  disciplinary  cases  should  be  heard  and  decided  by  the  whole  Court  since  it  would  result  in  
Section  11   an  absurdity,  as  will  hereafter  be  explained.  
   
  De  la  Llana  vs.  Alba  [G.R.  No.  57883,  March  12,  1982]   The   second   clause,   which   refers   to   the   second   situation   contemplated   therein   and   is  
  intentionally  separated  from  the  first  by  a  comma,  declares  on  the  other  hand  that  the  Court  
DISSOLUTION   OF   OFFICE   DOES   NOT   INFRINGE   ON   THE   DICIPLINARY   AUTHORITY   OF   THE   en  banc  can  "order  their  dismissal  by  a  vote  of  a  majority  of  the  Members  who  actually  took  
SUPREME   COURT   OVER   JUDGES.     Petitioners   contend   that   the   abolition   of   the   existing   part   in   the   deliberations   on   the   issues   in   the   case   and   voted   therein."   Evidently,   in   this  
Inferior   Courts   collides   with   the   security   of   tenure   enjoyed   by   incumbent   Justices   and   instance,   the   administrative   case   must   be   deliberated   upon   and   decided   by   the   full   Court  
judges  under  Article  X,  Section  7  of  the  Constitution.  There  was  a  similar  provision  the  1935   itself.  
Constitution.   It   did   not,   however,   go   as   far   as   conferring   on   this   Tribunal   the   power   to    
supervise  administratively  inferior  courts.  Moreover,  this  Court  is  empowered  "to  discipline   Pursuant  to  the  first  clause  which  confers  administrative  disciplinary  power  to  the  Court  en  
judges   of   inferior   courts   and,   by   a   vote   of   at   least   eight   members,   order   their   dismissal.   banc,  on  February  9,  1993  a  Court  En  Banc  resolution  was  adopted,  entitled  "Bar  Matter  No.  
"Thus   it   possesses   the   competence   to   remove   judges.   Under   the   Judiciary   Act,   it   was   the   209.   —   In   the   Matter   of   the   Amendment   and/or   Clarification   of   various   Supreme   Courts  
President  who  was  vested  with  such  power.  Removal  is,  of  course,  to  be,  distinguished  from   Rules  and  Resolutions,"  and  providing  inter  alia:  
termination   by   virtue   of   the   abolition   of   the   office.   After   the   abolition,   there   is   in   law   no    
occupant.  In  case  of  removal,  there  is  an  office  with  an  occupant  who  would  thereby  lose  his   For  said  purpose,  the  following  are  considered  en  banc  cases:  
position.   It   is   in   that   sense   that   from   the   stand-­‐point   of   strict   law,   the   question   of   any    
impairment  of  security  of  tenure  does  not  arise.  Nonetheless,  for  the  incumbents  of  'Inferior   6.   Cases   where   the   penalty   to   be   imposed   is   the   dismissal   of   a  
Courts   abolished,   the   effect   is   one   of   separation.   As   to   its   effect,   no   distinction   exists   judge,   officer   or   employee   of   the   Judiciary,   disbarment   of   a   lawyer,   or  
between   removal   and   the   abolition   of   the   office.   Realistically,   it   is   devoid   of   significance.   He   either   the   suspension   of   any   of   them   for   a   period   of   more   than   one   (1)  
ceases   to   be   a   member   of   the   Judiciary.   In   the   implementation   of   the   assailed   legislation,   year  or  a  fine  exceeding  P10,000.00,  or  both.  
therefore,   it   would   be   in   accordance   with   accepted   principles   of   constitutional   construction    
that  as  far  as  incumbent  justices  and  judges  are  concerned,  this  Court  be  consulted  and  that  
  51  
This   resolution   was   amended   on   March   16,   1993   and   November   23,   1993,   but   the   the   collegiate   composition   of   this   Court.   The   certification   in   AM   No.   R-­‐510-­‐P   entitled  
aforequoted  provision  was  maintained.   "Apolinario  de  Sarigumba  vs.  Deputy  Sheriff  Pasok,"  cited  in  the  Petition,  is  but  an  oversight.  
