Co Kim Cham v. Valdez, G.R. No.

L-5, September 17, 1945

Facts:

Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the CFI of Manila.
After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, respondent Judge Dizon refused to
continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and
nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines.

“That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control.”

On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their
Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by
the Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits,
all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall
continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their
present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."

During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was affected in the organization and jurisdiction
of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they
administered and enforced.

Issue:

W/N the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation or regime were de facto governments.

Held: Yes, the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
Military occupation or regime we de facto governments.

There are 3 kinds of de facto government:

a. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession
and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and
maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the
Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.

b. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount
force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and
Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States.

c. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy
in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds
of de facto governments.
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government
established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same
character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same
— the Japanese military authority and government.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were
good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international
law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known
principle in international law (DOCTRINE of POSTLIMINIUM), the fact that a territory which has been
occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does
not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or
another it is within his competence to do. Thus, judicial acts done under his control, when they are not
of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the
continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the
sanction of municipal law, remain good. (Supra)

Effect of suspension or change in sovereignty

"Law once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not
change merely by change of sovereignty."

The authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the
country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted
Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the
municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by
the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.