   
Indeed,  to  require  the  entire  Court  to  deliberate  upon  and  participate  in  all  administrative   But   even   if   such   a   certification   were   required,   it   is   beyond   doubt   that   the   conclusions   of   the  
matters   or   cases   regardless   of   the   sanctions,   imposable   or   imposed,   would   result   in   a   Court  in  its  decision  were  arrived  at  after  consultation  and  deliberation.  The  signatures  of  
congested   docket   and   undue   delay   in   the   adjudication   of   cases   in   the   Court,   especially   in   the  members  who  actually  took  part  in  the  deliberations  and  voted  attest  to  that.  Besides,  
administrative  matters,  since  even  cases  involving  the  penalty  of  reprimand  would  require   being   a   per   curiam   decision,   or   an   opinion   of   the   Court   as   a   whole,   there   is   no   ponente  
action  by  the  Court  en  banc.  This  would  subvert  the  constitutional  injunction  for  the  Court   although   any   member   of   the   Court   may   be   assigned   to   write   the   draft.   In   such   cases,   a  
to   adopt   a   systematic   plan   to   expedite   the   decision   or   resolution   of   cases   or   matters   formal  certification  is  obviously  not  required.  
pending  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  lower  courts,  9  and  the  very  purpose  of  authorizing  the    
Court  to  sit  en  banc  or  in  divisions  of  three,  five  or  seven  members.     Section  14  
   
Yet,  although  as  thus  demonstrated,  only  cases  involving  dismissal  of  judges  of  lower  courts     Nicos  Industrial  Corp.  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  88709,  February  11,  1992]  
are   specifically   required   to   be   decided   by   the   Court   en   banc,   in   cognizance   of   the   need   for   a    
thorough   and   judicious   evaluation   of   serious   charges   against   members   of   the   judiciary,   it   is   THE   CONSTITUTIONAL   REQUIREMENT   THAT   A   DECISION   MUST   STATE   CLEARLY   AND  
only   when   the   penalty   imposed   does   not   exceed   suspension   of   more   than   one   year   or   a   fine   DISTINCTLY   THE   FACTS   AND   THE   LAW   ON   WHICH   IT   IS   BASED   IS   AN   ADDITIONAL  
of  P10,000.00,  or  both,  that  the  administrative  matter  may  be  decided    in  division.   GUARANTEE   OF   DUE   PROCESS.   It   is   a   requirement   of   due   process   that   the   parties   to   a  
  litigation   be   informed   of   how   it   was   decided,   with   an   explanation   of   the   factual   and   legal  
It   must   not   also   be   overlooked   that   as   early   as   February   7,   1989,   the   Court   promulgated   reasons  that  led  to  the  conclusions  of  the  court.  The  court  cannot  simply  say  that  judgment  
Circular  No.  2-­‐89  which  clarifies  that:   is   rendered   in   favor   of   X   and   against   Y   and   just   leave   it   at   that   without   any   justification  
  whatsoever  for  its  action.  The  losing  party  is  entitled  to  know  why  he  lost,  so  he  may  appeal  
2. A   decision   or   resolution   of   a   Division   of   the   Court,   when   concurred   in   by   a   to   a   higher   court,   if   permitted,   should   he   believe   that   the   decision   should   be   reversed.   A  
majority   of   its   members   who   actually   took   part   in   the   deliberations   on   the   decision  that  does  not  clearly  and  distinctly  state  the  facts  and  the  law  on  which  it  is  based  
issues   in   a   case   and   voted   thereon,   and   in   no   case   without   the   concurrence   of   leaves  the  parties  in  the  dark  as  to  how  it  was  reached  and  is  especially  prejudicial  to  the  
at   least   three   of   such   Members,   is   a   decision   or   resolution   of   the   Supreme   losing   party,   who   is   unable   to   pinpoint   the   possible   errors   of   the   court   for   review   by   a  
Court  (Section  4[3],  Article  VIII,  1987  Constitution).   higher  tribunal.  
   
That   guideline   or   rule   in   the   referral   to   the   court   en   banc   of   cases   assigned   to   a   division   In   one   case,       this   Court,   exasperated   over   the   inordinate   length   of   a   decision   rife   with  
thereof  rests  on  the  same  rationale  and  applies  with  equal  force  to  confute  the  antithetical   irrelevant   details,   castigated   the   trial   judge   for   his   "extraordinary   verbiage."   Kilometric  
theory   of   respondent   Judge   Eustaquio   Z.   Gacott,   Jr.   Apropos   thereto,   it   would   indeed   be   decisions   without   much   substance   must   be   avoided,   to   be   sure,   but   the   other   extreme,  
desirable   for   said   respondent   to   hereafter   deal   with   situations   like   the   one   subject   of   this   where   substance   is   also   lost   in   the   wish   to   be   brief,   is   no   less   unacceptable   either.   The   ideal  
resolution  with  more  perspicacity  and  circumspection.   decision   is   that   which,   with   welcome   economy   of   words,   arrives   at   the   factual   findings,  
  reaches  the  legal  conclusions,  renders  its  ruling  and,  having  done  so,  ends.  
Section  12    
  In  re  Manzano  [A.M.  No.  88-­‐7-­‐1861-­‐RTC,  October  5,  1988]   INTERLOCUTORY   ORDERS   AND   MINUTE   RESOLUTIONS   ARE   EXEMPTED   FROM   THE  
  ABOVE-­‐MENTIONED  CONSTITUTIONAL  REQUIREMENT.    It  is  important  to  observe  at  this  
Section  13   point  that  the  constitutional  provision  does  not  apply  to  interlocutory  orders,  such  as  one  
Prudential  Bank  vs.  Castro  [A.C.  No.  2756,  March  15,  1988]   granting   a   motion   for   postponement   or   quashing   a   subpoena,   because   it   "refers   only   to  
  decisions  on  the  merits  and  not  to  orders  of  the  trial  court  resolving  incidental  matters."      As  
THE   CONSTITUTIONAL   REQUIREMENT   THAT   A   DECISION   MUST   CONTAIN   A   for  the  minute  resolutions  of  this  Court,  we  have  already  observed  in  Borromeo  v.  Court  of  
CERTIFICATION   THAT   THE   CASE   HAS   BEEN   REACHED   IN   CONSULTATION   DOES   NOT   Appeals      5  that  —    
APPLY  TO  ADMINISTRATIVE  CASES.    The  challenge  hurled  against  this  Court's  decision  as    
violative   of   the   1987   Constitution   due   to   lack   of   certification   by   the   Chief   Justice   that   the   The   Supreme   Court   disposes   of   the   bulk   of   its   cases   by   minute  
conclusions   of   the   Court   were   reached   in   consultation   before   the   case   was   assigned   to   a   resolutions  and  decrees  them  as  final  and  executory,  as  where  a  case  is  
member   for   the   writing   of   the   opinion   of   the   Court,   is   bereft   of   basis.   The   certification   patently   without   merit,   where   the   issues   raised   are   factual   in   nature,  
requirement   refers   to   decisions   in   judicial,   not   administrative   cases.   From   the   very   where   the   decision   appealed   from   is   supported   by   substantial   evidence  
beginning,   resolutions/decisions   of   the   Court   in   administrative   cases   have   not   been   and   is   in   accord   with   the   facts   of   the   case   and   the   applicable   laws,   where  
accompanied  by  any  formal  certification.  In  fact,  such  a  certification  would  be  a  superfluity   it   is   clear   from   the   records   that   the   petitions   were   filed   merely   to  
in  administrative  cases,  which  by  their  very  nature,  have  to  be  deliberated  upon  considering   forestall   the   early   execution   of   judgment   and   for   non-­‐compliance   with  

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 the   rules.   The   resolution   denying   due   course   or   dismissing   a   petition   these  provisions  have  been  held  to  refer  only  to  decisions  of  the  merits  and  not  to  orders  of  
always  gives  the  legal  basis.   the  trial  court  resolving  incidental  matters  such  as  the  one  at  bar."    
     
The  Court  is  not  duty  bound  to  render  signed  decisions  all  the  time.  It  has   It   is   thus   not   self-­‐evident   that   petitioner   could   justly   lay   claim   to   a   grievance.   For   if   the  
ample   discretion   to   formulate   decisions   and/or   minute   resolutions,   situation   is   subjected   to   a   searching   analysis,   it   cannot   be   denied   that   what   is   really  
provided  a  legal  basis  is  given,  depending  on  its  evaluation  of  a  case.   involved  is  just  a  mere  incident  in  the  prosecution  of  petitioner.  Had  he  prevailed,  he  would  
  have  been  entitled  to  provisional  liberty.  Under  the  circumstances,  as  the  facts  of  the  case  
DISMISSAL   ON   LACK   OF   JURISDICTION   DOES   NOT   REQUIRE   A   STATEMENT   OF   THE   FACTS   clearly  demonstrate,  with  the  plea  for  habeas  corpus  being  unavailing,  we  felt  that  a  minute  
AND  THE  LAW  ON  WHICH  IT  IS  BASED,  BUT  WHEN  DISMISSAL  IS  COUPLED  WITH  OTHER   resolution   which   certainly   would   require   less   time   than   a   full-­‐blown   decision,   was   not  
GROUNDS   LIKE   INSUFFICIENCY   OF   EVIDENCE,   THE   COURT   MUST   COMPLY   WITH   THE   inappropriate.   Precisely,   the   leniency   shown   the   parties   to   dwell   at   length   on   their  
CONSTITUTIONAL   REQUIREMENTHS.     It   may   be   argued   that   a   dismissal   based   on   lack   of   respective   contentions   should   disprove   any   suspicion   that   the   decision   arrived   at   was  
jurisdiction   is   not   considered   a   judgment   on   the   merits   and   so   is   not   covered   by   the   reached  without  according  the  parties  the  fundamental  fairness  to  which  they  are  entitled  
aforecited  provision.  There  is  no  quarrel  with  this  established  principle.  However,  the  rule   under   the   Constitution.   Since,   at   the   most,   the   relief   sought   by   petitioner   will   not,   in   any  
would  be  applicable  only  if  the  case  is  dismissed  on  the  sole  ground  of  lack  of  jurisdiction   way,   foreclose   the   ultimate   outcome   of   the   cases   against   him   one   way   or   the   other,   we  
and  not  when  some  other  additional  ground  is  invoked.   deemed  that  the  constitutional  provision  invoked  did  not  strictly  call  for  application.  In  that  
  sense,   a   minute   resolution   certainly   cannot   be   stigmatized   as   in   any   wise   failing   to   abide   by  
A   careful   perusal   of   the   challenged   order   will   show   that   the   complaint   was   dismissed   not   a  constitutional  command.  
only  for  lack  of  jurisdiction  but  also  because  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  prove  the    
invalidity   of   the   sheriff's   sale.   Regarding   this   second   ground,   all   the   trial   court   did   was   Borromeo  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  82273,  June  1,  1990]  
summarily  conclude  "from  the  very  evidence  adduced  by  the  plaintiff"  that  the  sheriff's  sale    
"was   in   complete   accord   with   the   requirements   of   Section   3,   Act   3135."   It   did   not   bother   to   MINUTE   RESOLUTIONS   ARE   ALLOWED   BY   THE   CONSTITUTION.     The   Court   reminds   all  
discuss   what   that   evidence   was   or   to   explain   why   it   believed   that   the   legal   requirements   lower   courts,   lawyers,   and   litigants   that   it   disposes   of   the   bulk   of   its   cases   by   minute  
had   been   observed.   Its   conclusion   was   remarkably   threadbare.   Brevity   is   doubtless   an   resolutions   and   decrees   them   as   final   and   executory,   as   where   a   case   is   patently   without  
admirable  trait,  but  it  should  not  and  cannot  be  substituted  for  substance.  As  the  ruling  on   merit,   where   the   issues   raised   are   factual   in   nature,   where   the   decision   appealed   from   is  
this   second   ground   was   unquestionably   a   judgment   on   the   merits,   the   failure   to   state   the   supported   by   substantial   evidence   and   is   in   accord   with   the   facts   of   the   case   and   the  
factual  and  legal  basis  thereof  was  fatal  to  the  order.   applicable   laws,   where   it   is   clear   from   the   records   that   the   petition   is   filed   merely   to  
  forestall   the   early   execution   of   judgment   and   for   non-­‐compliance   with   the   rules.   The  
Mendoza  vs.  CFI  [G.R.  No.  L-­‐35612-­‐14,  June    27,  1973]   resolution   denying   due   course   or   dismissing   the   petition   always   gives   the   legal   basis.   As  
  emphasized   in   In   Re:   Wenceslao   Laureta   (148   SCRA   382,   417   [1987],   "[T]he   Court   is   not  
MINUTE   RESOLUTIONS   ARE   NOT   REQUIRED   TO   COMPLY   WITH   THE   CONSTITUTIONAL   'duty   bound'   to   render   signed   Decisions   all   the   time.   It   has   ample   discretion   to   formulate  
REQUIREMENT   OF   STATEMENT   OF   FACTS   AND   LAW.     That   brings   us   to   the   point   raised   in   Decisions   and/or   Minute   Resolutions,   provided   a   legal   basis   is   given,   depending   on   its  
the   motion   for   reconsideration   objecting   to   our   dismissing   the   petition   through   a   minute   evaluation  of  a  case"  (Italics  supplied).  This  is  the  only  way  whereby  it  can  act  on  all  cases  
resolution.   It   is   his   contention   that   there   should   be   an   extended   decision.   As   noted   at   the   filed  before  it  and,  accordingly,  discharge  its  constitutional  functions.  The  Court  ordinarily  
outset,   reliance   is   had   on   the   constitutional   provision   requiring   a   decision   by   a   court   of   acts   on   the   incidents   or   basic   merits   of   three   hundred   (300)   to   four   hundred   (400)   cases  
record   to   contain   "clearly   and   distinctly   the   facts   and   the   law   on   which   it   is   based."   through  its  three  Divisions  every  Monday  and  Wednesday  when  the  Divisions  meet  and  on  
According  to  a  recent  decision,  Jose  v.  Santos,  what  is  expected  of  the  judiciary  "is  that  the   one  hundred  (100)  to  one  hundred  twenty  (120)  cases  every  Tuesday  and  Thursday  that  it  
decision  rendered  makes  clear  why  either  party  prevailed  under  the  applicable  law  to  the   meets  en  banc  or  around  one  thousand  (1,000)  cases  a  week.  It  is  only  on  Fridays  and  week-­‐
facts   as   established.   Nor   is   there   any   rigid   formula   as   to   the   language   to   be   employed   to   ends   that   the   members   of   the   Court   work   in   their   separate   chambers   or   at   home   because  
satisfy  the  requirement  of  clarity  and  distinctness.  The  discretion  of  the  particular  judge  in   the  Court  does  not  meet  in  session  —  either  in  Divisions  or  En  Banc.  
this   respect,   while   not   unlimited,   is   necessarily   broad.   There   is   no   sacramental   form   of    
words  which  he  must  use  upon  pain  of  being  considered  as  having  failed  to  abide  by  what   For   a   prompt   dispatch   of   actions   of   the   Court,   minute   resolutions   are   promulgated   by   the  
the  Constitution  directs."  What  must  then  be  stressed  is  that  under  such  a  provision  as  held   Court  through  the  Clerk  of  Court,  who  takes  charge  of  sending  copies  thereof  to  the  parties  
in   the   early   case   of   Soncuya   v.   National   Investment   Board,   the   decision   spoken   of   is   the   concerned  by  quoting  verbatim  the  resolution  issued  on  a  particular  case.  It  is  the  Clerk  of  
judgment   rendered   after   the   previous   presentation   of   the   proof   in   an   ordinary   civil   or   Court's   duty   to   inform   the   parties   of   the   action   taken   on   their   cases   by   quoting   the  
criminal   case   upon   a   stipulation   of   facts   upon   which   its   disposition   is   to   be   based.   In   resolution  adopted  by  the  Court.  The  Clerk  of  Court  never  participates  in  the  deliberations  
Bacolod   Murcia   Milling   Co.,   Inc.   v.   Henares,     the   above   decision   was   cited   with   approval,   of  a  case.  All  decisions  and  resolutions  are  actions  of  the  Court.  The  Clerk  of  Court  merely  
with  the  opinion  of  Justice  J.B.L.  Reyes  containing  the  following:  "Plaintiff-­‐appellant  assigns   transmits   the   Court's   action.   This   was   explained   in   the   case   —   G.R.   No.   56280,   "Rhine  
as  another  error  that  the  order  appealed  from  does  not  contain  any  statement  of  the  facts   Marketing  Corp.  v.  Felix  Gravante,  et  al.",  where,  in  a  resolution  dated  July  6,  1981,  the  Court  
and  the  law  on  which  it  is  based.  Obviously,  this  is  based  on  Section  1,  Rule  35  of  the  Rules   said   —   "[M]inute   resolutions   of   this   Court   denying   or   dismissing   unmeritorious   petitions  
of  Court,  and  Section  12,  Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution.  The  contention  is  untenable,  since   like   the   petition   in   the   case   at   bar,   are   the   result   of   a   thorough   deliberation   among   the  
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members   of   this   Court,   which   does   not   and   cannot   delegate   the   exercise   of   its   judicial   stating   the   legal   basis   thereof.   Thus,   when   the   Court,   after   deliberating   on   a   petition   and  
functions  to  its  Clerk  of  Court  or  any  of  its  subalterns,  which  should  be  known  to  counsel.   subsequent   pleadings,   decides   to   deny   due   course   to   the   petition   and   states   that   the  
When   a   petition   is   denied   or   dismissed   by   this   Court,   this   Court   sustains   the   challenged   questions   raised   "are   factual   or   there   is   no   reversible   error   in   the   respondent   court's  
decision  or  order  together  with  its  findings  of  facts  and  legal  conclusions."   decision,  there  is  sufficient  compliance  with  the  constitutional  requirement.  
     
In  G.R.  No.  76355,  Macario  Tayamura,  et  al.  v.  Intermediate  Appellate  Court,  et  al.  (May  21,   Oil  and  Natural  Gas  Commission  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  114323,  July  23,  1998]  
1987),   the   Court   clarified   the   constitutional   requirement   that   a   decision   must   express    
clearly  and  distinctly  the  facts  and  law  on  which  it  is  based  as  referring  only  to  decisions.   MEMORANDUM   DECISION   IS   ALLOWED   UNDER   THIS   JURISDICTION.     The   constitutional  
Resolutions  disposing  of  petitions  fall  under  the  constitutional  provision  which  states  that,   mandate   that   no   decision   shall   be   rendered   by   any   court   without   expressing   therein   clearly  
"No   petition   for   review   .   .   .   shall   be   refused   due   course   .   .   .   without   stating   the   legal   basis   and   distinctly   the   facts   and   the   law   on   which   it   is   based   does   not   preclude   the   validity   of  
therefor"   (Section   14,   Article   VIII,   Constitution).   When   the   Court,   after   deliberating   on   a   "memorandum  decisions"  which  adopt  by  reference  the  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  
petition   and   any   subsequent   pleadings,   manifestations,   comments,   or   motions   decides   to   law  contained  in  the  decisions  of  inferior  tribunals.  In  Francisco  v.  Permskul,  this  Court  held  
deny   due   course   to   the   petition   and   states   that   the   questions   raised   are   factual   or   no   that   the   following   memorandum   decision   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Makati   did   not  
reversible   error   in   the   respondent   court's   decision   is   shown   or   for   some   other   legal   basis   transgress  the  requirements  of  Section  14  Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution:  
stated  in  the  resolution,  there  is  sufficient  compliance  with  the  constitutional  requirement.    
  "MEMORANDUM  DECISION  
MINUTE   RESOLUTION   DOES   NOT   NEED   TO   BE   SIGNED   BY   THE   JUSTICES   NOR   TO    
CONTAIN  A  CERTIFICATION  REQUIRED  UNDER  SECTION  13,  ART  VIII.    Minute  resolutions   After  a  careful  perusal,  evaluation  and  study  of  the  records  of  this  case,  
need  not  be  signed  by  the  members  of  the  Court  who  took  part  in  the  deliberations  of  a  case   this   Court   hereby   adopts   reference   the   findings   conclusions   of   law  
nor   do   they   require   the   certification   of   the   Chief   Justice.   For   to   require   members   of   the   contained   in   the   decision   of   the   Metropolitan   Trial   Court   of   Makati,  
Court   to   sign   all   resolutions   issued   would   not   only   unduly   delay   the   issuance   of   its   Metro   Manila,   Branch   63   and   finds   that   there   is   no   cogent   reason   to  
resolutions   but   a   great   amount   of   their   time   would   be   spent   on   functions   more   properly   disturb  the  same.  
performed   by   the   Clerk   of   Court   and   which   time   could   be   more   profitably   used   in   the    
analysis   of   cases   and   the   formulation   of   decisions   and   orders   of   important   nature   and   "WHEREFORE,   judgment   appealed   from   is   hereby   affirmed   in   toto."  
character.  Even  with  the  use  of  this  procedure,  the  Court  is  still  struggling  to  wipe  out  the   (Emphasis  supplied.)  
backlogs   accumulated   over   the   years   and   meet   the   ever   increasing   number   of   cases   coming    
to  it.  Remedial  legislation  to  meet  this  problem  is  also  pending  in  Congress.   This  Court  had  occasion  to  make  a  similar  pronouncement  in  the  earlier  case  of  Romero  v.  
  Court  of  Appeals,  where  the  assailed  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  adopted  the  findings  
In   discharging   its   constitutional   duties,   the   Court   needs   the   full   time   and   attention   of   its   and  disposition  of  the  Court  of  Agrarian  Relations  in  this  wise:  
Clerks  of  Court  and  other  key  officials.  Its  officers  do  not  have  the  time  to  answer  frivolous    
complaints  filed  by  disgruntled  litigants  questioning  decisions  and  resolutions  of  the  Court   "We   have,   therefore,   carefully   reviewed   the   evidence   and   made   a   re-­‐
and  involving  cases  deliberated  upon  and  resolved  by  the  Court  itself.  As  earlier  stated,  all   assessment   of   the   same,   and   We   are   persuaded,   nay   compelled,   to   affirm  
resolutions   and   decisions   are   actions   of   the   Court,   not   its   subordinate   personnel.   The   Court   the  correctness  of  the  trial  court's  factual  findings  and  the  soundness  of  
assumes   full   responsibility   for   all   its   acts.   Its   personnel   cannot   answer   and   should   not   be   its   conclusion.   For   judicial   convenience   and   expediency,   therefore,   We  
made  to  answer  for  acts  of  the  Court.   hereby  adopt  by  way  of  reference,  the  findings  of  facts  and  conclusions  of  
  the   court   a   spread   in   its   decision,   as   integral   part   of   this   Our   decision."  
Komatsu  Industries  (Phils.),  Inc.  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  127682,  April  24,  1998]   (Emphasis  supplied)  
   
MINUTE   RESOLUTIONS.     As   early   as   Novino,   et   al.   vs.   Court   of   Appeals,   et   al,   it   has   been   Hence,   even   in   this   jurisdiction,   incorporation   by   reference   is   allowed   if   only   to   avoid   the  
stressed   that   these   "resolutions"   are   not   "decisions"   within   the   above   constitutional   cumbersome   reproduction   of   the   decision   of   the   lower   courts,   or   portions   thereof,   in   the  
requirements;  they  merely  hold  that  the  petition  for  review  should  not  be  entertained  and   decision   of   the   higher   court.   This   is   particularly   true   when   the   decision   sought   to   be  
even   ordinary   lawyers   have   all   this   time   so   understood   it;   and   the   petition   to   review   the   incorporated  is  a  lengthy  and  thorough  discussion  of  the  facts  and  conclusions  arrived  at,  as  
decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   is   not   a   matter   of   right   but   of   sound   judicial   discretion,   in  this  case,  where  Award  Paper  No.  3/B-­‐1  consists  of  eighteen  (18)  single  spaced  pages.  
hence  there  is  no  need  to  fully  explain  the  Court's  denial  since,  for  one  thing,  the  facts  and    
the  law  are  already  mentioned  in  the  Court  of  Appeals'  decision.   THE  REQUIREMENTS  UNDER  THE  CONSTITUTION  APPLY  ONLY  TO  PHILIPPINE  COURTS,  
  BUT   NOT   TO   FOREIGN   COURTS.     Furthermore,   the   recognition   to   be   accorded   a   foreign  
This  was  reiterated  in  Que  vs.  People,  et  al.,  and  further  clarified  in  Munal  vs.  Commission   judgment   is   not   necessarily   affected   by   the   fact   that   the   procedure   in   the   courts   of   the  
on   Audit,   et   al.     that   the   constitutional   mandate   is   applicable   only   in   cases   "submitted   for   country  in  which  such  judgment  was  rendered  differs  from  that  of  the  courts  of  the  country  
decision,"   i.e.,   given   due   course   and   after   the   filing   of   briefs   or   memoranda   and/or   other   in   which   the   judgment   is   relied   on.     This   Court   has   held   that   matters   of   remedy   and  
pleadings,   but   not   where   the   petition   is   refused   due   course,   with   the   resolution   therefor   procedure  are  governed  by  the  lex  fori  or  the  internal  law  of  the  forum.  Thus,  if  under  the  
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procedural  rules  of  the  Civil  Court  of  Dehra  Dun,  India,  a  valid  judgment  may  be  rendered   Valdez  vs.  CA  [G.R.  No.  85082,  February  25,  1991]  
by  adopting  the  arbitrators  findings,  then  the  same  must  be  accorded  respect.  In  the  same    
vein,   if   the   procedure   in   the   foreign   court   mandates   that   an   Order   of   the   Court   becomes   THE   DECISION   SHOULD   NOT   ONLY   MAKE   A   CONCLUSION   OF   LAW,   BUT   SHOULD   STATE  
final   and   executory   upon   failure   to   pay   the   necessary   docket   fees,   then   the   courts   in   this   THE  FACTS  AND  THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  LAW.    This  is  not  what  is  contemplated  under  
jurisdiction   cannot   invalidate   the   order   of   the   foreign   court   simply   because   our   rules   the  Constitution  and  the  Rules  as  a  clear  and  distinct  statement  of  the  facts  on  the  basis  of  
provide  otherwise.   which  the  decision  is  rendered.  The  foregoing  one-­‐paragraph  statement  constitute  a  mere  
  conclusion   of   facts   and   of   law   arrived   at   by   the   trial   court   without   stating   the   facts   which  
  Francisco  vs.  Permskul  [G.R.  No.  81006,  May  12,  1989]     serve   as   the   basis   thereof.   Indeed   the   conclusion   of   fact   therein   that   petitioners   had   not  
  registered   the   sale   to   them   is   traversed   by   the   records   which   show   on   the   contrary,  
REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE  VALIDITY  OF  MEMORANDUM  DECISIONS.    It  is  clear  that  where   petitioners   earlier   registered   the   sale   to   them.   The   court   statement   in   the   decision   that   a  
the   decision   of   the   appellate   court   actually   reproduces   the   findings   of   fact   or   the   party  has  proven  his  case  while  the  other  has  not,  is  not  the  findings  of  facts  contemplated  
conclusions  of  law  of  the  court  below,  it  is  not  a  memorandum  decision  as  envisioned  in  the   by  the  Constitution  and  the  rules  to  be  clearly  and  distinctly  stated.      
above   provision.   The   distinctive   features   of   the   memorandum   decision   are,   first,   it   is    
rendered   by   an   appellate   court,   and   second,   it   incorporates   by   reference   the   findings   of   fact   Unfortunately,   the   appellate   court   overlooked   this   fatal   defect   in   the   appealed   decision.   It  
or   the   conclusions   of   law   contained   in   the   decision,   order   or   ruling   under   review.   Most   merely   adopted   the   alleged   findings   of   facts   of   the   trial   court.   Although   it   made   some  
likely,  the  purpose  is  to  affirm  the  decision,  although  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  approval   findings   on   how   the   deed   of   assignment   in   favor   of   respondent   Viernes   came   about,   it   is   far  
of   the   findings   of   fact   by   the   lower   court   may   lead   to   a   different   conclusion   of   law   by   the   from  complete  and  is  hardly  a  substantial  compliance  with  the  mandate  aforestated.  
higher  court.  At  any  rate,  the  reason  for  allowing  the  incorporation  by  reference  is  evidently    
to   avoid   the   cumbersome   reproduction   of   the   decision   of   the   lower   court,   or   portions   As   it   is   now,   this   Court   has   before   it   a   challenged   decision   that   failed   to   state   clearly   and  
thereof,  in  the  decision  of  the  higher  court.  The  idea  is  to  avoid  having  to  repeat  in  the  body   distinctly  the  facts  on  which  it  is  predicated.  This  Court  has  said  again  and  again  that  it  is  
of   the   latter   decision   the   findings   or   conclusions   of   the   lower   court   since   they   are   being   not   a   trier   of   facts   and   that   it   relies,   on   the   factual   findings   of   the   lower   court   and   the  
approved  or  adopted  anyway.   appellate  court  which  are  conclusive.  But  as  it  is,  in  this  case,  the  Court  has  to  wade  through  
  the  records  and  make  its  own  findings  of  facts,  rather  than  further  delay  the  disposition  of  
That  same  circumstance  is  what  will  move  us  now  to  lay  down  the  following  requirement,   the  case  by  remanding  the  records  for  further  proceedings.  
as  a  condition  for  the  proper  application  of  Section  40  of  B.P.  Blg.  129.  The  memorandum  
decision,   to   be   valid,   cannot   incorporate   the   findings   of   fact   and   the   conclusions   of   law   of  
the  lower  court  only  by  remote  reference,  which  is  to  say  that  the  challenged  decision  is  not  
easily  and  immediately  available  to  the  person  reading  the  memorandum  decision.  For  the  
incorporation  by  reference  to  be  allowed,  it  must  provide  for  direct  access  to  the  facts  and  
the   law   being   adopted,   which   must   be   contained   in   a   statement   attached   to   the   said  
decision.   In   other   words,   the   memorandum   decision   authorized   under   Section   40   of   B.P.  
Blg.   129   should   actually   embody   the   findings   of   fact   and   conclusions   of   law   of   the   lower  
court  in  an  annex  attached  to  and  made  an  indispensable  part  of  the  decision.  
 
It  is  expected  that  this  requirement  will  allay  the  suspicion  that  no  study  was  made  of  the  
decision   of   the   lower   court   and   that   its   decision   was   merely   affirmed   without   a   proper  
examination   of   the   facts   and   the   law   on   which   it   was   based.   The   proximity   at   least   of   the  
annexed  statement  should  suggest  that  such  an  examination  has  been  undertaken.  It  is,  of  
course,   also   understood   that   the   decision   being   adopted   should,   to   begin   with,   comply   with  
Article  VIII,  Section  14  as  no  amount  of  incorporation  or  adoption  will  rectify  its  violation.  
 
The   Court   finds   it   necessary   to   emphasize   that   the   memorandum   decision   should   be  
sparingly   used   lest   it   become   an   addictive   excuse   for   judicial   sloth.   It   is   an   additional  
condition  for  its  validity  that  this  kind  of  decision  may  be  resorted  to  only  in  cases  where  
the  facts  are  in  the  main  accepted  by  both  parties  or  easily  determinable  by  the  judge  and  
there   are   no   doctrinal   complications   involved   that   will   require   an   extended   discussion   of  
the  laws  involved.  The  memorandum  decision  may  be  employed  in  simple  litigations  only,  
such  as  ordinary  collection  cases,  where  the  appeal  is  obviously  groundless  and  deserves  no  
more  than  the  time  needed  to  dismiss  it.  
 
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